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THE LIST PAPER ON NETHERLANDS AND SOUTH-AFRICA

NB: This is an early draft.

Arno Mong Daastøl
Department of Public Economics, University of Maastricht,
Postbus 616, NL-6200 Maastricht MD, The Netherlands.
Ph: +31.433 88 36 36, fax: +31.433 25 84 40

Permanent address:
Arno Mong Daastøl
Utsiktsveien 34, N-1410 Kolbotn, Norway
Ph: +47.6680 6373 / 6680 6523
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Fax: +47.94035650, PC-Fax : +47.6680 6373
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CONTENTS:

0: PREFACE

1: LIST ON THE NETHERLANDS

2: DUTCH ECONOMIC HISTORY

3: DUTCH ECONOMISTS - ESPECIALLY ON LIST'S THEORY

4: DUTCH ECONOMY IN PRACTICE - THE USE OF LIST

5: CONCLUSION

6: LIST OF LITERATURE

ADDITION: Same procedure for South Africa, but quoting List on countries in the situation of S-A in general.

0: PREFACE

Dealing principally with the reception of List's ideas in the Netherlands this article is based upon several secondary sources in the form of works in both English, German and Dutch dealing with the development of economic thought in the Netherlands. Furhtermore this article is based on a number of original works in Dutch, particularly from the period 1840-1880.

The connection between List's ideas and the Netherlands are more intimate than one may at first think. The Netherlands is crucial to his plans for Germany and for Europe because of its geographical position and because of its historical position as not only a major economic power but as an important link in the tradition of financial capitalism. In both regards and in particular in the combination of these the Netherlands represented kinds of obstacles to the development of Germany and the European Continent. And in a mirror-like way the Netherlands represented the most crucial foreign element in English history and plans for European domination and world hegemony.

The Low Countries, and Amsterdam in particular, are not only a crucial part of List's ideas but also of the core of Europe's history explaining what it is today. The cheered French economic historian Fernand Braudel writes,

"For the true beginning of Europe we have to look at the growth of these two complexes, the North and the South, the Low Countries and Italy, the North Sea-Baltic and the Mediterranean. ... this bipolarity, pulling the continent in two directions, would last in some form for centuries. This was to be one of the major features of European history - possibly the most important of all. When we speak of medieaval and modern Europe, we must speak two different languages: what was true of the North was never literally applicable to the South. ... the North was, other things equal, less sophisticated than the South, more "industrial", while the South was the greater trading center. ... The emergence of a single center for the European economy could only be achieved of course at the price of a struggle between these two poles. Italy was the stronger until the sixteenth century, for as long as the Mediterranean remanined the heart of the Old World. But in about 1600, the balance shifted northwards. The rise of Amsterdam was certainly not a minor incident, a mere transfer of weight from Antwerp to Holland, but a much more serious turningpoint: once the Mediterranean and the former glories of italy had been eclipsed, Europe would have only one center of gravity, in the North; and for centuries to come, right down to the present day, the patterns and circles of her profound imbalances would emanate from this pole. So before proceeding any further, it is necessary to outline the genesis of these crucial regions."[1]

Another indication of the historical importance and connections of the economics of the Netherlands is the first pages of the most famous book in economics ever written: Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. The "Advertisement to the Fourth Edition" is the only acknowledgement in this work and is solely devoted to Smith's expression of his deep gratitude, "I now ... find my self at liberty to acknowledge my very great obligations to Mr. Henry Hope of Amsterdam. To that Gentleman I owe the most distinct, as well as liberal information, concerning a very interesting and important subject, the Bank of Amsterdam".[2]

The Bank was a model for the Bank of England. The Bank of Amsterdam dominated European and thereby worldwide finance during the seventeenth century and the Bank of England dominated European and worldwide finance from that time until the second world war. The nucleus of both were originally provided by the Venetian family funds or "fondi" which moved to the Iberian Peninsula and then to the English channel countries. The history-teacher of the present U.S. president Bill Clinton, Carroll Quigley, wrote the following,

The history of this core of liberalist economic policies puts List's rather contrary ideas and efforts concerning the goals and methods of economics into perspective. It gives us a background on which we can evaluate the difficulties of his project - in particular concerning the Netherlands. This will be elaborated under the section on the Venetian influence and the chapter on List's ideas on the historical role of the Netherlands.

Concerning the geographical and strategical position of the Netherlands in Europe there is equally much reason to pay attention,

List compares the German situation where the Zollverein did not include the Netherlands with that of a house where the door belongs to a stranger and argues that for self-dependence it is necessary to get some kind of control over this entrance - preferably by negotiating with the Dutch and winning their consent by their joining the Zollverein. The English apparently saw this in the same perspective but with the opposite intentions. List quotes the report of English consul at Rotterdam, Mr. Alexander Ferrier, to the British parlament,

"For the commercial interests of Great Britain ... it appears of the greatest possible importance that no means should be left untried to prevent the aforesaid states (pr.au.'s remark: Holland, the Hansa towns, and Russia), and also Belgium, from entering the Zollverein, for reasons which are too clear to need any exposition. ... Whatever may happen ... Holland must at all times be considered the main channel for the commercial relations of South Germany with other countries."

And, indeed, Tony Smith in 1981 notes that,

"By 1894, German trade surpassed that of Britain in Holland and Belgium, and by 1912 had doubled in these two countries so crucial to the British scheme of things on the Continent."[4]

List continues regarding Holland,

"Notwithstanding her great colonial prosperity, she is and remains all the same a country dependent upon England, and by her seeming independence she only strengthens English supremacy. This is also the secret why England at the congress of Vienna took under her protection the restoration of the Dutch seeming independence. The case is exactly the same with the Hanse Towns. On the side of England, Holland is a satelite for the English fleet - unite it with Germany, she is the leader of the German naval power. In her present position Holland cannot nearly so well derive profit from her colonial possessions as if they became a constituent part of the German Union,"[5] [6]

and,

"Holland can only again attain to her ancient state of prosperity by means of the German Union and in the closest connection with it. Only by this union is it possible to constitute an agricultural manufacturing commercial nationality of the first magnitude."[7]

And in this List was to receive support for example from the Dutch prime minister Thorbecke in the 1850s. XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

List saw his goal as establishing a "veredelte Continentalsystems", following Napoleon's example peacefully, which was to equal the forces of England. This would be precluded, however, as long as Englands "Balance of Power" system, pitting continental nations against each other, was not put to an end. This was therefore the goal of both Napoleon and of List.

VAN DAAL AND HEERTJE'S BOOK

The book by van Daal and Heertje is written from the point of interpretation of analytical temperate liberalism with respect for historical experience. As usual it is also written from the winners point of view. Therefore, although it is mentioned that the English school was hardly known at all still the authors concentrate on their few followers and the attempts to create analytical economics - illustrative is the case of the unknown critical Ricardian Mees.

The authors claim that the most popular economists were French and German but of the German economists hardly any are noted except occasionally Justi, List and A.Wagner. Hardly anything is written on List except that Beaujon "slaughtered" him - and apparently did not understand anything judging from the description of him. Peirson, it is noted had "a great deal of admiration for List" but "he did not agree with List's proposal to introduce protective duties, because "protection undermines the entrepreneural spirit",[8]"[9] or as Pierson calls List: "a man of outstanding gifts"[10].

In the same train of thinking the authors claim that Dutch economists wrote very few text-books until the second half of the 19th century. And what they wrote was usually popular and hardly of any analytical quality, they claim. The translated books were of the same type and were therefore seldom from English, they were neither German as this hardly was needed given the closeness of the Dutch and German languages but the translated books were usually French practical policy oriented books.

HASENBERG BUTTER'S BOOK

Although delineated by the years 1800 and 1870 Irene Hasenberg Butter also discusses the period before the French revolution to some degree and notes that the main conflict of interests and economic policy was to dominate also the nineteenth century; between merchants and industrialists. After 1870 abstract Austrian economics gained domination.

1: DUTCH ECONOMIC HISTORY

The Dutch economic history until 1900 may be divided in two. The large watershed is the French revolution and later occupation which left a strong imprint on Dutch social relations as well as on the mental attitude of its people. This division also holds for the relation between Dutch economic theory and policy but is somewhat more complicated and it may therefore be divided into four periods with a possible fifth intermediate period. They are:

Economy Political Policy Theory

structure

1: ca. 1500 - 1748 com. olig. com.merc. nat.merc.

(Feudal union of cities) agro.ind. (opposition)

2: 1748 - 1795 agro.com. olig.-centr. com.merc. nat.merc.

(Central Stadtholder) (opposition)

3: 1795 - 1813 agro? centr. nat.merc.? nat.merc.

(French vasalle state)

4: 1813 - 1830 agro-com. centr. nat.merc. mod.lib.

(Willem I 1813-1839) (opposition)

5: 1830 - 1848 agro-com. lib? nat.merc-lib. lib.

(Willem II 1839-1849)

6: 1848 - 1914 agro-com. lib? lib. lib.

(Willem III 1849-1890)

(Wilhelmina 1890-1948)

7: 1880s interm. agro-com. ? lib./merc. lib./merc.

until 1914

AAA

1: DUTCH ECONOMIC HISTORY

The following quote will give an idea of the background of List's ideas specifically related to the Netherlands,

"In respect to temperament and manners, to the origin and language of their inhabitants, no less to their political connection and geographical position, Holland, Flanders, and Brabant constituted portions of the German Empire. The more frequent visits of Charlemagne and his residence in the vicinity of these countries must have exercised a much more powerful influence on their civilisation than on that of more distant German territories." [1] [2]

In old books the local language is called niederduits or simply neerduits meaning Low German. As Palmer and Colton notes,

"In the mid-sixteenth century neither a Dutch nor a Belgian nationality yet existed. In the northern provinces the people spoke German dialects. ... they has a popular literature of their own, written in their kind of German, which came to be called Dutch."[3]

Originally the Netherlands and Belgium were a part of the Roman empire, since the last century before Christ. As the remnants of the Roman empire was split into the German and Greek parts; the later empires of the Rhinelanders Clovis (481-511 AD) and Charlemagne (768-814), and of the Greeks Constantine (306-337) Justitian (527-565 AD), the Netherlands then became a part of the Frankish empire since the 4th century.[4] This empire expanded east and south to include France, Germany and Austria. It came to be the basis of the Holy Roman Empire ("Germany") and France - the two main countries of western European continental history of the past 1500 years. The low countries thereby consitute themself as the vomb of north-western European civilisation and in particular for "Germany". The western part of the former Roman empire was constituted of different Germanic tribes who mixed with various local tribes; in Gaul or France the Franks, in Lombardia or northen Italy the Lombardians, in Spain and North-West Africa the Visigots, and in Germany the Saxons.

So, for more than 1000 years, since before Charlemagne, the Netherlands; Holland and Belgium had been parts of the Holy Roman Empire: France, Italy, Germany and northern Spain. Although military offensive, Charlemagne based his rule upon the advice of his bishops who were inspired by St.Augustine's monarchical ideas as exposed in City of God[5] as Dante's de Monarchia came to be modelled on Charlemagne. He consciously identified his empire with that of the Romans and with the Christian Rome, a heritage the Germans were to continue.

The Netherlands was to remain a part of the Holy Roman Empire as the empire of Charlemagne was split into three with the peace treaties of respectively Verdun (843 AD) and of Mersen (870 AD) constituting France, Germany and Italy (Lombardia). The latter two were then merged into the Holy Roman Empire by Otto the Great in the middle of the 10th century; Benelux, Germany, Switzerland, the latter Austrian empire and northern Italy.[6] Continental Europe was until the turn of the millenium and mainly until the rise of France (and England) in the 13 century then confirmed and joined by Spain in the 15 century - for almost one thousand years - dominated by two forces; the Byzantine east which intellectually was "Greek oriented" and the German west which was "Latin oriented".[7] After this period continental Europe was dominated culturally and politically in the main by the "latin-oriented" France until Napoleon and the subsequent rise of a renewed Germany under Bismarck[8].

As Mckay Hill and Buckler puts it in A History of World Societies,

"The Germans replaced the Romans as rulers of the European continent, and German customs and traditions formed the basis of European society for centuries."[9]

The main disturbing forces to the Continent from outside were the Germanic tribes who invaded the north and then spread to the south. After Clovis Christianed the Franks and Charlemagne Christianed the Germans and included them into the (Germanic)[10] Frankish empire, the main disturbinbg force was the Norsemen for a period of six hundred years; the period 750-1350 although most disturbing before they were Christianed and turned into "Europeans" around 1050. The black plague around 1350 finally killed off their alliance with Constantinople. During the same period the Arab invasion caused some disruption in Italy, southern France and in Spain particularly. Nevertheless, after this period western Europe might have been able to develop itself better had it not been ripped apart by great internal movements and divisions, after the turn of the millenium partly staged by the worst remnants of the eastern empire within its own ranks: Venice, Amsterdam, London who ruled by division of the continental powers. The was particularly the case after the expulsion of the Arabs from Spain in 1492. The eastern European empire fared worse and was disturbed by Persians, Hunns, Vandals, and other invasions from 500, Arabic invasions and then the Mongol invasions (1200-1500), Turk invasions (1200 to 1918) and Magyar invasions.

The devastation of the European Continent by these forces was turned into spiritual, scicentific and geographic expansion with the advent of the Renaissance in the early 1400s. After the fall of Constantinople in 1453 Europe was to become torn between the western continental states and the heritage of Constantinople; Moscow and in chronological order the commercial cities of Venice/Amsterdam/London, constituting in general, respectively, the imperial and commercial heritages of Constantinople, mainly in opposition to the western European continent philosophically, culturally, economically and politically: commercial empiricism vs. productive rationalism. We are not to forget, however, that the most valuable parts of western culture were brought there from Constantinople, namely the Neo-Platonic inspiration to the Florentine Renaissance. Also the rulers in Constantinople preferred production over exchange as in later national mercantilist practice[11] and established an advanced welfare system.[12] So, we may say that the worst parts of the heritage were carried on by the mentioned states whereas the best parts were transferred to the west; to France and Germany in particular.

This adventure of the Renaissance took place in the western German dominated and inspired part of the European continent and not in the eastern part due in the main to the Turkish sack of Constantinople. But there were also deeper reasons for this limitation of the Renaissance to the west; spirituality was conceived quite differently, partly for political reasons: eastern collectivism and western individualism. In the eastern Greek-Byzantian part the church and religion was seen as a branch of the state and likewise intellectual life. This gave less innovative freedom. In the west the church was a part of the social life rather than of the life of the state. The different positions of the saints in the east and west are telling of another aspect which concerns social action, Whereas the

"Eastern saint had shunned contact with society and those who exercised power,; the saint had fulfilled no social function in his or her lifetime. ... In the west, holiness was wested in those who had known how to rule. ... Holyness in the west, therefore, could be utilized for political or economic purposes."[13]

In this perspective the Lutheran reformation (and to a lesser degree Calvinist reformation) may be conceived as a return to eastern standards: contemplation and belief instead of action to reach salvation. Precisely a reason why Martin Luther was welcome in Venice. And whereas the east, Venice and Constantinople, glorified the heritage of the Roman empire, in the west,

"Roman culture was condemned, avoided, and demystifyed - as Saint Augustine's City of God shows."[14]

Interestingly, precisely the same glorification of the Roman empire was later expressed up to and into our century in Great Britain. Likewise, Constantinople's undermination of the western Christian Europe through collabortation with the raiding Vikings, and Venice's undermination of Christian Europe through the collaboration with the Mongols in their rapes of Europe and earlier in their partaking in the Crusades - officially against the Musilms but really to a great extent against its trade rivals - was later paralelled by Britain's undermining of Christian Europe. This greatly confused the Britain's Muslim collaborators who seriously doubted Britain's claim to being a Christian nation.*

The Netherlands was a part of the Holy Roman empire until 1556 when Charles V, the most powerful ruler since Flemish born and Dutch speaking Charlemagne - Charles the Great, of the Holy Roman Empire and Spain resigned over the result of the Peace of Augsburg[15] and divided the empire. His Spanish speaking and Spanish born son Philip was given Italy, Spain, South America and the Netherlands and became Philip II of Spain. His brother Ferdinand was given Austria, Bohemia and what was left of Hungary and was therefore soon elected emperor of the Holy Roman Empire.

This arrangement lasted only until about 1566. The Dutch rebellion started as a petition from a ecumenical league of 200 nobles, established to check foreign or rather Spanish influence, to Philip II not to introduce the inquisition in the Netherlands.[16] The petition was turned down and the 1566 protestant picture storming in Antwerp led to a general rebellion against the Habsburg Catholic rule from Spain, although originally perhaps more a phenomenon of plunder and theft than a religious rebellion. The Spanish repression that followed and the introduction of a ten per cent value added tax (the core of the rebellers were journeymen wage earners) definetely led to a non-religious but political and somewhat organised rebellion and ultimately to the independence of seven northern provinces, the more easily defendable regions "north of the rivers", of the total seventeen provinces of the low countries. In this the low countries were assisted by neighbours who were opposed to the Spanish - in particular the English (Elisabeth I) and partly the French (Frans d'Anjou). The Dutch revolution was from the very beginning part of an international power struggle.[17] Elisabeth who was excommunicated by the Pope in 1570 at first was careful not to provoke the Spanish and thereby her domestic Catholics but,

"Elisabeth at last openly entered the war on the side of the rebels, sending 6.000 English troops to the Netherlands under the Earl of Leicester in 1585.

England was now clearly emerging as the bulwark of Protestantism and of anti-Spanish feeling in north-western Europe. ... The English were now openly and defiantly allied with the Protestant Dutch. Not only were they fighting together in the Netherlands, but both english and Dutch sea raiders fell upon Spanish shipping, captured the treasure ships, and even pillaged the Spanish Main, the mainland coast of northern South America."[18]

This activity brought Philip II to engage in the reconquest of the Netherlands not only as a goal by itself but as an instrument of conquering England - his by marriage to the later beheaded Mary, Queen of Scots. This ended with the grand failure of the Spanish Armada which was "swept away by the English and the Protestant winds" (the storm) in 1588. The main line in this activity is that Holland and in particular emerged as the heir of Venice and thereby of Constantinople and as the main opponent of Venice's arch enemy: the Roman Catholic church and its main allies; the formerly united Spain (including Sardinia and southern Italy) and the Holy Roman Empire (Germany-Austria-northern Italy), both under (German) Habsburg rule; which constitutes the former empire of Charlemagne. After the defeat of the Spanish fleet the seas were open to the Dutch and too the English.

The Netherlands and Amsterdam in particular became the center of Europe's shipping, commodity- and capital trading for two logistic reasons mainly. Geographically, it was situated as the most central transportation hub in northern Europe: at sea by the outlets of northern Europe's main river(s). Logistically, it temporarily benefitted from the prevalent character of trading with the need for a central market. When later trade was changed from such multilateral trade into bilateral trade Hollands role was accordingly diminished in the respects of shipping and commercial trade although it for a considerable time kept going as the main capital market. As industry was based on Hollands trading role it vanished as well. The policy deriving from the growing dominance of the capital market contributed to this industrial decline.

The period from around 1500 to the French revolution (hereafter "the pre-revolutionary period") was a period of bounty for the Dutch in comparison with any other country or perhaps shall we say region. The Dutch were united with the Belgians in two periods 1400-1600 and (1795) 1814-1830. The lower countries were especially favoured with an extremely fertile landscape in the south fitted for agricultural production and also extremely well fitted for commerce positioned as they are on the shore of the North Sea at the mouth of two of the largest navigable European rivers, the Rhine and the Maas ("Meusse") plus the Dutch Scheldt river. Belgium and Brabant (a southern province of the Netherlands) developed industry before any other region in northern Europe thanks to the peace and generally liberal surroundings established by the local rulers. The south supplied Europe with textiles for centuries through the Hansa who quite interestingly apparently never learned this trade themselves but left it for the factories in Belgium; Brugge, Antwerp and Leuven. Similarly the Hanse never learned the trade of banking.

Concerning the northern provinces of the low countries Angus Maddison points out three reasons for the Dutch achievement; the liberal modernity of their institutions leaving power with the urban burgoisie, geography, and the mercantile policies. Fernand Braudel rather points out the archaic nature of the Dutch institutions which hardly constituted a state at all[19] and Palmer and Colton agree,

"Under the republican government the Dutch enjoyed great freedom, but it can hardly be said that their form of government met all the requirements of a state. ... The prince of Orange, apart form being stadholder, was simply one of the feudal noblemen of the country. But the noble class had been outdistanced by the commercial, and affairs were generally managed by the burghers. The burghers, intent on making money and enjoying comfort, rarely worried over military questions and hated taxes.

Politics in the Dutch republic was a seesaw between the burghers, pacifistic and absorbed with business, and the princes of Orange, to whome the country owed most of its military security. When foreigners threatened invasion, the power of the stadholder increased."[20]

As in Italy before and England later, however, the ultimate goal of a Dutch trader in Amsterdam was to imitate the habits of the landed aristocracy and the court around the stadholder in The Hague.[21]

Maddison, as most, does not mention that in politics and economics the Flemish and the Dutch were taught by the feudal masters of trade related acitivities; Venetians who moved their establishments to more strategic locations after the discovery of the new sea-routes in the late 15 century first to the Iberian Peninsula[22] and then to the English channel. The main trade axises in Europe of the late medieval time had been between Antwerp on the one hand and Venice and Marseille/Genova on the other hand through southern Germany and southern France. The new axises in Europe were established between the Baltic and the North Sea and along the Mediterranean - between nothern Italy and the Iberian peninsula. In both cases the first axis was predominant: the Antwerp-Venice(-Constantinople) axis and then the North Sea-Baltic axis, the latter being the former exclusive trade area of the Norsemen (Vikings)[23] and then of the Hanse towns.

"Like England, the United Provinces were now benefitting from that slow shift in the economic balances from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic world which was one of the main secular trends of the period 1500 to 1700; and which, while working at first to the advantage of Portugal and Spain, was later galvanizing societies better prepared to extract the profits of global commerce."[24]

List comments this failure of the Spanish to keep up the momentum as the result of the (oldfashioned) lack of political and commercial freedom in Spain. Therefore the Netherlands became a gathering place not only for regugees from religious oppression but also for economic refugees seeking opportunities of free trade. Most protestant calvinists actually at first lived in the south. The spirit of religious and commercial freedom and the spirit of adventure went along hand in hand and nutured each other in the 7 northern provinces.

Economically at start the northern provinces of the low countries were far worse off than the south with hardly any natural resources, bad soil, and repeated floodings by sea water forcing them to build dikes. Their products were limited to fish and dairy products. Their hardships in battling the sea, however, paid off by producing an entepreneural spirit and as a consequence a vast trading fleet which (due to bad communications and therefore the multilateral trading system) gave the opportunity for a centrally located staple market in Amsterdam and related industries. Maddison's description should remind us of the fairly similar circumstances of Venice earlier on and of the USA later on,

"The unusual character of Dutch society was not a product of the Protestant ethic, but was due to the unique origins of the country. It was a country of recent settlement - on land mostly retrieved from the sea and marshes. Hence Dutch views were deeply impregnated with the possibilities for rational manipulation of the human and material environment and a "Faustian sense of mastery over man and nature", which characterizes capitalist attitudes to technological change."[25]

The Dutch managed for a long time to keep their freight charges at an incomparably low level thanks also to their lack of manpower benefitting therefore from low wage sailors immigrating in tens of thousands for example from Norway and Denmark.[26]

The northern provinces got their independence with the seize-fire agreements in 1609 but formally in 1648. In the period until the French "occupation" in 1795 the 13 Lower Countries (today called Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands) were ruled by a land-based feudal and a financial oligarchy who did not develop the hinterland much and instead carried out international commercial operations with the staple markets and local industry of the port-towns as their base. In 1585 (Antwerp in 1576) the Spanish conquest of the 6 southern lower countries (Belgium) was final. Charles V started a policy of ruthless "hispanisation and catholisation" and many artisans and craftsmen fled to the northern 7 provinces and especially Amsterdam which then became the commercial center of the lower countries - and especially so with the blocade of the port of Antwerp from 1585 to 1795. Amsterdam in the beginning of this period became a flourishing manufacturing town on the basis of raw material imports, the staple market and export of locally produced industrial goods - also textiles produced independently of the trade position. "Second hand" merchants dealing with inspecting, sorting, storing, and repackaging goods also made a good business. All these domestic acitities were included into the international commercial activities. Trade related activities like extensive information of global market conditions - with weekly price lists since 1585 - and excellent trade related and financial services contributed[27] to the Dutch competetiveness.

The political independence of the northern United Provinces was in part a result of the economic power which resulted from the influx of refugees from the south. But this could not have been the decisive factor as the small Dutch economy was not yet ripe for a confrontation against Habsburg Spain - the major European power. As Paul Kennedy writes, they were helped financially and militarily from in particular England. Of the 132 soldier companies (all mercenary) only 17 were Dutch. The Dutch were also helped by their overseas expansion and in particular by the access to cheap credit on their own financial markets established on a Venetian model and

"this gave the Dutch an inestimable advantage over its rivals".[28]

Elisabeth I of England in 1585 sent regular troops. (see: ch 1.p.3)

The combination of a central staple market, local refining industry, cheap freight, and cheap credit was for a time impossible to beat.

The policy in the Republic of the seven united provinces of the north was a consequence of the "liberal-feudal" social structure. The union was strictly decentral but still dominated by the most wealthy province of Holland which was run by the assembly of representatives from 18 towns again controlled by the most important town Amsterdam. The competition between the towns in particular between Amsterdam and those of the southern Zeeland was fierce and Ekelund and Tollison claims that this explains the efficiancy of the Dutch merchants. Nevertheless, they admit that the "state" personified by the statesman Oldenbarnefeld was necessary to unite the interests in the formation of the Dutch East India Company in 1602 in order to defend common interests against the Spanish and English competition.[29] The towns were ruled by the merchant oligarchy which chose its leader - the mayor or the "burgmeester" of Amsterdam - who was considered the equal of kings in international affairs. In other words quite paralell to the way Venice had been run for centuries by an elected Doge from the leading oligharcical families. - The Italian and in particular the Venetian influence was strong in many respects and can still be noticed today.[30]

In the most glorious period around 1580 to 1700 the Dutch provinces and especially Amsterdam dominated European manufacturing, fishing, trade and shipping and became Europe's main staple market. Amsterdam became the financial centre of the world and was to remain so after its dominating position in trade and industry had vanished. Writes Zuidema,

"The hallmark of the Republic was freedom of international trade and shipping. A mercantilist policy like that pursued in England, France, Bavaria or Sweden was unthinkable. It was the rich merchants of the towns who governed the union and paid most of its expenses. They decided about the economic policy, they wanted no interference with their commercial activities. Internally the situation was quite otherwise. In no way were the Dutch merchants free traders by some political maxime. I have already mentioned the blockade of Antwerp which lasted until 1795. Shipping on the Rhine was heavily regulated and taxed to the detriment of the Germans. The Dutch east India Company held a strictly controlled monopoly and moreover, industry in the towns was strongly reglemented by town governmemnts and guilds. That's why commercial mercantilism seems to be a good shorthand expression for that peculiar mix of freedom and regulation that was so remarkably succesful for a century."[31]

3: DUTCH ECONOMISTS - ESPECIALLY ON LIST'S THEORY

A: THE 17TH- AND EARLY 18TH CENTURY

- THE GOLDEN AGE AND COMMERCIAL MERCANTILISM

Because of the Dutch dominance of the European economy, which Daal and Heertje calls "proto-colonialism", there was for a long time no immediate need to develop a strategy and therefore economic theory to change what was already working well - the commercial mercantilism. The national mercantilist strategy was developed in opposition to this Dutch commercial dominance - particularly in France and Britain - where many complained of the destructive self-serving practices of the Dutch who were both hated and admired for the same reasons.[32]

Also the Dutch economists of the 17th century can be classified as belonging to the mercantilist camp but, as opposed to their colleagues in other countries like France, England and Sweden, they were confined to a life of opposition to the (perceived) interests and politics of the merchant oligarchy.

"In the Republic the ruling class did not need economic ideologists. Dutch economic thought at the time that is worthwhile to be mentioned was at the margin of economic life,"[33]

Except for Graswinckel they argued for a policy which would benefit the bourgois merchants e.g.: industrialism. As most writers on economics at the time they wrote on practical problems promoting special interests and as usual tried to pursuade their readers that this policy was in the general interest. Therefore they generally adviced

"The main section of the Dutch ruling merchant class was not interested in pursuing policies according with the first two points. This section of the elite consisted of the purely international merchants who bought in foreign countries in order to sell to other foreign countries at a higher price. In most cases no manufacturing took place between the two operations. These merchants were merely interested in the resulting financial gains, not in advancing population growth or international power. Obviously, they did not oppose exporting domestic products, but this was only a small part of their international trade. So, the defenders of export trade had to argue and theorize in their efforts to convince those in power. That is the purpose of their writings."[34]

The Dutch national mercantilists argued that their proposed policy would also be in the interests of the old merchant class. In general the Dutch national mercantilists argued in favour of free trade - and against regulations in particular domestically; against the guilds.

Th.van Tijn[35] argue that the mercantilistic doctrine generally had three characteristics:

1) Power and wealth of states depend on the number of productive inhabitants.

2) The source of wealth is foreign trade provided by the merchant class which creates export opportunities for domestic industries.

3) The global number of inhabitants, volume of production and trade is constant and therefore the gains of one nation will be the losses of another nation. Wealth in this context is therefore created not through productive work but through uneven trade.

One may argue that van Tijn seriously confuses the characteristics of two distinct phenomenas here (unlike the later article by Zuidema): municipal (or citystate/commercial) mercantilism and national (or state) mercantilism:

Point 2 and the first part of point 3 are less obvious parts of a national mercantilism. Therefore, national mercantilism is less prone to a zero-sum outlook and strategy arguing instead that relative wealth although created by uneven trade is the result of higher competence and efficiency and that this will benefit absolutely all nations involved in the trade.

So, the policy was one of commercial mercantilism with strong regulation and restrictions on the home market between towns and regions on the one hand and on the other hand "free trade" internationally meaning really monopolised trade by the trade-companies as the East-India companies. This as opposed to national mercantilism which has the "opposite" arrangement: free trade internally and restricted trade abroad. However, also in the latter case "free trade" was not complete, as it included governmental interference of various kinds concerning for example preferential treatment of economic activities concerning tax and credit. A significant point in the foreign policy whether of municilal or state mercantilism is the promotion of monopolies which could reap a monopoly profit or rent which then could be reinvested. Considerable effort was therefore made to secure such monopolies indeed contrary to free trade ideology as Schmoller points out concerning England even as late as the years immedeately before WW I.[36] Advantages of scale in use of force was therefore a supplement to advantages of scale in production - and in information for that matter (through intelligence and trade connections). As the Danes experienced when the Dutch made a blocade on Oeresund (today the sound between Denmark and Sweden leading into the Baltic) in order to force the Danish king to give concessions concerning the customs he demanded for traffic passing through. The conquest by the Swedish of the south-eastern part of the Scandianvian peninsula from the Danish also served the commercial interests well. The commercial interests were served well because since the sound thereby no longer was under the control of one nation which thereby solely could impose its demands upon the traffic through this extremely strategic sound controlling the entrance to the Baltic and thereby totally contolling sea-borne traffic to Finland, the Baltic states, Polen, western Russia, eastern Sweden and eastern Germany. The relations between Holland and Sweden was traditionally very good and the third largest town of Sweden, the main town in the southern Sweden, Malmoe, was partly built by the Dutch.

Caroll Quigley distinguishes the early municipal mercantilism and the later state mercantilism.[37] Immanuel Wallerstein calls this later development statism.[38] Fernand Braudel even devotes respectively his third and fourth chapter to each of these different versions of mercantilism.[39] Karl Polyani points out that (state) mercantilism was developed as a nationalist strategy to combat the effects of the feudal provincialism of merchant towns which were blocking development of the countryside of the towns. Polyani describes the situation of commerical- or municipal mercantilism before the national- or state mercantilism was introduced, and thereby very much also describes the situation in Holland until the French revolution and occupation of the Netherlands:

"A belief in spontaneous progress must make us blind to the role of government in economic life." op.cit.,p.37

and

"Internal trade in Western Europe was actually created by the intervention of the state. Right up to the time of the Commercial Revolution what may appear to us as national trade was not national, but municipal. The Hanse were not German merchants; they were a corporation of trading oligharcs, hailing from a number of North Sea and Baltic towns. Far from "nationalizing" German economic life, the Hanse deliberately cut off the hinterland from trade. The trade of Antwerp or Hamburg, Venice or Lyons, was in no way Dutch or German, Italian or French. London was no exception: It was as little "English" as Luebeck was German. ...

The sharp distinction drawn between local and long distance trade ... led us to the somewhat surprising conclusion that neither long-distance trade nor local trade was the parent of the internal trade of modern times - thus apparently leaving no alternative but to turn to for an explanation to the deus ex machina of state intervention. ... The town was an organization of the burgesses. They alone had right of citizenship and on the distinction between the burgess and the non-burgess the system rested. ... the burgess found themselves in an entirely different position in respect to local trade and long distance trade. ... As to food supplies, ... This type of ["international"] trade escaped local regulation and all that could be done was to exclude it as far as possible from the local market. ... In respect to industrial wares, the separation ... cut even deeper, ... the burgess hampered by all means the inclusion of the countryside... It was this development which forced the territorial state to the fore as the instrument of the "nationalization" of the market and the creator of internal tade.

Deliberate action of the state in the fifteenth nad sixteenth century foisted the mercantile system on the fiercely protectionist towns and principlaities. Mercantilism destroyed the outworn particularism of local and intermunicipal trading by breaking down the barriers separating these two types of noncompetetive commerce and thus clearing the way for a national market ... "[40]

Polyani also pays tribute to Schmoller,

"The first volume of Heckscher's Mercantilism (1935) bears the title Mercantilism as a Unifying System. ... The first modern author to recognize the liberalizing tendencies of the mercantile system was Schmoller (1884)."[41]

Wallerstein points out in the introduction of chapter three of his The Modern World System, called Absolute Monarchy and Statism, that the development from feudalism to a European world economy is correlated with the emergence of absolute monarchism. We below point to the the 1688 revolution in England as a counter-revolution for exactly this reason. While admitting that a bureaucracy could not be supported without the economic basis provided by trade capitalism Wallerstein also points out that the new governmental structure provided a strong economic and political foundation for a new capitalist system.[42] Later - in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when the new and larger nations-states to a large degree had been created - economic nationalism within the frame of mercantilism was supported also by the burgoisie born from this policy of the absolute monarchs whose ideology Wallerstein prefers to call "statism".[43]

In order to make the laguage more fluent, what will be ment by mercantilist writers and mercantilist policy below will be that of national or state mercantilism. As governmental policy hardly anyting else is logic and concerning writers few others are known - although some may have done what de la Court did namely to transform his advocations for the town of Leyden to the "state" (actually province) of Holland. Still, the distinction is most vital.

FOUR DUTCH (NATIONAL) MERCANTILISTS

Dirck Graswinckel (1600-1666), a wealthy judge advocate from Delft. Dealing with landed estates he mainly published juridical works dicussing the grain trade. He aimed at protecting the community against shortage and dearth by foodstuffs. He was the only economist of the time to defend the interests of the land owners and adviced a well-populated countryside, a high profit from the land and thereby a high agricultural production. He abhorred moral justifications and argued for free trade in the general interest. The import of grain was excepted from this as he argued to protect land owners through import tax on grain. Like the other mercantilist writers he insisted on the importance of trade in domestic products and thereby deviated from the opinion of the purely international merchants.

Main work, 1651: Aenmerckinghen ende betrachtinghen ... (Observations and considerations ...).

Willem Usselinx (1566 or 1567 - after 1647), a merchant from Antwerp, argued for the establishement of a Dutch West-Indian Company and later for chages in its constitution.

"Usselinx' conception of wealth was to remain close to the Antwerp model with its industrial hinterland before 1585. To him the export of domestically manufactured goods was the only secure basis of wealth. That is why he was alarmed by the attempts by Germany, France and Sweden to attract Dutch artisans."[44]

He saw establishment of colonies as the solution where settlers would develop it into a producer of fruits and crops and a market for industrial products of the mother country and that they therefore should not be allowed to engage in weaving or other handicrafts themselves. This larger market for Dutch products would attract artisans from other European countries and the general wealth and power of the Netherlands would grow accordingly therby weakening Spain. He recommends to tax the rich to relieve the poor and blame the rich for neglecting the common good and for prefering to ruin the country.

Main work, 1608: Vertoogh, hoe nootwendich, nut ende profejtelick het sy ... (Exposition, how necessary, useful and profitable it will be... ).

Pieter de la Court (1618- after 1669), a merchant from Leyden, lived half a century later at a time when Dutch dominance was threatened by the mercantilist measures in France and Britain. The immigration policy had with great success established Leyden as the industrial center of the Dutch provinces. De la Court was himself a son of immigrants from (Belgian) Flanders. The growth of trade and the organisational structure of the manufaturing businesses in Leyden gave the (former workers but now) merchants the upper hand. De la Court saw them as the providers of business opportunities and therefore the organisers of production and wealth-creation. He therefore joined their demand for freedom of trade from internal domestic restrictions. He argued for the beneficial role of the merchants and laid out the claims in the 1659 't Welvaren der Stadt Leiden' (The wealth of the City of Leyden) and applied the same principles in the 1662 Interest van Holland (Hollands Interest..) and revised and extended the book in 1669 with Aanwysing der Heilsame GRONDEN en MAXIMEN ... (Indication for sound political foundations and maxims of the commonwealth of Holland and West Frisia). Like Usselinx he argues against guilds and for ending the monoply of trade companies on foreign trade. This would benefit trade and employ more people, he argues. Following Thomas Hobbes believing men to be egoistic by nature he argues that the best constitution i links the interest of the rulers to the interest of the subjects. His recommended board of manufacturing, fishing, (purely (!) international) trade and shipping would give only

8 of 48 representatives to the latter two groups although the first two would be represented by their respective merchants. He intended to change the aristocratic or rather oligharcic Dutch constitution by convincing the rulers. He adviced export and trade of domestic products and the industry of the whole city or nation was his subject. He looked at it as if it was one enterprise in order to convince the rulers. He argued for protectionism on settlement colonies and against monopolies inside the Dutch economic system. In general he advocated a bourgois Republic.

Franciscus van Enden (1602-1674) from Antwerp was educated at and established Jesuit schools and accordingly had a quite different conception of human nature and therfore of society than the Hobbesian de la Court. Men cannot do by themselves and are therefore pushed into sociability and therefore seek mutual assistance. Evil is caused by superstitions, not by human nature itself. His main publication are Kort Verhal van Nieuw Nederlants... . (Short Report about the Condition of New Netherland....), 1662. And in 1665: Vrye Politijke Stellingen ... (Free Political Propositions...). He recommened a constitution and government of free and equal people and blames the

"now existing weak civil government, that seems to be founded on selfishness and thirst for power only.

His conclusion is, that a 'Society or Colony excelling in freedom' can only be established after the reformation of the (Dutch) state. The state must be cleared of multiple abuses' contrasting with 'the real and true foundations of freedom' because

the Good a state does not posess, it cannot possibly hand out."[45]

He critisised the high excises levied in the cities and blames the rich for profiting from the public debt by enjoying high interests. He therefore calls for redemption of the debt and reduction of excises which he argues will increase the population and wealth of the towns. This was conditional he argued on the reformation of the Dutch constitution. The recommended equality consisted in the guarantee of the commonwealth of the continuous improvement of every individual within his or her own rank, the absense of domination by violence, general education and lawmaking by a general assembly. Like de la Court he ment that the densely populated Holland which was restricted more and more by other countries had only two possibilities; establishing massive colonies in America and lowering of production costs. Like Usselinx he recommends cooperation with the fairly civilised American Indians, de la Court do not mention them. Like the other Dutch mercantilists he recommends free trade for the Dutch within the Dutch economic system.

THE ROLE OF VENICE IN DUTCH ECONOMIC THOUGHT

-A HISTORICAL NOTE

As noticed above there are serveral similarities and connections between the Netherlands and Italy. For example, the similar lay-out of the towns can hardly be missed. With its canals Amsterdam rightly has claim to the title "Venice of the North". Until the turn of the century the normal form of formally addressing people would be signore or seigneur remiding use of the Italian signore. Or only French? Visiting art-galleries one cannot miss the similarity between Belgian and Dutch Renaissance pantings and the former Italian Renaissance paintings as a result of the Flemish and Dutch painters' studies in Italy.

On the economic side, the Dutch money are still called gulders and are symbolised by the fl meaning florines, thereby reminding us of the golden florines, the money of Florence.

Apart from the mentioned similarity of the political system, financial oligharcy, one should also mention the similarity of the economic system and its fate. Both were based on transit trade mixed to some degree with closeby production. Venice no doubt learned financial techniches from pratices in mediaeval times particularly from Constantinople and beyond them from the Phoenicians. Venice thus further developed the banking system which Amsterdam and later London refined. For example in order to get around the Papal dislike of usury (interest) conditionalities were imposed on the borrower - a practice as we know still strong today with the IMF policies of SAP - structural adjustment program. The madness of the so-called "Tulip Crash" in Amsterdam in 1636[46] were only one indication of the continuance of the speculative practices of the Venetians which the English were to inherit as well - which the crash of "The South Sea Bubble" indicated.[47] Both these crashes devastated the national economies of Holland and England and trust in their financial markets needed a long period to recover.

