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# HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE TO

FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF ITS

PROBLEMS AND CONCEPTIONS

BY

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Second Edition, Revised and EnlarQ

Nefo

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# TRANSLATOR S PREFACE.

REGARDED simply as a historical discipline, the history of thought

might fairly claim a prominent place in education, and an equal

share of the attention now given to comparative and historical

studies. The evolution of an idea is in itself as interesting and

valuable an object of study as the evolution of a word, of an insti

tution, of a state, or of a vegetable or animal form.

But aside from this interest which it has in common with other

historical sciences, the history of philosophy has a peculiar value of

its own. For the moment we attempt any serious thinking in any

field, natural science, history, literature, ethics, theology, or any

other, we find ourselves at the outset quite at the mercy of the

words and ideas which form at once our intellectual atmosphere

and the instruments with which we must work. We cannot speak,

for example, of mind or matter, of cause or force, of species or indi

vidual, of universe or God, of freedom or necessity, of substance or

evolution, of science or law, of good or true or real, without involv

ing a host of assumptions. And the assumptions are there, even

though we may be unconscious of them, or ignore them in an effort

to dispense with metaphysics. To dispense with these conceptions

is impossible. Our only recourse, if we would not beg our questions

in advance, or remain in unconscious bondage to the instruments of

our thought, or be slaves to the thinking of the past generations

that have forged out our ideas for us, is to " criticise our categories."

And one of the most important, if not the only successful, means to

this end is a study of the origin and development of these categories.

We can free ourselves from the past only by mastering it. We

may not hope to see beyond Aristotle or Kant until we have stood

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on their shoulders. We study the history of philosophy, not so

much to learn what other men have thought, as to learn to think.

For an adequate study of the history of thought, the main requi

sites are a careful study of the works of the great thinkers a

requisite that need not be enlarged on here, although such study is

a comparatively recent matter in both Britain and America, with a

few notable exceptions and a text-book to aid us in singling out

the important problems, tracing their development, disentangling

their complications, and sifting out what is of permanent value. To

meet this second need is the especial aim of the present work, and,

with all the excellencies of the three chief manuals already in use,

it can scarcely be questioned that the need is a real one. Those

acquainted with the work here translated (W. Windelband s Ge-

schichte der Philosophic, Freiburg i. B., 1892) have no hesitation in

thinking that it is an extremely valuable contribution toward just

this end. The originality of its conception and treatment awaken

an interest that is greater in proportion to the reader s acquaintance

with other works on the subject. The author shows not only

historical learning and vision, but philosophical insight ; and in his

hands the comparative treatment of the history of thought proves as

suggestive and fruitful as the same method applied to other subjects

in recent times. A work like the present could only have been

written with some such preparation as has come in this case from

the previous treatment of Greek and Modern Philosophy at greater

length, and in presenting it to English readers I am confident that

it will meet the wants, not only of special students of philosophy,

but also of all who wish to understand the development of thought.

Teachers will, I think, find it very valuable in connection with

lecture courses.

As regards the work of the Translator, little need be said. He

has tried like many others to make a faithful translation into

intelligible English, and is fully conscious that it has been with

varying success. Of course translation in the strict sense is often

impossible, and I cannot hope to have adopted the happiest com

promise or found the most felicitous rendering in all cases.

"Being" (spelled with a capital) is used for " Sein." Where the

German " Form " seemed to differ enough from the ordinary English

Translator s Preface. vii

sense of the word to make "form" misleading, I have spelled it

"Form," and the same course has been taken with "Real," " Re-

alitat," where the German seemed to desire to distinguish them from

"wirklich," which has been translated sometimes by "real," some

times by "actual." " Vorstellung" is usually rendered by "idea,"

following Locke s usage, except in connection with the system of

Leibniz, where "representation " is necessary to bring out his thought.

"Idee," in the Platonic and Kantian use, is rendered "Idea" (spelled

with a capital). The convenient word "Geschehen" has no exact

counterpart, and has been variously rendered, most frequently per

haps by "cosmic processes." In the additions made to the bibliog

raphy, no attempt has been made to be exhaustive ; I have simply

tried to indicate some works that might aid the student. It is

scarcely necessary to say that any corrections or suggestions will

be gratefully received and utilised if possible. Material in square

brackets is added by the translator.

In conclusion, I desire to express my indebtedness to my col

leagues, Professors Shorey, Strong, and Cutting, and Dr. Schwill

for helpful suggestions. My chief indebtedness, however, is to the

critical taste and unwearied assistance of my wife. If I have in

any degree succeeded in avoiding German idioms, it is largely due

to her.

JAMES H. TUFTS.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO,

July, 1893.

# TRANSLATOR S NOTE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

IN preparing this second edition all changes made by the author

in the second German edition have been incorporated either in the

text or in the appendix at the close. In addition, I have included a

brief notice (pp. 663-670) of certain aspects of recent English

thought, which naturally have more interest for the readers of

this translation than for those of the original.

& JAMES H. TUFTS.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO,

May, 1901.

# AUTHOR’S PREFACE.

AFTER many painful delays and interruptions I now present at

last the conclusion of the work whose first sheets appeared two

years ago.

The reader will not confuse this with the compendiums which

have very likely sometimes been prepared by dressing out lecture

notes on the general history of philosophy. What I offer is a

serious text-book, which is intended to portray in comprehensive

and compressed exposition the evolution of the ideas of European

philosophy, with the aim of showing through what motives the

principles, by which we to-day scientifically conceive and judge

the universe and human life, have been brought to consciousness

and developed in the course of the movements of history.

This end has determined the whole form of the book. The

literary-historical basis of research, the biographical and biblio

graphical material, were on this account necessarily restricted to

the smallest space and limited to a selection that should open the

way to the best sources for the reader desiring to work farther.

The philosophers own expositions, too, have been referred to in the

main, only where they afford a permanently valuable formulation

or rationale of thoughts. Aside from this there is only an occa

sional citation of passages on which the author supports an inter-

. pretation differing from that ordinarily adopted. The choice of

material has fallen everywhere on what individual thinkers have

produced that was new and fruitful, while purely individual turns

of thought, which may indeed be a welcome object for learned

research, but afford no philosophical interest, have found at most

a brief mention.

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As is shown even by the external form of the exposition, chief

emphasis has been laid upon the development of what is weightiest

from a philosophical standpoint: the history of problems and concep

tions. To understand this as a connected and interrelated whole

lias been my chief purpose. The historical interweaving of the

various lines of thought, out of which our theory of the world and

life has grown, forms the especial object of my work, and I am

convinced that this problem is to be solved, not by any a priori

logical construction, but only by an all-sided, unprejudiced investi

gation of the facts. If in this exposition a relatively large part

of the whole seems to be devoted to antiquity, this rests upon the

conviction that for a historical understanding of our intellectual

existence, the forging out of the conceptions which the Greek mind

wrested from the concrete reality found in Nature and human life,

is more important than all that has since been thought the

Kantian philosophy excepted.

The task thus set required, however, a renunciation which no

one can regret more than myself. The purely topical treatment

of the historical movement of philosophy did not permit of giving

to the personality of the philosophers an impressiveness corre

sponding to their true worth. This could only be touched upon

where it becomes efficient as a causal factor in the combination and

transformation of ideas. The aesthetic fascination which dwells in

the individual nature of the great agents of the movement, and

which lends its especial charm to the academic lecture, as well as

to the more extended exposition of the history of philosophy, had

to be given up here in favour of a better insight into the pragmatic

necessity of the mental process.

Finally, I desire to express at this place also my lively gratitude

to my colleague, Dr. Hensel, who has not only aided me with a

part of the proofs, but has also essentially increased the usefulness

of the book by a subject index.

WILHELM WINDELBAND.

STRASSBURG, November, 1891.

# AUTHOR S PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

A LARGE edition of my History of Philosophy had been exhausted

more than two years ago, and in the meantime its use had been

further extended by English and Russian translations. This per

mits me to assume that the new treatment which I gave to the

subject has filled an existing gap, and that the synoptical and criti

cal method which I introduced has gained approval so far as the

principle is concerned. While therefore I could leave the book

unchanged in its main outlines when preparing this new edition, I

could be all the more careful in making evidently needed improve

ments and in fulfilling certain specific requests.

Under the head of improvements I have undertaken such correc

tions, condensations, and expansions upon particular points as are

requisite for a text-book which seeks to represent the present condi

tion of investigation, and in this work the literature which has

appeared since the first edition has been utilised. In consequence

of the great condensation of material the exposition had become

sometimes difficult to follow, and 1 have aimed in many cases to

give more fluent form to the expression by breaking up some of the

longer sentences, and occasionally omitting what was of merely sec

ondary importance.

A desire has been expressed by readers of the book for a more

extended notice of the personalities and personal relations of the

philosophers. In the preface to my first edition I had myself

recognised the justice of this demand, but had disclaimed the inten

tion of satisfying it because the special plan of my work and the

necessary limitations of space prevented. Now I have sought to

fulfil this demand so far as it has seemed possible within the

limit of my work, by giving brief and precise characterisations of

the most important thinkers.

A desire for a more extended treatment of the philosophers of the

nineteenth century has also been reckoned with. The few pages

originally accorded to the subject have been expanded to three times

the former compass, and I hope that although one will miss one

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topic and another another, it will nevertheless be possible to gain a

fairly complete general view of the movements of philosophy down

to the more immediate present, in so far as this is to be expected

from a history of principles.

Finally, I have remade the subject index, and so expanded it

that in connection with the text it may, as I hope, have the value of

a dictionary of the history of philosophy. This gives to my work a

second distinctive feature; namely, that of a work of reference of

a systematic and critical sort.

By all these expansions the size of the book has been considerably

increased, and I express here to my esteemed publisher, Dr. Siebeck,

my heartiest gratitude for the cordial response with which he has

made possible these essential improvements.

WILHELM WINDELBAND.

STRASSBURG, September, 1900.

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HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

# INTRODUCTION.

### 1. The Name and Conception of Philosophy.

R. Haym, Art. Philosophic in Ersch und Griiber s Encyclopadie, III. Abth.,

Bd. 24.

W. Windelband, Praeludien (Freiburg i. B., 1884), 1 ff.

A. Seth, Art. Philosophy in Erie. Brit. ]

G. T. Ladd, Introduction to Philosophy. N.Y. 1891.]

BY philosophy present usage understands the scientific treatment

of the general questions relating to the universe and human life.

Individual philosophers, according to the presuppositions with

which they have entered upon their work, and the results which

they have reached in it, have sought to change this indefinite idea

common to all, into more precise definitions, 1 which in part diverge

so widely that the common element in the conception of the science

may seem lost. But even the more general meaning given above is

itself a limitation and transformation of the original significance

which the Greeks connected with the name philosophy, a limita

tion and transformation brought about by the whole course of the in

tellectual and spiritual life of the West, and following along with

the same.

1. While in the first appearance in literature 2 of the words

&lt;t&gt;iXoar (f&gt;flv and &lt;f&gt;iXoo-o&lt;f&gt;ia the simple and at the same time indefinite

meaning, " striving after wisdom," may still be recognised, the word

" philosophy " in the literature after Socrates, particularly in the

school of Plato and Aristotle, acquired the fixed significance accord-

1 Cited in detail in Ueberweg-Heinze, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philoso

phic, I. 1. [Eng. trans. Ueberweg s History of Philosophy, trans, by G. S.

Morris. N.Y. 1871.]

2 Herodotus, I. 30 and 50 ; Thucydides, II. 40 ; and frequently also even in

Plato, e.g. Apol. 29 ; Lysis, 218 A ; Symp. 202 E ff.

1

2 Introduction.

ing to which it denotes exactly the same as the German word

" Wissenschaft." l According to this meaning philosophy in general 2

is the methodical work of thought, through which we are to know

that which "is"; individual "philosophies" are the particular sci

ences in which individual realms of the existent are to be investi

gated and known. 3

With this first theoretical meaning oi the word " philosophy " a

second was very early associated. The development of Greek

philosophy came at the time when the naive religious and ethical

consciousness was in process of disintegration. This not only

made the questions as to man s vocation and tasks more and more

important for scientific investigation (cf. below, Part I. ch. 2), but

also made instruction in the right conduct of life appear as an

essential aim, and finally as the main content of philosophy or

science. Thus philosophy in the Hellenistic period received the

practical meaning of an art of life, based upon scientific principles\*

a meaning for which the way had already been prepared by the

Sophists and Socrates.

In consequence of this change, purely theoretical interest passed

over to the particular " philosophies," which now in part assumed

the names of their special subjects of research, historical or belong

ing to natural science, while mathematics and medicine kept all the

more rigorously that independence which they had possessed from

the beginning with relation to science in general. 5 The name of

philosophy, however, remained attached to those scientific efforts

which hoped to win from the most general results of human knowl

edge a conviction for the direction of life, and which finally culmi

nated in the attempt (made by Neo-Platonism) to create from such

a philosophy a new religion to replace the old that had been lost. 6

1 A conception which it is well known is of much greater compass than the

English and French " science." [In this translation the words " science" and

" scientific " are used in this larger sense. The term " natural science " will be

used for the narrower meaning which "science " alone often has. If it should

serve to remind the beginner that philosophy and scientific thought should be

one, and that natural science is not aii of science, it may be of value.]

2 Plato, Bfp. 480 B ; Aristotle, Met. VI. 1, 102(5 a 18.

3 Plato, Theiet. 1431). Aristotle sets the doctrine " of Being as such" (the

later so-called Metaphysics) as "First Philosophy" over against the other

"philosophies," and distinguishes further theoretical and practical "philoso

phy." In one passage (Met. I. 6, 987 a 29) he applies the plural &lt; /&gt;tXo &lt; ro0/ai also

to the different systems of science which have followed in historical succession,

as we should speak of the philosophies of Kant, Fichte, Hegel, etc.

\* Cf. the definition of Epicurus in Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. XI. 169, and on

the other hand that of Seneca, Epist. 89.

5 Cf. below, Part I.

G Hence Proclus, for example, would prefer to have philosophy called

theology.

1.] Name and Conception of Philosophy. 3

There was at first little change in these relations, when the remains

of ancient science passed over into the culture of the present peoples

of Europe as the determining forces of their intellectual life. Con

tent and task of that which the Middle Ages called philosophy coin

cided with the conception held by later antiquity. 1 And yet the

meaning of philosophy underwent an essential change by finding

philosophy s task already performed, in a certain sense, by religion.

For religion, too, afforded not only a sure conviction as a rule for

the guidance of personal life, but also in connection with this, a gen

eral theoretical view of all reality, which was the more philosophical

in its character, as the dogmas of Christianity had been formulated

entirely under the influence of ancient philosophy. Under these

circumstances, during the unbroken dominance of Church doctrine,

there remained for philosophy, for the most part, only the position

of a handmaid to ground, develop, and defend dogma scientifically.

But just by this means philosophy came into a certain opposition to

theology as regards method ; for what the latter taught on the

ground of divine revelation, the former was to win and set forth by

means of human knowledge. 2

But the infallible consequence of this relation was, that the freer

individual thinking became in its relation to the Church, the more

independently philosophy began the solution of the problem which

she had in common with religion ; from presentation and defence of

doctrine she passed to its criticism, and finally, in complete inde

pendence of religious interests, sought to derive her teaching from

the sources which she thought she possessed in the "natural light"

of human reason and experience. 3 The opposition to theology, as

regards methods, grew in this way to an opposition in the subject

matter, and modern philosophy as " world-wisdom " set itself over

against Church dogma. 4 However manifold the aspects which this

relation took on, shading from a clinging attachment to a passionate

conflict, the office of " philosophy " remained always that which

1 Cf., for example, Augustine, Solil. I. 7 ; Conf. V. 7; Scotus Erigena, De

Div. Pra&gt;dest. I. 1 (Migne, 358) ; Anselm Proslog., ch. 1. (Migne, I. 227) ;

Abelard, Introd. in Theol. II. 3 ; Raymundus Lullus, De Quinque Sap. 8.

2 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. I. 32, 1 ; Contr. Gent. I. 8 f., II. 1 ff. ;

Duns Scotus, Op. Ox. I. 3, qu. 4 ; Durand de Pounjain, In Sent. Prol., qu. 8 ;

Raymundus of Sabunde, Theol. Natur. Prooem.

3 Laur. Valla, Dialect. Disp. III. 9 ; B. Telesio, De Nat. Rer. Prooem. ; Fr.

Bacon, De Awjm, III. 1 (Works, Spedding, I. 539 = 111. 336); Taurellus,

Philos. Triumph. I. 1 ; Paracelsus, Paragr. (ed. Huser) II. 23 f. ; G. Bruno,

Delia Causa, etc., IV. 107 (Lagarde, I. 272) ; Hobbes, De Corpor. I. (Works,

Molesworth, I. 2 and 6 f.).

4 Characteristic definitions, on the one hand, in Gottsched, Erste Griinde dcr

gesammten Weltweisheit (Leips. 1756), pp. 97 ff. ; on the other hand, in the

article Philosophie, in the Encyclopedie (Vol. XXV. pp. 632 ff.).

4 Introduction.

antiquity had assigned to it, to supply from scientific insight a

foundation for a theory of the world and of human life, where relig

ion was no longer able to meet this need, or at least to meet it alone.

In the conviction that it was equal to this task, the philosophy of

the eighteenth century, like that of the Greeks, considered it its

right and duty to enlighten men with regard to the nature of things,

and from this position of insight to rule the life of the individual

and of society.

In this position of self-security philosophy was shaken by Kant,

who demonstrated the impossibility of a philosophical (i.e. meta

physical) knowledge of the world beside of or above the individual

sciences, and thereby restricted once more the conception and the

task of philosophy ; for after this quitclaim the realm of philosophy,

as a particular science, was narrowed to just that critical consideration

by Reason of itself, from which Kant had won his decisive insight, and

which needed only to be extended systematically to activities other

than that of knowing. With this function could be united what

Kant 1 called the universal or cosmical conception of philosophy,

its vocation in the practical direction of life.

It is, to be sure, far from true that this new and apparently final

conception of philosophy gained universal acceptance at once. It is

rather the case that the great variety of philosophical movements of

the nineteenth century has left 110 earlier form of philosophy unre-

peated, and that a luxuriant development of the " metaphysical

need " 2 even brought back, for a time, the inclination to swallow up

all human knowledge in philosophy, and complete this again as an

all-embracing science.

2. In view of these mutations through which the meaning of the

word " philosophy " has passed in the course of time, it seems im

practicable to pretend to gain a general conception of philosophy from

historical comparison. None of those brought forward for this

purpose 3 apply to all those structures of mental activity which

lay claim to the name. Even the subordination of philosophy under

the more general conception " science " is questionable in the case

of those types of teaching which place a one-sided emphasis on the

1 Critique of Pure Reason, A. 839 ; B. 866.

2 Schopenhauer, World as Will and Idea, Vol. II. ch. 17.

3 Instead of criticising particular conceptions it is sufficient here to point to

the widely diverging formulas in which the attempt has been made to perform

this impossible task : cf., for example, only the introductions to works such as

those of Erdinann, Ueberweg, Kuno Fischer, Zeller, etc. All these conceptions

thus determined apply only in so far as the history of philosophy has yielded

the result which they express, but they do not apply with reference to the inten

tions expressed by the philosophers themselves.

1.] Name and Conception of Philosophy. 5

practical significance of their doctrine : ! still less can we define

the subject-matter and form of philosophy considered as a special

science, in a way that shall hold good for all cases. For even aside

from the primitive or the revived standpoint for which philosophy

is a universal science, 2 the attempts to limit it are extremely vari

ous. The problems of natural science form at first almost the sole

objects of interest for philosophy, then for a long period are in

cluded in its scope, and do not separate from it until modern times.

History, on the other hand, has remained an object of indifference to

most philosophical systems, and has emerged as an object of philo

sophical investigation relatively late and in isolated cases. Meta

physical doctrines, again, in which the centre of philosophy is

usually sought, we see either pushed one side at important turning-

points in history or declared to be entirely impossible 3 ; and if at

times the ability of philosophy to determine the life of the indi

vidual or of society is emphasised, a proud standpoint of pure theory

has renounced such a menial occupation. 4

From still another side it has been claimed that philosophy treats

the same subjects as the other sciences, but in another sense and by

another method ; but neither has this specific characteristic of form

historical universality. That there is no such acknowledged his

torical method would of course be no objection if only the endeavour

after such a method were a constant characteristic of all philoso

phies. This is, however, so far from being the case that in fact

many philosophers imprint on their science the method of other

disciplines, e.g. of mathematics or of investigation of nature, 5 while

others will have nothing at all to do with a methodical treatment of

their problems, and regard the philosophic activity as analogous to

the creations of genius in art.

3. From these circumstances is explained also the fact that there

is no fixed relation of philosophy to the other sciences, which is capa

ble of a definition valid for all history. Where philosophy presents

itself as the universal science, the other sciences appear only as its

more or less distinctly separated parts. 6 Where, on the contrary,

philosophy is assigned the task of grasping the results of the par-

1 So in the case of the majority of the philosophers of later antiquity.

2 As for Chr. Wolf ; cf. his Logica, 29 ff.

3 This is especially the case where philosophy is regarded solely as "science

of cognition." Cf., e.g., W. Hamilton in his notes to Reid s works, II. 808.

Among the French at the close of the eighteenth and the beginning of this cen

tury, philosophy = analyse de I entendement humain.

4 E.g. with Plotinus.

5 So Descartes and Bacon.

6 So, for example, in the Hegelian system.

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ticular sciences in their general significance, and harmonising them

into a comprehensive knowledge of the world, we have as the result

peculiarly complex relations : in the first place, a dependence of

philosophy upon the existing condition of insight reached in the par

ticular disciplines a dependence which expresses itself principally

in the furtherance of philosophy by the prominent advances made

by individual sciences; 1 in the next place, an influence in the

opposite direction, when philosophy takes part in the work of the

particular sciences. This action is felt as help or as hindrance,

according as the philosophical treatment of the questions embraced

under the particular disciplines sometimes contributes valuable

factors for their solution, by means of its wider range of vision and

its tendency toward unity, 2 but at other times presents itself only

as a duplication which, if it leads to like results, appears useless, or

if it wishes to furnish other results, dangerous. 3

From what has been said it is evident farther, that the relations

of philosophy to the other activities of civilisation are no less close than

its relation to the individual sciences. For the conceptions arising

from the religious and ethical and artistic life, from the life of the

state and of society, force their way everywhere, side by side with

the results won from scientific investigation, into the idea of the

universe which the philosophy of metaphysical tendencies aims to

frame ; and the reason s valuations ( Werthbestimmunyen) and stand

ards of judgment demand their place in that idea the more vigor

ously, just in proportion as it is to become the basis for the practical

significance of philosophy. In this way humanity s convictions and

ideals find their expression in philosophy side by side with its

intellectual insights ; and if these convictions and ideals are regarded,

erroneously often, as gaining thereby the form of scientific intelli

gence, they may receive under certain circumstances valuable clari

fication and modification by this means. Thus this relation also of

philosophy to general culture is not only that of receiving, but also

that of giving.

It is not without interest to consider also the mutations in external position

and social relations which philosophy has experienced. It may be assumed that

science was from the first, with perhaps a few exceptions (Socrates), pursued in

Greece in closed schools. 4 The fact that these, even at a later time, had the form

1 As the influence of astronomy upon the beginnings of Greek, or that of

mechanics upon those of modern, philosophy.

2 The Protestant theology of the nineteenth century stands in this relation

to German philosophy.

3 Cf. the opposition of natural science to Schelling s philosophy of nature.

4 H. Diels, Ueber die altesten Philosophenschulen der Griechen in Philos.

Aufsatze zum Jubilaum E. Zeller s, Leips. 1887, pp. 241 ff.

l.J Name and Conception of Philosophy. 7

of societies with religious laws ! would not in itself alone, in view of the religious

character of all Greek judicial institutions, prove a religious origin of these

schools, but the circumstance that Greek science worked out its contents directly

from religious ideas, and that certain connections with religious cults present

themselves unmistakably in a number of directions, 2 makes it not improbable

that the scientific societies sprang originally from religious unions (the Mys

teries) and continued in a certain connection with them. But when the scien

tific life had developed to complete independence, these connections fell away

and purely scientific schools were founded as free unions of men who, under the

guidance of persons of importance, shared with each other the work of research,

exposition, defence, and polemic, 3 and at the same time had an ethical bond in

a common ideal of the conduct of life.

With the advent of the larger relations of life in the Hellenistic and Roman

period, these unions naturally became loosened, and we frequently meet writers,

especially among the Romans, who are active in the field of philosophy in a

purely individual way, neither members of a school nor professional teachers.

Such were Cicero, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius. Not until the latest period of

antiquity were the ties of the schools drawn more closely again, as in Neo-

Pythagoreanism and Neo-Platonism.

Among the Romanic and Germanic peoples the course of events has been not

unlike that in the ancient world. The science of the Middle Ages also appears

in the train of the Church civilisation ; it has its seats in the cloister-schools, and

is stimulated toward independent development primarily by questions of religious

interest. In it, too, the oppositions of various religious orders, such as the Do

minicans and Franciscans, assert themselves for a time, and even the freer

scientific associations out of which the universities gradually developed, had

originally a religious background and an ecclesiastical stamp. 4 Hence there

was always but a slight degree of independence with reference to Church doc

trine in this corporate philosophy of the universities, and this held true on into

the eighteenth century for the Protestant universities also, in the foundation

and development of which ecclesiastical and religious interests had a foremost

place.

On the other hand, it is characteristic of the "world-wisdom" or secular

philosophy which was gaining its independence at the beginning of the modern

period, that those who bring and support it are not at all men of the schools,

but men of the world and of life. An escaped monk, a state-chancellor, a

cobbler, a nobleman, a proscribed Jew, a learned diplomat, independent men of

letters and journalists, these are the founders of modern philosophy, and in

accord with this, their work takes for its outer form not the text-book or the

deposit of academical disputations, but the free literary production, the essay.

Not until the second half of the eighteenth century did philosophy again

become corporate, and domesticated in the universities. This took place first

in Germany, where the most favourable conditions were afforded by the rising

independence of the universities, and where a fruitful interchange between

teachers and students of the university was beneficial to philosophy also. 5

1 v. Wilamowitz-Mollendorf, Antigonos von Karystos (Philol. Stud. IV.

Berlin, 1881, pp. 263 ff.).

2 The Pythagoreans, as is well known, offer a pre-eminent example of this ;

but sympathies with the Apollo cultus are plain enough in the Platonic Academy

also. Pfleiderer has lately sought to bring the apparently isolated Heraclitus

into connection with the Mysteries (E. Pfleiderer, Heraklit von Ephesus.

Berlin, 1886).

3 Cf. II. Usener, Ueber die Organisation der wissenschaftlichen Arbeit im

Alte.nhum (Preuss. Jahrb., Jahrg. LIII., 1884, pp. 1 ff.), and E. Heitz, Die Philo-

sophenschulen Athens (Deutsche Revue, 1884, pp. 826 ff.).

4 Cf. G. Kaufmann, Geschichte der deutschen Universitdten 1. pp. 98 ff. (Stuttg.

1888).

5 Schelling has erected the finest monument to the ideal conception of science

in the activity of German universities, in his Vorlesunyen uber die Methode des

akademischen Studiums (2. and 3. Vorlesung. Ges. Werke, I. Abth., Vol. 5,

pp. 223 ff.).

8 Introduction.

From Germany this spread to Scotland, England, Franco, and Italy, and in gen

eral it may be said that in the nineteenth century the seat of philosophy is essen

tially to be sought in the universities. 1

In conclusion, the share of the various peoples in the development of philoso

phy deserves a brief mention. As with all developments of European culture,

so with philosophy, the Greeks created it, and the primitive structure of

philosophy due to their creative activity is still to-day an essential basis of the

science. What was added in antiquity by the mixed peoples of Hellenism and

by the Romans does not, in general, amount to more than a special form and

practical adaptation of the Greek philosophy. Only in the religious turn which

this last movement took (cf. below, Part II. ch. 2) do we find something essen

tially new which sprang from the harmonising of national differences in the

Roman Empire. The scientific culture of the Middle Ages was also international,

as is implied in the universal employment of the Latin language. It is with

modern philosophy that the special characters of particular nations first present

themselves as of decisive influence. While the traditions of mediaeval scholas

ticism maintain themselves most vigorously and independently in Spain and

Portugal, the Italians, Germans, English, and French supply the first movements

of the new science which reached its highest point in the classical period of

German philosophy. Compared with these four nations, the rest stand almost

entirely in a receptive attitude ; a certain independence is noticeable, if any

where, in more recent time among the Swedes.

### 2. The History of Philosophy.

The more varied the character assumed by the problems and con

tent of philosophy in the course of time, the more the question

rises, what meaning there can be in uniting in historical investiga

tion and exposition products of thought which are not only so

manifold, but also so different in kind, and between which there

seems to be ultimately nothing in common but the name.

For the anecdotal interest in this checkered diversity of vari

ous opinions on various things, which was perhaps formerly the

chief motive of a " History of Philosophy," stimulated too by the

remarkable and strange nature of many of these views, cannot

possibly serve as the permanent centre of a genuine scientific disci

pline.

1. At all events, however, it is clear that the case stands other

wise with the history of philosophy than with that of any other

science. For with all these the field of research remains fixed, on

the whole at least, however many the variations to which its extent,

its separation from a still more general field, and its limitation with

reference to neighbouring fields, may be subject in the course of his

tory. In such a case there is no difficulty in tracing the develop

ment of knowledge over a field which can be determined in this

way, and in eventually making just those variations intelligible as

the natural consequences of this development of insight.

1 The best evidence for this statement is afforded by just the passionate

attacks which Schopenhauer directed against the relation between philosophy

and the universities.

2.] The History of Philosophy. 9

Quite otherwise, however, in the case of philosophy, which has

no such subject-matter common to all its periods, and whose " his

tory," therefore, sets forth no constant advance or gradual approxi

mation to a knowledge of the subject in question. Rather, it has

always been emphasised that while in other sciences, a quiet build

ing up of knowledge is the rule, as soon as they have once gained

a sure methodical footing after their rhapsodical beginnings, a

rule which is interrupted only from time to time by a sudden new

beginning, in philosophy the reverse is true. There it is the

exception that successors gratefully develop what has been already

achieved, and each of the great systems of philosophy begins to

solve its newly formulated problem ab ovo, as if the other systems

had scarcely existed.

2. If in spite of all of this we are still to be able to speak of a " his

tory of philosophy," the unity of connection, which we find neither

in the objects with which philosophers busy themselves, nor in the

problems they have set themselves, can be found only in the common

work which, they. Jtane accomplished in spite of all the variety in their

subject-matter and in the purposes with which they have worked.

But this common product, which constitutes the meaning of the

history of philosophy, rests on just the changing relations which

the work of philosophers has sustained in the course of history, not

only to the maturest results of science in general and of the special

sciences in particular, but also to the other activities of European

civilisation. For was it that philosophy had in view the project of

a general scientific knowledge of the universe, which she would win

either in the role of universal science, or as a generalising compre

hension of the results of the special sciences, or was it that she

sought a view of life which should give a complete expression to

.the highest values of will and feeling, or was it finally that with a

clearly defined limitation of her field she made reason s self-knowl

edge her goal, the result always was that she was labouring to

bring to conscious expression the necessary forms and principles in

which the human reason manifests its activity, and to transfer these

from their original form of perceptions, feelings, and impulses, into

that of conceptions. In some direction and in some fashion every

philosophy has striven to reach, over a more or less extensive field,

a formulation in conception of the material immediately given in

the world and in life; and so, as these efforts have passed into his

tory, the constitution of the mental and spiritual life has been

step by step disclosed. The History of Philosophy is the process in

tvhich European humanity has embodied in scientific conceptions its

views of tlie world and its judgments of life.

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It is this common fruit of all the intellectual creations which

present themselves as " philosophies," which alone gives to the

history of philosophy as a genuine science its content, its problem,

and its justification. This, too, is the reason why a knowledge of

the history of philosophy is a necessary requirement, not only for

all scholarly education, but for all culture whatever ; for it teaches

how the conceptions and forms have been coined, in which we all,

in every-day life as well as in the particular sciences, think and

judge the world of our experience.

The beginnings of the history of philosophy are to be sought in the historical

compositions (for the most part lost) of the great schools of antiquity, especially

the Peripatetic School. As we may see in the examples given by Aristotle, 1

these works had the critical purpose of preparing for the development of their

own views by a dialectical examination of views previously brought forward.

Such collections of historical material were planned for the various fields of

science, and doxographies 2 in philosophy arose in this way side by side with

histories of particular disciplines, such as mathematics, astronomy, physics, etc.

As inclination and power for independent philosophic thought later declined,

this literature degenerated into a learned scrap-book work, in which were mingled

anecdotes from the lives of the philosophers, individual epigrammatic sayings,

and sketches of their doctrines.

Those expositions belonging to the modern period which were based upon

the remains of ancient tradition had this same character of collections of curiosi

ties. Such were Stanley s 3 reproduction of Diogenes Laertius, and Brucker s

works. 4 Only with time do we find critical discernment in use of the sources

(B thle,\* Fulleborn 6 ), a more unprejudiced apprehension of the historical

significance of individual doctrines (Tiedemann, Degerando 8 ), and systematic

criticism of these upon the basis of the new standpoint (Tennemann, 9 Fries, 10

and Schleiermacher 11 ).

It was, however, through Hegel 12 that the history of philosophy was first

made an independent science, for he discovered the essential point that the

1 E.g. in the beginning of the Metaphysics.

2 More in detail on these below.

3 Th. Stanley, The History of Philosophy. Lond. 1685.

4 J. J. Brucker, Historia Critica Philosophic. 5 vols. Leips. 1742ff. Insti-

tutiones Historian Philnsophice. Leips. 1747.

5 J. G. Buhle, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie. 8 vols. Gottingen,

179(5 ff.

6 G. G. Fiilleborn, Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie. 12 Studien.

Ziillichau, 1791 ff.

7 D. Tiedemann, Geist der Speculativen Philosophie. 7 vols. Marburg,

1791 ff.

8 De Gerando, Histoire Comparee des Systemes de Philosophie. 2d ed. in

4 vols. Paris, 1822f.

9 W. G. Temiemann, Geschichte der Philosophie. 11 vols. Leips. 1798 ff.

Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie fur den akademischen Unterricht.

Leips. 1812. [Eng. trans. 1833 and 1852.]

1[) J. Fr. Fries, Geschichte der Philosophie. 2 vols. Halle, 1837 ff.

" Fr. Schleiermacher, Geschichte der Philosophie, from his literary remains

in the Coll. Works. III. Abth., 4 Bd., 1 Th. Berlin, 1839.

12 Cf. the introductions of the Phanomenologie des Geistes, of the lectures on

the Philosophy of History, and those on the History of Philosophy. Ges. Werke,

Bd. II. pp. 62 ff.; IX. pp. 1 1 ff. ; XIII. pp. 11-134. In Hegel s works the Geschichte

der Philosophie, edited from his lectures by Michelet, occupies Vols. XIII. -XV.

Berlin, 1833-36. [Lectures on the History of Philosophy, by G. W. Hegel.

Trans, by E. S. Haldaue in 3 vols. Vol. 1. Lond. 1892.] On his standpoint

2.] The History of Philosophy. 11

history of philosophy can set forth neither a motley collection of opinions of

various learned gentleman " de omnibus rebus et de qnibusdam aZns," nor a

constantly widening and perfecting elaboration of the same subject-matter, but

rather only the limited process in which the "categories" of reason have suc

cessively attained distinct consciousness and reached the form of conceptions.

This valuable insight was, however, obscured and injured in the case of Hegel

by an additional asumption, since he was convinced that the chronological order

in which the above " categories " have presented themselves in the historical

systems of philosophy must necessarily correspond with the logical and syste

matic order in which these same categories should appear as "elements of

truth " in the logical construction of the final system of philosophy (i.e. in

Hegel s view, his own). The fundamental thought, right in itself, thus led to

the mistake of a construction of the history of philosophy under the control of a

philosophical system, and so to a frequent violation of historical fact. This

error, which the development of a scientific history of philosophy in the nine

teenth century has set aside in favour of historical accuracy and exactness, arose

from the wrong idea (though an idea in logical consistence with the principles of

Hegel s philosophy) that the historical progress of philosophical thought is due

solrly, or at least essentially, to an ideal necessity with which one "category"

pushes forward another in the dialectical movement. In truth, the picture of

the historical movement of philosophy is quite a different one. It depends not

solely upon the thinking of "humanity " or even of the " Weltyeist," but just

as truly upon the reflections, the needs of mind and heart, the presaging thought

and sudden flashes of insight, of philosophising individuals.

3. The history of philosophy, considered as such a sum-total, in

which the fundamental conceptions of man s views of the world and

judgments of life have been embodied, is the product of a great

variety of single movements of thought. And as the actual motives

of these movements, various factors are to be distinguished, both in

the setting of the problems and in the attempts at their logical

solution.

The logical, pragmatic factor is no doubt sufficiently important.

For the problems of philosophy are in the main given, and this is

shown by the fact that they are constantly recurring in the histor

ical movement of thought as the " primeval enigma of existence,"

and are ever anew demanding imperiously the solution which has

never completely succeeded. They are given, however, by the

inadequacy and internal contradictions of the material which con

sciousness presents for philosophical consideration. 1 But just for

stand G. O. Marbach, Lehrbuch der Geschichte Philosophic (2. Abth. Leips.

1838 ff.), C. Hermann, Geschichte der Philosophic in praymatischer Behandlung

(Leips. 1867), and in part also the survey of the entire history of philosophy

which J. Braniss has published as the first (only) volume of a Geschichte der

Philosophie seit Kant (Breslau, 1842). In France this line is represented by V.

Cousin, Introduction a VHistoire de la Philosophie (Paris, 1828 ; 7th ed. 1872) ;

Histoire Generals de la Philosophie (12th ed., Paris, 1884).

1 More precisely, this inadequacy, which cannot here be more exactly devel

oped, and which can be fully brought out only in a system of epistemology,

consists in the circumstance that that which is given in experience never meets

completely the conceptional demands which, in elaborating the same according

to the inner nature of the reason, we set up, at first naively and immediately,

and later with reflective consciousness. This antinomism (or failure to meet

the laws of thought) can be escaped by ordinary life, or even by experiential

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this reason this material contains the real presuppositions and the

logical constraining forces for all rational reflection upon it, and

because from the nature of the case these are always asserting

themselves anew in the same way, it follows that not only the chief

problems in the history of philosophy, but also the chief lines along

which a solution is attempted, are repeated. Just this constancy

in all change, which, regarded from without, makes the impression

that philosophy is striving fruitlessly in ever-repeated circles for

a goal that is never attained, proves only this, that the problems

of philosophy are tasks which the human mind cannot escape. 1

And so we understand how the same logical necessity in repeated

instances causes one doctrine to give birth to another. Hence prog

ress in the history of philosophy is, during certain periods, to be

understood entirely pragmatically, i.e. through the internal necessity

of the thoughts and through the " logic of things."

The mistake of Hegel s mentioned above, consists, then, only in his wishing to

make of a factor wliich is effective within certain limits, the only, or at least

the principal, factor. It would be the opposite error to deny absolutely the

"reason in history," and to see in the successive doctrines of philosophy only

confused chance- thoughts of individuals. It is rather true that the total content

of the history of philosophy can be explained only through the fact that the

necessities existing in the nature of things assert themselves over and over in

the thinking of individuals, however accidental the special conditions of this

latter may be. On these relations rest the attempts made to classify all philo

sophical doctrines under certain types, and to establish a sort of rhythmical

repetition in their historical development. On this basis V. Cousin 2 brought

forward his theory of the four systems, Idealism, Sensualism, Scepticism, Mys

ticism ; so too August Comte 3 his of the three stages, the theological, the meta

physical, and the positive. An interesting and in many ways instructive

grouping of philosophical doctrines about the particular main problems is

afforded by A. Renouvier in his Esquisse d une Classification Systematique

des Doctrines Philosophiques (2 vols., Paris, 1885 f.). \*A school-book which

arranges the philosophical doctrines according to problems and schools has been

issued by Paul Janet and Seailles ; Histoire de la Philosophic ; les problemes et

les ecoles (Paris, 1887).

4. But the pragmatic thread very often breaks off in the history

of philosophy. The historical order in particular, in which prob

lems have presented themselves, shows almost a complete absence

science, by working with auxiliary conceptions, which indeed remain problem

atical in themselves, but which, within certain bounds, suffice for an elaboration

of the material of experience that meets our practical needs. But it is just in

these auxiliary conceptions that the problems of philosophy inhere.

1 In this way the results of Kant s investigations on " The Antinomy of Pure

Reason " ( Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Dialectic, second sec.) might

be historically and systematically extended ; cf. W. Windelband, Geschichte der

neueren Philosophic, II. 95 f.

2 Cf. Note 12, p. 10.

3 A. Comte, Cours de Philosophic Positive I. 9, with which Vols. V. and VI.

are to be compared as the carrying out of the scheme. Similar thoughts are

also found in D Alembert s Discours Preliminaire in the Encyclopedic.

$2.] The History of Philosophy. U

of such an immanent logical necessity. Here, on the contrary,

another factor asserts itself which may best be designated as the

factor contributed by the history of civilisation. For philosophy

receives both its problems and the materials for their solution from

the ideas of the general consciousness of the time, and from the

needs of society. The great conquests and the newly emerging

questions of the special sciences, the movements of the religious

consciousness, the intuitions of art, the revolutions in social and

political life, all these give philosophy new impulses at irregular

intervals, and condition the directions of the interest which forces,

now these, now those, problems into the foreground, and crowds

others for the time being aside ; and no less do they condition also

the changes which questions and answers experience in course of

time. Where this dependence shows itself with especial clearness,

we have under certain circumstances a philosophical system appear

ing, that represents exactly the knowledge which a definite age has

of itself ; or we may have the oppositions in the general culture of

the age finding their expression in the strife of philosophical sys

tems. And so besides the constant dependence upon the essential

character of the subject-matter the pragmatic factor there pre-,

vails also a necessity growing out of the history of civilisation, or

current state of culture, which warrants a historical right of exist

ence to structures of thought in themselves untenable.

This relation also was first brought to notice in a greater degree than before

by Hegel, although the "relative truth" which he ascribes to the particular

systems has with him at the same time a systematic meaning, owing to his

dialectical fundamental thought. On the other hand, the element due to the

history of civilisation has been best formulated among his successors by Kuno

Fischer, 1 who has also availed himself of it in most brilliant manner in his expo

sition of the subject. He regards philosophy in its historical unfolding as the

progressive self-knowledge of the human mind, and makes its development

appear as constantly conditioned by the development of the object which in it

is attaining self-knowledge. Although this applies to a number of the most

important systems, it is yet but one of the factors involved.

The influences from the history of civilisation which condition the statement

and solution of philosophic problems, afford an explanation in most cases of an

extremely interesting phenomenon which is of great importance for understand

ing the historical development ; viz. the complication or interweaving of prob

lems. For when interest is directed chiefly on certain lines of thought, it is

inevitable, according to psychological laws, that associations will be formed

between different bodies of thought, associations which are not based on the

subject-matter, and so, that questions which in themselves have nothing to do

with each other become blended and made to depend upon each other in their

solution. An extremely important and very often recurring example of this is

the intermingling of ethical and aesthetic interests in the treatment of theoretical

problems. The well-known fact of daily life that men s views are determined

by their wishes, hopes, fears, and inclinations, that their theoretical are condi-

1 Kuno Fischer, Geschichte der neueren Philosophic, I. 1, Einleitung I.-V.

trans, by J. P. Gordy, Descartes and his School, N.Y. 1887].

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tioned by their ethical and aesthetic judgments ( Urtheile durch ihre Beurthei-

lungen), this fact is repeated on a larger scale in their views of the universe,

and has even been able to rise so high in philosophy that what had been pre

viously involuntarily practised, was proclaimed (by Kant) an epistemological

postulate.

5. Meanwhile the historical process we are tracing owes all its

variety and multiplicity of forms to the circumstance that the de

velopment of ideas and the formulation of general beliefs into

abstract conceptions are accomplished only through the thinking

of individual personalities, who, though rooted ever so deeply with

their thought in the logical connection and prevalent ideas of a

historical period, always add a particular element by their own

individuality and conduct of life. This individual factor in the

development of the history of philosophy deserves so great atten

tion for the reason that those who have borne the leading part in

the movement have shown themselves to be marked, independent

personalities, whose peculiar nature has been a determining in

fluence, not merely for the selection and combination of problems,

but also for working out the conceptions to furnish solutions, both

in their own doctrines and in those of their successors. That history

is the kingdom of individualities, of details which are not to be

repeated and which have value in themselves, is shown also in the

history of philosophy : here, too, great personalities have exercised

far-reaching and not exclusively beneficial influences.

It is clear that the above-mentioned complication of problems is brought

about by the subjective relations in which individual philosophers stand, in a

much greater degree than by the occasions presented in the general conscious

ness of a time, of a people, etc. There is no philosophical system that is free

from this influence of the personality of its founder. Hence all philosophical

systems are creations of individuality, presenting in this respect a certain re

semblance with works of art, and as such are to be understood from the point of

view of the personality of their founder. The elements of every philosopher s

Weltanschauung grow out of the problems of reality which are ever the same,

and out of the reason as it is directed to their solution, but besides this out of

the views and ideals of his people and his time ; the form and arrangement,

however, the connection and valuation which they find in the system, are condi

tioned by his birth and education, his activity and lot in life, his character and

his experience. Here, accordingly, the universality which belongs to the other

two factors is often wanting. In the case of these purely individual creations,

aesthetic charm must take the place of the worth of abiding knowledge, and the

impressiveness of many phenomena of the history of philosophy rests, in fact,

only upon the magic of their "poetry of ideas" (Begriffsdichtung).

In addition, then, to the complication of problems and to the ideas determined

by fancy and feeling, which are already enough to lead the general conscious

ness astray, there are in the case of individuals similar, but purely personal,

processes to lend to the formation and solution of problems still more the char

acter of artificiality. We cannot fail to recognise that philosophers have often

gone about struggling with questions which have no basis in reality, so that all

thought expended upon them was in vain, and that, on the other hand, even in

connection with the solution of real problems, unfortunate attempts in the a

priori construction of conceptions have slipped in, which have been hindrances

rather than helps toward the issue of the matter.

2.] The History of Philosophy. 15

The wonderful feature in the history of philosophy remains just this, that

out of such a multitude of individual and general complications there has yet

been on the whole laid down that outline of universally valid conceptions for

viewing the world and judging life, which presents the scientific significance of

this development.

6. Investigation in the histor;/ of philosophy has accordingly the

following tasks to accomplish: (1) To establish with precision what

may be derived from the available sources as to the circumstances

in life, the mental development, and the doctrines of individual

philosophers ; (2) from these facts to reconstruct the genetic pro

cess in such a way that in the case of every philosopher we may

understand how his doctrines depend in part upon those of his

predecessors, in part upon the general ideas of his time, and in part

upon his own nature and the course of his education ; (3) from

the consideration of the whole to estimate what value for the total

result of the history of philosophy belongs to the theories thus

established and explained as regards their origin.

With reference to the first two points, the history of philosophy

is a philologico-Jiistorical, with reference to the third element it is a

critico-ph ilosoph ical science.

(a) To establish its facts the history of philosophy must proceed to a careful

and comprehensive examination of the sources. These sources, however, vary

greatly at different times in their transparency and fulness.

The main sources for investigation in the history of philosophy are of course

the icorks of the philosophers themselves. For the modern period we stand

here upon a relatively safe footing. Since the discovery of the art of printing,

literary tradition has become so well established and clear that it offers in gen

eral no difficulties of any kind. The writings which philosophers have pub

lished since the Renaissance are throughout accessible for the research of

to-day. The cases in which questions of genuineness, of the time of origina

tion, etc., give rise to controversies are extremely seldom ; a philological criti

cism has here but a narrow field for activity, and where it can enter (as is the

case in part in reference to the different editions of Kant s works), it concerns

solely subordinate, and in the last instance indifferent, points. Here, too, we are

tolerably sure of the completeness of the material ; that anything of weight is

lost, or still to be expected from later publication, is scarcely to be assumed ; if

the sharpened philological attentiveness of the last decades has brought us new

material for Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Maine de Biran, the philosophical outcome

has been only vanishing in comparison with the value of what was already

known. At most it has concerned the question of supplementing our knowl

edge, and this must continue to be its province. The importance of occasional

expressions in letters has been specially felt here, for these are adapted to sh&lt; d

more light on the individual fa,ctor in the historical development of philosophy.

With the sources of the Medieval Philosophy the case stands less favourably.

These have in part (a small part, to be sure) still only a manuscript existence.

V. Cousin and his school have rendered valuable service in publishing the

texts, and in general we may be convinced that for this period also we possess

material, which has indeed gaps, but is on the whole adequate for our purpose.

On the other hand, our knowledge of the Arabian and Jewish philosophy of the

Middle Ages, and so of the influence of those systems on the course of Western

Thought, is still very problematical in details ; and this is perhaps the gap most

sorely felt in our investigation of the sources for the history of philosophy.

Much worse still is the situation as regards the direct sources for Ancient

Philosophy. Of the original works, we have preserved, to be sure, the most

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important : the fundamental portion of the works of Plato and Aristotle, though

even these are often doubtful in form. Besides these we have only the writings

of later time, such as those of Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, the Church Fathers,

and the Neo-Platonists. By far the greater part of the philosophical writings

of antiquity is lost. In their stead we must content ourselves with the frag

ments which the accident of an incidental mention in the writings of extant

authors has kept for us, here too often in a questionable form. 1

If, nevertheless, success has been attained in gaining a view of the develop

ment of the ancient philosophy, clearer than that of the mediaeval, presenting a

picture whose accuracy extends even to details and is scientifically assured, this

is due not only to the unremitting pains of philologists and philosophers in

working through their material, but also to the circumstance that beside the

remains of the original works of the philosophers there are preserved also, as

secondary sources, remains of historical records made in antiquity. The best,

indeed, of these also is lost: namely, the historical works which arose from the

learned collection made by the Peripatetic and Stoic schools at the end of the

fourth and in the third century B.C. These works passed later through many

hands before they were preserved for us in the extant compilations prepared in

the Roman period, as in the Placita Philosophorum,\* going by the name of

Plutarch, in the writings of Sextus Empiricus, 8 in the Deipnosophistce of Athe-

nseus, 4 in the treatise of Diogenes Laertius, irepl /StW Soy/j.d.rwv KO.I diroOeyndruv

TU&gt;V ti&gt; &lt;t&gt;i\off&lt;Ht&gt;l$ ev8oKifj.rjffdi&gt;Tui&gt;, 5 in the collections of the Church Fathers, and

in the notes of the Commentators of the latest period, such as Alexander Aphro-

disias, Themistius, and Simplicius. H. Diels has given an excellent, and thor

ough treatment of these secondary sources of ancient philosophy, Dxographi

Grceci (Berlin, 1879).

Where the condition of the sources is so doubtful as is the case over the

entire field of ancient philosophy, critical ascertainment of the facts must go

hand in hand with examination of the pragmatic and genetic connection. For

where the transmission of the material is itself doubtful we can reach a decision

only by taking a view of the connection that shall accord with reason and

psychological experience. In these cases it becomes the task of the history of

philosophy as of all history, after establishing a base of operations in that which

is assured by the sources, to proceed to ascertain its position in those regions

with which tradition finds itself no longer directly and surely in touch. The

historical study of philosophy in the nineteenth century may boast that it has

fulfilled this task, to which it was stimulated by Schleiermacher, by the labours

of H. Hitter, who.se Geschi&lt;-hte der Philosophic (12vols., Hamburg, 1829-53) is

now, to be sure, antiquated, Brandis and Zeller for the ancient philosophy ;

and of J. E. Erdmann and Kuno Fischer for the modern. Among the many

complete expositions of the history of philosophy by far the most trustworthy

in these respects is J. 5. Erdmann s Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophic,

2 vols. (3d ed.), Berlin, 1878 ; [Erdmann s History of Philosophy, trans, ed. by

W. S. Hough, Loud, and N.Y., 1890].

An excellent bibliography of the entire history of philosophy, assembling the

literature in exhaustive completeness and good arrangement, is to be found in

Ueberweg s Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, 4 vols., 8th ed., ed. by

M. Heinze (Berlin, 1894-98). [Ueberweg s History of Philosophy, trans, from

the 4th ed. by G. S. Morris (N. Y. 1871), contains additions, but of course does not

1 The collections of fragments of particular authors are mentioned under the

notices of the individual philosophers. It would be desirable if they were all as

excellent as Usener s Epicurea. Of the fragments of the Pre-Socratics W. F.

A. Mullach has published a careful collection, which, however, is no longer

adequate in the present condition of research (Fragmenta Philosophorum

Grcecorum) .

2 Plut. Moralia, ed. Dubner, Paris, 1841 ; Diels, Dox., pp. 272 ff. ; [Plutarch s

Morals, Miscellanies, and Essays, ed. by Goodwin, Boston, 1870 ; trans, also in

the Bohn Lib.].

Ed. Bekker, Berlin, 1847.

4 G. Kaibel, Leips. 1888-90.

6 Ed. Cobet, Paris, 1850.

2.] The History of Philosophy. 17

give the bibliography of recent works.] Under the general literature may also

be mentioned, R. Eucken, Die Lebensanschauunf/en tier qrossen Denker (Leips.

1890).

(6) Explanation of facts in the history of philosophy is either pragmatic (logi

cal), or based on the history of civilisation, or psychological, corresponding to the

three factors which we have set forth above as determining the movement of

thought. Which of these three modes of explanation is to be applied in individ

ual cases depends solely upon the state of the facts with regard to the trans

mission of material. It is then incorrect to make either one the sole principle

of treatment. The pragmatic method of explanation is dominant with those

who see in the entire history of philosophy the preparation for a definite system

of philosophy ; so with Hegel and his disciples (see above, p. 10 f. ); so from a

Herbartian standpoint with Chr. A. Thilo, Kurze pragmatische (Jesc.hichte der

Philosophic, (2 pts. ; Coethen, 1876-80). Kuno Fischer and W. Windelband

have emphasised in their interpretation of modern philosophy, the importance

of considering the history of civilisation and the problems of the individual

sciences.

The purely biographical treatr c \-nt which deals only with successive person

alities is quite inadequate as a scientific exposition or the history of philosophy.

This mode of treatment is represented in recent time by the treatise of G. H.

Lewes, The History of Philosophy from Thale.s to the Present Day (2 vols.,

Lond. 1871), a book destitute of all historical apprehension, and at the same

time a party composition in the spirit of the Positivism of Comte. The works

of the French historians (Damiron, Ferraz) are inclined to take this form of

a separate essay-like treatment of individual philosophers, not losing from sight,

however, the course of development of the whole. 1

(c) The most difficult task is to establish the principles according to which the

critical philosophical estimate of the individual doctrines must be made up.

The history of philosophy, like all history, is a critical science ; its duty is not

only to record and explain, but also to estimate what is to ccunt as progress

and fruit in the historical movement, when we have succeeded in knowing and

understanding this. There is no history without this critical point of view, and

the evidence of a historian s maturity is that he is clearly conscious of this point

of view of criticism ; for where this is not the case he proceeds in the selection

of his material and in his characterisation of details only instinctively and

without a clear standard. ^

It is understood, of course, that the standard of critical judgment must not be

a private theory of the historian, nor even his philosophic conviction ; at least

the employment of such a standard deprives the criticism exercised in accord

ance with it of the value of scientific universality. He who is given to the

belief that he possesses the sole philosophical truth, or who comes to this field

imbued with the customs of the special sciences in which, no doubt, a sure result

makes it a very simple 3 matter to estimate the attempts which have led to it,

such a one may well be tempted to stretch all forms that pass before him upon

the Procrustes-bed of his system ; but he who contemplates the work of thought

in history, with an open historical vision, will be restrained by a respectful

reverence from reprimanding the heroes of philosophy for their ignorance of the

wisdom of an epigone. 4

1 A. Weber, History of Philosophy, is to be recommended as a good text-book

(5th French ed., Paris, 1891). [Eng. tr. by Thilly, N.Y. 1896.]

2 This applies in every domain of history, in the history of politics and of

literature, as well as in that of philosophy.

8 As an example of this it may be noticed that the deserving author of an

excellent History of the Principles of Mechanics, Ed. Duhring, has developed

in his Kritische Geschichte der Philosophic (3d ed., Berlin, 1878) all the caprice

of a one-sided judgment. The like is true of the confessional criticism passed

by A. Stockl, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophic (2 vols., 3d ed., Mainz,

1889).

4 It is impossible to protest enough against the youthful conceit with which

it was for a time the fashion in Germany to look down with ridicule or insult

from the " achievements of the present " upon the great men of Greek and Ger-

18 Introduction .

In contrast with this external method of pronouncing sentence, the scientific

history of philosophy must place itself upon the standpoint of immanent criti

cism, the principles of which are two : formal logical consistency and intellectual fruitfulness.

Every philosopher grows into a certain set of ideas, and to these his thinking

remains bound, and is subjected in its development to psychological necessity.

Critical investigation has to settle how far it has been possible for him to bring

the different elements of his thinking into agreement with each other. The

contradiction is almost never actually present in so direct a form that the same

thing is expressly maintained and also denied, but always in such a way that

various positions are put forward which, only by virtue of their logical conse

quences, lead to direct contradiction and really irreconcilable results. The dis

covery of these discrepancies is formal criticism ; it frequently coincides with

pragmatic explanation, for this formal criticism has been performed in history

itself by the successors of the philosopher in question, and has thus determined for them their problems.

Yet this point of view alone is not sufficient. As purely formal it applies

without exception to all attested views of a philosopher, but it gives no criterion

for decision on the question, in what the philosophical significance of a doctrine

really consists. For it is often the case that philosophy has done its work just

in conceptions which must by no means be regarded as in themselves perfect

or free from contradiction ; while a multitude of individual convictions, which

there is no occasion to oppose, must remain unnoticed in a corner, so far as our

historical survey is concerned. In the history of philosophy great errors are

weightier than small truths.

For before all else the decisive question is : what has yielded a contribution to

the development of man s conception of the universe and estimate of life? In

the history of philosophy those structures of thought are the objects of study

which have maintained themselves permanent and living as forms of apprehen

sion and norms of judgment, and in which the abiding inner structure of the

human mind has thus come to clear recognition.

This is then the standard, according to which alone we can decide also which

among the doctrines of the philosophers concerning, as they often do, so

many various things are to be regarded as properly philosophical, and which,

on the other hand, are to be excluded from the history of philosophy. Investi

gation of the sources has of course the duty of gathering carefully and com

pletely all the doctrines of philosophers, and so of affording all the material for

explaining their genesis, whether from their logical content, or from the history

of civilisation, or from psychological grounds ; but the purpose of this laborious

work is yet only this, that the philosophically indifferent may be ultimately

recognised as such, and the ballast then thrown overboard.

It" is especially true that this point of view must essentially determine selec

tion and presentation of material in a text-book, which is not to give the investi

gation itself, but to gather up its results.

3. Division of Philosophy and of its History.

It cannot be our purpose here to propose a systematic division of

philosophy, for this could in no case possess universal validity his

torically. The differences which prevail in the course of the histori

cal development, in determining the conception, the task, and the

subject-matter of philosophy, involve so necessarily and obviously a

change also in the divisions, that this needs no especial illustration.

The oldest philosophy knew no division at all. In later antiquity

man philosophy ; this was mainly the haughtiness of an ignorance which had

no suspicion that it was ultimately living only by the thoughts of those whom it

was abusing and despising.

### 3.] Division of Philosophy and of its History. 19

a division of philosophy into logic, physics, and ethics was cur

rent. In the Middle Ages, and still more in modern times, the

first two of these subjects were often comprised under the title,

theoretical philosophy, and set over against practical philosophy.

Since Kant a new threefold division into logical, ethical, and

sesthetical philosophy is beginning to make its way, yet these

various divisions are too much dependent upon the actual course

of philosophy itself to make it worth our while to recount them

here in detail.

On the other hand, it does commend itself to preface the historical

exposition with at least a brief survey of the entire circuit of those

problems which have always formed the subject of philosophy, how

ever varied the extent to which they have been studied or the value

that has been attached to them, a survey, therefore, for which no

claim is made to validity from a systematic point of view, but which

is determined only by the purpose of preliminary orientation.

1. Theoretical problems. Such we call those which refer, in part to

our knowledge of the actual world, in part to an investigation of the

knowing process itself. In dealing with the former class, however,

the general questions which concern the actual taken as a whole are

distinguished from those which deal with single provinces of the

actual. The former, viz. the highest principles for explaining the

universe, and the general view of the universe based on these prin

ciples, form the problem of metaphysics, called by Aristotle first, i.e.

fundamental, science, and designated by the name now usual, only on

account of the position which it had in the ancient collection of the

Aristotelian works " after physics." On account of his monothe

istic view of the world, Aristotle also called this branch of knowl

edge theology. Later writers have also treated rational or natural

theology as a branch of metaphysics.

The special provinces of the actual are Nature and History. In

the former, external and internal nature are to be distinguished.

The problems presented to knowledge by external nature are called

cosmological, or, specially, problems of natural philosophy, or perhaps

physical. The investigation of internal nature, i.e. of consciousness

and its states and activities, is the business of psychology. The phil

osophical consideration of history remains within the borders of

theoretical philosophy only if it be limited to the investigation of

the laws that prevail in the historical life of peoples ; since, how

ever, history is the realm of man s purposeful actions, the questions

of the philosophy of history, so far as this deals with the end of the

movement of history viewed as a whole, and with the fulfilment of

this end, fall under the head of practical problems.

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Investigation directed upon knowledge itself is called logic (in

the general sense of the word), and also sometimes noetic. If we

are occupied with the question how knowledge actually arises, this

psycho-genetic consideration falls in the province of psychology. If,

on the other hand, we set up norms or standards according to which

our ideas are estimated as regards their worth for truth, we call

these logical laws, and designate investigation directed upon them

as logic in the narrower sense. The application of these laws gives

rise to methodology, which develops the prescriptions for a systematic

ordering of scientific activity with reference to the various ends of

knowledge. The problems, finally, which arise from the questions

concerning the range and limit of man s knowing faculty and its

relation to the reality to be known, form the subject-matter of

epistemology or theory of knowledge.

H. Siebeck, Geschichte dcr Psyrhologie, Vol. L, in two parts (Gotha, 1880-84),

incomplete, extending into the scholastic period.

K. Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, 4 vols. (Leips. 1855-70),

brought down only to the Renaissance.

Fr. Harms, Die Philosophic in ihrer Geschichte. I. "Psychologic"; II.

"Logik" (Berlin, 1877 and 1881).

[K. Adamson, The History of Psychology (in prep.).]

2. Practical problems are, in general, those which grow out of the

investigation of man s activity, so far as it is determined by ends.

Here, too, a psycho-genetic treatment is possible, which falls under

psychology. That discipline, on the other hand, which considers

man s action from the point of view of the ethical norm or stand

ard, is ethics or moral philosophy. By morals (Moral) in the narrower

sense is usually understood the proposal and grounding of ethical

precepts. Since, however, all ethical action has reference to the

community, there are attached to morals or ethics, in the narrower

sense, the philosophy of society (for which the unfortunate name

sociology seems likely to become permanent), and the philosophy of

law or right. Further, in so far as the ideal of human society con

stitutes the ultimate meaning of history, the philosophy of history

appears also in this connection, as already mentioned.

To practical problems, in the broadest sense of the word, belong

also those which relate to art and religion. To designate philosoph

ical investigation of the nature of the beautiful and of art, the name

(Esthetics has been introduced since the end of last century. If phi

losophy takes the religious life for its object, not in the sense of

itself intending to give a science of the nature of the deity, but in

the sense of an investigation with regard to man s religious behaviour,

we call this discipline philosophy of religion.

tJ.J Division of Philosophy and of its History. 21

Fr. Schleiermacher, Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisheriyen Sittenlehre (col

lected works, III., Vol. I., Berlin, 1834). L. v. Henning, Die Principle\*, der

Ethik in historischer Entwickluny (Berlin, 1825). Fr. v. liaumer, Die ye-

schichtliche Entirickluny der Beyriffe von Staat, Recht, und Politik (Leips., od

ed., 18(51). E. Feuerlein, Die philos. Sittenlehre in ihren yeschichtlichen Haitpt-

formen (2 vols., Tubingen, 1857-59). P. Janet, Histoire de la philosophic

morale et politique (Paris, 1858). \V. Whewell, History of Moral Science

(Edinburg, 1868). H. Sidgwick, Th? Method\* &lt;&gt;f Ethics, 4th ed. (Lond. and

N.Y. 1890). [Outlines of the History nf Ethics, by same author (Lond. and

N.Y., 3d ed., 1892). J. Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory (2d ed., Oxford

and N.Y. 1886).] Th. Ziegler, Geschichte der Ethik, 2 vols. (the third not yet

appeared; Strassburg, 1881-8&lt;$). K. Kostlin. Geschichte der Ethik (only the

beginning, 1 vol., Tubingen, 1887). [J. Bonar, Philosophy and Economics in

their Historical Relations (Lond. and N.Y. 1893). 1). G. Ritchie, The History

of Political Philosophy (in prep.).]