According to Braudel and others, after all Venice was more a trading town than a industrial town - as Amsterdam and London were to be as well.[48] This paved the way for their downfall - regardless of for example late Venetian large scale efforts to establish and temporary success of textile manufacturing after 1560[49] and late Dutch industrialisation attempts under William I after 1816. It was, however, too late for both of them to catch up what had been lost in the meantime both technologically, economically, and politically. They both became followers in the near peryphery of the world economic system. The economic system of Venice was better suited to the (short-time speculation) needs of merchants than to the (long-term investment) needs of production. Venice - and later Amsterdam - accordingly degenerated becoming exporters of capital as they fell victim to changed trade routes and lack of domestic industrial base. The receivers of this capital in the instance of Venice was (Lissabon, Antwerp and then) Amsterdam. The receiver of the capital in the case of the Amsterdam was London. - And if we were to continue today, the receiver of London's capital has been in particular New York and then Singapore.

The German initiator of the first study of Dutch economic theory (by Laspeyres), Wilhelm Roscher wrote,[50]

"That Holland sometime in the future should inherit the Italian, especially the Venetian, cultural leadership was anticipated in a prophetic manner already by Marinus Santunus: Secreta fidelium crucis II, 18."

The Venetian republic was for considerable time a model for seventeenth century republican thought in Europe - in Holland as in England[51]. As the heyday of Venetian imperialism ended around 1580 the Dutch took over immedeately after with the results of the Spanish conquest of Antwerp in 1576. Of the Dutch in particular the pupil of Hugo Grotuis; Graswinckel, and de la Court studied and were in close contact with Venice but also a number of other Dutchmen were warm defenders of the Venetian model. "Graswinckel's first major work was inspired and aided by friends in Venice"[52] After intense studies of Italian republican politics and Machiavelli de la Court concluded by favouring the political system of Genova over the more aristocratic system of Venice[53] but which, nevertheless, had to give in for the Venetian pressure. In the political ideas of the Dutch philosopher Spinoza, the political unit was the city state modelled upon Venice[54] This tradition of hailing the Venetian republican example, or more correctly the plutocratic example, can be contrasted to that of Dante Aligheri who in his De Monarchia praised the example of imperial rule under Natural Law by Charlemagne and the Holy Roman Empire of Frederick I (Barbarossa) and Frederick II Hohenstauffen which was later to be practiced in the mercantilist practices following the Renaissance. In fact, a whole tradition of writing went into this issue.

Haitsma Mulier writes that the myth of Venice was interpretated and twisted according to the purposes of the interpreters. Nevertheless,

"This myth fulfilled a function in the fight against external menaces such as the ever greater pressure brought to bear on Venice by Habsburg power. The similar pressure which the republic in the North (pr.au.'s remark: during the "80 year-war" of liberation against the Spanish/the Habsburgs 1568-1648) still felt was without doubt one of the stimuli for Graswinckel to give detailed support to the myth of the Serenissima. It is also possible that he wanted to hold the older, more illustrious republic up as an example to his countrymen ..."[55]

A central part of the myth of Venice was its claim to be the second Rome[56] later continued in London. Graswinckel was perfectly aware of the aristocratic nature and history of the Venetian regime.[57] By countering the Habsburgs Graswinckel followed the tradition of the Venetians and his Dutch forerunner Willem Usselinx who, in a letter (1623) to the French treasurer of state Richelieu, suggested a commercial and colonial union with the German principalities and Sweden against the naval supremacy of Spain, thereby weakening the its main ally the Habsburgers who were considered as the main cause of trouble for a hundred years.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AT THE TIME

In order to get a picture of the international economic situation and the political methods as the background for List's ideas regarding the Netherlands we include a little description of the politics of Richelieu which was initiated with Louis XI's Jean Bodin and later continued with Colbert as this was the tradition List built on concerning economics in a more "modern" sense and economics in his sense; as political economy. In this tradition a navy was seen as the key to security and prosperity. Without it there would be no free trade for the domestic merchants either with other competing industrial nations nor with any colonies.

List was perfectly aware of this and repeatedly mentioned the fate of the German Hanse towns Hamburg and Bremen who were cut off from trade by the English occupation of the strategic German island Heligoland barring Germany's greatest river.[58] Other examples are the British occupation of Iceland in 1809 which ended after promises of trade benefits: the English blocade against Norway during the Napoleonic wars resulting in starvation; Dutch and English piracy against Spanish vessels carrying gold and silver from America; the Dutch blocade of the port of the Belgian port of Antwerp between 1585 and 1795 which ended with the French occupation: the Dutch blocade against Denmark to force through lower freight passage duties. These are only some local examples but global examples are indeed endless. A navy was therefore need to protect trade - and this is the very reason for and beginning of the so-called imperialism which was political until matters were so stable and "refined" that a more an purely economic and more efficient version of imperialism could be used; free trade.

H.Rosinski gives us in short a reason for the obsession with bulding naval power,

"Thus sea-power in ... its classic age was a highly complex factor, defensive as well as offensive; economic or, more specifically, financial as much as military; achieving its greatest effects not so much by its own intrinsic strength as by its skillful exploitation of the weaknesses of its opponents. By its aid the Portugese, then the Dutch, and finally the British were able to wield an influence out of all proportion to their size, resources, and man power. Thanks to unique key position Great Britain was able not merely to control the flow of overseas treasure but to manipulate on the continent of Europe the balance of half a dozen powers, each intrinsically superior to her in every other respect."[59]

In the early seventeenth century-France Richelieu used the Venetian system of taxation as a model for France in order to beat them in their own game, economic expansion and further to establish a strong nation-state[60], thereby creating a take-off in science later continued with the policies of Colbert.[61] As Usselinx, mentioned above, Richelieu intended to ally not only with Sweden and the German principalities but also with with Denmark and England against Spain and the Habsburgs and to build a navy for the purpose of depriving Spain of its hegemony of the seas and in the future deprive England of its dominance of the colonial trade. A strong navy was therefore seen as the key to prosperity both by him and later by Colbert who both envied Holland of her position, making it possible to loot the Spanish ships (this as opposed to the peaceful practice of the Hansa). The pursuits of a strong French navy were of course strongly resented by the Venetians and others.[62] Concerning similar later attempts by Colbert Paul Kennedy writes,

"The only paralell, notes Professor Jones "is the similar work of Tirpitz in the years before 1914" - and the reaction on this side of the Channel was similar in both cases"[63]

Both the Swedish and the Habsburg attempts to ally with the Hansa trade cities failed to the relief of Richelieu. Richelieu feared a zollverein between the Habsburg empire, Spain, Italy and the German principalities as this would result in a trade war detrimental to the ambitions of France.[64] He tried instead to push other states to battle each other and thereafter have France emerge as the winner and leader of Europe, thereby securing peace and through this welfare for her citizens. Throughout his regime he sought to play England and Holland against each other[65] and the alliance with them was only sought in order to bring about the downfall of a more immedeate threat to the French nation, the Habsburgs. Temporarily he also allied with Spain against England.[66] This classic devide and conquer strategy was, of course, utilized among others, also by the Romans, the Venetians and was later pursued so successfully by the English.

Leibniz was sent to Paris in a diplomatic mission in order to try to redirect Louis XIV's foreign ambitions from Germany to that of Egypt (which Napoleon later realized). His later collaborator, the finance minster of France J.B.Colbert, had during the same period even more advanced ideas: Discussing Justi's Gesammelte Politische und Finanzschriften.. [67] Albion Small refers to Justi's translation of a

"letter alleged to have been written by Colbert to Louis XIV in 1672, and first published in the Guardian. It has a scheme of reasons why the French monarch could not subdue the Netherlands. On the general question of the true power of states, the essay premises: The state is not powerful because of extensive territories (pp.57 ff.); nor because of population alone (pp.60 ff); nor because of territories, plus population, plus riches (pp.62 ff.); nor even because of invinsible armies (pp.65 ff.), with frequent and strong fortifications (pp.73 ff.). Then the positive dictrine follows:

"The true strength and power of a state rests entirely upon the wisdom and completeness [Vollkommenheit] of the government (page 74). This theorem involves very much. It means not only that the whole correlation and fundamantal constitution of the state is good; but the wisdom of the government must display itself in all parts of the civic body; and it must neglect no kind of affairs..." "[68]

The point is the same as Roscher made concerning the Viking-raids of the Norse people, that instead of invading other peoples they might have stayed at home and refined their own culture reaping material befeneits from this more lasting well of prosperity.

The thirty years war weakened Spain, Germany and the Habsburgs and with the death of Richelieu and the Swedish king Gustav Adolph this opened the way to England's road to supremacy. This was completed after the only intermediate success of the Dutch republic. After the British defeat of the Dutch and the end of the Algo-Dutch wars the Dutch aristocracy was amalgated into the English aristocracy. With the succession in 1688 of William of Orange, after the Catholic Jacob II, he,

"drew England into the large scale conflict that was just beginning to erupt in reaction to the French attempt to gain colonial mastery."[69]

The so-called "glorious revolution of 1688" established a new alliance whereby enlightened absolutism was replaced by plutocracy with short and long-term destructive effects on England[70] - and more immedeately so on the Continent. The compromise between the establishment and the new king, the "Bill of Rights", established as a principle that the king could not issue taxes as opposed to the practice under for example Jacob II's ally Louis XIV and his treasurer Colbert.

The Anglo-Dutch establishment then jointly fought attempts at a unified Continent as under Charlemagne and his followers under the leadership of one nation; first the French and thereafter the Germans. Dutch and Venetian money, influence, and ways of thought thereafter poored into London. The Aristotelean empiricist and liberalist school was thereby continued as well as the monetarist thinking of the commercial mercantilism of Venice and Amsterdam. - This is seen for example in the idea that wealth is money, an idea of early municipal or commercial mercantilism[71] - an idea that already Richelieu as a state mercantilist had soon left on the road side. On the philosophical side - crucial for the establishement of the fundamental axioms of practical thought - Holland for example was the first continental stronghold of Newton and anti-Leibnizian thought.

A HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVE OF LIST'S IDEAS

The great historical divide in Europe, which was the main fight in which Richelieu, Colbert, Napoleon and F.List engaged, was the ideal-typical divide between the sea powers and the continental powers. This idea has in our century been formulated by geo-political thinkers as Friedrich Ratzel and Karl Haushofer in Germany, Admiral A.T.Mahan and Sir Halford Mackinder in Britain and Isaiah Bowman in the United States.[72] The divide probably goes back to the beginnings of western civilisation. The seapower Constantinopel (with the inheritance of the Phoenicians of Lebanon) and its tretcherous ally and inheritor Venice subsequently fought the continental European powers of Charlemagne, the Holy Roman Empire and the Habsburgs. This obviously corresponds to some degree with the religious dividing lines of east and west. The eastern empire was allied to the major seapower in the north - the Vikings who established empires in the east (Russia) the west (Normandy and Great Britain) and the south (Sicily, Malta etc.)[73]. So, traditionally we have a situation where western continental Europe (the area of Carlemagne's empire) is surrounded by states with another conception of wealth creation; that of trading and looting as opposed to creative production. As land-powers did not have the mobile ability which made wealth creation possible by trading and looting they had to develop other means.[74]

The Dutch inheritors of Venice also fought the Habsburgs through such practices - against Spain in particular. The next inheritor of the tradition, England, fought Spain, France and then Germany through their organisers Richelieu, Colbert and Napoleon and then List, Bismarck etc.. Through this historical development, however, the states which have taken over the tradition have become increasingly larger and therefore more continental; Venice, Holland, England and then the USA. This corresponds to the fact which List pointed out, that a trade power without a productive basis in continental, protectionist production would have to give in for a power based on such a basis as Holland had to give in to England. Successively therefore the naval powers have become larger in size and therefore prone to behave more like continental powers and their productive conception of wealth creation. This is particulary the case with the USA where we today can watch the rift between these two historical political tendencies.

The divide is between power primarily based on riches from trade (and formerly plunder) on the one hand and power primarily based on the productive powers on the other hand seeing the necessity of a unification of these powers across national boundaries. England was able to wrest the power from the Dutch because she was the first to be able to combine promotion of both these power sources. Eventually, however, the sea-power role dominated and she fell into decline. This process of decline was ironically started with the English "counter-revolution" of the so-called "Glorious Revolution of 1688" and the succession of William I when the sea-power tradition took over a "continental culture" - that of England. A nice way - and the usual way - of putting this is to say that this replaced absolutism with constitutional monarchy and replaced to a large extent an idealist culture of the Renaissance with a materialist culture of the Enlightenment.[75] Another way of putting is is to say that it replaced enlightened absolutism with the rule of plutocracy with the power in the hands of the landed and financial aristocracy being symbolised with the establishment of the Bank of England in 1694 and the end of the kings soverreign right to issue taxes.

USA then picked up the land-power and mercantilist tradition, and as capital earlier in history had passed from Venice to Amsterdam and then on to England it then passed on to the USA and then south-east Asia as these states succesively supplied better infrastructure for profitable investments. Most of the capital of the Hansa went to the Netherlands and to England.[76] With the influx of this old capital, however, the physical basis of the new countries was looted and undermined, and subsequently the old capital passed on the the next looting place providing a temporary nest. So, we might say that the historical dividing line in politics also is between old and new capital. We also have a west-ward movement of the economic world center of production and trade: from the eastern Mediterranean to the North Sea and the Atlantic and today to the Pacific.

On the continental or landpower side there are of course periods and areas which see no such so-called "continental" ways of thought or politics. Of the main opponents to List's efforts to unite Germany and the Continent was not only Lord Palmerstone of England[77] but also Metternich of Austria. These were both keen on keeping their contender Germany divided, poor and down.

CREDIT AS THE MAJOR SOURCE OF POWER

The main sources of power for the sea and continental powers were economy or industry on the one hand and on the other hand money or credit. After the devastating black plague and the chaos and destruction of the hundred years wars military strength was strenghtened by new and costly technology but this put more strain on national budgets,

"The fifteenth century experienced, however, the large remakers of inner order in Western-Europe: Louis 11. in France, Henry VII in England and Ferdinand and Isabella of Castilla in Spain. The most important mechanisms which stood at their disposal in this task ... were financial: with the help of a persistently built bureaucracy (civil and military) which was strong enough to taxate and thereby finance an ever stronger buraucratic structure. ... This was the case not only in France, England and Spain, but also in the principalities in Germany. The main question is of course the taxes. ... The growing monetary income of the king did not only weaken the nobility by strenghtening the state but also by weakening the wells of income of the nobility."[78]

As Wallerstein notices the Hansa used the institution of credit to further their control of their markets by buying the products before they had been produced thereby putting an end to an open merket. This was first

"perfectioned by the Hansa over against Norwegian fishermen and fur-hunters in late medieaval time and later by German merchants in towns like Riga, Reval and Danzig regarding the East-European markets. The technique was known from other places; it was used by merchants in Toulouse, by the Genovese on the Iberian peninsula, and in parts of England's and Spain's wool-trade."[79]

Writes historian Carroll Quigley,

"Credit had been known to the Italians and the Netherlanders long before it became one of the instruments of English world supremacy. Nevertheless, the founding of the Bank of England by William Paterson and his friends in 1694 is one of the great dates in world history. ... This new stage of financial capitalism, which continued to dominate England, France, and the United States as late as 1930, was made necessary by the great mobilisations of capital needed for railroad building after 1830. ... The third stage of capitalism is of such overwhelming significance in the history of twentieth century, and its ramifications and influences have been so subterranean and even occult, ... This system had its center in London for four chief reasons. ... great volume of savings ... oligarcichal social structure ... aristocratic but not noble ... skill in financial manipulation, especially on the international scene..." [80]

Braudel writes,

"And credit, indispensable in any trade center, was a vital nrecessity on Amsterdam, not only because of the abnormal volume of goods which were bought and stored only to be exported a few months later, but also because the secret weapon of the Dutch merchant against foreign competitors was money, the many advance payments made in order to securte better terms for buying and selling. The Dutch were in fact credit suppliers for the whole of Europe - and this weas the real secret of their prosperity."[81]

This explains to us another aspect of why the Netherlands is such an important link to the present world situation concerning in particular present credit policy coordinated through the IMF - establishing in fact a credit cartell. Another indication of the historical importance and connections of the economics of the Netherlands is given on the first pages of the most famous book in Economics ever written: Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. The "Advertisement to the Fourth Edition" is the only acknowledgement of this work and is solely devoted to Smith's expression of his deep gratitude to Mr. Henry Hope of the company Hope & Co. in Amsterdam,

"concerning a very interesting and important subject, the Bank of Amsterdam".[82]

The Bank was founded in 1609 on the model of the Bank of Venice and functioned as a reliable center for the clearance of payments.[83] The Bourse founded in 1611 became the center of speculative commodity transactions. The bank became the model for the Bank of England founded in 1694. The Bank of Amsterdam dominated European and thereby worldwide finance during the seventeenth and most of the eighteenth century and the Bank of England dominated European and worldwide finance from that time until the second world war.[84] The nucleus of both were originally provided by the Italian and particularly the Venetian family funds or "fondi" which moved to the Iberian Peninsula, in particular Lissabon, after the discovery of the new sea-routes to Asia and America. The Iberian trade was dominated by the Genovese and in particulatr the jews in lack of a domestic burgoisie.[85] They then moved on to the English channel countries with the growing importance of fur and grain of the Baltic trade and of fish, timber, metals and ammunition of the North Sea trade. Likewise the Venetian office in Portugal, the Levant office, was the original nucleus of what was to become the Dutch- and British East Indian Companies. Amsterdam emerged as the main staple market especially of grain.

THE FALL OF AMSTERDAM AS A CENTRE OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY

Hasenberg Butter views the decline of Amsterdam as a result of the following reasons,

1) The mercantilistic policy of emerging and thereby competing West-European countries in particular France and England. Their efforts to become ecomomically self-sufficient and therefore a) establish domestic industry as well as b) colonial connections; a) imposed restrictions on Dutch imports; b) established competition in shipping and port fascilities in order to create direct trading links with the colonies.

2) The decline in the Amsterdam staple market was not counterbalanced with an effort to create a new domstic basis for trade in industry - the same failure experienced earlier by the Venetians and later by the British.

3) Holland's colonial monopoly was undermined by competition mainly from England but also from France, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and Denmark.

4) The Dutch merchants became bankers. Savings were canbalised into foreign loans instead of investments into domestic industry.

THE FALL OF AMSTERDAM AND GEOGRAPHY

As mentioned there is every reason to see economics on relation to politics and to geography or so-called geopolitics.

"The fate of the United Provinces in this period provides a good example of the influences of geography upon politics. In the early seventeenth century it posessed many of the domestic ingredients for national growth ... But a century later, the Dutch were struggling to hold their own against a number of rivals. The adoption of mercantilist policies of Cromwell's England and Colbert's France hurt Dutch commerce and shipping. ... This was made worse by the Dutch vulnerability from the landward threat from Louis XIV's France from the late 1660s onwards."[86]

So therefore,

"The balance against Louis XIV was engineered mainly by the Dutch. The most tireless of his enemies, and the man who did more than any other to checkmate him, was the Dutchman William III, the prince of orange, who in his later years was king of England and Scotland as well."[87]

Kennedy writes that the Dutch focus on the French threat drew attention and ressources away from the maintainance of the fleet which was to have disastrous consequences. The wars not only posed problems for commerce directly but also indeirectly; war-expenditures forced up taxes and therefore wages and contributed to a loss in economic competiveness. List notices that the passing of the English famous Navigation Act in 1651, established on the model of the Hanse navigation laws which again had Venetian laws as prototypes, intended to shut out the Dutch merchant ships,

"struck a fatal blow at Dutch naval supremacy at at Dutch fishing industry. So seriously did the Dutch suffer that they immedeately delared war upon England."[88]

The battle was lost by the Dutch and ended their naval and commercial supremacy. Nevertheless, after the English started a commercially caused war in 1665 they got into severe trouble. The Dutch merchants were in general opposed to war and rather opted for negotions and neutrality as they saw this as more beneficial to their trade. Nevertheless the Dutch defeat of 1651-53 and the English trouble in 1665 opened up for a new alliance in 1668 against the threat from the land-power France and started a long-lasting military and financial alliance between the Dutch and English elites[89]. It is likely that this alliance had long-term consequences for the economic and political future development of Germany blocking her from west-ward access to the sea for example by the neglect of the Dutch elites to buil railroads to their ports.[90]

Kennedy writes that,

"The English alliance that William III had cemented in 1689 was simultanously the saving of the United Provinces and a substantial contributory factor in its decline - in rather the same way in which, over two hundred years later, Lend-Lease and the United States alliance would both rescue and help undermine a British Empire whiuch was fighting for for survival ... "[91]

By 1739 the Dutch ships unloaded twice as much in London as in Amsterdam and the decline in Dutch industry was fast; within 16 years from 1735 the number of cloth factories in the leading town Leyden were halfed.[92] The marxist Maurice Dobb claims that,

"The Netherlands is a striking example of how the overseas trade and lending activity can be a rival to the growth of industry. In spite of the early blossoming in this fortress of cloth industry the industrial investment was to stagnate in the following centuries; and in the 18th century Holland was to be totally put in the shade by England concerning the development of capitalistic production. The wealths which were created by trade and foreign stocks seems to have removed capital and enteprise from industry. British financial papers became the main item of speculation at the exchange of Amsterdam and even displaced the Dutch East-India Company from this position; and "the Dutch capitalist could by simply taking contact with his lawyer in London have his 5 per cent on investments in English papers, or win up to 20-30 per cent on speculation in normal times."[93] Import- and export-merchants whose interests were to keep the door open to foreign products, had enough power to prevent the protectionist customs policy which the industry demanded,[94] wheras a lack of labour resulted in high labour costs, which acted as a brake on industrial investment. At the same time the Dutch cloth industry was seriously injured by the meeting with the English subsidised trade competition (the bleaching industry of Haarlem was more than halfed between the beginning and end of the 18th century and the number of bleach factories fell from twenty to eight).[95] "Quite contrary to stimulating the development of Dutch industry," says mr. C.H.Wilson, "the loans of Holland in the 18. century prevented and retarded it directly and indirectly ... The attitude at the staple markets and their allies in the banks ... together with the free movement of the international capital prevented what Unwin described as the industrial fertilisation of trade capital .. The economic development of Holland was retarded by a capital leakage in the international finance."[96] That a country takes the first step on the road towards capitalism is no guarantee that it will complete its journey."[97]

As Immanuel Wallerstein points out the Italians and Flanders had been victims to the same fate earlier when industry fled because of high taxes and the high wages caused by the guilds. (More precisely they withstood the international wage decrase of the early seventeenth century.) Capital benefitted most (only in the short term, however) from low wages for production in the periphery and high wages (social welfare) in the center of the international economic system for consumption market - as is the case today. Wallerstein also points out - as List did - that the political lack of unification of Italy was a major cause of its downfall - as it later was to the Hansa and the Dutch: The unwillingness to develop the feudal countryside led to a growing lack of productive investment opportunities and therefore in stead unproductive investments as well as capital flight to economically expanding areas as a result of the international character of the creditsystem.[98] Nevertheless, even as late as in 1786, 97 % of the 1504 ships (not very impressing; little more than 4 a day) visiting the harbour of Amsterdam were of Dutch origin.[99]

CREDIT CONTINUED: IN SERVICE OF ENGLAND

On the credit side the Dutch banks became a contineous source of credit for warfare becoming increasingly important as wars tended to become struggles of endurance. On the other hand the wars contributed to the development of the banking system.[100] And by this intermixing of govermental and banking affairs, as Marx noticed,

"the public debt becomes one of the most energetic levelars of the original accumulation."[101]

The evolution of British financial institution did not rob the Dutch of their leading position but rather strenghtened it and Amsterdam consolidated its position as the center of European finance. By 1790 the Dutch more than 800 million guilders were invested abroad in England, Sweden, France and Russia - more than three times the national income of the United Provinces and was of considerable importance to the economic development of Europe. From 1737 to 1776 the Dutch investments to England rose from 11 million guilders to 59 millions thereby comprising three sevenths of the English national debt.[102]

Kennedy explains how this advantage of credit was used by the English against other nations like Napoleon's France.[103]

"In the 1730s the philosopher Gerorge Berkeley described it as "the chief advantage England has over France; and three decades later an expert on commercial questions spoke of the strength of England's public credit as "the permanent miracle of her policy, which has inspired both astonishment and fear in the States of Europe". ... These comments had much justification: of the costs of the four great wars fought by Britian in 1702-83 three-quarters were raised by borrowing. It was borrowing moreover at relatively low rates of interest: the ability to raise money cheaply was a major British advantage in the country's struggle with France."[104]

Zara Steiner notices that,

"It is the present view of some historians that it was Britain's financial and commercial role and not its manufacturing base that was, and remained, the real source of her wealth. The city of London played the dynamic role in overseas expansion and stood at the centre of Britain's global prestige. World trade was invoiced in pounds and financed by London."[105]

Naturally the Dutch were more interested in the financial stability and reliability of their government clients than of their religion and ideology.[106] Nevertheless, the post-1689 Anglo-Dutch alliance made France the main enemy of the future for the Netherlands and prevented Dutch merchants from trading with the French during the Anglo-French wars of 1689-1815 as had been usual. In the future the Dutch were to provide England with momentous credit for warfare giving England one of its most important weapons for regular and irregular warfare[107]. This ended during the American fights for independence and after when the Netherlands instead entered the wars on the side of France in 1795.[108]

During the 1780s, the Irish managed temporarily to retake their independence from the British with the aid of France[109] who also gave the Americans the decisive help in their fight for independence.[110] So, it seems that in this period of around 1764-1815[111] the British empire was in deep trouble. It may have been an opportune moment for the Dutch to change horses. After all, America emerged as a major trading partner and France as the major land power in Europe. An indication of Holland's more or less informal role is given by the following quote from James A.Huston,

"The focal point for a great deal of the foreign commerce essential for the American colonists in bringing in the munitions needed to support a war was the tiny Dutch island of St.Eustatius in the West Indies. ... during the American Revolution it became a great entrepot for the clandestine exchange of American produce for European munitions of war. ... The States general of the United Netherlands issued procalmations prohibiting the export of munitons of war to the rebelling American colonies, but they appear to have been loosely enforced. It was reported that in the first five months of 1776 eighteen Dutch ships had sailed from Holland for the Americans. A favorite expedient was to load the ships for Africa, and then sail instead to St.Eustatius where powder was bringing six times the price given in Holland. ... While Holland was a principal source of the munitions arriving at St.Eustatius, and the Dutch - with the benefit of a treaty with Great Britian recognizing the doctrine of "free ships, free goods" - were the principal neutral carriers, supplies from France, and appqarently from Great Britian itself, found their way to the American colonies by way of St.Eustatius.

Later when the British extended the war to include the Netherlands, St.Eustatius became one of their primary objectives. When the British seized the island in February 1781 and captured a numbwer of vessels there, they found an estimated £3 million sterling worth of military stores, tobacco and sugar. ... The French recaptured the island a few months later."[112]

At the end of the American and French revolutions and the Napoleonic wars, nevertheless, Britain, Austria, Sweden, and Russia came out on top of this conflict in Europe, against the alliance of the Ireland, France, Denmark-Norway, the Netherlands and the USA. As a result of the continued English supremacy at sea the Netherlands effectively shut itself out of seaborne trade during the Napoleonic wars and after.

The career of the Netherlands as a major sea-trading and partly industrial state was largely ended before this as the decay was visible already in the 1750s even if the collapse came as late as the 1780s. But with the change of partners in the 1780's the Dutch central position was ended also as a financial center and left the stage completely to London. As List points out the Dutch colonies were formally given back to the Netherlands by England only only to become, however, informally the economic colonies of England as the Portugese colonies had been for some time - as a result of the supremacy of the British industrial and naval power as compared with those of Portugal and the Netherlands.

B: THE LATE 18TH CENTURY:

THE AGE OF DECLINE AND THE FAILING ATTEMPTS OF NATIONAL MERCANTILISM

The United Seven Provinces of the Netherlands were for more than a hundred years the leading economic power in Europe and the world but the changing economic circumstances undermined this position from the last decades of the 17th century.

Amsterdam's role as the leading staple market of Europe was undermined when commision business took over. The town no longer found itself at the hub of international transport with the developing new trade routes - as Zuidema notices, this - and thereby an old trade route - was only restored after the industrialisation of Rhineland Germany. The technical and organisational lead was lost to England and France who supported their economic activities by governmental mercantilist policies. Conditions for the new industries of the age were not favourable and the political structure became an impediment to change, Zuidema claims.

Instead Holland developed the features of an aging capitalist country; by financing the commision business and lending to foreign governments, Amsterdam developed into the centre of international finance and insurance, as London City is today. "Exportation of capital was the consequence."[113]

And as Roscher noted in his Principles (Chicago 1882) when railroads were built in the Netherlands they had to be financed from abroad instead of by Dutch sources.

"During two centuries power was in the hand of merchants. This gave them the freedom they needed for their trade. But at the same time this was the source of the eventual decline. Saying it very roughly, the country had degenerated, at the end of the 18th century, into a nation of passive rentiers who were only interested in maintaining a reasonable yield from their capital and who neglected the defence of their country, because they had lost their spirit of enterprise."[114]

The death of the King-Stadtholder in 1702 left the union without a central authority and a regime of merchant-oligarchy ruled. State revenue was to be primarily based on duties on import and export, as well as levies in the towns. The decline of value-added in transport, trade and industry led to unemployment and pauperisation. The financial situation was wrapped in a veil of secrecy. Zuidema write that "Oligarchy and secrecy seem to have been two hallmarks of our country,". In the 1740s during the Austrian war of succession the weaknesses of the Dutch union became apparent.

The election of William of Orange as central Stadtholder made a more central government seem possible. A reorganisation of the tax structure was urgently needed as the Amsterdam silk weavers asked for protection and merchants asked for lifting export duties. A proposal for porto-franco in ports and industrial protection was however turned down as the conservative powers still were too strong. The conservative Orange party lacked vision and energy and the economy deteriorated slowly. - One of the people recognizing the problems was David Ricardo's father, the Amsterdam banker Abraham Ricardo who emigrated to London in 1760.

Nevertheless, the interest in political economy had been awakened and the theme of learned contests of the time was growth in employment and industry. This was intended to be promoted by a reformed tax system, protection of industry and limitation of the export of capital. Foreign artisans were to be invited and internal impediments to production and trade were to be removed. This was all belived to contribute to diminishing costs of production. Domestic production should be promoted, luxury imports taxed and guilds and monopolies in external trade be abolished. This liberalisation had nothing to do with the maxims of d'Argeson (1752) or the ideas of Adam Smith (1776).

Rather, Zuidema stresses, the mood of the period was entirely in the spirit of national mercantilism. These republicans in the country opposed the old merchant class and defended industry. The economists of the time had all read the Dutch mercantilists, especially de la Court, as well as translated mercantilists like the French F.Véron de Forbonnais (translated) and J.A. de Sérionne (alias E.Luzac and Renier Vryaarts), as well as the German von Justi. The interest in anti-protectionism was not large, Zuidema claims, although the French Condillac (1782), Adam Smith (only a fifth of the Wealth.. 1790s) and the Italian Pietro Verri (1801) were translated and the latter propagated by Hogendorp (see below).

The anti-Orangist party was in power and was in favour of protection. Zuidema writes that among others, the following economists were representatives of these ideas:

"A.Rogge, the lawyer H.H.van den Heuvel, the merchants J.van Heukelom and W.Koopman, the historian-jurist E.Luzac, and the professors W.Pestel and A.Kluit. The tendency is evident: the approach was strongly mercantile."[115]

Zuidema does not provide us with much individual analysis of the specific views of these mercantilists of the 18th century, no books by these individuals are refered to neither are any works on their theories refered to. What he does say is that of the two most important academic economists both rejected the analytical appraoch to economics. Education followed the German model and stressed the importance of history and law as a preparation for a career in the civil service. The

originally German professor W.Pestel as well as A.Kluit worked in the German statistical tradition. Pestel stressed a positive balance of trade and critisized the monopoly of the Dutch East India Company. A.Kluit recommended free transit of goods and opposed export duties according to Zuiidema.

Pieter de la Court wrote during a time when Holland was still a leading country economically. Accordingly, his mercantilism was a of a liberalist version regarding monopolies, guilds and such as unfavourable to the economic development of Holland but as Hasenberg Butter emphasizes it was not of an ideological or principle-oriented type. It was rather pragmatic; whenever it was seen as a suitable strategy to further one's interests. Pestel, Luzac and Kluit were the leading Dutch academic economists around the time of the French revolutionary wars when Holland's leadership weas long gone. Accordingly their mercantilism was of the more traditional type favoring more government intervention. This relation between the theories and the economic situation is noticed neither by Zuidema nor by Hasenberg Butter.

Luzac and the German-born Pestel were mercantilists of a quite traditional type favouring industry to trade as opposed to De la Court as the latter was believed to favour only a few inhabitants. Industry should therefore be furthered through tax priviledges. Kluit's favoured writer was von Justi and he was little influenced by liberalist like Verri and Smith. He seemed to have taken over the "cameralistic resistance to Smith" and favoured a more extreme protectionist policy than Pestel and Luzac according to Hasenberg Butter. He found the true and original source of a nation's wealth not to be the supply of money but the productivity of the land and the people. Industry was more important than agriculture and should be protected by the state through restrictions to harmful guilds, public consumption of domestic goods, tax and duty preferences as well as premiums to industry. Care for the poor should be promoted by creating employment. He did not, however, oppose export of capital.

The pivotal role of the United Provinces was lost and because of the inertia of thought of the regents a reconstruction did not take place. Although the economy had declined the Dutch were still very rich at the end of the 18th century when they were occupied by the French. The loose organisation of the Netherlands never created a strong nation and never was ment to. It therefore became an easy victim of French expansionism in the 1790s.

We shall see that when Zuidema claims that,

"After 1815 the central topic was free trade, a truly political orientation.",[116]

then he may, perhaps, have been thinking of another country than the Netherlands. WHY??

2: LIST ON THE NETHERLANDS

List was politically active in the years immediately after the fall of Napoleon - the great inspirer both to List and his forerunner William I of the Netherlands. To List the Netherlands and in particular Holland played perhaps the key role in his strategy of getting Germany and thereby the European Continent on its feet. As List points out by quoting reports to the British parliament this was equally true to the English in order to prevent such a development.

The following quote from The Global Economic System by the Canadian geographer Iain Wallace, will give an idea of the economic and political setting in which List was writing,

"The world economy of Pax Britannica

By 1815 Great Britain had emerged unquestionably as a global hegemonic power. British industry was increasingly demonstrating its superiority over that of other nations, and the British armed forces had established their nation's military and political ascendancy over its principal European rival France. Between 1815 and approximately 1870 the capitalist world-economy expanded in size and geographical reach under relatively stable conditions guaranteed by British supremacy. Mercantilist policies were abandoned as counterproductive, for Britain's economy no longer needed protecting. Even British landowners survived the repeal of the Corn Laws, as growth in domestic food demand provided markets for their output in addition to imports. Logically, therefore, liberal (laissez faire) capitalism became the foundation of British policy - or for most of it, for there was a significant exception. Trade rather than colonialism shaped British dealings with Latin-America and Africa, but not with India. The deliberate destruction of the Indian textile industry in order to consolidate Lancashire's world leadership in cotton goods was a crucial anomaly in the otherwise "home-grown" dynamism of Britain's Industrial Revolution."[117]

The immediate setting was provided by the Congress of Vienna in 1815 which set out to cement the preferred status quo of the winners of the Napoleonic wars, the monarchies England, Russia, and Austria-Hungary, thereby encircling the former republic of France. One of the instruments was the creation of the first Benelux under a king: William I. The efforts directed towards unification of Germany by Karl vom Stein, Bonaparte's bitterest German enemy did not succeed. Actually without the German opposition to Napoleon, with for instance Blücher's forces at Waterloo, Napoleon most likely would have won. Karl vom Stein aimed at restoring in a modern way the Holy Roman empire of the Hohenstauffen rulers in the 10th to 13th centuries. Too many rulers of neighbouring states, though, had interests in preventing this.[118] The German peoples had informally dominated the continent for centuries because of these German-based state constructions.[119] The resulting setting in Vienna was cemented until 1914 but destabilised by the dissolution of the "Benelux" and then strongly so by the unification of the principalities in "northern" Germany by Bismarck - although "the Imperial Government officially declared that Germany did not harbour any further territorial claims in Europe."[120]

List describes the disintegration of Germany in the sixteenth century as a result of among other reasons (the Venetian sponsored) reformation of Martin Luther and the downfall of the Hanseatic league as the English took over their trade,

"When Holland, once part of the Holy Roman Empire, became independent, the estuary of Germany's greatest rivers fell into foreign hands and Germany was so weak at that time that it failed to appreciate the incalculable drawback of Holland becoming an independent state."[121]

Without recapitulating what might be written on List's ideas in too large a measure it may be wise to review his ideas somewhat - especially those pertaining to the situation of the Netherlands. Put short, List's theories are not on economics as the subject is understood today. His subject was far wider-reaching[122]. Dealing with the foundation of welfare and economics List found it to be both the mental and creative attitude of the people in question[123] and therefore as much the balance of power between nations; The issue was productive and political power.[124] The power of a nation would define its degree of self-determination in politics and in particular economic policy and thereby define the productive power and welfare of its citizens which again - vica versa - will define the power of a nation. As will be seen below the establishment of Germany as a merchant power and therefore as a naval power was of the utmost importance and therefore, naturally, the Netherlands was the key to potential German future greatness. To prepare for this future power and welfare of the German and Continental peoples List contributed to the establishment of what he calls

"a league of German merchants and manufacturers for the abolition of our internal tariffs and the adoption of a common commercial policy for the whole of Germany. ...

"As adviser of this German commercial league, I had a difficult position. All the scientifically educated Government employés, all the newspaper editors, all the writers on political economy, had been trained up in the cosmopolitical school, and regarded every kind of protective duty as a theoretical abomination. They were aided by the interests of England, and by those of the dealers in English goods in the ports and the commercial cities of Germany. It is notorious what a powerful means of controlling public opinion abroad, is possessed by the English Ministry in their 'secret service money;' and they are not accustomed to be niggardly where it can be useful to their commercial interests.

"The contest was clearly being fought with unequal weapons. On one side a theory thoroughly elaborated and uncontradicted, a compact school, a powerful party which had advocates in every legislature and learned society, but above all the great motive power - money. On the other side poverty and want, internal divisions, difference of opinion, and absolute lack of theoretical basis."[125]

As a German his primary object was to free Germany from the overwhelming manufacturing supremacy of England and secure the people of his own country a decent standard of living.

"Germany was that which Franklin once said of the State of New Jersey, "a cask which was tapped and drained by it neighbours on every side." England, not contented with having ruined for the Germans the greater part of their own manufactories and supplied them with enormous quantities of cotton and woollen fabrics, excluded from her ports German grain and timber. ... the all-monopolising islanders would not even grant to the poor Germans what they conceded to the conquered hindoos, viz. to pay for the manufactured goods which they received by agricultural produce. ... The latter (the Britons) treated them worse than a subject people. Nations, like individuals, if they at first permit themselves to be ill-treated by one, soon become scorned by all, and finally become an object of derision to the very children."[126]

List did not at all limit his ideas to that of Germany, however, as his perspective was much wider: As a human being, he wrote equally favourably of the development of the European Continent, the United States and South America as well as that of Russia. His main theme, nevertheless, was that of the Continent (the European) versus the "Insular Supremacy" (England). He argued that

"the culture and civilisation of the human race can only be brought about by placing many nations in similar positions of civilisation, wealth, and power; just as England herself has raised herself from a condition of barbarism to her present high condition, so the same path lies open for other nations to follow..."[127]

It is important to remember that List saw the short-sightedness of the old landed aristocracy as a major hindrance to general, universal welfare and security - also for the English. By protecting English agricultural produce USA and Germany were prevented from paying the import of English manufactured products with agricultural exports to England and consequently had to start manufacturing their own and to protect them from English imports. He points out how,

"Lord Castlereagh gave over the commercial policy of England into the hands of the landed aristocracy, and these killed the hen which had laid the golden eggs. Had these permitted the English manufacturers to monopolize the markets of all nations ... after a time the English landed aristocracy would have obtained much higher rents than by the exclusion of foreign grain from the home market."[128]

Since also this tariff on foreign agricultural produce lowered their prices in Germany they acted as an indirect protection of German manufacture. Thereby he considered the English landed aristocracy as having given the impetus to the eventual downfall of English supremacy by neglecting the need to repeal the English protective system after it had done its duty. England thereby simply repeated the follies and the downfall of Venice. In general therefore it seems like List regarded the short-term interests of the landed aristocracy as a main hindrance to progress in industry, welfare and civilisation. This as opposed to Malthus and partly Roscher.

In order to understand his continuous focus on the supremacy of England it is necessary to understand its magnitude and its destructive consequences for other countries.[129] The relative power of England at that time is still unmatched at any point of history by any empire on earth. England was not only strong it was also the biggest bully in the world securing for herself the most advantageous commercial treaties by diplomatic, economic and military force and skill. In this game of trying to repeat the successes of England, and taking over from where France lost that very battle, Germany and therefore Holland would have the future key roles on the Continent in building the bulwark against the "insular supremacy".