K. Ziminennann, Geschichte der Aesthetik (Vienna, 1858). M. Schasler,

Kritische. Geschichte der Aesthetik (Berlin, 1871). [B. Bosanquet, The History

of ^Esthetics (Lond. and N.Y. 1892). W. Knight, The Philosophy of the B&lt;au-

tiful (an outline of the history, Edin. and N.Y. 1891). Gay ley and Scott, A

Guide to the Literature of ^Esthetics, Univ. of California, and Introd. to the

Methods and Materials of Literary Criticism (Bost. 1899) have bibliographies.]

J. Berger, Geschichte der Religionsphilosophie (Berlin, 1800). [Piinjer,

History of the Christian Philosophy of Reliyion (Vol. I., Edin. and N.Y. 1887)

O. Pfleiderer, The Philosophy of Religion, trans, by Menzies (Lond. 1887). Mar

tineau, A Study of Religion (2 vols., 1888), and Seat of Authority in Religion.

1890). J. Caird, Introd. to the Philos. of Reliyion (1880). E. Caird, Evolu

tion of Reliyion (2 vols., Lond. and N.Y. 1893).]

The division of the history of philosophy is usually connected with

that current for political history, so as to distinguish three great

periods, Ancient, Mediaeval, and Modern Philosophy. Yet the

sections made in this way are not so favourable for the history of

philosophy as they perhaps are for political history. Other points

of division must be made, equally important as regards the nature

of the development ; and, on the other hand, the transition between

the Middle Ages and modern times demands a shifting of the point

of division on either side.

In consequence of this, the entire history of philosophy will here

be treated according to the following plan of division, in a manner

to be more exactly illustrated and justified in detail by the exposi

tion itself :

(1) Tfie Philosophy of the Greeks: from the beginnings of

scientific thought to the death of Aristotle, from about 600 to

322 B.C.

(2) Hellenistic-Roman Philosophy: from the death of Aristotle

to the passing away of Neo-Platonism, from 322 B.C. to about

500 A.D.

(3) Mediaeval Philosophy : from Augustine to Nicolaus Cusanus,

from the fifth to the fifteenth century.

(4) The Philosophy of the Renaissance : from the fifteenth to the

seventeenth century.

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(5) The Philosophy of the Enlightenment: from Locke to the

death of Lessing, 1689-1781.

(6) The German Philosophy : from Kant to Hegel and Herbart,

1781-1820.

(7) The Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century.

# PART I. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS.

Chr. A. Brandis, Handbuch der Geschichte der griechisch-romischen Philosophic.

3 pts. in 6 vols. Berlin, 1835-66.

Same author, Geschichte der Entwickelungen der griechischen Philosophic und

Hirer Nachwirkungen im romischen Rciche. 2 pts. Berlin, 1862-66.

Ed. Zeller, Die Philosophic der Griechen. 3 pts. in 5 vols. 1st vol. in 5th,

2 vol. in 4th, 3-5 vols. in 3d ed. Leips. 1879-93. [Trans., with the excep

tion of the portion on the concluding religious period, as six works: Pre-

Socratic Philosophy (2 vols.), Socrates and the Socratic Schools, Plato and

the Older Academy, Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics (2 vols.), Stoics,

Epicureans, and Sceptics, History of Eclecticism, chiefly by S.F. Alleyne and

O. J. Reichel. Lond. and N.Y., Longmans.]

A. Schwegler, Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie. Ed. by K. Kostlin. 3d

ed. Freiburg, 1882.

L. Striimpell, Die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie. 2 pts. Leips.

1854-61.

W. Windelband, Geschichte der alten Philosophie. 2d ed. Munich, 1894.

[History of Ancient Philosophy, trans, by H. E. Cushman, N.Y., 1899. J

Hitter et Preller, Hixtoria philosophies grcKco-romanoK (Grcecce). In 8th ed.

Edited by Wellman. Gotha, 1898. An excellent collection of the most

important sources.

[A. W. Benn, The Greek Philosophers. 2 vols. Lond., 1883. The Philoso

phy of Greece. Lond. 1898.]

Th. Gomperz, Griechische Denker. Vienna, 1897. [Trans, by L. Magnus.

Greek Thinkers. Lond. and N.Y., 1900.]

IF by science we understand that independent and self-conscious

work of intelligence which seeks knowledge methodically for its

own sake, then it is among the Greeks, and the Greeks of the sixth

century B.C., that we first find such a science, aside from some

tendencies among the peoples of the Orient, those of China and

India 1 particularly, only recently disclosed. The great civilised

1 Even if it be conceded that the beginnings of moral philosophy among the

Chinese rise above moralising, and especially those of logic in India above inci

dental reflections on the scientific formation of conceptions, on which we shall

not here pronounce, these remain so remote from the course of European

philosophy, which forms a complete unity in itself, that a text-book has no

occasion to enter upon them. The literature is brought together in Ueber-

weg, I. 6.

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24 The Philosophy of the Greeks.

peoples of earlier antiquity were not, indeed, wanting either in an

abundance of information on single subjects, or in general views of

the universe ; but as the former was gained in connection with prac

tical needs, and the latter grew out of mythical fancy, so they

remained under the control, partly of daily need, partly of religious

poetry ; and, as was natural in consequence of the peculiar restraint

of the Oriental mind, they lacked, for their fruitful and independent

development, the initiative activity of individuals.

Among the Greeks, also, similar relations existed until, at the time

mentioned, the mighty upward movement of the national life unfet

tered the mental powers of- this most gifted of all peoples. For this

result the democratic development of constitutions which in passion

ate party struggle tended to bring out independence of individual

opinions and judgments, and to develop the significance of person

ality, proved even more favourable than the refinement and spiritual-

isation of life which increasing wealth of trade brought with it.

The more the luxuriant development of individualism loosened the

old bonds of the common consciousness, of faith, and of morals, and

threatened the youthful civilisation of Greece with the danger of

anarchy, the more pressing did individual men, prominent by their

position in life, their insight, and their character, find the duty

of recovering in their own reflection the measure that was becoming

lost. This ethical reflection found its representatives in the lyric

and gnomic poets, especially, however, in the so-called seven wise men. 1

It could not fail to occur, also, that a similar movement, in which

individual opinions asserted their independence, should trench upon

the religious life already so varied, in which the opposition between

the old mystery-cults and the aesthetic national mythology stimu

lated the formation of so many special types. 2 Already in the cos-

mogonic poetry the poet had dared to portray the heaven of the

myths according to his own individual fancy ; the age of the seven

sages began to read its ethical ideals into the gods of the Homeric

poetry, and in the ethico-religious reformation attempted by Pythag

oras, 3 coming as it did in the outer form of a return to the old strict

ness of life, the new content which life had gained came all the more

clearly to view.

1 The "seven sages," among whom Thales, Bias, Pittacus, and Solon are

usually named, while with regard to the rest tradition is not agreed, must not,

with the exception of Thales, be regarded as representatives of science. Diog.

Laert. I. 40 ; Plato, Protag. 343.

2 Cf. E. Rohde (Psyche, 2d ed., 1897) for the influence of religious ideas.

3 Phcrecydcs of Syrus is to be regarded as the most important of these cos-

mogonic poets ; he wrote in prose at the time of the first philosophies, but his

mode of thought .is still mythical throughout, not scientific. Fragments of his

writings collected by Sturz (Leips. 1834).

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From such conditions of fermentation the science of the Greeks

to which they gave the name philosophy was born. The independ

ent reflection of individuals, aided by the fluctuations of religious

fancy, extended itself from the questions of practical life to the

knowledge of Nature, and there first won that freedom from exter

nal ends, that limitation of knowledge to itself, which constitutes

the essence of science.

All these processes, however, took place principally in the outly

ing parts of Greek civilisation, in the colonies, which were in advance

of the so-called Mother-country in mental as in material develop

ment. In Ionia, in Magna Graecia, in Thrace, stood the cradles of

science. It was only after Athens in the Persian wars had assumed

together with the political hegemony the mental as well, which she

was to keep so much longer than the former, that Attic soil, conse

crated to all the muses, attracted science also. Its advent was at

the time of the Sophists ; it found its completion in the doctrine

and school of Aristotle.

It was in connection with the disinterested consideration of

Nature that reflection first rose to the scientific construction of

conceptions. The result of this was that Greek science devoted all

the freshness of youthful joy and knowledge primarily to the prob

lems of Nature, and in this work stamped out fundamental concep

tions, or Forms of thought, for apprehending the external world. In

order to turn the look of philosophy inward and make human action

the object of its study, there was first need, for one thing, of subse

quent reflection upon what had, and what had not, been, accomplished

by this study of Nature, and, for another thing, of the imperious

demands made by public life on science now so far matured as to be

a social factor. The effect of this change might for a time seem to

be to check the pure zeal for research which had marked the begin

nings, but after positive results had been reached in the field of the

knowledge of man s inner nature this same zeal developed all the

more vigorously, and led to the construction of those great systems

with which purely Greek philosophy reached its consummation.

The philosophy of the Greeks divides, therefore, into three periods :

a cosmological, which extends from about 600 to about 450 B.C. ; an

anthropological, which fills out about the second half of the fifth

century B.C. (450-400) ; and a systematic, which contains the

development of the three great systems of Greek science, those of

Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle (400-322).

The philosophy of the Greeks forms the most instructive part of the whole

history of philosophy from a theoretical point of view, not only because the

fundamental conceptions created in it have become the permanent foundations

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for all further development of thought, and promise to remain such, but also

because in it the formal presuppositions contained in the postulates of the

thinking Keason itself, attained sharp formulation as set over against the mate

rial of knowledge, which, especially at the beginning, was still relatively small

in amount. In this the Greek philosophy has its typical value and its didactic

importance.

These advantages appear already in the transparency and simplicity of the

entire development, which enable us to see the inquiring mind at first turned

outward, then thrown back upon itself, and from this point of view returning

to a deeper apprehension of reality as a whole.

There is, therefore, scarcely any controversy with regard to this course of

the general development of Greek philosophy, though different expositions have

located the divisions between the periods at different points. Whether Socrates

is made to begin a new period, or is placed together with the Sophists in the

period of Greek Enlightenment, depends ultimately only on whether the result

(negative or positive), or the object-matter of the philosophising, is regarded as

of decisive importance. That, however, Democritus must in any case be sepa

rated from the " Pre-Socratics " and assigned to the great systematic period

of Greek Philosophy, has been proved by the Author in his survey of the

History of Ancient Philosophy, ch. V., and the objections which the innovation

has encountered have not sufficed to convince him of any mistake.

## CHAPTER I. THE COSMOLOGICAL PERIOD.

S. A. Byk, Die vorsokratische Philosophic der Griechen in ihrer organischen

Gliederung. 2 Parts. Leips. 1875-77.

[J. Biirnet, Early Greek Philosophy. Lond. 1892.]

THE immediate background for the beginnings of Greek philoso

phy was formed by the cosmogonic poetry, which aimed to present

in mythical garb the story of the prehistoric ages of the given

world, and so, in the form of narratives of the origination of the

universe, made use of prevailing ideas as to the constant mutations

of things. The more freely individual views developed in this pro

cess, the more the time factor in the myth retreated in favour of the

emphasising of these abiding relations; and the question finally

emerged : " What is then the original ground of things, which out

lasts all temporal change, and how does it change itself into these

particular things, or change these things back into itself ? "

The solution of this question was first attempted in the sixth

century by the Milesian School of natural philosophy, of which

Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes are known to us as the

three chief representatives. Information of many kinds, which had

long been publicly accumulating in the practical experience of the

sea-faring lonians, stood at their disposal, as well as many true

observations, often of an acute sort. They kept in touch, also, no

doubt, with the experience of the Oriental peoples, especially the

Egyptians, with whom they stood in so close relation. 1 Knowledge

from these various sources was brought together with youthful zeal.

The chief interest fell upon physical questions, particularly upon

1 The influence of the Orient upon the beginnings of Greek philosophy has

been overestimated by Glabisch (Die Religion und die Philosophic in ihrer

weltgeschichtlichen Entwicklung, Breslau, 1852) and Roth (Geschichte unserer

abendldndischen Philosophic, 2 Vols., Mannheim, 1858 ff.). In the case of

information upon particular fields such influence is certainly to be recognised ;

on the other hand, the scientific conceptions are throughout independent works

of Greek thought.

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the great elementary phenomena, to explain which many hypotheses

were thought out. Besides this, interest turned chiefly to geo

graphical and astronomical problems, such as the form of the earth,

its relation to the sidereal heavens, the nature of the sun, moon,

and planets, and the manner and cause of their motion. On the

other hand, there are but feeble indications of a zeal for knowledge

applied to the organic world and man.

Such were the objects of experience studied by the first "philosophy." It

stood quite far removed from medical science, which, to be sure, was limited to

technical information and proficiency in the art, and was handed down as a

secret doctrine, guarded in priest-like fashion in orders and schools, such as

those of Rhodes, Gyrene, Crotona, Cos, and Cnidus. Ancient medicine, which

aimed expressly to be an art and not a science (so Hippocrates), came into

contact with philosophy when this was an all-embracing science, only at a late

period and quite transiently. Cf. Haser, Lehrbuch dcr Geschichte der Medicin,

I. (2d ed., Jena, 1875).

So also the beginnings of mathematics go along independently beside those of

ancient philosophy. The propositions ascribed to the Milesians make the im

pression of individual pieces of information picked up and put together, rather

than of results of genuine research, and are quite out of relation with their

doctrines in natural science and philosophy. In the circles of the Pythagoreans,

also, mathematical studies were at first evidently pursued for their own sake, to

be drawn all the more vigorously into the treatment of general problems. Cf.

G. Cantor, Geschichte der Mathematik, I. (Leips. 1880).

The efforts of the Milesians to determine the nature of the one

world-ground had already in the case of Anaximander led beyond

experience to the construction of a metaphysical conception to be

used for explanation, viz. the Sjrupov, and thereby drew science away

from the investigation of facts to the consideration of conceptions.

While Xenophanes, the founder of the Eleatic School, drew the con

sequences which result for the religious consciousness from the

philosophical conception of the unity of the world, Heraditus, in

hard struggle with ideas that were obscure and religiously coloured,

analysed destructively the presupposition of an abiding substance,

and allowed only a law of change to stand as ultimate content of

knowledge. All the more sharply, on the other hand, did the Eleatic

School, in its great representative, Parmenides, shape out the con

ception of Being until it reached that regardless boldness of formu

lation which, in the following generation of the School, was defended

by Zeno, and softened down in some measure only by Melissus.

Very soon, however, a series of efforts appeared, which brought

anew into the foreground the interest in explanatory natural science

that had been thrust aside by this development of the first meta

physical antitheses. In behalf of this interest more comprehensive

efforts were made toward an enrichment of knowledge ; this time,

more than in the case of previous observations, questions and

hypotheses from the organic and physiological realms were kept in

CHAP. 1.] The Cosmological Period. 29

mind ; and the attempt was made to mediate with explanatory

theories between the opposing conceptions of Heraclitus and Par-

menides.

Out of these needs arose, about the middle of the fifth century,

side by side, and with many reciprocal relations, positive and polem

ical, the theories of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Leucippus, founder

of the Atomistic School of Abdera. The number of these theories

and their well-known dependence upon one another prove that in

spite of the distance by which individual men and schools found

themselves separated, there was already a great vigour in exchange

of thought and in literary activity. The picture of this life takes

on a much fuller form as we reflect that tradition, in sifting its

material, has obviously preserved only the memory of what was

most important, and that each of the names remaining known to

us indicates, in truth, an entire circle of scientific activity-

The Pythagoreans, during this same period, occupied a peculiar

position at one side. They also took up the metaphysical problem

given by the opposition between Heraclitus and the Eleatics, but

hoped to find its solution by the aid of mathematics, and, by their

theory of numbers, as whose first literary representative Philolaus is

known, added a number of most important factors to the further

movement of thought. The original purpose or tendency of their

league made itself felt in their doctrines, in that, in fixing these,

they conceded a considerable influence to considerations of (ethical

or aesthetic) worth. They indeed attempted a scientific treatment

of ethical questions as little as did the entire philosophy of this

period, but the cosmology which they based upon their astronomical

ideas, already widely developed with the help of mathematics, is

yet at the same time permeated by aesthetic and ethical motives.

Of the Milesian School only three names Thales, Anaximander, and An-

aximenes have been handed down to us. From this it appears that the school

flourished in what was then the Ionic capital during the entire sixth century,

and perished with the city itself, which was laid waste by the Persians in 494,

after the battle of Lade.

Thales, sprung from an old merchant family, is said to have predicted the

solar eclipse in 585, and survived the invasion of the Persians in the middle of

the sixth century. He had perhaps seen Kgypt, and was not deficient in mathe

matical and physical knowledge. So early an author as Aristotle did not know

writings from him.

Anaximander seems to have been little younger. Of his treatise vepl ^tfo-eojs

a curious fragment only is preserved. Of. Neuhiiuser (Bonn, 1883). Biisgen,

Ueber das lirtipov des A. (Wiesbaden, 1867).

It is difficult to determine the period of Anaximenes. It falls probably about

560-500. Almost nothing of his work irepl 0i/o-eojs remains.

Aside from that given by Aristotle (in the beginning of the Metaphysics) we

owe our meagre information concerning the theories of the Milesians chiefly to

the Commentary of Simplicius. Cf. H. Hitter, Geschirhte der jonischen Philos-

ophie (Berlin, 1821) ; K. Seydel, Der Fortschritt der Metaphysik unter den altes-

ten jonischen Philosophen (Leips. 1861).

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At the head of the Eleatic School, Xenophanes, who at all events was

concerned in its establishment, is generally placed. Born about 570 in Colophon,

he fled in 540, in consequence of the Persian conquest of Ionia, and gained a

living as wandering poet. At last, in Elea, founded by the lonians who fled into

Magna Grsecia, he found a permanent dwelling. He died after 480. The frag

ments of his partly gnomic, partly philosophical, sayings have been collected by

Karsten (Amsterdam, 1835). Concerning him see Fr. Kern (Naumburg, 1804,

Oldenburg, 1807, Danzig, 1871, Stettin, 1874 and 1877) and J. Freudenthal (Bres-

lau, 1880).

Parmenides, an Eleatic of renowned family, who was not a stranger to the

Pythagorean society, wrote about 470. The fragments of his didactic poem

have been collected by Peyron (Leips. 1810) and H. Stein (Leips. 1864). [Met.

tr. in Jour. Spec. Phil, IV.] The lost treatise of Zeno (about 490-430) was

probably the first which was separated into chapters and arranged dialectically.

He, too, came from Elea.

Melissos, on the contrary, was the Samian general who conquered the Athe

nians in 442. Concerning his personal connection with the Eleatic school nothing

io Known. A. Pabst, De M. j ruyweutiK ^iioiiu, iSb9;.

The unimportant fragments of the Eleatics are in a measure supplemented by

the accounts of Aristotle, Simplicius, and others. The pseudo-Aristotelian work,

De Xenephone, Zenone, Gorgia (Arist., Berl. ed., 974 ff.), which must be used

with great discretion, gives an account in the first chapter probably of Melissos ;

in the second, from confusedly intermingling sources, of Zeno ; in the third, of

Gorgias.

Heraclitus of Ephesus ("the Obscure"), about 530-470, disgusted with the

ever-growing power of the democracy, gave up the high position which was his

by birth, and in the moody leisure of the last decade of his life, wrote a treatise

which was pronounced difficult of comprehension even by the ancients, while

the fragments of it which we possess are often very ambiguous. Collected and

edited by P. Schuster (Leips. 1873) and J. By water (Oxford, 1877). Cf. Fr.

Schleiermacher (Ges. W-, III. Abth., Bd. 2, pp. 1-146); J. Bernays ( Ges. Abhand-

Inngen, Bd. I., 1885); F. Lasalle (2 Bde., Berlin, 1858); E. Pfleiderer (Berlin,

1880). [G. T. W. Patrick, Heraclitus in Am. Jour. Psy., I., 1888, contains trans,

of the Fr. ]

The first Dorian in the history of philosophy is Empedocles of Agrigentum,

about 490-430, a priestly and prophetic personality, much regarded in his char

acter as statesman, physician, and worker of miracles. He had, too, relations

with the Sicilian school of orators, of which the names of Korax and Tisias are

familiar ; and besides his Ka.Oa.piJ.oL (Songs of Purification) has left a didactic

poem, the fragments of which have been published by Sturz (Leips. 1805),

Karsten (Amsterdam, 1838), and Stein (Bonn, 1852).

Anaxagoras of Klazomene (500 till after 430) settled, toward the middle

of the fifth century, in Athens, where he made friends with Pericles. In 434

he was accused of impiety and obliged to leave the city, and founded a school

in Lampsacus. Schaubach (Leips. 1827) and Schorn (Bonn, 1829) have col

lected the fragments of his treatise, irepi &lt;j&gt;taew. Cf. Breier (Berlin, 1840),

Zevort (Paris, 1843).

So little is known of the personality of Leucippus, that even in ancient

times his very existence was doubted. The great development of the atomistic

theory by Democritus (see ch. 3) had completely overshadowed its founder.

But traces of Atomism are to be recognised with certainty in the entire structure

of thought after Parmenides. Leucippus, if not born in Abdera, yet active

there as head of the school out of which Protagoras and Democritus went later,

must have been contemporary with Empedocles and Anaxagoras, even though

somewhat older. Whether he wrote anything is uncertain. Cf. Diels, Verh.

der Stett. Philol. Vers. (1886). A Brieger, Die Urbewegung der Atome (Halle,

1884); II. Liepmann, Die Mechanik der leucipp-demokritischen Atome (Leips.

1885).

The Pythagorean Society first appeared in the cities of Magna Graecia as

a religious-political association toward the end of the sixth century. Its founder

was Pythagoras, of Samos, who, born about 580, after long journeys, which

probably led him toward Egypt also, made the aristocratic city of Crotona the

starting-point of a reform movement which had for its aim a moral and religious

CHAP. 1, 4.] Conceptions of Being. 31

purification. We are first apprised of the internal relations of the society

through subsequent narratives (Jamblichus, De Vita Pythagorica, and Porphyrius,

De Vita Pythagorce published by Kiesling (Leips. 1815-16), whose trustworthiness

is doubtful. It seems, however, to be certain that already the old society imposed

definite duties upon its members, even for private life, and introduced tlie prac

tice of working in common at intellectual pursuits, especially at music and

mathematics. In consequence of its political position (in regard to which

B. Krische, Gottingen, 1830) the external conditions of the society assumed at

first a very favourable form, inasmuch as, after the plunder of the democratic

Sybaris, 509, Crotona won a kind of hegemonic influence in Magna Gnecia.

In time, however, the Pythagoreans became the losers in the bitter party

struggles of the cities, and often suffered bitter persecution, by which the

society was finally destroyed in the fourth century.

To Pythagoras himself, who died about 500, we can trace back no philosoph

ical writings, although the subsequent myth-making process sought so strenu

ously to make him the idol of all Hellenic wisdom. (E. Zeller in Vortr. u.

Abhandl., I., Leips. 1865.) Plato and Aristotle knew only of a, philosophy of

the Pythagoreans. Philolaus, who seems to have been somewhat younger than

Empedocles and Anaxagoras, appears as the most prominent representative of

this philosophy. Almost nothing is known of the circumstances of his life, and

the fragments of his treatise (ed. by Boeckh, Berlin, 1819 ; cf. C. Schaar-

schmidt, Bonn, 1864) lie under considerable suspicion.

Of the remaining adherents of the society, only the names are known. The

latest representatives came into so close relations with the Platonic Academy

that, as regards their philosophy, they may almost be said to have belonged to

it. Among them Archytas of Tarentum, the well-known savant and statesman,

should be mentioned. Concerning the very doubtful fragments attributed to

him, cf. G. Hartenstein (Leips. 1833), Fr. Petersen (Zeitschr. f. Alterthumsk ;

1836), O. Gruppe (Berlin, 1840), Fr. Beckman (Berlin, 1844).

The reports concerning the teaching of the Pythagoreans, especially in the later

accounts, are clouded by so many additions from foreign sources, that perhaps

at no point in ancient philosophy is it so difficult to determine the actual facts

in the case as here, even if we sift out the most trustworthy, namely Aristotle

and his best taught commentators, notably Simplicius, many dark points and

contradictory statements remain, particularly in details. The reason for this

lies probably in the fact that in the school, which for a time was widely extended,

various trends of thought ran side by side, and that among these the general fun

damental thought first brought forward perhaps by Philolaus, was worked out

in different ways. It would be of great service to attempt such a separation.

H. Ritter, Geschichte der pythagoreischen Philosophic (Hamburg, 1826) ;

Rothenbucher, Das System der Pt/thagoreer nach Aristoteles (Berlin, 1867) ;

E. Chaignet, Pythagore et la philosophic pythaqoricienne (2 vols., Paris,

1873).

### 4. The Conceptions of Being.

The fact that things of experience change into one another was

the stimulus to the first philosophical reflections, and wonder l at

this must indeed have arisen early among a people so mobile and

with so varied an experience of Nature as the lonians. To this

fact, which furnished the fundamental motive of its reflection, the

Ionic philosophy gave liveliest expression in Heraclitus, who seems

to have been unwearied 2 in seeking the most pointed formulations

for this universal mutability of all things, and especially for the

sudden changes of opposites into each other. But while myth gave

1 Cf. upon the philosophical value of the Oavudieiv, Arist. Met. I. 2, 982 b 12.

2 Fragm. (Schust.) 41-44, 60, 63, 67.

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to this view the garb of a fabled account of the formation of the

world, science asked for the abiding ground of all these changes,

and fixed this question in the conception of the cosmic matter, or

l{ world-8tuff" ( Weltstoff"), which experiences all these transforma

tions, from which all individual things arise, and into which they

become again transformed (d/&gt;x&gt;?)- In this conception l was tacitly

contained the presupposition of the unity of the world; whether the

Milesians 2 already sought to justify this we do not know. It was a

later eclectic straggler 3 who first attempted to justify this Monism

by the transformation of all things into one another, and by the

inter-connection of all things without exception.

1. That, however, a single cosmic matter, or world-stuff, lies at

the basis of the entire process of nature, appears in ancient tradi

tion as a self-evident presupposition of the Ionic School. The only

question was to determine what this elementary matter was. The

nearest course was then to seek for it in what was given in experi

ence, and so Thales declared it to be water; Anaximenes, air. To

this choice they were probably determined only by the mobility,

changeability, and apparent inner vitality 4 of water and air. It is

evident, too, that the Milesians thought little in this connection of

the chemical peculiarities of water and air, but only of the states

of aggregation 5 concerned. While the solid appears in itself dead,

moved only from without, the liquid and volatile make the impres

sion of independent mobility and vitality f. and the monistic prepos

session of this first philosophising was so great that the Milesians

never once thought of asking for a reason or ground of this cease

less change of the cosmic matter, but instead assumed this as a self-

intelligible fact a matter of course as they did all change or

occurrence ; at most they described its individual forms. The cos

mic matter passed with them for something in itself living : they

thought of it as animated, just as are particular organisms, 6 and for

this reason their doctrine is usually characterised from the stand

point of the later separation in conceptions as Hylozoism.

1 Which Aristotle in the Met. I. 3, 983 b 8, has defined, not without the

admixture of his own categories.

2 The expression dpx 1 ?? which, moreover, bears in itself the memory of the

chronological fancies of the Cosmologists, is said by Simplicius to have been

used first by Anaximander.

3 Diogenes of Apollonia. Cf. Simpl. Phys. (D.) 32 r 151, 30, and Arist. Gen. et

Corr. I. 6, 322 b 13.

\* Schol. in Arist. 514 a 33.

5 For vSwp, vyp6v is frequently substituted. With regard to the dijp of Anaxi

menes the accounts are such that the attempt has been made to distinguish his

metaphysical "air" from the empirical : Hitter, I. 217 ; Brandis, I. 144.

6 Plut. Plac. I. 3 (Doxogr. D. 278). Perhaps this is intended in the conjec

ture of Aristotle, Met. I. 3, 983 b 22.

()nAi . 1, 4.] Conceptions of Being : The Milesians. 33

2. If we ask, however, why Anaximenes, whose doctrine, like

that of Thales, seems to have kept within the bounds of experience,

substituted air for water, we learn l that he believed air to have a

characteristic which water lacked, a characteristic, too, which his

predecessor Anaximander had postulated as indispensable for the

conception of primitive matter, viz. that of infinity. As motive for

this postulate of Anaximander there is related the argument that a

finite cosmic matter would exhaust itself in the ceaseless succession

of productions. 2 But Anaximander had also seen that this demand

made by the conception of the apxy could not be satisfied by any

matter or substance which we can perceive, and had on this account

transferred the cosmic matter beyond experience. He maintained

boldly the reality of an original ground of things, possessing all the

properties that are necessary, if we are to derive the changes in the

world of experience from something itself abiding and raised above

change, even though such a ground might not be found in experi

ence. He drew from the conception of the dpx^ the consequence,

that though no object of experience corresponds to this conception,

we must yet, to explain experience, assume such a conception behind

it as real and conditioning it. He therefore called the cosmic mat

ter "the Infinite" (TO obrapov), and ascribed to it all the qualities

postulated in the conception of the apx&gt;j that is, that it had never

begun to be, and was imperishable, inexhaustible, and indestructible.

The conception of matter, thus constructed by Anaximander is,

nevertheless, clear only in the respect that it is to unite within it

spatial infinity and the quality of being without beginning or end

in time, and thus the mark of the all-embracing and all-determin

ing; 3 on the other hand, with reference to its qualitative deter

mination, it cannot be made clear what the philosopher intended.

Later accounts give us to understand that he expressly maintained

that the original matter was qualitatively undetermined or indefinite

(dd/aio-Tos), 4 while the statements of Aristotle 5 speak more for the

assumption of a mixture of all kinds of matter known in experience,

a mixture completely adjusted or equalised, and therefore as a

whole indifferent or neutral. The most probable view here is, that

Anaximander reproduced in the form of an abstract conception the

iSimpl. Phys. (D.) 6 24, 26.

2 Plut. Plac. I. 3 (Doxogr. D. 277) ; Arist. Phys. III. 8, 208 a 8.

3 Arist. Phys. III. 4, 203 b 7.

4 Schol. in Arist. 514 a 33 ; Herbart, Einleitung in die Philosophic (Ges.

W., I. 196).

5 Me.t. XII. 2, 1069 b 18, and especially Phys. I. 4, 187 a 20. Cf. also Simpl.

Phys. (D.) 33 r 154, 14 (according to Theophrastus) . This much-treated contro

versy will be spoken of more in detail below ( 6).

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unclear idea of the mythical chaos which was "one" and yet also

" all." This he did by assuming as the cosmic matter an infinite,

corporeal mass, in which the various empirical substances were so

mixed that no definite quality could be ascribed to it as a whole.

For this reason, however, the separation of the individual qualities

out of this self-moved matter could no longer be regarded as properly

a qualitative change in it. With this view the conception of the

unity of the world as regards quality would be given up, to be sure,

and an essential preparation made for the later development.

3. Still another predicate was given by Anaxirnander to the In

finite, TO Otiov, the divine. As a last remembrance of the religious

home in which scientific reflection arose, it shows for the first time

the inclination of philosophers, constantly recurring in history, to

view as " Deity " the highest conception which theory has led them

to use for explaining the world, and so to give it at the same time

a sanction for the religious consciousness. Anaximander s matter is

the first philosophic conception of God, the first attempt, and one

which remains still entirely within the physical, to strip the idea

of God of all mythical form.

But while the religious need thus maintained itself in the deter

mination of metaphysical conception, the possibility of an influence

of the results of science upon the religious life was brought nearer, the

more these results met and responded to an impulse which hitherto

had been dominant only in an obscure and uncertain manner within

that life. The transformation which the Greek myths had undergone,

as well in the import given them in cosmogonic fancy as in that given

to their ethical interpretation, tended everywhere toward a mono

theistic culmination (Pherecydes, Solon); and to this movement

its final result, a clearly outspoken monism, was now proffered by

science.

This relation was brought to expression by Xenophanes, not a

thinker and investigator, but an imaginative disciple of science,

strong in his convictions, who brought the new teaching from East

to West and gave it a thoroughly religious colouring. His mainte

nance of monotheism, which he expressed as enthusiastic intuition in

the saying, 1 that whithersoever he looked all was constantly flowing

together for him into one Nature (/uW cis &lt;wriv), took on at once,

however, that sharp polemis turn against the popular faith, by which

he is principally characterised in literature. The scorn, which he

poured out with abundant wit over the anthropomorphism of myth

ology, 2 the anger with which he pursued the poets as the portrayers

1 Timon in Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. I. 224. 2 Clem. Alex. Strom. V. 601.

CHAP. 1. 4.] Conceptions of Being : Xenophanes. 35

of these divine figures provided with all the weaknesses and vices of

human nature, 1 these rest upon an ideal of God which will have

the Supreme Being regarded as incomparable with man in both

bodily and mental characteristics. When he passes to positive at

tributes, Xenophanes becomes more obscure. On the one hand, the

deity as ev KCU vav is identified with the universe, and to this " World-

God " are then ascribed all the predicates of the Milesian a.pxn

(eternity, existence that has not become what it is, imperishability) ;

on the other hand, qualities are ascribed to the deity, some of which

are spatial, as the spherical form, while others are psychical func

tions. Among these latter the omnipresence of the knowing activity

and of the rational guidance of things is expressly mentioned. In

this respect the World-God of Xenophanes appears only as the

highest among the rest of " gods and men."

While here a predominantly theological turn of philosophy is

already manifested, the exchange of the point of view of metaphysics

and natural science taken by Anaximander, for the religious point

of view of Xenophanes shows itself in two essential deviations.

The conception of the World-God is for the latter an object of

religious reverence, and scarcely a means for understanding Nature.

The Colophonian s sense for knowledge of Nature is slight, his ideas

are in part very childlike, and, as compared with those of the Mile

sians, undeveloped. And so for his views, the characteristic of

infinity, which Milesian science regarded as necessary in the cosmic

matter, could be dispensed with ; on the contrary, it seemed to him

more in accordance with the dignity of the divine Nature, 2 to think

of this as limited within itself, as entirely shut up or complete, con

sequently as regards its spatial aspect, spherical. And while the

Milesians thought of the original ground of things as ever in motion

spontaneously, and as characterised by living variety in its inter

nal structure, Xeuophanes struck out this postulate hitherto in use-

for the explanation of Nature, and declared the World-God to be

immovable and perfectly homogeneous in all its parts. How, indeed,

he thought that the variety of individual things whose reality he

did not doubt, could be reconciled with this view, must remain

uncertain.

4. As was required by the conception of change, the Milesian

conception of the World-substance had united without clear discrim

ination two essential elements : the one that of a substance re

maining like itself, the other that of independent or self-subsistent

1 Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. IX. 193.

2 Ilippol. Ref. I. 14 (Doxogr. I). 565). In other passages, again, it is said

that he would have the deity thought neither limited nor unlimited (?).

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changeability. In the thought of Xenophanes the first element was

isolated ; the same process took place for the second through Hera

clitus, His doctrine presupposes the work of the Milesians, from

the conclusion of which it is separated by a generation, in this way :

their effort to determine or define in conceptions an abiding world-

ground has been recognised as hopeless. There is nothing abiding,

either in the world or in its constitution taken as a whole. Not

only individual things, but also the universe as a whole, are involved

in perpetual, ceaseless revolution: all flows, and nothing abides. We

cannot say of things that they are ; they become only, and pass away

in the ever-changing play of the movement of the universe. That,

then, which abides and deserves the name of deity, is not a thing,

and not substance or matter, but motion, the cosmic process, Becom

ing itself.

To meet a strong demand that seems made by this turn to abstrac

tion, Heraclitus found help in the sensuous perception in which this

motion presented itself to him : that of fire. / The co-operation of

this in the conversion of things of Nature into each other had been

already noticed by the Milesians ; to this may have been added

ancient Oriental mystical ideas, which contact with the Persians

made especially accessible to the lonians of that day.; But when

Heraclitus declared the world to be an ever-living fire, and Fire,

therefore, to be the essence of all things, he understood by this apxn

not a material or substance which survived all its transformations,

but just the transforming process itself in its ever-darting, vibrating

activity (ziingelnde), the soaring up and vanishing which corre

spond to the Becoming and passing away. 1

At the same time, however, this idea takes on a still firmer form,

in that Heraclitus emphasised much more strongly than the Mile

sians the fact that this change is accomplished in accordance with

definite relations, and in a succession that remains always the same. 2

This rhythm of events (which later times have called the uniformity

of Nature under law) is therefore the only permanent ; it is termed

by Heraclitus the destiny (ei/Ma/o/ue vi;), the order (8iip;), the reason

(Ao yo?) of the world. These predicates, in which physical, ethical,

1 The difficulty of ascribing to such a motion without any substrate, to a mere

Becoming, the highest reality and the capacity to produce things, was evidently

very much less for undeveloped thought not yet conscious of its categories than

for later apprehension. The conception of Becoming as fire, hovering between

the symbolic and the real meaning of the term, was supported by the use of

language which treats of functions and relations as also substantives. But

Heraclitus does not disdain to let the dim idea of a World-substance stand in the

background in his metaphors (of the clay kneaded ever anew, of the drink

continually stirred).

2 Further in detail on this point in the following section.

CHAP. 1, 4.] Conceptions of Being : Heraclitus, Parmenides. 37

and logical order in the world appear as still identified, prove only

the undeveloped state of thought which does not yet know how to

separate the different motives. The conception, however, which

Heraclitus has grasped with complete clearness, and carried though

with all the strength of his austere personality, is that of order, a

conception, nevertheless, whose validity was for him as much a

matter of conviction as of knowledge.

5. In evident opposition to this theory of the Ephesian, the con

ception of Being was worked out by Parmenides, the head of the

Eleatic School, and the most important thinker of this period. Yet

it is not easy to reconstruct his formulation of this conception from

the few fragments of his didactic poem, the quite unique character

of which consists in the union of dryest abstraction with grand and

rich imagery. That there is a Being (O-TI yap etvai), is for the Ele

atic a postulate of such cogent evidence that he only states this

position without proving it, and that he explains it only by a nega

tive turn of thought which first discloses to us completely the sense

in which we are to understand his main thought. " Non-being "

(py cfvcu), he adds, or that which "is" not (TO firj eov), cannot be

and cannot be thought. For all thought is in relation to a some

thing that is, which forms its content. 1 This view of the correla

tive nature of Being and consciousness leads so far with Parmenides

that the two, thought and Being, are declared to be fully identical.

No thought to whose content Being does not belong, no Being

that is not thought : thought and Being are the same.

These propositions, which look so abstractly ontological if we con

sider only the words, take on quite another meaning when we con

sider that the fragments of the great Elean leave no doubt as to

what he desired to have regarded as " Being " or that which " is."

This was corporeality, materiality (TO TrAe ov). For him, " being" and

"filling space" are the same. This "Being," this function of filling

space, is precisely the same in the case of all that " is " ; there is,

therefore, only the one, single Being which has no internal distinc

tions. " Non-being," or what is not [has not the attribute of Being],

means, accordingly, incorporeal ity, empty space (TO KCVO V). This

double meaning of the emu (Being) employed by Parmenides, ac

cording to which the word means at one time " the full " and at an

other time " Reality," leads then to the proposition that empty space

cannot be.

Now for the nai ve, sensuous way of looking at things which

lurks even in these principles of Parmenides, the separateness of

1 Fr., ed. Karsten, vv. 94 ff.

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bhings, by virtue of which they present themselves in their plurality

and multiplicity, consists in their separation by empty space ; and,

on the other hand, all that takes place in the corporeal world, i.e.

all motion, consists in the change of place which the " full " experi

ences in the "empty" (or the "Void"). If, therefore, the Void is

not real or actual, then the plurality and motion of individual things

cannot be real.

The number and variety of things presented in co-existence and

succession by experience had given the Milesians occasion to ask

for the common abiding ground of which all these things were

metamorphoses. When, however, the conception of cosmic sub

stance or world-stuff has culminated with Parmenides in the con

ception of Being, there seems so little possibility of uniting these

individual things with it, that reality is denied them, and the one

unitary Being remains also the only being. 1 The conception formed

for the purpose of explanation has so developed internally that to

maintain it involves the denial of that which was to be explained

by it. In this sense the Eleatic doctrine is acosmism : the mani-

foldness of things has sunk in the All-one : the latter alone " is,"

the former are deception and seeming.

According to Parmenides, however, we are to predicate of the

One that it is eternal, has never come into being, is imperishable,

and especially (as Xenophanes had maintained) that it is through

and through one in kind, one with itself, without any distinctions

or differences, i.e. completely homogeneous and absolutely unchange

able. He follows Xenophanes also in regarding the One as limited,

complete, and definitive. Being is then a well-rounded sphere, per

fectly homogeneous within itself, and this only and unitary world-

body is at the same time the world-thought, 2 simple, excluding all

particulars from itself : TO yap TrAe ov eo-ri VOT//WI.

6. All these attempts, in part fantastic, in part regardlessly

abstract, were needed in order to gain the presuppositions for the

development of the first usable conceptions for apprehending Nature.

For important as were the motives of thought that had come to

recognition therein, neither the world-stuff or cosmic matter of the

Milesians, nor the "Fire-Becoming" of Heraclitus, nor the Being of

Parmenides were available for explaining Nature. Now the imper

fection of the first had become clear through the contrast which

1 A great role in these considerations of the Eleatics is obviously played by

the ambiguities in language, by which, on the one hand, the fv means both

numerical unity and also qualitative unity or simplicity, while the verb elvai has

not only the function of the copula, but also the meaning of " Reality."

2 Hence, terms like " materialism " and " idealism " do not apply to this naive

identification of consciousness and its object, the corporeal world.

CHAP. 1, 4.] Conceptions of Being : Empedocles. 39

separated the two latter as by a gulf, and with the recognition of

this, occasion was given for the more independent investigators of

the next period to separate in their conceptions the two motifs

(being and becoming), and by setting them over against one another

to think out new forms of relation, out of which permanently valua

ble categories for the knowledge of Nature resulted.

These mediating attempts have in common, on the one hand, the

recognition of the Eleatic postulate that that which " is " must be

thought throughout not only as eternal, without a beginning and

imperishable, but also as homogeneous, and as regards its qualities

unchangeable ; on the other hand, however, they assent also to the

thought of Heraclitus that an undeniable reality belongs to Becom

ing and change (Geschehen), and so to the manifoldness of things.

Common to them, also, in their adjustment of these two needs of

thought is the attempt to assume a plurality of beings, each of which

should satisfy for itself the postulate of Parmenides ; while, on

the other hand, by changing their spatial relations, they were to

bring about the changeful variety of individual things which expe

rience shows. If the Milesians had spoken of qualitative changes

of the cosmic substance or matter, the Eleatic principle had ex

cluded the possibility of it ; if, nevertheless, change ought to receive

recognition, as with Heraclitus, and be attributed to Being itself,

it must be reduced to a kind of change which leaves untouched

the qualities of the existent. Such a change, however, was think

able only as a change of place, i.e. as motion. The investigators of

Nature in the fifth century maintained, therefore, with the Eleatics,

the (qualitative) unchangeableness of the existent, but against the

Eleatics, its plurality and motion ; 1 with Heraclitus, they insisted

upon the reality of occurrence and change, and against Heraclitus,

upon the Being of permanent and unchangeable substances as under

lying and producing the same. Their common view is this : there

is a plurality of existing beings which, unchangeable in them

selves, make the change and variety of individual things compre

hensible.

7. This principle seems to have been asserted first and in its

most imperfect form by Empedodes, in a form, however, that was

widely influential historically. He put forward as " elements " 2 the

four which are still current in the popular modes of thought, earth,

1 Later (Plato, Theaet. 181 D ; Arist. var. Zoc.), d\Xo/w&lt;m (qualitative change)

and irepHfropd (change of place) are contrasted as species of Klvijffis or /iera/SoXij.

In reality this is done here, though the terms are as yet lacking.

2 Instead of the later expression o-roixeta, we find in Empedocles the more

poetic term " roots of all things,"

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water, air, and fire. 1 Each of these is according to this system,

without beginning and imperishable, homogeneous and unchange

able, but at the same time divisible into parts, and in these parts

capable of change of place. Out of the mixture of the elements

arise individual things, which in turn cease to exist when the mix

ture is separated into the elements ; to the kind of mixture made

are due the various qualities of individual things, which are often

different from the properties of the elements themselves.

"At the same time the note of unchangeableness and a deviation

from the Milesian Hylozoism assert themselves in the system of

Empedocles .to the extent that In- could not assign independent ca

pacity of motion to these material elements which experience only

changing states of motion and mechanical mixings. On this account

he was obliged to seek a ccw.se of motion independent of the four

elements. As such a cause he designated love and hate. The out

come, however, of this first attempt to set over against a dead matter,

deprived by abstraction of all motion of its own, the force which

moves it, as a metaphysically independent something, was very

obscure. Love and hate are, with Empedocles, not mere properties,

functions, or relations of the elements, but rather independent

powers set over against them ; but how we are to think the reality

of these moving forces is not disclosed in any satisfactory way in the

fragments. 2 Only this seems certain, that in fixing the dual nature

of the principle of motion the thought was also operative that two

distinct causes, love and hate, were requisite to account for the

good and the evil in the change of things of our experience, 3 a first

indication that determinations of " worth " or value are beginning

to be introduced into the theory of Nature.

8.! Empedocles thought it possible to derive the special qualities

of individual things from the proper mixture of the four elements :

whether he attempted so to derive them, and if so, how, we do not

indeed know. This difficulty was avoided by Anaxagoras, who,

from the Eleatic principle that nothing that is can arise or pass

away, drew the conclusion that as many elements must be assumed

1 Aside from dependence upon his predecessors, his selection was evidently

due to the inclination to regard the different states of aggregation as the original

essence of things. No importance seems to have attached to the number four,

in this. The dialectical construction which Plato and Aristotle gave for this is

quite remote from the thought of the Agrigentine.

2 If &lt;pi\ia and veZVos are occasionally counted by the later recorders as fifth

and sixth dpx 1 ? of Empedocles, we must not infer from this that he regarded

them as substances. His obscure and almost mythical terminology rests, for

the most part, upon the fact that conceptions standing for functions are substan

tives in language. 3 Arist. Met. I. 4, 984 b 32.

4 He called them a-ir^iara (seeds of things), or also simply xP nf J - aTa (sub

stances).

CHAP. 1, 4.] Conceptions of Being : Anaxagoras. 41

as there are simple substances in the things of experience, meaning

by simple substances those which on repeated division always sep

arate into parts qualitatively the same with their wholes^ Such

elementary substances were later, in accordance with his definition,

called homoiomeriai. At that time, however, when only mechanical

division or change of temperature were known as means of investi

gation, this conception of element (in principle entirely correspond

ing to the conceptions of the chemistry of to-day) applied to the

greater part of the substances given in experience, 1 and on that ac

count Anaxagoras maintained that there were countless elements dif

fering in form, colour, and taste. He held that they were present

throughout the entire universe in a very finely divided state. Their

coming together or compounding (o-uyK/oio-is) constitutes the arising,

their separation (SiaKpions) the passing away, of individual things.

There is, accordingly, something of every substance present in every

thing: it is only for our sensuous apprehension that the individual

thing takes on the properties of that substance or of those sub

stances which may be present in a preponderating degree.

The elements, as the true being, are regarded now by Anaxagoras

also as eternal, without beginning or end, unchangeable, and though

movable in space, yet not in motion of themselves. Here, too, then,

we must ask for a force which is the cause of motion. Since, how

ever, this force must be regarded as existent, a something that is,

Anaxagoras hit upon the expedient of assigning it to a special,

single sort of matter or elementary substance. This force-element

or motive-matter (Bewecjuitgsstojf) is conceived to be the lightest and

most mobile of all elements. In distinction from all the others it is

that one of the homoiomeriai which alone is in motion of itself, and

communicates this its own motion to the rest ; it moves itself and

the rest. To determine the inner nature of this " force-substance,"

however, two lines of thought unite : the property of originating mo

tion is, for the naive mode of looking at things, the surest sign of the

animate; this exceptional kind of matter, then, which is self-moved?

must be animate matter or " soul-stuff" (Seelenstojf), its quality

must be animate or psychical. 2 And, secondly, a power is known

through its effect : if, now, this motive-matter is the cause of the

formation of the world, to bring about which it has separated out

the remaining idle elements, then we must be able to know its

nature from this which it has accomplished. But the universe, in

particular the regular revolution of the stars, makes the impression

1 According to the fragments of Anaxagoras, bones, flesh, and marrow also ;

on the other hand, the metals.

2 [The Greek ^v^t and German Seele include both these meanings.]

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of beautiful and purposive order (/cotr/uos). Such a mastering of

gigantic masses in a harmonious system, this undisturbed circling

of countless worlds, on which Anaxagoras turned his wondering

contemplation, it seemed to him could be the result only of a mind

arranging the movements according to ends, and ruling them. For

this reason he characterised the force-substance as Reason (vous) or

as " Thought-stuff."

The vovs of Anaxagoras is then a stuff or substance, a corporeal

element, homogeneous, unproduced, and imperishable, diffused in a

finely divided state throughout the universe ; different from the

other substances, however, not only in degree, as being the finest,

lightest, and most mobile, but also in essence, since it alone is self-

moved, and by virtue of its own motion moves the other elements in

the purposive way which we recognise in the order of the world.

This emphasising of the order in the universe is a Heraclitic element

in the teaching of Anaxagoras, and the conclusion drawn from the

ordered movements to a rational cause of them, acting according to

ends, is the first instance of the ideological explanation of nature. 1

With this procedure a conception of worth ( Werthbegriff) namely,

beauty and perfection is made a principle of explanation in the

theoretical field also.

9. The Atomism of Leucippus developed from the Eleatici concep

tion of Being in a direction opposite to that just traced. While

Empedocles maintained that some, and Anaxagoras that all, qualities

were metaphysically primitive, the founder of the school of Abdera

remained in accord with the position of Parmenides, that no "Being"

belongs to any of all the various qualitative determinations exhibited

by experience, and that the sole property of Being is the property of

filling space, corporeality, TO TrXt ov. If now, however, the plurality of

things, and the mutations taking place among them as they come

and go, were to be made intelligible, then instead of the single world-

body, with no internal distinctions which Parmenides had taught, a

plurality of such must be assumed, separated from one another, not

by other Being, but by that which is not Being, Non-being: i.e. by the

incorporeal, by empty space. This entity, then, which is Non-being [i.e.

not Being in the true sense], must have in its turn a kind of Being,

or of metaphysical reality ascribed to it, 2 and Leucippus regarded it

1 As such he was praised by Plato (Phced. 97 B), and overestimated by

Aristotle (Met. I. 3, 984 b). Cf., however, 5. The moderns (Hegel) have

added the further over-estimate of seeking to interpret the \*oDs as an immate

rial principle. But the fragments (Simpl. Phys. (D.) 33 T 156, 13) leave no

doubt that this lightest, purest element, which does not mingle with the rest,

but only plays about them and moves them as living force, was also a space

filling matter or stuff. 2 Plut. Ado. Col. 4, 2, 1109.

CHAP. 1, 4.] Conceptions of Being : Leueippus, Zeno. 43

as the unlimited, the aTrtipov, in contrast with the limitation which

Being proper possesses, according to Parmenides. Leueippus, there

fore, shatters in pieces the world-body of Parmenides, and scatters

its parts through infinite space. Each of these parts, however, is,

like the absolute Being of Parmenides, eternal and unchangeable,

without beginning, indestructible, homogeneous, limited, and indi

visible. Hence these portions of Being are called atoms, aro/iot;

and for the reasons which had led Anaximander to his concept

of the aarttpov Leueippus maintained that there were countless

numbers of such atoms, infinitely varied in form. Their size must

be taken as imperceptibly small, since all things in our experience

are divisible. Since, however, they all possess only the one like

quality of filling space, differences between them can be only quan

titative ; differences in size, form, and situation.

Out of such metaphysical considerations grew the concept of the

atom, which has proved so fruitful for the theoretical science of

Nature just because, as was evident already in the system of Leu

eippus, it contains the postulate that all qualitative differences

exhibited by Nature are to be reduced to quantitative. The things

which we perceive, Leueippus taught, are combinations oF~afoirn? ;

they arise when atoms unite, and pass away when they part. The

properties which we perceive in these complexes are only seeming

or appearance ; there exist in truth only the determinations of size,

form, arrangement, and situation of the individual atoms which

constitute Being.

Empty space is, accordingly, the presupposition as well for the

uniting and separating of atoms as for their separateness and shape.

All " becoming," or change, is in its essence motion of atoms in space.

If we ask for the ground of this motion of the atoms, 1 since space

as properly not a true Being cannot be allowed as cause, and

Atomism recognises nothing as actual except space and the atoms,

this ground can be sought only in the atoms themselves; i.e. the

atoms are of themselves in motion, and this, their independent mo

tion, is as truly without beginning and end as is their being. And as

the atomj are indefinitely varied in size and form, and completely

independent of one another, so their original motions are infinite in

variety. They fly confusedly about in infinite space, which knows

no above and below, no within and without, each for itself, until

their accidental meeting leads to the formation of things and worlds.

The separation between the conceptions of matter and moving force

1 Arist. Phys. VIII. 1, 252 a 32, says of the Atomists that they did not ask as

to the origin of motion as a matter of course, for they declared motion itself

to be causeless (cf. Met. I. 4).

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which Empedocles and Anaxagoras, each in his way, had attempted r

was thus in turn abolished by the Atomists. They ascribed to the

particles of matter the capacity, not indeed of qualitative change

(dAAotWis), but of independent motion (KIV-TJO-IS in the narrower sense r

equivalent to Trtpt^opa), and took up again in this sense the principle

of Milesian hylozoism.

10. In opposition to these pluralistic systems, JZenn, the friend

and disciple of Parmenides, sought to defend the Eleatic doctrine by

setting forth the contradictions in which the assumption of a plural

ity of Beings is involved. As regards size, he pointed out, it fol

lows that the totality of Being must be on the one hand infinitely

small, on the other hand infinitely great: infinitely small, because

the combination of any number whatever of parts, each of which is

to be infinitely small, never yields anything more than an infinitely

small sum ; l infinitely great, on the contrary, because the bound

ary which is to separate two parts must itself be an existent some

thing, i.e. spatial magnitude, which again is itself separated from

the two parts by a boundary of which the same holds true, and so

on in infinitum. From the latter argument, which was called that

from dichotomy (the IK Sixo-ro/uas), Zeno reasoned also that as

regards number, what is must be unlimited, while, on the other hand,

this complete Being, not in process of becoming, is to be regarded

also as numerically limited [i.e. as complete]. And just as with the

assumption of the " many," so the position that empty space ~is real

is held to refute itself by a regress ad infinitum : if all that is is in

space, and thus space is itself an existing entity, then it must itself

be in a space, and this last likewise, etc. When the concept of the

infinite, to which the Atomists had given a new turn, became thus

prominent, all the enigmas involved in it for the contrasting points

of view of intellect and sense-perception became prominent also, and

Zeno used them to involve in a reductio ad absurdum the opponents

of the doctrine of the one, self-limited Being.

/ This dialectic, however, cut both ways, as was shown in the Ele

atic School itself, by the fact that a cotemporary of Zeno, Melissus,

who shared his opinions, saw himself forced to declare that the

Being of Parmenides was as unlimited in space as in time. For as

Being can arise neither from other Being nor from Non-being, so

it can be limited neither by existing Being (for then there must be

a second Being), nor by a non-existent (for then this non-existent

must be) : a line of argument more consistent from a purely theo-

1 The argument can be directed only against Atomism, and applies to this

weakly.

CHAP. 1, 4.] Conceptions of Being : Pythagoreans. 45

retical point of view than the position of the master, which had

been influenced by determinations of worth.

11. The Pythagoreans took a mediating position in these ques

tions : for this, as for their other doctrines, they were happily fitted

by their employment with mathematics, and by the manner in which

they prosecuted this study. Its chief direction seems to have been

arithmetical ; even the geometrical knowledge ascribed to them (as

the well-known proposition named after Pythagoras) amounts to a

linear representation of simple relations between numbers (3 2 + 4 2

= 5 2 , etc.). It was not, however, in the general relations of construc

tions in space only that the Pythagoreans found numbers to be the

determining principles ; the same was found to be true also in such

phenomena of the corporeal world as they were chiefly engaged

with. Their theoretical investigations concerning music taught them

that harmony was based upon simple numerical relations of the

length of the strings (octave, third, fourth), and their knowledge

of astronomy, which was far advanced, led them to the view that

the harmony prevailing in the motions in the heavenly bodies had,

like the harmony in music, 1 its ground in an order, in accordance

with which the various spheres of the universe moved about a com

mon centre at intervals fixed by numbers. Suggestions so various

as these mentioned seem to have united to evoke in a man like

Philolaus the thought, that the permanent Being which philosophy

was seeking was to be found in numbers. In contrast with the

changing things of experience mathematical conceptions possess as

regards their content the marks of a validity not subject to time

they are eternal, without beginning, imperishable, unchangeable,

and even immovable ; and while they thus satisfy the Eleatic postu

late for Being, they present, on the other hand, fixed relations,

that rhythmical order which Heraclitus had demanded. Thus, then,

the Pythagoreans found the abiding essense of the world in the

mathematical relations, and in particular in numbers, a solution

of the problem more abstract than the Milesian, more capable of

"being represented to perception or imagination than the Eleatic,

clearer than the Heraclitic, more difficult than those offered by

cotemporary mediating attempts.

The Pythagorean doctrine of numbers, as carried out by them, was

attached partly to the numerous observations they had made on the

arithmetical relations, partly to analogies which they discovered or

sometimes artificially introduced, between numerical and philosophi

cal problems. The definite nature of each individual number and

1 Out of this analogy arose the fantastic idea of the harmony of the spheres.

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the endlessness of the number series must indeed have at first sug

gested that reality belongs as well to the limited as to the unlimited,

and by transferring this thought into the geometrical sphere the

Pythagoreans came to recognise, in addition to the elements as the

limited, a Reality as belonging also to space as the unlimited void.

They thought of the elements, however, as determined by the forms

of the simple solids : fire by the tetrahedron, earth by the cube,

air by the octahedron, water by the icosahedron, and a fifth material,

aether, which they added as the celestial element to the four terres

trial elements assumed by Empedocles, by the dodecahedron. 1 In

these conceptions the prevailing idea was this : corporeality, or the

essential quality of bodies, consists in the mathematical limitation

of the unlimited, in the shaping out of space into forms. Mathemati

cal forms are made the essence of physical reality.

The Pythagoreans further believed that in the antithesis between

the limited and the unlimited they recognised the antithesis found

in numbers between the odd and the even ; 2 and this antithesis was

again identified with that between the perfect and the imperfect,

the good and the bad, 3 in this last case not without the influence of

old ideas connected with the religious faith of the oracles. Their

Weltanschauung becomes thus dualistic: over against the limited,

odd. perfect, and good stands the limitless, even, imperfect, and bad.

As, however, both principles are united in the number one, 4 which

has the value of an even as well as of an odd number, so in the

world as a whole these antitheses are adjusted to form a harmony.

The world is harmony of numbers.

Some of the Pythagoreans, 5 moreover, sought to trace out through

the various realms of experience that fundamental antithesis, in the

assumption of which all the school were agreed, and so a table of ten

pairs ofopposites came into existence: viz. limited and unlimited

odd and even one and many right and left male and female

at rest and in motion straight and curved light and dark

1 While the main line of the Pythagoreans thus followed Empedocles, a later,

Kcphantus, conceived of this limitation of space in the sense of Atomism.

2 The reason presented for this, viz. that even numbers permit of bisection

to infinity (?), is indeed very questionable and artificial (Simpl. Phys. D. 105 r

455, 20).

8 Nor must we here overlook the factor which had already asserted itself with

Xenophanes and Pannenides, viz. that to the Greek the conception of measure

was one that had a high ethical worth ; so that the infinite, which derides all

measure, must to him appear imperfect, while the definite or limited (ireTepao--

tdvov) was necessarily regarded as more valuable.

\* Arist. Met. I. 5, 986 a 19.

5 Or men standing in close relations with Pythagoreanism, such as the physi

cian Alcmaeon, a perhaps somewhat older contemporary of Philolaus. Cf.

Arist. Met. I. 5, 980 a 2-2.

CHAP. 1, 5.] Conception\* of Cosmic Processes. 47

good and bad square and oblong or with unequal sides. This is

evidently a collection put together without system, to fill out the

sacred number ten, but an attempt at an articulation may at least be

recognised.

In accordance, then, with this or a similar scheme the Pythagoreans

exerted themselves to make an order of things corresponding to the

system of numbers, by assigning the fundamental conceptions in

every department of knowledge to various numbers, and on the other

hand by adjudging to every individual number, but especially to those

from one to ten, determining significance in the various spheres of

reality. The fantastic nature of the symbolic interpretation into

which they fell in doing this must yet not cause us to overlook the

fact that the attempt was therewith made to recognise an abiding order

of things which could be grasped and expressed in conceptions, and to

find the ultimate ground of this order in mathematical relations.

Nor did it escape the notice of the Pythagoreans themselves,

notably of the later members of the school, that numbers could not

be called the principles (a-jx&lt;u) of things in the same way in which

the term is applied to the various " stuffs," or kinds of matter, to the

elements, etc., that things have not arisen out of them, but are

formed according to them; and perhaps they best and most effec

tively express their thoughts when they say that all things are

copies or imitations of numbers. With this conception the world of

mathematical forms was thought as a higher, more original reality,

of which the empirical reality was held to be only a copy : to the

former belonged abiding Being ; the latter was the contrasted world

of Becoming and change.

### 5. Conceptions of Cosmic Processes. 1

E. Hardy, Der Bfgriff der Physis in yriechisr.hen Philosophic, I. Berlin, 1884.

As the fact of change that is, the cosmic processes furnished

the most immediate occasion for reflection upon the abiding Being,

so, on the other hand, the various conceptions of Being had

as their ultimate aim only to make the processes of Nature intel

ligible. This task was indeed occasionally forgotten, or set aside,

in the development of the conceptions of Being, as by the Eleatics ;

but immediately afterward the further progress of thought proved

to be determined all the more by the renewed attention given to

1 [Geschehen. I have translated this word variously by "change," "occur

rence," "event," "taking place," "coming to pass," "becoming," etc. The

last, which is ordinarily used for the Greek yiyvofuu seems hardly broad enough. The German means any natural process or event.]

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Becoming and change, and by the need of so thinking Being that

Becoming and change could not only be reconciled with it, but also

be made intelligible by it. Hand in hand, then, with ideas of Being,

go those of Becoming, the two in constant relation to one another.

1. To the lonians the living activity of the world was something

so much a matter of course that they never thought of asking for

a cause of it. Naive Hylozoism could have in view only the explana

tion of a particular occurrence or cosmic process. Explanation,

however, consists in reducing what is striking not a matter of

course or intelligible in itself to such simpler forms of occur

rence as seem to need no explanation, inasmuch as they are most

familiar to our perception. That things change their form, their

qualities, their working upon one another, seemed to the Mile

sians to require explanation. They contented themselves in this

with conceiving these changes as condensation or rarefaction of the

cosmic matter. This latter process did not seem to them to need a

farther explanation, though Anaximenes at least did add, that these

changes in the state of aggregation were connected with changes in

temperature condensation with cooling, rarefaction with growing

warm. This contrast gave rise to the arrangement of the states of

aggregation in a series corresponding to the degree of rarefaction

or condensation of the primitive matter : 1 viz. fire, air, water, earth,

(or stone).

The Milesians used these ideas not only to explain individual

phenomena of Nature, particularly the meteorological processes so

important for a sea-faring people, but also to explain the develop

ment of the present state of the world out of the prime matter.

Thus Thales conceived water as in part rarefying to form air and

fire, and in part condensing to form earth and stone ; Anaximenes,

starting from air, taught an analogous process of world-formation.

As a result of these views it was assumed that the earth resting

on water, according to the first, on air, according to the second

occupied the centre of the sphere of air revolving about it, and this

sphere of air was yet again surrounded by a sphere of fire, which

either broke through or shone through in the stars.

In setting forth this process of ivorld-origination, which was per

haps still regarded by Thales and Anaximander as a process occur

ring once for all, the Milesians attached themselves closely to the

cosmogonic poetry. 2 Not until later does the consideration seem to

1 Hence it is intelligible that there were also physicists (not known to us by

name) who would regard the world-stuff as an intermediate stage between air

and water, or between air and fire.