It is necessary to remember, as indicated, that Germany not at all was the obvious or only challenger to the position of England as should be obvious if one remembers the time in which the book was written; 25 years after the defeat of Napoleon's France. France had most of the time between ca. 1462 (with the system of Louis XI) and that day been the most powerful nation on the Continent - for some 350 years. Contributing to its strength France had been ruled by the kind of economic system which England had displayed a variant of and which List wished for Germany to implement; the national mercantilist system of the treasurers (Jean Bodin,) Sully, Richelieu and Colbert. Germany had most of that time been split and in ruins after endless internal wars and invasions - from Sweden, France, Austria and Russia. Dudley Dillard writes that,

"Germany's rapid growth towards becoming the leading industrial country in the years between 1870 and 1914 disturbed the political and military balance of power between the European nations. At least from the time of Louis XIV until Napoleon I France had been the most powerful nation in Europe. Great Britain took care of the balance of power both over against Louis XIV and Napoleon's France. By alternately supporting Preussia, Austria and other of the continental rivals of France, the British could hold France in check. By the beginning of the 20 century Germany had taken the place of France as the strongest nation on the continent. In order to uphold the balance of power in Europe the British now allied with France against Germany."[130]

In this Dillard might have noticed the repeated efforts historically, as for instance in 1648 and 1815, to keep not only the continent separated but also Germany separated. Britain´s efforts were primarily directed against a continental league no matter who was to be the dominant power. List saw his goal as establishing exactly such a "veredelte Continentalsystems", peacefully following Napoleon's example, which was to equal the forces of England. This would be precluded, however, as long as England’s "Balance of Power" system, pitting continental nations against each other, was not put to an end.[131] Paul Kennedy gives among other examples of balance of power strategy one concerning the result of the Peace of Utrecht in 1713:

"The allocation of the Spanish Netherlands, Naples and Sardinia to Austria, a non-maritime power, was a classic example of divide et impera on Britain's part, since it tied the Emperor to the defence of those key strategical points which London wished, in any case, to be kept out of Bourbon hands. Friendly alliances with those British satellites, Portugal and Savoy, the latter of which received Sicily, and the acquisition of some (but not all) of the barrier fortresses by the Dutch, completed this system of checks and balances. The destruction of the privateer port of Dunkirk, and the recognition of Louis XIV of the Protestant Succession in Britain, put the icing on the cake.[132]

The end of the balance of power politics on the Continent was therefore the goal of both Napoleon and of List. But as List himself noted, every nation seeks to divide other nations in order to rule. Karl Polyani points out, in a way that could easily be made to account for the Venetian situation that,

"The balance of power policy is an English national institution. ... That policy was the outcome of her island position off a continental littoral occupied by organized political communities. "Her rising school of diplomacy, from Wolsey to Cecil, pursued Balance of Power as England's only chance of security in face of the great Continental states being formed," says Trevelyan. This policy was definitely established under the Tudors, was practised by Sir William Temple, as well by Canning, Palmerstone, or Sir Edward Grey. It antedated the emergence of a balance of power system on the Continent by almost two centuries..."[133]

Polyani then describes how the peace treaty in 1648 established the status quo as something desirable to all as it guaranteed common action against anyone breaking that peace. With the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, however, the balance-of-power principle was formally recognised. Thereafter political Europe was built upon this principle as a system. "the independence of the small states was indirectly safeguarded by the system." What Polyani forgets to notice, however, is that this system also safeguarded the power of the great powers of the existing status quo being in particular Great Britain and France and preventing the unification of small states into a new great power, being in particular Germany. The history and permanent potential threat of the empires of Charlemagne and Frederick I Barbarossa and Frederick II Hohenstauffen had not been forgotten by the other great powers.[134]

In promoting this strategy of "continental self-defence" against England's destructive policies towards the Continent List was not by any means a slavish follower of economic "protectionism" but rather saw this as one possible measure to be used depending on the specific circumstances of the situation regarding a whole lot of things.[135] The primary goal of economic policy he argued was promote the productive powers and thereby and therefore (feedback!) raise the welfare and culture of a nation. In modern language one would say to raise the productivity, or the efficiency of production. But List's expression also carries with it an idea of how to accomplish this through rent-seeking; through building competence in production of strategic goods establishing a comparative advantage and thereby an overhead; a surplus; or more precisely a quasi-rent to use the term of Albert Schäffle. This could only be accomplished by industrialisation and therefore governmental stimuli to tend, protect and thereby raise the productive powers of a nation. Of these he considered the immaterial forces of knowledge, competence and indeed the will to strengthen these powers to be the foremost conditions.[136]

He used historical examples to drive his point through and did indeed argue that the same industrial principles could be used by any nation. The concept of nation was for him and still is today, indeed, a vital concept. As an economist he considered the concept nation from an economic point of view. This in turn hinges on the notion of what the concept economy means and therefore what economic policy may be.

List argued that production does usually not simply develop by itself but that it has to be created consciously and wilfully both on the individual and collective level. As noted above the immaterial powers of production were considered by List to be the most important ones. They are also the most tender ones as opposed to natural resources which are not likely to be lost as easily. In fact knowledge and competence establish the very definition and existence of natural resources. This precarious status of the most important (immaterial) powers of production implies the necessity of a tending government, e.g. authority over a geographical region, which should promote the productive powers. Thereby the goal to supply the population of a geographical region with its necessities could be reached.

The first obligation of a government would be to security of its supplies. This can be established by domestic production and eventually supplemented by trade. Thereby we have reached the area where List repeatedly speaks of the Netherlands in connection to his primary object which was the liberation of Germany. This however, was set in a larger perspective; that of the continental liberation of the productive forces in order to secure every nation in Europe a decent living standard in opposition to the domination of the then ruling economic big power of Europe, England.

His way of approaching this therefore hinged on the conception of what a viable nation is. To him history had proved again an again that unions or leagues of trading towns; commercial mercantilism, could not survive the competition with nation-states; national mercantilism. This was proved with the fall of the Venetian league, the Hanseatic league and the Dutch league. The winners was the first nation-states which developed its productive powers into industrialisation; France and England.

The deficiency of these unions of trading towns was that the did not develop their hinterland and remained satisfied with being middle-men of the production and the consumption of other regions thereby acquiring a trading-profit. To some extent only, was domestic production encouraged but then only locally around the trading towns. An effort to develop infrastructure in the hinterland and thereby the productive forces of the hinterland would eventually give enormous positive feedback impulses to the trading towns but was lacking in the commercial mercantilism of the feudal ages. The coming of national mercantilism in the 15th century changed that especially in France and England both of which by conscious national policy overtook the technological and economic leadership of the Venicians, the Hanse and the Dutch in the period 1450-1700 and thereby took over the political leadership of Europe and the world. And essential to List: Only when politically strong could any nation hope to establish the international conditions which would secure its rights to wealth and decent ways of life. In other words, to secure a prosperous future government had to tend its economic roots today.

In his chapter on "Nationality and the Economy of the Nation" List argues against the school of "exchange value" (as opposed to List's and H.Carey's preferred school of "use value") following Adam Smith that it not only suffers from boundless cosmopolitanism, dead materialism, but also from disorganising particularism and individualism which,

"considers private industry only as if it would develop itself under a state of free interchange with society (i.e. with the whole human race) were that race not divided into separate national societies.

Between each individual and entire humanity, however, stands the NATION, ... which regognizes the law of right for and within itself, and in its united character is opposed to other societies of a similar kind in their national liberty, and consequently can only under the existing conditions of the world maintain self-existence and independence by its own power and resources. As the individual chiefly obtains by means of the nation and in the nation mental culture, power of production, security, and prosperity, so is the civilisation of the human race only conceivable and possible by means of the civilisation and development of the individual nations."[137]

Since the nations are infinite different in the conditions and circumstances and since an impulse of self-preservation and of improvement is implanted by nature,

"It is the task of politics to civilise the barbarous nationalities ... It is the task of national economy to accomplish the economical development of the nation, and to prepare it for admission into the universal society of the future."[138]

"A large nation in its normal state possesses one common language and literature, a territory endowed with manifold natural resources, extensive, and with the convenient frontiers and a numerous population. Agriculture, manufactures, commerce, and navigation must be all developed in it proportionately; arts and sciences, educational establishments, and universal cultivation must stand in it on an equal footing with material production. Its constitution, laws, and institution must afford to those who belong to it a high degree of security and liberty, and must promote religion, morality and prosperity; in a word, must have the well-being of its citizens as their object. It must posses sufficient power on land and at sea to defend its independence and to protect its foreign commerce."[139]

"A large population, and an extensive territory endowed with manifold national resources, are essential requirements of the normal nationality ... A nation restricted ... can only posses a crippled literature, crippled institutions for promoting art and science. A small state can never bring to complete perfection within its territory the various branches of production. In it all protection becomes mere private monopoly. Only through alliances with more powerful nations, by partly sacrificing the advantages of nationality, and by excessive energy, can it maintain with difficulty its independence.

A nation which possesses no coasts, mercantile marine, or naval power, or has not under its dominion and control the mouths of the rivers, is in its foreign commerce dependent on other countries; ...

A nation not bounded by seas and chains of mountains lies open to attack of foreign nations, and can only by great sacrifices, and in any case only very imperfectly, establish and maintain a separate tariff system of its own.

Territorial deficiencies of the nation can be remedied either by means of hereditary succession ... purchase ... or by conquests ...

In modern times a fourth means has been adopted, which leads to this object in a manner much more in accordance with justice and with the prosperity of nations than conquest, and which is not so dependent on accidents as hereditary succession, namely, the union of the interests of various States by means of free conventions.

By its Zollverein, the German nation first obtained one of the important attributes of its nationality. But this measure cannot be considered complete so long as it does not extend over the whole cost, from the mouth of the Rhine to the frontier of Poland, including Holland and Denmark. A natural consequence of this union must be the admission of both these countries into the German Bund, and consequently into the German nationality, whereby the latter will at once attain what it is now in need of, namely, fisheries and naval power, maritime commerce and colonies. Besides, both these countries belong, as respects their descent and whole character, to the German nationality. The burden of debt with which they are oppressed is merely a consequence of their unnatural endeavours to maintain themselves as independent nationalities, and it is in the nature of things that this evil should rise to a point when it will become intolerable to those two nations themselves, and when incorporation with a larger nationality must seem desirable and necessary to them.

Belgium can only remedy by means of confederation with a neighbouring larger federation her needs which are inseparable from her restricted territory and population."[140]

Like national mercantilism since Louis XI in the late 15. century List advocated the establishment of national markets by uniting the markets of the provinces through establishment of infrastructure: transport facilities of rivers, canals and railroads; establishment of colonies abroad through supervision of emigration, regular lines of steamships, a merchant fleet as well as a German navy to protect it; German foreign consulates and commercial treaties with the United States and Holland as well as with other countries.

List's idea was that free trade was a good idea as long as military wars and trade wars did not exist. Also

"the uniting of all nations under a common law of right ... is to be attained only through the greatest possible equalisation of the most important nations of the earth in civilisation, prosperity, industry and power, ... but the solution of this problem is a work of immensely long duration. ... As yet, the apportionment of territory to the European nations does not correspond to the nature of things. ... If every nation was already in possession of the territory which is necessary for its internal development, and for the maintenance of its political, industrial, and commercial independence, then every conquest of territory woulf be contrary to sound policy, ... A just and wise apportionment of territory is, however, at this day not to be thought of... "[141]

So, more realistically (and indeed the ideas of the mercantilists and of List are noted as the forerunners of today's realist approach in international politics literature - as with Robert Gilpin), in an unstable world things were different and accordingly trade policy had to be otherwise. Indeed, the history of the foremost promoter of free trade was a nation which had used the exact opposite remedies to establish herself as the leading economic and political power; England. Opposing the view that governmental regulation is the exception P.J.D.Wiles claims that,

"What really has to be explained is how there was ever pure capitalism, free trade and anti-imperialism[142]: these are the strange phenomena, and they have no right to dominate our textbooks. The answer is of course that that this exceptional period (c.1815-1870) was dominated by one industrial power alone, Britain. She at any rate as the pioneer, had had to weaken the state in order to abolish the old Mercantilist technological restrictions and give capital free play. Thereafter other states might be expected to take a more enlightened view of the new industry, and restrict it in more appropriate ways. This is indeed what happened.

Looking now abroad, for Britain, as the overwhelming front-runner, free trade was Mercantilism. She needed, like all Mercantilist powers, to reserve a colonial market as her very own. This market simply happened to be, at the time, the world. But cynicism is never enough. There was also a very genuine ideological movement, engendered no doubt by the objective fact of the American defeat. Its first move was the abolition of the slave trade (1807) but it gathered strength by the defeat of Napoleon, the arch-Mercantilist (1815). ... With this background free trade was inevitable, though the actual abandonment of imperial power over other races in, say, India was not on the cards.

So free trade coexisted with imperialism and then, when other countries had industrialised and begun annexing new empires, faded away again (c. 1870). Except for Britain, the whole period of capitalism has been one of state capitalism and imperialism, from 1600 until 1945. And the British exception does not amount to much. After all, within four years of the advent of free trade even in agricultural products (the abolition of the Corn Laws, 1846, the great climax of the whole movement) the Royal Navy was sent to Greece to enforce the debt claims of a man who may not have been a British subject (Don Pacifico 1850).[143]

With these kinds of wars - trade related wars - being the rule rather than the exception; therefore, in order to be viable a nation had to secure for herself with a certain degree of invulnerability. Therefore she should be self-supplied with the most basic goods and implicitly (!) able to pressure her way into accessibility of what is otherwise needed - if herself threatened and pressured. In order to be self-supplied all aspects of a modern agro-industrial trading nation had to be represented; industry, agriculture and other raw materials for the industry were needed. And the industry was needed to lift the efficiency of the other parts of the economy.

In the original mercantilist scheme colonies were to be established in order to provide the supply of raw materials and a consumption market of industrial products for the industry of the motherland. Therefore the establishment of industry likely to compete with that of the motherland was to be prohibited. Thereby the establishment of new nation-states was also hindered at least in the sense of being economically independent organisations as referred to above. (And in this sense one may say that the liberation of the European colonies in the 1960s to a large degree has not led to any new nation-states but only to self-rule within the frames established by the economic dispositions of the former colonial powers - as through the SAP; the Structural Adjustment Program of the International Monetary Fund. The main effect may therefore be said to be a relief of the administrative burden of the colonial powers.

Whereas List was thinking in ways familiar to old national or state mercantilism the English who had already established themselves as the leading power could afford to refine their method of power in order to make it more efficient and less costly both economically and politically. The method was free trade in general and trade agreements more particularly. Bernard Porter writes in a chapter called "An empire in all but name: the mid-nineteenth century" that,

"The mid-Victorians themselves, or at least some of them, knew how wide their empire was spread. There was much disparaging talk of empire at the time, but generally what was objected to was a particular kind of empire - the old mercantilist empire with colonies forced to supply Britain's industries with raw materials, forbidden to compete with her in manufactures, and prohibited from trading with other countries. The old American colonies had been in this kind of relationship to Britain, with bitter and long-remembered consequences. The apostles of the "free trade" creed in the mid-nineteenth century favoured a more subtle kind of empire, a method by which (said a free trader in 1846) "foreign nations would become valuable Colonies to us, without imposing on us the responsibility of governing them"[144]. The method was to dominate the world by means of a natural superiority in industry and commerce. ... This informal empire was the product of Britain's expanding economy."[145]

Wallerstein characterises political empires (i.e. traditional imperialism; formal empire) as "a primitive means of economic dominance" and claims that a (informal) capitalist economic "world system" is "a more lucrative well of revenue-collection". In stead of using energy to produce political stability energy is used for securing monopolistic rights.[146] Regulation (mercantilism) and free trade (liberalism) are only different ways of securing these rights the choice being dependent on the particular situation of the subject state and the object area as Lars Magnusson point out. He claims that the British foreign policy to a large extent was directed towards making large parts of the world to "economic colonies" or "satellite colonies" under Great Britain. "Only if this policy failed would direct annexation be pursued".[147] According to Magnusson, the Manchester-liberalists' criticism of mercantilism to a large extent followed Adam Smith's own criticism in the Wealth of Nations.

Concerning the establishment of Britain's colonies in South-East Asia Porter writes,

" Britain would much have preferred to extend her trade without extending her political control. But things seemed to be taken out of her hands. The area of British economic interest in one or two places hardened into areas of overt colonial or near-colonial domination, by a natural process , almost of reaction and counter-reaction. Victorians grumbled at the responsibilities thus incurred, but they had about as much right to complain as a reluctant father-to-be. They did not want what happened, but they had wanted the thing which made it happen."[148]

This refinement of British imperialism introduced credit as a major instrument as pointed out by the teacher of US. President Clinton, Carroll Quigley and referred to below. This made the Dutch experience particularly in the Bank of Amsterdam crucial as Adam Smith pointed out in the acknowledgement in the Wealth of Nations.

This refinement of imperialism was of course not anything new as Immanuel Wallerstein points out. Venice as the main supporter and organiser of the Crusades refused to take over the political responsibility of the Byzantine empire when offered it but willingly secured for itself the monopoly of the markets controlled by this Latin dominion.[149]

The old realist model of national mercantilism should with List and his American "contemporaries" as A.Hamilton, H.Clay, D.Raymond, M.& H.Carey and E.Peshine Smith be viewed as part of a larger scheme where it was to be complemented by the harmony of interests policy thereby making it less "nationalist" in the meaning the word is most often used today - or more correctly; less "chauvinist": This harmony of interest policy would imply that the development of other nations would benefit one's own nation as well by creating not only competitors for raw materials and markets: It would also create new markets for one's own products and new knowledge which could be utilised in the domestic production of welfare. Besides the kind of markets that would be created would be of an higher order of quality implying that more advanced products could be exported. This would expand the potential for large-scale production in these areas of production and thereby improve one's own potential welfare. This strategy would in total be in the interest of all nations as it would improve the welfare of all and it would also be realistic by seeing the world as it is; a competitive market.

THE NETHERLANDS

The Netherlands had in List's view no viability by itself. Only when united to other regions which were industrialised was it lifted to the level of the foremost economic powers; the period under Burgundy rule and Spanish rule before 1648, the period under and after the French revolution and occupation until 1830, both of which united the northern part of the Netherlands to the southern part; Belgium and Luxembourg.[150]

- This is to be doubted; the golden era 1580-1648 was not a period of unification; the growth of prosperity was but a result of the resolution of the union and resulting Flemish refugees establishing themselves in the northern provinces around Amsterdam thereby creating the industrial backbone of mercantile activity. In other words List's argument rather counts for the period before the golden era.

The strength was regathered with the industrialisation of Germany in the late 19th century when the Netherlands again became an important trade hub without having to work for it itself - as was the case with effects of the Flemish immigration, which lasted until 1703 (with the Methuen treaty between England and Portugal - as the English a century before managed to conquer the trade to Russia from the Hanse league). The intermediate periods 1648-1795 and 1830-1870 (???) were characterised by relative decay.

List therefore argued that not only would Germany profit, but also the Netherlands would profit from an arrangement of continental protectionism. In his Nat.Sys. he describes the history of the Hanse and the Netherlands in chapter 3 and 4 "The Hanse" and "The Netherlanders" and the relationship between the Netherlands and Germany in chapter 36 "The commercial policy of the German Zollverein."

As noticed above List's primary object as a German

"was to free Germany from the overwhelming manufacturing supremacy of England and secure the people of his own country a decent standard of living." Similarly as a European he held the opinion that the whole European continent had to free itself from the manufacturing supremacy of England. In trying to repeat the successes of England, both Germany and Holland would have key roles although different.

List argued that the countries of the Continent had special interests in uniting against the English supremacy - as countries of the continent earlier had reason to unite against the supremacy of France: when Napoleon introduced his Continental system with the intent of uniting Europe as a defence against English domination he made the mistake of granting France the same position within this system as England had before and after, argues List. Thereby, Napoleon secured the basis for the future opposition against an introduction of French mercantilism á la Bodin, Richelieu & Colbert[151]. Instead, all of Europe preferred the English system of free trade[152]. To Palmer and Colton the Napoleonic system brought back enlightened despotism to Europe and the advantages of the French Revolution without its violence.[153] Unable to invade England Napoleon wished bring the island to its knees economically by a continental trade blockade against English produce established with the 1806 Berlin decree[154] but in fact by the similar "order in council" 1807 response from England, proclaiming a trade blockade against the Continent, the result was to give England a factual monopoly on sea trade for the next century - thereby making it possible to end the English protectionist Navigation Act in 1833.

"Beyond the tributary states of the grand Empire lay the countries nominally independent, joined under Napoleon in the Continental System. Napoleon thought of his allies as at best subordinate partners in a common project. The great project was to crush Great Britain, and it was for this purpose that the Continental System had been established. But the crushing of Great Britain became in Napoleon's mind a means to a further end, the unification and mastery of all of Europe. This in turn had he achieved it, would doubtless have merely opened the way to further conquests. ...

... to arouse an all-European feeling , Napoleon worked upon the latent hostility to great Britain. The British, in winning out in the eighteenth-century struggle for wealth and empire, had made themselves disliked in many quarters. There were the natural jealousy felt toward the successful and resentment against the highhandedness by which success had been won and was maintained. Such feelings were present among almost all Europeans. It was believed that the British were really using their sea power to win a larger permanent share of the world's seaborne commerce for themselves. Nor, in truth, was this belief mistaken."[155]

The blockades protected West-Continental industry which experienced a boom - as did the American industry. The English industry experienced a boom thanks to their new-found monopoly of seaborne trade with the colonies. The aim of the British blockade policy was as always,

"to kill off enemy commerce and shipping, in order, in the short run, to weaken the war-making powers of the enemy government by undermining its revenues and its navy, and in the long run to weaken the enemy's position in the markets of the world. Economic warfare was trade warfare. The British were willing enough to have British goods pass trough to the enemy either by smuggling or by the mediation of neutrals.

As early as 1793 the French republicans had denounced England as the "modern Carthage," a ruthless mercantile and profit-seeking power which aspired to enslave Europe to its financial and commercial system. With the wars, the British in fact obtained a monopoly over the shipment of overseas commodities into Europe. ... and ... threatened to monopolize the European market for ... manufactured goods. There was much feeling in Europe against the modern Carthage, especially among the bourgeois and commercial classes who were in competition with it. The upper classes were perhaps less hostile, not caring where the goods that they consumed had originated, but aristocracies and governments were susceptible to the argument that Britain was a money power, a "nation of shopkeepers" as Napoleon put it, which fought its wars with pounds sterling instead of blood and was always in search of dupes in Europe.

It was on these feelings that Napoleon played, reiterated time and time again that England was the real enemy of Europe, and that Europe would never be prosperous or independent until relieved of the incubus of British "monopoly." To prevent the flow of goods into Britain was no more the purpose of the Continental System than to prevent the flow of goods into France was the purpose of the British blocade. The purpose of each was to destroy the enemy's commerce, credit, and public revenues by the destruction of his exports - and also to build up markets for oneself. ...

But the Continental System was more than a device for destroying the export trade of Great Britain. It was also a scheme - today it would be called a "plan" - for developing the economy of a continental Europe, around France as its main center. The Continental System, if successful, would replace the national economies with an integrated economy for the Continent as a whole. It would create the framework for a European civilisation. And it would ruin the British sea power and commercial monopoly; for a unified Europe, Napoleon thought, would soon take to the sea. ...

But the Continental System failed; it was worse than a failure, for it caused widespread antagonism to the Napoleonic regime. The dream of a unified Europe, under French rule, was not sufficiently attractive to inspire the necessary sacrifice - even a sacrifice more of comforts than of necessities."[156]

The British trade blockade denied Europe access to demanded luxuries which were colonial. Shipping, shipbuilding, ports, commerce with oversea goods, all strong elements of the old bourgeoisie were also hard hit by the blocade and disgrunted. The Continental System certainly provided necessary goods as Europe was self-supplied with agricultural and industrial goods and industrial interests were well disposed toward the industrial system. But commerce was difficult because of the lack of efficient alternatives to seaborne transportation as roads did not improve enough.

"infant industries and investments were built up which, after Napoleon's fall clamoured for tariff protection. In general, the European industrial interests were well disposed toward the Continental System.

Yet they could never adequately replace the British in supplying the market. One obstacle was transportation. Much trading between parts of the Continent had always been done by sea: this coastal traffic was now blocked by the British. Land routes were increasingly used, ... But land transport, at best, was no substitute for the sea. Without railroads, introduced some thirty years later, a purely Continental economy was impossible to maintain.

Another obstacle was tariffs. The idea of a Continental tariff union was put forward by some of his subordinates, but Napoleon never adopted it. The dependent states remained insistent on their ostensible sovereignty. Each had widened its trading area by demolishing former internal tariffs, but each kept a tariff against the others. ...

As a war measure against Great Britain the Continental System also failed. British trade with Europe was significantly reduced. But the loss was made up elsewhere because of British control of the sea."[157]

As we shall see below, in List's view, being politically active in the years immediately after Napoleon's fall, the Netherlands and in particular Holland played perhaps the key role in his strategy of getting Germany and thereby the Continent on its feet. As he points out this was equally true for the English in order to prevent such a development.

List compares the German situation where the Zollverein did not include the Netherlands with that of a house where the door belongs to a stranger and argues that for self-dependence it is necessary to get some kind of control over this entrance. The English saw this in the same manner apparently but with the opposite intentions. List quotes the report of English consul at Rotterdam, Mr. Alexander Ferrier,

"For the commercial interests of Great Britain ... it appears of the greatest possible importance that no means should be left untried to prevent the aforesaid states (pr.au.'s remark: Holland, the Hanse towns, and Russia), and also Belgium, from entering the Zollverein, for reasons which are too clear to need any exposition. ... Whatever may happen ... Holland must at all times be considered the main channel for the commercial relations of South Germany with other countries."

List comments as follows,

"Clearly Mr. Ferrier understands by the term "other countries," merely England; clearly he means to say that if the English manufacturing supremacy should loose it means of access to Germany on the North Sea and the Baltic, Holland would still remain to it as the great means of access by which it could predominate over the markets for manufactured goods and colonial produce of Germany.

But we from a national point of view say and maintain that Holland is in reference to its commercial and industrial circumstances, and to the origin and language of its inhabitants, a German province, which has been separated from Germany at a period of German national disunion, without whose reincorporation in the German union Germany may be compared to a house the door of which belongs to a stranger: Holland belongs as much to Germany as Brittany and Normandy belong to France, and so long as Holland is determined to constitute an independent kingdom of her own, Germany can as little attain independence and power as France would have been enabled to attain if those provinces had remained in the hands of the English. That the commercial power of Holland has declined, is owing to the unimportance of the country. Holland will and must also, notwithstanding the prosperity of her colonies, continue to decline, because the nation is too weak to support the enormous expense of a considerable military and naval power. Through her exertions to maintain her nationality Holland must become more and more deeply involved in debt. Notwithstanding her great colonial prosperity, she is and remains all the same a country dependent upon England, and by her seeming independence she only strengthens English supremacy. This is also the secret why England at the congress of Vienna took under her protection the restoration of the Dutch seeming independence. The case is exactly the same with the Hanse Towns. On the side of England, Holland is a satellite for the English fleet - unite it with Germany, she is the leader of the German naval power. In her present position Holland cannot nearly so well derive profit from her colonial possessions as if they became a constituent part of the German Union, especially because she is too weak in the elements which are necessary for colonisation - in colonisation and mental powers. Further than this, the profitable development of her colonies, so far as that has hitherto been effected, depends for the most part on German good nature, or rather on the non-acquaintance of the Germans with their own national commercial interests; for while all other nations reserve their market for colonial produce for their own colonies and for the countries subject to them, the German market is the only one which remains open to the Dutch for their disposal of their colonial produce."[158]

The Hanse towns, Belgium and Holland were from the days of Charlemagne and are still today Germany's main access to export by sea. Concerning Holland List complains that the situation was more beneficial to Holland than to Germany. The Dutch sold their colonial products mainly to Germany as Germany was without colonies whereas Holland did not buy much products from Germany. He argued that if Holland would instead of applying the old merchant maxim of "buy cheap and sell dear" this would benefit them more as it would the Germans. This argument was directed equally much toward the Hanse towns which List saw just as much as Belgium and Holland as instruments of British economic and therefore political interests. Even in the prosperous times of the Hanse they did not benefit the German hinterland as Karl Polyani comments.[159] But, concerning the Dutch, if they were to buy German produce German industry would prosper and therefore import even more Dutch produce. At the time, however, the Dutch bought their manufacturing produce from the English.

"As soon as the Germans clearly comprehend that those from whom they purchase colonial produce must be made to understand that they on their part must purchase manufactured goods from Germany under differentially favourable treatment, then the Germans will also see clearly that they have in their power to compel Holland to join the Zollverein. That union would be of the greatest advantage to both countries. Germany would give Holland the means not only of deriving profits from her colonies far better than at present, but also to found and acquire new colonies. Germany would grant special preferential privileges to Dutch colonial produce in the German markets. Holland and the Hanse Towns, in return would preferentially export German manufactures, and preferentially employ their surplus capital in the manufactories and the agriculture of the interior of Germany.

Holland, as she has sunk from her eminence as a commercial power because she, the mere fraction of a nation, wanted to make herself pass as an entire nation; because she sought her advantage in the oppression and the weakening of the productive powers of Germany, instead of basing her greatness on the prosperity of the countries which lie behind her, with which every maritime state must stand or fall; because she sought to become great by her separation from the German nation instead of by her union with it; Holland can only again attain to her ancient state of prosperity by means of the German Union and in the closest connection with it. Only by this union is it possible to constitute an agricultural manufacturing commercial nationality of the first magnitude."[160]

List believed that if the coastal parts of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland joined the Zollverein,

"then Germany could secure peace to the continent of Europe for a long time, and at the same time constitute herself as the central point of a durable continental alliance. ... the nations which are less powerful at sea can only match England at sea by uniting their own naval power, ... They all again, if Germany, Holland and Belgium constitute together a common naval power; for while separated these last are mere satellites to the supremacy of England, but if united they strengthen the opposition to that supremacy of all nations at sea."[161]

And, indeed, as Gustav Schmoller notes, the British foreign secretary,

"Palmerston announced this Zollverein to be a measure directed against England and against which reprisals must be made."[162]

List goes on to explain that since no other nation has any mercantile marine or any industrial power

"which would maintain important preponderance of others. None of them, therefore, has any ground to fear the competition of others. On the other hand, all have a common interest in protecting themselves against the destructive competition of England. Hence it must be to the interest of all that the predominating manufacturing power of England should lose those means of access (Holland, Belgium, and the Hanse Towns) by means of which England has hitherto dominated the markets of the continent."[163]

List describes in a few passages the history and interest of the continental European countries in a way that is up to date to a terrifying degree,

"If we only consider the enormous interest which the nations of the continent have in common, as opposed to the English maritime supremacy, we shall be led to the conviction that nothing is so necessary to these nations as union, and noting is so ruinous to them as Continental wars. The history of the last century also teaches us that every war which the powers of the Continent have waged against one another has had for its invariable result to increase the industry, the wealth, the navigation, the colonial possessions, and the power of the insular supremacy."

Therefore the continental system of Napoleon was in essence right but suffered from several defects already mentioned putting France in the place of England.

"That the idea of this Continental system will ever recur, that the necessity of realising it will the more forcibly impress itself on the Continental nations in proportion as the preponderance of England in industry, wealth, and power further increases, is already very clear, and will continue become more evident. But it is not less certain that an alliance of the Continental nations can only have a good result if France is wise enough to avoid the errors of Napoleon. ...

An effective Continental system can only originate from the free union of the continental powers, and can succeed only in case it has for its object (and also effects) an equal participation in the advantages which result from it, for in that way only, and in no other, can the maritime powers of second rank command respect from the predominant power of England in such a way that the latter without any recourse to the force of arms will concede all the just requirements of the less powerful states. Only by such an alliance will the Continental manufacturing powers be able to maintain their r4altions with tropical countries, and assert and secure their interests in the East and in the West.

In any case the British, who are ever to anxious for supremacy, must feel it hard when they perceiving this manner how the Continental nations will reciprocally raise their manufacturing power by mutual commercial concessions and by treaties; how they will ...

For the same causes which have raised Great Britain to her present exalted position, will (probably in the course of the next century) raise the United States of America to a degree of industry, wealth, and power, which will surpass the position in which England stands, as far as at present England excels little Holland. ...

Thus in a not very distant future the natural necessity which now imposes on the French and Germans the necessity of establishing a Continental alliance against the British supremacy, will impose on the British the necessity of establishing a European coalition against the supremacy of America. Then will Great Britain be compelled to seek and to find in the leadership of the united powers of Europe protection, security, and compensation against the predominance of America, and an equivalent for her lost supremacy.

It is therefore good for the English that she should practise resignation betimes, that she should by timely renunciations gain the friendship of European Continental powers, that she should accustom herself betimes to the idea of being only the first among equals."[164]

In his final chapter, on the "Commercial Policy of the German Zollverein" List argued that" a moderate protective duty" should "completely establish

"a guarantee for our capitalists and artisans by which they may be protected against loss of capital and loss of work"[165]

Thereby Germany should also be able to

"establish extensive machine manufactories" and

"development of a race of competent technical instructors and practical foremen."[166]

Concerning the colonial trade where France and England gave preference and privileges to trade with their own colonies,

"we should give a preference to those tropical countries which purchase manufactured goods from us; or, in short, that we should buy from those who buy from us. That is the case in reference to our trade with the West Indies and to North and South America.

But it is not the case in reference to our trade with Holland, which country supplies with enormous quantities of her colonial produce, but takes only in return disproportional small quantities of our manufactured goods.

At the same time Holland is naturally directed to the market of Germany for the disposal of the greater part of her colonial produce, inasmuch as England and France"[167]

give preference to products from their own colonies. and therefore only import small quantities of Dutch produce.

"Holland has no important manufactoring industry of her own, but, on the other hand, has a great productive industry in her colonies, which has recently greatly increased and may be immeasurably further increased. But Holland desires of Germany that which is unfair, and acts contrary to her own interests if rightly understood, inasmuch as she desires to dispose of the greater part of her colonial produce to Germany, while she desires to supply her requirements of manufactured goods from any quarter she like best. This is, for Holland, an only apparently beneficial and a short-sighted policy; for if Holland would give preferential advantages to German manufactured goods both in the mother country and in her colonies, the demand in Germany for Dutch colonial produce would increase in the same proportion in which the sale of German manufactured goods to Holland and her colonies increased, or, in other words, Germany would be able to purchase so much the more colonial produce in proportion as she sold more manufactured goods to Holland; Holland would be able to dispose of so much more colonial produce to Germany as she purchased from Germany manufactured goods. This reciprocal exchange operation is, at present, rendered impracticable by Holland if she sells her colonial produce to Germany while she purchases her requirements in manufactured goods from England, because England (no matter how much of manufactured goods she sells to Holland) will always supply the greater parts of her own requirements of colonial produce from her own colonies, or from the countries which are subject to her.

Hence the interest of Germany require that she should either demand from Holland a differential duty in favour of Germany's manufacturing production, by which the latter can secure to herself the exclusive market for manufactured goods in Holland and her colonies, or, in case of refusal, that Germany should impose a differential duty on the import of colonial produce in favour of the produce of Central and South America and of the free markets of the West Indies.

The above-named policy would constitute the most effective means of inducing Holland to join the German Zollverein."[168]

As a consequence of this analysis he concluded concerning Germany's commercial position therefore was that,

"the German protective system only accomplices its object in a very imperfect manner, so long as Germany does not spin for herself the cotton ... : so long as she possesses no perfect system of transport by river, canal, or railway: so long as the German Zollverein does not include all German maritime territories and also Holland and Belgium.[169]

List added to the mercantilist system of Richelieu, Colbert and James Steuart the British and especially the American experience concerning the importance of the invention of steam power utilised in railroads. By supplying an additional means of landbased transportation (apart from poor roads, rivers and canals) this made it possible to overcome the drawbacks for a nation of being a land power as opposed to being a sea-power. Commerce with other countries and colonies could thereafter to some extent be performed by way of railroads in addition to by way of ships. The construction of railroads therefore had a tremendous effect on the balance of power on the world scene an in particular in Europe and explains why the construction of railroads was followed with great attention in England as it without doubt contributed to severe competition to England's supremacy. Several British historians like Peter Hopkirk and Sir Michael Howard have recently claimed that the German railroad construction caused the two world wars. Although this has some truth to it is not the whole story an definitely not the fundamental cause of the coming tragedies. The construction of the Eurasian railroad projects of the List-followers Sun Yat-sen in China and Sergei Witte in Russia, resulting in the Trans-Siberian railroad were even greater challenges to British supremacy by threatening to bypass maritime transport making the British superiority in this areas as well naval superiority superfluous. Tony Smith argues that,

"Politically speaking, the most important feature of the dissemination of the technics of the industrial revolution was that as this know-how spread to the Continent and to North America, it became apparent before the end of the century that Britain’s physical ability to control world events was in rapid decline. The Russians for example were able to make themselves into formidable regional threats to Britain through the extension of their railways into Asia, bordering Persia, Afghanistan, and China. More importantly, it was recognized at the time that Both Germany and the United States would surpass Great Britain economically some time around the turn of the century. ... At one and the same time, therefore, economic factors were creating the possibility of serious new political conflicts in international relations, just as they were undermining the ability of Great Britain, the guarantor of the world order, to manage events in such its accustomed ways. In a world of rival nations states, rapid and uneven change had laid the groundwork for a political crisis of the first magnitude.

But it is in political terms that the ensuing conflict must be finally understood, whether we are looking for the causes of the "new imperialism" or for those leading to the outbreak of the World War I. ...

"Of course, economic developments may have rather automatic political repercussions. By 1894, German trade surpassed that of Britain in Holland and Belgium, and by 1912 had doubled in these two countries so crucial to the British scheme of things on the Continent. By 1913, German trade had surpassed that of Britain throughout the Balkans as well, ... The extent of this commerce with the expansion of the Bagdad Railway under German auspices (begun in 1888, with the final - and perhaps most vital - concession granted in 1899) to establish Berlin's influence in the Eastern Mediterranean along the route to India.[170] In effect, a single power was coming to exert growing strength in the two areas of the world most crucial strategically to Britain. It was not, therefore, the fact of German economic expansion alone that concerned the British so much as the geographic setting in which this occurred and the political consequences it potentially entailed, not so much for the European but also for the Mediterranean balance of power."[171]

Woodruff D. Smith outlines how the colonial ideas of F.List and W.Roscher concerning colonisation in East and South-East Europe and Turkey were early indications of the later more twisted lebensraum-ideology and politics as compared to the migration and trade oriented approach of List and Roscher.[172] A most crucial difference in ideology, intention and consequences is indicated by the radical-conservative agrarian outlook of the late 19th century faction of the lebensraum politics on the one hand and on the other hand the modernist industrial outlook of Roscher, in particular List and later Gustav Schmoller.[173] As Woodruff points out, however, there were also elements of the latter faction within the lebensraum politics. He argues that the traditionalists saw England as a political and cultural danger to Germany whereas the modernists saw it as a model. This is probably so only to the degree that we are talking about political expansionists. There is indeed a complicated mixture of political stands making no easy short-cut generalisation possible.

Nevertheless, Woodruff explains the German Weltpolitik as modelled on the British empire politics.

"the model of British imperialism, as it was understood by the weltpolitiker, was paramount. Britain’s strength and prosperity was held to derive from the connection between her domestic industrial economy and a world-wide periphery of markets, investment areas, and sources of raw materials .... The real foundation lay in the connection between British industry and the marketing areas in other countries that , because of the cultural affinities, heavy British investment, or the influence of British naval power, gave preferential treatment to the British . Britain possessed, in essence, a world-wide informal empire that maintained her economy, even in the face of competition from more efficient competitors such as Germany. Germany needed a similar arrangement."[174]

Co-operation between the German government, finance, and big industry was supposed to expand trade to Asia and South America without necessitating the expensive nuisance of establishing formal colonies. Eastward expansion through German and other foreign investments, into for example infrastructure such as the Bagdad railway, was believed to be beneficial for both parties; the foreigners, such as Germany, and the domestic governments and people, such as Turkey.[175]

Tony Smith argues that the British until 1901 were more worried about the Russian activities and in general were in favour of

"joining Berlin in an international condominium favorable to both parties.[176] However, by this time opinion in Britain had begun to change as the full import of the second German naval law of 1900 became apparent. As Winston Churchill stressed in his chronicle of these times it was not at all economic thinking that determined the mood in London, but rather the clear offensive military trust being mounted by Germany in a geographical setting of first-rank importance to Britain.[177]

Why, then, did Germany build the fleet? The answer must be found not in the dictates of international affairs, but in the struggles of domestic German politics."[178]

Smith attributes this to the historical compromise between the Junker landlords and the German industry starting with Bismarck's tariff law of 1879 and culminating with the outcomes of Bülow becoming the foreign secretary and Tirpitz navy secretary in 1897. Thereby we are back to List's proposals for a strong German navy which indeed would be stirring the pot in the future as we will see. List is often blamed, justly or not, for World War I and thereby World War II through his insistence on railway construction. Gustav Schmoller has been blamed for the same concerning his support for navy construction. That also List might be blamed for the same tragedies also because of his insistence on access to coastlines and naval force is usually missed. The forces behind such a drive for naval construction is usually acknowledged as Prussian aristocratic militarism. According to Giles McDonogh, however, it was quite the contrary: The driving force both behind German nationalism, as opposed to Prussian, and the navy as a national symbol was the liberal middle class, both historically and at the turn of the 20 century, the main exception being Kaiser William II.[179]

As opposed to Smith P.J.Cain and A.G Hopkins, however, claim that the British also faired German domination of the Continent but, indeed, that an agreement with Berlin would only have been acceptable if Germany had accepted "permanent naval inferiority".