2 Hence, also, the designation of the world-stuff as apxt (beginning).

CHAP. 1, 5.] Cosmic Processes : Anaximander, Heraclitus. 49

have gained prevalence, that if to change of form a change back to

the original form corresponds, and if, at the same time, matter is

to be regarded as not only eternal but eternally living, it is necessary

to assume a ceaseless process of world-formation and world-destruc

tion, a countless number of successive worlds. 1

2. Although these essential constituents characterise also the

physical theories of Anaximander, he was led beyond them by his

metaphysical conception of the airupov. The infinite, self-moved

matter which was intended by this obscure conception was indeed,

as a whole, to have no definite properties. It was held, however, to

contain qualitative opposites within itself, and in its process of evolu

tion to exclude them from itself, so that they became separate. 2

Anaximander remained then a Hylozoist in so far as he regarded

matter as self-moved; he had seen, however, that the differences

must be put into it if they were to come forth out of it on occasion

of its self-motion. If, then, as regards his doctrine of Being, he ap

proached the later theory of a plurality of primitive substances, and

abandoned the doctrine that the primitive matter was changeable in

quality, he was yet entirely at one with the other Milesians as

regards his conception of the causelessness of the cosmic process, and

thought that by the union of the two opposites, the warm and the

cold, which he conceived as the first to come out from the airupov, he

could explain water. This done, he could proceed with his cosmog

ony along the oceanic path taken by Thales.

But besides these physical and metaphysical determinations, the

only fragment 3 preserved from him, giving his own words, repre

sents the perishing of things as an expiation for injustice, and so

presents the first dim attempt to present the world-process as

ethical necessity, and to conceive of the shadows of transitoriness,

which rest even on the bright picture of Hellenic life, as retribution

for sin. However doubtful the particular interpretation of this

utterance, there is yet without doubt voiced in it the need of giving

to physical necessity the worth of an ethical order. Here Anaxi

mander appears as a predecessor of Heraclitus.

3. The order of events which Heraclitus thought he could estab

lish as the only constant amid the mutation of things, had two

essential marks, the harmony of opposites and the circuit completed by

1 This doctrine was supported, probably by Anaximander, certainly by

Anaximenes. It is repeated in Heraclitus and Empedocles.

2 The decisive passages for this very controverted question (Ritter, Seydel,

Zeller) are Arist. Phys. I. 4, 187 a 20, and Simpl. Phys. (D.) 33 154, 14 (after

Theophrastus) ; also the continuation of the passage in the following note.

8 Simpl. Phys. (D.) 6 r 24, 18. Cf. Th. Ziegler, Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos.,

I. 16 ff.

7

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matter in its successive changes in the universe, The observation that

everything in the world is in process of constant change was

exaggerated by Heraclitus to the claim that everything is con

tinually changing into its opposite. The " other " was for him eo

ipso the opposed. The "flux of things " became transformed in his

poetic rhetoric into a ceaseless strife of opposites, and this strife

(TTo Ae/xos) he declared to be the father of things. All that seems to

be for a shorter or longer time is the product of opposed motions

and forces which in their operation maintain themselves in equilib

rium. The universe is thus at every moment a unity divided in

itself and again re-united, a strife which finds its reconciliation, a

want that finds its satisfaction. The essence of the world is the

invisible harmony in which all differences and oppositions are

solved. The world is Becoming, and Becoming is unity of oppo

sites.

These antitheses, according to the view of Heraclitus, present

themselves particularly in the two processes taking place in con

trary directions, through which, on the one hand, fire becomes

changed into all things, and, on the other hand, all things change

back into fire. The same stages are passed through in both

processes: on the "ivay downward" fire passes over, by condensation,

into water and earth, on the "way upward" earth and water, by rare

faction, pass over into fire ; and these two ways are alike. .Change

and counter-change run on side by side, and the semblance of a per

manent thing makes its appearance where for a time there is as

nrnch counter-change upon the one way as there is change upon the

other. The fantastic forms in which Heraclitus put these views

envelop the essential thought of a sequence of changes taking place

in conformity to law, and of a continual compensation of these

changes. The world is produced from the fire in ever-repeated

rhythm and at fixed intervals of time, and then again flashes up in

fire, to arise from it anew, a Phoenix. 1

In this ceaseless transformation of all things nothing individual

persists, but only the order, in which the exchange between the

contrary movements is effected, the laio of change, which consti

tutes the meaning and worth of the whole. If in the struggle be

tween opposites it seems as though something new were constantly

arising, this new is at the same time always a perishing product.

The Becoming of Heraclitus produces no Being, as the Being of

Parmenicles produces no Becoming.

1 In details his physical, and especially his astronomical, ideas are weak.

Metaphysical inquiry is more important with him than explanatory investiga

tion. He shares this with his opponent, Parmenides.

CHAP. 1, 5.] Cosmic Processes : Parmenides, Empedocles. 51

4. In fact, the doctrine of Being held by the Eleatics excluded

with plurality and change, events or cosmic processes, also. Ac

cording to their metaphysics an event or occurrence is incomprehen

sible, it is impossible. This metaphysics tolerates no physics.

Parmenides denies to time, as to space, independent reality (oXXo

TraptK TOV edvros) : for him there is only timeless Being with no dis

tinctions. Although Parmenides added to the first part of his didac

tic poem, which presents the doctrine of Being, a second part which

treats physical problems, this is yet done with the protest in advance

that he is here presenting not truth, but the " opinions of mortals."

At the basis of all these ordinary opinions lies the false presupposi

tion, previously rejected, that in addition to Being there is still

another, Non-being. All becoming, all plurality and motion, rest on

the interaction of these opposites, which are then further designated

as light and darkness, warmth and cold. A Weltanschauung is then

p ortrayed in poetic imagery, in which fire shapes the dark empty

space into corporeal structures, a mode of representation which in

part reminds us of Heraclitus, and in part accords with the astro

nomical teaching of the Pythagoreans. The all-ruling Fire-power

(ufuov), as inexorable necessity (81x77), with the help of love (epws)

forces together what is akin, working from the centre of the world

outward. Appropriation of the doctrines of others and polemic

against them appear in motley mixture, agreeably to the purpose of

the whole. Over this tissue thus interwoven hovers a poetic breath

of plastic formative power, but original research and clear concep

tions are lacking.

5. Ideas more definite, and more usable for explaining the par

ticular, are found among the successors, who transformed the Eleatic

conception of Being into the conceptions of element, homoiomerise,

and atom, expressly for this purpose. They all declare that by

occurrence or coming to be nothing else is to be understood than the

motion of unchangeable corporeal particles. Empedocles and Anax-

agoras seem still to have sought to connect with this the denial of

empty space, a principle which they received from Parmenides.

They ascribed to their substances universal divisibility, and re

garded parts as capable of displacement in such a way that as these

parts mixed and reciprocally interpenetrated, all space should be

always filled out. The motion in the world consists, then, in this

1 The hypothetical exposition of how the world would have to be thought if,

in addition to Heing, Non-being, plurality, and becoming were also regarded as

real, had, on the one hand, a polemic purpose; and on the other, it met the

want of his disciples, who probably demanded of the master an explanation of

his own of the empirical world.

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displacement of the parts of matter, each of which is always crowd

ing and displacing the other. Things at a distance from one another

cannot act upon one another, except as parts of the one flow out and

penetrate into the other. This action is the more possible in pro

portion as the effluxes of the one body resemble in their spatial

form the pores of the other. So at least Empedocles taught, and

the assumption of an infinite divisibility of substances is attested in

the case of Anaxagoras also. Another picture of occurrence more

akin to the present way of thinking is that presented by Leucippus.

The atoms which impinge upon each other in empty space act upon

each other by pressure and impact, group themselves together, and

so form greater or smaller things or masses which are not separated

and destroyed until some impact or pressure of other masses conies

from without. All occurrence and coming to be consists in this

process in which atom-complexes are successively formed and

shattered.

/The fundamental form of world-motion in all three systems, how

ever, is that of the vortex, of circular rotation (8tvr)). According to

Empedocles it is brought about by the forces of love and hate acting

among the elements ; according to Anaxagoras it is begun by the

Keason-stuff acting according to ends, and then continues with

mechanical consistency ; according to Leucippus it is the result

always occurring from the collision of several atoms. I The principle

of mechanism was with Empedocles still enveloped in myth, with

Anaxagoras it first made a half-successful attempt to break through

the covering, and was completely carried through only by Leucippus.

What hindered the first two from reaching this position was the

introduction of considerations of worth into their explanatory

theory. The one was for tracing the good and the evil back to cor

responding powers of mind, which were, to be sure, not ascribed to

any being, but mythically hypostatised ; the other believed that he

could explain the order of the whole only from the assumption that

purposive, rationally considered impulse had originated the motions.

Yet both came so near the position of Leucippus as to demand a

teleological explanation for the beginning only of the vortex-motion;

the farther course of the motions, arid thus every individual occur

rence, they explained, as did Leucippus, purely mechanically, by the

pushing and crowding of the particles of matter after these are once

in motion in the manner determined. They proceeded so con

sistently in this that they did not exclude from this mechanical

explanation even the origination and functions of organisms, among

which, moreover, plants are regarded as being as truly animate as are

animals. Anaxagoras is reproached for this by Plato and Aristotle,

CHAP. 1, 5.] Cosmic Processes : Anaxagoras, Leucippus, 53

and an expression of Empedocles has been handed down, 1 according

to which he taught that the animals had arisen here and there, with

out any rule, in odd and grotesque forms, and that in the course of

time only those fitted for life maintained themselves. The principle

of the survival of the fittest, which plays so great a part in the

biology of to-day, i.e. in Darwinism, is here already clearly formu

lated.

On the ground of these ideas, an interesting contrast discloses

itself in the case of the three investigators, as regards their atti

tude toward cosmogonic theories. For Empedocles and for Leu-

cippus, namely, the process of world-formation and world-dissolu

tion is a perpetual one ; for Anaxagoras, on the contrary, it is one

that takes place once for all. Between the first two there is again

the difference that Empedocles, like Heraclitus, teaches that the

world arises and perishes in periodic alternation; while Atomism,

on the contrary, holds that a countless number of worlds come into

being and pass away. According to the principles of Empedocles,

to be more explicit, there are four different states of the elements ;

their complete intermixture, in which love alone rules, and hate is

excluded, he calls cr^aipos 2 (sphere) ; when hate penetrates, this

homogeneous world-sphere becomes separated into the individual

things, until the elements are completely parted from one another ;

and out of this separate condition love brings them again together,

until full union is again attained. Neither in the case of complete

mixture, nor in that of complete separation, are there individual

things ; in both cases the Eleatic acosmism makes its appearance.

A world of individual things in motion exists only where love and

hate struggle with one another in mingling and separating the

elements.

It is otherwise with Leucippus. Some of the atoms that dart

about irregularly in the universe strike together here and there.

From the various impulses to motion which the individual particles

bring with them, where such aggregations occur, there results,

according to mathematical necessity (avdyK-rj), a whirling movement

of the whole, which draws into itself neighbouring atoms and atom-

complexes, and sometimes even whole " worlds," and so gradually

1 Arist. Phys. II. 8, 198 b 29. Moreover, we find an expression already

attributed to Anaximander, which teaches a transformation of organisms by

adaptation to changed conditions of life : Plut. Plac. V. 19, 1 (Dox. D. 430, 15).

For man, also, the oldest thinkers claimed no other origin than that of growth

out of the animal world : so Empedocles in Plut. Strom, fr. 2. (Dox. D. 579, 17).

2 Evidently not without suggestion from the Eleatic world-sphere, which this

absolute, fully adjusted mingling of all elements, taught by Empedocles, much

resembles.

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extends. Meanwhile such a system in process of revolution is

differentiating itself, since, by the rotation, the finer, more movable

atoms are driven to the periphery, the more inert and massy are,

gathered in the centre ; and so like finds its way to like, not by

inclination or love, but through their like conformity to the law of

pressure and impact. So there arise at various times and in differ

ent places in the boundless universe, various worlds, each of which

continues in motion within itself, according to mechanical law, until

it perhaps is shattered in pieces by collision with another world, or

is drawn into the revolution of a greater. So, the Atomists main

tained, the sun and moon were at one time worlds by themselves,

which subsequently fell into the greater vortex of which our earth

is the centre. How near in principle this whole conception is to

the natural science of to-day is obvious.

The teleological point of view taken by Anaxagoras excludes, on

the contrary, a plurality of worlds in time as well as a plurality of

worlds in space. The ordering mind, which introduces the pur

posive motion of the elements, forms just this one world only, which

is the most perfect. 1 Anaxagoras, therefore, quite in the manner of

the cosmogonic poetry, describes how the beginning of the world

was preceded by a chaotic primitive condition, in which the ele

ments were intermingled without order and without motion. Then

came the vows, the "Reason-stuff" (Vernunflstoff } , and set it into

ordered motion. This vortex-motion began at one point, the pole of

the celestial vault, and extended gradually throughout the entire

mass of matter, separating and dividing the elements, so that they

now perform their mighty revolution in a uniformly harmonious

manner. The teleological motive of the doctrine of Anaxagoras

is due essentially to his admiration of the order in the stellar

world, which, after it has performed the rotations started by the

voCs, moves on without disturbance always in the same track. There

is no ground for assuming that this teleological cosmology directed

attention to the adaptation to ends in living beings, or even to the

connected system of Nature as beneficent to man ; its gaze was fixed

on the beauty of the starry heavens ; and what is related of the

views of Anaxagoras on terrestrial things, on organisms, and on

man, keeps quite within the setting of the mechanical mode of

explanation in vogue among his contemporaries. What he said, too,

with regard to the presence of life on other heavenly bodies, might

just as well have come from the Atomists.

1 This motive, fully carried out, is found in Plato, Tim. 31, with unmistak

able reference to the opposition between Anaxagoras and the Atomists.

CHAP. 1, 5.] Cosmic Processes : Zeno, the Pythagoreans. 55

Accordingly, although Anaxagoras conceived of the vous as also the principle

of animation, and thought of the particles of this substance as mingled in

greater or lesser number with organic bodies, yet the central point in this con

ception is that of the authorship of the astronomical world-order. The other

side, the moment or factor of the cause of animate life, is much more energeti

cally emphasised in the transformation which a younger eclectic natural

philosopher, Diogenes of Apollonia, undertook to effect in the conception of

Anaxagoras by connecting it with the hylozoistic principle of Anaximenes.

He designated air as dpxv [first principle, primitive element], fitted it out,

however, with the characteristics of the voOj, omniscience and force acting

according to ends, named this "rational air" also weS^a [spirit], and found

this formative principle in man and other organisms as well as in the universe.

A rich physiological knowledge enabled him to carry through in detail this

thought as applied to the structure and functions of the human body. With

him teleology became the dominant mode of apprehending also the organic

world.

His fragments have been collected by Schorn (Bonn, 1829) and Panzerbieter

(Leips. 1830). Cf. K. Steinhart in Ersch und Griiber s Encyclopddie.

6. All these doctrines, however, presuppose the conception of

motion as one that is intelligible of itself and in need of no further

explanation. They thought they had explained qualitative change

when they had pointed out as its true essence motion, whether

between the parts of a continuously connected matter, or in empty

space. The opposition, therefore, which the Eleatic School brought

to bear upon all these doctrines was directed first of all against this?

conception of motion, and Zeno showed that this could by no means

be taken so simply, but was rather full of contradictions which inca^

pacitated it for serving as principle of explanation.

Among Zeno s famous proofs of the impossibility of motion, 1 the

weakest is that which proceeds from the relativity of the amount of

motion, by showing that the movement of a wagon is variously esti

mated if it is observed either from wagons also in motion but in

different directions and at varying rates of speed, or again from two

wagons one of which is moving and one standing still. The three

other proofs, on the contrary, which made use of the analysis into

discrete parts, infinitely many and infinitely small, of the space

passed through by motion, and the time occupied by it, were

stronger, and for a long time were not overcome. The first proof

was with reference to the impossibility of passing through a fixed

space. This was regarded as proved by the infinite divisibility of

the line, since the infinite number of points which must be attained

before reaching the goal permitted no beginning of motion. The

same thought appears, somewhat varied, in the second argument,

which seeks to prove the impossibility of passing through a space

which /w.s movable boundaries. The argument (known as that of

1 Arist. Phys. VI. 9, 239 b. 9. Cf . Ed. Wellmann, Zenon s Beweise gegen die

Bewegung und ifire Widerlegungen (^--nkfurt a. O. 1870).

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Achilles and the tortoise) is, that since the pursuer in every inter

val or subdivision of time must first reach the point from which the

pursued simultaneously starts, it follows that the latter will always

be in advance, though by an interval which becomes constantly

smaller and approaches a minimum. The third argument has refer

ence to the infinitely small extent of the motion performed in any

instant. According to this argument, called "the resting arrow" the

moved body is in every instant in some one point of its track ; its

movement in this instant is then equal to zero ; but from ever so

many zeros no real magnitude arises.

Together with the above-mentioned difficulties (dire/gun) with

regard to space and plurality, these argumentations of Zeno set

forth an extremely skilfully projected system of refuting the

mechanical theories, especially Atomism, a refutation which was

intended to serve at the same time as indirect proof of the correct

ness of the Eleatic conception of Being.

7. The number-theory of the Pythagoreans, too, was determined by

Eleatic conceptions in so far as its procedure was, in the main, to

demonstrate mathematical forms to be the fundamental relations

of reality. When, however, they termed the actual world of reality

an imitation of the mathematical forms, they thereby ascribed a sort

of reality, even though of a derivative and secondary character, to

individual things, and to what takes place among them. They were

also the less inclined to withdraw from answering cosmological and

physical questions as they were able to bring to philosophy the

brilliant results of their astronomical investigation. They had come

to a knowledge of the spherical form of the earth and of the heav

enly bodies ; they were aware also that the change of day and night

depends upon a movement of the earth itself. At first, indeed, they

thought of this movement as a circuit performed about a central fire

to which the earth presented always the same side, a side unknown

to us. 1 On the other hand, they assumed that about this same cen

tral fire there moved in concentric circles, outside the earth s track,

successively the moon, the sun, the planets, and finally the heaven

containing the fixed stars. They brought into this system, however,

in a way, the metaphysical dualism which they had maintained be

tween the perfect and the imperfect, inasmuch as they regarded the

1 Already in Plato s time the hypothesis of the central fire was given up by

the younger Pythagoreans, Ecphantus, Hicetus of Syracuse (and with it that

of the " counter-earth," which had hitherto been assumed as placed between the

central fire and the earth, invented merely to fill out the number ten), and

instead the earth was located in the centre of the universe and provided with a

rotation on its axis. With this latter assumption that of a resting position of

the heaven of the fixed stars was connected.

CHAP. 1, 6.] Conceptions of Cognition. 57

heaven of the stars, on account of the sublime uniformity of its

motions, as the realm of perfection ; the world " beneath the moon,"

on the contrary, on account of the unrest of its changing formations

and motions, they regarded as that of imperfection.

This way of looking at things runs parallel to that of Anaxagoras,

and leads, though in another way, to the interweaving and complica

tion of theory with considerations of worth [ethical or aesthetic

values]. It was in connection with astronomical insight that the

thought of an order of Nature in conformity to law dawned as clear

knowledge upon the Grecian mind. Anaxagoras reasons from this

to an ordering principle. Pythagoreanism finds in the heavens the

divine rest of unchangeableness (Sichgleichbleibens) which it misses

upon the earth. Here we have a meeting of the ancient religious

ideas and the very different result yielded thus far by the scientific

work of the Greeks. This latter, seeking a Permanent in the muta

tion of occurrence, found such a permanence only in the great, simple

relations, in the revolution of the stars, which abides ever the same.

In the terrestrial world, with its whole change of manifold, con

stantly intersecting motions, this uniformity remained still hidden

from Greek science : she regarded this terrestrial world rather as a

domain of the imperfect, the lower, which wants the sure order of

that other world. In a certain sense this may be looked upon as

the ultimate result of the first period, a result which had a determin

ing influence for after time.

What the attitude of the Pythagoreans was to the question concerning a peri

odic change of origination and annihilation of the world is uncertain. A plurality

of co-existing worlds is excluded in their system. In their theory of world-for

mation and in their particular physical doctrines they concede so prominent a

place to fire that they come very near to Heraclitus. Aristotle even places one

of the contemporaries of Philolaus, Hippasus of Metapontum, in immediate con

nection with Heraclitus {Met. I. 3).

Their assumption of aether as a fifth element out of which the spherical shells

of the heavens were formed, in addition to the four elements of Empedocles, is

doubtless connected with the separation which they made between heaven and

earth. It is not less difficult to decide whether they derived the elements from

a common ground, and if so, how: according to many passages it would seem as

if they had spoken of a progressive "attraction," i.e. in this case (cf. above, p.

46), mathematical shaping out or forming of empty space by the ?c (one), the

original number, which is exalted above limitation and the unlimited. Yet it

seems, too, that in regard to these questions various views were held within the

school side by side.

### 6. The Conceptions of Cognition.

M. Schneidewin, Ueber die Ke imp erkenntnisstheoretischer und ethischer Phi-

losopheme bei den vorsokratischen Denkern, I hilos. Monatshefte, II. (1869), pp.

257, 345, 429.

H. Miinz, Die Keime der Erkenntnisstheorie in der vorsophistischen Pcriode

der griechischen Philosophic. Vienna, 1880.

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The question, what things really are, or what is the intrinsic

nature of things, which is already contained in the Milesian con

ception of the apxn, presupposes that the current, original and naive

mode of thinking of the world has been shaken, although this pre

supposition has not come to clear recognition in consciousness. The

question proves that reflective thought is no longer satisfied with

the ideas which it finds current, and that it seeks truth behind or

above them. Those ideas are given, however, through sense-per

ception and through the involuntary elaboration of this in thought,

an elaboration that has been transmitted from generation to

generation, until it has became consolidated and fixed and embodied

in language, and so forms a part of the thinker s data. When the

individual with his reflection transcends these ideas so given and

it is in this that philosophical activity ultimately consists he does

it on the ground of logical needs which assert themselves as he re

flects on the given. His philosophising, then, even though he takes

no account of this fact, grows out of discrepancies between his expe

rience and his thought out of the inadequacy exhibited by what

is presented to his perception or imagination, when set over against

the demands and presuppositions of his understanding. However

unconscious of this its inner ground naive philosophising may be

at the outset, attention cannot fail to be turned in time to the diver

sity in the sources of the conflicting ideas within.

1. The first observations, therefore, which the Grecian philosophers

made on human knowledge concern this contrast between experience

and reflection. The farther the explanatory theories of science

became separated from the way of looking at things which belongs

to daily life, the clearer it became to their authors that those

theories sprang from another source than that of the customary

opinions. To be sure they have not as yet much to say on this

point. They set opinion (So a) over against truth, and this often,

means only that their own doctrines are true and the opinions of

others false. So much only is certain to them, that they owe their

own views to reflection, while the mass of mankind concerning

whose intellectual activity it is just the older philosophers,

Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles, who express themselves in

an extremely depreciatory manner persist in the illusion of the

senses. Only through thinking (cf&gt;poveiv, votiv, Aoyos), then, is the

truth found ; the senses, if alone, give fraud and a lie. 1 So strong

has reflection become in itself that it not only proceeds to con

sequences which to the common thinking have become absolutely

i Heracl. Frag. (Sclmst.) 11, 123; Pannen. Fray. (Karsten) 54 ff.

CHAP. 1, 6.] Conceptions of Cognition: fferaclitus, Parmenides. 59

paradoxical, but also maintains expressly that it is itself the sole

source of truth as opposed to opinions.

This, to be sure, works oddly when we notice that completely

opposite illustrations of this same assertion are given by Heradi-

tus and Parmenides in close succession. The former finds the

deceit caused by the senses, and the error of the multitude, to consist

in the illusory appearance of the Being of permanent things, which

is presented to men by sense-perception ; the Eleatic, on the contrary,

is zealous against the senses, because they would fain persuade us

that there are in truth motion and change, becoming and arising,

plurality and variety. Precisely this double form in which this

same claim is put forward shows that it is not the result of an

investigation, but the expression of a demand made on other

grounds.

Moreover, this proposition fits very differently into the general

theories of the two great metaphysicians. The flux of all things,

with its restless change of individual phenomena, as taught by

Heraclitus, makes it easy to comprehend also the possibility of the

emergence of false ideas, and the seeming of permanence and Being

had besides a special explanation in the counter-course or opposi

tion (IvavTLOTpoTTLa) of the two " ways," for this causes the illusion of

permanence or Being to arise where there is just as much change in

one direction as in the other [i.e. from primitive fire into things and

vice versa] . On the contrary, it is quite impossible to see where the

seat of illusion and error was to be sought in the one world-sphere

of Parmenides, everywhere the same, which was held to be at the

same time the one, true world-thought. The search could be only

among individual things and their changing activities, which were

themselves declared to be illusion, non-existent. Nevertheless

there is no support to be found in the literature preserved, for

supposing that this so simple a thought 1 which would have over

thrown the entire Eleatic system, ever occurred to the investigators

of that time. In any case, the Eleatics contented themselves with

the assertion that all particular existence and all change were decep

tion and illusion of the senses.

The same naive denial of that which they could not explain seems to

have been employed also by the successors of the Eleatics in the

matter of the qualitative attributes of individual things. Emped-

ocles at least maintained that all things were mixtures of the ele

ments. The task that logically grew out of this was to show how

the other qualities arise from the mixture of the properties of the

1 First carried out in Plato, Sophist, 237 A.

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elements. But this he did not perform; so far as our knowledge

extends, he did not at all set himself this task; he probably re

garded these particular qualities as not being (objectively), and as

a deception of the senses, just as all qualities whatever were such

in the view of Parmenides. And so the oldest view of the Ato-

mists, as supported by Leucippus, may well have gone just to this

point, maintaining that in individual things only the form, arrange

ment, situation, and motion of the constituent atoms were real, and

that the other properties were a deceitful product of the senses,

which here, too, found no further explanation. 1

These difficulties were perhaps jointly influential in the mind of

Anaxagoras when he regarded all qualities as original, and not as

having become what they are, and accordingly postulated countless

elements. But for him arose the opposite difficulty of showing how

it could come about, if all was regarded as contained in all, every

quality in every thing, that only some of these qualities seemed to

be present in individual things. He explained this in part from the

consideration that many of the constituent parts are imperceptible

because of their minuteness ; hence it is only by thought that we

can learn the true qualities of things. 2 Besides this, however, he

seems to have followed up the thought, found already in Anaximan-

der s idea of the airupov, that a complete mingling of definite quali

ties yields something indefinite. So, at least, he described the

primitive mixture of all substances which preceded the formation

of the world as completely devoid of quality, 3 and a similar thought

seems to have permitted him to regard the four elements of Emped-

ocles not as primitive substances, but rather as already mixtures. 4

The rationalism common to the pre-Sophistic thinkers assumes,

among the Pythagoreans, the particular form of affirming that

knowledge consists in mathematical thought. This, though in itself

a narrowing, is yet, on the other hand, a great step in advance, in

asmuch as there is here given for the first time a positive definition

of "thought" as contrasted with "perception." Only through

number, taught Philolaus, 5 is the essential nature of things to be

known ; that is, it is when the definite mathematical relations lying

at their basis are recognised that things are properly conceived or

1 It is extremely improbable that the solution of the problem through the

suojectivity of the sense-qualities, which is found in Democritus, was presented

already by Leucippus, and therefore before Protagoras, who is universally

regarded as the founder of this theory.

2 Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. VII. 90 f.

3 Frag. (Schorn) 4. From this passage the true light may, perhaps, be thrown

upon the sense in which Anaximander designates the Awcipov as bbpiffTov.

4 Arist. De Gen. et Corr. I. 1, 314 a 24.

\* Fray. (Mull.) 13.

CHAP. 1, 6.] Conceptions of Cognition : Philolaus, Zeno. 61

understood. This had been the experience of the Pythagoreans in

music and in astronomy, and this was the object of their desire and

effort in all other fields. When, however, they ultimately came to

the result that this requirement could be completely met only in

the knowledge of the perfect world of the stars, they concluded

from this that science (&lt;ro&lt;ia) relates only to the realm of order and

perfection, that is, to heaven, and that in the realm of the imper

fect, of change not subject to order, i.e. on earth, only practical

ability (dpeny) is of avail. 1

Another positive characteristic of the "thinking" which the

earlier investigators had set over against "perceiving," without

closer specification, appears obscurely in the reasonings of Zeno,

viz. conformity to logical laws. At the basis of all his attacks

against plurality and motion lie the principle of contradiction and

the presupposition that that can not be actual of which the same

thing must be affirmed and also denied. This principle and presup

position were applied with clearness and certainty, though not ab

stractly expressed. The Eleatic theory of the world, so highly

paradoxical, forced its supporters to enter into polemic more than

did others, and the accounts as to Zeno s treatise, which, as it seems,

was also logically well arranged and divided, offer a notable evi

dence of the developed technique of refutation to which the school

attained in consequence. To be sure, this formal training which

prevailed in Eleatic circles does not seem to have led as yet to the

abstract statement of logical laws.

2. The setting over against each other of " thinking " and " per

ceiving" arose, then, from an estimation of their relative epistemo-

logical value (erkenntnisstheoretischen Werthbestimmung) \\_i.e. from

the postulate that one of these two forms of mental activity is

worth more epistemologically for attaining truth]. In decided

contradiction with this, however, stand the psychological principles

with which these same investigators sought to apprehend the origin

and process of knowing. For although their thinking was directed

first and chiefly toward the outer world, man s mental activity came

under their attention in so far as they were obliged to see in this

activity one of the formations, or transformations, or products of

motion, of the universe. The mind or soul and its action are then

at this time considered scientifically only in connection with the entire

course of the universe, whose product they are as truly as are all

other things ; and since among the men of this period the general

principles of explanation are everywhere as yet conceived corpore-

1 Stob. Ed. I. 488.

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ally it follows that we meet also a thorough-going materialistic

psychology. 1

Now mind or soul is in the first place moving force. Thales

ascribed such a soul to magnets, and declared that the whole world

was full of souls. The essential nature of individual souls was

therefore sought at first in that which had been recognised as the

moving principle in the whole. Anaximenes found it in air,

Heraclitus and likewise Parmenides (in his hypothetical physics)

in fire, Leucippus in the fiery atoms, 2 and Anaxagoras in the world-

moving, rational substance, the vovs. Where, as in the system of

Empedocles, a corporeal moving principle was lacking, the mixed

substance which streams through the living body, the blood, was

regarded as soul. Diogenes of Apollonia found the essence of the

soul in the air mixed with the blood. 3 With the Pythagoreans, too,

the individual soul could not be considered as the same with the ev

(One) which they conceived as moving principle of the world, nor

regarded as a part of it ; instead, they taught that the soul was a

number, and made this very vague statement more definite by say

ing that it was a harmony, an expression which we can only

interpret 4 as meaning a harmony of the body ; that is, the living,

harmonious activity of its parts.

If now to this moving force, which leaves the body in death, were

ascribed at the same time those properties which we to-day designate

as " psychical," we find a clear characterisation of the specifically

theoretical interest by which this oldest science was filled, in the

fact that among these attributes it is that of ideation, of " knowing,"

which is almost exclusively the object of attention. 5 Of feelings

and volitions there is scarcely incidental mention. 6 But as the

1 Besides those characterisations of the soul, which resulted from their gen

eral scientific theory, we find in the tradition in case of several of these men

(Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles, and the Pythagoreans) still other doc

trines which are not only not connected with the former, but are even in con

tradiction to them. A conception of the body as prison of the soul (&lt;rwfj.a =

o-Tjyuo), personal immortality, recompense after death, transmigration of souls,

all these are ideas which the philosophers took from their relations to the

mysteries and retained in their priestly teaching, however little they accorded

with their scientific teachings. Such expressions are not treated above.

2 In like manner, some of the Pythagoreans declared the motes which the

sunlight discloses in the air to be souls.

8 Since, with reference to this, he recognised the distinction between venous and

arterial blood, he meant by his irvev^a what the chemistry of to-day calls oxygen.

4 Ace. to Plato, Pheedo, 85 ff., where the view is rejected as materialistic.

6 The voOs of Anaxagoras is only knowing ; air with Diogenes of Apollonia is

a great, powerful, eternal, intelligent body. Being with Parmenides is at the

same time voeiv, etc. Only 0t\6ri;s and vet/coy with Empedocles are mythically

hypostasised impulses, and these, too, have nothing to do with his psychological

views.

6 With this is connected the fact that .in general we cannot once speak of

CHAP. 1, 6.] Conceptions of Cognition: Heraclitus, Anaxagoras. G3

individual soul in so far as it is moving force was held to be a part

of the force which moves the entire universe, so also the "knowing"

of the individual could be conceived only as a part of the knowing

activity of the world. 1 This is clearest in the systems of Heraclitus

and Anaxagoras ; each individual has so much knowledge as there

is contained in him of the general World-reason, fire with

Heraclitus, 2 the vovs with Anaxagoras. In the case of Leucippus

and of Diogenes of Apollonia the ideas are similar.

This physical conception, which with Anaxagoras especially is

purely quantitative, was given a turn by Heraclitus, in which the

epistemological postulate again forces its way to the front, and

asserts itself in the interest of a deeper insight and a profounder

view. The World-reason in which the individual participates in his

knowledge is everywhere the same ; the Aoyos of Heraclitus 3 and

the vous of Anaxagoras, as homogenous Keason, are distributed

through the whole universe as moving force. Knowing, then, is

that which is common to all. It is therefore the law and order to

which every one has to unite himself. In dreams, in personal opin

ion, each one has his own world ; knowing is common (wo v) to

all. By means of this characteristic, viz. that of universally valid

law, the conception of knowing acquires a normative significance, 4

and subjection to the common, to the law, appears as a duty

in the intellectual realm as well as in the political, ethical, and

religious. 5

attempts at ethical investigation in this period. For single moralising reflections

or admonitions cannot be regarded as beginnings of ethics. On the only excep

tion cf. below, note 5.

1 The expression " World-soul " was first used by Plato, or at the earliest by

Philolaus (in the fragment which has certainly been much questioned just for

this reason, Mull. 21). The idea is certainly present in Anaximenes, Heraclitus,

Anaxagoras, and perhaps also among the Pythagoreans.

2 Hence the paradoxical expression, the dryest soul is the wisest, and the

warning to guard the soul from the wet (intoxication).

3 Cf., for this and the following, M. Heinze, Die Lehre vom Logos in der

griechischen Philosophic (Oldenburg, 1872).

4 Fray. (Schust.) 123.

5 This is the only conception in the development of pre-Sophistic thought, in

the case of which we can speak of an attempt to propound a scientific principle

of ethics. If Heraclitus had in mind a universal expression for all moral duties

in speaking of this subordination to law, or at least hit upon such, he attached

it at once to the fundamental thoughts of his metaphysics, which declared this

law to be the abiding essence of the world. Yet attention has above ( 4) been

called to the fact that in the conception of the world-order which hovered before

him, he did not as yet separate consciously the different motives (especially the

physical from the ethical), and so ethical investigation does not as yet work

itself clear from the physical to an independent position. The same is true of

the Pythagoreans, who expressed the conception of order by the term " harmony "

(which also might be adopted from Heraclitus), and therefore designated virtue

as "harmony." To be sure, they used the term "harmony" for the soul, for

health, and for many other things.

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3. If now we ask how under these assumptions the fact was

explained that "knowledge" comes into the individual man, i.e. into

his body, we find that the only answer offered by Heraclitus and

the whole company of his successors is, " through the door of the

senses." When a man is awake, the World-reason streams into his

body through the opened senses (sight and hearing are of course

chiefly noticed 1 ), and, therefore, he knows. This comes about, to

be sure, only if there is besides, in the man himself, so much reason

or soul that the motion coining from without is met by an inner

motion ; 2 but upon this interaction, effected through the senses\*

between the outer and the inner reason knowledge rests.

A psychological distinction, then, between perceiving and think

ing, which, as regards their respective epistemological values, are so

abruptly opposed, Heraclitus does not know how to state. Par-

menides, 3 however, was just as little in a position to make such a

distinction. 4 Rather, he expressed more sharply still the dependence

upon bodily relations in which the thinking of the individual man is

involved, when he said that every one so thought as the conditions

constituted by the mixture of substances in the members of the body

permitted, and when he found in this a confirmation of his general

thought of the identity of corporeality and thinking in general.\*

Still more express is the testimony 6 that Empedocles declared

thinking and perceiving to be the same, that he thought change in

thinking as dependent upon change of the body, and that he

regarded the constitution of the blood as of decisive importance

for the intellectual capacity of the man.

These two last-named thinkers did not hesitate, moreover, to make

their conception more plain to the imagination by means of physio

logical hypotheses. Parmenides taught in his hypothetical physics

1 Also smell (Empedocles) and taste (Anaxagoras). Only the Atomists, and

in particular Democritus, seem to have given value to the sense of touch.

2 Arist. De An. I. 2, 405 a 27.

3 Theophr. De Sens. 3 f.

4 So, too, it is reported (Theophr. De Sens. 25) of Alcmseon, the Pythago-

reanising physician, that he declared thought or consciousness (Sri ^"os (vt4^rt)

to be the characteristic which distinguishes man from the other animals. But

a more precise determination is lacking here also unless, in accordance with the

expression, we think of something similar to the Aristotelian noivbv ai&lt;T0r)T-ripiov.

With this would agree the circumstance that the first attempts to localise the

particular psychical activities in particular parts of the body seem to have been

made in the circles of the Pythagoreans and of the physicians who stood in near

relations to them ; localising, e.g., thought in the brain, perception in the indi

vidual organs and in the heart, and the emotions also in the latter organ. From

them Diogenes of Apollonia, and after him Democritus, seem to have taken

these beginnings of a physiological psychology.

5 Frag. (Karst.) vv. 146-149.

e Arist. De An. I. 2, 404 b 7 ; III. 3, 427 a 21 ; Met. III. 5, 1009 b 17 ;

Theophr. De Sens. 10 f.

CHAP. 1, 6.] Conceptions of Cognition : Parmenides, Empedocles. 65

that like is always perceived by like, warmth without by the warmth

in man, the cold without by the cold even in the dead body. Emped

ocles, with the aid of his theory of effluxes and pores, carried out

the thought that every element in our body perceives the same ele

ment in the outer world, so as to teach that each organ is accessible

to the impress of those substances only whose effluxes fit into its

pores ; i.e. he derived the specific energy of the sense organs from

relations of similarity between their outer form and their objects,

and carried this out for sight, hearing, and smell, with observations

which in part are very acute. 1

This view, that like is apprehended by like, was opposed by

Anaxagoras, on what ground it is not certain. 2 He taught that

perception is only of opposite by opposite, warmth without by the

cold in man, etc. 3 At all events, his doctrine also is a proof that

these metaphysical rationalists maintained all of them in their

psychology a crass sensationalism.

1 Theophr. De Sens. 7.

2 Perhaps we have here a remembrance of Heraclitus, who also explained

perception from the tvavTiorpoTrla, motion against motion, and with whom

opposition was the principle of all motion.

3 Theophr. De Sens. 27 ff. It is interesting that Anaxagoras inferred from

this that every perception is joined with pain (XI/ITT/).

## CHAPTER II. THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERIOD.

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berg, 1839), pp. 179-231.

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zur Philosophie der Griechen," 1873, 2 Aufl. (Freiburg i. B. 1888).

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[H. Jackson, Art. Sophists, in Erie. Brit.}

THE farther development of Greek science was determined by the

circumstance that in the powerful, universal upward movement of

the mental and spiritual life which the nation achieved after the

victorious result of the Persian wars, science was torn away from

the restraints of close schools in which it had been quietly pursued,

and brought out upon the stage of publicity, where all was in vehe

ment agitation.

The circles in which scientific research was fostered had widened

from generation to generation, and the doctrines which at first had

been presented in smaller societies and spread abroad in writings

that were hard to understand, had begun to filter through into the

general consciousness. The poets, as Euripides and Epicharmus,

began already to translate into their language scientific conceptions

and views ; the knowledge gained by investigation of Nature had

already been made practically effective, as by Hippodamus in his

architecture. Even medicine, which had formerly been only an art

practised according to traditions, became so permeated with the

general conceptions of natural philosophy, and with the special doc

trines, information, and hypotheses of physiological research which

in the course of time had occupied an ever-broader space in the

systems of science, that it became encumbered with an excessive

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growth of etiological theories, 1 and first found in Hippocrates the

reformer who reduced this tendency to its proper measure and gave

back to the physician s art its old character in contrast to scientific

doctrine. 2

Moreover, the Greek nation, matured by the stern experience

which had been its lot within and without, had entered upon the

age of manhood. It had lost its naive faith in old tradition, and

had learned the value of knowledge and ability for practical life.

Of science, which up to this time had followed in quiet the pure

impulse of investigation the noble curiosity which seeks knowledge

for its own sake the state now demanded light on the questions

which disturbed it, counsel and help in the doubt into which the

luxuriance of its own development in culture had plunged it. In

the feverish emulation of intellectual forces which this greatest

period in the world s history brought with it, the thought everywhere

gained recognition that in every walk in life the man of knowledge

is the most capable, the most useful, and the most successful. In

every department of practical activity, the fruitful innovation of

independent reflection, of individual judgment, took the place of the

old life controlled by custom. The mass of the people was seized with

the burning desire to make the results of science its own. v lt was espe

cially true, however, that at this time family tradition, habituation,

personal excellence of character and address were no longer suffi

cient, as formerly, for the man who wished to play a political part.

The variety of transactions and the attendant difficulties, as well as

the intellectual status of those with whom and upon whom he would

work, made a theoretical schooling for the political career indispen

sable. Nowhere was this movement so powerful as in Athens, then

the capital of Greece, and here also these desires found their fullest

satisfaction.

For the supply followed the demand. The men of science, the

Sophists (&lt;ro&lt;icrrai), stepped forth out of the schools into public life,

and taught the people what they themselves had learned or discov

ered. They did this, indeed, partly out of the noble impulse to

teach their fellow-citizens, 3 but it was none the less true that this

teaching became their business. From all parts of Greece men of

the different schools flocked toward Athens to expound their doc-

1 This innovation in medicine began among the physicians who stood in near

relation to .Pythagoreanism, especially with Alcmaeon. Asa literary instance

of it, the writing which goes falsely under the name of Hippocrates, vtpl diairris,

serves. Cf. II. Siebeck, Gesch. d. Psych. I. 1, 94 ff.

2 Cf. principally his writings Trepi apx\*^\* IT)TPIKTJS and vep

3 Cf. Protagoras in Plato, Prot. 316 d.

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trines, and from so expounding them in the capital as well as in

the smaller cities, to gain honour and wealth.

In this way it happened that in a short time not only the social

position of science, but its own inner nature, its tendency and the

questions for its solution, were fundamentally changed. It became

j a social power, a determining factor in political life, as in the case

of Pericles ; but just by this means it came into a state of dependence

upon the demands of practical, and in particular, of political life.

These demands showed themselves principally in the facts that

the democratic polity demanded of politicians first of all the capac

ity for public speaking, and that in consequence the instruction

of the Sophists was especially sought as a preparation for public

life, and converged more and more upon this object. Men of science

became teachers of eloquence.

As such, however, they lost sight of the goal of nature-knowledge,

the vision of which had formerly hovered before the eyes of science.

At the most they presented transmitted doctrines in the most grace

ful and pleasing form possible. But their own investigations, if

they were not confined to a formal routine, were necessarily directed

toward man s thinking and ivilling, the activities which public

speaking was designed to determine and control, toward the

manner in which ideas and volitions arise, and the way in which

they contend with one another and maintain their mutual rights.

In this way Greek science took an essentially anthropological or -

subjective direction, studying the inner activities of man, his

ideation and volition, and at the same time lost its purely theoretical

character and acquired a preponderantly practical significance. 1 J &lt; -

But while the activity of the Sophists found itself brought face

to face with the manifold character of human thought and will,

while the teachers of eloquence were presenting the art of persua

sion and pursuing the path upon which every opinion could be

helped to victory, every purpose to its achievement, the question

rose before them whether above and beyond these individual opin

ions and purposes which each one feels within himself as a necessity

and can defend against others, there is anything whatever that

is right and true in itself. The question whether there is anything \*

universally valid, is the problem of the anthropological period of

Greek philosophy, or of the Greek Enlightenment.

For it is likewise the problem of the time, of a time in which

religious faith and the old morality were wavering, a time when the

1 Cicero s well-known expression (Tusc. V. 4, 10) with regard to Socrates

holds good for the entire philosophy of this period.

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respect which authority had commanded sank more and more, and

all tended towards an anarchy of individuals who had become self-

governing. Very soon this internal disintegration of the Greek

spirit became clearly evident in the disorders of the Peloponnesian

war, and with the fall of Athenian supremacy the flower of Grecian

culture withered.

The dangers of this condition were at first decidedly increased by

philosophy. For while the Sophists were perfecting the scientific

development of the formal art of presentation, verification, and refu

tation which they had to teach, they indeed created with this rheto

ric, on the one hand, the beginnings of an independent psychology,

and raised this branch of investigation from the inferior position

which it had taken in the cosmological systems to the importance of

a fundamental science, and developed, on the other hand, the prelim

inaries for a systematic consideration of the logical and ethical norms.

But as they considered what they practised and taught, viz. the

skill to carry through any proposition whatever, 1 the relativity of

human ideas and purposes presented itself to their consciousness so

clearly and with such overwhelming force that they disowned in

quiry as to the existence of a universally valid truth in the theoreti

cal, as well as in the practical sphere, and so fell into a scepticism

which at first was a genuine scientific theory, but soon became a

frivolous play. With their self-complacent, pettifogging advocacy,

the Sophists made themselves the mouth-piece of all the unbridled

tendencies which were undermining the order of public life.

The intellectual head of the Sophists was Protagoras; at least, he

was the only one who was the author of any conceptions philosophi

cally fruitful and significant. Contrasted with him, Gorgias, who is

usually placed at his side, appears only as a rhetorician who occa

sionally attempted the domain of philosophy and surpassed the

artifices of the Eleatic dialectic. Hippias and Prodicus are only to

be mentioned, the one as the type of a popularising polyhistor, and

the other as an example of superficial moralising.

To the disordered activity and lack of conviction of the younger

Sophists, Socrates opposed faith in reason and a conviction of the

existence of a universally valid truth. This conviction was with

him of an essentially practical sort; it was his moral disposition, but

it led him to an investigation of knowledge, which he anew set over

against opinions, and whose essence he found in conceptional thought.

Socrates and the Sophists stand, accordingly, on the ground of

1 Cf. the well-known rbv TJTTW \6yov Kpflrria iroitiv, Aristoph. Nnl&gt; 112 ff.,

893 ff. ; Arist. Ehet. II. 24, 1402 a 23.

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the same common consciousness of the time, and discuss the same

problems ; but where the Sophists with their skill and learning re

main caught iu the confusion of the opinions of the day and end

with a negative result, there the plain, sound sense, and the pure

and noble personality of Socrates find again the ideals of morality

and science.

The strong impression which the teaching of Socrates made forced

the Sophistic activity into new lines. It followed him in the at

tempt to gain, through scientific insight, sure principles for the

ethical conduct of life. While the old schools had for the most part

become disintegrated, and had diverted their activity to the teaching

of rhetoric, men who had enjoyed intercourse with the Athenian

sage now founded new schools, in whose scientific work Socratic

and Sophistic principles were often strangely intermingled, while

the exclusively anthropological direction of their investigation

remained the same.

Among these schools, called for the most part " Socratic," though

not quite accurately, the Megarian, founded by Euclid, fell most

deeply into the unfruitful subtleties of the later Sophists. Con

nected with this is the Elean-Eretrian School, the most unimportant.

The fundamental contrast, however, in the conception of life which

prevailed in the Greek life of that day, found its scientific expression

in the teachings of those two schools whose opposition permeates all

ancient literature from that time on: namely, the Cynic and the

Cyrenaic, the precursors of the Stoic and Epicurean. The first of

these schools numbers among its adherents, besides its founder

Antisthenes, the popular figure of Diogenes. In the latter, which is

also called the Hedonistic School, the founder, Aristippus, was suc

ceeded by a grandson of the same name, and later by Tlieodorus,

Anniceris, ffegesias, and Euemerus.

The wandering teachers known as the Sophists came in part from the earlier

scholastic societies. In the second half of the fifth century these had for the

most part disappeared, and had given place to a freer announcement of opinions

attained, which was not unfavourable to special research, particularly physiologi

cal research, as in the case of Hippo, Cleidemus, and Diogenes of Apollonia,

but which was attended by a crippling of general speculation. Only the school

of Abdera and the Pythagorean School survived this time of dissolution. A

society of Heracliteans which maintained itself in Ephesus appears soon to have

fallen away into the pursuits of the Sophists, as in the case of Cratylus. 1

From the Atomistic School came Protagoras of Abdera (about 480-410). lie

was one of the first, and rightly the most renowned, of these wandering teachers.

Active at various times in Athens, he is said to have been convicted of impiety

in that city, to have fied because of this, and to have met his death in flight. Of

his numerous treatises, grammatical, logical, ethical, political, and religious in

their character, very little has been preserved.

In Plato (The&lt;zt. 181 A) they are called ol ftovw. cf. Arist. Met. IV. 5,

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Gorgias of Leontini (483-375) was in Athens in 427 as an envoy from his

native city, and there gained great literary influence. In old age he lived in

Larissa in Thessaly. He came from the Sicilian school of orators, with which

Empedocles also had been connected. 1

Concerning Hippias of Elis, with the exception of some opinions (among

which are those criticised in the Platonic dialogue Hippias Major), it is known

only that he made great parade of his "much knowledge." Of Prodicus of

lulls, a town on the island of Ceos, the familiar allegory "Hercules at the Cross

roads" is preserved by Xenophon, Mmwr. 11. 1,21. The remaining Sophists,

known for the most part through Plato, are without intrinsic importance. We

know only that this or that characteristic affirmation is put in the mouth of one

or another.

In forming a conception of the Sophistic doctrine we have to contend with the

difficulty that we are made acquainted with them almost exclusively through

their victorious opponents, Plato and Aristotle. The first has given in the Pro-

tayoras a graceful, lively delineation of a Sophist congress, redolent with fine

irony, in the Goryias a more earnest, in the Theatetus a sharper criticism, and

in the Cratylus and Euthydemus supercilious satire of the Sophists methods of

teaching. In the dialogue the Sophist, to which 1 lato s name is attached, an

extremely malicious definition of the theories of the Sophists is attfmpted, and

Aristotle reaches the sime result in the book on the fallacies of the Sophists

(Ch. I. 165 a 21).

The history of philosophy for a long time repeated the depreciatory judg

ment of opponents of the Sophists, and allowed the word 0-o0m?s (which

meant only a "learned man," or, if you will, a " professor") to bear the dis

paraging meaning which they had given it. Hegel rehabilitated the Sophists,

and thereupon it followed, as often happens, that they were for a time eve r-

estimated, as by Grote.

M. Schanz, Die Sophistm (Geittingen, 1867).

Socrates of Athens (469-399) makes an epoch in the history of philosophy,

even by his external characteristics, by his original personality, and his new

style of philosophising. He was neither savant nor wandering teacher, le-

longed to no school and adhered to none. He was a simple man of the people,

the son of a sculptor, and at first busied himself with the chisel. In his ardent

desire for knowledge he absorbed the new doctrines with which the streets of

his native city re-echoed, but did not allow himself to be dazzled by these brill

iant rhetorical efforts, nor did he find himself much advanced by them. His

keen thought took note of their contradictions, and his moral earnestness was

offended by the superficiality and frivolity of this constant effort after culture.

He held it to be his duty to enlighten himself and his fellow-citizens concerning

the emptiness of this pretended knowledge, and, through earnest investigation,

to follow after truth. So, a philosopher of this opportunity and of daily life, he

worked unremittingly among his fellow-citizens, until misunderstanding and per

sonal intrigue brought him before the court which condemned him to the death

that was to become his greatest glory.

The accounts concerning him give a clear and trustworthy picture of his per

sonality. In these accounts Plato s finer and Xenophon s coarser portrayal

supplement each other most happily. The first in almost all his writings brings

out the honoured teacher with dramatic vividness. Of the second we have to

consider the Memorabilia ( \iro^vrnjMvev^a.Ta. ~ZwKparovs) and the Symposium.

As regards his teaching, the case is more difficult, for here the presentations of

both Xenophon and Plato are partisan writings, each laying claim to the famous

name for his own doctrine (in the case of Xenophon a mild Cynicism). The

statements of Aristotle are authoritative on all essential points, because of the

greater historical separation and the freer point of view.

E. Alberti, Sokrates (Gottingen, 1869) ; A. Labriola, La Dottrina di Socrate

(Naples, 1871) ; A. Fouill6e, La Philosophic de Socrate (Paris, 1873).

Euclid of Megara founded his school soon after the death of Socrates. The

two Eristics (see below), Eubulides of Miletus, Alexinus of Klis, Diodorus

Cronus of Caria (died 307), and Stilpo (380-300), are to be mentioned as

1 In regard to these relationships cf. H. Diels, Berichte der Berl, Akademie,

1884, pp. 343 ff.

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belonging to this school, which had only a brief existence, and later became

incorporated with the Cynics and Stoics. The same is true of the society which

Pheedo, the favourite pupil of Socrates, founded in his home at Elis, and which

Menedemus soon after transplanted to Eretria. Cf. E. Mallet, Histoire de

Vecole de Megare et des ecoles (T Elis et &lt;T Eretrie (Paris, 1845).

The founder of the Cynic School (named after the gymnasium Cynosar-

ges) was Antisthenes of Athens, who, like Euclid, was an older friend of

Socrates. The singular Diogenes of Sinope is rather a characteristic by-figure

in the history of civilisation than a man of science. In this connection Crates

of Thebes may also be mentioned. Later this school was blended with that of

the Stoics.

F. Dummler, Antisthenica (Halle, 1882) ; K. W. Gottling, Diogenes der

Kyniker, oder die Philosophie des griechischen Proletariats (Ges. Abhandl.

I. 251 ff.).

Aristippus of Cyrene, a Sophist and wandering teacher, somewhat younger

than Euclid and Antisthenes, and united only for a little time with the Socratic

circle, founded his school in old age, and seems to have left to his grandson the

systematic development of thoughts, which, for himself, were rather a practical

principle of life. The above-named successors (Theodoras, etc.) extend into

the third century, and form the transition to the Epicurean School, which took

up the remnants of the Hedonistic into itself.

A. Wendt, De Philosophia Cyrenaica (Gottingen, 1841).

### 7. The Problem of Morality.

The reflections of the Gnomic poets and the sentences of the

so-called seven wise men had already, as their central point, the

admonition to observe moderation. In like manner the pessimistic

complaints which we meet among poets, philosophers, and moralists

of the fifth century are directed for the most part against the

unbridled license of men, their lack of discipline and of obedience

to law. The more serious minds discerned the danger which the

passionate seething and foaming of public life brought with it, and

the political experience that party strife was ethically endurable

only where it left the order of the laws untouched, made subjection

to law appear as the supreme duty. Heraclitus and the Pythagoreans

expressed this with complete clearness, and knew how to attach it

to the fundamental conceptions of their metaphysical theories. 1

We meet here with two assumptions which even among these

thinkers appear as self-evident presuppositions. The first is the,

^validity of laws. The nai ve consciousness obeys the command

without asking whence it comes or by what it is justified. Laws

have actual existence, those of morals as well as those of the courts ;

they are here once for all, and the individual has to follow them.

\* No one in the pre-Sophistic period thought of examining the law

and asking in what its claim to valid authority consists. The sec

ond assumption is a conviction which is fundamental in the moralis

ing of all peoples and all times : viz. that obedience to the law

brings advantage, disregard of it, disadvantage. As the result of

1 Cf. above, p. 63, note 5.

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this thought admonition takes on the character of persuasive coun

sel, 1 which is directed to the shrewdness of the one admonished as

well as to the desires slumbering within him.

"With the Greek Enlightenment confidence in both of these pre

suppositions began to waver, and accordingly morality became for

it a problem.

1. The impulse to this came from the experiences of public life.

The frequent and sudden change of constitutions was indeed adapted

to undermine the authority of law. It not only took away the halo

of unconditional, unquestioned validity from the individual law,

but it accustomed the citizen of the democratic republic especially

to reflect and decide upon the ground and validity of laws as he

consulted and voted. Political law became a subject for discussion,

and the individual set himself with his judgment above it. If, now,

besides noting this mutation in time, attention is also given

to the variety exhibited not only in the political laws, but also in

the usages prescribed by customary morality in the different states

and among different peoples, the consequence is that the worth of

universal validity for all men can no longer be attributed to laws.

At least this holds good in the first place for all laws made by man ;

in any case, therefore, for political laws.

In the face of these experiences the question arose whether there

is anything whatever that is valid everywhere and always, any law

that is independent of the difference between peoples, states, and

times, and therefore authoritative for all. Greek ethics began thus

with a problem which was completely parallel to the initial problem of

physics. The essence of things which remains ever the same and

survives all changes the philosophers of the first period had called

Nature (&lt;wns) : 3 it is now asked whether there is also determined

by this unchanging Nature (&lt;ixr) a law that is exalted above ~

all change and all differences, and in contrast with this it is pointed

out that all existing prescriptions valid only for a time, and within

a limited territory, are given and established by human institution or

statute (Ot&ti or vo/xo&gt;).

This contrast between Nature and institution or statute is the

most characteristic work of the Greek Enlightenment in the forma-

1 A typical example of this is the allegory of Prodicus, in which the choosing

Hercules is promised golden mountains by Virtue as well as by Vice, in case he

will intrust himself to her guidance.

2 Hippias in Xen. Mem. IV. 4, 14 ff.

8 Ilepi &lt;t&gt;i&gt;fffws is the title borne by the writings of all the older philosophers.

It is to be emphasised that the constitutive mark of the concept &lt;wm was

originally that of remaining ever like itself. The contrary of this is then the

transient, that which occurs a single time.

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tion of conceptions. It dominates the entire philosophy of the

period, and has from the beginning not only the meaning of a prin

ciple of genetic explanation, but the significance of a norm or stan

dard/or the estimation of worth. If there is anything universally

valid, it is that which is valid " by Nature " for all men without

distinction of people and time ; what has been established by man

in the course of history has only historical worth, worth for a single

occasion. That only is justly authorised which Nature determines,

but human institution goes beyond this. The " law " (vo/ao?) tyr

annises over man and forces him to much that is contrary to Nature. 1

Philosophy formulated in its conceptions that opposition between a

natural, " divine " law and the written law/ which formed the theme

of the Antigone of Sophocles.

^ Out of this antithesis came the problems, on the one hand, to

establish in what this law of Nature, everywhere the same, consists;

on the other, to understand how, in addition to this, the institutions

of historical law arise.

The first problem Protagoras did not avoid. In the mythical

presentation of his thought which Plato has preserved, 2 he taught

that the gods gave to all men in equal measure a sense of justice, and

of ethical respect or reverence (81/07 an d &lt;"8ws), in order that in the

struggle of life they might be able to form permanent unions for

mutual preservation. He found, therefore, the &lt;WTO of practical

life in primary ethical feelings which impel man to union in society

and in the state. The carrying out of this thought in its details and

the definition of the boundary between this which is valid by Nature

(&lt;/&gt;uo-a) and the positive determinations of historical institution are

unfortunately not preserved to us.

There are, however, many indications that the theory of the

Sophists proceeded from such fundamental conceptions to a wide-

reaching criticism of existing conditions, and to the demand for pro

found revolutions in social and political life. The thought was

already at that time forcing its way forward, that all distinctions

between men before the law rest only upon institution, and that

Nature demands equal right for all. Lycophron desired to do away

with the nobility. Alcidamas 3 and others 4 combated slavery from

this point of view. Phaleas demanded equality of property as well

as of education for all citizens, and Hippodamus was the first to

1 Hippias in Plat. Prot. 337 C.

2 Plat. Prot. 320 ff. Cf. A. Harpff, Die Ethik des Protagoras (Heidelberg,

1884).

3 Arist. lihft. I. 13, 1373 b 18. Cf. also Oral. Attic, (ed. Bekker) II. 154.

\* Arist. Pol. 1.3, 1 253 b20.

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project the outlines of an ideal state, constituted according to

reason. Even the thought of a political equality of women with

men came to the surface in this connection. 1

If now positive legislation deviates from these demands of Nature,

its rationale is to be sought only in the interests of those who make

the laws. Whether this takes the form assumed in the opinion of

Thrasymachus 2 of Chalcedon, who held that it is those in power

who by means of the law force the subjects to do what is for their

(the masters ) advantage, or whether it wears the contrary form as

developed by Callicles, 3 that laws have been erected by the great

mass of the weak as a bulwark against the power of strong person

alities which would be superior to the individual, and that according

to the view of Lycophron 4 all those who do no harm to others thus

mutually assure for themselves life and property, in all these

cases the ground of the laws lies in the interests of those who make

them.

2. If personal interest is therefore the ground for setting up laws,

it is also the sole motive for obeying them. Even the moralist wishes

to convince man that it is for his interest to accommodate himself

to the law. From this it follows, however, that obedience to the

law is under obligation to extend only so far as it is the indi

viduals interest. And there are cases where the two do not coincide.

It is not true that only subordination to law makes a man happy ;

there are great criminals, so Polus works out the thought, 5 who

have attained the happiest results by the most frightful misdeeds.

Experience contradicts the claim that only right doing leads to

happiness ; it shows rather that a shrewd conduct of life, restrained

by no regard for right and law, is the best guaranty of good for-

Jbune. 6

Through such considerations the scepticism which had originally,

as it seems, 7 been directed only toward the validity of political

law, gradually attacked that of the moral laws as well./ What

Polus, Callicles, and Thrasymachus propound in the Platonic dia

logues, the Gorgias and the Republic, with regard to the concep

tions of the just and unjust (SLKO.IOV and a8icov) has reference in

equal measure to the moral and to the political law. This double

reference is effected through the middle ground of the characteristics

1 The persiflage in the Ecclesiazusce of Aristophanes can refer only to this.

2 Plat. E?p. 338 C.

8 Plat. Gory. 483 B.

\* Arist. Pnl. III. 9, 12801) 11.

s In Plat. Gnrg. 471.

6 Cf. the praise of dSuda. by Thrasymachus in Plat. Rep. 344 A.

7 This is especially true of Protagoras, perhaps also of Hippias.

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of penal justice, and proves that the law of Nature is set over

against, not only the civil law, but also the requirements of morals.

In both respects the naturalism and radicalism of the younger

Sophists pushed on to the extreme consequences.\ The weak may

subject himself to the law ; he is, though, but the slupid man, serv

ing the uses of others by so doing ; the strong, however, who is at

the same time the wise, does not allow himself to be led astray by

the law; he follows solely the impulse of his own nature. And this

is the right, if not according to human law, yet according to the

higher law of Nature. She shows in all living beings that the

stronger should rule the weaker ; only for the slave is it becoming

to recognise a command above himself. The free man should not

bridle his desires, but let them have full development; according to

human law it may be a disgrace to do injustice, according to the

dictates of Nature it is a disgrace to suffer injustice. 2

In such forms the individual s natural disposition, the constitution

of his impulses, was proclaimed as law of Nature, and exalted to be

the supreme law of action ; and Archelaus, a disciple of Anaxagoras,

belonging to the Sophistic period, proclaimed that the predicates

good and bad, "just" and "shameful" (Sucotov al^xpov), spring

not from Nature, but from Institution. All ethical judging is con

ventional. 5

3. Religious ideas were also involved in this overthrow as a mat

ter of course, and all the more since after their theoretical value

had been taken away, at least in educated circles, by the cosmologi-

cal philosophy typified by Xenophanes, they had retained recogni

tion only as allegorical methods of presenting ethical conceptions.

In this latter line of thought the school of Anaxagoras had been

active for a time, especially a certain Metrodorus of Lampsacus. It

was only a consequence of the ethical relativism of the Sophists

when Prodicus taught that men had made to themselves gods out of

all that brought them blessing, and when Critias declared belief in

the gods to be an invention of shrewd statecraft. 4 If such claims

still excited indignation among the masses and the powers of the

official priesthood, 5 it was easy for Protagoras in the presence of

these questions to wrap himself in the mantle of his scepticism. 6

4. The position of Socrates with reference to this whole move

ment presents two sides : on the one hand, he brought the principle

1 Thrasymachus in Plat. Rep. 343 C.

2 Callicles in Plat. Gorg. 483 A and 491 E.

3 Diog. Laert. II. 1(5

Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. IX. 51-54.

6 As is shown by the condemnation of Diagoras of Melos (Aristoph. Av. 1073).

Diog. Laert. IX. 51.

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underlying the movement to its clearest and most comprehensive

expression ; on the other hand, he set himself in the most vigorous

manner against its outcome, and both these sides of his activity,

contrary as they seem to be and much as this external opposition

had to do with the tragic fate of the man, stand, nevertheless, in the

most exact and rigidly consistent connection ; for just by grasping

the principle of the Enlightenment in all its depth, and formulating

it in its full force, did Socrates succeed in developing from it a

positive result of wide-reaching power.

For him, also, the time for following traditional customs without

question is past. Independent judgment of individuals has taken

the place of authority. But while the Sophists gave their attention

to the analysis of the feelings and impulses which lie at the basis of

the actual decisions of individuals, and ultimately saw themselves

forced to adjudge to all these motives the equal right of an unfold

ing in accordance with the necessity of Nature, Socrates, on the

contrary, reflected upon precisely that element which was the deci

sive factor in the culture of his tim e : namely, the practical, polit

ical, and social significance which knowledge and spiejijce had

achieved. Just through the process in which individuals had

achieved independence, through the unfettering of personal passions,

it had become evident that in all fields mans ability rests upon his

insight. In this Socrates found that objective standard for the esti

mation of men and their actions which the Sophists had sought in

vain in the machinery of feelings and desires.

Ability, then, or excellence (Tuchtigkeit, aperrj) is insight. He

who acts according to feelings, according to presuppositions that

are not clear, according to customs that have been handed down, /&gt;.

may indeed occasionally hit the right thing, but he does not know

it, he is not sure of the issue ; he who is entirely involved in delusion

and error as to the matter in hand is certain to make mistakes ; he

only will be able to act right who has the right knowledge of things

and of himself. 1 Scientific knowledge (eVio-n^T;) is therefore the

basis of all qualities which make man able and useful, of all single

dperat .

This insight consists, on the one hand, in an exact knowledge of the

things to which the action is to relate. Man should understand liis

business; as we find the able man in every business to be the one

who has learned it thoroughly and knows the objects with which he

has to work, so should it be also in civil and political life ; here, too,

1 These fundamental thoughts of Socrates are reproduced by Xenophon and

Plato in countless turns and variations. In Xenophon the passage, Mem. III.

ch. 9, is most important for comparison; in Plato, the dialogue Protagoras.

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only insight should be trusted. 1 The individual excellences differ

entiate themselves accordingly with reference to the objects which

the knowledge concerns in the individual case ; 2 common to all,

however, is not only knowledge in general, but also self-knowledge.

Hence Socrates declared it to be his principal vocation to educate

himself and his fellow-citizens to earnest self-examination ; the

yvoJ& ercavTov was the watch-word of his teaching. 3

5./ These considerations, which Socrates developed out of the

principles by which practical ability or excellence is determined,

became transferred by the aid of the ambiguity in the word apery, 4

to ethical excellence also, or virtue, and so led to the fundamental

doctrine that virtue consists in knowledge of the good\* So far the

course of thought followed by Socrates is clear and free from doubt.

The sources become less clear when we ask what the man who was

so strenuous to reach clearly denned conceptions intended by the

oojd. According to Xenophon s exposition, the good (dyafloV) must

have coincided everywhere, for his master, with the profitable or

useful (w&lt;eAt/Aov). Virtue would then be the knowledge of what

was suited to the end in view, or useful, in each particular instance.

This interpretation is the easiest to attach to that analogy between

moral virtue and the various kinds of excellence shown in daily

life, which Socrates really taught, and the presentation given in the

earliest Platonic dialogues, in particular the Protagoras attributes

to Socrates this standpoint of individual advantage. Insight or dis

cernment (here called prudence, &lt;f&gt;p6vr)&lt;ns) is a measuring art, which

weighs exactly the benefit and the harm that will result from the

action, and so chooses what is most to the purpose. In further agree

ment with this view is the fact that in exact contrast with the

Sophists, who demanded a free and uncramped development of the

passions, Socrates emphasised no virtue so much, and exhibited none

so fully in his own life, as that of self-control (o-ox^ocrwiy).

But according to this interpretation the Socratic conception of

the good would be indefinite in its content ; decision must be made

from case to case as to what suits the end in view, or is useful, and

1 Hence, too, the anti-democratic position, so fatal for his personal destiny,

taken by Socrates, who demanded expressly that the most difficult and most

responsible art, that of governing, should be practised only by those of the most

complete discernment, and who on this account absolutely rejected the appoint

ment of state officials by lot or popular choice.

2 Socrates did not attempt a system of the individual excellences ; on the

other hand, he did give by way of example definitions of courage (cf. the Platonic

Laches), piety (Plat. Euthyphro, Xen. Mem. IV. 6, 3), justice (Mem. IV. 6, 6),

etc.

3 As defined by his theoretical philosophy; see 8.

4 The same ambiguity which has given occasion to countless difficulties lies

in the Latin virtus ; so, too, in dyaMr, bonum, good.

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instead of the good we should again always have what is good for

something. 1 It may be regarded as certain that Socrates strove to

transcend this relativism, and also that by reason of the anthropo

logical basis of his thinking he did not get beyond this position in

the formulation of his conceptions. v His doctrine that it is better to

suffer wrong than to do wrong, his strict conformity to law, in

accordance with which he scorned to avoid the execution of an

unjust sentence and preserve himself by flight for further life and

activity, his admonition that the true meaning of life consists in

evTrpa&a, in continual right-doing, in man s ceaseless labour for ethical

improvement, in the participation in all that is good and beautiful

(KaAoKdya& a), especially, however, his erotic, i.e. his doctrine that

friendship and the relation of attachment between teacher and

taught should consist only in a mutual striving to become good or

constantly better through their life in common and their mutual

furtherance of each other s aims, all this goes far beyond the con

ception presented by Xenophon. It can be united with the stand

point of utility only if we attribute~to Socrates the distinction

between the true \velfare of the soul, on the one hand, and earthly

gain, on the other, which Plato makes him set forth in the Phcedo,

but of which we elsewhere find but slight traces, since the historic

Socrates, even according to Plato s Apology, maintained a completely

sceptical position with regard to personal immortality, and did not

know the sharp Platonic separation between immateriality and cor

poreality. Socrates teaches, indeed, even according to Xenophon,

that man s true fortune is to be sought, not in outward goods nor in

luxurious life, but in virtue alone : if, however, this virtue is to

consist only in the capacity to recognise the truly useful and act

accordingly, the doctrine moves in a circle as soon as it maintains

that this truly useful is just virtue itself. In this circle Socrates &gt;

remained fast ; the objective determination of the conception of the

good which he sought he did not find.

6. However indefinite the answer to the question as to what

should properly form the content of that knowledge of the good

which constitutes virtue, Socrates was at all events convinced

and this proved much more important that this knowledge is

in itself sufficient to cause one to do the good, and so bring happi

ness. This proposition, which may serve as a type of a rationalis

tic conception of life, contains two pregnant presuppositions, one

psychological, viz. pronounced intellectualism, the other ethical, viz.

pronounced eudcemonism.

1 Xen. Mem. III. 8, 5.

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The fundamental assumption which. Socrates thus makes is

indeed the expression of his own reflective, judicious nature. Every

man, he says, acts in the manner that he considers best suited for

his end, most beneficial and most useful ; no one does that which

he knows to be unfit for the end in view, or even fit in a lesser

degree. If, then, virtue is knowledge of what is to the purpose, it

follows immediately that the virtuous man acts in accordance with

his knowledge, therefore to the purpose, rightly, in the way that is

beneficial to him. No one does wrong knowingly and purposely : he

only does not act rightly who has not right insight. If it sometimes

seems as if some one acted wrongly in the face of better insight

"against his better judgment" it must be that he was not clearly

and surely in possession of this better knowledge, for otherwise he

would have purposely injured himself, which is absurd.

In. this a fundamental difference between Socrates and the

Sophists becomes evident: the latter maintained the originality of

the will, and on that account its warrant from Nature ; for Socrates,

to will a thing and to regard a thing as good, profitable, and useful

are the same thing. Knowledge determines the will without

opposition ; man does what he holds to be best. True as it may be

that Socrates was in error in this opinion, and that the truth lies in

the mean between him and the Sophists, this his intellectualistic

conception of the will came to exercise a decisive influence over all

ancient ethics.

Sin is, then, error. He who does a bad act does it from a mistaken

judgment, regarding the bad, i.e. the injurious, as the good ; for every

one believes that he is doing the good, i.e. the advantageous. Only

because the case stands thus is there any meaning in instructing

men ethically ; only for this reason is virtue capable of being taught.

For all teaching addresses itself to man s knowledge. Because ma-nr

can be taught what the good is, therefore and by this means alone

he can be brought to the stage of right action. Were virtue not

knowledge, it would not be capable of being taught.

From this standpoint Socrates raised the customary morality

taught by the popular moralising to a scientific plane. All his

keenness, his subtlety, and dialectical dexterity were employed to

prove against the Sophists that not only the surest, but even the

only sure way of attaining to permanent happiness, lies in obeying

ethical prescriptions under all circumstances, in subordination to law

and morals. So he gives back to Authority her right. The prin-

1 Compare in Plato the refutation of Thrasymachus in the first book of the

Republic, which may be regarded as Socratic in its principles, but which in part

is very weakly supported, both in form and in matter.

CIIAI. 2, 7.] Problem of Morality : Socrates. 81

ciple of the Enlightenment tolerates no unquestioning subjection to

the existing state of things and requires examination of the laws ;

but these laws sustain the examination, they evince themselves to be

requirements made by insight into what is for the best ; and because

it has now been recognised that it is the right course to obey them,

unconditional obedience must be rendered. 1 Far from being in con

flict with the institutions of law and morals, Socrates is rather the

one who undertook to prove their reasonableness and thereby their

claim to universal validity. 2 ^

F. Wildauer, Socrates 1 Lehre vom Willen. Innsbruck, 1877.

M. Heinze, Der Euddmonismus in der griechischen Philosophic. Leips.

1883.

7. In addition to the psychologico-ethical presuppositions that

the will is always directed toward what is recognised as good,

and that therefore virtue, as -knowledge of the good, draws after it

of itself the appropriate action, we find in the argumentations of

Socrates the further opinion that this appropriate action of the

virtuous man actually attains its end and makes him happy. Happi

ness or well-being (evScu/xovia) is the necessary result of virtue. The

intelligent man knows, and hence does, what is good for him ; he

must then, through his doing, become happy also. This assump

tion applies, however, only to a perfect intelligence which would

be absolutely certain of the effects that an intended action would

have in the connected series of the world s events.

1 In details, as might be expected from the nature of the case, this rehabilita

tion of the popular morals falls into trivial moralising, especially as Xenophon

portrays it. But while Socrates hoped precisely by this means to render the

right service to his people, it proved to be just the point where he came to the

ground between two stools : with the Sophists and their adherents, he passed for

a reactionary ; on the other hand, the men who, like Aristophanes, saw pre

cisely in the questioning of the authority of law and morals in general, the dan

gerous cancer of the time, without investigation classed him who wished to

place this authority on a basis of reason, among those who were undermining

it. So it was that it could come about that Socrates appeared in the Clouds of

Aristophanes as the type of Sophistic teaching which he combated.

2 It is hence quite alien to the principles of Socrates to demand or even to

allow for every individual act a special examination of the grounds of the polit

ical or ethical command If, for example, it has once been recognised as right

to obey the ordinances of the government under all circumstances, this obedience

must then be rendered, even if the ordinance evidently commands the unreason

able and the unjust ; cf . Plato s Crito. If, as was true of Socrates himself, a man

is convinced that his life is under divine guidance, and that where his insight

does not suffice, a higher voice warns him through his feeling, at least, warns

him away from what is wrong, then he must obey this voice. Cf. on the

SalfjMviov, 8. The essential thing always is that a man give an account to him

self of his doing, but the grounds on which he acts in so doing may even consist

in such maxims as exclude an examination in individual cases.

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The transmitted expressions of Socrates, in fact, make the impres

sion that he was convinced that man could possess that insight

which by its operation upon his action and its consequences is

adapted to bring about happiness, and that he might gain this

insight through philosophy : that is, through unremitting earnest

examination of himself, of others, and of the relations of human

life. Investigations as to how far the world s course, which man

cannot foresee, may cross and destroy the operation even of the best

planned and most intelligent conduct of life, are not to be pointed

out in the teaching of Socrates. . When we consider the slight

degree of confidence which he otherwise had in human knowledge,

as soon as this attempted to venture beyond establishing ethical

conceptions and practical requirements, we can explain the above

conviction only on the following basis he did not fear that the

providential guidance, which was for him indeed an object not of

knowledge, but of faith, would frustrate the beneficial consequences

of right action.

8. Socrates had defined virtue, the fundamental ethical concep

tion, as insight, and this in turn as knowledge of the good, but had

given to the concept oftHe good no universal content, and in a cer

tain respect had left it open. This made it possible for the most

diverse conceptions of life to introduce their views of the ultimate

end (rcAos) of human existence into this open place in the Socratic

concept; and so this first incomplete work in the formation of ethi

cal conceptions at once afforded the material for a number of partic

ular structures. 1 The most important, of these are the Cynic and

the Cyrenaic. Both present the attempt to define the true intrinsic

worth of the life of the individual in a universal manner. Both

wish to show in what man s true happiness consists, how man must

be constituted and how he must act in order to attain this with cer

tainty ; both call this constitution or disposition through which

participation in happiness is gained, virtue. The eudaemonistic side

of the Socratic ethics is here developed in an entirely one-sided

manner, and though universal validity is vindicated for the concep

tion proposed, the point of view of the individual s happiness forms so

exclusively the standard that the worth of all relations of public

life even is estimated by it. In Cynicism, as in Hedonism, the Greek

spirit is proceeding to appropriate the fruit which the conditions

1 So indeed in the case of Xenophon and TEschines ; the philosophising cob

bler Simon, too, seems to have have been thus dependent on Socrates. What

the Megarian and the Elean-Kretrian schools accomplished in this respect is

too indefinitely transmitted to us, and is too closely in contact with Cynicism,

to deserve separate mention.

CHAP. 2, 7.] Problem of Morality : Antixthenes.

of life brought about by civilisation yield for the fortune of the

individual. The criticism of the social conditions and authorities,

begun by the Sophists, has won a fixed standard through the medi

ating aid of the Socratic conception of virtue.

The doctrine of virtue taught by Antisthenes 1 takes at the begin

ning a high and specious turn at the point where the doctrine finds

itself hopelessly entangled in the Socratic circle. He declines to

define more closely the contents of the concept of the good, and

declares virtue itself to be not only the highest, but the only good,

understanding, however, by virtue essentially only the intelligent con

duct of life. This alone makes happy, not indeed through the conse

quences which it brings about, but through itself. The contentment

that dwells within the right life itself is accordingly completely

independent of the world s course : virtue is itself sufficient for

happiness ; the wise man stands free in the presence of fate and

fortune.

But this Cynic conception of virtue as sufficient in itself is, as is

shown by its further development, in nowise to be interpreted as

meaning that the virtuous man should find his fortune in doing

good for its own sake amid all the whims of fate. Cynicism did

not rise to this height, however much it may sound like it when

virtue is celebrated as the only sure possession in the vicissitudes

of life, when it is designated as the only thing to be striven for,

and baseness, on the contrary, as the only thing to be avoided. This

doctrine is a postulate derived with great logical consistency from

the Socratic principle that virtue necessarily makes happy (cf.

above, 7), and from this postulate Antisthenes sought in turn to

define the real contents of the concept of virtue.

If, namely, virtue is to make happy with certainty and under all

circumstances, it must be that conduct of life which makes man as

independent as possible of (he course of events. Now every want and

every desire is a bond which makes man dependent upon fortune,

in so far as his happiness or unhappiness is made to consist in

whether a given wish is fulfilled or not by the course of life. We

have no power over the outer world, but we have power over our

desires. We expose ourselves the more to alien powers, the more

we desire, hope, or fear from them ; every desire makes us slaves of

the outer world. Virtue, then, which makes man independent, can

consist only in suppression of desires, and restriction of wants

to the smallest conceivable measure. Virtue is freedom from

wants, 2 from the standpoint of eudaemonism certainly the most

1 Principally preserved in Diog. Laert. VI. 3 Xen. Symp. 4, 34 ff.

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consistent conclusion, and one that must have appealed especially to

men of a humble position in life such as we find the Cynics to be in

part.

By carrying out this thought in a radical manner the Cynics came

to occupy a purely negative attitude toward civilisation. By aiming

to reduce the measure of the virtuous wise man s wants to what was

absolutely inevitable, and to regard all other strivings as pernicious

or indifferent, they rejected all the goods of civilisation and attained

the ideal of a state of Nature, an ideal stripped of all higher worth.

Taking up earlier Sophistic theories and developing them farther,

they taught that the wise man accommodates himself only to what

Nature peremptorily demands, but despises all that appears desir

able or worthy of obedience merely as the result of human opinion

or institution. Wealth and refinement, fame and honour, seemed to

them just as superfluous as those enjoyments of the senses which

went beyond the satisfaction of the most elementary wants of hunger

and love. Art and science, family and native land, were to them

indifferent, and Diogenes owed his paradoxical popularity to the

ostentatious jest of attempting to live in civilised Greece as if in a

state of Nature, solely &lt;u o-.

In this way the philosophising proletarian forced himself to despise

all the good things of civilisation, from the enjoyment of which he

found himself more or less excluded. On the other hand, he recog

nised none of the laws to which civilised society subjected itself, as

binding in themselves, and if there is any truth at all in the coarse

anecdotes which antiquity relates on the subject, this class took

pleasure in scoffing openly at the most elementary demands of

morals and decency. This forced and, in part, openly affected nat

uralism knows nothing any longer of BLK-TJ and aiSws (justice and rev

erence), which the older Sophistic teaching had allowed to remain

as natural impulses, and elicits a conception of virtue which sup

poses that greed and lust complete the essential qualities of the

natural man.

Yet the Cynics were not so bad as they made themselves.

Diogenes even preserved a remnant of respect for mental training,

as the only thing which could free man from the prejudices of con

ventional institutions and lead to freedom from wants by insight

into the nothingness of the pretended goods of civilisation. He

also conducted the education of the sons of Xeniades, a Corinthian

Sophist, according to the principles of the Cynic naturalism, and

not without success.

On the whole, this philosophy is a characteristic sign of the time,

the mark of a disposition which, if not hostile, was yet indifferent

CHAP. 2, 7.] Problem of Morality : Aristippus. 85

to society and had lost all comprehension of its ideal goods ; it ena

bles us to see from within how at that time Greek society was dis

integrating into individuals. When Diogenes called himself a

cosmopolitan, there was in this no trace of the ideal thought of a

community of all men, but only the denial of his adherence to any

civilised community ; and if Crates taught that the plurality of gods

exists only in the opinion of men, and that, " according to Nature,"

there is but one God, there is in the Cynic doctrine no trace to war

rant the conclusion that this monotheism was for them an especially

clear idea or even an especially deep feeling.

9. In complete contrast with this system stands Hedonism, the

philosophy of regardless enjoyment. Starting as did the Cynics

from the incompleteness of the Socratic doctrine, Aristippus struck

out in the opposite direction. He was quick to give to the concept

of the good, a clear and simple content, that of pleasure (fi&ovrj).

This latter conception at first does duty under the general psycholo

gical meaning of the feeling of contentment which grows out of

the fulfilment of every striving and wish. 1 Happiness is then the

state of pleasure which springs from the satisfied will. If this is

the only thing to be considered, it is a matter of indifference what

the object of will and of gratification is ; all depends on the

degree of pleasure, on the strength of the feeling of satisfaction. 2

This, however, in the opinion of Aristippus, is present in the highest

degree in the case of sensuous, bodily enjoyment which relates to

the immediate present, to the satisfaction of the moment. If, then,

virtue is knowledge directed toward happiness, it must enable man

to enjoy as much and as vigorously as possible. Virtue is ability

for enjoyment.

Every one, to be sure, may and can enjoy ; but only the man of

education, of intelligence, of insight the wise man understands

how to enjoy rightly. In this we must consider not only the

intelligent appraisal (&lt;J&gt;p6vrj&lt;Ti&lt;;) , which knows how to select, among

the various enjoyments that present themselves in the course of

life, those which will afford the pleasure that is highest, purest,

least mixed with pain; we must consider also the inner self-posses

sion of the man who is not blindly to follow every rising appetite,

and who, when he enjoys, is never to give himself entirely up to

the enjoyment, but is to stand above it and control it. The enjoy

ment which makes man the slave of things is, indeed, as the Cynics

1 Besides this, also, Xenophon not infrequently puts the idt into the mouth

of Socrates.

2 This, too, is a completely correct consequence from the eudsemonistic prin

ciple.

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say, to be rejected; but to delight in pleasure and yet not give one s

self up to it is harder than to renounce it, as they do. Of this,

however, man becomes capable through right insight only. 1

On this ground the Cyrenaics, in particular the younger Aristippus

(called /x^r/3o8t8aKTos, " mother-taught," because his grandfather s

wisdom was transmitted to him through his mother Arete), set on

foot systematic investigations as to the origin of the -n-dOr), the

feelings and impulses. In a physiological psychology which was

connected with that of Protagoras (cf. below, 8), they traced the

varieties in feeling back to states of motion in the body : to rest

corresponded indifference, to violent motion pain, to gentle motion

pleasure. Besides such explanatory theories, however, this philos

ophy of bonvivants extended to an unprejudiced general theory

of things. For them, too, as Theodorus taught, all ethical and legal

prescriptions were ultimately merely institutions that were valid for

the mass of men; the educated man of enjoyment gives himself

no trouble about them, and enjoys things when they come into his

possession. Theodorus, who bears the surname "the Atheist," put

aside also all religious scruples which are opposed to devotion to

sensuous enjoyment, and the school also exerted itself in this

interest to strip the halo from religious faith, so far as possible, as

is proved by the well-known theory of Euemerus, who in his lepa

avaypa&lt;f&gt;ri undertook to trace belief in the gods back to the worship

of ancestors and veneration of heroes.

Thus the Cyrenaics ultimately agreed with the Cynics in this,

that they, too, regarded all that is fixed vo/iw, i.e. by the social

convention of morals and law, as a limitation of that right to enjoy

ment which man has by nature (&lt;uW), and which the wise man

exercises without troubling himself about historical institutions.

The Hedonists gladly shared the refinement of enjoyment which

civilisation brought with it ; they found it convenient and per

missible that the intelligent man should enjoy the honey which

others prepared; but no feeling of duty or thankfulness bound

them to the civilisation whose fruits they enjoyed. This same con

dition of recognising no native land, this same turning aside from

the feeling of political responsibility, which among the Cynics grew

out of despising the enjoyments of civilisation, resulted for the

Cyrenaics from the egoism of their enjoyment. Sacrifice for

others, patriotism, and devotion to a general object, Theodorus

declared to be a form of foolishness which it did not become the

wise man to share, and even Aristippus rejoiced in the freedom from

1 Cf. Diog. Laert. II. 65 ff.

CIIAI-. 2, B.] Problem of Science : the, Sophists. 87

connection with any state, which his wandering life afforded him.!

The philosophy of the parasites, who feasted at the full table of

Grecian beauty, was as far removed from the ideal meaning of that

beauty as was the philosophy of the beggars who lay at the threshold.

In the meantime, the principle of the expert weighing of enjoy

ments contains an element which necessarily leads beyond that

doctrine of enjoyment for the moment which Aristippus preached,

and this advance was made in two directions. Aristippus himself

had already admitted that in the act of weighing, the pleasure

and pain which would in future result from the enjoyment

must be taken into account ; Theodoras found that the highest good

was to be sought rather in the cheerful frame of mind (\apa.} than

in the enjoyment of the moment, and Anniceris came to see that this

could be attained in a higher degree through the spiritual joys of

human intercourse, of friendship, of the family, and of civil society

than through bodily enjoyments. This knowledge that the enjoy

ments afforded by the intellectual and spiritual aspects of civilisa

tion are ultimately finer, richer, and more gratifying than those

of bodily existence, leads directly over into the doctrine of the

Epicureans. But, on the other hand, the Hedonistic school could

not fail ultimately to see that the painless enjoyment to which it

aimed to educate the man of culture is but a rare lot. In general,

found Hegesias, he is to be accounted as already happy who attains

the painless state, is free from actual discomfort. With the great

mass of men discomfort, the pain of unsatisfied desires, pre

ponderates : for them it would be better, therefore, not to live.

The impressiveness with which he presented this brought him the

surname Tmo-iflavaros, he persuaded to death. He is the first

representative of eudcemonistic pessimism; with this doctrine, how-;

ever, eudsemonism refutes itself. He shows that if happiness,

satisfaction of wishes, and enjoyment are to be the meaning and

end of human life, it misses this end, and is to be rejected as

worthless. Pessimism is the last but also the annihilating con

sequence of eudaemonism, its immanent criticism.

### 8. The Problem of Science. 2

P. Natorp, Forxchungen zur (lesrhichte des Erkemitnissproblems bei den

Alten. Berlin, 1884.

The Sophists were teachers of political eloquence. They were

obliged in tlie first instance to give instruction on the nature and

1 \en.Tfrm. TT 1, 8 ff.

2 [ Wissemv-haft. Science, as used in this section, is nearly equivalent to

"scientific knowledge." Sometimes the subjective aspect of the terra is promi

nent, and sometimes the objective.]

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right use of language. And while they were transforming rhetoric

from a traditional art to a science, they applied themselves in the

first place to linguistic researches, and became creators of grammar

and syntax. They instituted investigations as to the parts of the

sentence, the use of words, synonyms, and etymology. Prodicus,

Hippias, and Protagoras distinguished themselves in this respect;

as to the fruit of their investigations, we are only imperfectly

informed.

1. Our knowledge of their logical acquisitions, which with the

exception of a few allusions are lost, is in a still more unfortunate

condition. For, as a matter of course, the teachers of rhetoric

treated also the train of thought in discourse. This train of thought,

however, consists in proof and refutation. .It was then inevitable

that the Sophists should project a theory of proof and refutation,

and there is explicit testimony to this in the case of Protagoras. 1

Unfortunately, there is no more precise information as to how

far the Sophists proceeded with this, and as to whether they

attempted to separate out the logical Forms from those elements

which belong to the content of thought. It is characteristic that

the little information which we have concerning the logic of the

Sophists relates almost without exception to their emphasising of

the principle of contradiction. To the essential nature of the advo

cate s task, refutation was more closely related than proof. Protag

oras left a special treatise 2 concerning Grounds of Refutation,

perhaps his most important writing, and formulated the law of the

contradictory opposite, so far, at least, as to say that there are with

reference to every object two mutually opposing propositions, and

to draw consequences from this. He thus formulated, in fact, the

procedure which Zeno had practically employed, and which also

played a great part in the disciplinary exercises of the Sophists,

indeed the greatest part.

For it was one of the main arts of these " Enlighteners " to per

plex men as to the ideas previously regarded as valid, to involve

them in contradictions, and when the victims were thus confused,

to force them if possible, by logical consequences, real or manufac

tured, to such absurd answers as to make them become ridiculous

to themselves and others. From the examples which Plato 3 and

Aristotle 3 have preserved, it is evident that this procedure was not

1 Diog. Laert. IX. 51 ff.

2 It is probable that KoTa/3dXXo^rej (sc. X67&lt;&gt;t) and Arri\oyLai are only two

different titles of this work, the first chapter of which treated truth.

3 Plato in the Euthydemus and in the Cratylus, Aristotle in the book "On the

Sophistic Fallacies."

CHAP. 2, 8.] Problem of Science : the Megarians. 89

always any too purely logical, but was thoroughly sophistical in the

present sense of the word. The examples show that these people

let slip no ambiguity in speech, no awkwardness in popular expres

sion, if out of it they might weave a snare of absurdity. The

witticisms which result are often based merely upon language,

grammar, and etymology ; more rarely they are properly logical ;

quite often, however, coarse and dull. Characteristic here, too, are

the catch-questions, where either an affirmative or negative answer,

according to the customs and presuppositions of the ordinary mean

ings of the words, gives rise to nonsensical consequences, unforeseen

by the one answering. 1

Plato has portrayed two brothers, Euthydemus and Dionysidorus,

who practised this art of logo mac hy^r ^eristic, which had great

success among the Athenians who were great talkers and accus

tomed to word-quibbling. Aside from them, it was prosecuted

principally by the Megarians, among whom the head of the school,

Euclid, busied himself with the theory of refutation. 2 His adhe

rents, Eubulides and Alexinus, were famous for a series of such

catches, which made a great sensation and called forth a whole lit

erature. 3 Among these there are two, the " Heap " and the " Bald-

head," 4 the fundamental thought in which is to be traced back to

Zeno, and was introduced by him into the arguments by which he

wished to show that the composition of magnitudes out of small

parts is impossible. In like manner, Zeno s arguments against

motion were amplified, even if not deepened or strengthened, 4 by

another Megarian, Diodorus Cronos. Unwearied in finding out such

aporice, difficulties, and contradictions, this same Diodorus invented

also the famous argument (/cupteiW) which was designed to destroy

the conception of possibility: only the actual is possible; for a

possible which does not become actual evinces itself thereby to be

impossible. 6

In another manner, also, the Sophists who were affiliated with the

Eleatics, show an extreme application of the principle of contradic

tion, and a corresponding exaggeration of the principle of identity.

Even Gorgias seems to have supported his opinion that all state

ments are false, upon the assumption that it is incorrect to predicate

1 As a typical example, " Have you left off beating your father ? " or " Have

you shed your horns ? "

2 Diog. Laert. II. 107.

8 Cf. Prantl, Gesch. der Log, I. 33 ff.

4 Which kernel of grain by being added makes the heap ? Which hair falling

out makes the bald head ?

6 Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. X. 85 ff.

6 Cic. De Fato, 7, 13.

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of any subject anything else than just this subject itself; and the

Cynics, as well as Stilpo the Megarian, made this thought their own

There remain, accordingly, only such purely identical judgments as,

good is good, man is man, etc. 1 As a logical consequence of this,

judging and talking are made as impossible as were plurality and

motion according to the Eleatic principle. As in the metaphysics

of Parmenides, the ghost of which appears occasionally both among

the Megarians and the Cynics (cf. below, No. 5), the lack of concep

tions of relation permitted no combination of unity with plurality

and led to a denial of plurality, so here the lack of conceptions of

logical relation made it appear impossible to assert of the subject a

variety of predicates.

2. In all these devious windings taken by the researches of the

Sophists concerning the knowing activity, the sceptical direction is

manifesting itself. If on such grounds the logical impossibility of

all formation of synthetic propositions was maintained, this showed

that knowledge itself was irreconcilable with the abstract principle

of identity, as it had been formulated in the Eleatics doctrine of

Being. The doctrine of Parmenides had itself become ensnared

past help in the dichotomies of Zeno. This came to most open

expression in the treatise of Gorgias, which declared Being, Knowl

edge, and Communication of Knowledge to be impossible. There is

nothing ; for both Being, which can be thought neither as" eternal

nor as transitory, neither as one nor as manifold, and Non-being are

conceptions that are in themselves contradictory. \_If, however,

there were anything, it would not be knowable ; for that which is

thought is always something else than that which actually is, other

wise they could not be distinguished. Finally, if there were knowl

edge, it could not be taught ; forj^verjMme has only his own ideas,

and in view of the difference between the thoughts and the signs

which must be employed in their communication, there is no guar

anty of "mutual understanding.

This nihilism, to be sure, scarcely claimed to be taken in earnest ;

even the title of the book, irtpl ^v crews rj irepl TOV p.rj OVTO? (Concern

ing Nature, or concerning that which is not), appears like a

grotesque farce. The Rhetorician, trained to formal dexterity, who

despised all earnest science and pursued only his art of speaking, 3

indulged in the jest of satirising as empty the entire labour of philos-

1 Plat. Thecet. 201 E. Cf. Soph. 251 B.

2 Extracts are found partly in the third chapter of the pseudo-Aristotelian

treatise De Xenophane, Zenone, Gorgia (cf. p. 30), in part in Sext. Emp. VII.

65-86.

3 Plat. Me no. 95 C.

CHAP. 2, 8.] Problem of Science : Protagoras. 91

ophy, and doing this ironically in the styie of Zeno s pinching-mill

of contradictions. V But just the facts that he did this, and that his

work found applause, show how among the men who occupied them

selves in instructing the people, and in the circles of scientific

culture itself, faith in science was becoming lost at just the time

when the mass of the people was seeking its welfare in it\J This

despair of truth is the more comprehensible, as we see how the

serious scientific investigation of Protagoras attained the same

result.

E. Laas, Idealismus und Positivismus. I. Berlin, 1880.

W. llalbfass. Die Berichte de.s Platon und Aristoteles uber Protagoras.

Strassb. 1882.

Sattig, Der Protagoreische Sensualismus (Zeitschrift fiir Philosophic, vols.

86-89).

3. The germ of the doctrine of Protagoras is found in his effort

to explain the ideas of the human mind psycho-genetically. Insight

into the origin and development of ideas was absolutely necessary

for the practical aspect of a, system of ethics, and particularly for

the cultivation of rhetoric. The statements, however, which the

metaphysicians had occasionally uttered, were in nowise sufficient

for the purpose, constructed as they were from general presupposi

tions and permeated by them ; on the contrary, the observations in

physiological psychology which had been made in the more recent

circles of investigators who were more given to natural science,

offered themselves as fit for the purpose. \_JThinking and perceiving

had been set over against each other from Hie point of view of

their relative worth ; this determining element now disappeared for

Protagoras, and so there remained for him only the view of the

psychological identity of thinking and perceiving, a view to which

even those metaphysicians had committed themselves as soon as

they attempted to explain ideation from the world-process (cf. 8).

In coiis (|U(nice of this he declared that the entire psychical life con

sists only in perceptions. 1 This sensualism was then illustrated by

the great mass of facts which physiological psychology had assembled

in connection with the teaching of the physicians that were scien

tific investigators, and by the numerous theories which had been

brought forward with special reference to the process of the action

of the senses.

^ All .tlieae^however, had in common the idea that perception rests

in the last instance upon motion, as does every process by which

things come to be or occur in the world. In this even Anaxagoras

1 Diog. Laert. IX. 51.

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,-uid Empedocles were at one with the Atomists, from whose school

Protagoras, as a native of Abdera, had probably gone out. This

agreement extended still farther to the assumption, made on all

sides, that in perception there was not only a condition of motion

in the thing to be perceived, but also a like condition in the percip

ient organ. Whatever view might be taken as to the metaphysical

essence of that which was there in motion, it seemed to be acknowl

edged as undoubted that every perception presupposed this double

motion. Empedocles had already anticipated the doctrine that the

inner organic motion advances to meet the outer. 1

On this foundation 2 the Protagorean theory of knowledge is built

up. If, that is to say, perception is the product of these two motions

directed toward one another, it is obviously something else than the

perceiving subject, but just as obviously it is something else than the

object ivhich calls forth the perception. Conditioned by both, it is yet

different from both. This pregnant discovery is designated as the

doctrine of the subjectivity of sense-perception.

Nevertheless, in the case of Protagoras this appears with a peculiar

restriction. Since, like all earlier thinkers, he evidently could not

assume a consciousness without a corresponding existent content of

consciousness, he taught that from this double motion there was a two

fold result : viz. perception (atcr^T/cns) in the man, and content of per

ception (TO alo-OrjTov) in the thing. Perception is therefore indeed

the completely adequate knowledge of what is perceived, but no knowl

edge of the thing. Every perception is then in so far true as, at

the instant when it arises, there arises also in connection with the

thing the represented content, as ala-Orjrov, but no perception knows

the thing itself. Consequently every one knows things not as

they are, but as they are in the moment of perception for him, and

for him only ; and they are in this moment with reference to him

sucTTas~he represents" them to himself. This is the meaning of the

Protagorean relativism, according to which things are for every

individual such as they appear to him ; and this he expressed in the

famous proposition that man is the measure of all things.

According to this, therefore, every opinion which grows out of per

ception is true, and yet in a certain sense, just for this reason, it is

1 Whether these two motions were already designated by Protagoras as active

and passive (TTOLOVV and Trd&lt;rxov), as is the case in Plato s presentation (Thecet.

156 A), may remain undecided. At all events, such anthropological categories in

the mouth of the Sophist are not surprising.

2 With regard to such preparatory ideas, there is no ground to trace this

theory of the motions which advance to meet one another, to direct connection

with Heraclitus. Its Heraclitean element, which Plato very correctly saw, was

sufficiently maintained by those direct predecessors who reduced all Becoming

and change to relations of motion.

CHAP. 2, 8.] Problem of Science : Protagoras. 93

also false. It is valid only for the one perceiving, and for him even

only at the momerfTw hen it arises. All universal validity forsakes

it. \_And since, according to the view of Protagoras, there is no

other kind of ideas, and therefore no other knowledge than percep

tion, there is for human knowledge nothing whatever that is univer-

sally valid. This view is phenomenalism in so far as it teaches in

this entirely definite sense a knowledge of the phenomenon, limited

to the individual and to the moment ; it is, however, scepticism in so

far as it rejects all knowledge which transcends that.

How far Protagoras himself drew practical consequences from this

principle that every one s opinion is true for himself, we do not

know. Later Sophists concluded that, according to this, error would

not be possible; everything, and again nothing, belongs to everything

as attribute. In particular they concluded that no actual contradic

tion is possible ; for since every one talks about the content of his

perception, different assertions can never have the same object. At

all events, Protagoras refused to make any positive statement con

cerning what is; he spoke not of the actual reality that moves,

but only of motion, and of the phenomena which it produces for

perception.

Moreover, the attempt was now made, whether by Protagoras him

self, or by the Sophistic activity dependent upon him, to trace dif

ferences in perception, and so also in the phenomenon, back to

differences in this motion. It was principally the velocity of the

motion which was considered in this connection, though the form also

was probably regarded. 1 i It is interesting to note further that under

the concept of perceptioi^ not only sensations and perceptions, but

also the sensuous feelings and desires, were subsumed ; it is note

worthy especially because to these states also an alvOrjTov, a momen

tary qualification of the thing which produced the perception, was

held to correspond. The predicates of agreeableness and desir

ability receive in this way the same valuation epistemologically

as do the predicates of sensuous qualification. What appears

agreeable, useful, and desirable to any one is agreeable, useful,

and desirable for him. The individual state of consciousness is

here, too, the measure of things, and no other universally valid

determination of the worth of things exists. In this direction

the Hedonism of Aristippus was developed out of the Protagorean

doctrine ; we know, teaches Aristippus, not things, but only their

1 Doubtless we have here asserting itself the development of the Pythagorean

theory of knowledge out of the Atomistic school, to which this reduction of the

qualitative to the quantitative was essential (cf. above, 5), even though the So

phist declined from principle to enter into such metaphysical theories as Atomism.

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worth for us, and the states (irdOr)) into which they put us. These,

however, are rest and indifference, violent motion and pain, or gentle

motion and pleasure. Of these only the last is worth striving for

(cf. above, 7,9).

4. Thus all courses of Sophistic thought issued in giving up truth

as unattainable. Socrates, however, needed truth, and on this account

he believed that it was to be attained if it were honestly sought for.

Virtue is knowledge; and since there must be virtue, there must be

knowledge also. Here for the first time in history the moral con

sciousness appears with complete clearness as an epistemoloyical

postulate. Because morality is not possible without knowledge,

there must be knowledge ; and if knowledge is not here and now

existent, it must be striven for as the lover seeks for the possession

of the loved object. Science is the yearning, struggling love for

knowledge, : &lt;/&gt;tA.oo-o&lt;ia, philosophy (cf. Plat. Symp. 203 E).

Out of this conviction grow all the peculiarities of the Jk&gt;cratic \*

doctrine of science, 2 and in the first place the bounds within Avhich

he held knowledge to be necessary and therefore possible. It is

only a knowledge of the relations of human life that is necessary

for the ethical life ; only for these is a knowing necessary, and

only for these is man s knowing faculty adequate. Hypotheses as

to metaphysics and the philosophy of Nature have nothing to do

with man s ethical task, and they are left unconsidered by Socrates,

so much the rather as he shared the view of the Sophists that it

was impossible to gain a sure knowledge concerning them. Science

is possible only as practical insight, as knowledge of the ethical

life.

This view was formulated still more sharply by the Sophistic

successors of Socrates under the influence of his eudsemonistic

principle. For both Cynics and Cyrenaics science had worth only

so far as it affords to man the right insight which serves to make

him happy. With Antisthenes and Diogenes science was prized

not in itself, but as a means for controlling the desires and for

knowing man s natural needs ; the Cyrenaics said the causes of

perception (TO. TreTrot^Kora TO. -rrdOrj) are for us as much matters of

indifference as they are unknowable; knowledge which leads to

happiness has to do only with our states, which we know with

certainty. Indifference toward metaphysics and natural science

1 Cf. Fr. Schleiermacher, Ueber den Werth des Sokrates als Philosophen (Ges.

W. III., Bd. 2, pp. 287 ft).

2 [ Wisse nschaft.ilf.hre. Wiasenschaft, "scientia," "science," has here both

, its subjective and objective sense ; knowledge as mental act, and knowledge as

a body of truth. Hence Wissenschaftslchre means both "doctrine of science,"

i.e. science of knowledge, and "scientific doctrine" i.e. philosophy. Tr.]

CHAP. 2, 8.] Problem of Science : /Socrates. 95

is with Socrates, as with the Sophists, the result of employment

with the inner nature of man.

5. It will remain a noteworthy fact for all time that a man who

so narrowed for himself the intellectual horizon of scientific research

as did Socrates, should yet determine within this the. essential

nature of science itself, in a manner so clear and so authoritative

for all the future. \ This achievement was due essentially to his

opposition to the relativism of the Sophists, an opposition that was

a matter both of instinct and of positive conviction. They taught

that there are only opinions (8o cu) which hold good for individuals

with psycho-genetic necessity ; he, however, sought a knoudedye that

should be authoritative for all in like manner. In contrast with

the change and multiplicity of individual ideas he demanded the

one and abiding which all should acknowledge. He sought the

logical " Nature " (cuW) as others had sought the cosmological

or ethical "Nature" (of. 7, 1), and found it in the concept or

general notion. Here, too, the view propounded was rooted in the

demand, the theory in the postulate.

The ancient thinkers, also, had had a feeling that the rational

thinking to which they owed their knowledge was something essen

tially other than the sensuous mode of apprehending the world in

vogue in everyday life, or than traditional opinion ; but they had

not been able to carry out this distinction in relative worth either

psychologically or logically. Socrates succeeded in this because

here, too, he defined the thing in question by the work which lie

expected it to perform. The idea that is to be more than opinion,

that is to serve as knowledge for all, must be what is common

in all the particular ideas which have forced themselves upon

individuals in individual relations : subjective universal validity is

to be expected only for the objectively universal. Hence, if there is

to be knowledge, it is to be found only in that in which all par

ticular ideas agree. This universal in the object-matter which

makes possible the subjective community of ideas is the concept

(Adyos), and science [scientific knowledge] is accordingly conceptional

thinkingj abstract thought. The universal validity which is

claimed for knowledge is only possible on condition that the

scientific concept brings out into relief the common element which

is contained in all individual perceptions and opinions.

Hence the goal of all scientific work is the determination of the

essential nature of conceptions, definition. The aim of investiga-

tion is to establish ri CKUO-TOV toy, what each thing is, and to come to

ideas of an abiding nature as over against changing opinions.

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This doctrine was in some measure prepared for by the investigations of the

Sophists concerning the meaning of words, synonyms, and etymological rela

tions. In the latter respect, the hypotheses of the Sophists in the beginnings of

the philosophy of language (cf. Plato s Cratylus) extended to the question

whether a natural or only a conventional relation obtains between words and

their meanings (&lt;wm y 06m)- Prodicus, whom Socrates mentions with com

mendation, seems to have been specially successful in fixing the meanings of words.

Among the later Sophists the Socratic demand for fixed conceptions became

forthwith fused with the Eleatic metaphysics, and with its postulate of the iden

tity of Being with itself. Euclid called virtue, or the good, the only Being : it

remains the same, changeless in itself, and only the names by which men call

it differ. Antisthenes, indeed, explained the concept by the definition that it

is this which determines the timeless Being of the thing ; l but he conceived

this identity of the existent with itself, raised above all relations, in so bold a

manner that he thought of every truly existing entity as capable of being defined

only through itself. Predication is impossible. There are none but analytic

judgments (cf. above, No. 1). Accordingly only the composite can have its

essential elements determined in conceptions ; the simple is not to be defined. 2

There is, then, no possibility of understanding the simple by conceptions ; it can

only be exhibited in a sensuous presentation. The Cynics came thus from the

Socratic doctrine of the conception to a sensualism which recognised as simple

and original only that which can be grasped with the hands and seen with the

eyes, and this is the ground of their opposition to Plato.

6. The searching out of conceptions (for his purpose, indeed, only

ethical conceptions) was accordingly for Socrates the essence of

science, and this determined in the first place the outer form of his

philosophising. The conception was to be that which is valid for

all : it must then be found in common thinking\ Socrates is neither

a solitary hypercritic nor an instructor who teaches ex cathedra, but

a man thirsting for the truth, as anxious to instruct himself as to

teach others. His philosophy is a philosophy of the dialogue; it

develops itself in conversation which he was ready to begin with

every one who would talk with him. 3 To the ethical conceptions

which he alone was seeking for, it was indeed easy to find access

from any object whatever of everyday business. The common

element must be found in the mutual exchange of thoughts ; the

SiaAoyioyxo? was the way to the Ao yos. But this " conversation "

encountered many difficulties : the inertia of the customary mode

of thinking, the idle desire for innovation, and the paradoxical state

ments which were characteristic of the Sophists, the pride belong

ing to seeming knowledge and thoughtless imitation. Into such a

condition of things Socrates made his entrance by introducing him

self as one eager to learn. By skilful questions he drew out the

views of others, disclosed the defects in these views with remorse

less consistency, and finally led the Athenian, proud of his culture,

into the state of mind where he recognised that insight into one s

1 \67os tffrlv 6 rb ri T,V $ (&lt;rri dri\uv : Diog. Laert. VI. 3.

2 Plat. Theoct. 202 B.

8 This factor united with the influence of Zeno s dialectic to stamp upon the

succeeding philosophical literature the form of the dialogue.

CHAP. 2, 8.] Problem of Science : Socrates. 97

own ignorance, is the beginning of all knowledge. Whoever stood

this test and still remained with him was taken into partnership

in a serious effort to determine, in common thinking, the essential

meaning of conceptions. Undertaking the direction of the conver

sation, Socrates brought his companion step by step to unfold his

own thoughts in clearer, less contradictory statements, and so caused

him to bring to definite expression what was slumbering in him as

an imperfect presentiment. He called this his art of mental mid

wifery, and that preparation for it his irony.

1. fbe-maieutic method has, however, still another essential

meaning. In the process of conversation the common rational

quality comes to light, to which all parts are subject in spite of

their diverging opinions. The conception is not to be made, it is

to be found ; it is already there, it requires only to be delivered from

the envelopes of individual experiences and opinions in which it

lies hidden. The procedure of the Socratic formation of conceptions

is, therefore, epagogic or inductive : it leads to the generic concep

tion by the comparison of particular views and individual sensuous

presentations ; it decides every individual question by seeking to

press forward to determine a general conception. This is accom

plished by bringing together analogous cases, and by searching

out allied relations. The general conception thus gained is then

employed to decide the special problem proposed, and this subordi-

nation of the particular under the general is thus worked out as the

fundamental relation of scientific knowledge. \

The inductive method of procedure as employed by Socrates,

according to Xenophon and Plato, is, to be sure, still marked by a

childlike simplicity and imperfection. It lacks as yet caution in

generalisation and methodical circumspection in the formation of

conceptions. The need for the general is so lively that it satisfies

itself at once with hastily gathered material, and the conviction of

the determining validity of the conception is so strong that the

individual questions proposed are decided forthwith in accordance

with it. { But however great the gaps may be in the arguments of

Socrates, the significance of these arguments is by no means lessened.

His doctrine of induction has its value not for methodology, but for

logic, and for the theoi-y of knowledge. It fixes in a way that is

decisive for all the future that it is the task of science to strive to

establish general conceptions from comparison of facts.

8. While Socrates thus defined the essential nature of science as

conceptional thought, thinking in conceptions, he also fixed the

bounds within which science can be employed: this task is, in his

opinion, to be fulfilled only within the domain of practical life.

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Science is, as regards its form, the formation of conceptions, and as

regards its content ethics.

Meanwhile the whole mass of ideas concerning Nature and all the

connected questions and problems still persist, and though for the most

part they are a matter of indifference for the moral life, neverthe

less they cannot be entirely put aside. But after Socrates renounced

the task of attaining insight into such questions through conceptions,

it was all the more possible for him to form an idea of the universe

that should satisfy his scientifically grounded ethical needs.

So it comes that Socrates puts aside, indeed, aU\_ natural science,

but at the same time professes a teleological view of Nature, which

admires the wisdom in the arrangement of the world, the adaptation

in things, 1 and which, where understanding ceases, trusts Providence

in faith. With this faith Socrates kept himself as near as possible

to the religious ideas of his people, and even spoke of a plurality of

gods, although he indeed inclined to the ethical monotheism which

was preparing in his time. But he did not come forward in such

matters as a reformer : he taught morality, and if he expounded his

own faith, he left that of others untouched.

Out of this faith, however, grew the conviction with which he

limited the rationalism of his ethics, his confidence in the Sai/xwov.

The more he pressed toward clearness of conceptions and complete

knowledge of ethical relations, and the more true to himself he was

in this, the less could he hide from himself that man in his limita

tion does not completely succeed in this task, that there are condi

tions in which knowledge is not sufficient for certain decision, and

where feeling enters upon its rights. Under such conditions Soc

rates believed that he heard within himself the daimonion, a coun

selling and for the most part warning voice. He thought that in

this way the gods warned from evil in difficult cases, where his

knowledge ceased, the man who otherwise served them.

So the wise man of Athens set faith and feeling beside ethical

science.

1 It is not probable that Socrates experienced any strong influence from

Anaxagoras in this respect, for the latter s teleology relates to the harmony of

the stellar universe, not to human life, while the considerations which are

ascribed to Socrates, especially by Xenophon, make utility for man the standard

for admiration of the world. Much more closely related to Socratic faith are

the religious views of the great poets of Athens, especially the tragedians.

## CHAPTER III. THE SYSTEMATIC PERIOD.

THE third, completing period of Greek science harvested the fruit

of the two preceding developments. It appears essentially as a

reciprocal inter -penetration of co sinolog ical and anthropological bodies of

thought. This union appears in but a very slight degree as a neces

sity found in the nature of the case, still less as a demand of the

time ; rather, it is m its essentials the work of great personalities

and of the peculiar direction taken by their knowledge.

The tendency of the time was rather toward a practical utilisa

tion of science : it was in accord with this tendency when research

separated into special investigations on mechanical, physiological,

rhetorical, and political problems, and when scientific instruction

accommodated itself to the ideas of the ordinary man. Not only for

the mass of the people, but for scholars as well, general questions of

cosmology had lost the interest which in the beginning was directed

toward them, and the fact that they were sceptically abandoned

because of the Sophistic theory of knowledge is nowhere presented

in the form of renunciation or lamentation.

If, therefore, Greek philosophy turned with renewed force from

the investigation of human thinking and willing researches with

which it had busied itself during the time of the Enlightenment

back to the great problems of metaphysics, and reached its greatest

height along this path, it owes this achievement to the personal

thirst for knowledge on the part of the three great men who

brought in this most valuable development of ancient thought, and

stand as its representatives, Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle.

The creations of these three heroes of Greek thought differ from the

doctrines of all their predecessors by reason of their systematic char

acter. Each of the three gave to the world an all-embracing system

of science complete in itself. Their teachings gained this character,

on the one hand, through the all-sidedness of their problems, and on

the other, through the conscious unity in their treatment of them.

While each of the earlier thinkers had seized upon but a limited

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circle of questions, and in like manner had shown himself informed

only in certain departments of actual reality, while especially no

one had as yet shown interest in both physical and psychological

investigation, these three men directed their work in like measure

to the entire compass of scientific problems. They brought together

what experience and observation had won ; they examined and com

pared the conceptions which had been formed from these, and they

brought that which up to this time had been isolated, into fruitful

union and relation. This all-sidedness of their scientific interest

appears in the compass and varied character of their literary activ

ity, and the great amount of material elaborated is in part explained

only through the vigorous co-operation of their extended schools, in

which a division of labour in accordance with inclination and endow

ment was allowed.

But this work thus shared in common did not result in a mass of

unrelated material. This was guarded against by the fact that each

of these three men undertook and conducted the working over of the

entire material of knowledge with a unity of purpose and method

derived from the principle which formed his fundamental thought.

This, indeed, led at more than one point to a one-sided conception,

and to a kind of violation of individual domains, and thereby to

the inter-weaving of problems in ways which do not stand criticism.

But on the other hand, just by means of the adjustment which must

take place in this process between the forms of cognition in differ

ent departments of knowledge, the formation of metaphysical concep

tions was so furthered, abstract thought was so refined and deepened,

that in the short time of scarcely two generations the typical out

lines of three different conceptions of the world were worked out.

Thus the advantages and the disadvantages of philosophical system-

building appear in like measure in the case of these men of genius

who were the first founders of systems.

The systematising of knowledge so that it should become an all-in

clusive philosophical doctrine was achieved with increasing success

by Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle, and with the last first found

the form of an organic articulation of science into the individual

disciplines. With this Aristotle concluded the development of Greek

philosophy and inaugurated the age of the special sciences.

The course of this development was more particularly this : the

two opposing systems of Democritus and Plato arose from the

application to cosmological and metaphysical problems, of the prin

ciples gained through the doctrines of the Sophists and of Socrates;

from the attempt to reconcile these opposites proceeded the conclud

ing doctrine of Aristotle.

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The essential feature in the work of Democritus and Plato was

that they used the insight into the theory of knowledge, gained by

the philosophy of the Enlightenment, to ground metaphysics anew.

Their common dependence upon the doctrines of the cosmological

period and upon the Sophistic teaching, in particular upon the the

ory of Protagoras, stamps upon the two doctrines a certain parallel

ism and a partial relationship, a relationship the more interesting,

the deeper the contrast between the two in other respects. This

contrast, however, is due to the fact that the Socratic teaching had

no effect upon Democritus, while its influence on Plato was decisive ;

hence the ethical factor is as preponderant in the system of the latter

as it is unimportant in that of the former. Thus in parallel lines from

the same source developed the materialism of Democritus and the

idealism of Plato.

From this contrast is explained, too, the difference in their work

ing. The purely theoretical conception of science which prevails

with Democritus did not suit the age ; his school soon disappeared.

Plato, on the contrary, whose scientific teaching furnished at the

same time the basis for a principle of life, had the pleasure of form

ing in the Academy fin extensive and lasting school. But this school,

the so-called Older Academy, following the general tendency of the

time, soon ran out partly into special investigation, partly into pop

ular moralising.

Out of it rose then the great form of Aristotle, the most influential

thinker that history has seen. The powerful concentration with

which he caused the entire content of thought in Greek science to

crystallise about the conception of development (eVrcXexeta) in order

to adjust the opposition discovered between his two great predeces

sors, made him the philosophical teacher of the future, and his system

the most perfect expression of Greek thought.

Democritus of Abdera (about 460-360) was educated in the scientific asso

ciation of his home and by journeys lasting many years, led the life of a quiet,

unassuming investigator in his native city during the turmoil of the Sophistic

period, and remained far from the noisy activity of Athens. He did not impart

any special ability, political or otherwise, by his teaching, but was essentially

disposed to theoretical thought, and particularly inclined to the investigation of

Nature. With gigantic learning and comprehensive information he united great

clearness of abstract thought and apparently a strong inclination to simplify prob

lems schematically. The number of his works proves that he stood at the head

of an extended school, of which some unimportant names are preserved, yet

nothing is more characteristic of the way in which his age turned aside from

research that was not interesting to it than the indifference with which his sys

tem of the mechanical explanation of Nature was met. His doctrine was forced

into the background for two thousand years by the teleological systems, and

prolonged its existence only in the Epicurean school, while even there it was not

understood.

Antiquity honoured Democritus as a great writer also, and for this reason the

almost complete loss of his works is all the more to be lamented, as aside from

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the numerous titles only very unimportant and in part doubtful fragments are

extant. The most important writings seem to have been, theoretically, the Mfyas

and Mtfcpos Sid/oxr/nos, Trepi vov and Trepi ideCiv ; practically, Trepi evOv/jil-ijs and viroOi)-

KO.I. W. Kahl (Diedenhofen, 1889) has begun to work through the sources

which had been collected by W. Burchard (Minden, 1830 and 1834) and Lort-

zing (Berlin, 18/3). P. Natorp has edited the Ethics (Leips. 1893).

Cf. P. Natorp, Forschungen zur Geschichte des Erkenntnissproblems im Alter-

thum (Berlin, 1884); G. Hart, Zur Seelen- und Erkenntnisslehre des Demokrit

(Leips. 1880).

Plato of Athens (427-347), of distinguished family, had most successfully

assimilated the artistic and scientific culture of his time when the personality of

Socrates made so decisive an impression upon him that he abandoned his at

tempts at poetry and devoted himself entirely to the society of the master. He

was his truest and most intelligent, and yet at the same time his most indepen

dent disciple. The execution of Socrates occasioned his acceptance of Euclid s

invitation to Megara ; then he journeyed to Gyrene and Egypt, returned for a

time to Athens, and here began to teach through his writings, and perhaps also

orally. About 390 we find him in Magna Grsecia and Sicily, where he became

connected with the Pythagoreans and took part also in political action. This

brought him into serious danger at the court of the ruler of Syracuse, the elder

Dionysius, whom he sought to influence with the help of his friend Dion ; he

was delivered as prisoner of war to the Spartans and ransomed only by the help

of a friend. This attempt at practical politics in Sicily was twice repeated later

(367 and 361), but always with unfortunate results.

After the first Sicilian journey, he founded his school in the grove Akademos,

and soon united about him a great number of prominent men for the purpose

of common scientific work. Yet the bond of this society was to be sought still

more in a friendship based upon community of ethical ideals. His teaching

activity at the beginning had, like that of Socrates, that character of a common

search for truth which finds expression in the dialogue. It was not until his

old age that it took on more the form of the didactic lecture.

This life finds its aesthetic and literary embodiment in Plato s works, 1 in which

the process itself of philosophising is set forth with dramatic vividness and

plastic portraiture of personalities and their views of life. As works of art, the

Symposium and the Phcedo are most successful ; the grandest impression of

the system, as a whole, is afforded by the Republic. With the exception of the

Apology of Socrates, the form is everywhere that of the dialogue. Yet the

artistic treatment suffers in Plato s old age, and the dialogue remains only as

the schematic setting of a lecture, as in the Timceus and the Laws. For the

most part, Socrates leads the conversation, and it is into his mouth that Plato

puts his own decision when he comes to one. Exceptions to this are not found

until in the latest writings.

The mode of presentation is also on the whole more artistic than scientific. It

exhibits extreme vividness and plasticity of imagination in perfect language, but

no strictness in separating problems or in methodical investigation. The con

tents of any individual dialogue is to be designated only by the prominent sub

ject of inquiry. Where abstract presentation is not possible or not in place

Plato takes to his aid the so-called myths, allegorical presentations which utilise

motives from fables and tales of the gods in free, poetic form.

The transmission of his works is only in part certain, and it is just as doubtful

in what order they originated and what relation they bear to one another.

The following are among the most important names of those who have worked

over these questions since Schleiermacher in his translation (Berlin, 1804 ff.)

gave an impulse in that direction: J. Socher (Munich, 1820), C. Fr. Hermann

1 Translated into German by Hier. Miiller, with introductions by K. Steinhart.

8 vols. Leips. 1850-1866. As ninth volume of the series Platan s Leben, by

K. Steinhart. Leips. 1873. [English by Jowett, third ed. 5 vols. Oxford,

1893.] Among more recent editions, in which the paging of that of Stephanus

(Paris, 1578), employed in citations, is always repeated, are to be noted those

of J. Bekker (Berlin, 1816 f.), Stallbaum (Leips. 1850), Schneider and

Hirschig (Paris: Didot, 1846 ff.), M. Schanz (Leips. 1875 ff.).

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(Heidelberg, 1839), E. Zeller (Tiibingen, 1839), Fr. Suckow (Berlin, 1855),

Fr. Susemihl (Berlin, 1855-50), E. Munk (Berlin, 1880), Fr. Ueberweg (Vienna,

1801), K. Sehaarschmidt (Bonn, 1800), H. Bonitz (Berlin, 1875), G. Ttich-

miiller (Gotha, 1870; Leipsic, 1879; Breslau, 1881), A. Krohn (Halle, 1878), W.

Dittenberger (in Hermes, 1881), H. Siebeck (Freiburg i. B. 188!)). [H. Jack

son in Jour. Phil., X., XL, and XIII. ; Archer-Hind s editions of Phcedo and

TimaKus; reviewed critically by P. Shorey in Am. Jour. Philol, IX. and X.]

[On Plato s philosophy, in addition to the above, W. Pater, Plato and Platon-

ism (Lond. and N.Y. 1893) ; J. Martineau, in Types of Ethical 1 heorij (Lond.

and N.Y. 1880), also in Essays; Art. Plato in Ettc. Brit., by L. Campbell ; K. L.

Nettleship, The Theory of Education in P. s Hep., in Hellenica ; J. S. Mill in

Essays and Discussions.]

The writings which are considered genuinely Platonic are (a) youthful works,

which scarcely go beyond the Socratic standpoint : Apology, Crito, Euthyphro,

Lysis, Laches (perhaps also Charmides, Hippias Minor, and Alcibiades, I.) ;

(b) writings to establish his position with regard to the Sophistic doctrines:

Protagoras, Gorgias, Euthydemus, Cratylus, Meno, Thewtetus ; (c) main works

intended to present his own doctrine : Phoidrus, Symposium, Ph&do, Philebus,

ami t .ie Republic, whose working out, begun early and completed in successive

strata, as it were, extended into the last years of the Philosopher s life ; (rf) the

writin ;s of his old age : Timwus, the Laws, and the fragment of Critias. Among

the doubtful writings the most important are the Sophist, J olitictts, and Par-

menides. These probably did not originate with Plato, but with men of his

school who were closely related with the Eleatic dialectic and eristic. The first

two are by the same author.

Cf. II. v. Stein, Sicben Bncher zur Geschichte des Platonismus (Gottingen,

1801 ff.); G. Grote, Plato and the Other Companions of Socrates (Lond. 1805);

A. K. Chaignet, La vie et les ecrits de Platon (Paris, 1873); E. Heitz, (0. Mullens

Gesch. d -r griech. Lit., 2. Aufl., II. 2, 148-#55).

Plato s school is called the Academy, and the time of its development, which

reaches to the end of ancient thought, and which was aided by the continued

possession of the academic grove and the gymnasium existing there, is usually

divided into three or five periods : (1) the Older Academy, Plato s most imme

diate circle of scholia and the succeeding generations, extending to about 200

.c.; (2) the Middle Academy, which took a sceptical direction, and in which

an older school of Arcesilaas and a younger school of Carneades (about 100) are

distinguished ; (3) the New Academy, which with Philo of Larissa (about 100)

turned back to the old dogmatism, and with Antiochus of Ascalon (about twenty-

five years later) turned into the paths of Eclecticism. Concerning the two (or

four) later forms cf. Part II. ch. 1. Later the Is eo-Platonic school took posses

sion of the Ar-ademy. Cf. Part II. ch. 2.

To the Oldsr Academy belonged men of great erudition and honourable per

sonality. The heads of the school were Speusippus, the nephew of Plato,

Xenocrates of Chalcedon, Polerno and Crates of Athens ; beside these,

Philip of Opus and Heracleides from Pontic Heraclea are to be mentioned

among the older, and Grantor among the younger members. Less closely

related with the school were the astronomers Eudoxus of Cnidos and the

Pythagorean Archytas of Tarentum. H. Heinze, Xenocrates (Leips. 1892).

Aristotle of Stagira towers far above all his associates in the Academy

(384-322). As son of a Macedonian physician, he brought with him an inclina

tion toward medical and natural science, when, at eighteen years of age, he

entered the Academy, in which as literary supporter and also as teacher, at first

of rhetoric, he early played a comparatively independent part, without acting

contrary to a feeling of reverent subordination to the master, by so doing.

It was not until after Plato s death that he separated himself externally from the

Academy, visiting, with Xenocrates, his friend Hermias, the ruler of Atarneusand

Assus in Mysia, whose relative Pythias he afterwards married. After an appar

ently transient stay at Athens and Mitylene, he undertook, at the wish of Philip

of Maeedon, the education of the latter s son Alexander, and conducted it for

about three years with the greatest results. After this, he lived for some years

in his native city, pursuing scientific studies with his friend Theophrastus, and

together with him, in the year 335, founded in Athens his own school, which

had its seat in the Lyceum, and (probably on account of its shady walks) was

called the Peripatetic School.

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After twelve years of the greatest activity, he left Athens on account of

political disturbances and went to Chalcis, where he died in the following year,

of a disease of the stomach. Cf. A. Stahr, Aristotelia, I. (Halle, 1830).