"Britain's sensitivity on the naval issue clearly indicated the connection between her diplomatic and military stance and her economic power. The navy was not only the key to the defence of Britain herself, but also the crucial safeguard for the enormously complex chain of economic interests which Britain had built up over centuries and without which she was just an offshore island of Europe rather than a great world power. It was for this reason that Grey, as Foreign Secretary, insisted that naval agreements with Germany could be made only on "the basis of superiority of the British navy", since the German Navy "is not a matter of life and death to them as it is to us". If Germany were to maintain a navy as large as Britain's, together with her enormous army, "for us it would not be a question of defeat. Our independence, our "very existence would be at stake".[180]

In 1912, the Admiralty made almost exactly the same claims but expanded the argument, linking it with a possible bid for continental hegemony by Germany:

There is practically no limit to the ambitions which might be indulged by Germany, or to the brilliant prospects open to her in every quarter of the globe, if the British navy were out of the way. The combination of the strongest Army would afford wider possibilities of influence and action than have yet been possessed by any empire in modern times.[181]

Indeed, the extent of Germany's economic power, its overseas ramifications and the apparent attempt to combine her formidable military strength with a navy as powerful as Britain’s, were felt to be a threat greater than anything Britain had faced in over a century."[182]

The Anglo-German negotiations on the naval question in 1911 were intended to reduce the tension.

"the only result was greatly to increase the suspicion of each for the other. The British became convinced that Germany was bent on challenging their supremacy at sea and on establishing her dominance in Europe as well; the German's became equally convinced that Great Britain was planning to `encircle' them and would ultimately join France and Russia in a war against them. Of the two, Germany was the more mistaken. The Germans could not, in fact, challenge Great Britain, so long as there were two independent Great Powers on the continent of Europe. If they had abadonned their great naval programme and concentrated on land armaments, they might have won British neutrality and would certainly have won a continental war."[183]

Taylor seems to be contradicting himself leaving the question open-ended when he writes - concerning German efforts to conciliate the British on the defensive intentions of the German naval programme - that the British,

"once mounted on the high horse of principle, they would not have got off it even for a reduction of the German naval programme.[184]

Taylor seems to be contradicting himself also when the above argument of limiting German interests to the continent is held up against another of his,

"The Germans so little understood the implication of total war that they abstained from invading Holland in August 1914, so as to be able to trade freely with the rest of the world."[185]

In essence this means that Germany would have had no other choice than to build a navy strong enough to compete with the strongest; the British, in order to defend the Dutch ports and trade therefrom - as would most likely have argued Philip II, Richelieu, Colbert, Napoleon and List. Zara Steiner criticises the British policy and foreign secretary such;

"Grey's lack of flexibility and his brinkmanship in 1911 and 1912 designed to exclude the Germans from any international condominiums and to confine them to Europe, helped to undermine the peace of the continent. ... Greater flexibility might have taken the edge off German frustration. Viewed from Berlin, and not just Berlin, Britain had no "right" to enjoy the major share of the extra-European fruits."[186]

In essence this may imply - as was indeed the intention of Bismarck- that an Anglo-German agreement to include Germany into sharing the extra-European fruits might have averted a clash in continental Europe.

Richard Lamb draws attention to British discussions in 1939 on the importance of maritime transportation of raw materials and therefore the necessity of a naval force for the European powers,

"At the War cabinet on the 22 December Churchill produced a summary of views from Thyssen, the German steel tycoon, then in Switzerland, claiming that victory in the war would go to the side that obtained control of Swedish ore. ... The War Cabinet approved Churchill's `limited scheme' and authorized Halifax to inform Norway that in connection with German violation of Norway's territorial waters[187] British ships would at times enter and operate in Norwegian territorial waters'.[188] The Norwegian reaction was a violent protest, as was the Swedish. This was reported to the War cabinet on 10 January. Churchill, however, was all for going on anyway, ..."[189]

As Hitler pointed out Norway was the ultimate strategical region of the war in a series of directives[190] directed to prevent English annexation of Norway,[191]

"Der Führer is convinced that Norway is the decisive theatre of war of this war. He therefore demands complete loyalty to all orders concerning a defence of this territory."[192]

The importance of Norway was its geographical position being in particular its long coast.[193] To defend these areas a navy was needed and these areas were needed to defend the navy; to give it a logistic base and prevent the enemy from such establishments as was in fact planned by the British. Kersaudy's argument is that in this race Hitler got there first.[194]

Reminding us strongly of List's open-hearted writings Cain and Hopkins draw attention to the fact that,

"the conflict would inevitable be a battle between Britain and Germany for the controlling voice in the management of the world economy and a struggle for empire. The essence of this conflict was expressed with remarkable bluntness in 1907 by Viscount Esher, an important member of the Committee of Imperial Defence:

Meanwhile the Germans proceed unabashed on their way, and have their objectives clearly in view. The German prestige, rising steadily on the continent of Europe, is more formidable to us than Napoleon at his apogée. Germany is going to contest with us the Command of the Sea, and our commercial position. She wants sea-power and the carrying trade of the world. Her geographical grievance has got to be redressed. She must obtain control of the ports at the mouths of the great rivers which tap the middle of Europe. She must get a coastline from which she can draw sailors to her fleets, naval and mercantile. She must have an outlet for her teeming population, and vast acres where Germans can live and remain Germans. These acres only exist within the confines of our empire. Therefore, "L`Ennemi c`est L`Allemagne."[195][196]

We can only say that the point is well taken by Viscount Esher, but as with all these British historians there is seemingly little willingness to see how this German strategy was to a large degree a result of British domination and even abuse of this power on the Continent of Europe. In the case of Germany the English were helped by the fact that the English king in fact also was the ruler of the important (German) state of Hanover until 1833 and many other states were ruled by non-German aristocrats as for example the Danish king was the ruler of the state of Schleswig. The ruling elites of the Hanse towns were of course also allied by commercial interests to the English - the latter of course pertains to the perceived short term interests of imports as opposed to the not-perceived longer term interests of exports.

Some examples of the destructive policy towards Germany are the occupation of the German island Heligoland[197], the blocade of German ports, the destructive trade policies against Germany - including barriers both to their industrial and agricultural exports - and the continued policies of preventing integrating trade agreement between Germany and the German Hanse towns as well as with the low-countries Belgium and the Netherlands as well as obstruction of German initiatives to establish links providing supply of raw materials. German reaction to this English policy might have been overly so[198] but the phenomenon of "retaliation" to having been trampled upon is also something we can observe with Israel in the recent past - and as opposed to Germany in the pre-WW I period: in action whereas Germany did not engage in expansion before WW I. The Germans as with List, saw their creation of a counter-force (naval and otherwise) to Britain as a way of self-defence against the British two-centuries long complete domination of European, German and world affairs.

Nevertheless, as noticed above the goal of many of the establishment in Germany was to establish an empire on pair with the British where the navy would secure advantages for German merchants. The threat this implied to the British supremacy was recognised but on the grounds of German superiority in technology, and by expansion of the navy Tirpitz argued, it was believed that the British would agree to a partnership of world domination. If not a had to be fought out in a war. The German technological superiority would, however, secure the victory for Germany.[199]

"Tirpitz and his supporters hit on a highly significant feature of Weltpolitik as an extended aggregate ideology: a particular view of Britain's role in Germany's future as a great power, and a characteristic (and wholly incorrect) set of predictions about British reactions to the emergence of Germany as an imperialistic state. In the general scheme of the Weltpolitik, the attitude of Great Britain was absolutely crucial to Germany's success. Britain, as the pre-eminent imperial power and as the major source of the world's investment capital, was the only European country presently in a position to interfere seriously with the Weltpolitiker´s' plan outside of Europe. ... Proposals for co-operative imperial ventures and massive divisions (e.g. of Portugal's African colonies) never got very far because few British politicians and interest groups could see the need to take on an imperial partner to share what Britain already had - a partner whose politics were regarded as politically unsound by many Britishers and unstable by most. .... It would involve, at the very least, a voluntary loss of prestige that no British party or government could accept.

Nowhere do the debilitating effects of an inaccurate ideology and the particular deficiencies of a Weltpolitik appear more clearly than in the Weltpolitiker´s' expectations about Britain."[200]

The British strategy was not only that of brute force but often more refined; In the mid-1850s Gladstone preferred a "humanistic" strategy presenting British rule as the height of civilisation;

"Unencumbered abroad, Gladstone could eschew balance-of-power politics ("this foul idol") and defend the rights of self-determination, the freedom of small countries from the domination of the large, and the pursuit of free trade. The merging of morality with self-interest gave domestic legitimacy to a "liberal" foreign policy. "The danger (of a combination against Britain) can in practice only be averted," Eyre Crowe, a Foreign Office clerk could write in 1907, "... on condition that the national policy of the insular and naval state is so directed as to harmonize with the general desires and ideals common to all mankind, and more particularly that it is closely identified with the primary and vital interests of a majority, or in as many as possible, of other nations. ... Britain was always a "liberal state", a nation dedicated to peace (navies were defensive, armies offensive), stability, and the advancement of trade. Representative government at home meant the avoidance of war abroad."[201]

Of course the assertion that navies are more defensive than navies is pure rubbish - or facade if one prefers. Any knowledge of history will show the reverse as navies are more mobile. A.J.P.Taylor maintains that,

"The Balance of Power was a concept alien to the mind of most liberal, and Grey himself often repudiated the phrase. Yet, in reality, he was concerned with the European Balance in a way that no British foreign secretary had been since Palmerston. He endorsed the opinion of his leading adviser. `if France is left in the lurch an agreement or alliance between France, Germany and Russia in the near future is certain.'[202] His underlying object was to prevent the `continental league' and the German domination that would follow from it; therefore he had to encourage France and, later, Russia, in their efforts to preserve their independence."[203]

Taylor writes on the role of England that,

"Great Britain played a sort of in-and-out game, sometimes claiming to be committed, sometimes not, as suited her purpose. Grey referred to `the two great groups of Powers, France and Russia on the one side and the Tripple Alliance on the other'[204]; Hardinge, at exactly the same time, wrote: `Great Britain owing to her insular position and having no alliance with any great power in Europe stands alone, and is the pacific advocate of a friendly grouping of the European Powers'.[205]

Gallagher and Robinson's 1953 article "The Imperialism of Free Trade" was innovative and pregnant and totally changed the picture of Great Britain as an anti-imperialistic liberal nation historically. Likewise the picture of a humanitarian liberal nation may be changed as well because of the destabilising effects British support to humanitarian actions may have had on regimes other than the English. For example; the instigator of nationalist republican movements in Europe, Mazzini, for some reason never acted in this way on the British isles. Moreover, separatist and revolutionary movements have always had a safe haven in London and by its allies - for example; the nationalist Mazzini, the anarcho-communist Krapotkin, the communists Marx, Lenin and Trotsky all stayed safely in London and Switzerland as various organised opposition movements do today - including the ones responsible for the bombings in France fall 1995.

Jahwaral Nehru[206], after describing old forms of conquering and enslaving people he wrote in his World History that,

"After some time this form of was replaced by another type of imperialism where only the country was annexed and the people were not turned into slaves. It was discovered that it was easier to earn money from them by taxation and by exploitation. Most still think that world empires are of this sort as the British in India and we imagine that if the British did not have the political control in India then India would have been free. But this type of world empires are about to disappear and give way to a more advanced and superior form. The new form of world empire does not even annex the country it only annexes the wealth or those activities which create the wealth in the country. In this way it can exploit the country to its own benefit and in the large control it and at the same time have no responsibility for governing and suppressing the people. In this way the country and the people who live there are really ruled and controlled with the least possible difficulties.

In this way imperialism has been rationalised and the modern form of imperialism is the invisible economic empire. ... People think that the only difficulty is that one country has the power over another and if that is changed freedom will come by itself. But it is not that simple for repeatedly can we see political free countries stand under the whip of another country which has the economic dominion. The British dominion in India is one example. Certainly England has the political control over India. But in addition to this visible empire and as an essential part of it England has the economic control over India. It is fully possible that England's political domination of India may be ended soon but the economic control will remain as a invisible empire. If that happens England's exploitation of India will continue."[207]

Nehru criticises the British rule in India for strengthening the religious fundamentalism in India, alliances with the most reactionary elements (large land owners) of India and conscious destruction of industry[208] and later writes concerning the British Victorians that the British,

"Religious tolerance did not mean tolerance in other matters. There was no tolerance in those matters which mattered to the majority and in every crisis all tolerance disappeared. The British rule in India is indeed tolerant in religious matters and praises itself for this. In reality they don't care the least about what happens to religion. But the slightest criticism of their policy make them listen and then nobody can accuse them of tolerance. The larger crisis the larger fall and if the crisis is strong enough the authorities put aside any appearance of tolerance and indulge in unadulterated terrorism."[209]

In the nineteenth century, Nehru writes,

"... England continued to play lottery with the future and to trust that the leading position of the country would last. It was a game with a great stake - to be the world's leading nation or to collapse. There was no middle way. But the Victorian middle-class Englishman did not lack self-confidence or indulgence. His long period with welfare and luck and the leading position in industry and trade had convinced him that he was superior to the rest of the world. He looked down upon all foreigners. The peoples of Asia and Africa were naturally backward and barbarian. It looked as if they had been created to give the English an opportunity to show their inborn talent to rule over and better mankind's backward races. Even the people on the European continent were ignorant and superstitious foreigners. The English were the chosen people on the top of civilisation, the vanguard of Europe which again was the vanguard of the world. The British Empire was a half devine institution which put the final seal on the greatness of the race."[210]

Gustav Schmoller wrote concerning the British discussion of customs duties following the Customs Duty Act of 1903 that,

"The whole question of duties stepped into the background after the advances towards France and Russia; as against the new colonial acquisitions; as against the power and conquest questions; as against the creation of English spheres of influence in foreign countries and areas, as in China, Persia, Arabia, Africa; as against the English occupation of main keypoints of world trade: to Gibraltar and Malta were added the Suez canal and Hong Kong-Singapore. The connection of Egypt and Cape Town by a railroad was hoped to be completed soon, the British expansion in Africa was successful on a large scale under the leadership of Cecil Rhodes, the advancement of the French towards the Red Sea was prevented, the German trade and the German extraction of iron in Marocco was paralysed; an agreement was made with the French over the division of Africa. The Japanese had been worked up against the Russians and after their defeat in 1905 they were captured into a British alliance.

In this way a brutal imperialism of conquests and alliances took the place of the conservative Chamberlainian imperialism with the solution: Germaniam esse delendam.[211] It is the Great British policy which had to lead to the world war in 1914. It is the retreat into mercantilist policy of violence of the 17. and 18. century. One intends to remove the unpleasant competition by violence and destruction instead of through better ships and goods.

It is the politics which as a consequence likewise has prevented the idea of a trade league in Middle-Europe, ... , a most mutually favouring customs union which would reach from Belgium through Germany to the Persian Gulf."[212]

For List, railroads surely seemed to make eastward expansion of German commerce possible but it also made commerce by way of sea easier as export-ports became more accessible for inland production of goods. This made Dutch railway construction of strategic importance both to the Germans and the Dutch and indirectly of course as well to the English. The Dutch financial elite, however, as Wilhelm Roscher pointed out, made little effort to promote this by investing their capital in these projects preferring rather to invest abroad thereby leaving the matter to public intervention.

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We might say that the battle with Britain was a battle within more traditional mercantilist lines of power. The "new" imperialism was by way of credit. Nevertheless, to reach this "higher" stage of financial imperialism, a country would first have to use traditional mercantilist policies and establish itself as a producer of real goods. More importantly, however, List did not intend to lead any nation into the stage of financial imperialism as it was his wholehearted conviction that it was immoral. His drive was to lead the peoples of the world towards higher prosperity, civilisation and happiness - although in this game he knew power was a force to be reckoned with and to be dealt with.

3: THE EARLY 19TH CENTURY 1795 - 1830

- FRENCH OCCUPATION AND NATIONAL MERCANTILISM

3 A: FRENCH OCCUPATION, 1795 - 1813

Most of the eighteenth century Holland had been ruled by the joint interests of the trade oligarchy and the goverment.

"It was not until 1795, the time of Batavian rule, that many voices critisised favoritism to the commercial interests. Yet most proposals regarding the modification of the tariff of 1725 were discarded."[213]

The Dutch alliance with anti-British forces and the Napoleonic wars had had a detrimental effect on many important industries in Holland. The bleaching, silk cotton, wool, shipping, tanning, and earthware industries had suffered from shortages of raw materials and the blocade of the export markets.[214] In other aspects the period did indeed change the social structure and politics to the better - subject to which we will return below.

Hasenberg Butter maintains the following reasons for the stagnant conditions of Dutch industry during the first half of the 19 century and accordingly the problems of getting it onto a new start:

1) Holland's international trade had dwindled to local trade.

2) Holland hardly produced any raw materials for industry except for flax, coarse wool, peat and madder. Raw materials import was burdened with mercantilistic export duties from competing countries.

3) Holland did not have a heavy industry from which it could receive stimulation to innovation, technological development and improve industrial organisation.

4) The pre-capitalistic mentality of the Dutch entrepreneurs blocked interest in innovation and their application.

5) The high labour costs and taxes handicapped the Dutch industry which was less efficient than industry in other countries.

6) Dutch industry moved it into rural areas and this dispersal was detrimental to industrial development. Not until the 1860s did this reverse.

7) Holland lagged behind competitors regarding infrastructural development. For a long time development of steam power was disregarded and railroads only got significantly developed in the second half of the 19th century.

So, reasons for the lack of industrial investment were high costs of labour in Holland as well as the high taxes. This is also the background for the establishment of industry in rural areas away from the power of the guilds exactly as in Venice earlier on. In Britain this problem of the power of the labour unions was combatted as late as in the 1980s by prime minister Thatcher though without restoring the former industrial force. The high labour costs in Holland, or Italy and Britain for that matter, would have been no problem, however, if the labour was highly skilled. But this would require investments into new technology and education on a contineous basis. This was not the case since Dutch merchants had been too shortsighted and too disorganised to establish a national investment policy in these regards - as we have pointed out elsewhere.

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MORE INFOMATION NEEDED ON NAPOLEONIC POLICY AND BONAPARTISM

- a little has been mentioned in a quote from Palmer and Colton on N.'s Continental System and Roscher claimed that Saint Simonism was close to Bonapartism.

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A SHORT PERSPECTIVE ON THE NINETEENTH CENTURY DEVELOPMENT

The main export products of Holland until the 1870s continued to be textiles and agricultural products when metal industry was developed. The trade revived as the commercial policy of other countries became more liberal in the 1830s and 1840s with England as the frontrunner in this process. The trade also picked up as a result of the economic expansion of the German hinterland after 1870. Although the population expanded considerably (1815-1850: by 38 %) Holland underwent little ubanisation. Unemployment was considerable in particular in the first half of the century and concerning unskilled labour. At the same time there was a shortage of skilled labour, an immobile labour market and remarkably stable wages.[215] This indicates a lack of public involvement in promotion of infrastructure; eduction, transportation, and tax and credit promoted technological development.

NATIONAL OR MUNICIPAL MERCANTILISM - ONCE AGAIN

The war had robbed the Netherlands finally of its prerogatives. England and the German cities Hamburg and Bremen had taken over several of the markets and Dutch traders had lost organisation and know-how. The old merchant families wanted to reassert the supremacy of their interest. However, the son of the last Stadtholder William of Orange was elected as king. He cooperated with the highly educated member of the cabinet Hogendorp between 1813 and 1828 but their ideas were too different for a lasting relationship and Hogendorp retired after a some years.

But the "French" period did indeed change the social structure and politics as well and to the better. Paul Johnson claims in his Birth of the Modern that,

"the country where the French revolution had most immedeate and permanent effect was the Netherlands."[216]

The French occupation from 1795 did away with many oligarchical privileges and the commercial mercantilism of the old merchant class. Instead the Jacobiners and later Napoleon introduced a centralist government and a system of national mercantilism. As noted above, Palmer and Colton claims that the Napoleonic system brought back enlightened despotism to Europe and the advantages of the French Revolution without its violence.[217] This, indeed, could be claimed also for William I. P.J.D.Wiles calls Napoleon "the arch-mercantilist".[218]

However, his economic policy was more directed towards the interests of France than that of Holland and the Continent as a whole. This is reflected in the failure to establish a continental customs union. Holland among other regions was therefore conceived as a satelite of France; serving the interests of France. In fact the Dutch moderately liberal 5 % tariff administrated after the "Placaat" of 1725 was ammended under the French annexation regime, most likely since the English were excluded and the strongest industrial power remaining on the Continent market as well as the Dutch was the French, therefore serving French interests. It is highly likely that Napoleon did not only act as a great inspiration to List but that he served as an even greater and more direct inspiration to William I and the development of the Netherlands in the years to follow his downfall. Napoleon did not simply give a model to the Dutch as he did to the Germans and List. He physically transformed the structure of the Netherlands - a mercantilistic unifying and centralist structure which as noted was inherited and strongly utilized by William I.

The king is uninanimously described by economic historians as having a more realistic and mature understanding of the situation of the interantional and Dutch economy than his main opponent Hogendorp[219] - who ironically was to shape Dutch academic economics in the future. And, therefore it is claimed that the implementation of the ideas of William I rather those of Hogendorp was a happy coincidence for Holland. To what degree the development of academic economics along the track pointed out by Hogendorp was destructive for Holland is a matter this author, for obvious reasons, hesitates somewhat to touch. But it is to some degree likely.

William I grew more protectionistic with time (and then reversed after 1830?) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX, precisely as List was to suggest: There is no reason to be protectionist when there is noting to protect; this only comes with the growth of industry, and as it grows and becomes more competitive the protectionist measures may be reduced again. That Hogendorp's liberalist ideas were put into practice after 1849 and the rule of William I was not contrary to the ideas of List nor probably of William I since the point of List's ideas at any rate was that free trade was only beneficial for both parties when these were placed on the same level technologically. There is some doubt as to whether such a level had been reached by the time a more liberal policy was introduced but, nevertheless, the gap had been closed to some degree and besides the economic policy had been steadily going in the liberal direction since the succession of the southern provinces in 1830, as List would have suggested.

However, List was probably thinking in a too static manner when he believed in univeresal free trade or in free trade at any historic point. Technological equality is certainly a pure chimera and the exeption rather than the rule precisely as free trade and economic equilibrium as well as the chimera of balance-of-powers as a political equilibrium. Since technological advance is always pursued in new areas there is bound to bee new leaders and new followers contineously as well as a contineous interchange of which nation belongs to which group. Therefore the governmental role is likely not to diminish but to stay.

Interventionism is therefore not a thing of the past or something which belongs only to an initial phase of the industrialising process of a country but a more or less an eternal ongoing business. For instance, infrastructure is not something which is established once and for all and only needs to be maintained. Also infrastructure is subject to change as a result of changing technology; markets; and trade routes. Therefore the role of goverment is likely to continue. Since the role of technology and knowledge rather than that of natural resources is likely to be accented by development the role of goverment probably needs to be strengthened in these respects. The increased size of projects and the growing investment necessary therein - from canals to space shuttles - is and will be a major driving force behind the increased role of goverment. Anything else is likely to be destructive or at best promote stagnation.

Although William I seems to have had very clear ideas on economic policy Hasenberg Butter has been unable to find any published works by the king or any information between him and foreign economists who might have influenced his ideas.[220] On the background that he was a fairly conventional national mercantilist it is somewhat amusing when Hasenberg Butter writes the following,

"The King has been described as ahead of his time, at least in the sense of having a more mature view of the Dutch economy's future, and a wider range of ideas on welfare policy than his contemporaries.[221] ... Though the King was not a theorist, his economic ideas were integrated and unified by the fact that they had to do primarily with the reconstruction and development of the Dutch economy. As Brugmans has stated, mercantilism has had a somewhat unique manifestation in each country because in the first instance it is expressed or supported by the apparatus of the state and because only secondarily is it theoratically founded. In general therefore, mercantilism may be described as seeking a welfare policy of a given content.[222] The most peculiar aspect of Willem I's mercantilism, as compared with the mercantilism that developed at diffferent times in other countries, is the liberal strain with which it was imbued. This explains why I.G.Brugmans has termed the King's mercantilism ass "a moderate or mitigated mercantilism, a mercantilism permeated with free trade elements."[223]"

Indeed, mercantilism was a way of practice more than a theory although for example James Steuart did much to overcome this[224] but the reason that mercantilist policy was more moderate in the case of William I may have been that Holland was a much more civilised country than other nations which earlier on had practiced mercantilist methods. Many social institutions including work and contract morality had already been eastablished and theefore made the former hard measures of mercantilism less necessary - as F.List certainly would have agreed to, devoted to political freedom as he was after the intense persecution of him and his ideas by Europe's leading statesmen Metternich, Palmerston and their many associates in Germany, Holland and elsewhere.[225]

In 1813 as in 1748 a reorganisation of the Dutch economic system was long due and William I became the first Dutch ruler to design a national economic policy. He inherited and further developed the Napoleonic administrative regime set up under French occupation. Once again a discussion started between the national mercantilists and defenders of "free trade". William I defended the national mercantilist point of view and Hogendorp defended the liberal point of view. Zuidema claims that the conception of free trade had changed from that of the old merchants to that of the liberals.[226] When Zuidema so to speak separates the "free trade" of the merchant class and that of the modern liberals we may suspect him of constructing a opposition where in reality there is none.

The free trade of the old merchants was hardly free at all - except to the national merchants (with their motto "laissez nous seul"), and the free trade of the liberals with Hogendorp was equally hardly free at all - except to the bourgois: which in the case of Hogendorp happens to be precisely the old merchants. Since Hogendorp defends the importance of the activities of the old merchant class (trade, transport and export of capital) the difference could be, although it is not stated, the attitude to state supported monopolies internally as well as externally? Meaning that the old merchants favoured national monopolies as a trade strategy within "free trade" and the new liberals did not.

This is however, neither the case: First, the ideological liberalism of Hogendorp did not exclude the suitability of restrictions on competition when this was likely to incourage production. Neither did the ideological liberalism exclude market-imperfections in practice; the free market, whenever, usually result in the creation of monopolies or cartells. Secondly, the old merchants certainly did not like a state regulated monopoly and rather preffered the freedom of the individual merchant to introduce his own market-imperfections on a lower level particularly with the Amsterdam and Zeeland merchants fighting each other.[227] The evil of monopoly of for example the Dutch East India Company was introduced after a long and reluctant delay in Dutch policy by the Statholder as a means to combat a greater evil: foreign competition.

As Dullart points out,

"Freedom was considered a necessary condition for Dutch propserity and, of course Grotius' Mare Liberum could haredly have been written by a German or a Frenchman.

However, experts in Dutch economic history deny that there was a consistant Dutcg'h policy of free trade, even in the grand age of the staple market, viz. in the 17th and 18th centuries. ... It was not until the 1840s, when Great Britain took the lead in economic liberalism and Holland followed the example, that it began to show all the characteristics of a free-trade country.

The problem with all eulogy on Holland's tradition of freedom is, of course, the concept of freedom. Economic freedom suggest competition and, As Adam Smith knew already, the Dutch were notorious for their successfull attempts to restrict competition. According to Johan Huizinga, Holland's grandeur of the 17th century is mainly explained by its medieaval concept of freedom:

every small unit inmdependent, strong prohibiutions within one's own circle, obstruction of outsiders as much as possible, but no restraints imposed by a central authority.[228]

Huizinga considers absense of freedom and an exceptional economic passivity of other European nations the the chief causes of of the prosperity of the Dutch Republic."[229]

It might be objected to this description of the passivity of other nations, as not only the British later and the Venetians earlier, but also the Dutch during their heighdays enganged in practices which blocked other nations possibilities to develop, the blocade of Antwerp, the high tolls on German transport on the Rhine, the support of Sweden's wars against Denmark and against Russia are only a few of the most obvious examples of the actions taken to preserve the interests of the Dutch merchants. And, indeed, Dullart finds that the Dutch historically had not been free traders but had prosepered through practice of,

"In short, the very monopolistic practices against which Adam Smith fulminated.

With regard to internal trade, the Dutch had great difficulties extricating themselves from the guild system, the very antipode of free competition. In 1798 under French occupation (which lasted from 1795 till 1814) the guilds were formally abolished, but they continued undisturbed until 1818. Then King Willem I, in spite of several petitions to retain the guilds, decided (after some hesitation) to do away with them once and for all. Apparently free competition in internal trade was not self-evident in Holland - to say the least. Actually the history of Dutch economic thought as far as concerned with the desirable economic organisation, could be written as a continuing debate between the proponents of free competition and those who longingly recalled the olden times of the guilds. Especially in the 20th century, when the heydays of liberlaism were over, an old interest revived in forms of organisation that could restrain competition. The German Historical School had some influence in the Netherlands and not everyone was impressed by John Stuart Mill's dictum:

To be protected against competition is to be protected in idleness, in mental dulness ... [230]"

So if there was a Dutch notion of freedom, it had nothing to do with some ideas of free competition. On the contrary, Dutch freedom was based on priviledges, on quod licet Jovi, non licet bovi, in which the government was the bullock rather than Jove."[231]

We would argue that the Dutch liberals of the 19th century with Hogendorp as a more moderate, but nevertheless, the initiating front man, were supporting a policy not very different than the policy of the old merchants at the time they did not grasp the importance of standing united in the national interest against foreign competition. It is in principle an ideological version of municipal city-mercantilism which is being forwarded as liberalism. The difference is that with liberalism free trade being was forwarded also on the local level thereby establishing it as a universal principle creating an ideology not longer as a common practice of vested interests but as the truth itself. And in fact this "municipalism" is the true origins of liberalism - later to made "scientific" with Smith's inclusion of the materialist outlook and formalism developed by the physiocrats. In this way "liberalism" is nothing but a feudal policy and outlook disguised as an ideological principle as opposed to the enlightened nationalism or rather statism of "mercantilism" following the Renaissance.

THE TRIPPING ONE'S NEIGHBOURS STRATEGY

- THE IDEOLOGICAL INSTRUMENTS OF STAYING ON TOP:

LIBERALISM, DEFLATIONISM, BALANCE-OF-POWERS AND MALTHUSIANISM

What is new about liberalism is the ideological factor; the ideology of free enterprise and trade. This is forwarded as a universal solution and remedy to all practical problems under all circumstances. This is largely a result of the inclination of the above mentioned formalism to generalize across all empirical differences. So, in the goal oriented practical sphere there is every reason to say that the development of liberalism was a significant step backwards. However, as an instrument of covering up the tracks which led to prosperity and power it was a major advance of unprecendented significance for the countries which already were established.

The connection between the ideology of free trade and the ideology of balance-of-power is intimate both in theory and in historical practice since the same "nations" have been been frontrunners in advancing and practicing them; Venice, Holland and England. The theory of balance of power in the international political sphere is a closely nit parallell legitimating intervention in other countries affairs. The same powers which become known as advancers of free trade also were the foremost practitioners of the policy of balance-of-powers, in chronological order: Venice, Holland and England. Likewise these "nations" have also pursued other connected policies; Malthusianism and deflationism.

The USA is not such a clearcut case since its has had a more varied past practicing both this theory of balance-of powers and also "the harmony of interests" theory depending on the President in power; as shown with for example the two opposite poles Theodore Roosevelt and Franklin D.Roosevelt. The reason behind this is the American experience of first, seeking refuge from European aristocratic rule and secondly, defending themselves against European economical and political imperialism. This culminated in the first war of liberation in modern history. This tradition has been surpressed from time to time but is constantly reoccuring in modern American politics, as with F.Roosevelt, Kennedy and Clinton. A Euro-American, Henry Kissinger, wrote his doctoral dissertation on "A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereigh and the problems of peace 1812-1822" and furthered this tradition of realpolitik as a U.S. Secretary of State. Kissinger showed - as a paralell to the post WW II communist regimes - how conservative powers dealt with a revolutionary regime, Napoleon's by artistic balance-of-power politics. He might have used another example of a revolutionary regime a decade or two before France; the USA. In fact, his biographer Walter Isaacson claims that Kissinger never liked the American idealistic tradition of diplomacy:

"Like George Kennan, his philosophical predecessor as a conservative and a realist, Kissinger never would learn to appreciate the messy glory of the American political system, especially when it affected foreign policy."[232]

And,

"Diplomacy should be divorced, Kissinger argued, from a moralistic and meddlesome concern with the internal policies of other nations. Stability is the prime goal of diplomacy. It is served when nations accept the legitimacy of of the existing world order and when they act based on the national interests; it is threatened when nations embark on ideological or moral crusades. "His was a quest for a realpolitik devoid of moral homilies," said his Harvard colleague Stanley Hoffman.[233]

On the first page of his thesis, Kissinger set up a basic premise that was to define his realpolitik outlook throughout his career. "Whenever peace - conceived as the avoidance of war - has been the primary objective of a power or a group of powers, the international system has been at the mercy of the most ruthless member of the international community," he wrote. A more proper goal, he argued, was for "stability based on an equilibrium of forces."

It is the mark of a true European-style conservative that he seeks stability even when it protects a system that is oppressive. Kissinger fell into that category."[234]

Theoretically, free trade is the utopian dream that it is preferable to have a perfect market were nobody is dominant, competition will then generate efficiency and private welfare. No companies should therefore esrtablish monopolies or cartells. Likewise in international politics; political equilibrium is supposed to be matchmate of economic equilibrium; no country should be able to dominate its surroundings. This is often connected to a defence of a status quo - no change - situation which in particular is seen as being a situation of no dominant powers on the European continent. This does not exclude, however, the existence of a dominant nation in Europe as long as this nation is off the continent, as for example an island would be.

Both theories are ideology in the bad sense of the word; in the meaning that they legitimize action against the countries which threaten the power of the promoter of this theory: Venice, Holland and England. In this way this combined theory is a cover-up for a self-serving practice against the newcomers on the world power scene, being historically, in crhonological order; Spain, France, USA, Germany, Russia, Japan, China, India and Indonesia.

The German Kameralist (mercantilist) is quoted by Evan Luard,

"when a state has grown more powerful .. is attacked ... in order to weaken it, such action is motivated least of all by the balance of power. This would be a war which is waged by the several states against a strong for specific interests, and the rules of the balance of power will be only camouflage under which these interests are hidden. ... States, like private persons, are guided by nothing but their private interests, real or imaginary, and they are far from being guided by chimerical balance of power. Name one state which has participated in a war contrary to its interests or without a specific interest, only to maintain the balance of power."[235]

Luard continues,

"General adoption of the so-called balance of power principle would make possible continual intervention by one state into the affairs of another. ... Thus the doctrine could be a recipe for war rather than peace."[236]

Since these small "nations"; Venice, Holland and England were to small in man-power and therefore also in industrial power to be able to control their surroundings through brute force other tactics had to be used being in particular the ancient principle of "divide and rule". USA had the advantage of size and likewise has not developed the similar policy-characteristics to the same degree.

Similarly, only during the last few decades, under John Foster Dulles, Henry Kissinger, John McNamara and George Bush, has the US developed a Malthusian policy as opposed to the mentioned long praticer policy of Venice, Holland and Great Britain who excelled in this theory. The reason was twofold. First, the immedeate surroundings of, in particular Venice, were limited and the islands of Venice soon got crowded as Holland was to be. Secondly, the strength of a nation was dependent not only on its policy of administration, economy, research and education, and its natural resources but on the other hand also was dependent on its human resources both in respect to the physical and mental powers of man. Therefore, newcomers should be prevented from establishing themselves as populous countries. The practical implementation of this could again take numerous forms. As a matter of fact the other two part of the combined policy of destructive supremacy took care of this to the extent that it was succesfull in establishing the results of free trade and balance-of-power-politics; absence of industrial policy on the one hand and civil and international wars on the other hand. Connected in particular to thge absence of industrial policy is the peculiar feature of Malthuisian power politics. The newcomers should be hiundered in establishing any education, technological abilities and public infrastucture. This would prevent them from being able to support a large population of a high density. A high density is crucial top get an efficient economy going simply because this will lower the outlays per capita of infrastructural costs and because it will create a synergic effect of civilisation; the advantage of large scale concerning education and culture. The more irrationalism is supported is supported in the country of a newcomer the better for the established state.

As, a matter of fact the phenomenon is more complex trhan this as is readily seen from the practices of the elites of the mentioned "nations" concerning the destruction of their productive base; Venice, Holland and Great Britain. The only loyalty of these fiancial elites is to themselves and not to a country. Therefore they have no second thoughts about undermining the productive capabilities of their own nation as long as it will earn them power or a buck. Long term productive "real" investments are sacrificed on the alter of short term profit in financial markets. That the latter is destructive to the former will not matter. But of course there are some in the elites who still stick to their nation as an instrument of these goals of power.

Similarly, there is an objective reason why the old financial establishment of these "nations" should act in a total reactionary manner. The power of any elite is based upon control of certain resource and therefore counteract all threats to their position of holding a monopoly of these.

As the power-base of the old landed and financial oligarchy in the western states has been and still is natural resources and financial funds, technological and economical development is a threat to be defeated. The reason is that technology will widen and deepen the resource base of an economy making the resources controlled by the establishment less worth. Economic growth will produce more capital and therefore do the same thing to the fiancial funds. Besides more capital means cheaper capital giving the renteneers less interest from their funds. Inflation has the same effect and in addition moder4ate infaltion does promote growth. A deflationay and restrictive monetary policy is therefore preferred by such groupings. Anti-interventionism does the same trick as a going part of the liberalist agenda.

By pushing through this combined ideology of liberalist free trade, balance-of-powers, Malthusianism and partly[237] anti-interventionist deflationism to its position as the going truth on the matters, vast and considerable energy could be saved by the imperialist powers, energy which otherwise would be used to protect and secure one's vested interests - as with the ancient development of economic imperialism of free trade as opposed to the cumbersome and costly establishment of colonies. Dealing with other independent nations the free trade ideology would make sure that no nation was to use the selective interventionism needed to develop an industrial base. Should, nevertheless, some nation still manage to do so and thereby establish themselves as a threat to the already existing major power, the practice of balance-of-power politics would make sure that they were put down again.

This would take innumerable forms of the divide and rule principle - as breaking up cooperation between this nation and its neighbours, encircling the newcomer by creating various ententes against her or destabilising her internally through support of various destructive political movements playing all sides against each other at the same time; as separatism, labour revolts, reactionary oppression, blind terrorism, financial or other scandals incriminating leading or constructive persons or more drastic actions as eliminating them. And, as a matter of fact, Venice and Great Britian in particular have had the most extensive and cunning secret services in modern world history. Only fantasy is the limit to the possible implementations of this principle.

As is readily acknowledged, the principles of free trade and balance of powers; divide and rule are destructive policies: This strategy of supremacy is a destructive practice of tripping someone up; the newcomers, as opposed to exelling in constructive creativity; education, technology, which eventually will benefit the newcomers as well.

3 B: THE NATIONAL MERCANTILISM OF WILLIAM I - 1816 - 1830 (-1849)

The struggle in the Netherlands between the two types of mercantilism: municipal and national - or so-called liberalism and mercantilism - is of particular interest to our subject here. Besides the recent example of Napoleon making a great impression upon List the example of William I is of no less importance as it could be watched by List himself across the German-Dutch border. The example does not only include traditional mercantilist policies but as with Napoleon's it also includes economic integration: As Harold Wright used as a subtitle to his thesis over the period of William I: the first Benelux. Indeed, Wright writes of William I's economic policy that,

"some have seen in it an anticipation of List's "National System"[238].

The historical circumstances were for the first time ready for the implementation of a national mercantilist policy in the Netherlands. First, it had an active and strongheaded ruler in the new king William I who preferred to run the state as his own factoryshop - and with the same secrecy as the former merchant rulers. Secondly, a well-organized central administration had been created by the French rule. Thirdly, the old party of merchant-regents had disolved with their economic basis. Finally, the heavy investments needed for the reallocation of reconstruction was provided by the, indeed, inventive new king. And inventive and initiating he had to be. The national debt, taxes, food prices and unemployment were all high. Low, almost deadened, however, was the entrepreneural spirit of the people.

Britain and its Castlereigh had pressured to surround France by strong neighbouring states and had therefore insisted that the northern seven provinces be united with the southern provinces formerly under Austrian rule (Belgium and Luxemburg)[239] and therefore also returned all the colonies occupied during the war to the Netherlands. The deterioration of capabilities of the Dutch as compared to the English concerning trade and industry, however, made the colonies British in practice but administrated by the Dutch as with Portugal earlier on.

While the king cherished industry Hogendorp wanted the old economic activities trade and transport (shipping) to be central. The king understood that the economic situation had changed and wrote to Hogendrop that,

"We should not remain a nation of barrow-men",

and to another,

"I want to compete with the English with industrial products".[240]

The new larger Netherlands was hardly a unity divided by language, religious and cultural differences and also by different institutional arrangements.