Of the results of the extraordinarily comprehensive literary activity of Aris

totle only the smallest part, but the most important part from the point of view

of science, is extant. The dialogues published by himself, which in the eyes of

the ancients placed him on a level with Plato as an author also, are lost with the

exception of a few fragments, and so also are the great compilations which with

the aid of his scholars he prepared for the different branches of scientific knowl

edge. Only his scientific didactic writings, which were designed as text-books

to be made the foundation of lectures in the Lyceum, are extant. The plan of

execution in his works varies greatly ; in many places there are only sketchy

notes, in others complete elaborations ; there are also different revisions of the

same sketch, and it is probable that supplementary matter by different scholars

has been inserted in the gaps of the manuscripts. Since the first complete edi

tion prepared in ancient times (as it appears, on the occasion of a new discovery

of original manuscripts) by Andronicus of Rhodes (60-50 B.C.) did not separate

these parts, many critical questions are still afloat concerning it.

Cf. A. Stahr, Aristotelia, II. (Leips. 1832); V. Rose (Berlin, 1854); H. Bonitz

(Vienna, 1802 ff.); .1. Bernays (Berlin, 1863); E. Heitz (Leips. 1865 and in the

second ed. of O. Mliller s Gesch. der griech. Lit., II. 2, 236-321); E. Vahlen

(Vienna, 1870 ff.).

This text-book collection, 1 as it were, is arranged in the following manner:

(a) Logical treatises : the Categories, on the Proposition, on Interpretation,

the Analytics, the Topics including the book on the Fallacies brought together

by the school as "Oryanon" ; (b) Theoretical Philosophy : Fundamental Science

(Metaphysics), the Physics, the History of Animals, and the Psychology ; to the

three last are attached a number of separate treatises ; (c) Practical Philosophy:

the Ethics in the Nicomachean and Eudemian editions and the Politics (which

likewise is not complete) ; (d) Poietical or Poetical Philosophy : the Rhetoric

and the Poetic.

Fr. Biese, Die Philosophic des Aristoteles (2 vols., Berlin, 1835-42); A.

Rosmini-Serbati, Aristote.le. Exposto ed Esaminato (Torino, 1858); G. II. Lewes,

Aristotle, a Chapter from the History of Science (Lond. 1864) ; G. Grote,

Aristotle (published from his literary remains, Lond. 1872).

[Trans, of the Psychology by E. Wallace (Camb. 1882) ; of the Ethics, by

Peters (Lond. 1881), Welldon (Lond. and N.Y.), Williams (Lond. 1876), Chase

(Lond. 1877), Hatch (Lond. 1879); of the Poetics, by Wharton (Camb. 1883) ; of

the Politics, by Welldon (Camb. 1888), Jowett (2 vols., Oxford, 1885-88) ; of

the Rhetoric, by Welldon (Lond. and N.Y. 1886) ; also tr. of all of the above and

of the Metaphysics, Organon, and History of Animals in the Bohn Library.

Editions of the Politics with valuable introduction by Newman (Oxford, 1887,

2 vols.); of the Ethics, by A. Grant. Cf. also Art. in Enc. Brit., Aristotle by

A. Giant; T. II. Green in Works; A. C. Bradley, ASs Theory of the State, in

Hellenica. E. Wallace, Outlines of ASs Phil, is convenient for the student.]

### 9. Metaphysics grounded anew in Epistemology and Ethics.

The great systematisers of Greek science exercised a swift but

just criticism upon the Sophistic doctrine. They saw at once that

among the doctrines of the Sophists but a single one possessed the

worth of lasting validity and scientific fruitfulness the perception

theory of Protagoras.

1 Of the newer editions, that of the Berlin Academy (J. Bekker, Brandis,

Rose, Usener, Bonitz), 5 vols., Berlin, 1831-70, is made the basis of citations.

The Parisian edition (Didot) is also to be noticed (Diibner, Bussemaker, Heitz)

5 vols., Paris, 1848-74.

CHAP. :i, !).] The New Metaphysics. 105

1. This, therefore, became the starting-point for Democritus and

for Plato ; and both adopted it in order to transcend it and attack

the consequences which the Sophist had drawn from it. Both admit

that perception, as being itself only a product of a natural process,

can be the knowledge of something only which likewise arises and

passes away as transitory product of the same natural process.

Perception then gives only opinion (Soa) ; it teaches what appears

in and for human view (called I/O/AW in Democritus with a genuine

Sophistic mode of expression), not what truly or really (CTC^ with

Democritus, OVTWS with Plato) is.

For Protagoras, who regarded perception as the only source of

knowledge, there was consequently no knowledge of what is. That

he took the farther step of denying Being altogether and declaring

the objects of perception to be the sole reality, behind which there

is no Being to be sought for, this "positivist" conclusion is not

to be demonstrated in his case : the doctrine of "nihilism" (" there

is no Being ") is expressly ascribed by tradition only to Gorgias.

If, nevertheless, from any grounds whatever, a universally valid

knowledge (71/170-117 yvw/AT? with Democritus, firuTTrjfirj with Plato) was

to be again set over against opinions, the sensualism of Protagoras

must be abandoned and the position of the old metaphysicians, who

distinguished thought (oieivoia), as a higher and better knowledge,

from perception, must be taken again (cf. 6). Thus Democritus

and Plato both in like manner transcend Protagoras by acknowledg

ing the relativity of perception, and looking to "thought" again for

knowledge of what truly is. Both are outspoken rationalists. 1

2. This new metaphysical rationalism is yet distinguished from

the older rationalism of the cosmological period, not only by its

broader psychological basis, which it owed to the Protagorean

analysis of perception, but also in consequence of this, by another

valuation of perception itself from the standpoint of the theory of

knowledge. The earlier metaphysicians, where they could not fit

the contents of perception into their conceptional idea of the world,

had simply rejected them as deceit and illusion. Now this illusion

had been explained (by Protagoras), but in such a way that while

surrendering its universal validity the content of perception might

yet claim at least the value of a transient and relative reality.

This, in connection with the fact that scientific knowledge was

1 Cf. Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. VIII. 50. The doctrine of Democritus with

regard to "genuine " knowledge is most shaiply formulated in Sext. Emp. Adv.

Math. VII. 139. Plato s attack upon the Protagorean sensualism is found prin

cipally in the Thecetetus, his positive rationalistic attitude in the Phaedrus, Sym

posium, Republic, and Phcedo.

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directed toward the abiding " true " Being, led to a division in the

conception of reality, and with this the fundamental need of explana

tory thought came to clear, explicit consciousness, a need which

unconsciously lay at the basis of the beginnings of science. To the

two kinds of knowledge so Democritus and Plato taught cor

respond two different kinds of reality: to perception a changing,

relative, transient reality or actuality ; to thought a reality homo

geneous, absolute and abiding. For the former Democritus seems

to have introduced the expression phenomena; Plato designates it

as the world of generation, yeVe&lt;m : the other kind of reality Democ

ritus calls TO, iTtfj VTa &gt; Plato, TO OVTWS 6V or ova-La [that which really

is, or essence].

In this way perception and opinion gain a correctness which is

analogous to that of scientific thought. Perception cognises chang

ing reality as thought cognises abiding reality. To the two modes

of cognition correspond two domains of reality. 1

But between these two domains there exists for this reason the

same relation, as regards their respective values, as obtains between

the two kinds of cognition. By as much as thought, the universally

valid act of consciousness, is above perception, the knowledge valid

only for individuals and for the particular, by so much is the true

Being higher, purer, more primitive, raised above the lower actuality

of phenomena and the changing processes and events among them.

This relation was especially emphasised and carried out by Plato

for reasons hereafter to be unfolded. But it appears also with Democ

ritus, not only in his theory of knowledge, but also in his ethics.

In this way the two metaphysicians agree with the result which

the Pythagoreans (cf. o, 7, and 6, 1) had likewise won from

their premises, viz. the distinction of a higher and lower kind of

reality. Nevertheless, in the presence of this similarity we are not

to think of a dependence ; in nowise in the case of Democritus,

who was a complete stranger to the astronomical view of the Pythag

oreans, and scarcely in the case of Plato, who indeed later adopted

the astronomical theory, but whose idea of the higher reality (the

doctrine of Ideas) has an entirely different content. The case

rather is that the common, fundamental motive which came from

the conception of Being propounded by Parmenides, led in these

three quite different forms to the division of the world into a

sphere of higher and one of lower reality.

3. The pragmatic parallelism in the motives of the two opposed

systems of Democritus and Plato reaches a step farther, although

1 Best formulated in Plat., Tim. 27 D ff., especially 29 C.

CHAP. 3, !).] The New Metaphysics : Democritus, Plato. 107

but a short step. To the world of perception belong, without doubt,

the specific qualities of the senses, for these disclose their relativity

in the fact that the same thing appears differently to different senses.

But after we have abstracted these qualities, that which remains as

an object for the knowledge of the truly actual, is primarily the

form which things have, and both thinkers designated as the true

essential nature of things the pure/orms (i8u).

But it almost seems as though here they had nothing in common

but the name, striking as this fact is ; for if Democritus understood

by the i8u, which he also called o^ /Aura, his atom-forms, while

Plato understood by his iSu or db-q the conceptions corresponding

to logical species (Gattungsbegrijfe), then the apparently like state

ment that the truly existent consists in " forms " has a completely

different meaning in the two authors. For this reason we must

here, too, remain in doubt as to whether we should see a parallel

dependence upon Pythagoreanism, which, to be sure, had previously

found the essence of things in mathematical forms, and whose influ

ence upon the two thinkers may be assumed without encountering

any difficulties in the assumption itself. At all events, however, if

a common suggestion was present, it led to quite different results in

the two systems before us, and though in both of them knowledge

of mathematical relations stands in very close relation to knowledge

of true reality, these relations are yet completely different with the

respective thinkers.

4. The relationship thus far unfolded between the two rational

istic systems changes now suddenly to a sharp opposition as soon as

we consider the motives from which the two thinkers transcended

the Protagorean sensualism and relativism, and observe also the

consequences which result therefrom. Here the circumstance be

comes of decisive importance, that Plato ivas the disciple of Socrates,

while Democritus experienced not even the slightest influence from

the great Athenian sage.

With Democritus the demand which drives him to transcend the

position of Protagoras grows solely out of his theoretical need and

develops according to his personal nature, the demand, namely,

that there is a knowledge, and that this, if it is not to be found in

perception, must be sought for in thought ; the investigator of Nat

ure believes, as against all the Sophistic teaching, in the possibility

of a theory that shall explain phenomena. Plato, on the contrary,

sets out with his postulate of the Socratic conception of virtue.

Virtue is to be gained only through right knowledge ; knowledge,

however, is cognition of the true Being: if, then, this is not to be

found in perception, it must be sought for through thought. For

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Plato philosophy grows, according to the Socratic principle, 1 out of

the ethical need. But while the Sophistic friends of Socrates were

endeavouring to give to the knowledge that constituted virtue some

object in the form of a general life-purpose, the good, pleasure, etc.,

Plato wins his metaphysical position with one stroke, by drawing

the inference that this knowledge in which virtue is to consist must

be the cognition of what is truly real, the ovcno, as opposed to

opinions which relate to the relative. In his case the knowledge

in which virtue is to consist demands a metaphysics.

Here, then, the ways are already parting. Knowledge of the

truly real was for Democritus, as for the old metaphysicians,

essentially an idea of the unchangeably abiding Being, but an idea

by means of which it should be possible to understand the

derivative form of reality which is cognised in perception. His

rationalism amounted to an explanation of phenomena, to be gained

through thought; it was essentially theoretical rationalism. For

Plato, on the contrary, knowledge of the truly real had its ethical

purpose within itself; this knowledge was to constitute virtue, and

hence it had no other relation to the world given through per

ception than that of sharply defining its limits. True Being has

for Dernocritus the theoretical value of explaining phenomena; for

Plato, the practical value of being the object of that knowledge

which constitutes virtue. His doctrine is, as regards its original

principle, essentially ethical rationalism.

Democritus, therefore, persevered in the work undertaken in the

school of Abdera, the construction of a metaphysics of Nature.

With the help of the Sophistic psychology he developed Atomism

to a comprehensive system. Like Leucippus, he regarded empty

space and the atoms moving in it as the true reality. He then

attempted not only to explain from the motion of these atoms

all qualitative phenomena of the corporeal world as quantitative

phenomena, but also to explain from these motions all mental

activities, including that knowing activity which is directed

toward true Being. Thus he created the system of materialism.

Plato, however, was led to the entirely opposite result by his

attachment to the Socratic doctrine, which proved to be of decisive

importance for his conception of the essential nature of science.

5. Socrates had taught that knowledge consists in general concep

tions. If, however, this knowledge, in contrast with opinions, was

to be knowledge of what truly, actually is, there must belong to the

content of these conceptions that higher Being, that true essential

1 Set forth most clearly in the Meno, 96 ff.

CHAP. 3, 10.] $ystem of Materialism : Democritus. 109

reality which, it was held, could be grasped only by thought, in

contrast with perception. The "forms" of true reality, knowledge

of which constitutes virtue, are the species or class-concepts (Gattungs-

begrijfe), uSrj. With this consideration, the Platonic conception of

the "Idea" first gains its complete determination.

So understood, Plato s doctrine of Ideas presents itself as the

summit of Greek philosophy. In it are combined all the different

lines of thought which had been directed toward the physical, the

ethical, the logical first principle (apx\*l or &lt;w). The Platonic

Idea, the species or class-concept, is firstly the abiding Being in the

change of phenomena; secondly, the object of knowledge in the

change of opinions ; thirdly, the true end in the change of desires.

But this ovo-t a, from the nature of its definition, is not to be found

within the sphere of what may be perceived, and everything cor

poreal is capable of being perceived. The Ideas are then something

essentially different from the corporeal world. True reality is

incorporeal. The division in the conception of reality takes on

accordingly a fixed form ; the lower reality of natural processes or

generation (yeveo-is), which forms the object of perception, is the

corporeal world ; the higher reality of Being, which thought knows,

is the incorporeal, the immaterial world, TOTTOS vo^rds. Thus the

Platonic system becomes immaterialism, or, as we call it after the

meaning given by him to the word "Idea," Idealism.

6. In the Platonic system, accordingly, we find perhaps the most

extensive interweaving and complication of problems which history

has seen. The doctrine of Democritus, on the contrary, is ruled

throughout by the one interest of explaining Nature. However

rich the results which this latter doctrine might achieve for this

its proper end, results which could be taken up again in a later,

similarly disposed condition of thought, and then first unfold their

whole fruitfulness, at first the other doctrine must surpass this,

all the more in proportion as it satisfied all needs of the time and

united within itself the entire product of earlier thought. More

points of attack for immanent criticism are perhaps offered by the

Platonic system than by that of Democritus ; but for Greek thought

the latter was a relapse into the cosmology of the first period, and

it was Plato s doctrine that must become the system of the future.

### 10. The System of Materialism.

The systematic character of the doctrine of Democritus consists

in the way in which he carried through in all departments of his

work the fundamental thought, that scientific theory must so far

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gain knowledge of the true reality, i.e. of the atoms and their

motions in space, as to be able to explain from them the reality

which appears in phenomena, as this presents itself in perception.

There is every indication (even the titles of his books would show

this) that Democritus took up this task by means of investigations

covering the entire compass of the objects of experience, and in this

connection devoted himself with as great an interest to the psy

chological as to the physical problems. So much the more must we

regret that the greater part of his teachings has been lost, and

that what is preserved, in connection with accounts of others,

permits only a hypothetical reconstruction of the main conceptions

of his great work, a reconstruction which must always remain

defective and uncertain.

1. It must be assumed in the first place that Democritus was

fully conscious of this task of science, viz. that of explaining the

world of experience through conceptions of the true reality. That

which the Atomists regard as the Existent, viz. space and the par

ticles whirring in it, has no value except for theoretical purposes.

It is only thought in order to make intelligible what is perceived ;

but for this reason the problem is so to think the truly real that

it may explain the real which appears in phenomena, that at the

same time this latter reality may " remain preserved" 1 as some

thing that " is " in a derived sense, and that the truth which inheres

in it may remain recognised. Hence Democritus knew very well

that thought also must seek the truth in perception, and win it out

of perception. 2 His rationalism is far removed from being in con

tradiction with experience, or even from being strange to experience.

Thought has to infer from perception that by means of which the

latter is explained. The motive which lay at the foundation of

the mediating attempts following the Eleatic paradox of acosmism

became with Democritus the clearly recognised principle of meta

physics and natural science. Yet tmfortunately nothing is now

known as to how he carried out in detail the methodical relation

between the two modes of cognition, and how the process by which

knowledge grows out of perception in the particular instance was

thought by him.

More particularly, the theoretical explanation which Democritus

1 The very happy expression for this is duurdfciv TO. &lt;t&gt;a.Lvt&gt;iteva. Cf. also Arist.

Gen. et Corr. I. 832, 5 a.

2 Hence, the expressions in which he recognised the truth in the phenome

non ; e.g. Arist. De An. I. 2, 404 a 27, and the like. To attempt, however, to

construe out of this a " sensualism" of Democritus, as has been attempted by

E. Johnson (Plauen, 1868), contradicts completely the accounts with regard to

his attitude toward Protagoras.

CHAP. 3, 10.] System of Materialism : Democritus. Ill

gave for the contents of perception consists, as with Leucippus, in

the reduction of all phenomena to the mechanics of atoms. What

appears in perception as qualitatively determined, and also as in

volved in qualitative change (dAAoiou/xe/xov), exists "in truth" only

as a quantitative relation of the atoms, of their order, and their

motion. The task of science is then to reduce all qualitative to

quantitative relations, and to show in detail what quantitative rela

tions of the absolute reality produce the qualitative characteristics

of the reality which appears in phenomena. Thus, the prejudice in

favour of what may be perceived or imaged (anschaulich), as if spatial

form and motion were something simpler, more comprehensible in

themselves, and less of a problem than qualitative character and

alteration, is made the principle for the theoretical explanation of

the world.

Since this principle is applied with complete systematic rigour

to the whole of experience, Atomism regards the psychical life with

all its essential elements and values as also a phenomenon, and the

form and motion of the atoms which constitute the true Being of

this phenomenon must be stated by the explanatory theory. Thus

matter in its form and motion is regarded as that which alone is

truly real, and the entire mental or spiritual life as the derived,

phenomenal reality. With this the system of Democritus first

assumes the character of conscious, outspoken materialism.

2. In the properly physical doctrines, the teaching of Democritus

presents, therefore, no change in principle as compared with that of

Leucippus, though there is a great enrichment by careful detailed

investigation. He emphasised still more sharply than his predeces

sor, where possible, the thought of the mechanical necessity (dvay\*^

which he also occasionally called Aoyos), in accordance with which

all occurrence or change whatever takes place, and further defined

this thought as involving that no operation of atoms upon one

another is possible except through impact, through immediate con

tact, and further, that this operation consists only in the change of

the state of motion of the atoms which are also unchangeable as

regards their form.

The atom itself as that which " is," in the proper sense of the

word, has accordingly only the characteristics of abstract corpore

ality, viz. the filling of a limited space, and the quality of being

in motion in the void. Although all are imperceptibly small, they

yet exhibit an endless variety of forms (iSe cu or a-xrj^ra). To form,

which constitutes the proper fundamental difference in the atoms,

belongs in a certain sense also size ; yet it is to be observed that

the same stereometrical form, e.y. the sphere, may appear in different

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sizes. The larger the atom, the greater its mass ; for the essential

quality of what is, is indeed materiality, space-claiming. For this

reason Democritus asserted weight or lightness to be a function of

size, 1 evidently yielding to the mechanical analogies of daily life.

In connection with these terms (fiapv and KOU&lt;OV), however, we are

not to think of the falling motion, but solely of the degree of mechani

cal movability or of inertia. 2 Hence it was also his opinion that as

the atom-complexes whirled about, the lighter parts were forced out

ward, while the more inert with their inferior mobility were gath

ered in the middle.

The same properties communicate themselves as metaphysical

qualities to things which are composed of atoms. The form and

size of things is produced by the simple summation of the form and

size of the component atoms ; though in this case, the inertia is not

dependent solely upon the sum total of the magnitudes of the atoms,

but upon the greater or less amount of empty space that remains

between the individual particles when they are grouped together.

The inertia depends therefore upon the less or greater degree of

density. And since the ease with which particles may be displaced

with reference to one another depends upon this interruption of the

mass by empty space, the properties of hardness and softness belong

also to the true reality that is known by thought.

All other properties, however, belong to things not in them

selves, but only in so far as motions proceeding from things act

upon the organs of perception ; they are " states of perception as it

is in process of qualitative change." But these states are also

conditioned throughout by the things in which the perceived prop

erties appear, and here the arrangement and the situation which the

atoms have taken with reference to each other in the process of

composition are of principal importance. 3

While, then, form, size, inertia, density, and hardness are properties

of things eTefl, i.e. in truth, all that is perceived in them by the indi

vidual senses as colour, sound, smell, taste, exists only vo/x,o&gt;or 0eW,

i.e. in the phenomenon. This doctrine, when taken up anew in the

philosophy of the Kenaissance (cf. Part IV. ch. 2) and later, was

1 As the most extensive exposition for this and for the following topic The-

ophr. De Sens. 61 ff. (Dox. D. 516) is to be compared.

2 It is scarcely to be decided now whether the motion of their own, which

Atomism ascribed to all the atoms as primitive and causeless, was thought of

by Democritus as conditioned already by the size or mass, so that the greater

had, even from the beginning, possessed less velocity. At all events, these

determinations held good for him within the sphere of the mechanical operation

of the atoms on one another. What is larger can be pushed with greater diffi

culty ; what is smaller can be pushed more easily.

Cf. Arist. Gen. et Corr. I. 2, 315 b 6.

CHAP. 3, 10.] System of Materialism : Democritus. 113

designated as distinguishing between the primary and secondary

qualities of things, and it is desirable to introduce this expression

here, since it corresponds throughout to the metaphysical and episte-

mological sense in which Democritus made the Frotagorean doctrine

useful for his own purpose. While the Sophist would make all

properties secondary and relative, Democritus admitted this only for

the qualities perceived by special senses, and set over against these

the quantitative determinations as primary and absolute. He there

fore designated also as " genuine knowledge " the insight into the

primary qualities to be won through thought, while, on the contrary,

perception which is directed toward the secondary qualities he

termed " obscure knowledge " (yvrjo-ir) O-KOTIT; yvw/i??)-

3. The secondary qualities appear accordingly as dependent

upon the primary ; they are not, however, dependent upon these

alone, but rather upon the action of these upon the percipient

agent. But in the atomistic system that which perceives, the mind

or soul, can consist only of atoms. To be more explicit, it consists,

according to Democritus, of the same atoms which constitute also

the essence of fire: namely, the finest, smoothest, and most mobile.

These are indeed scattered also through the whole world, and in so

far animals, plants, and other things may be regarded as animate, as

having souls, but they are united in largest numbers in the human

body, where in life a fire-atom is placed between every two atoms of

other sorts, and where they are held together by breathing.

Upon this presupposition, then, analogous, as we see, to the older

systems, Democritus built up his explanation of phenomena from

the true essence of things. That is, perception, and with it the

secondary qualities, arises from the action of things upon the fire-

atoms of the soul. The reality which appears is a necessary result

of the true reality.

In carrying out this doctrine Democritus took up and refined the

theories of perception advanced by his predecessors. The effluxes

(cf. above, 6, 3) which proceed from things to set in motion the

organs and through them the fire-atoms, he called images (a8o&gt;A.a),

and regarded them as infinitely small copies of the things. Their

impression upon the fire-atoms is perception, and the similarity

between the content of this perception and its object was held to be

secured thereby. Since impact and pressure are the essence of all

the mechanics of the atoms, touch is regarded as the most primitive

sense. The special organs, on the contrary, were regarded as capable

of receiving only such images as corresponded to their own forma

tion and motion, and this theory of the specific energy of the sense

organs was worked out very acutely by Democritus. From this it

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followed also that in case there were things whose effluxes could

not act upon any one of the organs, these would remain imperceptible

for the ordinary man, and for these perhaps " other senses " might

be accessible.

This theory of images appeared very plausible to ancient thought.

It brought to definite expression, and indeed to a certain extent

explained, the mode of representing things which is still common

for the ordinary consciousness, as if our perceptions were " copies "

of things existing outside of us. If one did not ask further how

things should come to send out such miniature likenesses of them

selves into the world, he might think that he understood, by means

of this theory, how our " impressions " can resemble things with

out. For this reason this theory at once attained the predominance

in physiological psychology, and retained its position until after the

beginnings of modern philosophy, where it was defended by Locke.

Its significance, however, for the conceptions in the system of

Democritus, lies in this, that it was regarded as describing that

motion of the atoms in which perception consists. It remained

hidden from this materialism, which was such from principle, as

well as from all its later transformations, that perception as a

psychical activity is something specifically different from any and

every motion of atoms, however determined. But in seeking out

the individual forms of motion from which the individual percep

tions of the special senses arise, the philosopher of Abdera caused

many a keen observation, many a fine suggestion, to become known.

4. It is interesting now that the same fate befell the materialistic

psychology of Democritus as had befallen the pre-Sophistic meta

physicians (cf. 6) : it, too, was obliged in a certain respect to oblit

erate again the epistemological contrast between perception and

thought. Since, that is, all psychical life is regarded as motion of

the fire-atoms, 1 and since the motion of atoms in the connected sys

tem of the universe is conditioned by contact and impact, it follows

that thought, which knows the truly real, can be explained only from

an impression which this truly real makes upon the fiery atoms,

explained therefore itself only through the efflux of such images.

As a psychological process, therefore, thought is the same as percep

tion, viz. impression of images upon fire-atoms; the only difference

is that in the case of perception the relatively coarse images of the

atom-complexes are active, while thought, which apprehends true

reality, rests upon a contact of the fire-atoms with the finest images,

with those which represent the atomic structure of things.

i Arist. De An. I. 2, 405 a 8.

C HAP. ;5, lo.] System of Materialism : Democrifus. 115

Odd and fantastic as this sounds, the indications are yet all in

favour of the supposition that Democritus drew this conclusion from

the presuppositions of his m ierialistic psychology. This psychol

ogy knew no independent, internal mechanism of ideas or conscious

states, but only an arising of ideas through the motion of atoms.

Hence it regarded ideas that were evidently deceptive as also

" impressions," and sought for these the exciting images. Dreams,

e.g. were traced back to e?Sa&gt;A.a. which had either penetrated into the

body in the waking state and on account of their weak motion had

previously produced no impression, or had first reached the fiery

atoms in sleep, evading the senses. A mysterious ("magnetic," or

" psychic," we should say to-day) action of men upon one another

appeared comprehensible on this hypothesis, and an objective basis

was given to faith in gods and demons by assuming giant forms in

infinite space from which corresponding images proceeded.

In correspondence with this Democritus seems to have thought of

" genuine knowledge " as that motion of the fire-atoms which is pro

duced by the impression of the smallest and finest images, those

which represent the atomic composition of things. This motion is,

however, the most delicate, the finest, the gentlest of all that which

comes nearest to rest. With this definition the contrast between per

ception and thought was expressed in quantitative terms quite in the

spirit of the system. The coarse images of things as wholes set the

fiery atoms into relatively violent motion and produce by this means

the "obscure insight " which presents itself as perception ; the finest

images, on the contrary, impress upon the fiery atoms a gentle, fine

motion which evokes the "genuine insight" into the atomic structure

of things, i.e. thought. In consideration of this, Democritus com

mends the thinker to turn away from the world of the senses, quite

in contrast with the mode of thought which would develop truth out

of perception. Those finest motions assert their influence only where

the coarser are kept back ; and where too violent motions of the

fiery atoms take place, the result is false ideation, the dAAo^poveiv. 1

5. This same quantitative contrast of strong and soft, violent

and gentle motion, was laid by Democritus at the basis of his ethical

theory also. 2 In so doing he stood with his psychology completely

upon the iutellectualistic standpoint of Socrates in so far as he

transposed the epistemological values of ideas immediately into

ethical values of states of will. As from perception only that

1 Theophr. De Sens. 58 (Dox. D. 515).

2 The resemblance with the theory of Aristippus ( 7, 9) is so striking, that

the assumption of a causal connection is scarcely to be avoided. Yet it may be

that we should seek for this rather in a common dependence upon Protagoras,

than in the interaction of Atomism and Hedonism upon each other.

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obscure insight follows which has for its object the phenomenon

and not the true essence, so also the pleasure which arises from the

excitation of the senses is only relative (VO/AW), obscure, uncertain

of itself, and deceitful. The true happiness, on the contrary, for

which the wise man lives "according to nature" (^uo-ei), the iv8unfj.o-

via, which is the end (TC XOS) and measure (ovpos) of human life, must

not be sought in external goods, in sensuous satisfaction, but only

in that gentle motion, that tranquil frame (tueo-rw), which attends

upon right insight, upon the gentle movement of the fiery atoms.

This insight alone gives to the soul measure arid harmony (V/A/AC-

rpia), guards it from emotional astonishment (aflau/xacna), lends it

security and imperturbability (drapa^ta, dtfa/x/fta), the ocean-calm

(yaXvyVr/) of the soul that has become master of its passions through

knowledge. True happiness is rest (lyo-uxia), and rest is secured only

by knowledge. Thus Democritus gains as the cap-stone of his

system his personal ideal of life, that of pure knowledge, free

from all wishes ; with this ideal, this systematic materialism cul

minates in a noble and lofty theory of life. And yet there is in it

also a tendency which characterises the morals of the age of the

Enlightenment : this peace of mind resting upon knowledge is the

happiness of an individual life, and where the ethical teachings of

Democritus extend beyond the individual, it is friendship, the rela

tion of individual personalities to one another, that he praises,

while he remains indifferent as regards connection with the state

### 11. The System of Idealism.

The origin and development of the Platonic doctrine of Ideas is

one of the most difficult and involved, as well as one of the most

effective and fruitful, processes in the entire history of European

thought, and the task of apprehending it properly is made still

more difficult by the literary form in which it has been transmitted.

The Platonic dialogues show the philosophy of their author in

process of constant re-shaping : their composition extended through

half a century. Since, however, the order in which the individual

dialogues arose has not been transmitted to us and cannot be estab

lished absolutely from external characteristics, pragmatic hypotheses

based on the logical connections of thought must be called to our aid.

1. In the first place there is no question that the opposition

between Socrates and the Sophists formed the starting-point for

Platonic thought. Plato s first writings were dedicated to an

affectionate and in the main, certainly, a faithful presentation of

the Socratic doctrine of virtue. To this he attached a polemic

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against the Sophistic doctrines of society and knowledge. marked by

increasing keenness, but also by an increasing tendency toward

establishing his own view upon an independent basis. The Platonic

criticism of the Sophistic theories, however, proceeded essentially

from the Socratic postulate. It admitted fully, in the spirit of

Protagoras, the relativity of all knowledge gained through percep

tion, but it found just in this the inadequacy of the Sophistic theory

for a true science of ethics. 1 The knowledge which is necessary for

virtue cannot consist in opinions as they arise from the changing

states of motion in subject and object, nor can it consist of a

rational consideration and legitimation of such opinions gained by

perception ; 2 it must have a wholly different source and wholly

different objects. Of the corporeal world and its changing states

Plato held to thh view of Protagoras in its entirety there is no

science, but only perceptions and opinions ; it is accordingly an

incorporeal world that forms the object of science, and this world

must exist side by side with the corporeal world as independently

as does knowledge side by side with opinion. 3

Here we have for the first time the claim of an immaterial reality,

brought forward expressly and with full consciousness, and it is

clear that this springs from the ethical need for a knowledge that

is raised above all ideas gained by sense-perception. The assump

tion of immateriality did not at first have as its aim, for Plato, the

explanation of phenomena : its end was rather to assure an object

for ethical knowledge. The idealistic metaphysics, therefore, in its

first draft \* builds entirely upon a new foundation of its own, with

out any reference to the work of earlier science that had been

directed toward investigating and understanding phenomena ; it is

an immaterial Eleatism, which seeks true Being in the Ideas, with

out troubling itself about the world of generation and occurrence,

which it leaves to perception and opinion.\*

To avoid numerous misunderstandings we must, nevertheless,

expressly point out that the Platonic conception of immateriality

(do-cu/LiaTov) is in nowise coincident with that of the spiritual or

psychical, as might be easily assumed from the modern mode of

thinking. For the Platonic conception the particular psychical

1 On this point, the Thecetetus brings together the whole criticism of the

Sophistic doctrine.

2 Soa dX^Tjs /JXTO. \6yov, Thecet. 201 E. (Probably a theory of Antisthenes.)

3 Arist. Met. I. (5, 987 a 32 ; XIII. 4, 1078 b 12.

4 As set forth in the dialogues Fhaxlrus and the Symposium.

5 Investigations as to theoretical and natural science are first found in the

latest dialogues.

(i To which the Neo- Pythagorean and Neo-PIatonic transformation of the

doctrine of Ideas gave occasion. Cf. Ft. II. ch. 2, 18.

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functions belong to the world of Becoming, precisely as do those of

the body and of other corporeal things ; and on the other hand, in

the true reality the " forms " or " shapes " of corporeality, the Ideas

of sensuous qualities and relations, find a place precisely as do those

of the spiritual relations. The identification of spirit or mind and

incorporeality, the division of the world into mind and matter, is un-

Platonic. The incorporeal world which Plato teaches is not yet the

spiritual.

Rather, the Ideas are, for Plato, that incorporeal Being which is

known through conceptions. Since, that is, the conceptions in which

Socrates found the essence of science are not given as such in the

reality that can be perceived, they must form a " second," " other "

reality, different from the former, existing by itself, and this imma

terial reality is related to the material, as Being to Becoming, as the

abiding to the changing, as the simple to the manifold in short,

as the world of Parmenides to that of Heraclitus. The object of

ethical knowledge, cognised through general conceptions, is that

which " is " in the true sense : the ethical, the logical, and the phys

ical apx&gt;i (ground or first principle) are the same. This is the point

in which all lines of earlier philosophy converge.

2. If the Ideas are to be " something other " than the percep

tible world, knowledge of them through conceptions cannot be found

in the content of perception, for they cannot be contained in it.

With this turn of thought, which corresponds to the sharper separa

tion of the two worlds, the Platonic doctrine of knowledge becomes

much more rationalistic than that of Democritus, and goes also

decidedly beyond that of Socrates ; for while the latter had devel

oped the universal out of the opinions and perceptions of individuals

inductively, and had found it as the common content in these opin

ions and perceptions, Plato does not conceive of the process of

induction in this analytical manner, but sees in perceptions only the

suggestions or promptings with the help of which the soul bethinks

itself of the conceptions, of the knowledge of the Ideas.

Plato expressed this rationalistic principle in the form that phil

osophical knowledge is recollection (dva/^cris). He showed in the

example of the Pythagorean proposition l that mathematical knowl

edge is not extracted from sense-perception, but\* that sense-percep

tion offers only the opportunity on occasion of which the soul

recollects the knowledge already present within her, that is, knowl

edge that has purely rational validity. He points out that the pure

mathematical relations are not present in corporeal reality ; on the

1 Me.no, 80 ff.

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contrary, the notion of these relations arises in us when similar

figures of perception offer but the occasion therefor, and he extended

this observation, which is completely applicable to mathematical

knowledge, to the sum total of scientific knowledge.

That this reflection upon what is rationally necessary should be

conceived of as recollection is connected with the fact that Plato,

as little as any of his predecessors, recognises a creative activity of

the consciousness, which produces its content. This is a general

limit for all Greek psychology ; the content for ideas must somehow

be given to the " soul " ; hence, if the Ideas are not given in perception,

and the soul nevertheless finds them in herself on occasion of per

ception, she must have already received these Ideas in some way or

other. For this act of reception, however, Plato finds only the

mythical representation, 1 that before the earthly life the souls have

beheld the pure forms of reality in the incorporeal world itself, that

the perception of similar corporeal things calls the remembrance

back to those forms forgotten in the corporeal earthly life, and that

from this awakes the philosophical impulse, the love of the Ideas

(l/o&lt;os), by which the soul becomes raised again to the knowledge

of that true reality. Here, too, as in the case of Democritus, it is

shown that the entire ancient rationalism could form no idea of

the process of thought except after the analogy of sensuous percep

tion, particularly that of the sense of sight.

What Socrates in his doctrine of the formation of conceptions had

designated as induction, became transformed, therefore, for Plato,

into an intuition that proceeds by recollecting (crwaywy . /), into re

flection upon a higher and purer perception (Anschauun&lt;j). This

pure perception, however, yields a plurality of ideas corresponding

to the multiplicity of objects which occasion such perceptions, and

from this grows the further task for science to know also the rela

tions of the Ideas to each other. This is a second step of Plato s

beyond Socrates, and is specially important for the reason that it led

shortly to the apprehension of the logical relations beticeen concep

tions. It was principally the relations of the subordination and co

ordination of concepts to which Plato became attentive. The

division of the class-concepts or logical genera into their species

played a great part in his teaching. 2 The possibility or impossibility

of the union of particular conceptions is brought more exactly into

1 Phcedr. 246 ff.

2 Of. Phile.b. 16 C. Yet this dividing process is not anywhere especially promi

nent in the writings that are certainly Platonic. It is handled with the pedantry

of a school in the Sophist and Politicus. Antiquity preserved "definitions"

and " divisions " from the Platonic school. In Athenwus\* II. f&gt;9 C, is an instance

of mockery, by a comic poet, at this academical concept-splitting.

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consideration, 1 and as a methodical aid he recommended the hypo

thetical method of discussion, which aims to examine a tentatively

proposed conception by developing all the possible consequences

that would follow from the possibility of its union with conceptions

already known.

These logical operations taken as a whole, by means of which the

Ideas arid their relations to one another (KOLWVLO) were to be found,

Plato denoted by the name dialectic. What is found in his writings

concerning it has throughout a methodological character, but is not

properly logical.

3. The doctrine of knowledge as recollection stood, however, in

closest connection with Plato s conception of the relation of Ideas to

the world of phenomena. Between the higher world of ouo-io. and the

lower world of y/eo-is, between what is and what is in process of

Becoming, he found that relation of similarity which exists between

archetypes (TrapaSeiy^aTa) and their copies or images (ctSwAa) . In this,

too, a strong influence of mathematics upon the Platonic philosophy

is disclosed : as the Pythagoreans had already designated things as

imitations of numbers, so Plato found that individual things always

correspond to their class-concepts only to a certain degree, and that

the class-concept is a logical ideal which none of its empirical

examples comes up to. He expressed this by the conception of

imitation (/ou/x^o-is). It was thus at the same time established that

that second world, that of the incorporeal Ideas, was to be regarded

as the higher, the more valuable, the more primitive world. )

Yet this mode of representing the matter gave rather a deter

mination of their respective values than a view that was usable for

metaphysical consideration : hence Plato sought for still other desig

nations of the relation. The logical side of the matter, according to

which the Idea as class-concept or species represents the total uni

tary extent or compass, of which the individual things denote but a

part, appears in the expression participation (/u.&lt;$eis)&gt; which means

that the individual thing but partakes in the universal essence of the

Idea ; and the changing process of this partaking is emphasised by

the conception of presence (-n-apova-La) . The class-concept or species

is present in the thing so long as the latter possesses the qualities

which dwell in the Idea. The Ideas come and go, and as these now

communicate themselves to things and now again withdraw, the

qualities in these things which are like the Ideas are successively

changed to the eye of perception. )

The precise designation of this relation was, for Plato, an object

1 Phcedo, 102 ff.

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of only secondary interest, provided only the difference between

the world of Ideas and the corporeal world, and the dependence of

the latter upon the former, were recognised. 1 Most important and

sufficient for him was the conviction that by means of conceptions

that knowledge which virtue needs of what truly and really is, could

be won.

A. Peipers, Ontologia Platonica. Leips. 1883.

4. But the logico-metaphysical interest which Plato grafted upon

the Socratic doctrine of knowledge carried him far beyond the

master as regards the contents of this doctrine. The general

characteristics which he developed for the essence of the Ideas

applied to all class-concepts, and the immaterial world was therefore

peopled with the archetypes of the entire world of experience. So

many class-concepts, so many Ideas ; for Plato, too, there are count

less " forms." In so far criticism 2 was right in saying that Plato s

world of Ideas was the world of perception thought over again in

conception.

In fact, according to the first draft of the Platonic philosophy,

there are Ideas of everything possible, of things, qualities, and

relations ; of the good and the beautiful as well as of the bad and

the ugly. Since the Idea is denned methodologically, in a purely

formal way, as class-concept, every class-concept whatever belongs

to the higher world of pure forms ; and in the dialogue Parmenides, 3

not only was Plato s attention called by a man schooled in the

Eleatic Sophistic doctrine to all kinds of dialectical difficulties

which inhere in the logical relation of the one Idea to its many

copies, but he was also rallied, spitefully enough, with the thought

of all the foul companions that would be met in his world of pure

conceptual forms.

Plato s philosophy had no principle that could serve as a weapon

against such an objection, nor is there in the dialogues any intima

tion that he had attempted to announce a definite criterion for the

selection of those class-concepts that were to be regarded as Ideas,

as constituents of the higher incorporeal world. Nor do the ex

amples which he adduces permit such a principle to be recognised ;

we can only say that it seems as if in course of time he continually

emphasised more strongly the attributes expressing worth (as the

good arid the beautiful), the mathematical relations (greatness and

smallness, numerical determinations, etc.), and the types of species

in the organic world, while, on the contrary, he no longer reckoned

1 Phcedo, 100 D. 2 Arist. Met. I. 9, 990 b 1. 3 Farm. 130 C.

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among the Ideas mere concepts of relation, especially negative

notions and things made by human art. 1

5. Our knowledge of the systematic connection and order which

Plato intended to affirm in the realm of Ideas remains ultimately as

obscure as that in regard to the preceding point. Urgent as he was

to establish co-ordination and subordination among the conceptions,

the thought of a logically arranged pyramid of conceptions which

must culminate in the conception that was most general and poorest

in content seems not to have been carried out. A very problematical

attempt to set up a limited number (five) of most general concep

tions 2 is presented in the Sophist (254 ff.). But these attempts,

which tend toward the Aristotelian doctrine of the categories, are

not to be traced back with certainty to Plato himself.

With him we find, rather, only the doctrine presented in the

Philebus, as well as in the Republic, that the Idea of the Good is the

highest, embracing, ruling, and realising all others. Plato defines

this Idea as regards its content as little as did Socrates; he de

termined it only by means of the relation, that it should represent

in its content the highest absolute end of all reality, of the incor

poreal as of the corporeal. The subordination of the other Ideas

to this highest Idea is accordingly not the logical subordination of

a particular under the general, but the teleological of the means to

the end.

In the latest period of his philosophising, concerning which we

have only intimations in the Laws and in critical notices of Aris

totle, 3 and in the teachings of his nearest successors, the imperfec

tion of this solution of the logical problem seems to have led Plato

to the unfortunate thought of developing the system of Ideas ac

cording to the method of the Pythagorean number-theory. The

Pythagoreans also, to be sure, had the purpose of attaching the

abiding arrangements of things symbolically to the development of

the number series. But that was only a makeshift, because they

had as yet no idea of the logical arrangement of conceptions : hence,

when Plato, in connection with his other thoughts, fell back upon

this makeshift, designated the Idea of the Good as the /, the One,

and attempted to derive from it the duality (Suas) of the Infinite or

Indefinite, and the Measure (aTrupov and Wpas, = even and odd ; cf.

4, 11), and from this, further, the other Ideas in such a way as to

present a series of the conditioning and the conditioned, neither

1 Cf. also Arist. Met. XII. 3, 1070 c 18.

2 Being, rest, motion, sameness (ravrdr^} and otherness (erepirrjs), i.e. the

division of Being into the resting (owrfa), ever the same with itself, and the

moved (ytvetris}, in process of constant change.

3 Cf. A Trendelenburg, Platonis -de Ideis et Numeris Doctrina (Leips. 1826).

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this deplorable construction nor the fact that men like Speusippus,

Xenocrates, Philippus, and Archytas undertook to carry it out in

detail, would be worth more particular mention, were not this just

the point to which the speculation of the Neo-Pythagoreans and the

Neo-Platonists became attached. For by this gradation which Plato

thus began within the ouon a the world of true reality, the division

in the conception of reality, which had developed out of the opposi

tion between perception and thought, became multiplied, and thus

dualism was again abolished. For when to the One, or the Idea of

the Good, was ascribed the highest absolute reality, and to the vari

ous strata of the world of Ideas, a reality of constantly decreasing

worth in proportion as they were removed from the One in the

system in numbers, there arose from this a scale of realities which

extended from the One down to the lowest reality, that of the

corporeal world. Fantastic as this thought may be, it yet evinced

its force and influence in the development of thought, even to the

threshold of modern philosophy. Its power, however, lies doubtless

in all cases in its amalgamation of attributes of worth with these

various grades of reality.

6. While as metaphysics, the doctrine of Ideas fell into such seri

ous difficulties, it was carried out in an extremely happy, simple, and

transparent manner in that domain which formed its proper home,

that of ethics. For the systematic elaboration of this, however,

Plato needed a psychology, and that, too, of another sort than the

psychology which had arisen in previous science, out of the presup

positions of natural philosophy, and with the aid of individual per

ceptions or opinions. When, in contrast with this, he developed

his psychology from the postulates of the doctrine of Ideas, the

result was of course a purely metaphysical theory which stood and

fell with its postulate, yet it was at the same time, by reason of the

import of the doctrine of Ideas, a first attempt to understand the

psychical life from within, and in accordance with its internal char

acter and articulation.

The conception of the soul or mind was in itself a difficulty \* in

the dualism of the doctrine of Ideas. For Plato, also, "soul" was

on the onejiand the living element, that which" is moved of itself

and moves othej^thjngsTand on~theother hand, that which perceives,

knows, and wills. As principle of life and of motion, the soul

belmig^tlierefore, to the J^werjvorld^of Becoming, and in this it

remains when it perceives and directs\_its jiesires to^id-xjbjects of

the senses. But this same soul, nevertheless, by its true knowledge

iPhcedo, 76 ff., 105, Phcedr. 245, Laws, X. 896.

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of the Ideas, becomes partaker in the higher reality of abiding Being.

Hence it must be assigned a position bettveen the two worlds not

the timeless, unchanged essence of the Ideas, but a vitality which

survives change ; i.e. immortality. Here, for the first time, personal

immortality is brought forward by Plato as a part of philosophic

teaching. Of the proofs which the Phcedo adduces for this, those

are most in accord with the spirit of the system which reason from

the soul s knowledge of Ideas to its relationship with eternity ; in

correspondence with the form of the system is the dialectic false

conclusion that the soul cannot be or become dead, because its

essential characteristic is life ; the most tenable of the arguments is

the reference to the unity and substantiality which the soul evinces

in ruling the body.

In consequence of this intermediate position the soul must bear in

itself the traits of both worlds ; there must be in its essence some-

thing\_which corresponds to the world of Ideas t and something

which corresponds to the world of perception. The former is the

rational nature (XoyicrriKov or vovs), the seat of knowledge and of the

virtue which corresponds to it ; in the latter, the irrational nature,

Plato made a further distinction of two elements, the nobler, which

inclines towards the Keaamv-and-the lower, which resists it. The

nobler he found in the arderit r spirited Will (Spirit, 0J/ios), the

lower in the sensuous desire (Appetite, 7ri0u/Atu). Thus Reason,

Spirit, and Appetite are the three forms of activity of the soul, the

classes or species (etSr;) of its states.

These fundamental psychological conceptions which had thus grown

out of considerations of ethical worth are employed by Plato to set

forth the moral destiny of the individual. The fettering of the

soul to the body is at once a consequence and a punishment of

the sensuous appetite. Plato extends the immortal existence of

the soul equally beyond the two boundaries of the earthly life.

The sin for the sake of which the soul is ensnared in the world of

sense is to be sought in a pre-existent state ; its destiny in the

hereafter 1 will depend upon how far it has freed itself in the earthly

life from the sensuous appetite, and turned to its higher vocation

knowledge of the Ideas. But inasmuch as the ultimate goal of the

soul appears to be to strip off the sensuous nature, the three forms

of activity are designated also as parts of the soul. In the Thmnis

Plato even portrays the process of the formation of the soul out of

these parts, and retains immortality for the rational part only.

1 These doctrines are depicted in the form of mythical allegories which make

use of motives from the popular faith and from the Mystery-cults. V. Phcedr.

246 S.; Gorgias, 523 ff.; Rep. 614 ft; Phcedo, 107 ff.

CHAP. 3, 11.] System of Idealism: Plato. 125

It is already clear from these changing determinations that the

relation of these three fundamental forms of the psychical life to

the none too strongly emphasised unity of the soul s nature was not

clearly thought out; nor is it possible to give to these conceptions

formed from the ethical need the significance of purely psychologi

cal distinctions, such as have since been made. 1

7. But at all events there followed in this way, from the doctrine

of the two worlds, a negative morals that would fly from the world,

and in which the withdrawal from the world of sense and the spir-

itualisation of life were praised as ideals of wisdom. It is not only

the Phwdo that breathes this earnest disposition in its portrayal of

the death of Socrates ; the same ethical theory prevails in such dia

logues as the Gorgias, the Thecetetns, and, in part, the Republic.

But in Plato s own nature the heavy blood of the thinker was

associated with the light heart-beat of the artist, and thus while his

philosophy lured him into the realm of bodiless forms, the whole

charm of Hellenic beauty was living and active within him.

Strongly as he therefore combated root and branch the theory of

Aristippus, which would fain regard man s strivings as satisfied

with sensuous pleasure, it was nevertheless his opinion that the

Idea of the Good becomes realised even in the world of sense.

Joy in the beautiful, pleasure in the sensuous imitation of the Idea,

painless because free from the element of wishing, the development

of knowledge and practical artistic skill, the intelligent understand

ing of the mathematical relations which measure empirical reality,

and the appropriate ordering of the individual life, all these were

valued by him as at least preparatory stages and participations in

that highest good which consists in knowledge of the Ideas, and of

the highest among them, the Idea of the Good. In the Symposium

and in the Philebus he has given expression to this his estimate of

the goods of life.

This same thought, that ethical values and standards must illu

mine the whole circuit of human life, was used in another form by

Plato in that presentation of the system of the virtues which he

developed in the Republic. Here he showed that each part of the

soul has a definite task to fulfil, and so a perfection of its own to

reach : the rational part, in tvisdom (o-o^ia), the spirited (OvpotiSis)

in energy of will (courage, dvSpia), the appetitive (iTnOv^-qnuov) in

1 That the question here for Plato was essentially that of the gradation of the

psychical from the point of view of relative worth, is shown not only in the

employment made of these distinctions in ethics and politics, but also in such

remarks as those which designated this triple division as characteristic for the

different organic beings (plant, animal, man), or for the different peoplt-s,

inhabitants of southern countries, of northern countries, and the Greeks.

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self-control (moderation, erw^poo-wi/) ; that, however, in addition to

all these, as the virtue of the soul as a whole, there must be the

right relation of these parts, complete uprightness (justice, SIKCUOOWT;).

The true significance, however, of these four cardinal virtues, is

first unfolded upon a higher domain, that of politics.

8. The tendency of the doctrine of Ideas, directed as it was

toward the general and the universal, exhibited its most perfect

operation in the aspect now to be noticed, viz. that the ethical

ideal of the Platonic philosophy lay not in the ability and happi

ness of the individual, but in the ethical perfection of the species.

True to the logical principle of the doctrine of Ideas, that which

truly is in the ethical sense, is not the individual man, but mankind,

and the form in which this truly existent humanity appears is the

organic union of individuals in the state. The ethical ideal becomes

for Plato the political, and in the midst of the time which saw the

dissolution of Greek political life, and in opposition to those doc

trines which proclaimed only the principle of individual happiness,

he raised the conception of the state to an all-controlling height.

He considered the state, however, not from the side of its empiri

cal origin, but in reference to its task, viz. that of presenting in

large the ideal of humanity, and of educating the citizen to that

particular virtue which makes him truly happy. Convinced that

his project could be realised, with force if necessary, he wove into

its fabric not only features which he approved of the then-existing

Greek political life, in particular those of the aristocratic Doric

constitutions, but also all the ideals for whose fulfilment he hoped

from the right formation of public life.

K. F. Hermann, Ges. Abhandlungen, 122 ff. ; E. Zeller, Vortrage und Ab

handlungen, I. 62 ff.

If the ideal state is to present man in large, it must consist of the

three parts which correspond to the three parts of the soul, the

teaching class, the warrior class, and the working class. It belongs

to the first class alone, that of the cultured (&lt;iAdo-o&lt;oi), to guide the

state and to rule 1 (a^oi/re?) , to give laws and to watch over their

observance. The virtue proper to this class is wisdom, insight into

that which is for the advantage of the whole, and which is demanded

by the ethical aim of the whole. To support this class there is the

second class, that of the public officials (fmnovpoi ; guardians, ^uAaxts),

which has to evince the virtue of the fearless performance of duty

as it maintains the order of the state within and without.

1 Hence the \oyiffTiic6v is called also riyefUMftK^v.

CHAP. 3, 11.] System of Idealism : Plato. 127

It is, however, obedience which holds the desires in check, self-control

((Tw(j&gt;poa-vvrj} , that becomes the great mass of the people, the artisans

and farmers (yew^yoi \*ai S^/Aioupyoi ) , who have to care for providing

for the external means of the states by their labour and industry. 1

Only when each class thus does its duty and maintains its appro

priate virtue does the nature of the state correspond to the ideal of

justice (SiKaioavvrj) .

The principle of aristocracy in education, which is of decisive im

portance in the Platonic ideal of the state, appears most clearly in

the provision that for the great mass of the third class only the

ordinary ability of practical life is claimed, and in that this is re

garded as sufficient for their purpose, while the education, which the

state has the right and duty to take in hand itself in order to train

its citizens for its own ends, is given only to the two other classes.

By means of a constantly repeated process of selection continued

from birth to the late years, the government causes the two upper

classes to be continually renewed, strata by strata; and in order that

no individual interest may remain to hold back these classes, who are

properly the organs of the whole body, in the fulfilment of their

task, they are to renounce family life and private property. Their

lot is that of education by the state, absence of family relations,

community of life and of goods. He who is to live for the ends of the

whole, for the ethical education of the people, must not be bound to

the individual by any personal interest. To this thought, which

found its historic realisation in the sacerdotal state of the medieval

hierarchy, is limited whatever of communism, community of wives,

etc., men have professed to discover in the Platonic teaching. The

great Idealist carries out to its extreme consequences the thought

that the end of human life consists in moral education, and that

the entire organisation of a community must be arranged for this

sole end.

9. With this a new relation between the world of ideas and the

world of phenomena was discovered, and one which corresponded

most perfectly to the spirit of the Platonic system : the Idea of the

Good disclosed itself as the task, as the end (reXos), which the

phenomenon of human life in society has to fulfil. This discovery

became of decisive importance for the final form taken by Plato s

metaphysical system.

For, as first projected, the doctrine of Ideas had been precisely as

incompetent as the Eleatic doctrine of Being to explain empirical

reality. The class-concepts were held to give knowledge of the

1 Hence the third part of the soul is called also the &lt;f&gt;i\oxpjna.Toi&gt;.

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absolute reality, 1 which, purely for itself, simple and changeless,

without origin, and imperishable, forms a world by itself, and, as in

corporeal, is separated from the world where things arise. Hence,

as was demonstrated in the dialogue the Sophist, 2 in a keen polemic

against the doctrine of Ideas, this doctrine formed no principle of

motion, and therefore no explanation of facts, because it excluded

from itself all motion and change.

But however little Plato s interests may have been directed

toward this end, the conception of the Idea as true Being ultimately

demanded, nevertheless, that the phenomenon should be regarded,

not only as something other, something imitative, something that

participated, but also as something dependent. It demanded that

the Idea be regarded as cause of occurrence and change (ama). But

that which is itself absolutely unchangeable and immovable, and

excludes every particular function from itself, cannot be a cause in

the mechanical sense, but only in the sense that it presents the end

for the sake of which the occurrence takes place. Here for the first

time the relation between the two worlds of Being and Becoming

(ovo-t a and yeVeo-is) is fully defined; all change and occurrence exists

for the sake of the Idea; 3 the Idea is thejinal cause of phenomena.

This foundation of teleological metaphysics Plato gives in the

Philebns and in the middle books of the Republic, and adds at once a

further culminating thought by introducing as the final cause of all

occurrence, the world of Ideas as a whole, but in particular the high

est Idea, to which all the rest are subordinate in the sense of means

to end, the Idea of the Good. This, referring to Anaxagoras, he

designates as the World-reason (vovs), or as the deity\*

Side by side with this motif taken from Anaxagoras, another of

a Pythagorean nature appears with increasing force in a later form

of the doctrine of Ideas, a motif in accordance with which the

imperfection of the phenomenon is pointed out as in contrast with

the true Being. This inadequacy, however, could not be derived

from Being itself, and just as Leucippus, in order to understand

plurality and motion, had declared that in addition to the Being of

1 Symp. 211 B, avrb cca0 avrb fjxff avrov /jiovocidts del 6v.

2 Page 246 ff. The doctrine there criticised, that of the affibfiara. etdij, can in

accordance with the individual verbal coincidences be only the Platonic ; just

this is a factor in the decision against the genuineness of the dialogue. Schleier-

macher s hypothesis of a Megarian doctrine of Ideas, thought out to rescue the

genuineness, has not shown itself tenable.

3 Phileb. 54 C.

4 Yet we are not to think in this case of personality, or of a spiritual being,

but of the absolute ethical end or purpose of the world, the conception of the

dya66v finding an exact definition as little as with Socrates. It is rather presup

posed as being the simplest, the most comprehensible in itself.

CHAP. 3, 11.] System of Idealism: Plato. 129

Parmenides the Not-being was also " real," or " actual," and existent,

so Plato saw himself forced, with like logical consistency, for the

purpose of explaining phenomena and the inadequacy which they

show with reference to the Ideas, to assume beside the world of

Being or of cause, i.e. the world of Ideas and the Idea of the Good,

a secondary or accessory cause (frvairiov) in that which has not the

attribute of Being. Indeed, the parallelism in the two thinkers

goes so far that this secondary can e, which is not Being (TO p.rj oV),

is for Plato precisely the same as for Leucippus and Philulaus, viz.

empty .space. 1

Space was then for Plato the " nothing " out of which the world

of phenomena is formed for the sake of the Idea of the Good, or of

the deity. This process of formation, however, consists in taking on

mathematical form ; hence Plato taught in the Philebus that the

world of perception was a " mixture" of the "unlimited " (aTm/jo\*),

i.e. space, and of " limitation " (Wpas), i.e. the mathematical forms ; 2

and that the cause of this mixture, the highest, divine world prin

ciple, was the Idea of the Good. Space assumes mathematical for

mation in order to become like the world of Ideas.

The importance which mathematics had possessed from the outset

in the development of Plato s thought finds thus at last its metaphys

ical expression. The mathematical structures are the intermediate

link, by means of which empty space, which is not, is able to imitate

in phenomena the pure " forms " of the world of Ideas. Hence

mathematical knowledge (Siuvoia), as well as purely philosophical

knowledge (eVio-n/Vi;), has t do with an abiding essence (ovo-ta),

and is therefore comprised together with this, as rational knowledge

(vdr/o-is), and set over against knowledge of phenomena (Sofa). But

occupying thus an intermediate place, it takes only the position of a

last stage in the preparation for the wisdom of the "rulers," as set

forth in the system of education in the Republic.

10. The metaphysical preliminaries were now given for what

Plato ultimately projected in the Timceus; viz. a sketch or rough

draught of the philosophy of Nature, for which, of course, true to his

epistemological principle, he could not claim the worth of certainty,

but only that of probability. 3 Since, that is, he was not in a position

1 Under the influence of the Aristotelian terminology, this secondary cause

has been designated as "matter" (11X77), and it is only recently that modi rn

researches have made it clear that the Platonic "matter" is simply space. Cf.

H. Siebeck, Untersuchungen z. Philos. d. Or. (2 Aufl., Freiburg i. H. 1889).

2 It is probable that in this case PJato transposed the numbers into the world

of Ideas itself, but looked upon their representation in geometrical structures as

the "limitation" added to space.

8 The Platonic Physics is then hypothetical in like manner with that of

Parmenides. Here, too, it would seem that regard for the demands of his dis-

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to carry through dialectically, and establish in conceptions this

project of explaining occurrence from the world s end or purpose,

Plato gave an exposition of his teleological view of Nature in mythical

form only, a view intended only as an opinion, and not as science.

This view, nevertheless, takes a position sharply opposed to the

mechanical explanation of Nature, and, as this latter is set forth, we

can scarcely suppose that Plato had any other doctrine in mind than

that of Democritus. In opposition to the theory which makes all

kinds of worlds arise here and there from the "accidental " (mean

ing "purposeless" or "undesigned") meeting of "that which is in

unordered, lawless motion," and perish again, he sets forth his own

theory that there is only this one, most perfect and most beauti

ful cosmos, unitary in nature and unique as regards its kind, and

that its origin can be traced only to a reason acting according to

ends.

If, then, it is desired to form a theory concerning this origin, the

ground of the world of phenomena must be sought in the telic rela

tion of this world to the Ideas. This relation Plato expressed by

the idea of a "world-forming God" (Srj/Aioupyds, demiurge) who

formed or shaped out that which is not Being, i.e. space, " with

regard to the Ideas." In this connection the Not-being is character

ised as the indefinite plasticity which takes up all corporeal forms

into itself (S^a/xeVr/), and yet at the same time forms the ground

for the fact that the Ideas find no pure representation in it. This

counter-working of the accessory cause, or of the individual acces

sory causes, Plato designates as mechanical necessity (avay/o;). He

takes up then the conception of Democritus as a particular moment

into his physics, in order to explain by it what cannot be under

stood teleologically. Divine activity according to ends and natural

necessity are set over against each other as explaining principles, on

the one hand for the perfect, and on the other hand for the imper

fect in the world of phenomena. Ethical dualism passes over from

metaphysics into physical theory.

ciples was united with a polemical purpose. Hence there is found mingled in

the TimceuN, a dependence upon Democritus and a combating of his views, an

attitude like that of Parmenides toward Heraclitus. Yet the distinction is not

to be forgotten, that the Eleatic denied the reality of the world of phenomena,

while Plato denied only that it could be known scientifically, i.e. through con

ceptions. In presenting his view, however, Plato goes into questions of astron

omy, mechanics, chemistry, organic life, physiological psychology, finally even

into those of medicine. He gives, therefore, a kind of compendious exposi

tion of his opinions in matters of natural science, opinions which in detail are

extraordinarily fantastic, and as compared with the exact ideas even of his

time, inadequate ; and yet taken in their whole connection, in their relation to

their central principle, they have exercised an effect extending far beyond the

design of their author.

CHAP. 3, 11.] System of Idealism: Plato. 131

The characteristic fundamental thought of the Platonic as con

trasted with the Atomistic physics is, that while Democritus con

ceived of the movements of the whole as mechanical resultants of

the original states of motion of the individual atoms, Plato, on the

contrary, regarded the ordered motion of the universe as a whole, as

the primitive unit, and derived every individual change or occur

rence from this purposively determined whole. From this thought

sprang the strange construction of the conception of the world-soul,

which Plato characterised as the single principle of all motions, and

thus also of all determinations of form, and likewise of all activities

of perception and ideation in the world. 1 In fantastic, obscure ex

position he brought forward as the mathematical " division " of this

world-soul, his astronomical theory, which was in the main closely

connected with that of the younger Pythagoreans, but which was

less advanced than theirs in its assumption that the earth stood

still. The main criterion in this process of division was the dis

tinction between that which remains like itself (raui-oV) and that

which changes (6a.rf.pov), a contrast in which we easily recognise

the Pythagorean contrast between the perfect stellar world and the

imperfect terrestrial world.

A similar continuation of Pythagorean doctrine is contained in

the Platonic Timceus, with reference also to the purely mathematical

construction of the corporeal world. Here, too, the four elements

are characterised according to the simple, regular, geometrical solids

(cf. p. 46). But it is expressly taught that these consist of triangu

lar surfaces, and those, too, of a right-angled sort, which are in part

equilateral, in part so formed that the shorter side is half the length

of the hypothenuse. The limiting surfaces of these solids, tetrahe

dron, cube, etc., maybe thought of as composed of such right-

angled triangles, and Plato would have the essence of space-filling,

i.e. density or solidity of bodies, regarded as consisting in this com

position of these limiting surfaces. By thus conceiving of physical

bodies as purely mathematical structures, the metaphysical thought

of the Philebus found expression also in physics, the thought,

namely, that the phenomenal world is a limitation of space formed

in imitation of the Ideas. These triangular surfaces, which were,

moreover, conceived of as being indivisible, have a suspicious simi

larity with the atomic forms ((Tx r lp MTa ) f Democritus.

1 In this respect the Timceus, quite as does Democritus, characterises psychical

differences by differences of motion, tracing, for example, right ideation to the

ravrAv, merely individual perception to the Odrepov, etc. "Soul" is lor the

Greeks at the samp time principle of motion and of perception, and just that

(KLVTjTiKtiv and aiff8r,TiK6v, Arist. De An. I. 2, 403 b 25), and even Plato makes the

second characteristic dependent upon the first.