"In 1815 a union was imposed upon very different regions. The king tried with all his energy to make something like a unity out of his kingdom for internal as well as external reasons. After all, the country existed more or less under the guardianship of Britian and the Austyria of Metternich, and the king had to strive after a more respected, a much more independent state. However, tp forge one nation out of the Flemings, Dutchmen and the french-speaking Walloons was an impossible task. The union ended with the revolution of 1830. Only after taht year began the recovery of The Netherlands to take sahpe. For the first time since 1785, when Preussian influence had become preponderant, the Netherlands were once more by themselves. After 1813 a reconstruction of the economic basis of the country was due. A resurrection of the old republic was impossible, a new political and social organisation had to be established, new conditions had to made for an economic revival. What should be the tasks of government in the new state, what economic order pursued? Again a discussion started between mercantilists and defenders of free trade, but the conception of free trade had changed from the interpretation of the merchants to that of the liberlas. Hogendorp defended the second opinion, king WEilliam was the protagonist of the first."[241]

The main task of the British installed King William I was "simply" to rebuild the country. He chose to do this along the lines adopted with great success in France and Britain earlier when they struggled against Dutch supremacy. The citizens were willing to grant William I the power to run the country like his own because of their unfortunate experiences with the former municipal mercantilism, democracy under the French rule and as noted the oligarchy had been severely weakened. Besides a centralist government was, reasoned the Dutch, the only way to keep the unity with the southern part (Belgium and Luxemburg).

William I subscribed to the ideas of enlightened absolutism of the eighteenth century. He promoted popular education, higher education and established the Dutch Academy of Science (Akademie van Wetenshcappen) - some 150 years after the English and French and some 100 years after the German, Austrian, Swedish and Russian Academies.

He sought to integrate the Benelux region (his country) by opening the Dutch market to the Belgian cotton industry. As opposed to the municipal mercantilism practiced before the French revolution he strived to establish a unified economic policy in order to promote general welfare. He introduced a system of protection and obstructed importation - being in particular from Britain. He was particularly fond of export duties and restrictions to limit outflow of raw materials which could be used in industrial development. The import duties were on the whole moderate but William grew more protectionist with time - possibly as List would have argued as industry grew but also to secure support from Belgian industrialists. In the beginning - without industry - there was hardly anything to protect. He supported and stimulated textile- metal- and heavy industry partly by instructing that public consumption was to be supplied from domestic producers. A "Fund of National Industry" (Fonds Van Nationale Nijverheid) in 1821 designed to provide premiums for industry - new and old. Large investments in infrastructure followed - like building roads, canals and harbours. Even railroads were started and this as well as shipbuilding and shipping was stimulated through subsidies from the above mentioned fund.[242]

"Recognizing the important role which means of tranportation play in the economic development of a country, he utilized his abundant energy to stimulate this development and even financed it partly out of his own pocket."[243]

The Dutch financial elite, as Wilhelm Roscher pointed out in his Principles, made little effort to promote infrastructure and railroads by investing their capital in these projects. prefering rather to invest abroad thereby leaving the matter to public intervention, at best. Hasenberg Butter in a footnote contrasts the King's attitude with that of the merchants,

"Van der Koy provided illustration of the conservatism and apathy of the nineteenth century Dutch businessmen. He reported that in 1824 a Dutch writer remarked that Holland's trade rested on surer foundations than England's because it depended on industrial products only to a slight extent whereas 70 % of the British exports were the products of industry. Van der Koy, op.cit., pp.67-68. There was another species of Dutch merchants, Van Der Koy reported, who vehemently opposed the development of Dutch transit trade in compensation for losses in the intermediary trade. Such was the Amsterdam merchants who in 1836 still considered a railway to Cologne unnecessary because their forefathers had desured no such speed and had welcomed the interuption of transport in the winter as an opportunity for making out accounts and balancing their books, and because merchants and storekeepers had no right to be in business unless they had enough capital to practice the art of speculation and buy beyond immedeate needs. Van der Koy, op.cit., p.80"[244]

This point is of particular interest to the theme and scope of this article. List was particularly interested in Holland because of its geographical position and argued in the tradition of "harmony of interests" that both Holland and Germany would prosper from a cooperative solution making the transit trade the hub not only in the practice of trade but also in the theortical contect. The Netherlands had been the traffic hub of North West Europe for more than a millenium because of its position close to waterways; the rivers and the North Sea. By construction of railways the use of the harbours could be expanded and made even more important for German manufaturers and for Dutch merchants. That the latter opposed such an arrangement is, indeed, remarkable. It can hardly be explained but by plain stupidity, immense conservative inertia and the interests of Great Britain. In what manner the latter intervened to serve its interests should be investigated. Roscher commented in his Principles on the lacking development of railroads in Holland. The extreme contrast to that of Belgium is simply striking.

Mansvelt somewhat satirically describes the apathy of the Dutch in the following manner,

"What was chiefly lacking was the spirit of adventure, the courage to attempt great deeds and the power to sustain hardship and disappointment. ... We had been called the Chinese of Europe but we resembled the Chinese only in our conservatism; in industry and enterprise we resembled another ex-colonial power, the Portugese. We had become a curiosity, a picturesque people in clogs and baggy breaches, and our only merchants were shopkeepers who sang behind the counter while waiting for their customers."[245]

Concerning mentality Zuidema claims that,

"At the bottom of political and social ideas there is an institutional pattern of habits and customs, a system of values, a mentality, a set of expectation and illusions, the delusion of the day. Irrational ideas, `the voices in the air', are a most important aspect of institutions. Institutions are the result of an historical process, of long experience, but not organized, they have grown imperceptibly in the course of historical time. Nations stumble upon them, wrote Adam Ferguson. .. In the Netherlands we stumbled upon the esatblishment of political decetralisation in a state of merchants which had for more than a century been very sucessful. These establishements became more or less an obsession in the eithteenth century. A mentality is not something that can be changed in a jiffy. ... Institutions and organisations are not the same thing. Organisation is possible only within an institutional framework. ... However, institutions and organisations are also interdependent. Institutions are not clear-cut, they leave zones of tolerance. Organisations function within these zones. They are opportunities that are but partly known. The function of organisation is first to discover these opportunities and seconf to change them. The consequence is that in a developing society there will be tensions between institutions and organisations which become manifest in discussions about values, rules and taboos, in gradual change and sometimes in disaster. There we meet the fundamental questions of human nature and human society.[246]

Because of the Dutch decay or rather the insuitability of the Dutch institutions including the mentality of the finance-establishment, the King had to create various new fiancial institutions in order to fund his projects. The Bank of Exchange of Amsterdam had for a long time been the monetary basis of Dutch trade but it followed the Dutch East India Company's bankruptcy (of 1798) in 1819. William I therefore established a new central bank, the Netherlands Bank, in 1814 but its activities were limited to Amsterdam and therefore proved inadequate to finance the king's investment plans. In addition to the mentioned "Fund of National Industry" (1821) he therefore founded the Société Générale (in 1822) in Brussels to provide for credit to the Belgian industry and in the same year the "Amortisatie Syndicaat" a sinking fund for public debt. He was also forced to manipulate his own and the public finances in order to finance industry and infrastructure. This may be the reason that his financial dispositions were veiled in the same secrecy as that of the old oligarchy - and for which he was severely critisised.

William I sought to revive the staple market of Amsterdam through imports from the East Indies. Transportation to and from the colonies were guaranteed. The colonies were perceived not only as suppliers of raw materials as previously but now also as markets for industrial goods. Which, as noted elsewhere, actually was an invention at least by the Phoenicians in the 13 century BC. Nevertheless, Hasenberg Butter finds this,

"unusual when compared with the traditional view of the role of the Dutch colonial enterprise."[247]

The revolutionary implication is of course that they had to be made able to buy the goods. The "Netherland Trading Company" which was established in 1824 was to take over the role of the bankrupted Dutch East India Company (in 1798). It slowly evolved into a bank. XXXXXXXXXXXXX Officially it was not to become a monopoly excluding free trade of neither Dutch people nor foreigners or include any kind of dirigism. In practice, however, this was precisely what it was as it demonstarted great competance in the establishment and execution of monopolistic prectices. For example were markets captured for Belgian textiles to the exclusion of the previous supplier; Britain.

"The king was determined to derive benefits from the colonies by wiping out all detrimental foreign competition, with the Company serving as the intermediary organism between the state and the people with regsard to colonial economic activities. The company was also to serve as examplar and to stimulate private entrepreneurship. Its overiding task of course, was to develop the supposedly unlimited market possibilities existing in the colonies, and thereby stimulate Dutch industry."[248]

For example, the company provided as did the army, the social securrity system etc. a safe market for the national textile industry.

Hasenberg Butter sums up her chapter on William I's policy such,

"Although Willem I failed to realize some of his fanciful hopes, his achievement must be regarded as quite instrumental in getting under way the industrial progress and commercial development which flourished in Holland during the latter part of the century."[249]

She continues, however, by writing that,

"The King's ideas, as manifested in his approach to practical economic problems, represent an outlook and approach which evolved out of the particular historical-economic conditions found in late eighteenth- and easrly nineteenth century Holland."[250]

This is not quite correct. It is correct only to the degree that the economic problems were different than those of a developed nation and typical of an underdeveloped nation and therefore had to be dealt with with the typical mercantilist measures.

Zuidema observes that,

"all aspects of mercantilism were present: protection, subsidies, public works, industrialisation, shipping policy, pacte colonial. Even the free transport on the river Rhine, guaranteed by the Vienna treaty, was restrained. Under these conditions there were no place for the more liberal ideas of Hogendorp; they were not well timed. The King's economic policy was, when all is said and done, successful, though more for Belgium than for The Netherlands."[251]

BELGIAN SUCCESSION

By this policy the port of Antwerp and Belgian mills benefitted greatly although the circumstances in the north of the union were less rosy as trade was lost to Hamburg and Bremen. But although economically the south was favored this did not happen in the political or cultural sphere; The centralist government of William I was supported by the Dutch against the Belgians - where William I was regarded as a foreign ruler for several reasons: The tolerant laws introduced on religion in order to introduce more government control did not suit the Catholic Belgians. The stubborness of William I of not granting the Belgians home rule contributed to the rift. Paul Johnson gives us other clues; William I imposed at will taxes, a strict (northern) Dutch language, censored newspapers and closed Catholic monastries and seminars. To some extent he may be seen as a Dutch protestant mirror image to Philip II in addition to a smaller version of Napoleon. Another reason not often aired is the fact that the industrialized Belgium was far richer than the dairy-farm-based Netherlands and did not want to support the relatively poor Dutch.

William I had many gifts but in addition to behaving like a virtual dictator he also had no conception of the principle of divide and rule. In Belgium he managed to unite Catholics and liberals, French and Flemish speakers against his politically oppressive Dutch regime - however beneficial economically. But even the latter is not quite so either; The constitution had given the Dutch provinces a majority in parliament and a purely Dutch government. A new law would solely benefit the Dutch towns and make it difficult for Belgians to reach top positions in the bureacracy.[252] All in all - the Belgians seem to have had reason for unrest. The Dutch invation was halted and withdrawn after French assistance to the Belgians in exchange for removal of Belgian fortifications on the French border.

But the issue was bigger than this, it had international aspects - if not reasons: the interference of foreign powers acting according to their benefit would be normal to assume but is an issue not dealt with in most history books. Paul Johnson claims that the breakup of the "big" Netherlands (or "Benelux") caused alarm (with the English Palmerston) of the possibility that Belgium might join France and alarm (with the Austrian Metternich) that the spirit of revolt might spread to Italy. The withdrawal of the Dutch troops and the establishment of French military presence in Belgium caused the British minister of the Foreign Office to threaten France with a major war within days. The French lust for Belgium was reknown and old as Louis XIV had aquired the western parts through his wars. Writes Johnson,

"The chief aim of the British was to get an assurance of Belgian independence. The British had been so angered by William I's tariff policy that they were glad to see his kingdom split up. In conjunction with the French they arranged for a conference on Belgium to be held in London, ... This diplomatic process ... led to the creation of the Belgian monarchy for which the British nominated a suitable German princeling, and the guarantee of the new state's sovereignity, independence and neutrality by the treaty of London in 1839 - the famous "scrap of paper," which brought Britain into the First World War."[253]

So, after the English had installed a Dutch king who then behaved contrary to their wishes they installed another in a part of that same country. After the liberation, under king Leopold Belgium benefitted from rapid industrialisation following governmental construction of railways setting a standard for other countries as opposed to the development in Holland. But king William encouraged Belgian textile manufacturers to move their factories to Holland.

4: LIBERALISM IN THE 19TH CENTURY

Working with the Dutch tradition in economics until approximately WW I is laboursome as indexes are almost totally lacking in this tradition.

(An introduction can be retrieved and shortened from chapter 1 and chapter 3, for example last two pages of chapter 1)

The books and articles by the following authors have in particular been consulted in this article:

Irene Hasenberg Butter, Jan van Daal, Arnold Heertje,

M.H.J.Dullart, B.D.Elzas, Arnold Heertje, A.Jolink

H.Smissaert, H.C.R.Wright, and J.R.Zuidema.

By this we have reached the time of Friedrich List and therefore any possible reactions to what he wrote in books and in periodicals like the Das Eisenbahn-Journal oder National Magazin, and Das Zollvereinsblatt in the period 1828-1846. We should therefore like to repeat shortly the ideas of List which should be looked for as his particular contribution of consciously and politically enforced development through politically regulated domestic competition:

There are two complementary principles: selective protection and raised competition through unification, in effect building civilisation and welfare on the European Continent through traditional nation-building that is; by exercizing political control over the market in order to make it function as an instrument of common welfare: The preconditions of a market have to be tended in order to make it work optimally. F.List sought to establish the preeminence of the mutual political will over that of the strongest actors on the market in order to reach a balanced growth contributing to the mutual benefit.

First of all he advocated economic growth primarily through industrial growth and not primarily by growth of trade or export of raw materials (like corn) which was the traditional idea and practice of the Dutch merchant oligarchy. Secondly, he argued that this could be achieved by selective protection of infant industries through selective taxation - an idea also promoted by British free-traders but more hesitantly and unwillingly as opposed to List's underlining of this point. The idea was to protect the potential high-produtive economic activities until they were competitive. List was therefore explicity opposed to protection of agriculture - but in principle he ought to have been open to protection of new and more efficient ways of agricultural production. Thirdly, since protection in small states lead to monopolies and inefficiency List argued that smaller areas must unite into a country or into a customs union thereby enhancing controlled "internal" competition; concerning Holland this would mean unification with the German Zollverein as stated explicitly and repeatedly by List. Fourthly, he advocated the further unification of this customs union through building infrastructure; soft and hard; eduction, research, a common administrative law system: a union of law; and a common transportation system: a transport union of ideas, information, people, credit and material goods. - And eventually unite into common cultural and political systems; in effect building a nation-state as was done around the time of the Renaissance but now on a larger scale; uniting the European continent as had been tried so many times before since the fall of the Roman empire.

It turns out that promotion of eduction was not anything particular to List in the Dutch circumstances even though the way this was imagined may have been quite diffrent. Nevertheless, this will be left out of a search for his influence since his ideas are not well known in this area. The knowledge of his ideas on unification are, perhaps particularly in Holland, restricted to that of railroads and the particular case of the German Zollverein and not known as a principle of creating controlled competitive markets.

Since his ideas on unification included an inclusion of Holland and Belgium (and Denmark and the Hansa towns) into the Zollverein his ideas are likely to have aroused patriotic and negative feelings in Holland. Some, as prime minister Thorbecke, did nevertheless see the logic of his ideas.

4 A: A BELATED ATTEMPT TO PRODUCE ANALYTIC THEORY

As Zuidema notices and regrets, the Netherlands took long to develop an analytical economic structure of theory.

The north-western and flat-German- ("Platt-Deutsch"; Flemish and Dutch) speaking parts of The Holy Roman Empire (Germany) was the center of the "Northern Renaissance" in the 14th century. This more rationalistic and ethical-practical north-west German tradition of the Brotherhood of Common Life with Gerard Grotius (1340-84) and Erasmus Rotterdamus (1466/9-1536), and then Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) ?????? (and Colbert's cooperator, Christian Huygens (1629-1695), was most likely not so favourable to this way of materialist formalist way of thought. The later Spinoza (1632-1677) may be the exception. Therefore the discussion of economics in the Netherlands centered on practical issues rather than on a more abstract level, as in most other states until the development of physiocratism and liberalism in Frqance and Britain around 1750.

This was also, it should be noted, in the tradition of the pragmatic mercantilism which refused to generalize beyond the borders of experience as the 18th and 19th century liberalistic physiocrats and liberalists economists tended to do. This they did under the influence of Greek atomistic and materialist ideas (Leucippus, Democritus, Protagoras, Epicurus) carried on to modernity by people like Galileo, Hobbes, Newton, Locke and Hume. This as opposed to the idealist and rationalist tradition deriving from Greece as well (Heraklitus, Plato, Plotinus) and carried on by Augustine, Cusa, Thomas Aquinas, Kopernikus, Kepler, Bruno and Leibniz.

The scientific tradition in the Netherlands had for a long time been confined to the study of medicin, optics, and theology[254] plus geography (sea-maps) and the mechanics of clocks and water administration. Holland had for a long time been rather devoid of social theorists and philosophers claims Zuidema, except for Spinoza. As indicated above, Zuidema might have noted Henry of Ghent, Gerard (and Hugo) Grotius, Erasmus Rotterdamus and the forerunners who belonged to the efforts of the (united) Dutch-German tradition. After Erasmus (-1536) and after 1550-1580 (with the introduction of "golden" period)[255] the mood seems to have changed; Holland seems to have been included into the materialist Venetian tradition of philosophy later continued in England. The mirror image of man seen as a cunning animal is the more "Orthodox, Protestant and Calvinist" ideology that man is seen as "sinful" and condemned without "belief" - as opposed to the more "Catholic" promotion of "rational" efforts to change man's personality as well as her outward circumstances. The mirror image of such materialism is also that art expressed materially is sinful: After the Orangists adopted the Calvinist ideas several aspects of the Flemish-Dutch cultural Renaissance were repressed and halted, in particular this refers to polyphonic music and to religious painting as this was considered as idolatry and the success of painters like Rembrandt, Vermeer, Jan van Eyck and Josquin de Prés and poets like Vondel did not develop again.

And, as noted elsewhere, W.Roscher saw Amsterdam as the rightful cultural heir of Venice. Indeed, Hall observes that the Dutch were at first the only continental supporters of Newton's campaign against Leibniz[256] and thereby against the tradition of the Florentine Renaissance. This scientific and philosophical campaign was a struggle with deep roots also concerning the practical matters of life: it was a war for power and world supremacy. For as Francis Bacon is noted to have said; knowledge is power. By being attentive to the correct principles for scientific and economic growth oneself and simulateously confusing others, supremacy could have been established in an efficient way without having to resort to bloody battles or other costly efforts in order to control. This would, however, be contrary to the innate ideas of the idealist tradition. The emergence of these ideas within the ruling country is therefore logical and must therefore be explained as attempts to subdue one's own country under the domestic elite.

Longer stays in Holland had been granted by the late 17th and early 18th century Descartes, Locke, Bayle, Lamettrie, Linnae - all belonging to the more formalist and materialist tradition which France and Britain, however, cultivated since Descartes, Hobbes (1650) and Locke (1690) in opposition to the idealist Renaissance tradition of Anselm of Canterbury, Nicolaus of Cusa, the English Cambridge School, and Leibniz: a strong tradition of liberal, materialist atomistic philosophy. Economic thought in France and England was to be developed as an extension of these modes of thinking into a formal axiomatic-deductive model apparatus, particularly in England with Ricardo and Jevons, France with Quesnay and Walras and Austria with Menger.

The development of economic thought in the Netherlands,

"started with a iscussion between mercantilists stressing industrialisation and commercial industrialists. With the decline of international trade and shipping after 1795 the class of international traders faded away. Now the contyroversy was between mercantilists and prudent[257] liberal free traders with respectively the king and Hogendorp as protagonists. For the time being the king won the way with support of a great majority of influential people. These discussions[258] entailed real interest in the new science of political economy. A tradition was growing in the departments of law at the universities. Its representatives were jurists and historians, their object to spread the knowledge of the new principles and their applications to the economic problems of the day. Propaganda and policyt rather than analysis are stressed. During the whole new nineteenth century economics was to be an activity of jursits, with the French school dominating the first half of the century. The two most important professors, Tydeman and Ackersdijk, were to stress the importance of the British school."[259]

"From the point of view of scientific economics The Netherlands were an underdeveloped country between 1770 and 1870. During the period the arrears were slowly caught up. In the time between 1770 and the French occuapation the discussion went between two types of mercantilists, coinciding with the two political groups, the merchants/orangists and their French-oriented adversaries. French mercantilist and German cameralist literature were much more read than books from the United Kingdom, Smith's work was hardly known.

After the liberation of 1815 King William introduced a mercantilist regime, fought by the adherents of free trade. Hogenddorp was by far the most erudite and prudent defender of the new doctrine."[260]

The Netherlands continued for a long time to be as the mercantilists; practically oriented and showed little interest in formalistic analytical economics. The followers of Hogendorp, in particular Ackersdijk, changed this and in the 1860s his nephew continued this work which eventually Pierson took over.

There is no discussion of the change in theoretical interest or politics in Zuidema nor in Hasenberg Butter concerning one important aspect: National mercantilism dominated theory before the French period, under it (Napoleon's Continental System) and certainly after it with William I and his supporters in the leading circles of the country. Was it really discontinued in theory; why was it discontinued; and was it really discontinued in practical politics; and if so why?[261]

On the background of the practical success of the mercantilism of William I the whole project of liberal academic economics is put in a rather awkward light since it was based upon the opposed tradition. Its academic success cannot be attributed to earlier and therefore proven success in the real world. Can it therefore instead be attributed to or related to the sponsoring arrangements of academic economics, in the sense of for example merchants favouring and sponsoring liberalism rather than mercantilism both concerning professorial chairs and publishing? We are of course talking of indirect sensorship to the advantage of certain groups of Dutch society. That groups have vested interests in certain theories and actively promote and advance them should not come as a surprise to anyone.

4 B: GIJSBERT KAREL VAN HOGENDORP (1762-1834) - A FIRST GENERATION LIBERALIST

Hogendorp was to become the godfather of Dutch academic profession of economists.

Zuidema claims that

"Two factors have been of the greatest importance for the development of economic thought and theory in our country, the circumstances of the hectic period between 1790 and 1830 which made change imperative, and a charismatic man: Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp (1762-1834), a man with insight and influence. Hogendorp is the link between the laissez-nous faire conception of the merchants and the defenders of the true principles of political economy."

Interestingly Zuidema neglects to elaborate on the first factor. Concerning the second factor, Zuidema's insistance that Hogendorp was the link between the old merchants and "the defenders of the true principles of political economy" is interesting to notice for several reasons. First, it is acknowledged that municipal or commercial mercantilism of the old merchants is the source of the academic economics in Holland - as elsewhere. Secondly, it is also observed that his ideas where badly related to the real situation of the Dutch economy. - Also his claim of the influence of Hogendorp is limited to the influence on a few academic professors in economics - as Zuidema points out his influence on practical matters was negligible. Ironically, Zuidema observes that after the devastating effects of the Napoleonic wars,

"Under these conditions there were no place for the more liberal ideas of Hogendorp; they were not well timed. ... The influence of Hogendorp on practical economic issues was small, perhaps negligible, but he was influencial in the field of academic economics."[262]

Accordingly, the academic profession in Holland starts out with a detatched relation to reality. So, finally, that the sucessful practices of William I do not seem to qualify for a development of theoretical academic economic science is a confirmation of the point above. To argue that there was no such thing as theoretical mercantilism is an indication of ignorance as for example James Stuart's publication in 1767 should be suffiencient to disprove such a statement. That late or modern national mercantilism was not deductive-formalistic ("geometrical") but based on empirical foundations: practice, should not disqualify it rather the opposite: Analytical formalism as opposed to synthetic realism is no qualifying merit for being scientific.

Hogendorp derived from the merchant class and never lost his mission as a spokesman for this class. His opposition to King William I therefore reminds us of the milennia-old conflict between aristocracy and monarchy where the latter tended to care more for the country as a whole as opposed to the aristocracy and in this respect can be said to be more democratically oriented. Hogendorp,

"always remained loyal to what he understood to be the merchant interests.

As stated before, the King and Hogendorp held sharply opposing views concerning the future of the Dutch economy. Whereas the King emphasized the importance of the industrial development of the economy, Van Hogendorp insisted that the intermediary trading function of Holland must remain its main source of prosperity. As he proclaimed in 1813: "The sea is open, trade will revive ... the old times will return."[263] He regarded trade as peculiarly suited to the Dutch character and as a natural outgrowth of the location of Holland."[264]

Nevertheless, he started his career as a Preussian officer, studied German mercantilism (Cameralism) and probably was the most well read man in the Netherlands. He cooperated with the oriiginally German mercantilist Pestel on a dissertation on the financial relations between the central government and the provinces. He wrote the draft for the new constitution for the united Netherlands. He was a lawyer and chief magistrate in Rotterdam. He was appointed Secretary of State and was a Cabinet Member in the government of William I in the period 1816 to 1825.

Hogendorp became a lonely wolf after the discontinued cooperation with William I. He was the first Dutch writer in the nineteenth century to support the liberal doctrines and became the oracle of two professors in political economy, Tydeman and Ackersdijk, and also influenced among others Ouwerkerk de Vries, Metelerkamp and Elink Sterk[265], due to his enormous knowledge of literature. They were to establish the academic tradition of economics in the Netherlands moulded in a progressively more liberalist fashion than he himself. Hogendorp rejected abstract literature without historical perspective, implying also the use of statistics, and was not a man of system. He searched for practical solutions but also for a compass in the form of flexible starting point principles instead of strict maximes thereby allowing historical circumstances to enter a consideration of suitable policy. For him these principles were equilibrium and harmony in the tradition of natural law.

He was familiar with some of the British writers but he used them mainly to support his own arguments for free trade. The formalism of Ricardo and McCulloch did not appeal to him and neither did the pessimism of Malthus. His favourite authors according to Zuidema were Verri, Kraus, Louis Say and Charles Ganilh. Louis Say differs from his brother Jean-Baptiste by being less formalistic and generalising, and more historically (empirically) oriented. According to Hasenberg Butter he often quoted Ganihl (according to Schumpeter he was the French version of List), Chaptal, C.Tempier, Louis Say, J.B.Say, Sully and Sismondi and his favorite writers were Verri, J.B.Say, then Storch (after 1815) and then Sismondi (after 1827). These writers he claimed were superior to the British because they were deeply realistic and practical and did not get "lost in abstract concepts".[266] He published between 1818 and 1825 the ten volume Contributions to the Housekeeping of the State in the kingdom of the Netherlands collected at the service of the States General.[267]

"It is noteworthy that he stuck so much to such writers as Kraus, Ganilh and Storch and underrated the constributions of Smith and the classical school. The change in the interest was provided by two professors, Tydeman and Ackersdijk..."[268]

Hogendorp held that economic problems were byproducts of political considerations and that all forms of protection should be looked at askance. His ideas on eceonomic development are somewhat defaitist and passively oriented from a governmental point of view: Industrial development was a secondary derived result of trade and therefore conditioned by export markets. Free trade therefore had to be encouraged and restrictions put down. As is noted below, he nevertheless, argued that the government had a responsibility to establish infrastructure precisely as a pre-condition for a functioning market. Domestic industry was alwyas natrally protected by the cost of transportation and protection through import duties would degenerate the domestic industry. Export duties was unfair to the farmer because it lowered his prices. Therefore protection only had detrimental results. Stimulation of factories and enterprises could not succeed because of the smallness of the Dutch market. A liberal trade policy was the only logical answer. Obviously, he did not think of a limited economic integration in a customs union as a stepwise and preliminary alternative, as did List. In this sense Hogenddorp was a radical and revolutionay liberalist whereas List was a moderate and reformist liberal.

To some extent he would not have been opposed by List as also List argued that in a small country protectionism would most likely lead to monopoly and a degenerate economic life. But since free trade would only be to the advantage of the leader in international competition the obvious answer to List was economic integration and thereby create a larger market - large enough to avoid monopolies and small enough to make political guidance of economic development possible. Too some extent the economic balanced integration had been accomplished by the creation of the "big" Netherlands of the Vienna conference of 1814-1815. When List wrote his National System this economic integration had been reversed and List argued as we have seen for an integration of the Netherlands and Belgium into the German Zollverein as this would benefit all parties. The definition of what size of a country is to be preferred is a result of various factors of which productive and administrative technology are likely to be the most important. So, usually the optimal size will grow with time and technological development.

On the other hand List's solution to the infant industry problem was crude; taxation on import and export, as these were the financial means available at that moment of writing. Today there are numerous other and more refined measures available like variuous forms of subsidies and taxation both direct and indirect; for example inexpensive credit directed to certain economic activities. The problem of production of public goods can be included into this problem area. Therefore, since the financial instruments available for economic policy are more numerous are more refined the old problem of free trade vs protectionism could be avoided, unless of course internal taxes and subsidies are seen as protectionism, as is the practice today. Nevertheless, the problem of economic integration through economic unions whithin which the use of such instruments are equalized is as acute as ever since it concerns maximization of economic efficiency within a geographical area where the economic process can be regulated politically for the common benefit.

On the background of the severe social and economic problems in Holland Zuidema claims that, as opposed to Hogendorp's liberalism,

"The programme of such reformers as Van den Heuvel and Luzac can now be understood: stimulate economic growth by limiting the exports of capital and open the colonies to Dutch enterprise, cancel the monopolies. Hogendorp was not of their opinion. He reasoned that ceteris paribus capitalists would prefer investments and placements in their own country. The problem was that opportunities to invest within the country were lacking. ... Under the prevailing circumstances placements abroad were preferable."[269]

A point central to mercantilist tradition, however, is the government's duty to create profitable investment opportunities which - as the crucial point of the matter - are beneficial to the public. Hogendorp also argued that it would be technically difficult to limit capital exports and that interest from abroad would stimulate the economy at home through consumption by first the upper classes and eventually the lower classes. (Quite paralell to Malthus' defence of the institution of rent and the landed class' expenditures on luxuries as it would have the same trickle down effect on employment but preferably (!) not on low-class consumption - as opposed to raising wages!).

Zuidema claims that,

"the republicans ... were opposed to the old merchant class interests and liked to stimulate industry."[270]

According to Zuidema, Appelius wrote a report to the government in 1802 and claimed that increased trade would stimulate circulation, wages, prices and therefore the costs of industry. Hogendrop instead argued that larger circulation would lower interest, lower profits and stimulate production (?) and therefore not result in higher prices. He did apparently not accept the naive quantity theory of money, Zuidema9 writes.

- This disccussion seems relatively far fetched and might be interesting to look further into in order to see how this was perceived on each side.

Hogendorp believed that a sound monetary system and well organised money and capital markets were necessary for economic progress and that they were not fulfilled in the Netherlands. He considered a stable price level and rate of exchange to be highly important and abhorred paper money and favoured bullion as a fund of guarantee and a stepping stone to free trade. The experience with warfunding by the printing of money may have been the cause of this. Fichte and Müller instead favoured paper money as this would give the government larger control of the national economy. Hogendorp is the important link in the the development of Dutch monetary theory which was to be continued especially through the activity of Ackersdijk; his nephew W.C.Mees and his pupil; N.G.Pierson.

A MODERATE LIBERALIST AFTER ALL

Zuidema claims that,

"The reader should be careful not to consider Hogendorp as a sturdy free trader. Without a doubt freedom of trade, commerce and industry should be propagated fervently, but he did not believe that a perfect system of free trade was possible or even desirable. In his opinion the destination of the country was transport and trade with a growing mix of export products as a necessary complement. From that point of view a low tariff was necessary but a degree of protection of its industry and, most of all, its colonial trade should be maintained. In the meantime government should try to diminish impediments to trade in the world by reciprocal agreements with foreign nations. We should follow the lead of the United Kingdom, not from some abstract principle but from well understood national interest. Tariffs should be reduced prudently, step by step and always with exceptions."[271].

Nevertheless, despite Hogendorp's defence of prudence, noticing his insistence on the old strategy of trade and transport (commercial mercantilism) as opposed to William I's national mercantilism Hogendorp's historical flexibility is not obtrusive.

Zuidema further claims that,

"Hogendorp was firmly convinced that free trade was not a sufficient condition to attain a reasonable level of employment, however useful it might be in the struggle ahgainst social disease. An active policy of the government was also necessary to create a sufficient demand for labour. This opinion was the effect of reading publications of Laudedale and Malthus and the chapter `On Machinery' in the third edition of Ricardo's Principles. Something was wrong with the supply of labour in proportion to the supply of capital. The obstruction of mechanisation was of no avail, in the short run it would not meet with success and in the long run it would even be counterproductive. Hogendorp pleaded investments in industry and in the reclamation of waste grounds ... It seems that Tydeman, following Malthus, convinced him that the growth of population had a negative effect on prosperity because of the negative relation between the volume of the population and its income per caput (per capita output? Present author's remark). The problem of the quantitative proportion between the factors of production will take a prominent place in the analysis of W.C.Mees, as we shall see."[272]

Hogendorp's distrust of utopias and flexible historical understanding of principles led him to argue that "only the government may know the ins and outs" of the non-transparent market. Likewise trade has to be continuously cared for by the government even by granting exclusive rights. Therefore, he argued, the abolishment of the British Act of Navigation was reasonable as it had lost its function. He did agree with William I that a bank monopoly on money issue was necessary and that construction of roads, canals and ports were a task for government. Likewise he argued that the government should prefer domestic products in order to establish a home market and thereby promote industry.

Hogendorp,

"did not pass the threshold of analytical economics but gave, notwithstanding his reserves to pure theory, a definitive impulse in that direction. He is the true founder of a tradition."[273]

Nevertheless, Hasenberg Butter maintains that Hogendorp,

"did not recognize the importance of intervention to developing significant export industries and thereby to expand the Dutch economy. It was on this isssue principally that Van Hogendorp differed from the King. Though the King was not as sucessful with his schemes as he had hoped to be, in retrospect his diagnosis of Holland's economic future has been considered more realistic than Van Hogendorp's, which was based on the belief that the good old times and the Dutch trading monopoly could be restored. ... It may be noted, however, that the free trade policies for which Van Hogendorp fought so vigorously were gradually adopted after 1850. His trade policy have been described as premature by later Dutch economists; they have agreed that had a liberal policy been adopted in 1813, it would have led to further deterioration of the Dutch economy.[274]"[275]

Hogendorp's pupil Ackersdijk was of the opposite meaning and claimed that William I was wrong in his policy and diagnosis of the Dutch circumstances.

THE BELATED DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC ECONOMICS PART II

A reason pointed out by Hasenberg Butter why Dutch academic economics was so late to develop was the fact that academic economics in the Netherlands until 1921 was a part of the study of law. The sparce time devoted to economics for both the students and the professors did not encourage any in depth involvement nor any specialisation leading to more refined theoretical developments. Only in 1815 was a separate course in economics introduced within the law faculties. The first chair in economics was established at the technical school in Delft in 1906. The business school of Rotterdam was established as late as 1913. The first economics faculty at the University of Amsterdam was established in 1921. The Roman Catholic School of Economics was established in 1927 in Tilburg. These developments was not a result of academic economists pressing for economics as a separate study but the result of the efforts of the business community who felt the need for systematical and theoretical education of its young apprentices. The law professors were in general happy about the situation as it was. During the period 1815-1913 there still was some development, though, and in general it followed the course Hogendorp had pointed out.

Dutch economists wrote very few text-books until the second half of the 19th century. And what they wrote was usually popular and hardly of any analytical quality, the historians claim.

"Contrary to their German colleagues the professors did not write large books. Most books on our subject published in this country were translations, mostly of a popular type. The catchword was propaganda with emphasis on a rather extrme liberalism. ... The French school dominated Dutch thinking, especially the liberal apologetic works. Translations from the German are hardly to be found. Of course there is a wide difference between what is tranlated and what is read. Malthus's. Ricardo's, Lauderdale's and Sismondi's books were read, the discussion in Britian concerning the social consequences of industrialisation was well known and were no stimulus for industrialisation in these parts."[276]

The translated books were of the same practical oriented type and were therefore seldom translated from English, they were neither German as this hardly was needed given the closeness of the Dutch and German languages; the translated books were usually French practical-policy-oriented books, some of extreme liberalist ideological tendency preaching against everything which could be connected to the French revolution and socialism.

4 B: SECOND GENERATION LIBERALISTS - ACKERSDIJK AND TYDEMAN

Zuidema claims that if Hogendorp was the godfather of the Dutch academic tradition of economics then his pupil Ackersdijk was the father. The generations of academic economists of the 19 century all followed Hogendorp. The most prominent of these, however, were liberalists of a much more extreme degree than Hogendorp had been; Ackersdijk, Vissering and Rees in particular.

The Dutch nineteenth century economists were of two groups concerning foreign influence claims Hasenberg Butter. Those who were solely influenced by British authors; Tydeman, Ackersdijk, Rees, Mees and later Pierson. Another group was also influenced by Franch and partly German authors; Vissering, Bryun Kops and Sloet tot Oldhuis. The politically effects of the various orientation goes across these national orientation as the French inspirations were of an extreme liberalist kind like Say and Bastiat. Therefore this "British" or "also other than British" classification has little interest except that the British oriented were more inclined towards establishing economics as a formalist science; that is their works were of a more theoretical nature than the practical attitude of the eclectics. To the degree that Dutch economists were influenced by German writers this coincides more with the practical policies advanced. Among the liberalists above all the writers of De Economist Bruyn Kops and Pierson, as well as several Dutch economists who have not been mentioned by Hasenberg Butter, Zuidema and Elzas belong to the camp which also was influenced by the Germans and who also were more positive towards governmental interventions into the economic market sphere.

From the liberalist Hogendorp and the mercantilist Kluit there are two liberalist lines:

1) one extreme, which is influenced only from Hogendorp: Ackersdijk, Vissering, Rees;

2) and one moderate line, which is influenced both by Hogendorp and Kluit: Tydeman, Bruyn Kops.

Although students of the first tradition of Ackersdijk

3) the following line moved into the latter line's relatively moderate liberal positions: Mees, Pierson, and their followers (possibly moderates ? ): Beaujon, C.A.Verrijn Stuart, D'Aulnis de Borurouill, A.C.Cohen Stuart, F.de Vries.

Traditionally Dutch economists had been oriented towards French economists. The change of interest towards the "British tendency" of writers like Smith, Malthus, Ricardo and McCulloch was according to Hasenberg Butter[277] and to Zuidema[278] started by Hogendorp's "pupils" Tydeman and Ackersdijk. Except for a book on statistics by Schloezer all the foreign economic works which Tydeman introduced into Dutch translations were of British origin. Writes Hasenberg Butter,

"H.W.Tydeman (1778-1863) was the first nineteenth century Dutch economist who demonstatrated a strong interest in British economic thought. ... As far as is known, Tydeman never clarified explicitly why his interest in foreign economic literature were confined almost exclusively to writings of British origin."[279]

Ackersdijk was a fervent admirer of A.Smith and an ardent critic of the mercantilist policies of King William I and in particular his financial policy. Ackersdijk was convicted that the usefulness of the state in economic life was correlated with its passivity. Excepting maintainance of justice the state should refrain from intervention.

"The first true Smithian economist in Holland was Jan Ackersdijk (1790-1861), who was one of the most outstanding economic teachers in holland during about thirty years of the first part of the nineteenth century. ... One is led to believe that Ackersdijk must have had solid reasons for assigning priority to British economists and for making a glorious speach about Adam Smith in 1842. However, the reasons for Ackersdijk'sn particular orientation toward foreign economics cannot be clearly established. British economists further captured the interest of Otto van Rees (1825-1868). Ackersdijk had singled out Van Rees as thge most qualified person fort the inheritance of his chair at the University of Utrecht."[280]

Rees had become a devoted follower of Ackersdijk's economic ideas and blamed Pestel, Luzac and Kluit for the pollution of Dutch intellegencia with mercantilist ideas even after Verri's and Smith's ideas had become known in Holland. Rees considered Hogendorp to be ahead of his time as opposed to Kluit since Hogendorp managed to disengage him from the prejudices of his time and instead understand and apprecitate Smith's ideas. Rees,"was a fervent defender of the more extreme liberal pint of view; he considered the monoiply of the emission of banknotes of de Nederlandsche Bank superfluous."[281]

W.C.Mees (1813-1884) who Pierson considered as his true teacher also subscribed to the British ideas and in particular those of Malthus and Ricardo. Mees did not like the French polemical style nor their one-sided weight on industrial development - possibly an heritage from Colbert's mercantilism. The "high"-banker W.C.Mees produced the first and last Dutch book in the British classical tradition in economics. His book was hardly noticed but he had impact as a economist of his day through his work in the Dutch Bank and his work on monetary analysis and history. His pupil N.G.Pierson was to follow with more impact.

As Zuidema finds Mees' book Overzicht to be highly important although it did not arouse much attention at the time nor later, he reviews it closely. According to Zuidema,

"Pierson depored greatly that the book was not a success: `But the book is a real masterpiece; a goldmine which can be expored again and again'. It reminds the reader vividly of Ricardo's Principles but it is not a revised edition, for: `the pupil has surpassed the master'[282]. [283]

As Pierson later, Mees worked within and improved a Ricardian analytical model of analysis largely based on substitution, demand elasticities and allocation effects. Therefore, as with Ricardo,

"The fundamental problem of economics is the problem of distribution; the problem of growth is an intermediate one[284]."[285]

Neverteless he totally omitted Ricardo's labour theory of value which was the perfectly sound thing to do as this concerns another matter: not distibution but production, although hardly anybody seems to have noticed the principal difference and Ricardo's confusion here.

Mees explanation of distribution and income differences is relatively advanced: The principal cause is not competition but disproportionate quantities of factors such as skillfullness and capital. The principal proble is to change this distribution which is difficult, in particular, in the short run. This analysis is accompanied with a fairly advanced explanation of the phenomenon of rent[286] which he indirectly finds to be a universal phenomenon but without drawing the conclusions: rent is not limited to agriculture but in general a result of different kinds of property rights; imperfections like a monopoly - as with talented people. Since distribution is difficult to change Mees accordingly finds that, as Zuidema puts it:

"The most important economic political problems are rather complex to solve, certainly not by the free market alone."[287]

According to Zuidema,[288] Mees considered economics to be a moral science and not a physical one and had an open eye for the role of institutions. But the way this is imngained should, indeed, be commented. Zuidema doesn't comment on the following quote which he himself uses:

Without `intelligent and moral development',

"... the result will be a denser population of which, perhaps, the same percentage and thus a larger number of persons will stay in great misery[289]."[290]

For Mees, according to Zuidema,

"The most awkward problem is the growth of population. A feverish expantion of industrial production is `cheerless'[291]. As a solution it is only temporary. ... We now come to the fundamental institutional problem, the problem of morality. More prudency and more responsibility of the individuals will cause the birth rate to decline. At the same time better educated labour and more and better capital goods will produce a considerable rise of productivity. there is no reason to fear explotation by the capitalists: a smaller number of labourers suffices. It is a matter of adequate habits, a matter of morality. There will always be differences in income, but it is possible to raise the incomes of the lower classes.[292]"

So, morality and education is here put in the same frame as with modern neo-Malthusians; in the frame of population growth, not with reference to growth concerning in particular technology, but also infrastructure and economy in general and the responsibilities of the state in these matters: The of morality and education problem is individualized and limited to sexual reproduction.

Mees also puts the question of international trade within the same frame of population and Zuidema comments,

"The population problem was topical at the time, if not obsessional."[293]

A nation's foreign trade was considered in the light of relative values of import and export which was seen to depend on relative prices and therefore on local supply and demand; local wants.

Zuidema sums it up like this,

"- The result of the investigation, knowledge, is the handmaiden of morality; knowledge is the slave of our emotions, an influential slave but yet a slave, for questions of morality belong to another domain of discourse, as Hume has explained[294].

- From a moral point of view it all boils down to a fight against monopolies. Institutions, all kinds of inertia make the elimination of monopolies impossible. A supplementary set of transfers seems necessary."[295]

Mees, as Malthus and Ricardo, apparently was pessimistic concerning human nature and fate. Too pessimistic we would argue looking at history since his time. Concerning his fight against monopolies he also did not seem to have much faith in the abilities of government to regulate these to the common benefit.

Some economists were also influenced by French and sometimes but only slightly so by German economists:

Simon Vissering (1818-1888) was first an admirer of the extreme French liberalist Bastiat, then of Smith and in general of unconditional laissez faire. Zuidema describes his ideas such,

"Any mode of protection of industry is in vain, government lacks the knowledge, becomes an instrument of pressure groups and a source of crisis[296]. Natural monopolies should be `tempered', the other ones

"...how vigorous they may seem to bee ... they crumble in the end under the pressure of competition ... The only thing government should do, is not to maintain them[297].""

Vissering agreed with McCulloch's doctrine of the wage-fund and in his dicussion of McCulloch admitted that the state has certain obligations to promote formation of capital in order to raise wages and that it also ought to raise the level of taste and aspiration of the population. He did not specify how this was to be brought about. He had a somewhat more advanced theory of the origin of rent than did Ricardo.[298] He had an idea that human behaviour was based on selfishness and dependency on others. Economics was supposed to show how cooperation could result in material well-being and individual and general spiritual elevation. The objective of economics is to resolve the conflict between selfishness and brotherly love into beautiful harmony - freedom. From the starting point of Vissering perhaps there is no great conflict since dependency can be reconciled with selfishness through enlightened selfishness.

"Vissering ... expressed opposition to the German Historical School primarily because the historists denied the existence of natural laws and because they over-emphasised the role of the state in economic activities. Vissering looked upon German historism as an unsound outgrowth of a science to which the British had contributed the best, even if not the last word."[299]

So, Vissering was an eclectic who relied mainly on French and then on British sources for inspiration in his acitivities as an economist.

J.L.De Bruyn Kops was for many years the editor of the influential De Economist and the first text-book in Dutch: He is portrayed by Hasenberg Butter as being influenced mainly by British (Smith) and French writings (Chevalier) but,

"He was also favorably disposed to German Historism. The fact that De Bruyn Kops was a more moderate laissez faire enthusiast than Vissering and De Bruyn Kops' attitude towards the Historical School mark the main distinction between the two Dutch economists."[300]

His view of the purpose of economics as a science is to educate, increase knowledge and lift the level of morality in order to lift the conditions of the laboring poor. He defgended the liberal message and attacked socialist utopians.

Instead of endorsing the opinion that economics largely consisted of irrefutable truths he warned against doctrinairism and scientific orthodoxy.[301] He argued that even though society and the economy developed according to basic fixed, immutable natural laws the intepretations and solutions of these could change as a result of different circumstances. Nevertheless, he seemed to have little understanding of the role of the economic order; the institutions.[302] He was a convinced liberalist who wanted to see all obstacles to a free functioning economy removed and that therefore governmental interference was to be kept at a minimum.

As opposed to Vissering's "hands off" policy concerning governmental intervention De Bruyn Kops regarded intervention in some areas and circumstances as necessary and fruitful.

"It should be noted that De Bruyn Kops attitude to the German Historical School and Socialists of the Chair was a favorable one as he considered this movement a healthy reaction to the extreme position developed by the Manchester School and by such French economists as Bastiat.[303] De Bruyn Kops doubted whether the new approach veloped by the Historical School would actually replace "the old economics" but if the new movement serve merely to convince economists that the laissez faire was not to be interpreted as a "dolce far niente,"then it would have performed a most useful function. A hybridized French-British intellectual heritage was at leasdt partly responsible for the liberal economic views of De Bruyn Kops, but it did not arouse in him an antipathy for the German Historical School."[304]

B.W.A.E. Sloet Tot Oldhuis (1808-1884) was also a student of Ackersdijk. Hasenberg Butter describes him as rather superficial and without any points of view of his own and expressed surprise that somebody could praise such a wide variety of views as did Oldhuis. Nevertheless, he did lean in the French direction towards the positions of Say and in particular opposed socialist and communist movements. Ideas of British, French and German origin are equally well represented in his writings. In his journal Tijdschrift voor Staatshuishoudkunde en Statistiek (1841-1875) a serial on "The Main Trends in Economics" (18141-1855)

"Sloet Tot Oldhuis paid tribute to the views of Say, Droz, Storch, Garnier, Chevalier, Rossi, Blanqui, and Martineau; to the views of Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, and McCulloch as well as to Von Schloezer, Rau, Von Jacob, Soden, Roscher, and Kraus."[305]

Following the established tradition the issue of trade policy was repeatedly dealt with by Dutch economists and with the same conclusion as opposed to William I; free trade. The arguments are the old familiar ones; Holland's geographical position, the limited market and the aquired ableness of the Dutch people in conducting freight, trade and commerce.

If it was impossible to change the preconditions of this situation the liberalists were likely to be right also from List's point of view. But his point was that it was to the advantage of both Holland and Germany to change the position of Holland by including it into the German Zollverein and thereby both enlarge the market and the trade also to the Dutch industry, merchants and also make the provisions for the establishment of domestic German and Dutch industry through governmental regulation.

There were economists who were more sympathetic to the German school but these are mainly left out of the books dealing with the history of Dutch economic theory - as for instance the books by Hasenberg Butter (1969) and Van Daal and Heertje (1992). Even the book written by Laspeyres (1863) and initiated by Wilhelm Roscher did not mention List nor his influence. Van Rees (1865-1868) XXXXXXXXXXXXX

Nor did the Dutch books on the general history of economic theory mention List as for example the books by Molster (1851) and de Rooy (1851). Zimmermann (1947)? XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

This failure to mention List and the German Ethical-Historical School is peculiar; after all the Dutch economists before 1913 were all educated as lawyers and the German Ethical-Historical School was of the same inclination: To mix economics and law; they are parts of the same phenomenon. So it was a very institutionally oriented tradition defining institutions as also formal and informal aspects of phenomenas like morality and religion, institutional history and mentality in general. Economic was seen in this tradition as a part of the humanistic sciences and the methodology was seen as historical analysing the development particularly of institutions including law. This as opposed to the English and partly French tradition which saw economics as a part of the natural sciences and tried to immitate its formalist mathemetical methodology.

So it is highly unlikely that practioners of the Dutch tradition of law did not look over the border to Germany, a nation with practically the same language and culture in order to reach for inspiration to their own subjct; the development of societal institutions and law in particular and related to economics which was one of the sub-diciplines of the law-study in Holland. This is ever more likely as it is observed that it is long-standing tradition in Holland to have an extremely large contigent of both German students and German professors at the Dutch universities.[306] One is likely to suspect that the criteria chosen by the historians in the after-time to make anyone eligible for mention in a retrospective book on economics in Holland is likely to select those academicians who fit a formalist non-institutional angle of working.

Hasenberg Butter claims that economics was hindered in its theoretical development by its connection to law,

"Inasmuch as ewconomics is concerned with the empirical study of certain aspects of human behaviour, it differes from law in scope, in objectives, and in method of analysis. The location of academic economics in the Dutch law faculties thus hindered the advancement of the science, since economics was subjected to and combined with a field of study of which the overall objectives, the practical purposes, and the techniques of reasoning were merkedly different. ... about the manner in which economic was taught during the nineteenth century it seems that strong emphasis was placed upon practical issues and upon the discussion of specifially Dutch economic problems."[307]

This claim for the inhibition of the development of economics from the tie to law may be true from a certain point of view namely if the positive "objective" and abstract theory is what is regarded as theory proper. If, however, theory is regarded as being a means to a normative goal; that of regulating economic phenomenas towards the common benefit nothing could be more natural than an intimate relation between economics and law; in fact it would amount to the same and could not be separated. That the understanding of economic phenomenas could derive some improvement form at least partial formalisation through arithmetic or other kinds of mathermatics does not counter this fact. The relationship between economic and law should further be eased by the peculiar tradition of law on the continent: statutory continental law as opposed to the the Anglo-American common law. The more theoretical or rationalist character of continental law should ease such an integration as opposedd to the situation for example in England where the two subjects had been separated quite early.

Later Hasenberg Butter slaps her own mouth somewhat;

"... neither the training of Dutch economists in law faculties nor the academic appointments in law faculties was suited to stimulate the supply of theoretical contrbutions or of contributions of fundamental significance to economic science. The constraints ensuing from close academic association of economics and law, two fields whose methods, objectives and ways of reasoning did not basically lend themselves to integration, served to orient Dutch econmists to endeavors other thanpromoting the discovery of economic knowledge. The information presented in this study indicates that the academic framework of economcs, before the cleavage of economics and law, was not conduicive to autonomy of economic thinking of economics as a science.

It should be noted, however, that after the 1870's changes took place in the nature of Dutch economics despite the fact that the position of economics in the academic sphere was not modified. ... Not until the last decades of the nineteenth century did the combined impact of N.G.Pierson and Austrian economics add new dimensions to Dutch economic thought."[308]

So, after all the development of abstract economics was not totally determined by its tie to law. Another matter is whether there is anything called Austrian economics but this we will leave untouched.

The development of historical statistics was encouraged by the needs of the state and was initially introduced by Napoleon in 1810 on his request for census and registers on birth, marriage and death. An increasing public interest in the compilation of various data led to the formation of governmental commissions for investigatory and regulatory purposes. In general, during the two middle quarter of the century the Dutch lawyers were getting more professionalized as economists. They received increasingly important positions in Dutch political life as economists as they were invited to take part in these public committees, commisions and evaluations and raised their voices on public matters in media of which several were started and run by the economists themselves in particular De Economist, De Gids, Tijdschift voor Staatshuishoudkunde en Statistiek and Magazijn voor het Armwesen. This expansion ion the professional sphere may explain some of the applied character and policy-orientedness of Dutch economics. Still, despite this increased motivation to specialize as economists, they indentified themselves as lawyers and the initiatives to establish economics as an independent subject and study did not come from their ranks but from practical business-men who thought theoretical perspective and structure might improve the quality of their new employees.

DUTCH TRADE POLICY:

The academic economists reffered to by Hasenberg Butter generally favoured non-intervention and were historically oriented only to a limited extent. As we have pointed out above, there is reason to question this claim of the whole-sale Dutch allegiance to the British free-trade position as there are empirical exceptions to the allegiance of the Dutch economists towards the British and their free-trade policy and also there are logical-institutional and historical reasons to doubt it.

Anyhow, this changed after the period Hasenberg Butter described: Hasenberg Butter claims that although most subjects discussed by Dutch economists in the period 1800-1870 were of a acute practical interests and rather less theoretically oriented there were two issues which received permanent interest and were continuously discussed; pauperism and trade policy. Still she claims that trade policy was little discussed after 1850 which is somewhat peculiar since it is precisely during this period the trade policy changes. The way she describes this phenomenon points to the possibility that it was so widely acknowledged within the academic community that there was no reason to discuss it. Nevertheless there is quite some discussion of the problem of trade policy during the 1860's for example in De Gids.

Evident it is, however, that the forerunning German discussion and then the 1879 decision by the German chancellor Bismarck to introduce selective protection on certain products were of immense importance to prompt the Dutch discussion on trade policy. From 1880 onwards to the beginning of the 1930's (reemerging somewhat in the 1980's), pamphlets and books on the theme relatively flooded the country compared to the previous situation. The stride might be seen as between those of a English and those of a German inclination but at the time there was an (almost equally) strong faction of the English economists who favoured the protectionist attitudes of the German historical-ethical school in economics. J.A.Levy for example dedicated a copious book to the English historical school, or katheder-socialists as they also were known as on the continent, in 1879.[309]

Hasenberg Butter claims concerning the period 1800-1870 that,

"Dutch economic thought during the period in consideration may be characterized in broad terms as a quest for liberalism. Although there were differences in the views and emphases of leading dutch economists, they pleaded unanimously for laissez faire in most spheres of economic activity. ... It is sufficient to mention here that in the controversy between protectionist and free trade groups during the early part of the century, economists always supported the free trade position."[310]

The period 1830-1850 formed the preparation for later liberal economic policy both in theory and in practice.

"Insofar as early nineteenth-century Dutch economic policy is concerned, the years 1830-1850 represent a period of germination of free trade policy. The transition from mercantilistic economic policy under the reign of Willem I (1813-1840) to the free trade policy established during the second part of the century, was modeled after the liberalisation taking place in England.[311] Orientation towards Britain manifested itself in economic-policy measures as well as in the attitudes of economists. In 1847, for example, two Dutch economists published a "History of Tariff Reforms in England," for the purpose of stimulating the similar policies in Holland."[312]

"During the first part of the nineteenth century Dutch policy often conflicted with the ideas of leading economists. However, since liberalism manifested itself increasingly in policy formation during the second half of the century. Dutch economists were less frequently compelled to write about trade policy after than before 1850. A discussion of the corn laws by two prominent economists exemplifies how Dutch ecenomists viewed problems of commercial policy and illustrates the tendency of the Dutch to follow the British in respect to trade-policy reforms"[313].

It is ironical and at the same time obscuring that she chooses the example of agricultural protection to show this - of which there in general is no difference of opinion between trade theorists; David Ricardo, Richard Cobden on the so-caaled free trade side and Friedrich List on the so-called protectionist side all combatted it as contrary to national interests as both. If she had chosen the self-evident and obvious candidate which was the main subject of all the protectioists; infant-industry protection, she might have reached another conclusion as for example Hogendorp and Pierson modified their liberalism in face of the problems faced by such industries.

Nevertheless Hasenberg Butter sticks to her exposition of the Dutch tradition by using two rather extreme liberalist as her show-case;

"The discussion of the corn law problem by Ackersdijk and Vissering illustrates the general approach of Dutch economists to questions of trade policy. The objections of economists to non-agricultural prtection was based on contentions very similar to those raised against the corn laws. On the subject of commercial policy Dutch economists argued invariably in favor of non-intervention. The position taken was supported with references to Dutch commerical policy during previous centuries, to views of antecedent Dutch economic thinkers, to conclusions derived from economic theory, to the experience of other nations (especialy England), and, to the extent that they were avaliable, empirical data."[314]

To the degree that Dutch economists used England as an example, they may have acted totally contrary to the point of List's argumentation; to use the contemporary experience of a leader as a model for a catcher-up is erroneous. To use the history of the leader as a model may be better to the extent that the circumstances in the main are somewhat similar. If this had been done free-trade would surely not be the conclusion as it was not the strategy by which England became a leader.

INFRASTRUCTURE POLICY

As noticed, according to Hasenberg Butter Dutch economists in general were non-interventionists in the 19the century. Nevertheless, Hogendorp in particular, acknowledged the role of the state concerning transportation infrastructure, moderate protection, money and in general tending the preconditions for an effective market. The more moderate liberalists Bruyn Kops and Mees were in favor of temporary state intervention to relieve pauperism although the ultimate solution would be to remove restrictions to the workings of the market. He and Mees also believed part of the solution to be promotion of education. Mees believed that public works would crowd out more efficient private enterprises.

Ackersdijk's distrust of the government led him to oppose paper money. Mees and Peirson acknowledged the necessity of state monopoly concerning the issue of money, as they, although (?) bankers, distrusted the private bankers; over issue was possible and dangerous.[315]

TAXATION POLICY

The Netherlands emerged from the Napoleonic wars with a large debt and large annual public interest payments. These payment grew by 60 per cent from 1815 to 1830 partly due to KIng William I's investments and then started to decrease partly as a result of revenue from the investments and reorganisation of the debt (?). The financial policy was severely critisised in particular by Ackersdijk.

The general attitude of the Dutch economists was that tax should not be based on whether income nor property. Instead a whole lot of indirect and selective taxes were used to generate public revenue. The problem, however, was that these taxes were seen in isolation; the tax-structure was rather accidental and not at all systematical. Hasenberg Butter claims that,

A "unified and methodological fiscal policy was not introduced in Holland until the 1890's. ...

In the field of public finance writers turned to problems of public expenditures and debt mangement only infrequently, apparently preferring to deal with problems of taxation. A systematic approach is not to be found in Dutch literature respecting fiscal problems during the period under consideration.However, during the last two decades of the century analysis of taxation and the national budget made considerable progress."[316]

W.C.Mees tried a systematical approach in 1874 and referred to the principles of ability to pay and of benefits derived constituting the problem of fairness. Additionally there is he pointed out the problem of efficiency of collection. He argued that a particular tax-structure has more impact on growth than that of distribution between different classes. This latter point goes directly to the core of List's argument: although temporary protection may be a burden on some parts of society: the consumers, the ultimate effect on general growth may legitimize it.

HISTORICAL BOOKS

Historical books were hardly written: Most economists did not do historical work whether on economic policy or theory; except for Rees, Mees and Pierson. Two books by de Rooy and by Molster had been written on the history of economic thought by 1850 but neither hardly mentioned any Dutch economists - nor List for that matter. Roscher asked Laspeyeres to write a history of Dutch economic thought, in which eventually Laspeyres did not mention anything about List. When Rees was asked he to translate it he preferred to write his own historical account as he did not like Laspyres' account.

In economic history J.A.Fruin, Arend, Rees were active. Mees wrote on banking, Bosch Kemper on pauperism, Porteijle and Vissering on the history of English tariffs and Pierson wrote on the physiocrats; the Italian economists; List and the German historical school. Hasenberg Butter writes that,

"The impression that no studies were written in the field of economic history between 1800 and 1870 would be errouneous. Certainly there were books published on such subjects as the hsitory of shipping, fishing, trade, industry, and other economic topics, However, it is true that leading Dutch economists of the period under consideration did not frequently turn to historical research, and that they demonstrated little interest in the history of economic thought."[317]

Concerning text-books Bruyn Kops wrote the fist in 1850, then came Vissering's more systematic attempt in 1860-61. Neither of these were theoretical in the modern sense. Mees theoretical work in 1866 was not much noticed but was the first Dutch theoretical work of international standard. Mees was nevertheless dominant in Holland after Rees and until his pupil Pierson, Hasenberg Butter notes, and,

"Concerned about the influence of such economists as Carey, MacLeod and Bastiat, Mees wished to restate some basic economic laws formulated by the classical school, which were in his mind as reputable as general laws in natural science."[318]

Quite interestingly, neither of these authors are mentioned as influential in Holland elsewhere neither by Hasenberg Butter nor by the authors in van Daal and Heertje.

Hasenberg Butter claims that,

"Dutch economic thought during the nineteenth century was largely eclectic. With the exception of Mees' theory of international bimetallism, it was not marked by originality."[319]

NICOLAAS GERARD PIERSON

As noticed Pierson considered Mees as his true teacher.

"There is a direct line of influence from Hogendorp through Ackerdijk and Mees to Pierson. This line is the real trend in economic in our country in the nineteenth century."[320]

As noticed above, Pierson was the leading economist in the latter part of the nineteenth century, self-taught and with great success both in the academic life, banking profession, commercial life, and in politics being invited to hold important position in all these areas. He was keenly interested in history of economic thought and of monetary history, a devoted Ricardian, a trade liberalist, a social-liberal in politics and a reformer and systematizer of the taxation system.

Pierson critisized A.Smith for his overly individualism and Karl Marx for his lacking scientific scholar. A.Heertje finds both critisism by Pierson to be to strong[321] but Pierson is, indeed, explicit in praising Smith and Ricardo as the founders of the economic science.

Pierson is without comparison the most outstanding Dutch economist before WW I. A.Heertje in 1992 wrote that Pierson in 1866 published a long article on Italian economists based on the collected edition P.Custodi. He acknowledged the importance of the Italian writers a hundred years before Schumpeter and A.Heertje writes that,

"In 1866 Pierson published another article, on the German iconoclast F.List[322] and again showed an incredibly detailed knowledge of his subject matter. He did not agree with List's proposal to introduce protective duties, because `protection undermines the entrepreneural spirit'[323], but he nevertheless had a great deal of admiration for List."[324]

In his article on the German Historical School, Pierson himself calls List: "a man of outstanding gifts"[325] and in the article on List he showed good understanding of List and correctly and explicitly wrote that List "is no unconditional promoter of protection".[326]

From the description given by Heertje one is led to believe that apparently Pierson did not understand much of List and Heertje neither since Pierson's critisism passes uncommented. Pierson did hwoever understand quite a lot of List. List's advocation of protection cannot be separated from his advocation of unification that is of enlarging the market, in the case of Germany and Holland through the customs union; the Zollverein, and through building railroads. Thereby sufficient competition could be secured in order to escape this entrepreneurial problem leading to inefficiency.

"After 1871, Pierson continued as a prolific and suceessful writer on many aspects of economics. He vehemently defended his methodological insights against Levy, who in a publication on kathedersocialism, had tried to refute a critical essay on the subject by Pierson.[327] Pierson again emphasized the explanatory task of economics and rejected the idea that science should exercise an advisory role for the government."[328]

"He was a strong defender of free trade and very much opposed to protection in international trade.[329]"[330]

Regardless of his earler rejection of income tax, as a Minister of Finance he arraged for a reform of the tax system baseing it on a mix ogf taxes including income tax based on the sacrifice principle

The first volume of Pierson's Textbook appeared in 1884 anfd the second part in 1890.[331] This book governed teaching at Dutch universities for decades to come and was translated into English, French, Italian and partly into Japanese.

"Schumpeter observed that Pierson had `founded a school that, supported by leaders such as Verrijn Stuart and De Vries, lasted well into the 1920's[332],

ON RICARDO: RENT AND VALUE

Heertje notes Pierson's close relation to Ricardo,

"Pierson applies the marginal productivity theory to labour and then relates the relative prices of goods to the quantity of labour, incorporated in the goods, which is a direct a link to Ricardo's relative labour theory of value. Ricardo also comes to mind when Pierson writes that goods do not have value because they require labour, but the labour is allocated becuase goods have value, as ricardo once said with respect to rent. Without saying it explicitly, Pierson introduces the subjective value in use against objective value in exchange: the first is determined by marginal utility and the second by costs. Subsequently, the distinction between market price in the short run and in the long run is entirely left out. It has to be assumed that he had perfect competition in mind, but his becomes less clear than in his publications on value and production costs.

Pierson's treatment of the prices of goods is followed by his treatment of production factors. Rent, rental value, capital interest, entrepreneurial profits, as distinguished from entrepreneurial wages and wages are all discussed in detail. On rent, Pierson follows Ricardo and in doing so he also appreciates Menger, as Ricardo's theory on rent can be seen as a forunner of the Austrian tradition.[333] The discussion on rental value is illustrated by many practical examples."[334]

He introduces to the Netherlands the ideas of Jevons through his and Vissering's student J d`Aulnis Bourouill. Although he apparently did not accept the subjectivistic interpretation of value and cost in his article on Ricardo, he must have changed his mind later on: Two years later in an article in De Economist such an element can be seen. The concept of marginal utility is omitted and like Jevons

"he discusses value first of all, independent of exchange, and concludes that it is determined by the utility of the last increment, which Jevons calls, from the point of view of the consumer, final utility. ... When Pierson discusses the factors of production, like Menger[335] but unlike Jevons, he takes the view of the entrepreneur into account. In particular when discussing labour there are traces of the marginal utility theory when analysing the price level in an industry.[336] The prices of the goods are established in markets derived from supply and demand. Pierson did not supply a subjectivist interpretation of supply, so one should not be surprised that he readily returned to Ricardo."[337]

According to Heertje, Pierson stayed true to the material concept of welfare of the classics and this blocked the way for a formation of a subjectivist way of thinking. Pierson repeatedly praised Ricardo's work and in particular his deductive method.

"It was Pierson's opinion that Ricardo's system is determined by two issues, namely the theory of rent and the theory on value. .. Pierson pointed out thast Ricardo's labour theory of value is founded on two conditions: utility and reproduction of goods. With respoect to value, Pierson throws light on Ricardo's distinction in reproducible and non-reprodicible goods. This distinction is vvery important for a full understanding of the interpretations of Ricardo which are based on Sraffa. Pierson points out that Ricardo puts the emphasis on value, as it is detemined in the long run by cost of production, so that incidental factors on the supply and demand side of the market have to be abandoned.

Pierson also appreciated Ricardo's opinion that value is determined by labour which, under favouable conditions, that is, at the margin, is nefcessary for production. This point of view was important with respect to Ricardo's theory. Rent is not an element but a result of price, because of the determination of the value of goods by the application of labour under unfavourable conditions. Pierson carefully discussd the different objections which had been put forward against Ricardo's theory of rent and finally came to the conclusion that Ricardo's theory, in principle, was just, though it needed to be refined.[338] In this sophisticated essay, Pier4son vigorously defended Ricardo's deductive method. It is, in particular, Ricardo's methodology which won Pierson's admiration.

With respect to the method, it is Ricardo who is the master. ..... Then a future Wilhelm Roscher will write ... when that time comes, and if political economy is not doomed to strand at the present stage of development, she will - I am quite positive - be indebted to no one, after Adam Smith, so much as to David Ricardo.[339]

Fifteeen years later, when Pierson again discussed Ricardo, he expressed his deep admiration once more. `Ricardo posessed an extremely interesting mind; not all he has written may be just, but it is certtainly worthwhile.He seldom mfollowed a old trail; mostlyu, he choses his own way and leads us to a point which pre-eminently provides the oppostunity to become aquinted with the phenomena he wants to explan.'[340]"[341]

Pierson introduced Ricardo into several of the subjects he treated in his Textbook.

SOCIAL EFFICIENCY AND INTERVENTIONISM

Pierson regarded the price mecanism as a compass for supply and demand in the markets and therefore as a cornerstone for a correct allocation of resources.

"Yet Pierson does not forget the role of self-interst.`there is no profit in founding hospitals, schools for the poor, libraries and public parks. Yet all these things are necessary. However, if one waits until they are brought about by self-interest, one will wait in vain'.[342] It is possible for social profits to exceed the gain of the producer. Pierson cites the example of transport, from which the external positive effects are undeniable. It is therefore wrong to follow thte compass of the price mechanism blindly, as it does not always forecast `what direction one should take in order to serve the interests of humanity and society'.[343] Every public work that supplies a need, is economically productive. However, sas Pierson adds, its production should posess `the highest possible degree of productivity'.[344] Governmant subsidies are only justified if the benefits to the population convincingly exceeeds the profits that the entrepreneurs may appropriate by capitalistic methods of production. Pierson provides a fully modern account of what should be left to private enterprise: `one can be sure that much useful work would remain undone' if a country adhered to the principle of laissez faire.[345] Depressions and crises also demonstrate to Pierson the imperfection of a society in which self-interest is allowed full play. He again advocates a monopolistic position fo rthe Central Bank, as a means `to temper disasters'.[346]

Pierson pays a lot of attention to the interest of the employees, who may be harmed by the entrepreneur's arbitrary attitude. Trade unions are very important in the fight against the many abuses of power. But the government has an essential role to play in combatting many unjust practices so Pierson shows himself to be a warm defender of social legislation. One sees here a relationship between his theoretical analysis and his conduct as a politician, in particular as Prime Minister of a `cabinet of social justice'. The principal element in Pierson's critisism of a society based on self interest is the enormous inequality in welfare, which it brings about.[347] We must know better than to identify the present order with the `natural order'.

It is no more natural than any other society. It is based on the right of property, brought into being by the law, and protected by a strong defence. Purely scientific speaking, one can only regard it as one of many possible orders, and every sincere economist should ask himself whether it is the best.[348]

This quotation would not be out of place in a modern introduction to the economic analysis of property rights.[349]"[350]

PIERSON IN GENERAL AND IN THE AFTERTIME

Heertje argues that Pierson, in the fourth part of the Textbook, shows himself to be a master of the theory and policy of taxation and loans. (Heertje does unfortunately not say much more.) In one section Pierson argues that the burden of taxation can be reduced by a different distribution of it and by technological innovations.[351] Concerning economic laws he paid much attention to Marshall.

In the international literature Pierson did not leave many traces but; Viner notes him, Schumpeter notes him, Irving Fisher quotes him, Hayek included his essay on the problem of prices in socialism. His Textbook was translated into several languages. He was frequently quoted in Dutch textbooks in the interwar period but the years 1926-36 meant a break with Pierson's inheritance. For example Hennipmann chose the subjectivist approach as against Pierson's material and objectivist approach.

THE PERIOD 1870-1930

B.D.Elzas claims in his article on Dutch economic thought in the period 1870-1950 that concerning the first part of the period until the death of Pierson in 1909 ,

"Two typical `Dutch' traits can be discerned in this story: the prompt attention given by at least some economists in this country to emerging international theoretical literature ... and the absence of original contributions to the new developments spotted. Theoretical profundity emerges in response to practical issues only. Even Pierson satisfies that description to a large extent., ..

Most debates centred around issues of trade policy rather than trade theory. Nevertheless, as should be expected, theoretical claims played an important role in these debates. Traditionally, as a result of the openness of the economy, free trade is rather popular and finds many defenders in professional and professorial circles as well, Vissering and Pierson being two prominent examples from the nineteenth century. If international conditions had stayed constant throughout, free trade would not even have been much of a discussion point. However, as a result of international developments, every now and then discussion flares up again. In 1878, for instance, Imperial Germany takes a turn towards protectionism, and this induces protectionist measures by other European countries. As international trade interests in the Netherlands are hurt by trade protection elsewhere, voices in favour of (counter-) protection became louder. Prominent economists her warn against it; among them are Pierson (Pierson 1888), and his successor as professor of `economics and statistics' at the Municipal University of Amsterdam since 1885, Beaujon (1853-1890) who publishes the first Dutch textbook on the subject (Beaujon 1888) our second example of profundity in practical issues. This remarkable concise and clear textbook could be regarded as a free-trade pamphlet, but then a coherent and scrupulous one with skilful argumentation."[352]

"5. The second part of the book is devoted to the analysis of several kinds of artificial restraints on international trade; it shows all of them to be pernicious to the gains from trade, with the exception of, perhaps, particular circumstances. For instance, an import duty is less harmful if, through unfavourable production conditions, it fails to stimulate domestic production, than if it diverts production factors from their best allocation. Nor will it do much harm to consumption if the product on which the duty is imposed is a pure luxury bought by the very rich only (such as art objects) with (in modern jargon) a low price elasticity of demand (p.72). As that combination of circumstances is definitely not the usual one under which import duties are imposed, they are apt to harm the country's interests even if only meant to be countervailing.

6. Beaujon acknowledges one possible exception to this rule: the infant-industry case (p.76 and chapter VI), but he doubts that the set of assumptions required for a valid pro-protection implication is realistic for this case: would protection really lead to modernisation of the protected industry? And, if so, would not people with direct interests in this industry prevent the later abolishment of the protective measures?

7. Notwithstanding his provisional acceptance of the infant-industry argument, Beaujon gives a crushing analysis of Friedrich List's Das nationale System der politischen Oekonomie (The national system of political economy, 1841). By the impact of the book, the German List had become - and still is - famous as a champion of infant-industry protection. One of Beaujon's objections to such a policy is neatly summarised by the title of a booklet published almost a century later: Picking loosers... ? (Burton 1983; Beaujon 1888, p. 107).

8. Beaujon demonstrates the near-sightedness of pleas for import duties with a view to protect domestic employment. Even under the gold standard régime of his time, restricting imports could lead to some currency appreciation (between the `gold points'), and, thus to less employment in export industries. Moreover, as far as imported goods did not serve domestic consumption directly, but are used in domestic production processes, import duties have the effect of making final products more expensive to produce. So, selling the latter - abroad or on the home market - becomes more difficult or less profitable. Thus domestic employment is endangered again."[353]

This description of List totally misses his main point: comparative advantages have to be analysed dynamically and not statically as Ricardo had done, thereby invoking the crucial concept of learning which is totally missing in the liberalist approach.

Beaujon was the teacher of Cohen Stuart. After Pierson's death in 1909 C.A. Verrijn Stuart became the most influential economist in the Netherlands with many official positions.

"The combination of all these positions gave him considerable potential influence on the profession in the Netherlands, a potential which, through his strong and uncompromising character as well as his dogmatic belief in the Austrian approach, he realized in full .. ."[354]

Since most economists in the Netherlands were lawyers by profession the less mathematical Austrian version of neo-classical economics, as opposed to the rival ones by Jevons, Marshall and Walras, was favoured claims Elzas and he continues to write that the second publication of notice in the period was a Walrasian treatise on equilibrium theory by J.G.Koopman. F.A.G.Keesing's doctoral thesis claimed that equilibrium will never be reached and that the equilibrium theory was,

"completely inapplicable to a market economy and he pleads the development of an analysis of economic dynamics. Harrod (1939) is in the air!"[355]

P.B.Kreukniet, however, saw the Lausanne equilibrium model as a methodological device for demonstrating general interdependence in a market economy, but not for calculating.

20TH CENTURY ECONOMIC IDEAS

Among the more moderate liberalists the Catholic influence is felt.

Johan Huizinga, Nederland's bescaving in de zeventiende eeuw, H.D.Tjeenk Willink & Zoon NV, Haarlem 1941.

"With regard to internal trade, the Dutch had great difficulties extricating themselves from the guild system, the very antipode of free competition. In 1798 under French occupation (which lasted from 1795 till 1814) the guilds were formally abolished, but they continued undisturbed until 1818. Then King Willem I, in spite of several petitions to retain the guilds, decided (after some hesitation) to do away with them once and for all. Apparently free competition in internal trade was not self-evident in Holland - to say the least. Actually the history of Dutch economic thought as far as concerned with the desirable economic organisation, could be written as a continuing debate between the proponents of free competition and those who longingly recalled the olden times of the guilds. Especially in the 20th century, when the heydays of liberlaism were over, an old interest revived in forms of organisation that could restrain competition. The German Historical School had some influence in the Netherlands and not everyone was impressed by John Stuart Mill's dictum:

To be protected against competition is to be protected in idleness, in mental dulness ... [356]"

"So, in the 1920s and 1930s theoretical economics in The Netherlands became a discipline to be discussed among memebers of the profession rather than to be taught (or even `preached') by professionalists to a layman's audience only, as used to be the common practice; ...

Nevertheless, the old tradition of publishing mainly on the impulse of a hot point of economic policy was still alive in the Netherlands. So, for instance, the discussion between free-traders and protectionists flared up again in the second half of the 1920s, as a result of international protectionist developments. In response to protectionist pleas, Verrijn Stuart had a reprint published of Beaujon's textbook (Beaujon 1888, 1927) and the Society for Free Trade found the gifted economist J.E.Vleeschouwer (1896-1973) prepared to undertake a project of empirical research ... into the conseqeunces of trade protection for countries that had opted for such a policy in the recent past. Vleeschouwer's results appeared in a book entitled Actieve handlespolitiek (Active trade policy) (Vleeschouwer 1927). With hindsight, it could tentatively be characterized as an empirical test of the hypothesis - defended by Beaujon among others - that trade protection is as a rule pernicious to the country implementing it. The results of the test support that hypothesis."[358]

The book is written as witty styled polemics.

In the 1920s and the 1930s an unmistaken shift occured in the international economic debate, the origin of theoretical innovation shifted from continental Europe to England and particularly to the USA. Elzas does not put this change into connection with the international political facts of the period.

In The Netherlands Elzas finds three themes of investigation to be made on top level.

1) Are ideas like economic motive and principle still usable.

2) Can a value-free science be established.

3) Can value theory be a foundation for price theory.

Economist who engaged in these discussions were;

ad 1) Hennipman;

ad 2) De Vries, J.Zijlstra, F.Hartog, F.J.de Jong on the one side and Ch.Raymaakers, F.Polak, and ten Doeschate on the other side;

ad 3) Vleeschouwer.

Comments:

ad 1) Hennipman shows how a change has taken place in the transformation of the `economic end' in liberal economic from classisism to neo-classisism; from maximation of money income to maximation of psychic income.

ad 2) Raymaakers claimed that economics and ethics have to be studied in context. De Vries, de jong and Hartog replied by defending the possibility of a value-free science whereas Polak and ten Doenschate denied this.

ad 3) Vleeschouwer found no way of making value theory the foundation of price theory

VAN DAAL'S AND HEERTJE'S BOOK

In the book edited by Van Daal and Heertje a few other German authors are mentioned occasionly; Knapp, Schloezer, Roscher, A.Wagner, F.v.Wiser and v.Justi. In this book hardly anything is written on List by the historians of Dutch economic thought except that,

"Beaujon gives a crushing analysis of Friedrich List"[359]

- and apparently did not understand anything judging from the description given by Elzas - a very statical one not at all grasping the List's ideas of non-material factors of production: learning, which by its very nature is dynamical. The second place List is mentioned is by A.Heertje concerning Pierson's essay on List, refered to above under the treatment of Pierson.[360]

HASENBERG BUTTER'S TREEATMENT OF LIST

In the book by Hasenberg Butter List is not mentioned at all but there a few references to Roscher, Rau, Schloezer, and some older German cameralists like Justi, Jacob, Soden, and Kraus. According to Hasenberg Butter, the three most important academic economists in the first half of the 19th century were Ackersdijk, Vissering and Rees. In the second half it was Mees and then Pierson. (She also claims, however, that Bruyn Kops, who was also a politician and the editor of De Economist influenced many students during the third quarter of the century.) Of these the first three were rather extreme liberalists and anti-inventionists whereas the latter two were more moderate and favoured intervention in several instances. Nevertheless, also the latter were in general free-traders. The former were as were most Dutch economists at the time economists of a more practical inclination who showed little efforts into theoretical and in particular analytical work. The latter are exceptions in this matter and did indeed do analytical work of a high international standard. Of these Mees' theoretical work was not much noticed as opposed to that of Pierson.

SUMMARY OF ACADEMIC ECONOMICS IN HOLLAND

"In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the views of German cameralists gained some popularity in Holland. Thereafter liberal economics of the English and French variety exerted major influence on the development of Dutch economic thought. Generally speaking, Dutch economists expressed opposition to protectionism, socialism, and communism as well as to German Historism. This is not tot say that German Historism found no spokesmen whatsoever in Holland. However, at least unitl the 1870's, such advocates of remained lartgely outside the mainstream of Dutch economic thought."[361]

While British economists usually were consulted on the issues of trade policy, taxation and wages the French literature was consulted on resistance to socialism and in aprticular the French literature tended to be translated as Dutch economists were particularly interested in education and popularization of the discussion of economic problems.

"Early phases of Dutch interest in German Liberal economists had been noticed in Tydeman, in the Dutch writers on value after the middel of the century, and in Sloet Tot Oldhuis. Eventiually a liberal economists, De Bruyn Kops, welcomed German Historism though the movement as such never gained much influence in Holland. On the whole the German impact on Dutch thought during most of the nineteenth century was overshadowed by British and French influence."[362]

For several reasons discussed above this is hard to believe in toto;

A1) The German language, culture, and geographical position is to that of Holland than any other neighbouring countries.

A2) The economic interests of Holland would to a large extent be the same as those of Germany; promote continental production and thereby trade and wealth.

A3) Dutch economists were lawyers and institutionally oriented as was the German tradition.