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### 12. The Aristotelian Logic.

The breadth of plan which appeared in the systems of the two

great antipodal thinkers, Democritus and Plato, and in accordance

with which their doctrines were methodically developed, made it

indispensable that there should be not only a division of labour, but

a separation of problems. The titles of the writings of Democritus

make it probable that he proceeded clearly and definitely in this

respect also. Plato, to be sure, conceived his literary activity essen

tially from the artist s point of view, but it is evident that in his

activity as a teacher he did not fail to make that arrangement of

problems for separate treatment which we miss in his dialogues.

In his school the division of philosophy into dialectic, physics,

and ethics became dominant.

If by dialectic in this connection we are to understand essentially

the doctrine of Ideas in its metaphysical development^ Aristotle

made the great step in advance of prefacing the investigation of the

subject-matter in all three departments with a preliminary study of

the essential nature of science, a doctrine of the forms and laws of

scientific thought. Even with the Sophists and Socrates reflection

had begun upon the question, in what scientific activity properly

consists, and the sharpened attention given to the inner processes

had made it possible for the abstracting thinker to separate the

general forms of the thought-process itself from the particular con

tents to which this process relates at different times. All these

beginnings and attempts for even with Plato it did not go beyond

this were comprehended by Aristotle in his Logic, and developed

into a complete system in which we have before us the ripe self-

knowledge of Greek science.

1. The immediate aim of the Aristotelian logic is, according to

the express declarations of the philosopher, entirely methodological.

The way is to be shown by which the goal of scientific cognition can

be reached in all departments of knowledge. As in rhetoric the art

of persuasion is taught, so in logic we are to learn the art of scien

tific investigation, cognition, and proof. For this reason Aristotle

did not reckon logic, which was his greatest creation, among the

philosophical disciplines themselves, but treated it in his lectures

as a propaedeutic, and for this reason his school regarded this

study as the general instrument (opyavov) for all scientific work.

But this preparatory study itself was made a science by Aristotle.

Instead of bringing forward rules of practical value in individual

cases, as may well have been the case with the Sophists, instead

of the general fixing of a principle which had been the service of

. 3, 12.] Tfie Aristotelian Logic. 133

Socrates, he offers an examination of the thinking activity on all

sides, a comprehensive examination of its regular forms. He fulfils

the methodological task by formal logic.

But in so doing it becomes evident that the knowledge of the

forms of right thinking can be gained only from understanding the

task of thought, and that in turn this task can be disclosed only

from a definite idea of the general relation of knowledge to its

object. Thus the Aristotelian logic is connected in the most

intimate manner with the metaphysical presupposition which lie

at the basis of his treatment of the other disciplines also. In

its principle, it is thoroughly epistemological.

2. As such, however, it has its roots in the Socratic-Platonic

doctrine of Ideas. That which truly is, is the general or universal,

and knowledge of this is the conception. In this respect Aristotle

always remained a"Platontst: What llB UOmbated in the system of

his great predecessor ] was only the Eleatic assumption of absence

of relation, absence of relation between general and particular,

between Ideas and phenomena, between conceptions and percep

tions ; an absence of relation which, in spite of all his efforts,

Plato had not overcome, even in the later phase of his teaching.

Even as the final cause of occurrence the Ideas remained a world

by themselves beside (-n-apd) the phenomena. This tearing apart

(X&lt;YHV) of essence and phenomenon, of Being^and Beconmfg7Ts&gt;

in addition to special dialectical objections, 2 the object of the chief

reproach which Aristotle brings against the doctrine of ideas.

While Plato had made two different worlds out of the general

which is known by the conception, and the particular which is per

ceived, the entire effort of /Aristotle is directed toward removing

again this division in the conception of reality, and discovering that

relation between Idea and phenomenon which shall make concep-

tional knowledge able to explain what is perceived.,/

Out of this grows as the primary task for logic, that of recognis

ing the true relation between the general and the particular, and hence

this fundamental form of abstract or conceptional thought, which

had been already recognised as fundamental by Socrates, stands in

the centre of the Aristotelian logic.

1 Principally in Met. I. 9, and XIII. 4.

2 Of these, two are principally worthy of mention in passing. The one

argues, from the logical subordination which obtains among the Ideas, that

everything that we perceive must be subsumed under a number of Ideas ; the

other calls attention to the difficulty that the resemblance, which, according t;&gt;

this system exists between the Idea and \*,he phenomenon, makes necessary still

a higher general above both, etc., in injinitum (dotfpwiros avrdvepuiros T p i r o s

&i&gt;6puiro j).

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The importance of this same relation grows out of still another

course of thought. If Aristotle found any previous works that

were preparatory for his theory of science, they consisted in the

considerations of the Sophists with regard to the art (principally

rhetorical) of proof and refutation. If now Aristotle asked how

one can prove anything scientifically, i.e. in a manner universally

valid and relating to true knowledge, he found that this could con

sist only in the deduction of the particular from the general. To

prove scientifically means to state the grounds for the validity of

what is asserted, and these are to be found only in the more general

under which the particular is subsumed.

From this resulted the peculiar complication which constitutes

the Aristotelian conception of science. The general, the Idea, is,

as the true Being, the cause of occurrence and change. It is that,

therefore, out of which and through which the perceived particular

is to be comprehended, conceived, or explained. Science has to set forth

how the perceived particular follows from the general which is

known in conceptions. On the other hand, the general is in thought

the ground by means of which and from which the particular is

proved. Accordingly, conceiving or comprehending and proving are

the same thing, viz. deduction of the particular from the general.

The scientific theory of Aristotle is accordingly concentrated in

the conception of derivation or deduction (ciTrdSa&s). Scientific

explanation of phenomena from true Being is the same logical

process as scientific proof : na^Aely, the deduction or derivation of

what.\_isjgiyen in perception from its general ground. ^Explaining

and proving are therefore "denoted by the same word, "deduction,"

and the right proof is that which takes as its ground the actual or

real general cause of that which is to be proved. 1 It is, therefore,

the task of science to exhibit the logical necessity with which the

particular insight (of perception) follows from the general insight (of

conception), and the particular phenomenon from the general cause.

This characterisation of the task of science, thus developed from

metaphysical presuppositions, experienced an essential change in

the progress of its author s investigations.

3. The most immediate task of logic, according to this, is to

establish more exactly what deduction i.e. on the one hand, proof,

1 This definition of the conception of scientific proof is obviously directed

against the rhetorical proof of the Sophists. In the art of persuasion, all proofs

are welcome, however external they may remain to the true nature of the case,

provided only they are formally sufficient to bring the hearer to assent. Scientific

proof, however, should proceed from the inner, logical necessity of the case, and

should therefore give at the same time insight into the true cause of what is to

be proved.

CHAP. 3, 12.] The Aristotelian Lotjic. 135

on the other hand, explanation properly is, or to set forth those

forms in which thought cognises the dependence of the particular

upon the general. This theory was given by Aristotle in the Analyt

ics, the logical groundwork, which treats synthetically, in the first

part, of the syllogism, in the second of deduction, proof, and concep

tion. For in the process of analysing those activities of thought in

which all deduction consists, there results as simple fundamental

form the deduction of one proposition, one statement from another :

i.e. the inference or syllogism (0-uAA.oyioyxos).

The doctrine &lt;&gt;f the syllogism became thus the central point of the

Aristotelian logic. To this points all that he taught (apparently

only in the most general outlines) concerning the forms of thought

which lie at the basis of the syllogism : out of it come all the points

of view in his methodology.

The outlines of this doctrine, which form the basis of traditional

logic even to this day, are the following. The syllogism is the

deduction of a judgment from t\vo other judgments. Since in a

judgment one concept (the predicate) is affirmed of another concept

(the subject), this affirmation can be grounded only by establishing

the desired connection between the two by means of a third concept,

the middle term (/xe o-ov). This third concept must then stand in

some relations with the other two, and these relations must be

expressed in two judgments, which are called the premises (irpoTa-

&lt;ms) of the syllogism. Inference, or drawing the conclusion, con

sists in the process of thought which, from the relations that one

and the same concept (the middle term) sustains to two other

concepts, discovers the relation of these two concepts to each other.

Agreeably to its general presuppositions, the Aristotelian doctrine

of the syllogism fixed its attention upon but one of the possible

relations existing between concepts, the relation of the subordina

tion of the particular under the general. The only question for this

theory is always whether the one concept (the subject) should be

subordinated to the other (the predicate) or not. The doctrine of

the syllogism has to do only with the knowledge of those forms

of thought according to which it is to be decided, with the help of

an intermediate concept, whether a subordination of one concept under

another occurs or not. This question Aristotle answered in an abso

lutely exhaustive manner ; in this consists both the abiding worth

of his doctrine of the syllogism and also the limits of its signifi

cance.

In correspondence with the fact just noted, Aristotle treats in his

theory of the judgment essentially only the two elements which come

into consideration for this end : first, Quantity, which determines

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the kind of subordination of the subject to the predicate as regards

extent, and yields the distinctions of general, particular, and singu

lar judgments; and second, Quality, according to which this sub

ordination is either affirmed or denied, and, therefore, the relation

either of connection or of separation is asserted as existing between

the respective extents of the two concepts.

The kinds or figures (^Vara) of the syllogism are, therefore,

essentially fixed by the manner in which the relations of subordina

tion between the concepts, which are given in the premises, deter

mine the subordination sought in the conclusion, a relation which

finds its external expression in the position of the middle term in

the two premises, since this is either the subject of one premise and

predicate of the other, or predicate of both, or subject of both. As

the most valuable and primitive of these three figures, however,

Aristotle consistently designated the first, because in it the principle

of subordination is purely and clearly expressed, since the subject

of the conclusion is subordinated to the middle term, and together

with this, as falling within its compass, is subordinated to the predi

cate of the major. 1

4. But by defining inference, and so deduction, proof, and expla

nation in this way, it followed that only propositions of a lesser

degree of generality could be deduced from those of higher generality

by means of this activity so essential to science. That is, by means

of inference, we can never prove anything equally general with the

premises, to say nothing of proving anything more general. The

peculiar restriction of the ancient idea of the nature of thought,

according to which thought can only apprehend and take apart

what is given but can never produce anything new, makes its

appearance in this feature of the Aristotelian logic. From this,

however, it follows immediately that the deducing, proving, and ex

plaining science may, indeed, in the individual case, be able to take

that which has served as premise in the syllogism, and deduce it

again as the conclusion of a still more general syllogism, but must,

nevertheless, ultimately proceed from premises which are themselves

capable of no further deduction, proof, and comprehension, of no

reduction to middle terms. The truth of these ultimate premises is,

therefore, immediate (d/utcra), not to be deduced, proved or compre

hended. All deduction needs something primitive; all proof, a

ground that cannot be proved ; all explaining, something given which

cannot be explained.

1 The details cannot be developed here. Cf. in general, F. Kanipe, Die

Krkpnntnisstheorie des Aristotelat (Lfips. 1870); R. Eucken, Die Mctltodc drr

aristotelischen Forschung (Berlin, 1872).

CHAP. 3, 12.] The Aristotelian Logic. 137

The apodictic, proving, and explaining activity of science has,

therefore, a limit ; the ultimate grounds of proof are not to be proved ;

the ultimate causes used in explaining are not to be explained.

Hence if science is to fulfil its task, which consists in explaining the

particular by means of the general, it must first press forward from

the particular on to the general, in the case of which proving and

explaining are forbidden by the nature of the case, because as imme

diately certain it asserts itself as not to be deduced and not to be

proved. Hence the processes of deducing, proving, and explaining,

in which the ultimate task of science consists, must be preceded by

the searching out of the starting-points for deduction, of the ultimate

grounds of proof, and of the highest principles of explanation. The

activity of thought involved in this last process Aristotle calls dia

lectic, and has laid down its principles in the Topics.

This procedure of searching out the grounds is not, in the nature of

the case, attended by the same " apodictic certainty," as is that of

deducing consequences from the grounds, when the latter are once

established. Investigation proceeds from the particular given in

perception, and from the ideas current in customary opinion (!v8oov),

to find the general, from which the particular can then be proved

and explained. Investigation, therefore, follows a direction the

reverse of that taken by deduction ; the latter is deductive, the

former inductive, epagogic. The latter proceeds, proving and

explaining, from general to particular ; the former, searching and

testing, from particular to general. 1 Only the completed science is

"apodictic"; science, in its process of coming into being, is epa

gogic.

In all these investigations and the contrasts that appear in them,

the chief question for Aristotle is that with regard to judgments ;

but in connection with this he treats also concepts. As a judgment

is proved or deduced, by being concluded from more general judg

ments, by means of the middle term, so a concept is deduced or

derived by being formed from a more general concept (the next

higher class or genus, yeVos) by adding a particular characteristic

mark or difference (8ta&lt;opa). This deduction of the concept is defini

tion (opioyxos). As, however, the deduction of propositions ulti

mately presupposes most general premises, which cannot be further

1 This relation of contrariety between deduction and inquiry Aristotle ex

pressed in the statements that that which, as regards the nature of the thing, is

the original (irp6Ttpov rfj tpvaei), and therefore the general, is for human knowl

edge the later, that which must be acquired (vvrepov irpds ij/xeis) ; and that, on

the contrary, that which is for us the most immediate (irp6Ttpov irp6s ^M&lt;), the

particular, is, according to the true essence, the derivative, the later (vvrepov TV

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proved, so, too, definition of lower concepts goes back ultimately to

most general concepts which withdraw from all attempts at deduc

tion and explanation. These concepts, also, as well as the highest

premises of proof, must be sought inductively; 1 and it seems as

though Aristotle looked upon the propositions of highest generality

as the elucidations of these most general concepts.

5. Among the text-books which Aristotle left, the two main

logical treatises, the Analytics and the Topics, are those which are

most nearly complete by far. 2 This may explain the fact that the

logical demands which the Philosopher makes of science are devel

oped so clearly and surely, while, on the other hand, his system as

carried out in the form known to us, fulfils in but a lesser measure

the expectations thus raised.

For evidently we should expect that a sure statement could be

made as to what the Philosopher declared to be those immediately

certain, highest propositions or concepts which were to be the result

of investigation, and the starting-point of proof and explanation.

If, however, we ask for these, we find ourselves in great embarrass

ment as regards the teaching of Aristotle. Of general propositions

there is but a single principle, the principle, of contradiction, 3 which

he set forth as an unprovable major premise, or highest principle

for all proofs, partly in the purely logical setting that affirmation

and denial of the same combination of concepts reciprocally exclude

each other, partly in the metaphysical form that a thing cannot be

the same and also not be the same. But aside from this he prefers to

call attention to the fact that every department of knowledge has its

own ultimate presuppositions, and does not state these more exactly.

If, however, we seek for the highest concepts, aside from the

reference made here also to the particular nature of individual dis

ciplines, we have the choice between the four "principles" (apxat),

or " causes," of the Metaphysics, and the " categories," which are

designated as the fundamental forms of predication concerning what

is, a choice not decided by Aristotle. In both cases we find our

selves already in the midst of the material as opposed to the formal

elements of his teaching.

1 Over against determination (7rpj&lt;r0e&lt;m), as the deduction of one concept

from the higher by adding a new mark, stands therefore abstraction (d&lt;cu&gt;f&lt;m)

as process of formation of class-concepts, a process which, by continually

taking away individual characteristics, gains a concept poorer in contents, but

wi.hr in its extent. Formation of concepts is, accordingly, with Aristotle, again

co upletely analytic, while with Plato it had been intuitive. Aristotle was the

first to free himself from the optical analogy, in accordance with which the know

ing process of thought had been conceived even by Democritus and Plato.

2 In the case of the Topics, this completeness seems even to have been at

tained. 3 Met. IV.:} ff.

CHAP. 3, 13.] System of Development : Aristotle. 139

### 13. The System of Development.

The impression of something completely new, which the logic of

Aristotle makes, as contrasted with all that had previously appeared

in Greek science, rests principally upon the capacity for abstract

thought, prestipposed in so high a degree by this separation of the

general Forms of thought from every possible content a separa

tion that evinced his genius. iThis genius for the formation of con

ceptions by abstraction was evinced by Aristotle in all departments

of his scientific work, and if the " Father of logic " became the

philosophic teacher for two thousand years, he owes this success,

first of all, to the sureness, clearness, and consistency with which

he formed and defined his conceptions. 1 He fulfilled the task set by

Socrates, and in so doing created the language of science. The funda

mental part of the scientific conceptions and expressions everywhere

in use, even to the present time, goes back to his formulations.

With this inclination to abstraction is connected the further fact

that Aristotle solved the fundamental problem of Greek philosophy

viz. how behind the changing multiplicity of phenomena a uni

tary and abiding Being is to be thought by means of a concept of

relation, that of development. His two great predecessors had still

been seeking to assign a particular content to the conception of true

Being. Democritus had regarded the atoms and their motion, Plato

the Ideas and their final causation, as the causes of phenomena,

causes different from the phenomena themselves. Aristotle, how

ever, determined the true reality that which is as the essence

which unfolds in the phenomena themselves. He renounced the at

tempt to think out as the cause of phenomena something different

from them (a second world), and taught that the Being of things

which is known in conception possesses no other reality than the

sum total of the phenomena in which it realises itself. So regarded,

Being (oucna) takes on the character of the essence (TO T! fy eTvai),

which constitutes the one, only ground of its individual formations,

but is real or actual only in these themselves, and all phenomenal

appearance or coming into being becomes the realisation of the

essence. This is the concept of relation by means of which Aristotle

overcame the opposition of the Heraclitic and Eleatic metaphysics.

1. In particular, the process of development presents itself to

Aristotle as the relation of Form ami Matter (eTSos, p.op4&gt;ij ^77).

Plato \* had declared the world of phenomena to be a mixture of the

1 The main outlines of the Aristotelian metaphysics develop in the simplest

way from that, phase of the Platonic, metaphysics which is presented in the

Philebus ;cf. above, 11, 9). Cf. ,J. C. Glaser, Die Metaphysik des Aristotelfs

(Berlin, 1841).

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" unlimited " and of " limitation " ; Aristotle holds to the observa

tion that, in everything of the phenomenal world, formed matter

lies before us. But for him this matter is, indeed, in itself indefi

nite, and yet not purely indifferent, empty space, but a corporeal

substratum (v-n-oKtifjitvov) ; for him, this form is not merely the

mathematical limit, but the form determined as to its contents by

the essence. The matter or material substratum is the possibility

of that which, in the complete thing, has become actual or real by

means of the form. In matter, therefore, the essential nature

(ovo-ta) is given only potentially (Swa/na). First, and only by means

of the form, does it exist in reality or actuality (evepyeia, actu).

Occurrence, however, or the natural process, is that process in which

the essence passes over from mere possibility, through form, into

actualisation. The essence has not any second, higher reality beside

and apart from the phenomena ; it exists only in the succession of

its pEenomenal manifestations, by means of which it realises its

own possibility. The universal is real or actual only in the partic

ular; the particular is only because in it the universal realises

itself.

With this transformation of the doctrine of Ideas, Aristotle solves

the fundamental problem of the theoretical philosophy of the

Greeks, viz. that of so thinking Being or what " is " that Becoming,

or the process of Nature (das Geschehen). may be explained from

it. From the Hylozoism of the Milesians on to the opposing

theories of his two great predecessors, all standpoints of Greek

metaphysics are contained as elements in this doctrine of Aristotle.

The Being cognised in conception is the general essence, which

realises itself in its particular phenomenal manifestations from

potentiality on through form, and the process of this realisation is

motion. Being is that which comes to existence in the processes

of Nature. This self-realisation of the essence in the phenomena,

Aristotle calls entelechy (evTcAe xeia).

2. The central point of the Aristotelian philosophy lies, therefore,

in this new conception of the cosmic processes as the realisation of

the essence in the phenomenon, and the respect in which it is op

posed to the earlier explanation of Nature consists therefore in

carrying through in conceptions the teleology which Plato had only

set up as postulate, and developed in mythical, figurative form.

While the earlier metaphysics had looked upon the mechanical

process of pressure and impact as the typical fundamental relation

of the cosmic processes, Aristotle regarded as this typical rela

tion the development of organisms and man s building or forming

activity. From these two departments he took his examples when

CHAP. 3, 13.] System of Development : Aristotle. 141

he wished to elucidate the metaphysical character of the cosmic

processes. 1

Nevertheless, the relation of form and matter is not completely

the same in these two kinds of purposive processes, and the differ

ence between the two asserts itself everywhere in the carrying out

of the Aristotelian fundamental thought. In the case of organic

processes, matter and form are the two sides, Separable only through

abstraction, of one and the same reality identical from beginning

to end ; even in the germ which in the process of development

brings the essence to its unfolding, the matter is already shaped

internally by the form. In the case of artistic construction, on the

contrary, the material which contains possibility exists at first by

itself, and the work of the artist with its end in view is added later

to produce the shape by means of motion.

| In the latter case, therefore, the development is to be regarded

under four principles. These are the Matter, the Form, the End. and

the Cause of what comes to pass or comes to be.

In the former case, on the contrary, the three other principles, as

set over against the Matter, are but different expressions for the

same thing, since the Form constitutes the Cause and the Result of

the process.

We find, accordingly, that when applied to the task of science,

this fundamental relation of form and matter is carried out in a

twofold way : on the one hand, individual things are regarded as

self-realising forms ; on the other hand, things in relation to one

another are regarded, the one as matter, the other as form. These

two applications of the fundamental principle go through the entire

Aristotelian system side by side, and in the general principles of

the system they sometimes so collide, that it is only by their separa

tion that apparent contradiction can be cleared away.

3. The former point of view yields the result, that for the Aristo

telian conception of the world, in contrast with both that of Democ-

ritus and that of Plato, the truly real is the individual thing,

determined in itself by its form. To it, therefore, belongs primarily

the name of essence or substance (ou&lt;na). / But the essence develops

and realises itself in individual determinations, which are partly its

states (irdOr)), partly its relations to other things \* (TO. Trpds n).

Hence knowledge has these which belong to the thing (ra o-u/n/?e/?r/-

Kora) to predicate of it, while the individual thing itself cannot be

predicated of anything else, i.e. in the proposition it can be only

1 Aside from its discussion in the Metaphysics, this question is chiefly treated

in the Physics.

2 Met. XIV. 2, 1089 b 23.

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subject mid never predicate. 1 Of these modes in which substance

manifests itself, or of the predicates that are possible with regard

to it, Aristotle enumerates as categories, quantity (TTOO-OV), quality

(TTOCOV), relation (-n-pos rt), determination in space and time (TTOU, -n-orf),

action (TTOICIV), and passion or passivity (Trao-^etv) ; and in addition,

also, position (^to-flat) and condition (|^i/).\ This collection

(making ten categories inclusive of substance), in which, perhaps,

grammatical observations co-operated, is designed to present the

highest classes or genera under which the contents of all possible

ideas are to be subsumed. Yet Aristotle made no methodical use

of this collection, and his doctrine of the categories acquired, there

fore, no importance in his metaphysics, aside from the above-noted

relation of substance to its determinations.

When we consider how sharply Aristotle shaped out the scientific

conception of substance in its logical and metaphysical character,

it may appear strange at the first glance that he has announced

neither a methodical principle nor a real principle applying to the

nature of the thing, according to which it would be possible to de

cide what these truly existing individual things, in his sense of the

word, are.^ It is clear only that, on the one hand, he did not regard

as essence everything whatever that occasionally appears in ex

perience as a thing separate from others, and, on the other hand,

that he ascribed this character to organic individuals, to individual

men. It would be in the spirit of his teaching to suppose that he

could have spoken of an " essence " only where an inner determina

tion of form constitutes the ground of the coherence of individual

characteristics, where, therefore, the knowledge of this essence

solves the problem of science viz. to determine existent reality

by the general conception in so far as the abiding individual

thing forms the class-concept for all its particular modes of appear

ing which show themselves in perception.

But the Socratic-Platonic view of the problem of science brought

with it the consequence that Aristotle defined yet again the essence

of the individual thing as that through which the individual thing

belongs to its class or species. \ If substance, as contrasted with its

perceptible phenomena and attributes, presents the universal, on

the other hand the species (yeVos, or again Platonically, eZSos) is the

universal that realises itself in the individual substances. Here, too,

the same relation is repeated ; the species exists only in so far as it

realises itself in individual things as their truly existing essence,

and the individual thing exists only as the species comes to its phe-

1 AnaJyt. Post. I. 22, 83 a 24.

CHAP. :5, 13. J System of Development : Aristotle. 143

nomenal manifestation jn itL - Just for this reason the species also

have the claim to the metaphysical significance of being essences

(owri ai). Hy this means the conception of substance wittr Aristotle

contains a peculiarly changeable double meaning. The substances

proper are individual things as determined in conception, but as a

second kind of substances (Stirrepcu own ut) we have the species

winch constitute the e ssence of individual things, just as these latter

constitute the essence of perceptible phenomena.

Scientific knowledge is directed partly toward the conception of

the individual thing, partly toward the conception of the species.

Each of these realises itself in phenomena, and here there is found

much which, as belonging directly to the conception (o-iyx/Je/^KOTa in

the narrower sense), can be deduced from it, but also much which,

as foreign to the conception, appears in the particular only incident

ally, as a consequence of the matter in which the conception realises

itself; and of this which is conceptionally indifferent or "accidental "

( o-v/x/Se/Jr/Kora in the usual sense of the word) there is, according

to the presuppositions of the Aristotelian doctrine, no " theory,

no scientific knowledge. Hence Aristotle also and in this lies a

characteristic limit of the ancient study of Nature disclaimed on

principle any scientific insight into the necessity of law, with which

even the most individual and most particular follow from the gen

eral. This individual instance he declared rather to be something

really accidental, not to be explained by conception, and limited

scientific consideration to that which is valid universally (\*ca0 OAOU),

or at least for the most part (CTTL TO TroAu).

4. In this we see decidedly a holding fast to the tradition of the

doctrine of Ideas : the same attitude discloses itself also in another

direction. If, that is, the relation of matter and form is affirmed

between the different things or classes of things, each of which is

in itself already actual as formed matter, this relation becomes

relative in so far as the same thing which in contrast with a lower

is to be regarded as form, appears as matter when contrasted with

the higher. In this aspect the conception of development becomes

the principle of an ordering of things according to their metaphysical

values, considering these things as risiug in uninterrupted succession

from the lowest formations of matter to the highest forms. In

this scale every class of things is assigned its metaphysical dignity

by means of the test that it is regarded as form of the lower and as

the material of the higher.

1 So, at least, they are called in the treatise on categories, the genuineness of

which is, to be sure, not entirely uncontested ; yet the designation is quite in

the line of Aristotle s teaching taken as a whole.

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This system of individual things, and of their classes, has both a

lower and an upper limit, the former in mere matter, the latter in

pure form. Wholly unformed matter (irpuTrj v\rj) is, of course, in

itself, as mere possibility, not actual; it never exists without being

somehow actualised as form. Yet it is not merely that which is not

Being (the Platonic p.rj oV, or empty space), but the accessory cause,

which evinces itself as such through real effects (TO ov OVK aveu, sine

qua non). Its reality is shown in the fact that the forms do not

completely realise themselves in individual things, and that from it

side-workings (Trupa^vas) proceed which are without connection

with the purposefully active form, or even in contradiction with it.

It is, therefore, from matter that the fact is explained that the

forms realise themselves only potentially (xara TO oWaTov) : from

matter arises that which is conceptionally indeterminate (a-v/t/Se-

/fyKos), or the accidental (uvTo/Aarov) , the lawless and purposeless

in Nature. Hence the Aristotelian doctrine distinguishes, in its

explanation of Nature, as did Plato in the Philebus, between final

causes (TO ou ei/eKa) and mechanical causes (TO e dvayKTjs) : the former

are the forms which realise themselves in matter ; the latter reside

in matter, out of which proceed side-workings and counter-workings.

Thus the cosmic processes are regarded by Aristotle ultimately

under the analogy of the plastic artist, who finds in the hard material

a limit to the realisation of his formative thought. This material

is, indeed, so far related to the Idea, that the Idea can present itself

in it, at least in general, and yet it is in so far a foreign, and thus

an independent, element, that it in part opposes itself as a retarding

principle to the realising of the forms. Ancient philosophy did not

overstep this dualism between the purposive activity of the form

and the resistance of matter ; with the demand of the teleological

view of the world it united the naive honesty of experience, recog

nising the necessity, purposeless and contrary to design, which

asserts itself in the phenomena of the actual world.

5v^ It is, on the contrary, self-evident in the case of pure form,

since its conception is immediately connected with that of true act

uality, that it possesses in itself the highest actuality without neeci-

ing any matter whatever. The assumption of such a pure Form is

necessary according to the system of Aristotle, for the reason that

matter, as the merely possible or potential, has in itself alone no

principle of motion or of generation.. We cannot, indeed, speak of

a beginning of motion in time in this system of development, which

centres about the conception of self-realising essence, since motion

must be as eternal as Being itself, to the essential characteristics of

which it belongs ; but yet we must point out that property in Being

CHAP. 3, 13.] tfyttem of Development : Aristotle. 145

which is the cause of motion. This is, however, everywhere the

action of the form upon the matter, in which, with reference to indi

vidual things, Aristotle distinguishes two elements, viz. an impulse

to be formed inherent in matter, and the purposive motion proceed

ing from the form itself. But in so far as the form is itself moved,

it must be regarded in turn as matter for a higher form ; and, since

the same thing is true of the latter, and so on, motion would not be

understood if the chain of its causes did not have a first link in the

pure Form which is itself not moved. The first mover (irpwrov /avow)

is itself unmoved. Hence, in the case of its action upon matter,

only the first of the two elements above mentioned comes into con

sideration. It operates, not by means of its own activity, but only

by means of the fact that its absolute actuality excites in matter

the impulse to form itself according to it (the prime mover), not as

a mechanical, but as a pure, final cause (KIVCI ws epw/jifvov, ou KLVOV-

The prime mover, or the pure Form, means, then, in the Aristo

telian metaphysics, quite the same thing as the Idea of the Good in

the Platonic, and for it alone Aristotle employs all the predicates

of the Platonic Idea. It is eternal, unchangeable, immovable,

wholly independent, separated (^wpio-rov) from all else, incorporeal,

and yet at the same time the cause of all generation and change.

It is the perfect Being (fvepytia) in which all possibility is at the

same time actuality ; of all that exists it is the highest (TO ri rjv emu

TO TrpuJToi/) and best the deity. 1 \*\

The highest Being or Essence, thus determined according to its

relations, is also characterised by Aristotle as regards its content.

Such an activity, related to no possibility, resting purely within

itself (actiis purus}, is thought, and thought alone ; not, of course,

that mental process which applies itself to individual things and

their changing phenomena, but the pure thought, which is employed

with itself and its eternal nature ; that thought which presupposes

nothing else as an object, but has itself for its constant, unchang

ing content, the thought of thought (J/OT/O-IS VOT/O-CWS), self-conscious

ness.

In these conceptions, so determined, dwells a significance of

mighty import for the world s history. On the one hand, mono-

1 The exposition of this course of thought from which the later, so-called cos-

mological proof for the existence of God essentially arose, is found principally

in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics. In his popular dialogues Aristotle

amalgamated it with determinations of worth, by giving it the following form :

the distinction between the imperfect and the more perfect which things of

experience show presupposes the reality of a most perfect. Cf. Schol. in Arist.

487 a 6.

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theism was herewith conceptionally formulated and scientifically

grounded; on the other hand, it passed over from the pantheistic

form, which it had with Xenophanes, and even still with Plato, into

the theistic form, since God is conceived of as a self-conscious being

different from the world. But besides this transcendence, the doc

trine that God in the absolute mind or spirit (Geist) involves at the

same time the metaphysical advance that the immaterial, the incor

poreal pure Being, is made equivalent to the spiritual. Spiritual

monotheism is the ripe fruit of Grecian science.

This divine spirituality is conceived of in a purely intellectualistic

manner ; its essential nature is solely thought directed upon itself.

All doing, all willing, is directed toward an object, distinct from the

doer or the wilier. The divine mind, as pure form, needs no object;

he is sufficient for himself, and his knowledge of himself (fowpia),

which has no other goal than itself, is his eternal blessedness.

He acts upon the world, not through his motion or activity, but

through the longing for him which the world has. The world, and

what takes place in it, arises from the longing of matter after God.

6. JVlatter (the merely potential) is that which is moved without

itself moving anything; God (the solely actual) is that which moves

without itself being moved; between the two is the entire series of

things, which suffer motion as well as call it forth ; and these, taken

as a whole, are designated by Aristotle as Nature (&lt;wn?; equivalent

to "world" according to present usage). Nature is, accordingly,

the connected system of living being\* viewed as a unity, in which

matter developing ever higher, from form to form, through all the

multitude of its particular shapes, approaches the resting Being of

the deity, and imitating this, potentially takes it up into itself.

But in this connection, the graded scale of things, in the exposition

of which the Aristotelian philosophy of Nature consists, shows a two

fold standard for estimating relative worth. The scale is therefore

developed in two different series, which find their union only at the

end in a manner which is, indeed, consistent with the fundamental

conceptions of the system, but which is, nevertheless, in itself sur

prising.

In the conception of the deity, according to Aristotle, there meet,

as chief characteristics, that of Being, resting within itself, and

remaining like itself (dtSiov), and that of spirituality or rationality

(vous). Hence the individual "forms" of Nature take a higher

rank in proportion as they contain the one or the other of these

elements which constitute the highest worth. In the one line,

the series of phenomena ascends from the unordered change of the

terrestrial world to the ever-uniform revolution of the stars; in the

CHAP. 3, 18.] System of Development : Aristotle. 147

other line, we are led from the merely mechanical change of

place to the activities of the soul and its most valuable develop

ment, rational knowledge ; and both series have the same terminus,

inasmuch as the stars that are in most uniform motion are con

ceived of as the highest intelligences, the most rational spirits.

7. In relation to the first of these two aspects Aristotle, taking

up the astronomical views of Plato, adopted the old Pythagorean

antithesis between the earthly and the heavenly world, and it is to

be ascribed to the victorious influence of his philosophy that the

maturer ideas of the later Pythagoreans did not prevail in antiquity,

in spite of their recognition by those learned in astronomy in the

following period. As the whole universe has the most perfect form,

everywhere the same, that of the sphere, so among all motions

the most perfect is the circular motion, which returns into itself.

This belongs to the cether, the celestial element, out of which the

stars are formed, and the transparent hollow spheres, in which the

stars move with ever-unchanged uniformity. Farthest out, and in

an absolute changelessness that comes nearest the divine Being, is

the heaven of the fixed stars, beneath that the planets, the sun, and

the moon, whose apparent deviation from the circular movement

was explained by a complicated theory of hollow spheres placed one

within another, the theory which Eudoxus, an astronomer sustaining

a close relation to the Academy, and his disciple Callippus had

propounded. 1 The stars themselves were, however, for Aristotle

beings of superhuman intelligence, incorporate deities. They ap

peared to him as the purer forms, those more like the deity, and

from them a purposive, rational influence upon the lower life of

earth seemed to proceed, a thought which became the root of

mediaeval astrology.

The lower " forms " of terrestrial life, on the other hand, are the

four elements (of Empedocles), which are characterised by the ten

dency to rectilinear motion. But rectilinear motion involves at once

the opposition of two tendencies, the centrifugal, which belongs to

Fire ; and the centripetal, which belongs to Earth. The first of the

two tendencies is also attributed in a lesser degree to Air, and the

latter in a lesser degree to Water, and so the central mass, our earth,

1 Schiaparelli, Le Sfere Omocentriche di Endosso, CaJlippo, ed Aristotele (Mi

lan, 1876). Cf. also (). Gruppe, Die kosmischen Systeme der Grirchen (Berlin,

1851). As a principle of method, the following prescription for the proposal of

these questions has been preserved from the Old Academy, typical of the math-

ematico-metapliysical presupposition of the speculative explanation of Nature :

viz. to discover the uniformly ordered motions of the stars by means of which

their apparent motions may be explained (5ia&lt;ru^eiv~). Simpl. in Arist. De Coelo

(Karst.), 119.

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in a state of rest as a whole, is composed in such a way that about

the earthy material is disposed at first Water and then Air, while

Fire strives toward the celestial outer world. The changing combi

nations, however, into which the four elements enter, constitute the

imperfect, that which cannot be conceived, that which is accidental

in the terrestrial world. Here the side-working and counter-work

ing of matter are stronger than in the celestial region where the

mathematical determinateness of undisturbed circular motion real

ises itself.

8. In the changes of the terrestrial world, mechanical, chemical,

and organic processes are built up upon each other in such a way

that the higher always presupposes the lower as its condition.

Without change of place (&lt;j&gt;opd or KI VT/O-IS in the narrowest sense),

change of qualities (dAAoiWis) is not possible, and the organic

transformation which consists in growth and decay (av^o-is &lt;0t&lt;n&lt;)

is not possible without both the preceding. The higher form is,

however, never merely a product of the lower, but is something self-

subsistent, by means of which those lower forms can be employed

only in a purposive manner.

From this develops an important principle in which Aristotle is

opposed to Democritus, a principle which the former esteemed

very highly in regard to detailed research in natural science, and

used a great deal, even with express mention. Aristotle protests

against the attempt to reduce all qualitative to quantitative deter

minations, an attempt ultimately accepted even by Plato. He

combats the contrasting from an epistemological and metaphysical

point of view, of secondary and primary qualities ; to the former he

accords not a less but rather a higher reality than to the latter, and

in the succession of " forms " the inner conceptional character or

determination is evidently of more worth for him than the outer

determination which is capable of mathematical expression. 2 The

attempt of Democritus to raise to the rank of a principle for

explaining the world the reduction of all qualitative to quantitative

differences, found its victorious opponent in Aristotle and his doctrine

of the " entelechies," the inner Forms of things. The keen logician

saw that it is never possible to develop qualities analytically from

quantitative relations, and that, on the contrary, the quality (by which

ever sense it may be perceived) is something new, which presup

poses the entire body of quantitative relations as its occasion only.

1 Cf. especially the third book of the treatise De Coelo.

2 For this reason Aristotle also characterises the elements not only by the

different tendencies of their motions, but also by primitive qualities ; and he

develops them out of a meeting of the contrasted pairs, warm and cold, dry and

moist. Meteor. IV. 1, 378 b 11.

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9. With logical consistency the same view is applied by Aristotle

to the relation of the psychical and bodily activities ; the latter are

but the matter for which the former furnish the forms. There is,

with Aristotle, no such dependence of psychical upon corporeal func

tions as Democritus, in accordance with the procedure of the older

metaphysics, and even Plato, in part (in the TimiKus}, had taught.

For Aristotle the soul is rather the entelechy of the body, i.e. the

Form which realises itself in the motions and changes of the organic

body. The soul is the cause of bodily formation and motion, a

cause acting from ends ; itself incorporeal, it is yet actual or real

only as the power moving and controlling the body.

But the psychical life itself is also, according to Aristotle, built

up as it were in successive grades or strata, each of which, in turn,

presents matter for the higher. The first Form of organic life is

the vegetative soul (Open-TiKov) , which "forms" the mechanical and

chemical changes to the purposive functions of assimilation and

propagation. The soul of plants is restricted to this purely physio

logical significance of a vital force ; to this is added in the whole

animal kingdom, 1 the animal soul, whose constitutive characteristics

are spontaneous motion in space (KIVI/TIKW Kara TOTTOV) and sensation

The purposive,\* spontaneous motion of the animal body proceeds

from desire (opeis), which arises from the feelings of pleasure and

pain, in the form of an effort to procure or shun. But these pre

suppose everywhere the idea of their object, and are at the same

time bound together with the thought that this object is worthy to

be striven for or to be shunned. The view of the dependence of all

desire upon ideas, peculiar to all Greek psychology, is so strong with

Aristotle, that he even sets forth these relations expressly, accord

ing to the logical function of judgment and inference. In the

practical sphere, also, there is affirmation and denial, 2 there is the

process of drawing a conclusion from a general aim to a particular

mode of action.

The proper seat, or home, as it were, of the entire animal life of

ideation is found in sensation. In the physiological psychology

which treats this subject 8 Aristotle has used in comprehensive

1 Aristotle s History of Animals (cf. J. B. Meyer, Berlin, 1855) treats in ex

emplary manner, and with admirable care of detailed investigation, anatomical,

physiological, morphological, and biological problems, and also the questions of

system. The parallel work on plants is indeed lost, but in compensation we

have the work of his friend and disciple Theophrastus.

2 Eth. Nic. VI. 2, 1139 a 21.

8 Besides the sections which treat this subject, in the treatise on the Soul, the

smaller treatises attached to this are also to be compared, viz : on Perception,

on Memory, on Dreams, etc.

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manner all the particular information and theories which his prede

cessors, especially Democritus, possessed on this point; but he

overcame the common inadequacy of all earlier doctrines by conced

ing a much greater importance to the self-activity of the soul in the

process in which perception arises. Not satisfied to adopt the old

theory that perception consists in a co-operation of object and sub

ject, he pointed to the unity of consciousness (Einheitlichkeit, /itaoVr;?),

with which the animal soul unites what is given in the individual

perceptions of the individual senses to form collective perceptions,

or perceptions that perceive the object as a whole, and in so doing

grasps also the relations of number, situation, and motion. Thus

above the individual senses we must assume the common sense

(KOIVOV aldOriTrjpiov) / which is also the seat of recollection, both of

the involuntary or memory (/xv?^) and the voluntary (dvi/A^crts),

by virtue of the circumstance that in it the perceptions remain as

imaginative representations (favraaiai) ; at the same time, however,

it is also the seat of our knowledge of our own states. 2

10. Vegetative and animal souls, however, form in man but the

matter for the realisation of the Form peculiar to him, the reason

(vovs (Woclo-0at) . By its operation, impulse (opet$) becomes will

(f3ov\t](n&lt;i) ; imaginative representation becomes knowledge (em-

It comes as a something new and higher ( from without,"

to all the psychical activities which develop from perception

even among the beasts. Aristotle expressed this relation by desig

nating the pure rational activity itself as the active reason (vow

TTOITJTIKOS), and, on the contrary, as passive reason (vows wa^nxos),

the material of perceptions, which arises from the bodily existence,

furnishes possibilities and occasions for reason, and is subsequently

worked over and formed by it.

Accordingly the " passive " reason signifies the individual phase

(Erscheinungsweise) given in the natural disposition of the individ

ual man, and determined by the occasions of his personal experience,

the "active" reason, on the contrary, signifying the pure reason

considered as a unity in its nature and principles (principielle Ein

heitlichkeit), common to all individuals. The latter is imperishable,

as it is without beginning, while the former passes away with the

1 With regard to physiological localisation Aristotle found the psychical

activity to be attached to the vital warmth (tupvTov 0fpfj.6v), which as animating

breath (irvevna) is mingled with the blood, and his school developed this doc

trine still further. Cf. H. Siebeck, Zp.itschrift fitr Volkerpsycholngie, 1881, pp.

364 ff. In consequence of this he regarded the heart as the seat of the common

sense and so supplanted the better insight with which Alcmseon, Diogenes of

Apollonia, Democritus, and Plato had recognised the importance of the brain.

2 This beginning for a doctrine of inner perception is found in Arist. De. An.

III. 2, 425 b 12.

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individuals in whom it appears. Personal immortality is put in

question by this conclusion just as in the Platonic Timceus, where

it was claimed only for the " rational " " part " of the soul, i.e. that

part which is everywhere alike and impersonal. It is clear that we

have here no longer to do with empirical psychology, but with such

doctrines as have been taken from the systematic connection of

the whole work, and grafted upon psychology in consequence of

ethical and epistemological postulates.

11. In the conception of the reason as the Form peculiar to the

human soul, Aristotle found the key to the solution of that feature

of the ethical problem which even Plato had sought in vain, i.e.

that of the content of the Good. Man s happiness or well-being

(evSui/Aovta), which in Aristotle s system also is regarded as the

supreme end of all endeavour (reXos), is, indeed, dependent in part

upon external fortune ; it is not complete until this has afforded

its good things ; but ethics has to do only with that which stands in

our power (TO. &lt; r/fuv), only with the happiness which man gains

by his own activity (irpaKrov ayaOov). Every being, however, be

comes happy by the unfolding of his own nature and of his own

peculiar activity man, therefore, through reason. The virtue of

man is, accordingly, that habitude or permanent state of mind (eis)

through which he is made capable of the practice of rational activ

ity ; it develops out of the endowments of his natural disposition,

and has for its fruit, satisfaction, pleasure.

As in the animal soul impulse and perception were to be dis

tinguished as different expressions, so, too, the reason develops

itself, partly as rational action, partly as rational thought ; as per

fection, on the one hand, of the character or disposition (^0os), on

the other, of the faculty of intelligence (alaBdvta-dai in the broadest

sense of the word). Thus there result, as the excellence or ability

of the rational man, the ethical and the intellectual or dianoetic vir

tues.

12. The ethical virtues grow out of that training of the will by

which it becomes accustomed to act according to right insight

(&lt;povi7&lt;ns opOos Xoyos). It enables man, in his decisions, to follow

practical reason, i.e. insight into what is correct or proper. With

this doctrine Aristotle transcends the principles of Socrates,

with evident regard to the facts of the ethical life : not that he

assigned to the will a psychological independence as over against

knowledge ; the point, rather, is, that he gave up the opinion that

the determination of the will arising from rational insight must of

itself be stronger than the desire arising from defective knowledge.

Since experience often shows the reverse of this, man must gain by

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practice that self-control (ey/c/aaTeia) by means of which he follows

under all circumstances that which is rationally known, even against

the strongest desires. 1

While to ethical virtue in general belong natural disposition,

insight, and habitude, the individual virtues are distinguished by

the different relations of life to which they refer. A systematic

development of these is not given by Aristotle, but we have, rather,

a comprehensive and delicate treatment of the individual virtues.

The general principle is that rational insight always finds the right

mean between the unreasonable extremes to which the natural

impulsive life leads. Thus courage is the right mean between

cowardice and rashness. A particularly detailed exposition is given

to friendship 2 as the common striving for all that is good and

beautiful, and also to justice as the basis of the political community.

13. For Aristotle, like Plato, was convinced that the moral excel

lence of man, since it always relates to activities which prosper in

the life of a community, can find its fulfilment only in the life of a

community ; for him, too, there is ultimately no perfect moral life

outside the state, the essential end of which was considered by

Aristotle, also, to be the ethical training of its citizens. As, never

theless, in the case of the individual man, virtue ought to develop

out of the natural disposition, so the political relations also are

treated by Aristotle from the point of view, that the historically

given relations are to be used for the highest possible fulfilment of

that highest end.

Every constitution is right if the government has the ethical weal

of the community as its highest goal ; every constitution has failed

if this is not the case. The good of the state, therefore, does not

depend upon the external form, which is defined by the number

of those who rule. 3 The rule of a single individual may be right

as a kingdom (/3a&lt;nA.cia), bad if a despotism (pawi s) ; the rule

of few may be good if an aristocracy of culture and disposition,

if an oligarchy of birth or property, bad; the rule of all as a

republic of law and order (TroXireta) may be good, as mob-rule

(8r}fj.oKpaTia) , bad. With profound political intelligence, Aristotle

brings together in these expositions the experiences of Grecian

history, and on the ground of these enters upon the philosophy of

1 In the polemic against the Socratic doctrine which Aristotle brings forward

in this line, Eth. Nic. III. 1-8, are developed the first beginnings of the problem

of freedom.

2 In the eighth book of the Nicomachcean Ethics.

3 A point of view which the dialogue the Statesman, passing under Plato s

name, had already emphasised, while Plato himself in the Republic constructed

the " bad " constitutions from psychological analogies of a predominance of the

lower parts of the soul.

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history in giving intimations as to the necessity with which individ

ual forms of constitutions pass over into one another and develop

out of one another.

After these presuppositions we can understand that Aristotle

could not think of projecting in detail the constitution of an ideal

state in Plato s manner. He contented himself with a critical

emphasising of those elements which had proved requisite in indi

vidual constitutions for fulfilling the general task of the state. In

this connection he agrees with the Platonic demand for a public

system of education ; the ethical community must itself take the

care of fitting for their place the elements of which it will in future

consist, and it is the task of education (in the treatment of which

the fragment of the Politics breaks off) to lead man out of his rude

state of nature with the help of the noble arts, to ethical and intel

lectual culture.

14. To the practical activity of the reason (AoytortKov), in the

broader sense of the word, Aristotle reckoned also " making "

(TTOICIV) in addition to "acting" (Trpa&s) ; yet, on the other hand,

he made so great distinction between this creative activity, which

presents itself in art, and the action directed toward the ends of

daily life, that he occasionally set the science of art, poietic phi

losophy, as a third independent science, side by side with the theo

retical and practical. Of this poietic philosophy, there is preserved

besides the Rhetoric only the fragment of his theory of the art of

poetry, under the name of the Poetic. This sets out, indeed, from

principles relating to the nature of art in general, but in its particu

lar subject offers only the outlines of a theory of tragedy. In

this, such peculiar relations of this science of art to the two other

principal parts of philosophy appear, that it becomes difficult to sub

ordinate this branch under either of the other two.

Art is imitative production, and the arts are distinguished as well

by the objects which they imitate as by the material with which

they imitate. The objects of poetic art are men and their actions ;

its means are language, rhythm, and harmony. Tragedy, in particu

lar, represents an important action as performed immediately by

speaking and acting persons. 1

But the purpose of this imitative representation is an ethical one :

the passions of man, in particular in the case of tragedy, fear and

sympathy, are to be so excited, that by their excitation and en

hancement purification of the soul (Ka0ap&lt;ns) from these passions

is brought about. -

\* Poet. 6, 1449 b 24.

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On the doctrine of the Catharsis, which became so important for the later

theory of art, and on the literature concerning it, cf. A. Doring, Die Kunstlehre

des Aristoteles (Jena, 1876).

The attainment of this end is, however, accomplished in such

a way, that in artistic representation the particular is brought to

our view, not as a particular, but in its universal nature or essence.

Art, like science, has for its object the universal in its particular

realisation ; it offers a kind of knowledge, and with this the pleas

ure which attends upon knowledge. 1

15. The highest perfection of its development finally is achieved

by the rational nature of man in knoidedge. The dianoetic virtues

are the highest, and those which bring complete happiness. The

activity of the theoretical reason (CTTICTT^/AOVIKOV) is directed to the

immediate apprehension of the highest truths, i.e. of the concep

tions and judgments which the inductive search of scientific inves

tigation only leads up to without being able to prove, and from

which all deduction must take its beginning (cf. 12, 4).

But knowledge of these, the full unfolding of the " active reason "

in man, is again designated by Aristotle as a "beholding" (Qtwpia) ;

and with this beholding of the highest truth man gains a participa

tion in that pure thought, in which the essence of the deity consists,

and thus, also, in the eternal blessedness of the divine self-conscious

ness. For this " beholding " which exists only for its own sake

and has no ends of will or deed, this wishless absorption in the

perception of the highest truth, is the blessedest and best of all.

1 Poet. 9, 1451 b 5.

# PART II. THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN PHILOSOPHY.

As regards the general literature, the same works serve for this part that were

cited at the beginning of Part I.

WITH the age of Aristotle, Grecian civilisation stepped out

from its national restrictions and into the great general movement

in which the peoples of antiquity that dwelt about the Mediter

ranean, through interchange and adjustment of their ideas, became

fused into one common civilisation. This process began through

the union of Oriental with Greek thought, in the Hellenistic states

of Alexander s successors. It found its external completion in the

Roman Empire, its internal completion in Christianity. Hellen

ism, Romanism, and Christianity were the three stages in which the

world s future civilisation developed from antiquity.

The intellectually determining element in this union was Greek

science, and herein consists its significance for the world s history.

It became, like Greek art, the common possession of ancient civili

sation. To it were joined step by step the highest movements in

the inner life of the peoples, and it became the forming power for

all the longings and impulses that lived within their souls. It

was with the fall of its political independence, with its absorp

tion into the Empire, that the Greek nation bought the accomplish

ment of its task of civilisation; by their dispersal over the world

the Greeks became the teachers of the world.

But in connection with this entrance into more extended relations,

Greek science experienced a separation of the different elements

which were united in it. Together with the purely theoretical

interest in which it had originated, and which had found so clear

an expression in the personality and teaching of Aristotle, a practi

cal interest had in time developed, which sought in science the

conviction that should govern life. In Plato s philosophy the two

were inseparately fused together, but now these two tendencies of

science became separated.

Scientific thought, which had come to a knowledge of its own

processes in the Aristotelian logic, had arrived at the consciousness

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of fundamental conceptions, with the aid of which it could use the

abundance of phenomena. The principal opposing theories of the

interpretation of the world had developed in the great systems, and

in this way a fixed frame or setting was formed for the scientific

treatment of detail. But beginning, as it did, with so slightly ex

tended a knowledge of detail, the more successful Greek science was

in the development of principles, the more it now experienced a

crippling, at once of metaphysical interest and metaphysical force.

In consequence of this, however, the theoretical tendency of sci

ence was toward details, and the fundamental scientific character of

the Hellenistic-Roman time is erudition and the development of the

special sciences. The individual man of science, by entrance into

one of the great schools, gained a firm support of collective opinion,

and a ruling principle for the treatment of separate questions and

subjects which interested him. And indifference toward general

metaphysical theories was the greater, the more it appeared that

fruitful investigation in special provinces, extension of knowledge

of facts, and comprehension of special departments of science were

possible, independently of the strife of metaphysical systems. The

separation of problems, which had been completed typically in the

Aristotelian teaching and school, led necessarily to specialisation,

and the purely theoretical interest in knowledge for its own sake

developed, during the Hellenistic-Roman period, essentially in the

individual sciences. The great savants of later antiquity stand, it is

true, in loose relations with one school or another, but they always

show themselves indifferent to metaphysics. So it happens that

during this time production, so far as the theoretical principles of

philosophy were concerned, was extremely small, while investiga

tion into mathematics, natural science, grammar, philology, literary

and general history, had rich and comprehensive results to record.

With the great mass of those names which are reckoned as " philos

ophers," whether heads of schools or associates in the schools, and

which are continued in the schematic treatment of the " History of

Philosophy," only literary-historical notices are connected, as that

they worked specially in this or that department ; or it may be per

sonal information, of no importance to philosophy, as that they

attached themselves to this or that one among the earlier teachers,

almost never do we find any formation of new and original con

ceptions. So far as theoretical knowledge was concerned, this

period turned the old problems of the Greeks hither and thither,

and moved along the track which it found already laid down.

So much the more powerfully, during these centuries of appropri

ation and elaboration, did the practical significance of philosophy

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unfold itself. The need of a scientific doctrine of the ends of

human life, of such a wisdom as should guarantee the happiness of

the individual, could but become more urgent as the ideal structure

of Greek life fell in pieces, as the religion of the people sank ever

more and more to an external tradition, as the crumbling political

life, robbed of its independence, no longer awakened devotion, and

the individual in his inner life felt thrown back upon himself.

Thus wisdom for the conduct of life became the fundamental problem

of the philosophy which followed that of the Greeks, and the nar

rowing in the statement of the philosophical problem which Socrates,

and after him the Cynic and Cyrenaic schools of Sophistic thought,

had begun, is the general character of the succeeding period.

This did not exclude general theoretical doctrines and their

sharply championed contests from assuming airs of great impor

tance during this period ; but, on the -one hand, they met with no

original interest for their own sake, and consequently developed

only in the directions which were determined by the real end in

view, i.e. that of wisdom for the conduct of life; on the other hand,

they were lacking in originality, they were throughout only the old

traditions shifted about, conditioned by the fundamental practical

thoughts. Even such comprehensive systems as the Stoic and the

Neo-Platonic work only with the conceptions of Greek philosophy,

in order to gain a theoretical basis for their practical ideal. The

key to their theoretical doctrines lies always in the fundamental

practical conviction, and in so far they are all of them character

istic types of the mingling of problems.

With this predominance of practical importance is connected the

fact that the dependence of philosophy upon the general movement

of civilisation, which had already with the Sophists made its

entrance into the quiet circle of disinterested investigation, became

in the Hellenistic-Roman period a permanent phenomenon, and

this appears most decisively in the changing attitude of this phi

losophy toward religion.

The development which Greek philosophy had taken, and the

ever more sharply pronounced opposition to the religion of the

people into which it had come, brought with it the result that

the special task of that wisdom for the conduct of life which the

post- Aristotelian philosophy sought, was to find a compensation for

religious faith. The cultured world, which had lost the support

afforded by religion, and was obliged to give up that of the state

also, sought it in philosophy. As a result, the point of view of the

Hellenistic-Roman wisdom for the conduct of life was primarily

that of individual morality, and the philosophy which busied itself

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with this had, consequently, a thoroughly ethical stamp. The

sharpness of the opposition of this individualistic ethics to religion

appears most clearly among the Epicureans. But in the other

schools, also, the doctrines of the deity have a purely ethical, or

perhaps a theoretical interest, but none that is specifically religious.

This essentially ethical development of philosophy reached its

completion in Greece, especially, indeed, in Athens, which, amid all

the spread of Greek culture eastward and westward, formed for

centuries the centre of scientific life. But soon new centres par

ticularly for erudite detailed investigation, arose in the great libra

ries and museums, in Rhodes, in Pergamum, in Alexandria, in

Tarsus, in Rome, and later, in Antioch and Byzantium. Of these,

Alexandria became especially important, where not only did elabora-

tive erudition experience so typical a development, that the entire

direction of this period is generally called " literary-historical " in

accordance with it, but where, also, the philosophical direction of

the time experienced its decided change.

For as time went on philosophy could not remain indifferent to

that deep feeling of dissatisfaction which had seized the ancient

world in the midst of all the glory of the Roman Empire. This

huge empire offered to the peoples which it had welded together

into a mighty unit, no compensation for the loss of their national

independence; it granted them neither inner worth nor outer for

tune. The draught from the life of earth had become insipid to

ancient peoples, and they thirsted after religion. So they groped

after the different cults and religious practices which individual

peoples had brought with them, and the religions of the Orient

became mixed with those of the Occident.

Into this movement philosophy was the more drawn, the more it

became clear that it could not satisfy the cultured man by the

presentation of its ethical ideal of life, could not secure for him

the promised happiness. It followed then at first, in Alexandria

that the mingling, surging flood of religious ideas emptied itself

into philosophy, which now sought to build up upon a scientific

basis, not only an ethical conviction, but a religion as well. Philos

ophy employed the conceptions of Greek science to clarify and put

in order religious ideas, to give to the importunate demand of

religious feeling an idea of the world that should be satisfactory

to it, and so created the systems of religious metaphysics, in more or

less intimate connection with the contending religions.

Accordingly, in the Hellenistic-Roman philosophy there are two

distinct periods to be distinguished, the ethical and the religious.

The last century B.C. is to be designated as the time in which the

one gradually passed over into the other.

## CHAPTER I. THE ETHICAL PERIOD.

THE two schools of the great masters of Attic philosophy, the

Academic and the Peripatetic, followed the tendency of the time

which separated science into the two branches, ethical philosophy

and learned investigation. While in thft first generation of the

Academy that contemporary with Aristotle a Pythagoreanising

metaphysics had predominated, this made room in the next period

for popular moralising (cf. p. 101). In the Lyceum, indeed, Theo-

phrastus, and after him, Strato, held fast to the development and

re-shaping of the Aristotelian metaphysics, but the associates of

Theoprastus, Diccearchus, Aristoxenus, and others, as well as Theo-

phrastus himself, turned to literary-historical studies and to natural

science. Later, the Peripatetics had a great share in the Alexan

drian erudition, and the history of philosophy especially found in

them its most industrious workers. But in philosophy itself they

played only the conservative role of defending the system of their

school against the attacks of the others, especially upon the ethical

domain, and the new edition of the Aristotelian works by Androni-

cus gave new stimulus for a zealous reproduction of his teaching.

Paraphrases, commentaries, excerpts, and interpretations formed

the chief occupation of the later Peripatetics.

The Academy and Lyceum were, however, injured in their work

ing by the two schools which were founded toward the end of the

fourth century, and which owed their great success to the fact that

they formulated the tendency of the time toward the practical wis

dom of life with the clearness and impressiveness of one-sidedness :

namely, the Stoic and the Epicurean.

The first was founded in the STOOL TTOLKL\^ by Zeno, a native of

Citiuin in Cyprus, and had, both in his time and in that of his suc

cessor, Cleanthes, more likeness to Cynicism than in the time of its

third head, Chrysippus, who succeeded in turning the school into a

more scientific course. Epicurus, on the contrary, founded a society

which made the Hedonistic principle, in a refined and intellect-

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ualised form, its centre, but developed only a slight degree of

scientific vitality. While numerous adherents were won to its

social-ethical principle then established, and to the view of the

world connected with it, as these were continued through antiquity

and especially in the Roman world, the school remained decidedly

more unfruitful scientifically than the others, as well in the special

sciences as in philosophy. Its doctrines have been presented in an

interesting manner by the Roman poet, Lucretius.

These four schools continued side by side in Athens for centuries,

and in the time of the Empire they were still maintained in various

chairs of instruction, and formed there a sort of university ; but

only in the Academy, and here only with great gaps, can a succes

sion of heads of the school be traced ; while the tradition in the

case of the Stoa and the Epicureans breaks off with the first cen

tury B.C., and for the Lyceum soon after that time.

At first, however, these four schools contended with each other in

the liveliest fashion during the third and second centuries B.C., and

it was especially in ethical questions, and in metaphysical, physical,

and logical questions only in so far as connected with the ethical,

that they sought to bear away the palm from one another. 1

But, moving along side by side with the dogmatic doctrines during

the whole period was another tendency, which, like the Stoic and

Epicurean philosophy, originated in the teaching of the Sophists :

namely, Scepticism. It did not, indeed, take on the form of an

association in a school, but it, too, was brought together into a system

atic form,^ and found an ethical culmination. Such a concentration,

in accord with the spirit of the times, of the negative results of the

teaching of the Sophists, was achieved by Pyrrho, whose doctrines

were set forth by Timon. This Sophistical scepticism had the

triumph of obtaining possession of Plato s grove for a time; for, if

the Middle Academy did not make this doctrine fully its own, it made

it a weapon for combating Stoicism and grounding its own ethics.

In this phase of the development of the Academy appear the two

heads of the school, Arcesilaus and Carneades, who were separated by

about a century. In after time, when the Academy again rejected

Scepticism, this doctrine met with sympathy principally among the

empirical physicians, among whom, even at the end of this period,

^Enesidemus and Agrippa are to be mentioned. A complete collec

tion of the doctrines of the Sceptics, made at a much later time,

is preserved in the works of Sextus Empiricus.

1 Cicero in his philosophical dialogues gives vivid pictures of these school con

troversies, with a dextrous use of the original sources.

CHAP. l.J The Ethical Period. 161

But the deeper significance of this Scepticism was that it brought

to expression the fundamental frame of mind which had seized the

entire ancient civilisation as it had once seized that of Greece, a

frame of mind at variance with the true ideal import and content of

that civilisation ; and the same lack of the spirit of decided convic

tion found only another form in the Eclecticism which began to

develop in the second half of the second century. With the exten

sion of the schools in the great relations of the life of the Koman

Empire, the school-spirit disappeared, polemic was crippled, and the

need of adjustment and fusion made itself felt instead. The teleo-

logical view of the world, especially, formed the basis upon which

Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Stoicism could agree in a common

opposition against Epicureanism.

The tendency toward such a fusion, toward syncretism, first awoke

in the Stoic school, and found its most efficient supporters in Pance-

tius and Posidonius, who supplemented the doctrine of the Stoa

on all sides by borrowing Platonic and Aristotelian elements. In

opposition to them stood the, New Academy, which, after Philo of

Larissa had made an end of the sceptical episode in the develop

ment of the school, made the attempt, through Antiochus, to unite

philosophy, then so disunited, upon those doctrines in which Plato

and Aristotle agree.

Less important, because more devoid of principles, but not, there

fore, the less significant historically, was that sort of eclecticism

which the Romans employed in taking up Greek philosophy. This

consisted in piecing together, from an essentially practical point of

view, the different school systems which met their approval. This

was the case with Cicero, Varro, and in part with the school of the

Sextians.

Of the Peripatetic School (the Lyceum), the co-founder himself is primarily

to be noticed, Theophrastus of Erebus in Lesbos (about 370-287), a somewhat

younger friend of Aristotle, who through his teachings and writings won great

regard for the school. Of his works, the botanical, also a fragment of the

Metaphysics, extracts from his Characters, from the treatise concerning percep

tion, from his history of physics, and some isolated fragments are preserved

(edited by F. Wimmer, Bresfau. 1842-62).

With him appear Eudemus of Rhodes, Aristoxenus of Tarentum, who

studied music historically and theoretically ( Element? der Musik, German by

R. Westphal, Leips. 1883), Diceearchus of Messina, a learned polyhistor who

wrote a history of Grecian civilisation (/3tos EXXdSos), and Strato of I.nmps^fiis,

who was head of the school (287-2(&gt;!&gt;) and had as surname The Physicist."