On the other hand, what would work against an interest in German more or less cameralist ideas?

B1) Predominance of industry over trade would temporarily curb development of trade interests through protectionst measures. In the longer run this would be paid back with more trade resulting form higher produtction as noticed in A1 above.

B2) Inclusion of Holland into the Zollverein as a way to expand the continental market and thereby competition would result in less political control over their own territory for the Dutch elite. The would be paid back with higher influence over German decissions however.

So, all in all, the objective opposition to German ideas, and in particular to List's ideas, may be desribed as short sighted both in time and in scope. It is hard to believe that the majority of Dutch economists thought in this way.

Concerning the ebb and flow of the Dutch interest in German ideas in economics the following can be observed. The increased popularity of German cameralism in the latter part of the eighteenth century coincided with popular rebellion against the old merchant oligarchy (Dutch patriotic revolution of 1787) as well as with a change of Dutch political alliance with France and USA instead of the more traditional alliance with Britain. In 1815 France and the republican forces in Europe were defeated. Under the British installed but unexpected anti-British-trade regime of William I and its mercantilist policy a British-oriented academic economic tradition, nevertheless, was built up which eventually became permanently dominant after the British-hailed break-up of the "big" Netherlands. A more limited interest in List's ideas is noticable in the 1860's (noticed: 2 x Pierson, 1 x Vissering, 1 x Hamaker) but the economic crash in 1873 and Bismarck's introduction of protectionism in 1879 reintroduced with force the interest in the German tradition in economics, now called the Historical School and "pulpit-socialists"; Katheder-socialisten. This interest was lasting but with the main burst lasting until the first world war and the end of the short German dominance of the European continent.

What we therefore can observe is a coinciding academic interest in German economic thought along with the relative weakness of Britian's influence on the European continent; whenever Britain has gained a strong hand on the continent the interest in mercantilist oriented ideas has declined - whether of German or French origin.

The interest in List's ideas was accodingly also greatest in the periods with greatest interest in German theory in general and therefore in periods when Germany was a strong force in European continental policy. However, this goes both ways concerning The Netherlands: As we have pointed out List advocated protectionism for less industrialised countries and economic integration if the country in question was relatively small. In the case of The Netherlands this would mean uniting with the German Zollverein in the period 1830-1871 and some kind of economic unification with the German empire after 1871. The massive expansion of Germany during the period made many neighbouring countries anxious and reluctant to such ideas and more inclined to protect their independence than their industry. Therefore the German expantion in the 1860s and the german protectionism in the 1880s resulted in an interest in List's ideas but in political practice more in protectionism as retaliation than as cooperation as List would have wanted, in particular and foremost concerning The Netherlands.

B RESOURCES, WEALTH

In §46 Roscher writes in a non-materialist mode that although

"All economic production generally demands the coöperation of the three factors ... with the political economist, labor is the principal thing; and not merely because every combination of the three is an act of labor; but, in general, because "the human mind's idea of the means and ends makes all good goods for the first time." ... The greater part of the forces of nature are latent to nomads and nations of hunters. When labor develops, they are set free to assist it. ... It is very seldom that anything could be produced without capital. ... Life would only be possible in a tropical climate."

Although, when analysing resources, he hardly considers anything but material resources, he still writes that (§21),

"Political economy treats chiefly of the material wants of nations. ... even in a material sense, the intellect of a people is their most important element, ... [363]"

He claims (§16) that "There are two bases to all material power:[364] Wealth and war-like ability" and he points out (§17) the close subject affinity of public economy, Political Economy, politics "in the case of the science of finance, or of the science of governmental house-keeping, otherwise the administration of public affairs." and momentous is the declaration that,

(§19) "Political Economy in Germany developed out of the science of law and the cameralistic sciences, while in England and Italy it had its origin chiefly in the study of questions of finance and foreign commerce."

This may help us to understand why the liberalist tradition of Italy and Britain, as with the physiocratic tradition, did not develop a clear understanding of the role of technology since this would not be central to commerce.

PRODUCTION OF RESOURCES

Wilhelm Roscher: Principles of Political Economy, 2 Vol.s, (translated after the 13th German ed. of Grundlage 1877, originally 1854), Chicago 1882

ADDITION:

On the other hand List's solution to the infant industry problem was crude; taxation on import and export, as these were the financial means available at that moment of writing. Today there are numerous other and more refined measures available like variuous forms of subsidies and taxation both direct and indirect; for example inexpensive credit directed to certain economic activities. The problem of production of public goods can be included into this problem area. Therefore, since the financial instruments available for economic policy are more numerous are more refined the old problem of free trade vs protectionism could be avoided, unless of course internal taxes and subsidies are seen as protectionism, as is the practice today. Nevertheless, the problem of economic integration through economic unions whithin which the use of such instruments are equalised is as acute as ever since it concerns maximisation of economic efficiency within a geographical area where the economic process can be regulated politically for the common benefit.

SEARCH PROCEDURE

The search for information regarding how the ideas of F.List were received in the Netherlands was done throught the National Dutch library system which includes most of all literature stored from around 1550 until today. For budget reasons reasons it had to somewhat restricted - for example to the Dutch economic magazines available in Maastricht.

A search for `List' gave 57 entries as compared with the entries of other German scholars of the same tradition: Sombart: 121, Roscher: 46, Schmoller: 50, Knies: 10, Hildebrand: 2, A.Wagner: 42, J.H.G.Justi: 20, Möser: 1, Wollf: 184, Leibniz: 410 and Cusa + Kues: 160 + 198. The entries however were practically all non-Dutch texts and therefore were of less interest. Consulting a modern standard textbook on the history of Dutch economic ideas by van Daal and Heertje, two entries were found regarding the non-reception by two liberalists: Pierson and his student Beaujon. Nevertheless, the main works of practically all economists mentioned by van Daal and Heertje up to 1885, the main economists up to 1935 and a few thereafter were searched through.

Other books by authors mentioned by these main stream liberalist authors in connection with the main themes of interests regarding List's ideas were also scrutinized. In particular authors were sought who might be opposed to the main liberalist stream. These were mainly dissertations and pamphlets where the latter were of a more practical nature which often did not mention any theoreticians at all. All books covering Dutch economic-, tariff-, and trade history were scrutinized. The leading economic magazines were scrutinized in the same manner: De Gids through the years 1855-1885 (founded 1837) and de economist through the years 1852-1885. The ending-year 1885 was a matter of cost-benefit choice concerning time spent and information received.

The books and articles had to be scrutinized page by page. This procedure had to be repeated for practically all book as only about 5 per cent of the books released before WW II seem to have been given a index.

The search included also other economists, as well as concepts like "vrijhandel" and "het vrije ruilverkeer" (free trade), "protectie" and "bescherming" (protection), "tarivenpolitiek" (tariff policy), "handelspolitiek" (trade policy), katheder-socialist, historische school, "Zollverein" (German customs union), "spoorweg" (railroads) and concepts related to non-material factors of production.

Practically no refereences were found in these books to railroads, extremely few to customs union and then regarding German history and not theory. Regarding education there was a Malthusian bent towards viewing the education of common people into limiting their procreation rather than promoting technical development.

The results for most of the books were listed in a separate ducument were entires easily can be found by making an entry for for example Adam Smith or Frederic Bastiat or Gustav Schmoller on a computer-text-program like Word Perfect which was the working program. The ducument had reached 40 pages when we deceided to stop the search. There still is an amazing amount of pamphlets to be searched through, more than 200 known at present. This could not be done due to lack of time, lack of funds since each order costs 10 gulders and since many pamphlets siimply are not available through the library system due to old age or scarcity. To review them would have ment a considerable amount of time (and money) spent on travelling to local libraries in the Netherlands.

The entries found in the Dutch library system on the various concepts were:

vrijhandel: 61

vrije ruilverkeer: 7

protectie: 54

protectionisme: 34

bescherming: 7

handelspolitiek: 108

tarivenpolitiek: 3

katheder-socialist: 3

historische school: 1

REFERENCES IN DUTCH LITERATURE TO F.LIST:

Books and articles from which I have not listed all the names mentioned are marked with a *

But they have been looked through.

Willem van Houten: De Koophandel, Gebroeders Diederichs, Amsterdam 1836 (384p,)

Most likely no reference to List: too old and hardly any names mentioned at all

No index, no table of contents

Chapter on railroads115

vrije of beperkte handel 80

Mr.D...: Over de aloude vrijheid van handel en nijverheid en Nederland, M.Ballot, Denveter 1840 (319p.)

Quote from List ??? Pages 301-302 or Schön as is written?

History of Dutch economy and tariffs

NO REGISTER

I limit the registration to foreign economists and some Dutch

Lots of references to Karl V, Philip II, Maximillian I

Physiocratism 311,

mercantilism 311,

Willem I 21,

Cromwell 86,306,

Louis XIV 94,

Colbert 102, "vollste success", 306,

Grawinckel 145,

Boxhorn 145,

Gronovius 145,

Heinsius 145,

Luzac 201,

Arthur Young 180,

Smith 182,299,303,307,

Baldwin 308,

Canning 308,

Strijd over vrijheid van handel 275,

Luzac 276,289,

Charlemagne and the blooming of Frisian manufacture 278,

Charlemagne291,

Karl V 279,290,

John Bowring291,315,

McCulloch 292,

Johann Schön 301,302,312,

B.W.A.E.Sloet tot Oldhuis:

Voorede te: Staatshuihoudkunde of beginselen des rijkdoms, (translation from French) by Joseph Droz, J.de Lange, Denventer 1849

No reference to List

No register

Droz mentions:

Ganilh 30n

Storch 3

Colbert 63,148

E.W.de Rooy: Geschidenis der Staatshushoudkunde in Europa, an de vroegste tijden tot heden, Met eene voerede van Mr. D.A. Walraven, L.F.J.Hassels, Amsterdam 1851

No register

Economic history from Athens to 1550

No reference to List

E.W.de Rooij: Geschidenis van den Nederlandschen Handel, L.F.J.Hassels, Amsterdam 1856 (1030p.)

WITH REGISTER!!!

LIST IS NOT MENTIONED

no references to protection or to spoorwegen

J.A.Molster: De Geschiedenis der Staatshuishoudkunde, van de Vroegste Tijden tot Heden, Gebroeders Kraay, Amsterdam 1851

List p. 235

Cameral 235

Zollverein 233, 234

same pages: Rau, Osiander, Lotz, Riedel, Smitthenner, Hufeland, Hoffman,Fulfa, Muchard, Jacob, von Veller, and the Dutch Bosscha

Hendrik Muller S.zoon: De Nederlandsche Katoen-nijverheid en het stelsel van bescherming in Nederlandsch Indië, H.A.Kramers, Rotterdam 1857 (233p.)

no index, no chapters

practically oriented book

No reference to List

Hogendorp 35

graaf Schimmelpenninck 36,39,69,

Willem I 38

Zie 96

Jordaan 117

Dumayr van Twist 123

Meijer Bing 149

S.J.Hingst: Proeve eener geschiedenis der Historische School op het gebied van het privaatregt in Duitsland, Johannes Müller, Amsterdam 1859 (179p.)

No references to economists

No reference to List

Otto Van Rees: Geschiedenis der staatshuishoudkunde in Nederland tot het achttiende eeuw, 2 Vol., Kemink en zoon, Utrecht 1865-1868

Part I: Oorsprong en karakter van de Nederlandsche nijverheidspolitiek, der zeventiende eeuw.

Part II: Geschiedenis der koloniale politiek van de republiek der vereenigde Nederlanden.

No reference to List

No register

Rees mentions:

PART I:

Bodinus

Child

Colbert

Cromwell

Court

Graswinkel

Kluit

Laspeyres

Luzac

Petty

Roscher

Steuart

Willem I...

PART II:

Child

Hogendorp....

Luzac....

Pestel...

Richelieu 173

Usselinx....

S.van Houten: De Staatsleer van Mr.J.R.Thorbecke, Te Groningen bij J.B.Wolters, 1872 MU PH hV 11

No reference to List

J.Bosscha: Pruisen en Nederland, Een word van J.Bosscha, oud-minister, aan zijne landgenooten, Te Amsterdam, bij C.M.van Gogh. 1866 (49p.)

No reference to List

An article on Dutch independence from the Habsburgers, the French and the Germans through history since Charlemagne and of course since 1573

No references to economists

N.G.Pierson: Het begrep van volksrijkdom, P.N.van Kampen, Amsterdam 1864

List 77, 81,

Knies 81

German economists: 36

Historical school 104

Ganilh 36

Roscher 20,22,23,85,107

N.G.Pierson: Friedrich List en Zijn Tijd (Friedrich List and his time), de Gids, 1866, see also Economic Papers, volume II, pp.257-88

Many references to List of course

German railroads 370

National system 372

Pressed by Roscher, Hildebrand, Stein 375

List no unconditional protectionist 376

List's inconsequenct protectionism 382

N.G.Pierson: 'Het katheder-socialisme' (Katheder socialism), de Gids, 1878 3, pp.250-280, see also Economic Papers, volume I, pp.211-47

Many references on German economists of course

LIST 252,

Nederlandsche katheder-socialisten 255,256

Goeman Borgesius 256,262,263,276

l'Ange Huet 278

N.G.Pierson: Het stelsel van Bescherming, De erven F.Bohn, Haarlem 1885

LIST 34

Seckendorff 1,4

North 1

Smith 2,34

Bastiat 3

Say 6,14,

Boisguillebert 32,44

Loius XIV 32

van Horn 32

P.Verri 37,38

Falke: Geschichte des deutschen Zollwesens, 1869

Weber: Geschichte des Zollvereins, 1869

N.G.Pierson: Economist Januari 1888

List 34, 35

Seckendorf 1,4

North 1

Boisguilebert and Louis XIV 32,44

N.G.Pierson: Leerboek der Staatshuishoundkunde, De erwen F.Bohn, Haarlem 1896 MU EAF 334-7

NO INDEX

No reference to List

Looked up part two: chapters on protection: pp.189-241

No references to List despite many references to "de protectionisten".

Mentioned are:

Quesnay 189

Smith 189

Cobden 190

Thomas More 201

A.Beaujon 209

Paul Leroy Beaulieu241

N.G.Pierson: Het waardeproblem in een socialistische Matschappij, De Economist, vol.41, S'Gravenhage 1902, pp.423-56, reprinted in Verspreide Economische Geschriften edited by C.A.Verrijn Stuart, Haarlem 1910, vol.I, pp.333-77, tranlated by G.Gardiner and published as The Problem of Value in the Socialist Community in F.Hayek, Collectivist Economic Planning, Routledge and Sons, London 1935, pp. 41-85

No reference to List

Denies what German writers insist on: that there is any relationship between Ricardo and Marx78

N.G.Pierson: Grondbeginselen der Staatshuishoundkunde, new ed., fifth printing, De erwen F.Bohn, Haarlem 1905 (349p.)

No index,

Looked only on chapter on "uit en invoer" and belastingen

LIST 265

Duitsche tolverbond 265

Lotz 261

Clement 263

Hogendorp 265

Sickenga 265

Sillem265

Smith 265

Huskinson 265

graaf Caprivi 276

A.Raffalovich279

A.E.Sayous 279

G.L.Porter 283

H.Paasche 283

Sauerbeck 285

Boissavian 285

Lincoln 285

Verri 291

d'Aulnis de Bourouill295

P.Bruckner 297

chapter on belastingen

Ricardo 321,323

A.Soetbeer 322

MacCulloch 322

Inama Sternegg 329

Neumann 336

Folkert Nicolaas Sickenga:

Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis der belastingen in Nederland, Proefschrift Leiden, Academische Boekhandel van P.Engels, Leiden 1864

No register

No reference to List

Mentions negotiations with England and transit trade with Germany p. 197

Alkemade 20,21

Aitzema 133,148,210,311,318, 319,346

Berg 60,61,65,71,83,86,96

Boissevain 500

Boxhorn 44,68,70,76

Burman 15,49,

Bynkershoek 432

Cibrario 22

Citters 477,

de Coeur 328,

de la Court 156,166

Mr. D... 227,244,256,259,374,375,440,

Dirks 42

Engels 83,100,116,158,300,314,334,356,367,368,393,400,414,417,421,436,441,442,443,445,

Gibbon 22

Graswinckel 10,204,208,209,294

de Groot 136,497

Halsema 4,14,27,31,38,39,41,42,43,46,47

Hamerster 429

Hasse 491

Heeneman 6,7,8,30,33,75,78,82,

Heel 55

Heeren 327

Hoeven 146,146,147

Hogendorp 440

Huber 429

Idsinga 17,26,27,30,62

Karl de Groote 6

Kluit 8,22,34,35,36,82,476,

Koenen 133,375,455,466,474,

Laspeyres 294,315 2

Libertas 329

Le Long 242,416,459,463,467,475,

Leeuwen 12,14,16,29,30,476,477,481

L'Espine 416,467,475,

Loon 34,5,6,7,9,13,17,18,19,22,28,29,33,34,35,54,70,83

Luzac 92,230,231,244,245,246,247,248,249,258,260,263,273,284,380,408,409,423,440,441,460

Mac Culloch 198

Metelerkamp457

Paulus Scheltus

56,83,87,103,109,113,114,115,116,117,381,395,

Pestel 263,264

Pinto 498

Pot 64,74,82,83,87,334,335

Quack 3

Raleigh 139

Reyd 63,80,103,135,156,318

Robertson 5,13,55

de Rooy 122,329

Say 224

Scheltus 102

vin Scheurl 491

Schotanus 39,40,44,46,48,87

Schrassert 27,67,73,286,293,332,333,354,382,480,

Seneuil 496,497

Slingelandt 71,75,81,103,107,108,109,110,111,112,113,244,285,295,300

Sminia 37,46

Smith,A 458

Spence 22

Spiegel 102,446,

Sterk 150,151,

Swinderen 340,341,

Tacitus 36

Temple 123

den Tex 145

Tongerlo 244

Toullier 493,495,

Vissering 198,427

Valckenier 192,191,

Vynckt 96

Wagen 255,256,264

Wagenaar 9,19,31,40,45,61,64,65,70,71,73,75,76,78,79,80,82,83,84,85,86,88,90,92,93,95,96,103,133,156,227,244,246,249,250,251,254,257,258,262,263,273,294,295,312,315,331,356,445,455,458,461,462,463,465,467,469,471,475

Wall 16,19,70,82

Walter 493

Wertheim 181,199,294

Westendorp 12,27,39,42,43,45,46,47,59

Willem IV V 375

Winsemius 80,81,84,85,87,101

Wttewall 211

Zillesen 367

Zurck 30,54,206,302,469,477,

F.N. Sickenga: Geschiedenis der Nederlandsche belastingen, P.N. van Kampen, Amsterdam 1865

No reference to List

French influence 106

F.N. Sickenga: Geschiedenis der Nederlandsche belastingen sedert het jaar 1810, 1883

Not borrowed

W.C.Mees: Overzicht van Eenige Hoofddoornstukken der Staatshuishoudkunde, P.N.van Kampen, Amsterdam 1866 (226p.)

No reference to List

No index, table of contents in the front

It is strange that almost none has commented on the relatively very large chapter by Mees on international trade III p.144-226

Very unusual book: One name is mentioned:

Robinson Crusoe 15

H.J.M.van de Laar: Oppenbanker en Wetenschapsman, Willem Cornelis Mees, 1813-1884, Martinus Nijhoff, Den Haag 1978.

No reference to List

H.W.Tijdeman: De Nederlandsche Handelsmaatschappij, Hazenberg, Leiden 1867

no register and no reference to List

a few references to Vissering, Mees and Hogendorp but to no foreigners

except

Thomas Stamford Raffles 3,62,65,384: "The History of Java"

Pinchegru 51

Willem I 236

Simon Vissering: Handboek van praktische Statshuishoudkunde, 2 vols., P.N. Kamen, Amsterdam 1867

PART I

PART II references to paragraphs

2 Hoofdstuuk De Werking van de staat tot de maatschappij

1 handeheving 10

2 bescherming 13

3 ondersteuning 16

Interesting references inluding all foreign economists:

List en zijn nationale system 84 (p.48)

Bastiat

Bescherming672-680 zie: Nijverheid en Staat

Carey 639, (pp.429,434)

Colbert 1097

Fourier

Gogel en besherming 89,94,118

Jackson

Law

Malthus

Mill

Montesquieu

Ondersteunning

Pinto

R.Price

Ricardo

Say

Smith

spoorwegen

Staatshandheven

Staatsschuld

Tolheving

Willem I 179,965

Simon Vissering: Handboek van praktische staatshuishoudkunde, 2 vol., vierde, herziene druk, P.N.van Kamen, Amsterdam 1878

List en zijn nationale system 84 (p.48) (same as above)

Simon Vissering and D.A.Portielje:

Tariefshervorming in Engeland,

Not available

Hendrik Jacob Hamaker: De Historiscche School in de Statshuishoudkunde, - Academisch Proefschrift over, Gebroeders van der Hoek, Leiden 1870

List 18,19

Hildebrand 1,4,7,11,29

Kautz 2,10,22.

Knies 2,3,7,8,11,26n,27n,28n,29

Roscher 1,11,12,13,26n,27n,29

Vissering 10,11,18

Pierson 10,13,17,18

Houten 14,15,16

Fruin 14

J.L.de Bruyn Kops: Beginselen van staatshuishoudkunde, 2 vol., vijfde, herziene en vermeerede druk, J.H.Gerhard & Co., Amsterdam 1873

No register

PART I

1 HoofdstuukWaarde p.9

no references to any authors

2 Voortbrenging 18

no references to any authors

14 Handel 165-186

no references to any authors

18 Bemoeingen der regeering met de nijverheid 228

no references to any authors except: Colbert p. 229

19 Bescherming241-297

no references to any authors except:

Richard Cobden 269-287

PART II

22 Belastingen 333

D'Aulnis de Bourouill:

Katheder-socialisme, Redevoering bij de aanvardering van het Hoogleeraarsambt aan de Rijksuniversiteit te Utrecht, op den 23sten Maart 1878, Uitgesproken door Mr Baron D'Aulnis de Bourouill, J.L.Beijers, Utrecht 1878 (40p.)

No register

No reference to List

Wilhelm Roscher 14,15,21,22,33,35,37

Adolf Held 12,18,22,23,31,32,34,

Schmoller 14,34,35,

Brentano 34,35,

Adolph Wagner 30,33,34,

Levasseur 24,

Marx 31,33,

Smith 5,7,12,15,24,

Leone Levi 24,

Ricardo 15,

Malthus 15,24,

Senior 15,

Stuart Mill 15,20,23,24

Cairnes 15,

Jevons 15,

Say 5,6,

Courcelle Seneuil 7,

Emile de Lavaleye 7,

Heinrich von Treitschke 7,32,

Verein für Socialpolitik 8,

C.W.Opzoomer 11,

van Houten 11,

Vissering 11,

van Rees 38,

Ackerdijk 38,

Hemskeerk 37,

J.Bn.D'Aulnis de Bourouill: Praeadvies van Mr. J.Bn.D'Aulnis de Bourouill: in:

Prae-adviezen over de vraag: Is wijziging van de handelspolitik hier te lande wenschelijk? Vereeniging voor de Staatshuishoudkunde en de Statistiek, Jo.Müller, Amsterdam 1904, pp.1-25 (178p.)

No register, table of contents in the front

LIST 6

Beaujon 6,9

Harte 7,8,9,10,

Pierson 8

Smith 8

Dusseldorp 10,14,15,

Stryen 10,

Marx 11,

M.Mees 12,15,

Pijnappel 12,

Smissaert 13

Chamberlain 15,16,19 !!!,

C.A.Vince 19,

Balfour 19

Bahlmann 20

van Tienhoven 20

U.G.Schilthuis: Praeadviezen van den heer U.G.Schilthuis, in: Prae-adviezen over de vraag: Is wijziging van de handelspolitik hier te lande wenschelijk? Vereeniging voor de Staatshuishoudkunde en de Statistiek, Jo.Müller, Amsterdam 1904, pp.26-81

No reference to List

Note this person who puplished a lot on construction of railroads and canals

This article is full of references to transportation to and from Germany

Bos 26,74,: "Het protectionisme en zijne volgen"

Smissaert 26,77.

Engels 27 : "Schutzzoll und Freihandel in der Neuen Zeit"

E.van Gelder 29

minister Pierson 29

Dobbelman 32,37,

Malthus 42

Bruinsma 43

F.B.Löhnis 43

Czar Peter den Grote 55

W.Toose 56

Thorbecke 59,64,

Minster Kuyper 63

van Heek 77

A.H.Jannink: Praeadviezen van den heer A.H.Jannink, in: Prae-adviezen over de vraag: Is wijziging van de handelspolitik hier telande wenschelijk? Vereeniging voor de Staatshuishoudkunde en de Statistiek, Jo.Müller, Amsterdam 1904, pp.82-114

No reference to List

A.Ledeboer 85

Chamberlain 85

Pierson 98,109,

J.van Dusseldorp: Praeadviezen van den heer J.van Dusseldorp A.Mzn., in: Prae-adviezen over de vraag: Is wijziging van de handelspolitik hier te lande wenschelijk? Vereeniging voor de Staatshuishoudkunde en de Statistiek, Jo.Müller, Amsterdam 1904, pp.115-178

LIST 129

Carey 160,161,

Treub 129

D.Bos 117

Beaujon 120,

Roscher 122,153,

Karl Marlo 153,154,178,

K.G.Winkelblech 154

Smith 126,129,160,

Say 126,130,131,134,135,154,

Pijnappel 132,

Bastiat 165,

Smissaert 172,173,174,175,177,178,

Pierson 134,135,136,1137,140,141,143,156,165,

Diepen 135,

Harte 135,

Schölvinck 135

Mill 135,

McCulloch 149,152,

J.A.Levy: Engelsch "Katheder-socialisme", Gebroeders Belinfante, 'S Gravenhage 1879 (443p.)

No reference to List

NO REGISTER

An attack on the essay by Pierson

Many refernces to Pierson, Cairnes, Spencer,Mill,

I only mention German authors

G.Rümelin 17,25,27,29,32,41,47,310,439

M.Müller 17,20

Kant 71,260,262,263,310

A.Wagner 82

Roscher 87, 318

Brentano 105,111,114,

Helferich 105,112,

Bluntschli 155

de Savorin Lohman 161,162,163

W.v.Humboldt 164

Ihering 165 ff 175,4423

Histoircal school same

Stahl 171

F.A.Lange 210,259,260,274,318,343,

Ed.Hartenst 259,260

L.v.Ranke 220

R.Eucken 269

E.Pfleiderer 272,280

A.Horwicz 279,281,

Wundt 279

Mommsen 279

Helmholtz 299,307

D.F.Strauss 299

Hans Gross 304

A.Held 334,348,352,355

A.Oncken 364

K.D.A.Röder 429

Aristoteles 427

J.A.Levy: Het ideele in Recht en Staat

Pesonijke dinstvervulling, den Haag 1876, p.14

duty 404

Hobbes on protection 399

David Syme: Outlines of an industrial science, London 1876

J.G.Hintzen: Kolonialprotectionisme, geschreven naar aanleiding van brochure van den Heer Joseph Jacobson, Te Rotterdam bij M.Wyt & Zonen, 1880 (11p.)

No reference to List

Jos.Jacobson 3,5,6,7,10,

Hendrik Muller S.zoon 3,

Smith 9,

M.Mees: Een en ander over het stelsel van bescherming, M.Wyt & Zonen, Rotterdam 1882 (55p.)

No reference to List

overview in the back:

Erzieungszölle 8-10

Why has protection so many adherents? 51

Schützzoll 11

Gründungsmanie 18

Bismarck 53

Mongredien 56

No other names

M.Mees: Nadeelen van het protectionisme voor de werkende klassen, M.Wyt & Zonen, Rotterdam 1891

No reference to List

Hardly any mentioning of authors or references at all

except:

President Cleveland67

Sir John B.Phear 62

Erziehungszölle 73,74

J.Spée: Vrijhandel of Bescherming? Een en ander over den invloed, dien het stelsel van het laissez-faire, laissez psser, op het ttoestand van handle, landbouw, scheepvaart en nijverheid in het akgemeen heeft uitgeoefend, Gebroders Binger, Amsterdam 1883 (70p.)

No reference to List

Attack on free traders: see foreword, in particular on Mees

Willem I 27,

Erzieungszzölle 26,27

Gründer-zwendel 26

Preussia 28

German expansionism 54

P.N.Muller 54,55,56,

Colbert 5,6

Hndrik Muller (Szoon?) 66,

Louis XIV 6,

Smith 5,7,8

Say 5,7,8,61

cobden 7,65,

Mees 9,10,11,12,16,18,24,25,28,29,33, etc. etc.

(refered to on practically on every page)

van Bosse 13,14,15,

Kamerdebatten 1850 14

Rossi 17,

Gössingen 46,

Everhardus Cornelis Godée:

Het oude stelsel van den Vrijen Handel en het

NB !! moderne Protectionisme, Academisch proefschrift aan de Rijksuniversiteit van Utrecht 1883, J.P.Diehl 1883 (122p.)

No register but appendixes on: free trade vs protection taken from Augustus Mongredien, Bismarck's 1878 writing.

Chapter two (of four) is on List!!! p.38-58

Chapter three on change in German trade policy p.58-83

Chapter four on results of the above in Germany p.84 ff

?????Nationale en Cosmopolitische Huishoudkunde, Een vluugschrift naar de aanledning van het proefschrift

NB !!! van Mr.E.C.Godée: "Het oude stelsel van den Vrijen Handel en het moderne Protectionisme, Minkman & Co, Arnheim 1883 (167p.)

This is a detailed and sharp critisism of Godée's thesis by an anonymous writer (!!)

No Index, table of contents in the front

same chapters as with Godée, see in particular page V

see also description of List's "system" chapter two, p.76 ff

Anonymously: Curiositeiten van het Protectionisme, Nijgh & Van Ditmar, Rotterdam 1884 (72p.)

No register

B.M.Bahlmann 14,

Tilburgse industri 14ff

Ueberwälzung der steuer 35

Freetrader fanatisme 56,

vom Stein 57,

Galilei 57,

Cobden 57,

William III 57,

Stulta en Puera 57,

F.Bastiat 57,

Armand Diepen: Het verslag der Tilburgsche wol-industrie en Hendrik Muller Szoon, of, Bescherming contra vrijhandel, Snelpersdruk van N. Luijten, Tilburg 1887 (120p.)

Includes the original proposal from the Tilburg industry as an apendix

No reference to List

No register

Clearly a protectionist see p.40 on Colbert and p. 105

Discusses particularly criticism of the anti-protectionist

Hendrik Muller Szoon against the Tilburg wol-industrie,

his proposal, book and some articles of his in the NRC

21 sept 1886 or 7, 29 aug.,

Handelsblad

Frankfurter Zeitung

The Ministries Peel, Russell Gladstone, 39

Pierson 39,68,

Vissering 39,

Bryun Kops 40,

Say 40,

Colbert 40,

J.Spée 52,

Suyver 57,

Landbauw-comitée rapport82ff

Cromwell's Act of navigation 99

Smith 100,

Armand Diepen: De jongste uitingen van het anti-protectionisme in Nederland, J.Noorduyn & Zoon, Gorinchem 1889

No reference to List

No register

A lot of space devoted to protection of grainproduction as with Bruyn Kops, discusses also Beaujon, partly Mees and particularly Pierson closely

but is a protectionist, see page 392 for example

Against the role of Holland as a trade country see page 209

References to many newspaper-articles and a few Dutch books:

Pierson: Leerboek, Grondbeginselen, Vissering: Handboek, Beaujon: Handelspolitiek, Stork: Twentsche katoennijverheid, Mees: Overzicht,

and one foreign book: Say: Traite d'economie politique

2 Afdeeling landbouw en landbouwbescherming 55

Hoofdstuuk VI de Nederlandsche economen en de theorie van Ricardo100

Een merkwerdig antwoord 119

3 Afdeeling Nijverheid en nijverheidbescherming 139

4 Afdeeling Handel en handelbescherming 191

Hoe de ahndel beschermd kan worden

5 Afdeeling Een wenig historie 253

De theorie

references to Beaujon, Pierson, Greven, Deking Dura, Patijn, Rozenraad, Say, Schölwinck, Van Houten: Bijdragen,

Hoofdstuuk 17 Hoe het effecten-argument bestreden werd 332

Hoofdstuuk 18 de Bevoordering van het binnenlandsche ruilverkehr 344

Hoofdstuuk 19 Dure landen zijn welvaarende landen 365

Mentions

de nederlandse protectionisten 30

Patijn 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,14,15,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,28,29,30,33,35

G,Pollet 5,36,37,

George Medley 33,34,35

Hendrik Muller 36,37,

Beaujon, 181,222,223,226,228,231,

Greven

Veegens

Schölvinck

Deking Dura

Roschussen

etc.etc.

More interesting perhaps, but with no references:

Erziehungszölle 185,186,

Van Houten 219,220,233,

Ricardo 91,96,100,110,111,112,117,126,127,128,129,

Smith 195,223,

Bismarck 192

Cromwell 195

C.T.Stork 247

Say 266

Cobden 389

ARTICLES:

De Economist,

uitgegeven van J.L.De Bruyn Kops, H.L.Smits, 'S Gravenhage:

1887, vol.36:

I: De Nederlanders en de Duitschers in de Wereldhandel pp. 444-448

Het Protectie-stelsel in de vereenigde staaten,pp.96-98

II: De waarde der nieuwe protectie-beweging, pp.681-685

A.D.van Assendelt de Coningh: Belastinghervorming op historischen grondslag, pp.953-960

J.G.Patijn: De Malaise en het Protectionisme, W.P.Van Stockum & Zoon, S'Gravenhage 1888 (80p.)

No reference to List

Armand Diepen 56,

Hendrik Muller Szn 56,63,

Frentzel 68,

G.Pollet 58,

Ramaix 61,

F.Bernard 9,

Courcelle-Seneuil 10,

Alfred de Foville 12,13,

Henri Cernuschi 15,

Huygens 12,

Amerikaanse spoorwegen 17

Amerikaanse consul rapport 188723,51,

P.W.A.Cort van der Linden 17,

Bismarck 19,43,

Beaujon 47,69,

Vissering 73,

Th.Waller 68,

R.de Fontenay 26,

Th.Bart 30,

president Cleveland 30,

William Sumner 32, : "Protectionism"

G.de Puynode 37,

Sir Charles Palmer 37,

Kabinet Salisbury 47,

Lord Churchill 47,

George W.Medley 48,49; "England the home of protection" 71; "Fairtrade unmasked"

Bastiat 73,74,

Van Houten 78,

Augustus Mongredien 80; "Freetrade and English Commerce"

C.T.Stork: De Twentsche Katoennijverheid hare vestiging en uitbreiding, Herinneringen en wenken, M.J.van der Loeff, Eenschede 1888 (103p.)

No reference to List

NO REGISTER

PRACTICALLY ORIENTED: a point of view from his own firm

Maastricht 70,

Peel 70,

Cobden 24,70,

H.Tydeman 34,

Vissering 83

H.J.va Heek 93

Thorbecke 40,42,43,47,49,54,61,103

German goods 40,42,43,47,

Hogendorp 49,55,56,

Hendrik Muller Szoon 49,

Pollet 98

P.A.S.van Limburg Brouwer 50,

Spoorwegen en industrie 61,

bescherming 71,

protectie 95,100

free trade 100

regulaton 93 ff

List of new industry 80 ff

ARTICLES:

De Economist,

uitgegeven van J.L.De Bruyn Kops, H.L.Smits, 'S Gravenhage:

1888: vol.37:

J.D'Aulnis de Bourouill: Russische handelspolitiek, pp.38-53

H.B.Greven: Immigratie van Werklieden en vrijhandel, pp.116-132

J.G.Schölvinck: De protectionisten verdedigd, pp.234-242

N.G.Pierson: Antword aan Mr.J.G.Schölvinck, pp.243-250

S.van Citters (De vereeniging "Het Buitenland"):

Uitgebreding van handlesbetrekkingen met den vreemde, pp. 666-673

M.Mees: Eenige lichtpunten voor het stelsel van vrijhandel, pp.81-83

S.van Citters: Bescherming in verkeerde richting (invoerecht en accijns op azijn), pp. 181-186

A.Beaujon: Handel en Handelspolitik, H.D.Tjeenk Willink, Haarlem 1888

Beaujon mentions:

List p. 89-109,

Fair trade 141-154

Piersin 128

Diepen 135

Greven 135

Protection 110-135

ARTICLES:

De Economist,

uitgegeven van J.L.De Bruyn Kops, H.L.Smits, 'S Gravenhage:

1889, vol. 38:

A.Beaujon: Een leerboek van protectionisme (A.Diepen: De jongste uitingen), pp.708-720

J.D'Aulnis de Bourouill: Het economisch pessimisme, pp.346-268

N.G.Pierson: Niuewe uitgaven (Quack and Beaujon), pp.47-57

The following four pamphlets, by Vereeiniging van den Nationalen Arbeid, Doornbosch, Talens and Harte, are collected in one book

Brochure van de Vereeiniging van den Nationalen Arbeid gevestigd te Utrecht in verband met de Financiële voorstelllingen van den Minister van Financen, W.Boekhoven, Sommelsdijk 1906 (11p.)

Ministerie Kuyper 3

J.Doornbosch: Beschermende rechten (Protectionisme) in Nederland, Wat wil het? Wat doet het? Wat is het? Waarnaar streeft het? Beanword door J.Doornbosch te Bafflo, M.D.de Lange, Veendam 1895 (101p.)

No reference to List

No index

Oud-minister van Finincien van der Heim 5

Internationale vs natinale staatshuishoudkunde 8

Washington, Jefferson, Metternich, Nesselrode, Thiers, Disraeli, Gambetta, Freycinet8

Freycinet 8

Deputy Paul Deschanel 9

Cort van der Linden 17,26,63

Regout in Maastrcht 19

H.H.Stork in Twente 19

Walewski, Garnier,Lcouvreur 21

Mees 24

Minister Röll 27,29,68

Minister Pierson 27,28,

Perish the country, long live the free trade principle 36

Levy 37,64,65,,97

Hogendorp 68

Modderman, Reinders 69

Hope & Co (same Hope as in A.Smith's wealth of nations) 70

Spoorwegen 71

Malthus 84,87,

Veegens 90

oud-ministers baron Mackay 92

Hintzen 92

Spandaw 97,98

M.Talens: Nederlanders, die vijanden van hun eigen land zijn. Vrijhandel of Bescherming? Een stem uit de praktijk door M.Talens Hzn., - Fabrikant te Apeldorn. M.de Wekker, Apeldoorn 1905 (51p.)

No reference to List

No index

Practically oriented book against free trade, but also against Treub see p.41

Mentions many Dutch factories/companies

Prof. Treub 40,41,44,45

Hovi 40

Mr v.R. 3

Jannink 4,13,20,

anti-protectionist M.H. 20,21,

Prof.Reiger 5

B.Cohen 6 (Leerboek der Staatshuis...)

Muysken 6

Laudrillard 9

Prof. von Bartels 9

Prof. Drefegger 9

Prof. Karl Raupp 9

Prof. D'Aulnis 20,41,

van Niedorp 25,26,51,

Prof. de Louter 27

Z.Hooggel 28,

Dr.Kuyper 29

Lucas Bols 36

van Houten 36

Harte 21,44,45,,46,

J.J.I.Harte: Vrijhandel en Bescherming door J.J.I.Harte, Lid van de Tweende Kamer der Staten-Generaal, J.Cikot, voorheen F.J.de Zwaan, 'S-Gravenhage 1890 (101p.)

No reference to List

Minister and protectionist !!! critisism of Pierson and Beaujon

table of contents in the back

chapter one on free trade or protection

part four is critisism of free trade p.27

part five is on the wealth of people p.51

chapter one on the monetarist fallacy of mercantilism

I have only listed references of the first part

I am protectionist 4

mercantilisme 7

national point of view 14

Henry Carey 37

August Oncken 37,

Roesler 54,

Fawcett 14

Pierson 3,4,6,11,13,14,17,21,22,26,31,34,36,39,43,54,58,

Beaujon 14,17,20,24,25,29,31,33,36,39,40,42n,46,48,49,53,

Mees 22,24,46,

Vissering 43

Smith 5,7,11,12,21,39,49,52,54,56,

Ricardo 21,

Blanqui 5

Say 5,12,30,36,

Mill 7,12,16,18,21,24,28,30,37,42,53,

Veegens 7

Goethe 8

W.T.Krug 32,

Bülau 9

Tydeman 10

Turgot 11,

second part includes almost only references to Pierson and Beaujon and perhaps interesting:

V.Schlüber 73

M.J.Pijnappel: Arbeid en Bescherming, Lid van de twende kamer der Staaten-General, J.H.& G.van Heteren, Amsterdam 1897

No reference to List

Influential pamphlet, no authors mentioned

Een Industrieel: Vrijhandel of Bescherming in Nederland? H.D.Tjeenk Willink & Zoon, Haarlem 1897

Influential pamphlet, no authors mentioned

Dirck Bos: Het Protectionisme, Tweende herziene en bijgewerkte druk, (Gedrukt voor de leden der vereeniging "Het Vrije Ruilverkeer"), De Nederlandsche Boek- en Steendrukkerij, 'S Gravenhage 1898 (78p.)