Among the Peripatetic doxographers, Hermippus, Notion, Satyrus, Heracleides

Lembus (in the second c&lt; ntury B.C.), and am-&gt;iig the later commentators,

Alexander of Aphrodisias (about 200 A.I&gt;. in Athens) are to be mentioned.

The Middle Academy begins with Arcesilaus of Pitane in ^olia (about

315-241), whose teachings were recorded by his pupil Lacydes, and ends with

Carneades (in Rome, 155) and his successor Clitomachus, who died 1 10. Noth

ing remains of their writings. The sources are, beside Diogenes Laertius, prin

cipally Cicero and Sextus Empiricus.

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Just as indirect and general in its character is our knowledge of the New

Academy. Philo of Larissa was still in Rome in 87. His successor, Antio-

chus of Ascalon, was heard by Cicero in Athens in 78. To the supporters of

eclectic Platonism in this first, essentially ethical form belong among others

Arius Didymus, who inclined strongly to Stoicism (in the time of Augustus),

and Thrasyllua (under Tiberius), who prepared an edition of the works of

Democritus and Plato, arranged according to subjects. An extensive literature

of paraphrase and commentary connected with Plato s works also developed in

the Academy.

When we consider the personality of the Stoic School, we are struck by the

frequency of the descent of its members from the Hellenistic mixed races of the

Orient. Thus the founder, Zeno (about 340-265), came from his Cyprian home

as a merchant to Athens, and there, taken captive by philosophy, is said to

have absorbed the doctrines of the different schools, to found his own in the

year 308. His principal pupil was Cleanthes of Assos in Troas, from whose

writings a monotheistic hymn to Zeus is preserved, Stob. Eel. I. 30 (Wachs-

muth, p. 25). The scientific head of the school was Chrysippus (280-209) of

Soli or Tarsus in Cilicia. He is said to have written an extraordinary amount,

but, aside from the titles, only very unimportant fragments of his works are

preserved. Cf. G. Bagnet (Loewen, 1822). Among the literary-historical

savants of the Stoic School, Diogenes of Babylon and Apollodorus are to be

mentioned ; Aristarchus and Eratosthenes stood in close relation to the school.

Paneetius (18 )-110), who was strongly influenced by the Academic scepticism

and w.io maintained a close relation with the Roman statesmen, began the syn-

cretistic development of the Stoa, which was completed by Posidoniusof Syrian

Apamea (about 135-50). The latter was one of the greatest polyhistors of

antiquity, especially in the geographico-historical dom lin. He taught in Rhodes,

and was heard by many young Romans, among whom was Cicero.

Concerning the Stoics of the time of the Kmpire, cf. the following chapter.

Sources for the Stoic doctrines are Cicero and Diogenes Laertius, Book VII., in

part also the extant writings of the Stoics of the time of the Empire, and the

discoveries at Herculaneum.

I). Tiedmann, System der stoischen Philosophic (3 vols., Leips. 1776) ; P.

Weygoldt, Die Philosophic der Stoa (Leips. 1883) ; P. Ogereau, Essai sur le

System\* Philo so phique dcs Stoiciens (Paris, 1885) ; L. Stein, Die Psychologic

der Stoa (2 vols., Berlin, 1880-88) ; [Capes, Stoicism, Lond. 1880].

Epicurus (341-270), born in Samos, the son of an Athenian schoolmaster,

had already made attempts at teaching in Mitylene and in Lampsacus, before

founding in Athens, in 306, the society which is named after his "gardens"

(KTJTTOI, horti, as also the other schools were named after the places where they

assembled). He was much loved as a teacher, on account of his companionable

qualities. Of his numerous writings lightly thrown off, the proverbs (icvpiai

3Jcu), three didactic letters, parts of his treatise irepl 0wrews (in the discoveries

at Herculaneum), and besides only scattered fragments are preserved ; collected

and arranged systematically by H. Usener, Epicurea (Leips. 1887).

Among the great mass of his followers, antiquity brings into prominence his

closest friend Metrodorus of Lampsacus ; also Zeno of Sidon (about 150) and

1 Iuedrus (about 100 B.C.). Fhilodemus of Gadara in Coele-Syria has become a

somewhat more distinct figure to us since a part of his writings has been found

at Herculaneum (Hercidanensium voluminum quce supersunt, first series, Naples,

1793 ff. ; second, 1861 ff.) ; the most valuable, irepl ffrjueiuv Kai ffrjueiwo-ewv (cf.

Fr. Bahusch, Lyck, 1879; H. v. Arnim, Philodemea, Halle, 1888).

The didactic poem of Tit. Lucretius Carus (98-54), De Natura Eerum, in six

books, has been edited by Lachmann (Berlin, 1850) and Jac. Bernays (Leips.

1852) ; [Kng. ed. with tr. of the poem by Munro, Lond. 1886. Cf. The Atomic

Theory of Lucretius, by J. Masson, Lond. 1884].

Further sources are Cicero and Diogenes Laertius, in the tenth book.

Cf. M. Guyau, La Morale d" Epicure (Paris, 1878); P. v. Gizycki, Ueber das

Leben und die Moralphilosophie des Epikur (Berlin, 1879) ; W. Wallace, Epi

cureanism (Lond. 1880) ; [Wallace, Art. Ep. in Enc. Brit.; W. L. Courtney,

Efi. in Hellenica ].

CHAP. 1, 14.] Ideal of the Sage. 163

Scepticism, as accords with the nature of the case, makes its appearance,

not as a close school, but in looser form. 1 It remains doubtful whether the sys-

tematiser of Scepticism, Pyrrho of Elis (perhaps 365-275), had any intimate

relations with the Socratic-Sophistie school of his native city. A certain Bryso,

who passes for the son of Stilpo, is looked upon as an intermediate link. He

accompanied Alexander on his journey to Asia, together with a follower of

Democritus, Anaxarchus by name. The Sillograph, Timon of 1 hlius (320-230,

the latter part of the time at Athens) from I yrrho s standpoint derides philoso

phers. Fragments of his writings in C. Wach.smuth, De Timone Phliasio

(Leips. 1859). Cf. Ch. Waddington, Pijrrhon (Paris, 1877).

The external relations of later Scepticism are very obscure and uncertain.

JEnesidemus from Cnossus taught in Alexandria, and composed a treatise,

Ilvppuvcioi \uyot, of which nothing remains. His life falls probably in the first

century B.C., yet it has also been set almost two centuries later. Of Agrippa,

nothing in detail can be established. The literary representative of Scepticism

is the physician Sextus Empiricus. who lived about 200 A.D., and of his writ

ings there are extant his Outline Sketches of Pyrrhonism (llvppuveioi virorvirAffeis),

and the investigations comprehended under the name Adversus Mathematicos,

of which Books VII.-XI. contain the exposition of the sceptical doctrine, with

many valuable historical notices (ed. by J. Bekker, Berlin, 1842).

Cf. K. Staudlin, Gesch. und Geist des Skepticismus (Leips. 1794-05) ; N.

Maccoll, The Greek Sceptics (London, 18(i9) ; L. Haas, DC Philosophoruin

Scepticorum Success ionibus ( Wiirzburg, 1875) ; [Owen, Evenings with the Scep

tics (Lond. 1881) ; A. Seth, Art. Scepticism, in Enc. Brit.].

Among the Romans, the admission of philosophy at first encountered violent

resistance; but by the beginning of the first century B.C. it was the general

custom for the young Romans of superior rank to study in Athens or Rhodes,

and to hear the lectures of the heads of schools, for the same end as that for which

the Athenians had formerly heard the Sophists. The literary activity of Marcus

Tullius Cicero (10(5-43) must be judged from the point of view of his purpose,

which was to awaken among his countrymen an inclination for general scien

tific culture and a comprehension of its meaning, and from this standpoint his

work is to be highly prized. Skill in composition and grace of form excuse the

lack of proper philosophising ability, which is shown in a selection of doctrines

based on no philosophical principle. The main treatises are De Finibns, De

Officiis, Tusc.ulan(K Disputationes, Acadcmica, De Natura Deorum, De Fato,

De Divinatione. Cf. Herbart, Ueber die Philosophic des Cicero; in Works,

XII. 1(17 ff. [Trans, of the above writings of Cicero in the Bohn. Lib.]

His friend, M. Terentius Varro (110-27), the well-known polyhistor and

prolific writer, was more learned, but of his labours toward the history of philos

ophy only occasional notes are extant.

Quintus Sextus and a son of the same name and Sotion of Alexandria are

named as Sextians. Sotion seems to have been the intermediate link in which

the Stoic morals were brought into union with the Alexandrian Pythagoreanism,

and given that religious turn which characterises them in the time of the Empire.

Some of their Sentences, discovered in a Syrian translation, have been edited

by Gildemeister (Bonn, 1873).

On the literary conditions of this whole period cf. R. Hirzel, Untersuchungen

zu Cicero 1 s philosophischen Schriften (3 vols., Leips. 1877-83).

### 14. The Ideal of the Wise Man.

The fundamental ethical tendency of the philosophising of this

entire period is still more precisely characterised by the fact that

it is throughout individual ethics that forms the centre of investiga

tion in this time of epigones. The elevation to the ideals of ethical

1 Hence all reckonings by the successions of heads of the school, attempted

in order to fix the chronology of the later Sceptics, are illusory.

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community, in which morals culminated with both Plato and Aris

totle, was a glorification that had become foreign to its time, of

that through which Greece had become great, viz. the thought

of an active, living state. This had lost power over the hearts of

men, and even in the schools of Plato and Aristotle it found so

little sympathy that the Academicians, as well as the Peripatetics,

brought into the foreground the question of individual happiness

and virtue. What is preserved from the treatise of the Academi

cian Grantor, On Grief, 1 or from the works of Theophrastus under

the title of Ethical Characters, stands wholly upon the footing of a

philosophy that esteems the right appreciation of the good things

of life to be its essential object.

In the endless discussions on these questions in which the schools

engaged in the following centuries, the successors of the two great

thinkers of Attic philosophy found themselves in an attitude of

common opposition to the new schools. Both had pursued through

the entire circuit of empirical reality the realisation of the Idea of

the Good, and in spite of all the idealism with which Plato

especially strove to transcend the world of the senses, they had

not failed to appreciate the relative value of this world s goods.

Highly as they prized virtue, they yet did not exclude the view that

for the complete happiness of man 2 the favour of external fortune,

health, prosperity, etc., are requisite also, and they denied espe

cially the doctrine of the Cynics and Stoics that virtue is not

only the highest (as they admitted), but also the sole good.

At all events, however, they too laboured to determine the right

conduct of life which promised to make man happy, and while

individual members of the schools pursued their special researches,

the public activity, especially that of the heads of the schools

in their polemic with their opponents, was directed to the end of

drawing the picture of the normal man. This it was that the time

desired of philosophy : " Show us how the man must be constituted

who is sure of his happiness, whatever the fortune of the world

may bring him ! " That this normal man must be called the able,

the virtuous, and that he can owe his virtue only to insight, to

knowledge, that he therefore must be the " wise " man, this is

the presupposition arising from the Socratic doctrine, which is

recognised as self-evident by all parties during this entire period ;

and therefore all strive to portray the ideal of the wise man, i.e.

of the man whom his insight makes virtuous, and so, happy.

1 Cf. F. Kayser (Heidelberg, 1841).

2 This Aristotelian view was completely assented to by Speusippus and Xen-

ocrates of the Older Academy.

CHAP. 1, 14.] Ideal of the Saye : JEpicurus. 165

1. The most prominent characteristic in the conception of the

" wise man," as determined in this period, is, therefore, imperturba

bility (ataraxy, arapa^ia) . Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics are un

wearied in praising this independence of the world as the desirable

quality of the wise man: he is free, a king, a god; whatever hap

pens to him, it cannot attack his knowledge, his virtue, his happi

ness; his wisdom rests in himself, and the world does not trouble

him. This ideal, as thus portrayed, is characteristic of its time;

the normal man, for this period, is not he who works and creates

for the sake of great purposes, but he who knows how to free him

self from the external world, and find his happiness in himself alone.

The inner isolation of individuals, and indifference toward general

ends, find here sharp expression : the overcoming of the outer world

conditions the happiness of the wise man.

But since he has no power over the world without him, he must

overcome it within himself; he must become master of the effects

which it exercises upon him. These effects, however, consist in

the feelings and desires which the world and life excite in man ;

they are disturbances of his own nature emotions, or passions

(irdOrj, affectus). Wisdom is shown, therefore, in the relation

from passions or emotions, emotionlessness (apathy, aTrdOeiM, is the

Stoic expression). To rest unmoved within one s self, this is the

blessing of this " wisdom."

The terms with which this doctrine is introduced in the case of

Epicurus and Pyrrho point immediately to a dependence upon

Aristippus and Democritus. It corresponds to the gradual trans

formation which took place in the Hedonistic school (cf. 7, 9) that

Epicurus, 2 who made its principle his own, and likewise designated

pleasure as the highest good, nevertheless preferred the permanent

frame of satisfaction and rest to the enjoyment of the moment.

The Cyrenaics also had found the essence of pleasure in gentle

motion; but Epicurus held that is still a "pleasure in motion";

and the state of painless rest, free from all wishes (17801/77 Karatrr-rj-

fjuiTLKrj), is of higher value. Even the zest and spirit of enjoy

ment has become lost ; the Epicurean would indeed gladly enjoy

1 The ancient conception of the passions (Affect), extending into modern

time (Spinoza), is accordingly wider than that of the present psychology. It is

best denned by the Latin translation " perturbationes animi," "emotions," and

includes all states of feeling and will in which man is dependent upon the outer

world.

2 As intermediate links, the younger followers of Democritus, strongly tinc

tured with Sophistic doctrine, are named; especially a certain Nausiphanes,

whom Epicurus heard.

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all pleasure, but it must not excite him or set him in motion.

Peace of soul (yaA^vior/Aos, cf. 10, 5) is all that he wishes, and he

anxiously avoids the storms which threaten it, i.e. the passions.

Epicurus therefore recognised the logical consistency with which

the Cynics had characterised absence of wants as virtue and happi

ness ; but he was far from seriously renouncing pleasure, as they

did. The wise man must, to be sure, understand this also, and act

accordingly, as soon as it becomes requisite in the course of things.

But his satisfaction will be greater in proportion as the compass of

the wishes which he finds satisfied is fuller. Just for this reason,

he needs the insight (&lt;pov7;(ns) which not only makes it possible to

estimate the different degrees of pleasure and pain as determined

through the feelings, which are to be expected. in a particular case,

but also decides whether and how far one should give place to indi

vidual wishes. In this aspect Epicureanism distinguished three

kinds of wants : some are natural (&lt;tW) and unavoidable, so that,

since it is not possible to exist at all without their satisfaction, even

the wise man cannot free himself from them ; others, again, are only

conventional (VO/AU&gt;), artificial, and imaginary, and the wise man has

to see through their nothingness and put them from him ; between

the two, however (here Epicurus opposes the radically one-sided

nature of Cynicism), lies the great mass of those wants which have

their natural right, but are not indeed indispensable for existence.

Hence the wise man can in case of necessity renounce them ; but

since the satisfaction of these gives happiness, he will seek to satisfy

them as far as possible. Complete blessedness falls to his lot who

rejoices in all these good things in quiet enjoyment, without stormy

striving.

On the same ground, Epicurus prized mental joys higher than

physical enjoyments which are connected with passionate agitation.

But he seeks the joys of the mind, not in pure knowledge, but in

the aesthetic refinement of life, in that intercourse with friends

which is pervaded by wit and sentiment and touched with delicacy,

in the comfortable arrangement of daily living. Thus the wise

man, in quiet, creates for himself the blessedness of self-enjoyment,

independence of the moment, of its demands and its results. He

knows what he can secure for himself, and of this he denies himself

nothing ; but he is not so foolish as to be angry at fate or to lament

that he cannot possess everything. This is his " ataraxy," or im-

passiveness : an enjoyment like that of the Hedonists, but more

refined, more intellectual, and more blase.

2. Pyrrhd s Hedonism took another direction, inasmuch as he

sought to draw the practical result from the sceptical teachings of

CHAP. 1, 14.] Ideal of the Sa&lt;/e : Pyrrho, Stoics. 167

the Sophists. According to the exposition of his disciple, Timon, he

held it to be the task of science to investigate the constitution

of things, in order to establish man s appropriate relations to them,

and to know what he may expect to gain from them. 1 But accord

ing to Pyrrho s theory it has become evident that we can never

know the true constitution of things but at the most can know

only states of feelings (iraQ-tj) into which these put us (Protagoras,

Aristippus). If, however, there is no knowledge of things, it

cannot be determined what the right relation to them is, and

what the success that will result from our action. This scepticism

is the negative reverse side to the Socratic-Platonic inference. As

there, from the premise that right action is not possible without

knowledge, the demand had been made that knowledge must be

I possible, so here the argument is, that because there is no knowl

edge, right action is also impossible.

Under these circumstances all that remains for the wise man is

to resist as far as possible the seducements to opinion and to action,

to which the mass of men are subject. All action proceeds, as

Socrates had taught, from our ideas of things and their value; all

foolish and injurious actions result from incorrect opinions. The

wise man, however, who knows that nothing can be affirmed as to

things themselves (&lt;!&lt;acria), and that no opinion may be assented to

(eUaTaArji/a a), 2 restrains himself, as far as possible, from judgment,

and thereby also from action. He withdraws into himself, and in

the suspension (eVo^i/) 3 of judgment, which preserves him from

passion and from false action, he finds imperturbability, rest within

himself, ataraxy.

This is the Sceptical virtue, which also aims to free man from the

world, and it finds its limit only in the fact that there are, never

theless, relations in which even the wise man, withdrawn within

himself, must act, and when nothing else remains for him than to act

according to that which appears to him, and according to tradition.

3. A deeper conception of the process of overcoming the world in

man was formed by the Stoics. At the beginning, to be sure, they

professed quite fully the Cynic indifference toward all goods of the

outer world, and the self-control of the virtuous wise man remained

stamped upon their ethics also as an ineradicable feature ; "but they

1 Euseb. Prcep. Ev. XIV. 18, 2. The doctrine of Pyrrho is shown by this to

be in exact coincidence with the tendency of the time ; it asks, " What are we

to do, then, if there is no knowledge ? "

2 An expression which was probably formed in the polemic against the Stoic

conception of KardX^is ; cf. 17.

3 The Sceptics were called also the tyeKTiKol [" Suspenders "] with reference

to this term, characteristic for them.

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soon dulled the edge of the radical naturalism of the Cynics by a

penetrating psychology of the impulsive life, which shows a strong

dependence upon Aristotle. They emphasise, still more than the

Stagirite, the unity and independence of the individual soul, as con

trasted with its particular states and activities, and so, with them,

personality first becomes a determinative principle. The leading-

power, or governing part of the soul (TO ^ye/xonKoj/), is, for them, not

only that which makes perceptions out of the excitations of the

individual organs in sensation, but also that which by its assent !

(cnr/Kcn-afco-i?) transforms excitations of the feelings into activities

of the will. This consciousness, whose vocation is to apprehend

and form its contents as a unity, is, according to its proper and

true nature, reason (vovs) ; the states, therefore, in whichi conscious

ness allows itself to be hurried along to assent by the violence of

excitement contradict) in like measure, its own nature and reason.

These states (ajffectus) are, then, those of passion (-rrdOrj) and dis

ease of the soul ; they are perturbations of the soul, contrary to

Nature and contrary to reason. 2 Hence the wise man, if he cannot

defend himself from those excitations of feeling in presence of the

world, will deny them his assent with the power of reason ; he does

not allow them to become passions or emotions, his virtue is the

absence of emotions (a-n-dOtia) . His overcoming of the world is his

overcoming of his own impulses. It is not until we give our assent

that we become dependent upon the course of things ; if we with

hold it, our personality remains immovable, resting upon itself. If

man cannot hinder fate from preparing for him pleasure and pain,

he may, nevertheless, by esteeming the former as not a good, and

the latter as not an evil, keep the proud consciousness of his self-

sufficiency.

Hence, in itself, virtue is for the Stoics the sole good, and on the

other hand, vice, which consists in the control of the reason by the

passionsyis the j&ol&^eyll, and all other things and relations are

regarded\* as in themselves indifferent (dSia&lt;o/3a). 3 But in their

1 This assent, to be sure, even according to the Stoics, rests upon the judg

ment ; in the case of passion, therefore, upon a false judgment, but it is yet at

the same time the act of the will which is bound up with the judgment. Cf. 17.

2 Diog. Laert. VII. 110: r6 n-ct0os -f) 5X0705 ACCU irapa &lt;pvffiv i/ i/x^s Klvtjff^ y

opfii) Tr\eovd^ovffa. The psychological theory of the emotions was developed

especially by Chrysippus. Zeno distinguished, as fundamental forms, pleasure

and pain, desire and fear. As principles of division among the later Stoics

there seem to have been used, partly characteristics of the ideas and judgments

which call out the emotion, and partly the characteristics of the states of feeling

and will which proceed from it. Cf. Diog. Laert. VII. Ill ff. ; Stob. Eel. II. 174 f.

3 By reckoning even life in this division, they came to their well-known

defence or commendation of suicide (^ayuy^). Cf. Diog. Laert. VII. 130;

Seneca, Ep. 12, 10.

CHAP. 1, 14.] Ideal of the Sage : Stoics. 169

doctrine of goods they moderate the rigour of this principle by the

distinction of the desirable and that which is to be rejected (TT/DOT/-/-

fjLfva and aTTOTT/aoT/y/xeVa ) . Strongly as they emphasised in this con

nection that the worth (d&a) which belongs to the desirable is to be

distinguished strictly from the Good of virtue, which is a good in

itself, there yet resulted from this, in opposition to the Cynic one-

sidedness, an at least secondary appreciation of the good things of

life. For since the desirable was valued for the reason that it

seemed adapted to further the Good, and, on the other hand, the

demerit of that which was to be rejected consisted in the hindrances

which it prepares for virtue, the threads between the self-sufficient

individual and the course of the world, which the Cynic paradoxical

theory had cut, were thus more and more knit together again. The

mean between what is desirable and what is to be rejected, the abso

lutely indifferent, survived ultimately only in that which could be

brought in no relation whatever to morality.

As these distinctions, by repression of the Cynic element, gradu

ally made Stoicism more viable and, so to speak, better able to get

on in the world, so we may see a like modification, by means of

which it became more usable pedagogically, in the later removal of

the abrupt contrast which at the beginning was made between the

virtuous wise and the vicious fools (&lt;avAoi, /u,wpot ) The wise man,

so it was said at the beginning, is wise and virtuous entirely, and in

everything the fool is just as entirely and universally foolish and

sinful; there is no middle ground. If man possesses the force and

soundness of reason, with which he controls his passions, then he

possesses with this one virtue all the individual particular virtues J

at the same time, and this possession, which alone makes happy,

cannot be lost; if he lacks this, he is a plaything of circumstances

and of his own passions, and this radical disease of his soul commu

nicates itself to his entire action and passion. According to the

view of the Stoics, therefore, the few sages stood as perfect men

over against the great mass of fools and sinners, and in many decla

mations they lamented the baseness of men with the Pharisaic

pessimism which thus gratifies its self-consciousness. But over

against this first opinion, which looked upon all fools as to be

rejected alike, the consideration presented itself that among these

fools there were always noticeable differences with regard to their

departure from the ideal virtue, and thus between wise men and

fools there was inserted the conception of the man who is progres

sive and in a state of improvement (irpoKOTTTwv) . The Stoics, indeed,

1 The Stoics also made the Platonic cardinal virtues the basis for their sys

tematic development of their doctrine of the virtues. Stob. Ed. II. 102 ff.

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held fast to the view that no gradual transition takes place from

this process of improvement to true virtue, and that the entrance

into the condition of perfection results rather from a sudden turn

about. But when the different stages of ethical progress (TrpoKo-n-rj)

were investigated and a state was designated as the highest stage,

in which apathy is indeed attained, but not yet with full sureness

and certainty, 1 when this was done, the rigorous boundary lines

were in some measure effaced.

4. Yet in spite of these practical concessions, the withdrawal

of the individual personality within itself remained ultimately an

essential characteristic in the Stoic ideal of life ; on the other hand,

this which these Greek epigones in common regarded as the mark

of wisdom, was nowhere so valuably supplemented as among the

Stoics. Scepticism, so far as we can see, never desired such a pos

itive supplementation consistently enough ; and Epicureanism

sought it in a direction which expressed in the sharpest form the

restriction of ethical interest to individual happiness. For the

positive content of the wise man s peace of soul, hidden from

the storms of the world, is, for Epicurus and his followers, at last

only pleasure. In this they lacked, indeed, that spirited joy of the

sensuous nature with which Aristippus had exalted the enjoyment

of the moment and the joys of the body to be the supreme end,

and we find, as already mentioned, that in their doctrine of the

highest good the blase, critically appreciative epicurism of the culti

vated man, is declared to be the content of the ethical life. To be

sure, in his psycho-genetic explanation Epicurus reduced all pleasure

without exception to that of the senses, or, as they said later, to

that of the flesh; 2 but, combating the Cyrenaics, he declared 3 that

just these derivative and therefore refined joys of the mind were far

superior to those of the senses. He recognised very properly that

the individual, upon whose independence of the outer world all

hinges, is much surer and much more the master of mental than

of material enjoyments. The joys of the body depend on health,

riches, and other gifts of fortune, but what is afforded by science

and art, by the intimate friendship of noble men, by the calm, self-

contented and free from wants, of the mind freed from passions,

this is the sure possession of the wise man, almost or wholly un

touched by the change of fortune. The cesthetic self-enjoyment of

the cultured man is hence the highest good for the Epicureans.

1 Cf. the account (probably with regard to Chrysippus) in Seneca, Ep.

75, 8 ff.

2 Athen. XII. 546 (Us. Fr. 409) ; Plut. Ad. Col. 27, 1122 (Us. Fr. 411) ; id.

Contr. Epic. Oral. 4, 1088 (Us. Fr. 429). :i Diog. Laert. X. 137.

CHAI. 1, 14.] Ideal of the Saye : Epicureans, Stoics. 171

Thus, to be sure, the coarse and sensuous in Hedonism fell away,

and the Gardens of Epicurus were a nursery of fair conduct of life,

finest morals, and noble employments; but the principle of indi

vidual enjoyment remained the same, and the only difference was

that the Greeks, in the old age of the national life, together with

their Roman disciples, enjoyed in a more refined, intellectual, and

delicate manner than did their youthful and manly ancestors. Only

the content had become more valuable, because it was the content

presented to enjoyment by a civilisation more richly developed

and deeply lived out ; the disposition with which life s cup was

smilingly emptied, no longer in hasty quaffing, but in deliberate

draughts, was the same egoism, devoid of all sense of duty. Hence

the inner indifference of the wise man toward ethical tradition and

rules of the land, which we find here also, though with greater cau

tion ; hence, above all, the putting aside of all metaphysical or

religious ideas that might disturb the wise man in this self-compla

cent satisfaction of enjoyment, and burden him with the feeling of

responsibility and duty.

5. To this, the Stoic ethics forms the strongest contrast. Already,

in the thought reminding us of Aristotle ( 13, 11), that the soul

exercises its own proper nature in the rational power with which it

refuses assent to impulses, we may recognise the peculiar antago

nism which the Stoics assumed in the human psychical life. For

just what we now are likely to call the natural impulses, viz. the

excitations of feeling and will called forth by things of the outer

world through the senses, and referring to these things, just these

seemed to them, as above mentioned, that which was contrary to

nature (irapa &lt; W). Reason, on the other hand, was for them the

" nature," not only of man, but of the universe in general. When,

for this reason, they adopt the Cynic principles in which the moral

is made equivalent to the natural, the same expression contains in

this latter case a completely changed thought. As a part of the

World-reason the soul excludes from itself, as an opposing element,

the determination by sensuous impulses to which the Cynics had

reduced morality : the demands of Nature, identical with those of

reason, are in contradiction with those of the senses.

Accordingly, the positive content of morality among the Stoics

appears as harmony with Nature, and thus, at the same time, as a

law which claims normative validity as it confronts the sensuous

man (vo/xos). 1 In this formula, however, "Nature "is used in a

1 With tliis is completed an interesting change in Sophistic terminology in

which (7, 1) VOMOS and 0&lt;f&lt;m had been made equivalent to one another, and

set over against &lt;PVJLS with the Stoics vj^as = ims.

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double sense. 1 On the one hand is meant universal Nature, the

creative, cosmic power, the world-thought acting according to

ends (cf. 15), the Adyos; and agreeably to this meaning, man s

morality is his subordination to the law of Nature, his willing obe

dience to the course of the world, to the eternal necessity, and in so

far as this World-reason is designated in the Stoic doctrine as deity,

it is also obedience to God and to the divine law, as well as sub

ordination to the world-purpose and the rule of Providence. The

virtue of the perfect individual, who, as over against other indi

vidual beings and their action upon him through the senses, ought

to withdraw within himself, his own master, and rest within him

self, appears thus under obligation to something universal and

all-ruling.

Nevertheless, since according to the Stoic conception the ^yc-

HOVIKOV, the life-unity of the human soul, is a consubstantial part of

this divine World-reason, the life in conformity with Nature must

be also that which is adapted to human nature, to the essential

nature of man ; and this, too, as well in the more general sense

that morality coincides with genuine, complete humanity and with

the reasonableness which is valid in like measure for all, as also in

the special meaning, that by fulfilling the command of Nature, each

person brings to its unfolding the inmost germ of his own individual

essence. Uniting these two points of view, it seemed to the Stoics

that a rationally guided consistency in the conduct of life was the

ideal of wisdom, and they found the supreme task of life in this,

that the virtuous man has to preserve this complete harmony with

himself 2 in every change of life, as his true strength of character.

The political doctrinairism of the Greeks found thus its philosophi

cal formulation and became a welcome conviction for the iron states

men of republican Rome.

But whatever the particular terms in which the Stoics gave

expression to their fundamental thought, this thought itself was

everywhere the same, that life according to Nature and according

to reason is a duty (KaQfjuov) which the wise man has to fulfil, a

law to which he has to subject himself in opposition to his sensuous

inclinations. And this feeling of responsibility, this strict conscious

ness of the " ought," this recognition of a higher order, gives to their

doctrine, as to their life, backbone and marrow.

This demand also, for a life according to duty, we occasionally

meet among the Stoics in the one-sided form, that the ethical con-

1 Cf. Diog. Laert. VII. 87.

2 Thus the formulas bfw\oyov/j.tvw; ry 0tf(ret fijv and 6fj.o\oyovnti ws fir have

ultimately the same meaning. Stob. Eel. II. 132.

CHAP. 1, 14.] Ideal of the Sage : Epicureans, Stoics. 173

sciousness requires some things on rational, grounds, forbids the

opposites, and declares all else to be ethically indifferent. What

is not commanded and not forbidden, remains morally indifferent

(dSta^o/aov), and from this the Stoics sometimes drew lax conse

quences, which they perhaps defended more in words than in actual

intention. But here, too, the systematic development of the theory

created valuable intermediate links. For even if only the Good is

unconditionally commanded, yet, in a secondary degree, the desir

able must be regarded as ethically advisable ; and though baseness

proper consists only in willing that which is unconditionally for

bidden, the moral man will yet seek to avoid also that which is " to

be rejected," Thus, corresponding to the gradation of goods, there

was introduced a like gradation of duties, which were distinguished

as absolute and " intermediate." So, on the other hand, with regard

to the valuation of human actions, a distinction was made on a some

what different basis between those actions which fulfil the demand

of reason 1 externally these are called "befitting," conformable to

duty in the broader sense (KaOrJKovra) and such as fulfil the de

mand of reason solely from the intention to do the Good. Only in

the latter case 2 is there a perfect fulfilment of duty (\*aTop0u&gt;/ia),

the opposite of which is the intention that is contrary to duty, as

evinced in an action, sin (u^apT^a) . Thus the Stoics, proceed

ing from the consciousness of duty, entered upon a profound and

earnest study, extending sometimes to considerations of casuistry,

of the ethical values of human will and action, and we may regard

as their most valuable contribution the universally applied thought,

that man in all his conduct, outer and inner, is responsible to a

higher command.

6. The great difference in apprehension of the ethical life which

exists between the Epicureans and the Stoics, in spite of a number

of deep and far-reaching common qualities, becomes most clearly

manifest in their respective theories of society and of the state. In

this, to be sure, they are both at one almost to verbal agreement in

the doctrine that the wise man, in the self-sufficiency of his virtue,

needs the state 3 as little as he needs any other society ; yes, that in

certain\* circumstances, he should even avoid these in the interest,

either of his own enjoyment or of the fulfilment of duty. In this

sense, even the Stoics, especially the later Stoics, dissuaded from

1 S&lt;ra 6 \67os alpei iroieiv; Diog. Laert. VII. 108.

2 For the contrast here alluded to by the Stoics Kant has made customary

the expressions legality and morality ; the Latin distinguishes according to

Cicero s precedent, rectum and honestum.

8 Epic, in Flut. De.Aud. Poet. 14, 37 (Us. Fr. 548).

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entrance into the family life and political activity; and for the

Epicureans, the responsibility which marriage and public activity

bring with them was sufficient to justify a very sceptical attitude

toward both, and especially to make the latter appear advisable for

the wise man, only in the case where it is unavoidable, or of quite

certain advantage. In general, the Epicureans hold to the maxim of

their master, to live in quiet, 1 XdOf. /ftwo-as, in which the inner crum

bling of ancient society found its typical expression.

But a greater distinction between the two conceptions of life

shows itself in the fact that, to the Stoics, human society appeared

as a command of reason, which must give way only occasionally to

the wise man s task of personal perfection, while Epicurus expressly

denied all natural society among men, 2 and therefore reduced

every form of social conjunction to considerations of utility. So

the theory of friendship, which in his school was so zealously

pledged, even to the point of sentimentality, did not find the ideal

support which it had received in Aristotle s splendid exposition; 3

it finds ultimately only the motives of the wise man s enjoyment of

culture as heightened in society. 4

In particular, however, Epicureanism carried through systemati

cally the ideas already developed in Sophistic teaching concerning

the origin of the political community from the well-weighed interest

of the individuals who formed it. The state is not a natural structure,

but has been brought about by men as the result of reflection, and

for the sake of the advantages which are expected and received from

it. It grows out of a compact (o-wfl^/o;) which men enter into with

each other in order that they may not injure one another, 5 and the

formation of the state is hence one of the mighty processes through

which the human race has brought itself up from the savage state to

that of civilisation, by virtue of its growing intelligence. 6 Laws,

therefore, have arisen in every particular case from a convention as

to the common advantage (cru/a/foW rov au^t/aoi/To?). There is

nothing in itself right or wrong; and since in the formation of a

compact the greater intelligence asserts itself to its own advantage

1 Plutarch wrote against this the extant treatise (1128 ff.), el /caXws X^erai

7-6 \dde j3ta;&lt;ras.

2 Arrian, Epict. Diss. I. 23, 1 (Us. Fr. 525); ib. II. 20, 6 (523).

8 Cf. 13, 12. The extensive literature on friendship is in this respect

a characteristic sign of the time which found its chief interest in the individual

personality and its relations. Cicero s dialogue Laelius (De Amicitia) repro

duces essentially the Peripatetic conception.

4 Diog. Laert. X. 120 (Us. Fr. 540).

5 Cf. among the Kvpiai 36cu of Epicurus the terse sentences in Diog. Laert. X.

150 f.

6 Cf. the description in Lucretius, De Eer. Nat. V. 922 ff. , especially 1103 ff.

CHAP. 1, 14.] Ideal of the Sage : Stoics. 175

as a matter of course, it is for the most part the advantages of the

wise that disclose themselves as motives in the enaction of laws. 1

And as is the case for their origin and content, so also for their

validity and acknowledgment, the amount of pain which they are

adapted to hinder and pleasure which they are adapted to produce,

is the only standard. All the main outlines of the utilitarian theory

of society are logically developed by Epicurus from the atomistic

assumption that individuals first exist by and for themselves, and

enter voluntarily and with design into the relations of society, only

for the sake of the goods which as individuals they could not obtain

or could not protect.

7. The Stoics, on the contrary, regarded man as already, by virtue

of the consubstantiality of his soul with the World-reason, a being

constituted by Nature for society, 2 and by reason of this very fact

as under obligation by the command of reason to lead a social life,

an obligation which admits of exception only in special cases.

As the most immediate relation we have here also friendship,

the ethical connection of virtuous individuals who are united in

the common employment of proving in action the moral law. 3 But

from these purely personal relations the Stoic doctrine at once passes

over to the most general, to all rational beings taken as an entirety.

As parts of the same one World-reason, gods and men together form

one great rational living structure, a TTO\LTLKOV o-vo-T^/ta, in which

every individual is a necessary member (/w Aos), and from this re

sults for the human race the ideal task of forming a realm of reason

that shall embrace all its members.

The ideal state of the Stoics as it had been already delineated by

Zeno, partly in a polemic parallel to that of Plato, knows, accord

ingly, no bounds of nationality or of the historic state ; it is a

rational society of all men, an ideal universal empire. Plutarch,

indeed, recognised 4 that in this thought philosophy constructed as

rational that which was historically prepared by Alexander the

Great, and completed, as we know, by the Romans. But it must

not remain unnoticed that the Stoics thought of this empire gjily

secondarily as a political power ; primarily it was a spiritual unity

of knowledge and will.

It is comprehensible that with such a high-flying idealism the

1 Stob." Flor. 43, 139 (Us. Fr. 530).

2 rCiv (pva-ei iroXrrt/cwi/ fv wv: Stob. Ed. II. 226 ff.

8 It was, to be sure, extraordinarily difficult for the Stoics to bring the need,

which they were obliged to recognise as a fact lying at the basis of the social

impulse, into accord with the independence of the wise man, so baldly empha

sised by them.

4 Plut. De Alex. M. Fort. I. 6.

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Stoics retained only a very weak interest for actual political life in

the proper sense. Although the wise man was permitted and

indeed charged to take part in the life of some particular state, in

order to fulfil his duty to all even in this base world, yet both the

particular forms of the state and the individual historical states

were held to be ultimately indifferent to him. As to the former,

the Stoa could not become enthusiastic for any of the characteristic

kinds of government, but, following the Aristotelian suggestion, held

rather to a mixed system, something such as Polybius 1 presented

as desirable on the ground of his philosophico-historical considera

tion of the necessary transitions of one-sided forms into each other.

To the splitting up of mankind in different states, the Stoics op

posed the idea of cosmopolitanism, world-citizenship, which fol

lowed directly from their idea of an ethical community of all men.

It corresponded to the great historical movements of the age, that

the difference in worth between Hellenes and Barbarians, which had

been still maintained even by Aristotle, 2 was set aside by the Stoics

as overcome, 3 and though, in accordance with their ethical principle,

they were too indifferent to the outer relations of position to enter

upon active agitation for social reforms, they demanded, neverthe

less, that justice and the universal love of man, which resulted as

the highest duties from the idea of the realm of reason, should be

applied also in full measure, even to the lowest members of human

society the slaves.

In spite of the fact, therefore, that it turned aside from the

Greek thought of the national state, to the Stoic ethics belongs the

glory that in it the ripest and highest which the ethical life of

antiquity produced, and by means of which it transcended itself

and pointed to the future, attained its best formulation. The intrin

sic worth of moral personality, the overcoming of the world in man s

overcoming of himself, the subordination of the individual to a

divine law of the world, his disposition in an ideal union of spirits

by means of which he is raised far above the bounds of his earthly

life, and yet, in connection with this, the energetic feeling of duty

that teaches him to fill vigorously his place in the actual world,

all these are the characteristics of a view of life which, though

from a scientific point of view it may appear rather as put together

than as produced from one principle, presents, nevertheless, one of

the most powerful and pregnant creations in the history of the

conceptions of human life.

1 In the extant part of the sixth book.

2 Arist. Pol. I. 2, 1252 b 5.

8 Seneca, Ep. 95, 52 ; cf. Strabo, I. 4, 9. The personal composition also of the

Stoic school was from its beginning decidedly international.

CHAP. 1, 14.] Ideal of the Sage : Stoics, Cicero. 177

8. In a concentrated form all these doctrines appear in the con

ception of the law of life, determined by Nature and reason fov

all men equally, TO &lt;uW SIKCUOV, and this conception, through Cicero, 1

became the formative principle of Roman jurisprudence.

For, in his eclectic attachment to all the great men of Attic phi

losophy, Cicero not only held fast objectively with all his energy

to the thought of a moral world-order which determines with uni

versal validity the relation of rational beings to each other, but

he thought also with regard to the subjective aspect of the question

in correspondence with his epistemological theory ( 17, 4)

that this command of reason was innate in all men equally, and that

it had grown into inseparable connection with their instinct of self-

preservation. Out of this lex naturce, the universally valid natural

law which is exalted above all human caprice, and above all change

of historical life, develop both the commands of morality in general,

and in particular those of human society, the jus naturale. But

while Cicero proceeds to project from this standpoint the ideal form

of political life, the Stoic universal state takes on under his hands 2

the outlines of the Roman Empire. Cosmopolitanism, which had

arisen among the Greeks as a distant ideal, in the downfall of their

own political importance, becomes with the Romans the proud

self-consciousness of their historical mission.

But even in this theoretical development of what the state should

be, Cicero interweaves the investigation of what it is. Not sprung

from the consideration or the voluntary choice of individuals, it is

rather a product of history, and therefore the ever-valid principles

of the law of Nature are mingled in the structures of its life with

the historical institutions of positive law. These latter develop

partly as the domestic law of individual states, jus civile, partly as

the law which the confederates of different states recognise in their

relation to one another, jus gentium. Both kinds of positive law

coincide to a large extent in their ethical content with the law of

Nature, but they supplement this by the multitude of historical ele

ments which in them come into force. The conceptions thus formed

are important not only as constructing the skeleton for a new special

science soon to branch off from philosophy ; they have also the

significance that in them the worth of the historical for the first

time reaches full philosophical appreciation : and at this point Cicero

1 Two of his treatises, only partly preserved, come into consideration here,

De Jtepublica and De Legibus. Cf. M. Voigt, Die Lehre vom jits naturale, etc.

(Leips. 1856), and K. Hildenbrand, Geschichte und System der Bechts- und

Staatsphilosophie, I. 523 ff.

2 Cic. De Eep. II. 1 ff.

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knew how to transform the political greatness of his people into a

scientific creation.

### 15. Mechanism and Teleology.

The practice of the schools in the post-Aristotelian period sepa

rated philosophical investigations into three main divisions,

ethics, physics, and logic (the latter called canonic among the

Epicureans). The chief interest was everywhere given to ethics,

and theoretically the two others were allowed importance only so

far as correct action presupposes a knowledge of things, and this in

turn a clearness with regard to the right methods of knowledge.

Hence the main tendencies of physical and logical theories are

undoubtedly determined in this period by the ethical point of view,

and the practical need is easily contented by taking up and re-shap

ing the older teachings ; but yet in scientific work the great objects

of interest, especially metaphysical and physical problems, assert

their fascinating power, and so notwithstanding we see these other

branches of philosophy often developing in a way that is not in full

conformity with the nature of the ethical trunk from which they

spring. Particularly in the case of physics, the rich development of

the special sciences must ultimately keep general principles always

alive and in a state of flux.

In this respect we notice first that the Peripatetic School, during

the first generations, made a noteworthy change in the principles for

explaining Nature which it had received from its master.

1. The beginning of this is found already with Theophrastus, who

doubtless defended all the main doctrines of Aristotelianism, espe

cially against the Stoics, but yet in part went his own ways. The

extant fragment of his metaphysics discusses, among" the aporise,

principally such difficulties as were contained in the Aristotelian

conceptions of the relation of the world to the deity. The Stagi-

rite had conceived of Nature (&lt;wns) as a being in itself alive

(OK&gt;V), and yet had conceived of its entire motion as a (teleological)

effect of the divine Reason ; God, as pure Form, was separated from

the world, transcendent; and yet, as animating, first-moving power,

he was immanent in it. This chief metaphysical problem of the

following period was seen by Theophrastus, though his own attitude

toward it remained fixed by the bounds of Aristotle s doctrine. On

the other hand, he shows a more definite tendency in the closely

connected question regarding the relation of reason to the lower

psychical activities. The vovs was regarded, on the one hand (con

sidered as Form of the animal soul), as immanent, inborn; on the

other hand, in its purity, as different in essence, and as having come

CHAP. 1, 15.] Mechanism and Teleology : Peripatetics. 179

into the individual soul from without. Here now Theophrastus

decided absolutely against transcendence ; he subsumed the vovs

also as a self-developing activity, under the concept of a cosmic

process, 1 of motion (KIVT/OTIS), and set it beside the animal soul as

something different, not in kind, but in degree only.

Strata proceeded still more energetically in the same direction.

He removed completely the limits between reason and the lower

activities of ideation. Both, he taught, form an inseparable unity ;

there is no thought without perceptions, and just as little is there

sense-perception without the co-operation of thought ; both together

belong to the unitary consciousness, which he, with the Stoics, calls

TO i/ye/ioviKov (cf. 14, 3). But Strato applied the same thought,

which he carried out psychologically, to the analogous metaphysical

relation also. The riyepoviKov of the Averts, also, the Reason of Nature,

cannot be regarded as something separated from her. Whether now

this may be expressed in the form that Strato did not think the

hypothesis of the deity necessary for the explanation of Nature and

its phenomena, or in the form that he postulated Nature itself as

God, but denied it not only external resemblance to man, but even

consciousness, 2 in any case, Stratonism, regarded from the stand

point of Aristotle s teaching, forms a one-sidedly naturalistic or

pantheistic modification. He denies spiritual monotheism, the con

ception of the transcendence of God, and by teaching that a pure

Form is as unthinkable as mere matter, he pushes the Platonic

element in the Aristotelian metaphysics, which had remained just

in the thought of the separation (^wpto-^os) of reason from matter,

so far into the background that the element derived from Democ-

ritus becomes again entirely free. Strato sees in what takes place

in the world, only an immanent necessity of Nature, and no longer

the working of a spiritual, extramundane cause.

Yet this naturalism remains still in dependence upon Aristotle, in

so far as it seeks the natural causes of the cosmic processes, not

in the atoms and their quantitative determinations, but expressly

in the original qualities (TTOIOT^TCS) and powers (8wa/xs) of things.

If among these it emphasised especially warmth and cold, this was

quite in the spirit of the dynamic conceptions held by the older

Hylozoism, and to this, also, Strato seems most nearly related in his

undecided, intermediate position between mechanical and teleological

explanation of the world. Just for this reason, however, this side-

development ran its course with Strato himself without further

result, for it was already outrun at the beginning by the Stoic and

1 Simpl. Phys. 225 a. 2 Cic. Acad. II. 38, 121 ; De Nat. Deor. I. 13, 35.

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the Epicurean physics. These both defended also the standpoint

of the immanent explanation of Nature, but the former was as out

spokenly teleological as the latter was mechanical.

2. The peculiarly involved position of the Stoics, in the de

partment of metaphysical and physical questions, resulted from

the union of different elements. In the foreground stands the

ethical need of deducing from a most general metaphysical prin

ciple the content of individual morality which could no longer find

its roots in state and nationality as in the period of Grecian great

ness, and therefore of so shaping the conception of this principle as

to make this deduction possible. But, in opposition to this, stood,

as an inheritance from Cynicism, the decided disinclination to regard

this principle as a transcendent, supersensuous, and incorporeal prin

ciple, out of the world of experience. All the more decisive was the

force with which the thoughts suggested in the Peripatetic philos

ophy of Nature came forward, in which the attempt was made to

understand the world as a living being, in purposive motion of itself.

For all these motives, the logos doctrine of Heraclitus seemed to

present itself as in like measure a solution of the problem, and this

became, therefore, the central point of the Stoic metaphysics. 1

The fundamental view of the Stoics is, then, that the entire uni

verse forms a single, unitary, living, connected whole, and that all

particular things are the determinate forms assumed by a divine

primitive power which is in a state of eternal activity. Their doc

trine is in its fundamental principles pantheism, and (in opposition

to Aristotle) conscious pantheism. The immediate consequence of

it, however, is the energetic effort to overcome the Platonic- Aris

totelian dualism, 2 and remove the opposition between sensuous and

supersensuous, between natural necessity and reason acting accord

ing to ends, between Matter and Form. The Stoa attempts this

through simple identification of those conceptions whose opposing

characters, to be sure, cannot by this means be put out of the world.

Hence it declares the divine World-being to be the primitive

power in which are contained in like measure the conditioning laws

and the purposeful determination of all things and of all cosmic

processes, the World-ground and the World-mind. As actively

productive and formative power, the deity is the Xoyos

1 Cf. H. Siebeck, Die Umbildung der peripatetischen Naturphilosophie in die

der Stoiker (Unters. z. Philosophie der Griechen, 2 Aufl., pp. 181 ff.).

2 If we were obliged to conceive of the relation of Aristotle to Plato in a

similar manner ( 13, 1-4), just in this point the Stoic philosophy of Nature

shows a farther development in the same direction which the Peripatetic takes

in Strato.

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the vital principle, which unfolds itself in the multitude of phenom

ena as their peculiar, particular \oyoi a-irepfjMTtKOL or formative forces.

In this organic function, God is, however, also the purposefully

creating and guiding Reason, and thus with regard to all particular

processes the all-ruling Providence (-n-povouj.). The determination of

the particular by the universe (which constitutes the dominant

fundamental conviction of the Stoics) is a completely purposeful

and rational order, 1 and forms as such the highest norm (V/O/AOS),

according to which all individual beings should direct themselves in

the development of their activity. 2

But this all-determining " law " is for the Stoics, as it was for

Heraclitus, likewise the all-compelling power which, as inviolable

necessity (avdyK-r)), and so, as inevitable destiny (dpapp.^, fatum),

brings forth every particular phenomenon in the unalterable succes

sion of causes and effects. Nothing takes place in the world with

out a preceding cause (ama TrpoT/yov/xeV?;) , and just by virtue of this

complete causal determination of every particular does the universe

possess its character of a purposeful, connected whole. 3 Hence

Chrysippus combated in the most emphatic manner the conception

of chance, and taught that apparent causelessness in a particular

event could mean only a kind of causation hidden from human

insight. 4 In this assumption of a natural necessity, admitting of no

exceptions even for the most particular and the least important

occurrence, a conviction which naturally found expression also in

the form that the divine providence extends even to the smallest

events of life, 5 the Stoic school agrees even verbally with Democ-

ritus, and is the only school in antiquity which carried this most

valuable thought of the great Abderite through all branches of

theoretical science.

In all other respects, indeed, the Stoics stand in opposition to

Democritus and in closer relation to Aristotle. For while in the

Atomistic system the natural necessity of all that comes to pass

results from the motive impulses of individual things, with the

Stoics it flows immediately from the living activity of the whole, and

1 As the Platonic Timseus had already taught, 11, 10.

2 The normative character in the conception of the logos appeared clearly even

with Herar.litus ( 6, 2, p. 63, note 5).

3 Plut. De Fnto, 11, 574. \* Ib. 7, 572.

6 Plutarch makes Chrysippus say (Comm. Not. 34, 5, 1076) that not even the

meanest thing can sustain any other relation than that which accords with the

decree of Zeus. Of. Cic. De. Nat. Deor. II. 65, 164. Only the circumstance

that the Stoa limited the immediate action of the divine providence to the pur

poseful determination of the whole, and derived from this that of the particular,

explains such modes of expression as the well-known Magna dii curant, pama

negligunt. Cf. 16, 3.

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as over against the reduction of all qualities to quantitative differ

ences, they held fast to the reality of properties as the peculiar

forces of individual things, and to qualitative alteration (dAAotWis,

in opposition to motion in space). They directed their polemic

particularly against the purely mechanical explanation of natural

processes by pressure and impact ; but in carrying out their teleology,

they sank from the great conception of Aristotle, who had every

where emphasised the immanent purposiveness of the formations in

which the Forms were realised, to the consideration of the benefits

which flow from the phenomena of Nature to meet the needs of

beings endowed with reason, " of gods and men." In particular,

they exaggerated, even to ridiculous Philistinism, the demonstration

of the manner in which heaven and earth and all that in them is,

are arranged with such magnificent adaptation for man. 2

3. In all these theoretical views, and just in these, the Epicureans

are diametrically opposed to the Stoics. With the Epicureans, em

ployment with metaphysical and physical problems had in general

only the negative purpose 3 of setting aside the religious ideas

through which the quiet self-enjoyment of the wise man might be

disturbed. Hence it was the chief concern of Epicurus to exclude

from the explanation of Nature every element that would allow a

government of the world, guided by universal ends, to appear as

even possible ; hence, on the other hand, the Epicurean view of the

world was absolutely lacking in a positive principle. This explains

the fact that Epicurus, at least, had only a sceptical shrug of the

shoulders for all questions of natural science from which no practical

advantage was to be gained ; and though many of his later disciples

seem to have been less limited, and to have thought more scien

tifically, the ruts of the school s opinion were worn too deep to

allow the attainment of essentially broader aims. The more the

toleological conception of Nature formed, in the course of time, the

common ground on which Academic, Peripatetic, and Stoic doctrines

met in syncretistic blending, the more Epicureanism insisted upon

its isolated standpoint of negation ; theoretically, it was essentially

anti-teleological, and in this respect brought forth nothing positive.

It was successful only in combating the anthropological excres

cences to which the teleological view of the world led, especially

1 Cic. De Fin. III. 20, 67 ; De Nat. Deor. II. 53 ff.

2 If one might trust Xenophon s Memorabilia, the Stoics had in this no less

a man than Socrates as their predecessor; yet it seems that even in this account,

which is tinctured with Cynicism if not worked over from the Stoic point of

view (Krohn), the general faith of Socrates in a purposeful guiding of the world

by divine providence has descended into the petty. Cf. 8, 8.

8 Diog. Laert. X. 143 ; Us. p. 74.

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with the Stoics, 1 a task which was undoubtedly not so very diffi

cult, but to create from principles a counter-theory it was not pre

pared. Epicurus, indeed, availed himself for this purpose of the

external data of the materialistic metaphysics, as he was able to

receive them from Democritus ; but he was far from attaining the

latter s scientific height. He could follow the great Atomist only

so far as to believe that he himself also, for explaining the world,

needed nothing more than empty space and the corporeal particles

moving within it, countless in number, infinitely varied in form and

size, and indivisible ; and to their motion, impact, and pressure he

traced all cosmic processes, and all things and systems of things

(worlds) which arise and again perish, thereby seeking to deduce

all qualitative differences from these purely quantitative relations. 2

He accepted, accordingly, the purely mechanical conception of nat

ural processes, but denied expressly their unconditioned and excep

tionless necessity. The doctrine of Democritus, therefore, passed

over to the Epicureans only in so far as it was Atomism and mechan

ism ; with regard to the much deeper and more valuable principle

of the universal reign of law in Nature, his legacy, as we have seen

above, passed to the Stoics.

Meanwhile, just this peculiar relation is most intimately con

nected with the Epicurean ethics and with the decisive influence

which that exercised upon their physics ; indeed, one may say that

the individualising tendency taken by the ethical reflection of the

post- Aristotelian age found its most adequate metaphysics just in

the doctrine of Epicurus. To a morals, which had for its essential

content the independence of the individual and his withdrawal

upon himself, a view of the world must have been welcome which

regarded the prime constituents of reality as completely independ

ent, both of each other and of a single force, and regarded their

activity as determined solely by themselves. 3 Now the doctrine of

Democritus which taught the inevitable, natural necessity of all

that comes to pass, contains unmistakably a (Heraclitic) element

which removes this autonomy of individual tilings, and just to their

adoption of this element did the Stoics owe the fact (of. 14, 5.)

that their ethics outgrew the one-sided Cynic presuppositions with

which they started. It is all the more comprehensible that Epi

curus let just this element fall away ; and his conception of the

1 Cf. especially Lucret. De Her. Xat. I. 1021 ; V. 156 ; Diog. Laert. X. 97.

\*Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. \. 4-&gt;.

3 Thus Epicurus grounded his deviation from Democritus s explanation of the

world by an appeal to human freedom of the will. Cf. 16, and also the cita

tions in Zeller IV. 3 408, 1 [Eng. tr. Stoics, etc., p. 446].

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world as contrasted with that of the Stoa is characterised precisely

by this, that while the latter regarded every individual as deter

mined by the whole, he rather regarded the whole as a product of

originally existing and likewise originally functioning individual

tilings. His doctrine is in every respect consistent Atomism.

Thus the system of Democritus had the misfortune to be propa-

g ited for traditions of antiquity, and so also for those of the Middle

Ages, in a system which indeed retained his Atomistic view, looking

in the direction of the exclusive reality of quantitative relations

and of the mechanical conception of the cosmic processes, but

set aside his thought of Nature as a connected whole, regulated by

law.

4. Following this latter direction, Epicurus gave a new form to

the doctrine of the origin of the world maintained by Atomism. 1

In contrast with what had been already seen, perhaps by the

Pythagoreans, but, at all events, by Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle,

that in space in itself there is no other direction than that from

the centre toward the periphery, and the reverse, he appeals to the

declaration of the senses, 2 agreeably to his doctrine of knowl

edge, according to which there is an absolute up and down, and

maintains that the atoms were all originally in motion from above

downward by virtue of their weight. But, in order to derive the

origination of atom groups from this universal rain of atoms,, he

assumed that some of them had voluntarily deviated from the direct

line of fall. From this deviation were explained the impacts, the

grouping of atoms, and, ultimately, the whirling motions which

lead to the formation of worlds, and which the old Atomism had

derived from the meeting of atoms which were moving about in an

unordered manner. 3

It is noteworthy, however, that after he had in this way spoiled

the inner coherence of the doctrine of Democritus, Epicurus re

nounced the voluntary choice of the atoms as a means for the

further explanation of the individual processes of Nature, and from

the point when the whirling motion of the atom-complexes seemed

to him to be explained, allowed only the principle of mechanical

1 Ps.-Plut. Plac. I. 3 ; Dox. D. 285 ; Cic. De Fin. I. 6, 17 ; Guyau, Morale

d Epic. 74.

\* Diog. Laert. X. 60.

8 Cf. 4, 9. It seems that later Epicureans who held fast to the sensuous

basis of this idea and yet would exclude the voluntary action of the atoms and

carry out more thoroughly the Democritic thought of Nature s conformity to

law, hit upon the plan of explaining the grouping (d0poi&lt;j&gt;irfj) of the atoms on

the hypothesis that the more massive fell faster in empty space than the " lighter" ;

at least, Lucretius combats such theories (De Eer. Nat. II. 225 ff.).

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necessity to stand. 1 He used, therefore, the voluntary self-determi

nation of the atoms only as .a principle to explain the beginning of

a whirling motion which afterwards went on purely mechanically.

He used it, therefore, just as Anaxagoras used his force-matter, vovs

(cf. p. 52). For upon this metaphysical substructure Epicurus

erected a physical theory which acknowledged only the mechanics

of atoms as explanation for all phenomena of Nature without any

exception, and carried this out, for organisms especially, by employ

ing for the explanation of their purposive formation the Empedo-

clean thought of the survival of the fit.

Lastly, the Democritic principle of natural necessity asserts itself

in the system of Epicurus in his assumption that in the continuous

arising and perishing of the worlds which beconle formed by the

assemblages of atoms, every possible combination, and thus every

form of world-construction, must ultimately repeat itself. This

was proved in a manner which would now be put upon the basis of

the theory of probabilities, and the result of this repetition was

held to be, that considering the infinitude of time, nothing can

happen which has not already existed in the same way. 2 In this

doctrine, again, Epicurus agrees with the Stoics, who taught a plu

rality of worlds, not co-existent, but following one another in time,

and yet found themselves forced to maintain that these must be

always completely alike, even to the last detail of particular forma

tion and particular events. As the world proceeds forth from the

divine primitive fire, so it is each time taken back again into the

same after a predetermined period : and then when after the world-

conflagration the primitive power begins the construction of a new

world, this &lt;uVis (Nature), which remains eternally the same, unfolds

itself again and again in the same manner, in correspondence with

its own rationality and necessity. This return of all things (iraXvy-

yivtvia or dTTOKaTao-Tcio-is) appears, accordingly, as a necessary con

sequence of the two alternative conceptions of the Stoics, Xoyos and

5. The theoretical ideas of these two main schools of later an

tiquity are accordingly at one only in being completely material-

1 Hence in a certain" sense it might be said, from the standpoint of present

criticism, that the difference between Democritus and Epicurus was only a rela

tive one. The former regards as an unexplained primitive fact the direction

which each atom has from the beginning, the latter regards as an unexplained

primitive fact a voluntary deviation, taking place at some point of time, from a

direction of fall which is uniform for all. The essential difference, however, is

that with Democritus this primitive fact is something timeless, while with

Epicurus it is a single voluntary act occurring in time., an act which is expressly

compared with the causeless self-determination of the human will (cf. 16).

3 Plut. in Kuseb. Dox. 1). 581, 19 ; Us. Fr. 266.

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istic, and it was just in opposition to Plato and Aristotle that

they expressly emphasised this position of theirs. Both maintain

that the real (TO. OVTU), because it manifests itself in action and

passion (TTOUIV Kat Treio-^etv), can be only corporeal; the Epicureans

declared only empty space to be incorporeal. On the contrary,

they combated the (Platonic) view that the properties of bodies

are something incorporeal per se (KaO euvro), 1 and the Stoics even

went so far as to declare that even the qualities, forces, and rela

tions of things, which present themselves in changing modes in

connection with things and yet as actual or real, are " bodies," 2

and with a mode of thought which reminds us of the coming and

going of the homoiomeriae with Anaxagoras, 3 they regarded the

presence and change of properties in things as a kind of inter

mixture of these bodies with others, a view from which resulted

the theory of the universal mingling and reciprocal interpenetration

of all bodies (K/oSo-is Si oAwv).

In carrying out the materialistic theory the Epicureans produced

scarcely anything new; on the contrary, the Stoic doctrine of Nature

shows a number of new views, which are interesting not only in

themselves, but also as having marked out the essential lines for

the idea of the world held during the following centuries.

First of all, in the Stoic system the two antitheses, which were

to be removed or identified in the conception of Nature as one, again

part company. The divine primitive essence divides into the active

and the passive, into force and matter. As force, the deity is fire

or warm, vital breath, pneuma / as matter, it changes itself out of

moist vapour (air) partly into water, partly into earth. Thus fire is

the soul, and the "moist" is the body, of the World-god; and yet

the two form a single being, identical within itself. While the

Stoics thus attach themselves, in their doctrine of the transmuta

tion and re-transmutation of substances, to Heraclitus, and in their

characterisation of the four elements principally to Aristotle, and

follow Aristotle also in the main in their exposition of the world-

structure and of the purposive system of its movements, the most

important thing in their physics is doubtless the doctrine of the

pneuma.

God as creative reason (Xoyos o-Trep/AariKo;) is this warm vital

breath, the formative fire-mind which penetrates all things and is

1 Diog. Laert. X. 67.

a Plut. C. Not. 50, 1085.

8 A similar materialising of the Platonic doctrine of Ideas (Plat. Phcedo, 102),

which reminds us of Anaxagoras, was apparently worked out by Eudoxos, who

belonged to the Academy (p. 1&lt;&gt;:5). Arist. Met. I. 9, 991 a 17, and also Alex.

Aphr. Schol. iu Arist. 573 a 12.

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dominant in them as their active principle ; he is the universe

regarded as an animate being, spontaneously in motion within

itself, and purposefully and regularly developed. All this is

comprehended by the Stoics in the conception of the Trvev/xa, 1 an

extraordinarily condensed conception, full of relations, an idea

in which suggestions from Heraclitus (Aoyos), Anaxagoras (vovs),

Diogenes of Apollonia (ar/p), Democritus (tire-atoms), and not least

the Peripatetic natural philosophy and physiology, became intri

cately combined. 2

6. The most effective element in this combination proved to be

the analogy between macrocosm and microcosm, universe and man,

which the Stoics adopted from Aristotle. The individual soul, also,

the vital force of the body, which holds together and rules the flesh,

is fiery breath, pneuma; but all the individual forces which are

active in the members and control their purposive functions, are

also such vital minds or spirits (spiritus animates). In the human

and the animal organism the activity of the pneuma appears con

nected with the blood and its circulation ; nevertheless, the pneuma

itself just because it is also a body, said Chrysippus 3 is sep

arable in detail from the lower elements which it animates, and this

separation takes place in death.

At the same time, however, the individual soul, as it is only a

part of the universal World-soul, is completely determined in its

nature and its activity by this World-soul ; it is consubstantial with

the divine Pneuma and dependent upon it. Just for this reason the

World-reason, the Xdyos, is for the soul the highest law (cf. above,

14, 3). The soul s independence is therefore only one that is

limited by time, and in any case it is its ultimate destiny to be

taken back into the divine All-mind at the universal conflagration

of the world. With regard to the continuance of this independence,

i.e. as to the extent of individual immortality, various views were

current in the school; some recognised the duration of all souls

until the time of the universal conflagration, others reserved this

for the wise only.