No register

Truyen (protectionist) 8,

Cremer 7,

Dobbelmann 7,24,27,42,43,

C.T.Stork 14,39,

Fransen van de Putte 15,

Bourouill 24,

Schilthuis 24,63,

Mansholt 24,

Pierson 24,

Bijmholt 25,

De Lange 35,

graaf Knitz 60,

Leon Say 63,

Claudio Jannet 62,

Aymar 62,

Charles Roux 63,

Meline 63,

S.van Houten 74,

J.Willink 76,

D.Bos: Vrijhandel, pro, in: "Pro et Contra", Betreffende Vraagstukken van Algemeen Belang ..., Present-Exemplar, Speciale Uitgave van de ... Tariefenvereeniging ..., Hollandia-Drukkerij, Baarn 1907

Pamphlet, No authors mentioned

J.van Dusseldorp: Drie Stelsels van Handelspolitek, H.D.Tjeenk Willink & Zoon, Haarlem 1900

List 9,10,12,13,14,25,76,

Carey 23,25,

Navigation Act 10,11,12,

McCulloch 3,10,71,

Smith 3,9,11,17,18,21,22,45,

Say 5,7,13,14,18,20,21,25,26,35,

T.Cooper 7,

J.J.I.Harte 9,

Pierson 17,25,26,28ff,33,37,38ff,64,75,

Verri 17,

Pijnappel 18,26,

Wereldrepublik 18,

Schölvinck 27,

J.S.Mill 27,

Bastiat 43,

S.Van Houten 78, (Free trader)

J.van Dusseldorp: Vrijhandel, contra, in: "Pro et Contra", Betreffende Vraagstukken van Algemeen Belang ..., Present-Exemplar, Speciale Uitgave van de ... Tariefenvereeniging ..., Hollandia-Drukkerij, Baarn 1907

Pamphlet which mentions several newspaper articles

Carey 10,

Brentano 11,

Struve 15,

Zimmerman 16,

Hengelo 18,

Smissaert 18,

Bastiat 1,3,

Pierson 3,6

de Meester 3,

Harte 4,8,

Tollens 4,

de Bourouill 6,

Diepen 9,

S.Van Houten 18,

J.van Dusseldoorp: De voordelen van invoerrechten en de weg tot verkrijging of benadering van den vrijhandel, H.D.Tjeenk Willink & Zoon N/V, Haarlem 1930

Pamphlet which refutes the claims of the freetraders point by point

Brentano 9,

Smith 9,10,

McCulloch 9,10,

H.Smissaert: Spoorwegstaakingen en Staats-explotatie van Spoorwegen, Onze Eeuw, Vol.3, part 2, de erven F.Bohn, Haarlem 1903, pp. 881-913

H.Smissaert: Vrijhandel of Zwakke Bescherming? Een word van verweer tegen het praeadvis van den Heer J.van Dusseldorp AMzn, by the secretary of the Dutch union of employers, Mouton & Co., 'S Gravenhage 1904 (26p.)

Dusseldorp 1,4,7,

minister Harte 13,15,17,23,

H.Smissaert: Staatsexplotatie van Spoorwegen, contra, in: "Pro et Contra", Betreffende Vraagstukken van Algemeen Belang ..., Serie III, No.2, Hollandia-Drukkerij, Baarn 1907

Macalester Loup 25,

Savornin Lohman 26,

Yves Guijot 40,

H.Smissaert: Vrijhandel en welvaart,Onze Eeuw, Vol.3, part 4, de erven F.Bohn, Haarlem 1903, pp. 715-750

H.Smissaert: Vrijhandel en Welvaart, Overdruk van "Onze Eeuw", November 1903, De Erven F.Bohn, Haarlem, 1903

Chamberlain 1,

Sickenga 2,

Willem I 3,21,

Portielje 5,

Bourouill 8,

Aalberse 8,

J.Kuiper 10,

A.Sauerbeck10,

M.Mees 16,

K.v.K.te Hengelo 24,

Pierson 30,

J.H.H.Hülsmann 32,

H.Smissaert: The Dutch Tariff Scheme, in: The Burden of Protection, An International Repudiation of the Gospel of Artificial Scarcity, Magazine of the International Free Trade League, Published for the Free Trade League, P.S.King & Son, Orchard House, Westminster, July 1912, pp. 47-56

Harte 52

M.Sayous 52

Smissaert 56

M.W.F.Treub:Vrijhandel en bescherming voor Nederland, Scheltema & Holkema's boekhandel, Amsterdam 1904

List 55,60,61,62,

Brentano 87,

Wagner 87,

Dietzel 87,

Colbert 11,55,56,

Carey 55,

E.Levasseur 11,56,

Dusseldorp 13,30,50,52,56,85,

Cromwell 56,

Hendrik 4 11,56,

J.de Witt 67,

Kuyper 94,97

Jos.Jacobson 88,

Van Rees 67,

Laspeyres 69,

Mayo-Smith 70,

W.E.J. Berg 71,

O.Pringsheim 71,

Blanqui 56,

W.Cunningham 56,

Pijnappel 85,86,

P.N.Muller 86,

G.Fagniez 11,

P.J.M.Alberse 53,92,

Plate 99,

Tecklenburg 99,102,

Eugénr Regout 103,

P.Stubmann 63,

Ricardo 9,10,12,13,14,15,

Smith 15,

Fourier 50,

Harte 19,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,42,43,46,47,49,

Pierson 20,26,36,55,56,103,

Minister Harte 103,107,

C.Raedt 107,

Diepen 29,30,

Schölvinck 30,

een industrieel 38,

C.T.Stork 72,

A.Ledeboer 72,

Beaujon 72,78,82,83,

Sickenga 73,

Portielje 73,

H.J.Koenen 73,

E.H.v.Baumhauer 73,

Smissaert 74,94,

J.D.Rodenburg 76,

Hogendorp 87,

Heine 96,

D.R.Mansholt: Vrijhandel, Fiscaliteit of Bescherming? Een waarschuwend woord aan den Nederlanden Landbouw, P.Nordhoff, Groningen 1904 (34p.)

van Houten 8,10,20

Pierson 10

Zangwill 21

an article by the minister-president on protectionism 14

an article by van Houten in the German "Die Nation" 20

D.R.Mansholt:* inledingen aantekningen tot: Jules Domergue, Het Bankroet der Vrijhandelsleer, met eene

NB !!! voorede van L.L.Klotz, Te Groningen bij H.L.van der Klei, 1909 (147p.)

No register and no table of contents

Critisism of French free traders

Klotz was president of the parliamentary customs commision !!!

Only looked at the introduction by Mansholt pp.1-31

Bismarck's evangelium 2

USA the richest land because of protection 3

the comedy of free trade 6

sponsorship of free trade scholars by rich Dutch merchants14

French liberalists

LeRoy Beaulieu 2

Michel Chevalier 2

Joseph Garnier 2

Sismonin 2

Klotz 13

Cobden 14

Molinari 8

Lord Milner 15,

Lord Avebury 15,

Bonar Law 15,

Lloyd George 16,

Heringa 18,

minister Kuyper 20,

Bülow 38

----------------------------

Jules Simon 42

Say 43

Krantz 43

M.Mees 45

U.G.Schilthuis: Staatsexplotatie van Spoorwegen, pro, in: "Pro et Contra", Betreffende Vraagstukken van Algemeen Belang ..., Serie III, No.2, Hollandia-Drukkerij, Baarn 1907

P.A.Diepenhorst: Vrijhandel en bescherming, G.J.A.Ruys, Utrecht 1911 (43p.)

LIST 26

Bismarck 18

Schmoller 30 (Grundriss) 40 (Hadelspolitik)

Richard Ehrenberg 40 (Handelspolitik)

van Houten 31 (Onze handelspolitiek)

Treub 23,25,42

Colbert 28

Louvois 28

Liefmann 18,19,20

Jenks 19,

R.van der Borght 35

Baumgarten 19,20

Evert 22

Meszlény 19,20,

Bücher 19,

Struve 36

Cunningham 28

Curtis 28

Levasseur 28

Say 23

Wisbaut 19,

Smissaert 26

Pierce 19

Beaujon 42

Pierson 20,21,27,38

De Meester 38

Harte 21

Dusseldorp 21

Minister Kolkman 3

Minister Betz 39

Minister Sprenger van Eyck38

ministerie Roël 38

ministerie Thorbecke 39

Vrolik 39

van Bosse 39

van der Vlugt 4

Smissaert 4

Barth 4

van Citters 5

van Strijen 7

de varick 7

von Heijking 8

von Raffel 8

Melon 9

van Becker 9

Brentano 11

Bastiat 11

Fontano-Russo 12,13

Pijnappel 15,

van der Schalk 17

d'Aulnis de Bourouill17

Havemeyer 17

Upton Sinclair 17

van der Golz 32

Sering 32

Grunzel 33

Minister Huskinson 40

R.Peel 40

Gladstone 40

Chevalier 40

Napoleon III 40

Bastiat 40

Dunoyer 40

Obreen 41

P.A.Diepenhorst: Beginselen der vrijhandelsleer, Wetenschapelijke samenkonst op 2 juli 1924, W.Kirchner, Amsterdam 1924 (27p.)

National and cosmopolitical 24

Hecht 25 (the real wealth of nations)

Arno Friederichs 25

Ernst Oberfohren 25

Pesch 25

Cunningham 26

Tausig 26

Truchy 26

von Tyska 26

Sigmund Schilder 27 (Mitteleuropa und Meistbegunstigung)

F.Lusensky 27 (Meistbegunstigung)

Cobden 5

de Varick 5

Vanderlint 7,8

Josiah Tucker 7,8

Edmund Burke 8

A.Smith 9,23

Thomas Cooper 23

James Bonar 7

Friderich Raffel 7

Julius Becker 7

Hermann Becker 7

Hermann Levy 7

Grambow 7

Biermann 7

Bastiat 10,22

John Prince-Smith 10

Ricard Cobden 10,14

Norman Angell 14

Ricardo 13

John Bright 10

Bamberger 10,

C.A.Verrijn Stuart 11

Prof.van Gijn 12,13,

Wilhelm Gerloff 16

Marx 16,17,18,

Lasalle 17

Bismarck 17

Wibaut 18

Julius Kaliski 19

Wilhelm Kolb 19

Richar Calwer 19

Max Schippeln 19,20

Etienne Buisson 19

Minster-president Branting 19

Albert Thomas 19

Groen van Prinsterer 20

Minster Thorbecke 20

van Bosse 20

van Zeylen 22

van Nyevelt 22

Dr Kuyper 23

P.A.Diepenhorst:* Eerherstel der actieve handelspolitiek, (theorie en practijk), Uitgegeven door de vereeniging voor actieve handelspolitiek, N.V.Dagblad en drukkerij de Standard, Amsterdam 1928 (192p.)

No index, table of contents in the back

NO REFERENCE TO LIST

Schmoller 12

European federation 35 by Dr.van der Waerden !!!

Ludvig Quessel 36 (Das Britische Dpppoelspiel)

A.Heringa: Freetrade and Protectionism in Holland, H.D.Tjenk Willink & Zoon, Haarlem 1914 (Heringa was then secretary of the Dutch Freetrade Union "Het Vrije Ruilverkeer").

LIST 61,78,120

Bismarck 121,130,

Schmoller 121,151,

Treschner 126,150,

Bethman-Hollweg 149

Colbert 117,

Colbertism 129,

mercantilism 129,

neo-mercantilism 132,137,138,

Emeric de Crucée 135,142,

Yves Gygot 148,

William I 2

Dusseldorp 25,26,

protection 3,63, etc.: all over the book

export duies abolished 7

Dutch protectionist movement influenced by the German 10

Bahlman 10,

Dobbelman 11,

Pierson 16,

Harte van tecklenburg 16,

Kolkman 19,75,88,

lex Kolkman 147,

Pijnappel 26,

Mansholt 27,

Gogel 33,

Heemskerk 58,59,

Kuyper 58,59,65,

Cosmopolitanism and free trade 61

Cobden 61,103,154,

Chamberlain 153,

Franklin Peirce 93,

Gothein 98,102,

d'Aulnis de Bourouill114

A.D.C.van de Velde:* Friedrich List en zijn strijd voor het nationale, Akademisch proefschrift, Vrije Universiteit te Amsterdam, Drukkerij Libertas, Rotterdam 1918 (99p.)

Promotor: Diepenhorst

table of contents in the back

chapter two is called List's efforts to make Germany large47

note: p.84:" first in Bodin we meet the man who first dealt with economic factors."

I did not go through this book as I saw no reason to since List is the theme of it.

Raphael Polak:* Wering van vreemden invloed uit nationale ondernehmingen, proefschrift Amsterdam, J.H.de Bussy, Amsterdam 1918 (168p.)

Promotor: Prof. Molster

No index, table of contents in the front

Only listed "interesting names"

Schmoller 2,3,7,10,15,16,22,23,

minister Treub 120

Conclusions 161: more protection

Kaufmann 61 (Die Entwicklung der französischen Volkswirtschaft in den ZLtzten jahrzehnten, ASS, 1909)

Koch 71 (Handelskriege und Wirtschaftsexpansion, Jena 1917, and: Der Wirtschaftskrieg, Fischer, Jena)

Ischchanian 72 Die ausländischen Elemente in der Russischen Volkswirtschaft, Berlin 1913)

Wysgodzinski 73 Die nationalisierung der Volkswirtschaft, Tübingen 1917

Borchardt 74 Die Handelsgesteze der Erdballs, 1906, sub: Russland

Leubuscher 120 Die Nationalisierung des Kapitals, Jahrbuch ASS, Band XLII, 1917, p.531

W.M.F.Mansvelt: Geschiedenis Van De Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, 2 vol., Haarlem 1922-24

J.H.Vleeschouwer: Actieve Handelspolitiek, feiten en uitkomsten, Uitgegeven door de Nederlansche vereeniging voor vrijhandel, Martinus Nijhoff, 's-Gravenhage 1927 (251p.)

(the Society for Free Trade found the gifted economist J.E.Vleeschouwer (1896-1973) prepared to undertake a project of empirical research ... into the conseqeunces of trade protection for countries that had opted for such a policy in the recent past. Vleeschouwer's results appeared in a book entitled Actieve handlespolitiek.

No Index, no list of literature, table of contents in the front

Henry George: Protectie of Vrijhandel, W.J.Thieme & Cie, Zutphen 1930

Index

No references to List, only to Cobden, Summer, Smith, Malthus, Rogers, Mill, Bright, Greely

W.C.Mees: Hoofdstukken der Economie, De Waardeleer en hare beteekenis voor der welvaart, De Eerven F.Bohn, Haarlem 1930 (174p.)

No reference to List

protection 125

Ricardo 47

Handel 69

Smith 61,69

W.C.Mees: Reëele Economie, Noodzakelijke grondslag voor iedere constructive welvaartspolitiek, H.Veenman & Zonene, Wageningen 1936 (366p.)

No references to names

Handelspolitiek 20,125,189,310

bescermingscomitée 91

Does not seem to be any reference to List

A.de Graaff: Autarkie, Dichting und Wahrheit, Nederlandsche Vereeniging voor Vrijhandel, no. 71 and 72, 'S Gravenhage, April and May 1933 (30+38 pages)

part I

Weltwirtschaft en nationalwirtschaft 12 ff

part II

Schrijver 11

Padmos 15

K.E.van der Mandele: Het liberalisme in Nederland, Schets van de ontwikkeling in de negentiende eeuw, Van Loghum Slaterus' Uitgeversmaatschappij N.V., Arnhem 1933 (237p.)

index

No reference to List

Diepenhorst 182v n, 186, 227

A.C.J.de Vrankrijker: Mercantilisme en koloniale expansie, N.V.Boord-Hollansche Uitgevers Maatschappij, Amsterdam 1941 (98p.) MU 53 F 3

A.C.J.de Vrankrijker:

Geschiedenis van de belastingen, Fibula - van Dishoeck, Bussum 1969 (112p.)

Index and table of contents in the back

No reference to List

bescherming 15,16,74,88

describes the Dutch discussion 15 ff

Duitse socialisten (katheder) 88

Treub 88,89

L.J.Zimmermann: Geschiedenis van het economisch denken, 1947, vijfde herziene druk, uitgeverij Albani, den Haag 1957

Index

List 121, 131

Chapter V on the Historical Schoolpp.118-132

H.C.R.Wright: Free trade and Protectionism in the Netherlands 1816-1830, A study of the first Benelux, Cambridge at the University Press 1955

Index does not list List

but

LIST ix concerning Willem I's system: "Some have seen in it an anticipation of List's `National System';[11] others merely a belated mercantilism."

L.H.Janssen: Vrijhandel, protectie en tolunie, een kwantitatief theoretische analyse, Proefschrift aan de Katolieke Hogeschool te Tilburg 1960, Deko-druk, Tilburg 1960 (181p.)

Promotor: Dr.D.B.J.Schouten

No reference to List

Smith 1

Graham 18

Schouten 24,25,153,159,

de Roos 28,159

Verdoorn 32,63,73,76,86,105,128,136,

Marshall 64,

Meerhaeghe 85,

Scitovsky 120,122,123,126,

W.A.Lewis 125,157

J.Viner 126,

I.Morriset 130,

A.A.J.Smulders 131

Allen and Hicks 153

H.Makower 156

G.Morton 156

Irene Hasenberg Butter: Academic Economics in Holland, 1800-1870, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1969.

No index

No reference to List but several to the German kameralists and to the German Historical School

J.J.Krabbe: Historisme in economisch denken, Opvattingen van de historische school in de economie, Van Gorcum, Assen 1983

No reference to List

Mentions only the German School but in two instances Dutch economists:

Drunen x

Stuivenberg 155-156

Diepenhorst 162-163

Thurlings 16, 21, 134, 167

J.Pelkmans: Vrijhandel of protectionisme, Een Europa dat openstaat voor de wereld, Stichting Maatschappij en Onderneming, SMO-boek, 1985 (140p.)

No index,

This is a book on post WW II history

Does not even mention Ricardo, in fact no authors at all except for public reports

section 4,3 Remmende protectie p.51 same as above

neoprotectionism 66,68,132

section 5.3: arguments for protectionism p.70

Smith, Ricardo, Bastiat, List Mill are metioned in one and the same sentence and that's it.71

Zollverein 80

USA and Germany built on protection 85

Cooper (1972) 97

5.6.2 Euro-protectionisme 98

J.Pelkmans: Vrijhandel of protectionisme, Een Europa dat openstaat voor de wereld, Korte weergave, Stichting Maatschappij en Onderneming, SMO-boek, 1985 (16p.)

Nothing of interest

G.Criel: The Infant Industry Argument for Protection, A Reevaluation, De Economist 133, Nr.2, 1985, pp.199-217,

p.202:

G.Criel wrote in 1985 an essay on the infant industry argument that,

"It is sometimes suggested that Carey, List and Hamilton formulated the first modern, dynamic versions of the infant industry argument. In fact, their approach was classic, albeit integrated in a more global framework of commercial policy. Johnson and Graham made the first real attempts to incorporate the argument in a global theory of trade. Manoilesco went some steps further and developed a comprehensive theory of protection and trade."

Maarten van Beek: Hamilton, List en het opvoedingsargument, proefschrift vrieje universiteit te Amsterdam, Druk DNB 1987, Amsterdam 1987

Jan van Daal and Arnold Heertje:

Economic thought in the Netherlands: 1650-1950, Avebury, Aldershot 1992

Index

LIST 79,104

Carey 52

Th.van Tijn: Dutch Economic Thought in the seventeenth Century, in van Daal and Heertje

J.R.Zuidema: Economic Thought in the Netherlands between 1750 and 1870, in van Daal and Heertje

Justi 32,34,69,

Roscher 46

Carey 52

B.D.Elzas: 1870-1950: Growing Away From Provincialism, in: van Daal and Heertje

LIST 79

Arnold Heertje: Nicolaas Geraard Pierson, in van Daal and Heertje

LIST 104

Roscher 114

A.Wagner 121

M.H.J.Dullart:The Embarrassment of Freedom, in van Daal and Heertje

C.Paulien van den Tempel, Truus van der Horst (eindredactie):

'Bananenspilt' in Europa, Protectionisme versus liberalisme in het Europese bananbeleid, Caribische Wekgroup AWIC, Univeriteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam 1994 (232p.)

List of literature p.201

Nothing on List or any Germans

chapter on trade-theory 7

Smith 7

Ricardo 7

Mill 7,13

infant industry as Mill's idea13

other theories mentioned are all 20th century like Heckscher-Olin, Krugman, Bhagwati, Corden

LATER COMMENTS:

C.H.E. de Wit: De Strijd Tussen Aristocratie en Democratie in Nederland 1780-1848, N.V.Uitgeverij Winants, Heerlen 1965

J.W.Schulte Nordholt and Robert P.Swierenga:

A Bilateral Bicantannial, A History of Dutch American Relations 1782-1982, Octagon Books, Meulenhoff, Amsterdam 1982

Jan A.van Houte: An Economic History of the Low Countries 800-1800, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London 1977

Jan A.van Houte: Economische Geschiedenis van de Lage Landen 800-1800, Fibula-Van Dishoek, Haarlem 1979

E.H.Kossmann: The Low Countries 1780 -1940, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1978

E.H.Kossmann: De Lage Landen 1780/1980, Twee Eeuwen Nederland en België, Deel I 1780-1914, elsevier, Amsterdam/Brussel 1986

E: INTERMEDIATE PROTECTIONISM - 1880s

AND EARLY POST WW II

- RETURN TO INDUSTRIAL MERCANTILISM

4: DUTCH ECONOMY IN PRACTICE

- THE USE OF LIST

5: CONCLUSION

SOUTH-AFRICA:

S.C.Bellar: Afrikaners en Nederlanders, A'dam 1896 (157p)

A.J.Bruwer: Protection in South Africa, University of Pennsylvania dissertation-thesis 1922, Stellenbosch 1923

W.van Citters: Zuid-Afrika voor en na Dr. Jameson's inval in de Transvaal, W.P.van Stockum en Zoon, 's-Gravenhage 1897

Samuel Evans: Preference and Protection in South Africa, in: The Burden of Protection, An International Repudiation of the Gospel of Artificial Scarcity, Magazine of the International Free Trade League, Published for the Free Trade League, P.S.King & Son, Orchard House, Westminster, July 1912, pp. 82-106.

J.H.Hofmeyr & F.W.Reitz:

The Life of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr (onze Jan), Van de Sandt de Villiers Printing Co., Ltd, Cape Town 1913

C.B.Spuyt: Afrikaners en Nederlanders, J.H.de Bussy, Amsterdam en Pretoria 1899

W.van der Vlugt: Transvaal contra Groot-Britannië, J.H.de Bussy, Amsterdam en Pretoria 1899

ARTICLES FROM THE JOURNAL DE GIDS

1856, 1 p.70-129

P.N.Muller: Moderne Alchymie, Eene Handelsstudie, The Life of P.T.Barnum, Edwin T.Freedley: How to get money, Sam.Budgett, the successful merchant

Luzac 120

Ricardo 122,124

Rotshild 103,122,124

1856 2 p.620-667 and 718-770

P.N.Muller: Het Vrijandel-congress te Brussel 22,23,24 en 25 september 1856

Smith 623

Mr.D 623,624

Say 623

Portielje 624

161 persons present:

The famous protectionist from Köln: Rittringhausen 625

C.Dunoyer 625

A.Blanqui 625

Horace Say 625

J.Garnier 625

Wolowski 625

Duchataux 625

Colonel Thompson 625

James Wilson 625

Corr 625

Molinari 625

Vissering 628

Turgot 632

Peel 632

Elink Sterk 634

Mullendorf 644

Mathyssen 653

Reepmaker 653

Malakoff 647

Ackersdijk 649

Willem I 654

Catteaux-Wattel 664

Agie 664

etc etc

Second part:

Cobden 718

"Persoonlijke niederigheid en nationale fierheid, de erste het gevolg van de laatste, ze springen ons hier als dedelijk in het oog, en ze geven ons eene juste karakteristiek van date krachtige volk, wartoe Cobden het zich teregt eene eere rekent te behoeren. De glrorie des Vaderlands boven alles, maar darin tevens zijne eigne glorie te stellen, 't is het keeenmerk van den even nationalen als egoistischen Brit."718

Peel 719

d'Israeli 719

"De Anti-Cron League was Cobden's wapen tegen onregt en onverstand, en meesterlijk wist hij dat wapen te hanteren."719

"Beschermend blijvt England" 724

Pruissen's Tolverbond 731 ff -735

Bamberg 732

Handelsminister Bruck 734

Freetraders and protectionists agree that rapid railroads are needed754

Carey 756

Rittringhausen 766

Cieskowski: aidez a faire, aidez a developper 767

1858 1 p.130-141, P.J.Veth: review of Roscher's Kolonien...1856,

Mentions: Rau, Hansen

P.N.Muller: review of books on railroads by J.G.W.Fijne, Bijdrage tot de kennis der nederlandsche Spoorwegen, en bijlagen daartoe behoorende, Blussé en Van Braam, Doordrecht 1858, and by a commision led by Zwolle, pp.473-476

Thorbecke 473

1858 2 pp. 828-830, review by M. of A.Belifante: Handel en nijverheid, Het Tarief, 'S Gravenhage 1858,

becherming 828

beschermde fabrieken in Vlaanderen 830

1859 2 p.530-566 P.N.Muller: Spoorwegen (railroads)

Time is money shouts the Americans 530

Napoleon 534

Fulton, Watt, Stevenson, Arkwright, Hargraves 534

No economists mentioned

1860 2 pp.741-759 P.N.Muller: Nederlands Handelspolitiek

Germany 743,753

Custons union 744 ff 748,749,753

protection 750

J.H.C.Bley 746,752,755

1861 1 pp.301-322 T.M.C.Asser: de Kluisters van Rhenus (5 books on the customs on the Rhine, all from 1860)

No economists mentioned

1862 1 pp.588-595 N.G.Pierson: review of roscher's Ansichten .. ,1861

Kosmopolitical and mathematical school vs the historical school 588

J.S.Mill and Lorenz Stein vs Roscher and Knies 588

Knies 589,594

Smith 590

Kapitalvoorming 590

Zie 591

Buckle 591

Schäffle 591

Carey 594

Peshine Smith 594

Malthus 594

1863 1 pp.401-434 S.van Houten: Kritiek der practische Staatshuishoudkunde, review of Vissering's Handboek

Friedrich List 403!!!

Knies 404,432,

historical school 403,404,405

Pickford 410

Mill 410,415,416,417,420,421,427,

Smith 416

1864 2 pp.424-442 P.N.Muller: Een Handelsverslag

Napoleon 424

No authors mentioned

1864 3 pp.393-435 N.G.Pierson: Het Begrip van Volksrijkdom

Already covered in its pamphlet version:

N.G.Pierson: Het begrep van volksrijkdom, P.N.van Kampen, Amsterdam 1864

List 77, 81,

Knies 81

German economists: 36

Historical school 104

Ganilh 36

Roscher 20,22,23,85,107

1865 3 pp.112-135 P.N.Muller: Ricard Cobden

Palmerston 114

"Het aristocratische en den Mammon aanbiddende Engeland"114

his rich friends John Bright 114,122

Peel 128,130,133

Lord Russel 130

1866 2 pp.1-17 R.G.Philipson: De Engels-Amerikanische geschillen I

1866 3 pp.185-210 S.van Houten: De Staatshuihoudkunde als wetenschap en kunst

Seems to contrast Vissering and Rossi and List

LIST 201,202,

Stahl 207,208

Groen 208

Whewell 186

Whately 204

Bruyn Kops 186,197

Rees 187,189

Vissering 188,189,191,197,198,199,200,201,202

Say 188

Lasalle 190

Smith, Say, Lasalle, Malthus, Ricardo, Mill, Blanqui, Rossi, Bastiat, Chevalier, Boudrillart, Rau, Roscher192

Rossi 195,196,198,199,

Opzoomer 200,

Smith 201

1866 3 pp.353-288 N.G.Pierson: Fredrich List en zijn tijd

Many references to List of course

German railroads 370

National system 372

Pressed by Roscher, Hildebrand, Stein 375

List no unconditional protectionist 376

List's inconsequenct protectionism 382

1866 3 pp.457-475 S.Vissering: Eene oude kwestie

review of W.E.Hearn: Plutology, or the theology of the efforts to satisfy human wants

attack on Houten above: he makes faults since he does not know Hearn

LIST 474

Roscher 470/471 (Grundlagen)

Carey 459,461,465,467,474

Ricardo 458,461,465,467,471

Smith 458,464,467,469,470,471

Senior 458,464,472

Say 467,469,471

Macleod 468

Richelot 468

Josheph Garnier 468

Rosseau 469

Quesnay 469,470

Mill 458,461,464,467.471

McCulloch 464,471

Bastiat 459,461,465,471

Malthus 465,467,472

Malthus natural selection 460

Baco 466,472

Kluit 470

Sismondi 471

Paracelsus 473

Helmont 473

Brown 473

Broussais 473

Fourier 474

Cabet 474

1866 4 pp.332-339 S.Vissering: Bezijden de kwestie?

de Bosch Kemper 332,333,334,335,338

van Doorn 333

Heemskerk 334

Keuchenius 335

Mijer 335

1868 1 pp.23-50 N.G.Pierson: Economisch Overzicht, Buitenlandsche letterkunde, review of Roscher's Grundlagen .. 1866

LIST 36

Düring 37

Carey 37

Max Wirth 36

Hildebrand 25,26,27,28,29,

Vissering 26,27,

Julius Kautz 28,40

Dunoyer 31

Ricardo 33,48

Mill 33

Bastiat 33,36,41,

Blanqui 40

Lasalle 41

Schulze-Delitsch 41

Smith 42

Mill 42,48

Knies 47

Say 50

1867 4 pp.185-222 N.G.Pierson: Economisch Overzicht, Buitenlandsche letterkunde, review of, among others, Adolf Held: Carey's Socialwissenschaft und das Mercantilsystem pp.212-218

Pierson defends Ricardo and attacks Carey's "quasi-historical" views and protectionism

LIST 214

Düring 212

Bastiat 212

Genovesi 214,215

Galiani Serra214

Davanzati 214

Ricardo 215 ff

1868 2 pp.1-29 Viftig jaren der Duitsche Bondgeschidenis I-IV: Oorsprong der bondsregeling van 1815, no author

1868 3 pp.55-86 Viftig jaren der Duitsche Bondgeschidenis V-VII: Het Tolverbond. De pruissche bondspolitiek. no author

No reference to List

Metternich 57

Polignac 60

von Bernstorff 60,61

etc etc

1869 2 pp.230-290 Viftig jaren der Duitsche Bondgeschidenis VIII-XI: Het herstel van den bondsdag en de reactie

1870 3 pp.77-116 L.de Hartog: Saint Simon en de Saint Simonisten, review of Lorenz Stein: geschichte der socialen Bewegung in Frankreich, von 1789 bis auf unseren Tage, 1855

1871 4 pp.79-98 Joh.C.Zimmerman: De Nederlansche Handels-Maatschappij

created by Willem I in 182481

Tydeman 89

Blom 79,89,90,92,93,94

1872 3 pp.109-132 van Diesen: Lokale Spoorwegen, review of E.H.Baucke, De goedkoepe aanleg van Lokalspoorwegen, door een voorbeld inn Nederland toegelicht, W.Hulscher, Denveter 1872

No "macro" perspective

J.J.van Kerkwijk 109

S.E.W.Roorda 109 : "Goedkoope spoorwegen"

Hollandsche spoorwegmaatschappij 125

Gunder 126

1874 4 pp.233-274 P.N.Muller: Een Handelsgeschidenis

Leone Levi 233,237

de Rooy 233

de la Court 237,272

Oud. de Vries 233

Hogendorp 237

O.van Rees 237

Luzac 233,237

Bastiat 246

Child 246,248,

Tydeman 273

1875 2 pp.385-440 A.Pierson: Een geschidenis van het materialisme

1876 1 pp.331-345 W.A.van Rees: Onze Hollandsche Broeders in Zuid-Afrika, review of: De Transvaal-Republiek en de Hollansche Boeren. Vrij naar het Hoogduitsch van Merensky, Jeppe, Mauch e.a. voor Nederlanders bewerkt. Amsterdam, Seyffardts Boekhandel.

In the latter pages this article also deals with the Portugese duties on export over Lorenco Maeques in Mocambique

1876 2 pp.524-539 Joh.C.Zimmerman: Het staandbeeld van Thorbecke, a review of three biographies by W.C.D.Olivier, J.A.Levy, J.van Vloten

1878 3 pp.250-280 N.G.Pierson: Het Katheder-socialisme

Many references on German economists of course

LIST 252,

Nederlandsche katheder-socialisten 255,256

Goeman Borgesius 256,262,263,276

l'Ange Huet 278

1879 3 pp.377-411 N.G.Pierson: Weekkring en Methode der

Staatshuishoudkunde, review of J.A.Levy's critical book on Pierson's understanding of the German historical school.

Smith 377,387,393,394,408,409,410,

Ricardo 377,409,

Hume 410

Locke 410

Malthus 377,387,

Brentano 379

Sonnenfels 386

J.J.Becker 386

Physiocrats 386,387

Roscher 386

Leroy-Beaulieu 390

Rau 392

Quesnay 393

Melon 393

S.van Houten395,398,

organisism 396

Cairnes 399,

Mill 400,401,405,406,407,410

B.Weisz 403

1879 4 pp.458-497 J.C.M.van Riemsdijk: De Pruisische Spoorweg-politiek

deals with "recent" developments in the 1870s, and hardly with history and background

mentions only politicians, no economists

1881 1 pp.336-351 P.J.Veth: Onze Tranvaalsche broeders. I

History of the colony and the relation to the Dutch East india company

1881 3 pp.177-179 J.D'Aulnis de Bourouill: review of G.Heymans: Karakter en methode der Staatshuihoudkunde, S.C.van Doesburgh, Leiden 1880.

J.A.Levy and katheder-socialisme 178,179

1881 3 pp.193-225 R.Feith: De totstandkoming van het Duitsche toltarief van 1879

LIST as the leader of the unification from 1819 199

Bismarck 193 etc

protection 193 etc

mercantilist 195

Napoleon 197

Carey 203

Katheder-socialisme 212,221

Schmoller 214, his role: 216,217,219,221,

Held 214,221

Roscher 221

Brentano 221

Cobden 214

Chevalier 214

1881 4 pp.1-62 N.G.Pierson: Belastingshervorming

Chapter I and II deals only with German theory

the rest is mainly practically oriented

Spoorweg 58

A.Wagner 1,4,11,

Schäffle 1,8,20,40,50,

Rudolf Gneist1,13,14,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,

Neumann 1,6,8,11,21,

Nasse 4,12,

Conrad 1

Gustav Kohn 2

Brentano 2

Arnold 2

Kay 2

Huber 2

Vocke 2

Leser 2

van Houten 3,44,

Land 3

Held 4,13,

von Stein 17

England; the home of self-gevernment 15

Gogel 28

Sillem 28

W.van Konijnenburg 29

Ocatave Noël50

1882 2 pp.1-54 H.J.van der Heim: Finantieel staatsbeleid en belastingshervoming

1882 2 pp.385-429 A.Beaujon: Eene bladzijde de geschiedenis van Het protectionisme in Nederland

deals with tariff history after 1815 mainly

Could not find any reference to german authors

Röll 391,393,395,

Hogendorp 398

Protectie 405,418,425

Duitsche tol 407

Ricardo 409

Cobden 413,415,425,

Peel 422,424

ARTICLES FROM DE ECONOMIST

De Economist,

uitgegeven van J.L.De Bruyn Kops, H.L.Smits, 'S Gravenhage:

1887, vol.36:

1887 I De Nederlanders en de Duitschers in de Wereldhandel pp. 444-448

Nasse446,447,448

1887 I Het Protectie-stelsel in de vereenigde staaten,pp.96-98

Ford 98

Elliot 98

1887 II: De waarde der nieuwe protectie-beweging, pp.681-685

1887 II: A.D.van Assendelt de Coningh: Belastinghervorming op historischen grondslag, pp.953-960, review of a book by M.Treub on internal taxes

Gogel 959

1888 Jan N.G.Pierson: Economist Januari 1888

List 34, 35

Seckendorf 1,4

North 1

Boisguillebert and Louis XIV 32,44

1888: vol.37:

1888 J.D'Aulnis de Bourouill: Russische handelspolitiek, pp.38-53

on Russian protectionism against Germany

LIST 43,44,45,

1888 H.B.Greven: Immigratie van Werklieden en vrijhandel, pp.116-132

Malthus 117

Toubeau 118

Bernard 119

Pierson 124

Beauregard 125,131

Mill 128/9

1888 J.G.Schölvinck: De protectionisten verdedigd, pp.234-242

Pierson 234,235,236,238,239

M.Mees 235,

Goschen 236,239,

Hildebrand 237

Conrad 237

Patijn 238

1888 N.G.Pierson: Antword aan Mr.J.G.Schölvinck, pp.243-250

Smith 245

Mill 245

W.C.Mees 245

Goschen 247,249

Baden-Powell 247

1888 S.van Citters (De vereeniging "Het Buitenland"):

Uitgebreding van handlesbetrekkingen met den vreemde, pp. 666-673

1888 M.Mees: Eenige lichtpunten voor het stelsel van vrijhandel, pp.81-83

Protectie 81

Pres.Cleveland 81

Lord Salisbury 82

1888 S.van Citters: Bescherming in verkeerde richting (invoerecht en accijns op azijn), pp. 181-186

Renan 181

1889, vol. 38:

1889 A.Beaujon: Een leerboek van protectionisme (A.Diepen: De jongste uitingen), pp.708-720

Nederlandsche neoprotectionisten709

Pierson 718

1889 J.D'Aulnis de Bourouill: Het economisch pessimisme, redevoering Rijksuniv. Utrecht, pp.346-268

Donders 246,266,

Henry George 253,264,265,

Michaël Flürscheim 253

Rosseau 254

F.Bastiat 259,260,

Ricardo 261,262,263,264,

1889 N.G.Pierson: Niuewe uitgaven (Quack and Beaujon), pp.47-57

Protection 50

Mill 50

1902 N.G.Pierson: Het waardeproblem in een socialistische Matschappij, De Economist, vol.41, S'Gravenhage 1902, pp.423-56, reprinted in Verspreide Economische Geschriften edited by C.A.Verrijn Stuart, Haarlem 1910, vol.I, pp.333-77, translated by G.Gardiner and published as The Problem of Value in the Socialist Community in F.Hayek, Collectivist Economic Planning, Routledge and Sons, London 1935, pp. 41-85

Denies what German writers insist on: that there is any relationship between Ricardo and Marx78

1985 G.Criel, The Infant Industry Argument for Protection, A Reevaluation, De Economist 133, Nr.2, 1985, pp.199-217,

p.202:

G.Criel wrote in 1985 an essay on the infant industry argument that,

[1]Fernand Braudel, Civilisation & Capitalism, 15th-18th Century, (1979), Vol.III; The Perspectives of the World, Fontana Press, London 1985, pp.97-98

[2]Adam Smith: An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 1776, 2 Vol., Oxford University Press 1976 and 1979, reprint: Liberty Fund, Indianapolis 1981, p.9. Smith as usual carefully avoids to mention the treatment by his main goal of attack in England: the leading state-mercantilist James Steuart. The sharp sighted editor of the edition, Edwin Cannan, remarks sarcastically in a foootnote that: "Stuart's account of the Bank of Amsterdam can hardly be described as unintelligible (Principles of Political Economy (London 1767) IV.2, xxxvii-xxxix).

[3]Carroll Quigley: Tragedy and Hope, A History of the World in Our Time, Macmillian, New York 1966, pp. 48-50. Quigley was professor of history at Georgetown University in Washington D.C., at the Industrial College of the Armed forces, and at the State Department's Foreign Service Institute.

During his presidency U.S.president William Clinton repeatedly has praised and announced his intellectual debt to his tutor Carroll Quigley and his central message: "he drummed into us that western civilisation was the greatest of all and America was the best expression of western civilisation because of its commitment to future preference, the belief that the future could be better than the present, and that we have an obligation to make it so."

[4]Tony Smith, The Pattern of Imperialism, The United States, Great Britian, and the late-industrializing world since 1815, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge 1981, pp. 42-44

[5]Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy, A.M.Kelly Publishers, Fairfield N.J., 1991, preface, p.xxvii. Reprint of the A.M.Kelly Publishers 1904 edition. Originally Das Nationale System der politischen Oekonomie 1841, first English translation and edition; Longman's Green & Co., London 1885. (454p) pp.407-408

The German original worked with is the following: Friedrich List, Das Nationale System der politischen Oekonomie, 1841, Vierte Auslage, Jena, Verlag von Gustav Fisher 1922. (552p)

[6]It is noteable that in the English edition a 12 page introduction, by the German professor Heirich Waentig - in the original German edition, has been eliminated. List's own most interesting preface has been cut down from 46 pages to 6 pages.

[8]N.G.Pierson: Friedrich List en Zijn Tijd (Friedrich List and his time), de Gids, 1866, see also Economic Papers, volume II, pp.257-88

[9]A.Heertje, Nicolaas Geraard Pierson, in: Jan van Daal and Arnold Heertje, Economic thought in the Netherlands: 1650-1950, Avebury, Aldershot 1992, p.104

[10]N.G.Pierson: 'Het katheder-socilaisme' (Katheder socialism), de Gids, 1878, see also Economic Papers, volume I, pp.211-47

[11]R.Häpke: `Die Wirtschaftspolitik im Königreich der Niederlände, 1815-1830', in Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte (1923).