As now the one Pneuma of the universe (whose seat was located

by the Stoics sometimes in heaven, sometimes in the sun, sometimes

in the midst of the world) pours itself forth into all things as

animating force, so the ruling part of the individual soul (TO rjytfj.o-

VIKOV or Aoyicr/Aos) in which dwell ideas, judgments, and impulses, and

1 Stob. Eel. I. 374. Dox. D. 463, 16 : elrai rt&gt; ov irvtS/M KIVOVV iavrb rpbt

iavrb Kal e avrov, 17 Trvevfia, eavrb KIVOVV irpbffd) Ka.1 6irlffu&gt; KT\.

2 Cf. H. Siebeck Zeitsch. f. Volkerpsychologie, 1881, pp. 364 ff.

8 Nemesius, De Nat. Horn. p. 34.

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as whose seat the heart was assumed, was regarded as extending its

particular ramifications throughout the whole body, like the " arms

of a polyp." Of such particular " pneumata " the Stoa assumed

seven, the five senses, the faculty of speech, and the reproductive

power. As the unity of the divine Primitive Being dwells in the

uiii verse, so the individual personality lives in the body.

It is characteristic that the Epicureans could entirely adopt

this external apparatus of psychological views. For them, too, the

soul which according to Democritus consists of the finest atoms

is a fiery, atmospheric breath (they apply likewise the term

"pneuma"); but they see in this breath something that is intro

duced into the body from without, something held fast by the body

and mechanically connected with it, which in death is forthwith

scattered. They also distinguish between the rational and the

irrational part of the soul, without, however, being able to attribute

to the former the metaphysical dignity which it acquired in the Stoic

theory. Here, too, their doctrine is, on the whole, insufficient and

dependent.

7. In accordance with the pantheistic presupposition of the

system, the metaphysics and physics of the Stoics form also a

theology, a system of natural religion based on scientific demonstra

tion, and this found also poetic presentations in the school, such as

the hymn of Cleanthes. Epicureanism, on the contrary, is in its

wholo nature anti-religious. It takes throughout the standpoint of

" Enlightenment," that religion has been overcome by science, and

that it is the task and triumph of wisdom to put aside the phantoms

of superstition which have grown out of fear and ignorance. The

poet of this school depicts in grotesque outlines the evils which

religion brought on man, and sings the glory of their conquest by

scientific knowledge. 1 It is all the more amusing that the Epicurean

theory itself fell to depicting a mythology of its own which it re

garded as harmless. It believed that a certain degree of truth must

attach to the universal faith in gods, 2 but it found that this correct

idea was disfigured by false assumptions. These it sought in the

myths which feigned a participation of the gods in human life, and

an interference on their part in the course of things ; even the

Stoics belief in Providence appeared to them in this respect as but

a refined illusion. Epicurus, therefore, following Democritus in

his doctrine of the eidola, or images ( 10, 4), saw in the gods

giant forms resembling men, who lead a blessed life of contemplation

and spiritual intercourse in the intermediate spaces between the

i Lucret. De Eer. Nat. I. 62 ff. a Diog. Laert. X. 123 f. ; Us. p. 59 f.

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worlds (intermundia) , undisturbed by the change of events, and

unconcerned as to the destiny of lower beings ; and thus this doc

trine, also, is fundamentally only the attempt of Epicureanism to

put in mythological form its ideal of aesthetic self-enjoyment.

8. It was in an entirely different way that the ideas of the

popular religion were fitted into the Stoic metaphysics. Whereas,

up to this time in the development of Greek thought philosoph

ical theology had separated itself farther and farther from the

indigenous mythology, we meet here, for the first time, the

systematic attempt to bring natural and positive religion into

harmony. Accordingly, when the Stoics, also, yielded to the need of

recognising the warrant of ideas universally present throughout the

human race (cf. 17, 4), their pneuma doctrine offered them not

only a welcome instrument, but suggestions that were determinative.

For consideration of the universe must teach them that the divine

World-power has evidently taken on mightier forms and those of

more vigorous life than individual human souls ; and so, beside the

one deity without beginning and end, which for the most part they

designated as Zeus, a great number of "gods that had come into exist

ence," made their appearance. To these the Stoics, as Plato and

Aristotle had already done, reckoned first of all the stars, which

they too honoured as higher intelligences and especially pure for

mations of the primitive fire, and further, the personifications of

other natural forces in which the power of Providence, benevolent

to man, reveals itself. From this point of view we can understand

how an extensive interpretation of myths was the order of the day

in the Stoic school, seeking to incorporate the popular figures in its

metaphysical system by all kinds of allegories. In addition to this

there was an equally welcome use of the Euemeristic theory, which

not only explained and justified the deification of prominent men,

but taught also to consider the demons sacred, as the guardian

spirits of individual men.

Thus the Stoic world became peopled with a whole host of higher

and lower gods, but they all appeared as ultimately but emanations of

the one highest World-power, as the subordinate powers or forces

which, themselves determined by the universal Pneuma, were con

ceived of as the ruling spirits of the world s life. They formed,

therefore, for the faith of the Stoics, the mediating organs, which

represent, each in its realm, the vital force and Providence of the

World-reason, and to them the piety of the Stoics turned in the

forms of worship of positive religion. The polytheism of the popular

faith was thus philosophically re-established, and taken up as an

integrant constituent into metaphysical pantheism.

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In connection with this scientific reconstruction of positive re

ligion stands the theoretical justification of divination in the Stoic

system where it awakened great interest, except in the case of a few

men like Panaetius, who thought more coolly. The interconnection

and providentially governed unity of the world s processes was held to

show itself as one form of manifestation in the possibility that

different things and processes which stand in no direct causal rela

tion to one another, may yet point to one another by delicate rela

tions, and therefore be able to serve as signs for one another. The

human soul is capable of understanding these by virtue of its rela

tionship with the all-ruling Pneuma, but for the full interpretation

of such ecstatic revelations the art and science of divination, resting

upon experience, must be added. On this basis Stoicism regarded

itself as strong enough to elaborate philosophically all the divination

of the ancient world. This was especially true of its younger repre

sentatives, and in particular, as it seems, of Posidonius.

### 16. The Freedom of the Will and the Perfection of the World.

The sharp definition of the contrasted mechanical and teleological

views of the world, and especially the difference in the conceptional

forms in which the thought, common to a certain extent, of Nature s

universal conformity to law had been developed, led, in connection

with the ethical postulates and presuppositions which controlled

the thought of the time, to two new problems, which from the

beginning had various complications. These were the problems of

the freedom of the human will and of the goodness and perfection

of the world. Both problems grew out of contradictions which

made their appearance between moral needs and just those meta

physical theories which had been formed to satisfy those needs.

1. The proper home for the formation of these new problems

was the Stoic system, and they may be understood as the necessary

consequence of a deep and ultimately irreconcilable antagonism be

tween the fundamental principles of the system. These principles are

metaphysical monism and ethical dualism. The fundamental moral

doctrine of the Stoics, according to which man should overcome the

world in his own impulses by virtue, presupposes an anthropological

duality, an opposition in human nature in accordance with which

reason stands over against a sensuous nature contrary to reason.

Without this antithesis the whole Stoic ethics is ready to fall. The

metaphysical doctrine, however, by which the command of reason

in man is to be explained, postulates such an unrestricted and all-

CHAP. 1, 16.] Freedom of the Will: Socrates, Aristotle. 191

controlling reality of the World-reason that the reality of what is

contrary to reason, either in man or in the course of the world,

cannot be united therewith. From this source grew the two ques

tions which since then have never ceased to employ man s critical

investigation, although all essential points of view that can come

into consideration in the case were more or less clearly illumined at

that time.

2. The conceptions which form the presuppositions for the prob

lem of freedom lie ready at hand in the ethical reflections on the

voluntary nature of wrongdoing, which were begun by Socrates

and brought to a preliminary conclusion by Aristotle in a brilliant

investigation. 1 The motives of these thoughts are ethical through

out, and the domain in which they move is exclusively psychologi

cal. The question at issue is hence essentially that of freedom of

choice, and while the reality of this is doubtless affirmed upon the

basis of immediate feeling, and with reference to man s conscious

ness of his responsibility, difficulty arises only in consequence of

the intellectualistic conception of Socrates, who brought the will

into complete dependence upon insight. This difficulty develops

primarily in the double meaning of " freedom," or, as it is here still

called, " voluntariness " (CKOUO-IOV), an ambiguity which has since

been repeated again and again in the most variously shifted forms.

According to Socrates, all ethically wrong action proceeds from a

wrong view a view clouded by desires. He who thus acts does

not "know," therefore, what he is doing, and in this sense he acts

involuntarily. 2 That is, only the wise man is free ; the wicked is

not free. 3 From this ethical conception of freedom, however, the

psychological conception of freedom i.e. the conception of freedom

of choice as the ability to decide between different motives must

be carefully separated. Whether Socrates did this is a question ; 4

at all events, it was done by Plato. The latter expressly affirmed

man s freedom of choice, 5 appealing to his responsibility, a psycho

logical decision on essentially ethical grounds, and, at the same

time, he held fast to the Socratic doctrine that the wicked man acts

involuntarily, i.e. is ethically not free. He even connects the two

directly when he develops the thought 6 that man may sink into the

1 Eth. Nic. III. 1-8.

2 Xen. Mem. III. 9, 4 ; Cyrop. III. 1, 38.

8 Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. III. 7, 113 b 14.

4 According to a remark in the Peripatetic Magna Moralia (I. 9, 1187 a 7)

Socrates, indeed, had expressly said, " it is not in our power" to be good or bad.

According to this, therefore, he had denied psychological freedom.

6 Plat. Rep. X. 617 ff.

6 Plat. I hcvd. 81 B.

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condition of ethical non-freedom by his own fault, and, therefore,

with psychological freedom.

With Aristotle, who separated himself farther from the Socratic

intellectualism, the psychological conception of freedom comes out

more clearly and independently. He proceeds from the position

that ethical qualification in general is applicable only in the case of

" voluntary " actions, and discusses in the first place the prejudices

which this voluntariness sustains, partly from external force (/?ia)

and psychical compulsion, and partly from ignorance of the matter.

That action only is completely voluntary which has its origin in the

personality itself, and of which the relations are fully known. 1 The

whole investigation 2 is maintained from the standpoint of responsi

bility, and the discovered conception of voluntariness is designed to

lead to the conception of accountability. It contains within itself

the characteristics of external freedom of action, and of a conception

of the situation unclouded by any deception. But, on this account,

it must be still further restricted, for among his voluntary acts a

man can be held accountable for those only that proceed from a

choice (Trpoeu pecris). 3 Freedom of choice, therefore, which proceeds

by reflecting upon ends as well as upon means, is the condition of

ethical accountability.

Aristotle avoided a farther entrance upon the psychology of

motivation and upon the determining causes of this choice ; he con

tents himself with establishing the position that the personality

itself is the sufficient reason for the actions 4 which are ascribed to

it ; and to this maintenance of the freedom of choice his school, and

especially Theophrastus, who composed a treatise of his own on

freedom, held fast.

3. On this same basis we find also the Stoics, in so far as purely

ethical considerations are concerned. Precisely that lively feeling

of responsibility which characterises their morals demanded of them

the recognition of this free choice on the part of the individual, and

they sought therefore to maintain this in every way.

Their position became critical, however, by reason of the fact

that their metaphysics, with its doctrine of fate and providence,

drove them beyond this attitude. For since this theory of fate

made man, like all other creatures, determined in all his external

and internal formation and in all that he does and suffers, by the

1 Eth. Nic. III. 3, 1111 a 73 : oC 17 aprf lv atr$ eidtri rd. \*ca0 Ixao-ra &lt;?x oh TJ

irpats.

2 As the reference at the beginning to the right of punishment clearly shows

(Eth. Nic. 1109 b 34).

a Ib. 4, 1112 a 1.

4 Ib. 5, 1112 b 31 : eoi/ce 5r? . . . &v6j&gt;wiros e~ivai ap^T] r&v irpdewi&gt;.

CHAP. 1, 16.] Freedom of the Will: Stoics, Epicurus. 193

all-animating World-power, personality ceased to be the true ground

(apxn) of his actions, and these appeared to be, like all else that

occurs, but the predetermined and unavoidably necessary operations

of the God-Xature. In fact, the Stoa did not shrink from this

extreme consequence of determinism; on the contrary, Chrysippus

heaped up proof on proof for this doctrine. He based it upon the

principle of sufficient reason (cf. above, 15, 2) ; he showed that

only by presupposing this could the correctness of judgments con

cerning the future be maintained, since a criterion for their truth or

falsity is given only if the matter is already determined ; \* he also

gave to this argument the changed form, that since only the

necessary can be known, and not that which is still undecided, the

foreknowledge of the gods makes necessary the assumption of deter

minism ; he even did not scorn to adduce the fulfilment of predic

tions as a welcome argument.

In this doctrine, which, from the standpoint of the Stoic doctrine

of the logos, was completely consistent, the opponents of the system

saw of course a decided denial of freedom of the will, and of the

criticisms which the system experienced this was perhaps the

most frequent and at the same time the most incisive. Among

the numerous attacks the best known is the so-called ignaoa ratio, or

"lazy reason" (d/&gt;yos Xoyos), which from the claim of the unavoid

able necessity of future events draws the fatalistic conclusion that

one should await them inactively, an attack which Chrysippus

did not know how to avoid except by the aid of very forced distinc

tions. 2 The Stoics, on the contrary, concerned themselves to show

that in spite of this determinism, and rather exactly by virtue of it,

man remains the cause of his actions in the sense that he is to be

made responsible for them. On the basis of a distinction 3 between

main and accessory causes (which, moreover, reminds us throughout

of the Platonic CUTIOV and (fwamov) Chrysippus showed that every

decision of the will does indeed necessarily follow from the co-opera

tion of man with his environment, but that just here the outer

circumstances are only the accessory causes, while the assent pro

ceeding from the personality is the main cause, and to this account

ability applies. While, however, this voluntarily acting ^ ye/ion/cov,

or ruling faculty of man, is determined from the universal Pneuma,

this Pneuma takes on in every separate being a self-subsistent

1 Cic. De Fato, 10, 20. So far as concerns disjunctive propositions Epicurus

also for this reason gave up the truth of disjunction : Cic. De Nat, Deor. I.

25, 70.

2 Cic. De Fato, 12, 28 ff.

8 Cic. De Fato, 16, 36 ff.

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nature, different from that of others, and this is to be regarded as a

proper dpxn- 1 In particular, the Stoics make prominent the point

that responsibility, as a judgment pronounced on the ethical quality

of actions and characters, is quite independent of the question

whether the persons or deeds might, in the course of events, have

been other than they were, or not. 2

4. The problem of the freedom of the will, which had been

already complicated ethically and psychologically, experienced in

this way still further a metaphysical and (in the Stoic sense) theo

logical complication, and the consequence was that the indeterminists

who were opponents of the Stoa gave a new turn to the conception

of freedom which they regarded as threatened by the Stoic doctrine,

and brought it into sharp definition. The assumption of the excep

tionless causal nexus to which even the functions of the will were

to be subordinated, seemed to exclude the capacity of free decision ;

but this freedom of choice had, since Aristotle, been regarded in all

schools as the indispensable presupposition of ethical accountability.

On this account the opponents thought and this gave the contro

versy its especial violence that they were defending an ethical

good when they combated the Stoic doctrine of fate, and with that

the Democritic principle of natural necessity. And if Chrysippus

had appealed to the principle of sufficient reason to establish this,

Carneades, to whom the freedom of the will was an incontestable

fact, did not fear to draw in question the universal and invariable

validity of this principle. 3

Epicurus went still farther. He found the Stoic determinism so

irreconcilable with the wise man s self-determination which formed

the essential feature of his ethical ideal, that he would rather still

assume the illusory ideas of religion than believe in such a slavery

of the soul. 4 Therefore he, too, denied the universal validity of the

causal law and subsumed freedom together with chance under the

conception of uncaused occurrence. Thus in opposition to Stoic

determinism, the metaphysical conception of freedom arose, by means

of which Epicurus put the uncaused function of the will in man

upon a parallel with the causeless deviation of the atoms from their

line of fall (cf. 15, 4). The freedom of indeterminism means,

accordingly, a choice between different possibilities that is deter

mined by no causes, and Epicurus thought thereby to rescue moral

responsibility.

This metaphysical conception of freedom as causelessness is not at

1 Alex. Aphr. De Fato, p. 112.

2 Ib. p. 106.

8 Cic. De Fato, 5, 9 ; 11, 23 ; 14, 31.

\* Diog. Laert. X. 133 f. ; Us. p. 65.

CHAP. 1, 16.] Physico-Theoloyy : Epicurus, Stoics. 195

all isolated in the scientific thought of antiquity. Only the Stoa

held fast inviolably to the principle of causality. Even Aristotle

had not followed into details the application of his general principles

(cf. p. 143); he had contented himself with the eVt TO TroAu, " for the

most part," and had based his renunciation of the attempt fully to

comprehend the particular upon the assumption of the contingent

in Nature, i.e. of the lawless and causeless. In this respect the

Stoics alone are to be regarded as forerunners of the modern study

of Nature.

5. Stoicism encountered difficulties which were no less great, in

carrying out its teleology. The pantheistic system which regarded

the whole world as the living product of a divine Reason acting

according to ends, and found in this its sole ground of explanation,

must of course maintain also the purposiveness, goodness, and perfec

tion of this universe ; and conversely the Stoics were accustomed to

prove the existence of the gods and of Providence by pointing to

the purposiveness, beauty, and perfection of the world ; that is, by

the so-called physico-theoloyical method. 1

The attacks which this line of thought experienced in antiquity

were directed not so much against the correctness of the reasoning

(though Carneades applied his criticism at this point also) as

against the premises ; and conversely, the easy exhibition of the

many defects and maladaptations, of the evils and the ethical harm

in the world was employed as a counter-reason against the assump

tion of a rational, purposeful World-cause and of a Providence.

This was done first and with full energy, naturally, by Epicurus,

who asked whether God would remove the evil in the world but

could not, or could remove it but would not, or whether perhaps

neither of these was true, 2 and who also pointed to the instances

of injustice in which the course of life so often makes the good

miserable and the wicked happy. 3

These objections, intensified and carried out with especial care,

were brought into the field by Carneades.\* But to the reference to

the evil and injustice of the course of events he added the objec

tion to which the Stoics were most sensitive : 5 " Whence then in

this world which has been created by Keason comes that which is

void of reason and contrary to reason, whence in this world ani

mated by the divine Spirit corne sin and folly, the greatest of all

1 Cic. De Nat. Dear. II. 5, 13 ff.

2 Lactant. DP Ira Dei, 13, 19 ; Us. Fr. 374.

8 Id. Inst. Div. III. 17, 8 ; Us. Fr. 370.

\* Cic. Acad. II. 38, 120 ; De Nat. Deor. III. 32, 80 ff.

\* Cic. De. Nat. Deor. III. 25-31.

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evils? " And if the Stoics, as perhaps occurred in spite of their

determinism, 1 wished to make free will responsible for these things,

the further question arose, why the almighty World-reason should

have given man a freedom which was thus to be abused, and why

it should permit this abuse.

6. In the presence of such questions the Stoics with their monis

tic metaphysics were in a much worse case than Plato and Aristotle,

who had been able to trace the maladaptations and evil back to

the resistance of the " Not-being," or of matter respectively. In

spite of this the Stoics came forward boldly to master these diffi

culties, and brought to light, not without acute thought, most of

those arguments in which at later periods theodicy has moved again

and again.

The teleological doctrine of the perfection of the universe can be

protected against such attacks either by denying the d/s-teleological

facts, or by justifying them as the indispensable means or attend

ant result in the purposefully connected whole. Both methods

were pursued by the Stoa.

Their psychological and ethical theories permitted the claim that

what is called a physical evil is not such in itself, but becomes such

by man s assent, that hence, if diseases and the like are brought

about by the necessity of the natural course of events, it is only

man s fault that makes an evil out of them ; just as it is frequently

only the wrong use which the foolish man makes of things that

makes these injurious, 2 while in themselves they are either indif

ferent or even beneficial. So the objection based on the injustice

of the course of the world is rebutted by the claim that in truth for

the good man and the wise man physical evils are no evils at all,

and that for the bad man, on the other hand, only a sensuous illu

sory satisfaction is possible, which does not make him truly happy,

but rather only aggi-avates and strengthens the moral disease which

has laid hold of him. 3

On the other hand, physical evils may also be defended on the

ground that they are the inevitable consequences of arrangements

of Nature which are in themselves adapted to their ends and do

not fail of their purpose, as Chrysippus, for example, attempted to

show in the case of diseases. 4 In particular, however, they have

the moral significance of serving partly as reformatory punishments

of Providence ; 5 partly, also, as a useful stimulus for the exercise

of our moral powers. 6

\* Cleanth. Hymn. v. 17. 4 Gell. N. A. VII. 1, 7 ff.

Seneca, Qu. Nat. V. 18, 4. 6 Plut. Stoic. Hep. 35, 1.

8 Seneca, Ep. 87, 11 ff. Marc. Aurel. VIII. 35.

CHAP. 1, 17.] Criteria of Truth: Peripatetics. 197

While external evils were thus justified principally by pointing

out their ethical purposiveness, it appeared for the Stoics an all the

more urgent problem, though one which proved also the more diffi

cult, to make moral evil or sin comprehensible. Here the negative

way of escape was quite impossible, for the reality of baseness in

the case of the great majority of men was the favourite subject of

declamation in the Stoic discourses on morals. Here, then, was the

centre of the whole theodicy, namely, to show how in this world

which is the product of divine Reason, that which is contrary to

reason in the impulses, dispositions, and actions of rationally

endowed beings is possible. Here, therefore, the Stoics resorted to

universal considerations. They showed how the perfection of the

whole not only does not include that of all the individual parts, but

even excludes it, 1 and in this way substantiated their claim that

God must necessarily allow even the imperfection and baseness of

man. In particular, they emphasised the point that it is only

through opposition to evil that good as such is brought about ; for

were there no sin and folly, there would be no virtue and wisdom. 2

And while vice is thus deduced as the necessary foil for the good,

the Stoics give as a final consideration, 3 that the eternal Providence

ultimately turns even the evil to good, and has in it but an appar

ently refractory means for the fulfilment of its own highest ends. 4

### 17. The Criteria of Truth.

The philosophical achievements of the post-Aristotelian ime

were least important in the department of logic. Such a powerful

creation as the Analytics of the Stagirite, which brought the prin

ciples of Greek science in so masterly a fashion to the consciousness

of all in a conclusive form, must naturally rule logical thought for

a long time, and, in fact, did this until the close of the Middle

Ages, and even beyond. The foundations of this system were so

firmly laid that at first nothing there was shaken, and there re

mained for the activity of the schools but to build up individual

parts, an activity in connection with which, even at that time,

much of the artificial adornment characteristic of a degenerate age

displayed itself.

1. The Peripatetics had already attempted to develop the Aristote

lian Analytics systematically in this direction by a more detailed treat

ment, by partially new proofs, by farther subdivision, and by more

1 Plut. Stoic. Eep. 44, 6. 8 Ib. 35, 3.

2 Ib. 36, 1. \* Cleanth. Hymn. vv. 18 f.

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methodical formulation. In particular, End emus and Theophrastus

undertook investigations concerning the hypothetical and disjunc

tive judgments, and the extension of the theory of the syllogism

occasioned by the appearance of these judgments and premises.

The Stoics continued these efforts ; they set these new forms of

judgment (d^tw/xa) as composite over against the simple 1 categorical

forms, developed into all their details the resulting forms of the

syllogism, emphasised also especially the quality 2 of judgments,

and deduced the laws of thought in altered forms. In general,

however, they spun out the logical rules into a dry schematism and

genuine scholastic formalism which thereby became farther and

farther removed from the significant fundamental thoughts of the

Aristotelian Analytics, and became a dead mass of formulae. The

unfruitful subtlety of this process took special delight in the solu

tion of sophistical catches, in which the real meaning was inextri

cably involved in the contradiction of forms.

It was in these elaborations by the schools that the science of

logic created by Aristotle first took on the purely formal character

that it retained up to the time of KANT. The more pedantic the

form taken in the development of the particular features, the more

the consciousness of the living thought, to which Aristotle had

aspired, was replaced by a schoolmaster-like network of rules,

essentially designed to catch thoughts and examine their formal

legitimacy, but incapable of doing justice to the creative power of

scientific activity. While, even with Aristotle, regard for proof

and refutation had occupied the foreground, here it occupies the

whole field. Antiquity did not attain a theory of investigation ;

for the weak beginnings which we find toward this end in the inves

tigations of a younger Epicurean, 3 Philodemus, 4 concerning conclu

sions from induction and analogy, are relatively isolated, and have

no result worthy of mention.

2. In the doctrine of the Categories, of the elaboration of which the

Stoics made much account, more that was real was to be expected.

Here it was indeed quite correct, and yet not very fruitful, to call

attention to the fact that the supreme category, of which the rest

1 Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. VIII. 93.

2 Diog. Laert. VII. 65.

8 Epicurus himself, and his school also, as a whole, did not trouble themselves

as to the principles of formal logic. One might regard this as an evidence of

taste and intelligence, but it was in truth only indifference toward all that did

not promise directly practical advantages.

4 On his treatise irepl ffrjfifluv /cai ff-r)/j.fiufftuv, discovered in Herculaneum, cf.

Th. Gompertz, He.rculanensische Studien, Heft 1 (Leips. 186"&gt;) ; Fr. Bahusch

(Lyck, 1879); R. Philippson (Berlin, 1881).

CHAP. 1, 17.] Criteria of Truth : Stoics. 199

represent only special determinations, is that of Being (r6oi/) or

Something (rt); and the co-ordination of the categories which, at

least as regards the method of their enumeration, was Aristotle s

plan, was replaced by an expressly systematic succession, according

to which each category was to be more exactly determined by the

following one. " What is," or Being, as abiding substrate of all

possible relations, is substance (V-JTOKIL^VOV} ; this is the supporter

(Trager) of fixed qualities (TTOIOI/), and only in this aspect is it

involved in changing states (TO TTW? e^ov), and, in consequence of

these latter, in relations to other substances (TO Trpos ri TTWS l^ov).

Out of the doctrine of the categories grows thus an ontology, that

is, a metaphysical theory as to the most general formal relations of

reality, and this theory in the system of the Stoics, agreeably to

their general tendency (cf. 15, 5), takes on a thoroughly materi

alistic character. As substance, the existent is matter which is in

itself destitute of properties (uA.r/), and the qualities and forces

which are inherent in matter as a whole, as well as in a particular

part (TrotoVr/Tcs Swa/xtis), are likewise kinds of matter (atmospheric

currents) which are commingled with it (Kpcuns SY o-W). In this

connection both substance and attributes are regarded, as well from

the point of view of the general conception as from that of the indi

vidual thing, and in the latter aspect it is emphasised that every

individual thing is essentially and definitely distinguished from all

others. 2

Besides these categories of Being, we find making their appear

ance among the Stoics those conceptional forms by which the rela

tion of thought to Being is expressed, and in these the separation of

the subjective from the objective, for which a preparation had been

growing more and more complete in the development of Greek

thought, now attains definite expression. For while the Stoics

regarded all objects to which thought relates as corporeal, while

they regarded the activity of thought itself, and no less its expres

sion in language 3 as corporeal functions, they were still obliged to

confess that the content of consciousness as such (TO A.CKTOV) is of in-

1 That the Peripatetics also busied themselves with this category is proved

by the definition preserved by Strato : rb 6 eari rb TTJS Sia/j.ovrjs atriov (Proclus

in Tim. 242 E).

2 In contrasting the first two with the last two categories, the language rela

tion of noun and verb appears here also (in Stoic terminology TTTWCW and KOTTJ-

yVj/xa).

8 The Stoics laid great weight upon the discriminative comparison of thought

and of speech, of the inner activity of reason (X6-yos evSiAOtros), and of its ex

pression through the voice (\6yot 7rpo&lt;/&gt;opi(c6s) . Hence, too, the assumption (cf.

15, 6) of the faculty of speech as a proper part of the soul ; hence their thor

ough treatment of rhetoric and grammar side by side with logic.

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corporeal nature. But since the distinction was thus sharply

drawn between Being and content of consciousness, the fundamental

epistemological problem came forward, how the relations by which the

ideational content refers to Being and agrees with it, are to be thought.

3. This question was, moreover, also brought home by the vigor

ous development which Scepticism had meanwhile undergone, and

by the relatively strong position which it occupied as compared with

the dogmatic systems.

Whether by Pyrrho or Timon it matters not, it was at all events

at about the same time at which the great school-systems became

dogmatically developed and fortified, that all those arguments were

systematised into a complete whole, by which the Sophistic period

had shaken the naive trust in man s capacity for knowledge. Al

though the ethical end of making man independent of fate by with

holding judgment was ultimately decisive (cf. 14, 2), this

Scepticism still forms a carefully carried out theoretical doctrine.

It doubts the possibility of knowledge in both its forms, the form

of perception as truly as that of judging thought, and after it has

destructively analysed each of these two factors singly, it adds

expressly that just on this account their union can have no certain

result. 1

As regards perception, the Sceptics availed themselves of the

Protagorean relativism, and in the so-called ten Tropes 2 in which

./Enesidemus 3 sets forth the sceptical theory with very defective

arrangement, this tendency still occupies the broadest space. Per

ceptions change not only with the different species of animate

beings (1), not only with different men (2), according to their cus

toms (9) and their whole development (10), but even in the case

of the same individual at different times (3), in dependence upon

bodily conditions (4), and upon the different relations in which the

individual finds himself with regard to his object spatially (5).

They alter, also, because of the difference in the states of the object

(7), and have, therefore, no claim to the value of an immediate

report of things, because their origination is conditioned by inter

mediate states in media such as the air, the co-operating elements

furnished by which we are not able to deduct (6). Man is, there-

1 From two deceivers combined it is only right to expect no truth. Diog.

Laert. IX. 114.

2 Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. I. 38 ff.

8 It was said by the ancient writers that ^nesidemus was attached, not only

to Scepticism, but also to the metaphysics of Heraclitus. The question whether

this was actually so, or whether such a relation was only ascribed to him by mis

take, has solely antiquarian significance. For had the former been the case, it

would have been but another manifestation of a real relationship in thought, to

which Plato had already directed attention, Thecet. 152 E ff. ; cf. p. 92, note 2.

CHAP. 1, 17.] Criteria of Truth : Sceptics. 201

fore, in all ways, not in a condition to know things purely (8), and

in the face of the multiplicity of impressions so full of contradic

tions he has no means of distinguishing a true from a false impres

sion. One is no more (ov /xoAAov) valid than another.

Equally relative with man s perceptions are also his opinions

(8ocu). In this aspect the influences of the Eleatic dialectic

assert themselves in Pyrrhonism. It is shown that to every opinion

the opposite can be opposed with equally good reasons, and this

equilibrium of reasons (roo-0cveta r&gt;v Aoywv) does not permit us,

therefore, to distinguish true and false : in the case of such a con

tradiction (dimAoyiu) the one holds no )nore than the other. All

opinions accordingly stand according to the phrase of the

Sophists, adopted by the Sceptics only by convention and cus

tom (vo/x&lt;u T KOL $a), not by their essential right and title (&lt;ixrei).

More energetically still did the later Scepticism attack the possi

bility of scientific knowledge, by disclosing the difficulties of the

syllogistic procedure, and of the methods which Aristotle had built

up upon this. 1 In this Carneades seems to have led the way, show

ing that every proof, since it presupposes other proofs for the valid

ity of its premises, makes necessary a regressus in injinitum an

argument that was completely in place for the Sceptic who did not,

as did Aristotle, recognise anything as immediately certain (d/xeo-ov ;

cf. 12, 4). The same argument was carried further by Agrippa,

who formulated Scepticism in five Tropes 2 much more clearly and

comprehensively than J^nesidernus. He called attention again to the

relativity of perceptions (3) and of opinions (1); he showed how

every proof pushes on into infinity (2 : 6 as airupov tK/JaAAwv), and how

unjustifiable it is in the process of proof to proceed from premises

that are only hypothetically to be assumed (4), and finally, how

often it occurs, even in science, that that must be postulated as

ground of the premises which is only to be proved by means of the

syllogism in question (5: 6 SidXkrjXos) . In the latter aspect atten

tion Avas also called to the fact that in the syllogistic deduction of

a particular proposition from a general one, the general would yet

from the outset be justified only on condition that the particular

were valid. 3

Since the essential nature of things is thus inaccessible to human

1 Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. VIII. 316 ff.

3 Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. I. 164 ff . : (1) The conflict of opinions. (2) The

endless regress in proving. (3) The relativity of all perceptions. (4) The im

possibility of other than hypothetical premises. (5) The circle in the syllogism.

8 Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. II. 194 ff. Renewed in J. S. Mill, Logic, II. 3, 2;

corrected in Chr. Sigwart, Logik, I. 55, 3.

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knowledge, 1 the Sceptics demanded that man should suspend judg

ment so far as possible (eVo^). We can say nothing concerning

things (d&lt;a(n a) ; we can only assert that this and that appears so

or so, and in so doing we report only our own momentary states (as

the Cyrenaics had already taught, 8, 3). Even the sceptical main

tenance of the impossibility of knowledge (in order to avoid the

contradiction that here something of a negative character, at least,

seems to be maintained and proved) 2 should be conceived of rather

as a profession of belief than as knowledge, more as a withholding

of opinion than as a positive assertion.

Cf. V. Brochard, Les Sceptiques Grecs (Paris, 1877).

4. The attack of Scepticism was most sharply concentrated in

the principle 3 that, in the presence of the deceptions to which

man is exposed in all his ideas of whatever origin, there is no uni-

vocal, sure sign of knowledge, no criterion of truth. If, therefore,

the dogmatic schools held fast to the reality of knowledge, even

from the Socratic motive that virtue is impossible without knowl

edge, 4 they found the task assigned them by this sceptical position

of announcing such a criterion and of defending it against the

sceptical objections. This was done also by the Epicureans and

Stoics, although their materialistic metaphysics and the sensualistic

psychology connected with it prepared for them serious, and,

ultimately, insurmountable difficulties.

In fact, it was the psycho-genetic doctrine of both these schools

that the content of all ideas and knowledge arises solely from sen

suous perception. The origin of sense-perception the Epicureans

explained by the image theory of Democritus ( 10, 3). This

theory gave even to the illusions of the senses, to dreams, etc., the

character of perceptions corresponding to reality ; and even the con

structions of the combining fancy or imagination could be explained

on this theory by unions which had already taken place objectively

between the images. But the Stoics also regarded perception as a

bodily process, as an impression of outer things upon the soul

(riJTroxns), the possibility of which seemed to them to be self-

evident, in view of the universal commingling of all bodies. This

1 The simplest formulation of Scepticism, finally, was that which brought

Agrippa s five Tropes together into two ; there is nothing immediately certain,

and just on this account nothing mediately certain; accordingly nothing what

ever that is certain. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. I. 178 f.

2 Cic. Acad. II. 9, 28 and 34, 109 ; Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. VIII. 463 ff.

3 Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. VII. 159.

4 Diog. LaerL X. 14(5 f. K. A ; Us. p. 76 f., on the other hand, Plut. Stoic.

Rep. 47, 12.

CHAP. 1, 17.] Criteria of Truth : Epicureans, Stoics. 203

crassly sensuous conception they expressed by the since frequently

repeated comparison, that the soul is originally like a blank tablet,

on which the outer world imprints its signs in the course of time. 1

More refined, but more indefinite, and yet absolutely mechanical

still in its tone is the designation of Chrysippus, who called percep

tion an alteration of qualities (erepotWis) in the soul ; for, at all

events, the idea or mental presentation (^avrao-ta) remains for

him, too, a corporeal effect or product of that which is presented

( (JxivTacrTov)

Both schools explained the presence of conceptions and of general

ideas (-n-poXyifstis, and among the Stoics also KOIVOL ci/i/ouu) solely by

the persistence of these impressions, or of parts of them, and by

their combination. They combated, therefore, as the Cynics espe

cially had already done, the Platonic-Aristotelian doctrine of Ideas

and Forms, 2 especially the assumption of an independent activity

or power of forming conceptions, and traced even the most general

and abstract conceptions back to this mechanism of elementary

perceptions (to which they scarcely gave any further analysis).

To these general ideas of experience (i^-n-upia) , which arise natu

rally and involuntarily (&lt;UO-IKU&gt;S), the Stoics indeed opposed the

conceptions of science produced by the aid of a methodical con

sciousness ; but even the content of these scientific conceptions was

held to be exclusively derived from sensations. In this connection,

both schools laid especial weight upon the co-operation of language

in the origination of conceptions.

But now, in so far as the total content of impressions, and like

wise also the nature of thought, are the same among all men, it

necessarily follows that under these circumstances the same general

ideas will be formed, in both the theoretical and the practical domain,

by means of the psychological mechanism. This consequence was

drawn especially by the Stoics, whose attention was by their whole

metaphysics directed vigorously to the common nature of the psy

chical functions, which were all held to arise from the divine Pneuma.

They taught, therefore, that the surest truth is to be sought in those

ideas which develop uniformly among all men with natural neces

sity, and they liked to take as their starting-point, even for scientific

reasonings, these Koival Zwoai, or communes notiones. They have a

1 Pint. Flac. IV. 11 ; Dox. D. 400 ; Plut. Comm. Xot. 47 ; cf. besides Plat.

Thecet. 191 C.

\* Hence the Stoics regard Platonic " Ideas" (class-concepts) as merely struc

tures of the human mind (fworifiara ij^repa ; cf. Plut. Pine. I. 10, Dox. D. 309),

and thus cave the first suggestion for the later subjective meaning of the term

"idea." Cf. 19.

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predilection for appealing to the consensus gentium the consent of

all men, an argument whose validity it was easy for the Sceptics

to shake by pointing to the negative instances of experience. 1

It was, therefore, not in the spirit of the Stoics that in the later

Eclectic literature these common ideas were called innate (innatve),

and that Cicero especially saw in them not only that which Nature

teaches equally to all, but also that which Nature or the deity has

originally implanted in every one at the same time with his reason.

Cicero maintains this, not only for the fundamental conceptions of

morality and right, but also for the belief in the deity and in the

immortality of the soul : the knowledge of God especially is held

to be only man s recollection of his true origin. 2 This doctrine

formed the best bridge between the Platonic and the Stoic theories

of knowledge, and under the Stoic name of Koival cwoai the ration

alistic doctrine of knowledge was propagated on into the beginnings

of modern philosophy. Just by this means it retained the accessory

psychologistic meaning that rational knowledge consists in innate ideas.

5. While now the Stoics as well as the Epicureans originally

traced back all the contents of ideas to sense-impressions psycho-

genetically, it was only the Epicureans who drew from this the

consistent inference that the sign for the recognition of truth is

solely the feeling of the necessity with which a perception forces

itself upon consciousness, the irresistible clearness or vividness

(evapyeta) conjoined with the taking up of reality in the function

of the senses. Every perception is as such true and irrefutable ; it

exists, so to speak, as a self-certain atom of the world of conscious

ness, free from doubt, independent, and unmovable by any reasons

whatever. 3 And if different and mutually contradictory perceptions

of the same objects seem to exist, the error lies only in the opinion

which refers them, and not in the perceptions which by the very

fact of their difference prove that different outer causes correspond

to them ; relativity is accordingly nothing in point against the cor

rectness of all perceptions. 4

Meanwhile, opinions (Sd&u) constantly and necessarily go beyond

this immediate presence of sense-impressions : for the knowledge

requisite for acting needs also knowledge of that which is not

immediately perceptible : it needs to know, on the one hand, grounds

1 Cic. De Nat. Deor. I. 23, 62 f.

2 Id. De Leg. I. 8, 24 : ... tit is agnoscat deum, qui unde ortus sit quasi re-

conletur ac noscat.

8 The parallelism of this epistemological Atomism with the physical and

ethical Atomism of the Epicureans is obvious.

\* Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. VII. 203 ff.

CHAP. 1, 17.] Criteria of Truth: Epicureans. 205

of phenomena (aS^Aov), and on the other hand the expectation as to

the future that may be inferred from them (Tiyxxr/xcVov). But for all

these farther functions of the psychical mechanism there is, accord

ing to the Epicureans, no other guaranty than perception again.

For if conceptions (TrpoA^cts) are only sense-impressions retained

in the memory, they have their own certainty in the clearness or

vividness of these impressions, a certainty susceptible neither of

proof nor of attack; l and hypotheses (VTTOAT/I/KIS), both with regard

to the imperceptible grounds of things and also with regard to future

events, find their criterion solely in perception, in so far as they are

verified by it, or at least not refuted ; the former holds for the pre

diction of the future, the latter for explanatory theories. 2 There

is therefore among the Epicureans nothing said of an independent

faculty of conviction or belief ; whether our expectation of any event

is correct we can know only when the event occurs. Thus they re-

noimce on principle any attempt at an actual theory of investigation.

6. It is evident from this that the Epicureans might regard their

own Atomistic metaphysics as a hypothesis not refuted by facts, but

that they were not permitted to regard it as a hypothesis that was

proved. It was a hypothesis, indeed, of which the essential end, as

they employed it, was to displace other hypotheses which seemed

to them ethically objectionable. Their dogmatism is accordingly

only problematical, and their doctrine of knowledge, in so far as it

has to do with rational knowledge, is very strongly permeated with

scepticism. In so far as they recognise only that which passes with

sense-perception as a " fact," but regard such facts as completely cer

tain, their standpoint is to be designated as that of Positivism.

This positivism was developed in antiquity still more consistently,

and in a form freed from the ethical and metaphysical tendencies of

Epicurus, by the theories of the later schools of empirical physi

cians. These schools went with the Sceptics as regards knowledge

of all that is imperceptible by the senses and as regards all rational

theories ; on the other hand, in their recognition of the sensuous

evidence of perceptions, they went with the Epicureans. Observation

(Trjprjo-Ls) is here portrayed as the basis of the physician s art, and ob

servation retained in memory is regarded as the sole essence of his

theory : aetiological explanations especially are rejected on principle.

Connected with this is the circumstance that the later Sceptics

treated the conception of causality in searching investigations and

1 As the final criterion even for the intellectually good is, with Epicurus, sen

suous pleasure, so the criterion of the truth of conceptions is only sensuous

vividness (Evidenz).

2 Sext. Erap. VII. 211.

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discovered its difficulties. ^Enesidemus had already propounded a

series of such aporiae, 1 and in Sextus Empiricus we find them devel

oped more broadly and comprehensively. 2 With him not only such

defects of setiological theories are designated as, that they reduce

the known to the unknown which is just as inexplicable, that they

maintain one possibility among many without a sufficient reason,

that they do not examine experience carefully enough with a view

to possible negative instances, and finally that they after all explain

that which is inaccessible to perception by some sort of a scheme

known from perception, which is especially simple and therefore

apparently intelligible in itself ; besides these, he searches out, also,

all the general difficulties which prevent us from gaining a clear

(picturate) idea of the causal relation. The process of the action

of one thing upon another, the passing over of motion from one

thing to another, can be made intelligible neither on the assumption

that that which acts (as force) is immaterial, nor on the opposite

assumption ; nor does contact (a&lt;^) which is assumed as a conditio

sine qua non of the causal process (as had been already done by

Aristotle) make it any more explicable. So, too, the time relation

of cause and effect is extremely difficult to determine. The most

important thought in these discussions, however, is the pointing out

of the relativity of the causal relation: nothing is in itself a cause or

effect ; each of the two is such only with reference to the other ;

ainov and irdo-xov are correlative terms which must not be absolutely

postulated or asserted. The (Stoic) conception of an essentially

efficient cause, the conception of a creative deity, is then thereby

excluded.

7. The Sceptics of the Academy sought in another direction a

substitute for the certainty of rational knowledge which they also

had given up. Since in practical life suspense cannot be carried

out as a principle of conduct and action is indispensable, and since

for action determining ideas are requisite, Arcesilaus brought out

the view that ideas, even though one refuse them his complete

assent, are yet able to move the will, 3 and that in practical life one

must content himself with a certain kind of confidence or trust

(TUCTTIS), according to which some ideas may in a greater degree than

others be regarded as probable (evAoyov), adapted to the purpose of

life, and reasonable. 4

1 Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. I. 180 ff.

2 Adv. Math. IX. 195 ff. ; cf. K. Goring, Der Begriff der Ursache in der grie-

chischen Philosophic. (Leips. 1874).

8 Plut. Adv. Col. 26, 3.

\* Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. VII. 158.

CHAP. 1, 17.] Criteria of Truth : Sceptics, Stoics. 207

The theory of Probabilism was carried out farther by Carneades 1

in an attempt to define more exactly, according to logical relations,

the particular degrees of this "belief." The least degree of proba

bility (n-LOavoTrj i) is that which (as an indistinct and imperfect form

of sensuous clearness or vividness eVa/oya) belongs to the single

idea that stands in no farther connections. A higher degree of

probability belongs to that idea which can be united (ctTreptWao-Tos),

without any contradictions, with other ideas in connection with

which it belongs. Lastly, the highest stage of belief is reached

where a whole system of such connected ideas is examined as to its

complete harmony and verification in experience (irepKaSev^vi] ) .

Empirical confidence rises, therefore, from the sensuously isolated

to the logical systems of scientific research. But though in the

latter form it may be completely sufficient for practical life (as

Carneades assumed), it is yet not able to lead to a completely

certain conviction.

8. In contrast with this, the Stoics made the most strenuous

efforts to gain an epistemological substructure for their metaphysics,

to which they attributed so high a value from considerations of ethi

cal interest, and in spite of psycho-genetic sensualism, to rescue the

rational character of science. 2 On the principle that like is known

by like, their doctrine of the World-reason demanded a knowledge

of the external Logos by the internal logos of man, by his rea

son; 3 and the ethical antagonism or dualism between virtue and

the sensuous impulses required a parallel distinction between

knowledge and sensuous ideas. Although, therefore, the whole

material of knowledge was held to grow out of sensuous presenta

tions, the Stoics pointed out, on the other hand, that in perception

as such, no knowledge whatever is contained ; that it is not to

be characterised as either true or false. Truth and falsity can be

predicated only when judgments (O^IW/AUTU) have been formed in

which something is asserted or denied as to the relation of ideas. 4

Judgment, nevertheless, is conceived of by the Stoics and in

this they take a new and important position, which, in antiquity,

only the Sceptics approach in some degree by no means merely as

the theoretical process of ideation and combination of ideas. They

recognised, as the essential characteristic in judgment, the peculiar

act of assent (&lt;yKaTa0ri&lt;;), of approval, and of being convinced,

with which the mind makes the content of the idea its own, grasps

1 Ib. 166 ff.

2 Cf. M. Heinze, Zttr Erkenntnisslehre der Stoiker (Leips. 1880).

8 Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. VII. 93.

4 Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. VIII. 10.

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it, and in a certain way takes possession of it (KaraAa/x/Jamv). This

act of apprehension the Stoics regard as an independent function of

consciousness (^ye/AovtKoV), in the same way as they regard the

assent to the impulses, which makes its appearance in passion. The

arising of ideas, like that of the excitations of feeling, is a process

which is of natural necessity and completely independent of human

will (axoixnov) ; but the assent by which we make the one class,

judgments, and the other, passions, is a decision (K^IO-IS) of con

sciousness, free (e/coJo-tov) from the outer world. 1

But now in the case of the wise man, by virtue of the identity of

the universal with the individual logos, this assent appears only in

the case of those ideas which are true : the soul, therefore, in appre

hending the content of these ideas, apprehends reality. Such an

idea the Stoics called &lt;avTacrta KaraA^-i-iK?;, 2 and they were of the

conviction that such an idea must call forth the reasonable man s

assent with immediate evidence or clearness. Hence assent itself

(o-vyKarafleo-is) is conceived of as an activity of the thinking soul,

but individual perceptions appear as the objects of assent as truly

as do the intellectual activities of conception, judgment, and reason

ing, based upon the individual perceptions.

If thus the Stoics understood by the favTao-ia KaTaXyirTiK-q that

idea by which the mind lays hold of reality, and which, therefore,

so illumines the mind that this, in its assent, makes reality its own,

this was indeed the correct expression for the requirement which

they set up for the true idea, 3 but the definition was not at all

adapted to the end for which it was framed : that is, for a sign by

which to recognise truth. For as the Sceptics 4 very justly objected,

the subjective mark, assent, might be shown as a psychological fact

in the case of a multitude of evidently false ideas.

Thus the anthropological discord in the Stoic doctrine manifests

1 Ib. VIII. 39, 7.

2 In the interpretation of this term there is a wide divergence. According to

the sources, it seems now as if the idea were intended which the mind lays hold

of, now that which apprehends the real fact, now that by which the mind appre

hends reality, and now again that which on its part so lays hold of the mind

that the mind must assent to it. It has hence been supposed that the Stoics

purposely constructed the expression in this ambiguous form, inasmuch as all

these relations would harmonise in it, and perhaps E. Zeller (IV. 3 83) [Eng. tr.,

Stoics, etc., p. 89] intended to repeat this ambiguity by his translation, " concep-

tional idea or perception" (be/jriffliche Vorstellung) , which, however, has an

accessory logical sense that the Stoics certainly did not intend.

8 It is worth while to point out the fact that in their designations for the

relation of the knowing mind to the external reality, the Stoics employ, for the

nust part, expressions from the field of the sense of touch (impression, appre

hending, or grasping, etc.), while formerly optical analogies had been preferred.

Cf. 11, 2.

1 Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. VII. 402 ff.

CHAP. 1, 17.] Criteria of Truth : Stoics. 209

itself even in this central conception of their theory of knowledge.

As it could not be explained in accordance with their metaphysics

how the individual soul arising from the World-reason should fall

under the mastery of sensuous impulses, so it is equally impossible

to understand how theoretical assent should, under certain circum

stances, be given even to false ideas. Both difficulties, however,

have ultimately a common ground. The Stoics agreed with Hera-

clitus in identifying in their metaphysics the normative and the

actual ordering of things, although these conceptions had meanwhile

become much more clearly separated. Reason was for them that

which should be, as well as that which is ; it was at the same time

vo/xos and &lt;v o-is. And this antithesis, the two sides of which came

into strenuous opposition in their doctrine of freedom and their

theodicy, was the problem of the future.

## CHAPTER II. THE RELIGIOUS PERIOD.

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THE gradual transition of the Hellenistic-Roman philosophy from

the ethical to the religious standpoint had its inner causes in this

philosophy itself, and its external occasion in the imperious de

mands made by the felt need of the time. For the farther the

contact between the systems extended, the more it became evident

how little able philosophy was to fulfil the task which it had set

itself : namely, that of educating man by a sure insight to a state

of virtue and happiness, to inner independence of the world. While

the sceptical mode of thought, which was extending more and more,

already taught that virtue consists rather in the renunciation of the

attempt to know, than in knowledge itself, the view forced its way

more and more, even among the Stoics, that their ideal of the wise

man, so sharply and rigidly drawn, was not entirely realised in a,ny

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human being, and thus it was felt in every direction that man in

his own strength can become neither knowing, nor virtuous and

happy.

If, then, a disposition to welcome a higher help for ethical ends

was necessarily evoked in philosophy itself, it was also true that

the theoretical doctrines of the time contained a great number of

religious elements. The Epicureans, to be sure, purposely excluded

such, but the Stoics, on the contrary, granted them an entrance that

was all the freer. With the Stoics, not only did metaphysics lead

to seeking the principle of morals in a divine command, but in their

pneuma doctrine, the possibility presented itself of giving to the

creations of myth a philosophical meaning, which might be shared

also by all forms of worship. Finally, the spiritual monotheism in

Aristotle s teaching, and that ideal tendency with which Plato

sought the abiding essence of things in a higher world of the super-

sensuous, were not forgotten.

Just this dualism, which opposed the earthly world of the perish

able to a supersensuous world of the divine, ultimately proved to be

the right expression for that inner discord which ran through the

entire life of the aging Greek and Roman world. The old craving

for sensuous pleasure might still celebrate its orgies in full power

and to the intoxication of the senses ; but in the midst of it all, out

of surfeit and loathing grew a new craving for a purer, higher joy :

and in the presence of the tremendous contrasts which the social

condition of the Roman Empire brought with it, the look of all the

millions that saw themselves excluded from the good things of this

earth turned longingly toward a better world. Thus in all ways a

deep, passionate need for true salvation of the soul (o-om/pia) came

to be increasingly felt, a hunger for something beyond the earthly,

a religious urgency without an equal.

This religious movement proved its vigour first of all in the eager

reception which foreign forms of worship found in the Graeco-

Roman world, in the mingling and fusing of Oriental and Occidental

religions. But with the adjustment which their oppositions found

here and there, their strife for the mastery over men s spirits be

came still more energetic, and thus the soil of the ancient world of

civilisation, after bearing the fruits of art and science, became the

battleground of religions. Man s essential interest became thereby

transferred for long centuries from the earthly to the heavenly

sphere ; he began to seek his salvation beyond the world of sense.

But the forms in which this contest of the religions was waged

prove in spite of all what a spiritual and intellectual power Greek

science had grown to be. For so strongly was the ancient world

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"sicklied o er with the pale cast of thought," so deeply had it be

come permeated by the feeling of a need for knowledge, that each of

the religions desired to satisfy not only the feelings but also the

intellect, and was therefore anxious to transform its life into a doc

trine. This is true even of Christianity, and indeed precisely true of

it. The true, victorious power of the religion of Jesus lay, to be

sure, in the fact that it entered this decrepit, blase world with the

youthful force of a pure, high, religious feeling, and a conviction

that was courageous to the death ; but it was able to conquer the

ancient civilised world only by taking it up into itself and working

it over ; and as in its external conflict with the old world it shaped

its own constitution l and thereby ultimately became so strong as to

be able to take possession of the Roman state, so also in its defence

against the ancient philosophy it made the world of that philoso

phy s ideas its own, in order thereby to build up its own dogmatic

system.

Thus the needs of science and of life met. The former sought the

solution of the problems at which it had been labouring in vain, in

religion, and the latter desired a scientific formulation arid basis for

its religious longing or conviction. Hence from this time on, for

many centuries, the history of philosophy is grown together with

that of dogmatic theology, 2 and the period of religious metaphysics

begins. The thought of antiquity described a peculiar curve, sepa

rating itself farther and farther from religion from which it pro

ceeded, reaching its extreme separation in Epicureanism, and then

again steadily drawing near to religion, to return at last entirely

within it.

Under these conditions it is possible to understand how that

Weltanschauung which separated the supersensuous and the sensu

ous, looking upon them, from the point of view of value, as divine

perfection and earthly baseness, respectively, constituted the

common ground of the whole religious-philosophical movement.

This view had already, indeed, been introduced by the Pythagoreans

(cf. 5, 7), and had been maintained even by Aristotle, but it had,

without doubt, found its most forcible formulation in the Platonic

metaphysics. It was, therefore, this latter system which formed the

controlling centre for the religious closing development of ancient

thought. A religious development of Platonism is the fundamental

character of this period.

1 Cf. K. J. Neumann, Der romische Staat und die allgemeine Kirche bis auf

Diocletian (Vol. I. Leips. 1890).

\* It will be understood as a matter of course that the following exposition

has left at one side all specifically dogmatic elements, except where they are

quite inseparably interwoven with philosophical principles.

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The geographical centre of the movement, however, is found in

that city which, by its history, as well as by its population, repre

sented most distinctly the mingling of peoples and of religions,

Alexandria. Here, where in the active work of the museum all

treasures of Grecian culture were garnered, all religions and forms

of worship crowded together in the great throngs of the commercial

metropolis to seek a scientific clarification of the feelings that

surged and stormed within them.

The first line of the Alexandrian philosophy is the so-called Neo-

Pythagoreanism, a mode of thought which, proceeding from the

religious practice of the Pythagorean mysteries, makes only an

external use of the number-mysticism of the old Pythagoreans after

whom it calls itself and its writings, while it finds the theoretical

setting for its world-renouncing, religious-ascetic ethics in a trans

formation of the Platonic metaphysics, which became of the pro-

foundest value for the conception of the spiritual nature in the

following period. Apollonius of Tyana, the founder of a religion,

is to be regarded as typical representative of this school.

Not without influence from this school, the Stoa, also, in the time

,of the Empire, brought out more energetically the religious elements

in its theory of the world, so that not only did the anthropological

dualism of the system become sharpened, but a more theistic mode

of thought gradually became substituted for the original pantheism

of the school. In men like Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius,

the Stoic doctrine became completely a philosophy of deliverance or

redemption.

Even Cynicism revived again about this time in a religious garb,

as a rude, popular preaching of renunciation, and Demonax passes

for its best-known representative.

Scarcely to be separated from the Neo-Pythagoreans are the

Eclectic Platonists of the first centuries of our era, such as Plutarch of

Chseronea and Apuleius of Madaura. Later appear Numenius of

Apamea and Nicomachus of Gerasa, who, besides, already stand

under Jewish and Christian influences as witnesses of a complete

fusion of the two tendencies.

But while, in all these forms, the Hellenic element ever maintains

the ascendency over the Oriental, the latter makes its appearance in

very much stronger force in the Jewish philosophy of religion. As

the sect of the Essenes l probably proceeded from a contact of Neo-

Pythagoreanism with the Hebrew religious life, so the various

attempts of learned Jews to draw nearer to Greek science in the

1 Cf. E. Zeller V. 8 277 ff.

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presentation of their dogmas, led ultimately to the doctrine of Philo

of Alexandria, whose original elaboration of these fermenting bodies

of thought influenced their further formation and movement in the

most important points.

The philosophy of Christianity, which for these first centuries is

usually designated by the name Patristics, unfolded in an analogous

manner upon a larger scale. This philosophical secularisation of the

gospel begins with the Apologists, who sought to present its re

ligious belief as the only true philosophy, with the purpose of pro

tecting Christianity in the eyes of the cultured world from contempt

and persecution, and therefore began to adapt this content of re

ligious faith to the conceptional forms of Greek science : the most

important of them are Justin and Minacius Felix.

But the need of changing faith (TUOTIS) into knowledge or wisdom

(yvwcns) asserted itself vigorously in the Christian communities,

even without this polemical tendency. The first attempts, how

ever, which the Gnostics made to create an adequate view of the

world for the new religion, proceeded from the excited phantasies

of a Syrian mingling of religions, and, in spite of the employment of

Hellenistic philosophemes, led to such grotesque constructions, that

the Church as it grew stronger and more definitive was obliged to

reject them. Saturninus, Basileides, and Valentinus are to be named

as the best known of this class.

In reaction against such over-hasty attempts of religious fantasti-

calness, a violent aversion toward all philosophical interpretation

and adjustment of Christian faith set in, for a time, in Christian

literature in the writings of men like Tatian, Tertullian, and Arno-

bius. An express anti-rationalism thus came forward which never

theless found it necessary on its part also to return to the related

doctrines of Greek philosophy. Without this one-sidedness and

with a closer approximation to the older Hellenising Apologists,

Gnosticism was combated by Irenceus and his disciple Hippolytus.

It was not until the beginning of the third century, and after all

these preceding attempts, that a positive Christian theology, a sys

tem of dogmatics in a complete conceptional form, was established.

This came about in the School for Catechists at Alexandria, through

the leaders of the school, Clement and Origen. The latter especially

is to be regarded as philosophically the most important representa

tive of Christianity in this period.

By his side, however, there went out from the Alexandrian phil

osophic school the man who undertook to bring the religion-forming

tendency of philosophy to an issue solely upon the Hellenistic basis,

Plotinus, the greatest thinker of this period. His attempt to

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systematise all the main doctrines of Greek and Hellenistic phil

osophy under the religious principle is designated as Neo- Platonism.

His doctrine is the most definitive and thoroughly constructed sys

tem of science that antiquity produced. His disciple Porphyry,

however, showed himself already inclined to make a religion out of

this religious teaching, and Jamblichu,\*, who is termed the leader of

Syrian Neo-Platonism, transformed it into a dogmatic theology of poly

theism, with which the learned and political opponents of Christianity,

such as the Emperor Julian, hoped to revive the forms of worship

of the heathen religions, then in a state of dissolution. After this

attempt had miscarried, the Athenian school of Neo-Platonism, as

the heads of which Plutarch of Athens, Proclus, and Damascius

appear, returned finally to a methodical, scholastic development of

the system of Plotinus.

Thus the Hellenistic efforts to attain to a new religion by means

of science remained without result in this form : the scholars dis

covered no church. On the other hand, the need felt by positive

religion to complete and strengthen itself in a scientific doctrine did

attain its goal : the Church created its dogma. And the great course

of history in this movement was, that the defeated Hellenism in its

powerful death-struggle still created the conceptions by means of

which the new religion shaped itself into a dogma.

While the Pythagorean mysteries had maintained their existence through all

antiquity, scientific Pythagoreanism vanished as a proper school after its

incorporation into the Academy (cf. p. :!). It is not until during the first

century B.C. that specifically Pythagorean doctrines become noticeable again :

they appear in the Pythagorean writings, of which Diogenes Laertius (VIII.

24 ff.), following Alexander Polyhistor, gives an account that leads us to infer

an essentially Stoic influence. They are renewed expressly by Cicero s learned

friend, P. Nigidius Figulus (died 45 n.&lt;:.), and find approval also with other

men in Koine. Cf. M. Herz, De P. Nig. Fig. Studiis atque Operibus (Berlin, 1845).

Hut Neo-Pythagoreanism proper was first presented in literary form by

the great number of writings which became public in Alexandria at about the

beginning of our era, under the names of Pythagoras, or Philolaus, or Archytas,

or other older Pythagoreans, the fragments of which give rise to so great diffi

culties in forming a conception of genuine Pythagoreanism. Cf. the lit. p. 31.

Of the personalities of the new school, on the contrary, very little is known.

The only distinct figure is Apollonius of Tyana, of whose life and nature the

rhetorician Philostratus (ed. by C. L. Kayser, Leips. 1870) gave a romantic

representation at the beginning of the third century, in order to portray in it

the ideal of the Pythagorean life. Of the works of Apollonius himself, who

lived in the first century A.D., fragments of a biography of Pythagoras and of

a treatise on Sacrifice are extant. Cf. Chr. Baur, Apollonius und Christus in

Drei Abhandl. zur Gesch. d. alt. Philos. (Leips. 1876). [Tredwell, Life of

Apollonius of Tyana, contains a good bibliography, N.Y. 1880.] His con

temporary, Moderatus of Gades, might perhaps also be mentioned.

Neo-Pythagorean and Stoic doctrines appear mingled in the Eclectic Sotion

of Alexandria, who was affiliated with the Sextians (cf. p. 163). His disciple,

L. Annaeus Seneca of Cordova (4-65 A.D.), was the leader of the Stoics in

the time of the Empire. He was instructor of Nero, was well known because of

his tragic fate, and also as tragic poet unfolded the rigid conceptions of life held

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by his school. Of his writings a considerable number of mainly ethical trea

tises are preserved besides his Epistolce (ed. by Haase, 3 vols., Leips. 1852-3)

[Eng. tr. (or rather paraphrase) by T. Lodge, Lond. 1014, Selections from th.s

and from L Estrange s Seneca" 1 s Morals by Way of Abstract, Lond. 1888, Game-

lot series]. Cf. Chr. Baur, S. und Panlux in the Drci Abhandl. ; see above.

Besides him we mentio.i L. Anmeus Cornutus (Phurnutus), a chief repre

sentative of the Stoic interpretation of myths (Ile/H TTJS rQ/v 6fCjv &lt;pv&lt;reus, ed.

by Osann, Gottingen, 1844), the satiric poet Persius, the moralist C. Musonius

Rufus, and especially Epictetus. who lived at the time of Domitian, and whose

doctrines were published by Arrian in two works, Aiarpipal and ^yx eL P^ lol&gt; ( e( i.

together with the commentary of Simplicius by J. Schweighauscr, Leips. 1799 f.)

[tr. by G. Long, Bohn s library ; also by T. W. Higginson, Boston, 1865]. Cf.

A. Bonhoffer E. und die Stna (Stuttgart, 1890).

With the noble Marcus Aurelius Antoninus the Stoa mounted the lloman

imperial throne (161-180). His reflections TO. eis avr6v (ed. by J. Stich, Leips.

1882) are the characteristic monument of this eclectic-religious Stoicism.

[Eng. tr. by G. Long. The Thoughts of the Emperor, M. Aurelius Antoninus,

Lond. Bohn s lib. ; W. Pater, Marius the Epicurean, Lond. and N.Y. 1888 ; M.

Arnold in Essays.]

In the ancient Grecian period, an original figure, that of the monkish wan

dering preacher Teles, had gone out from the Cynic school (cf. v. Wilamovitz-

Mollendorf, Philol. Untcrs, IV. 292 ff.). In the time of the Empire this quaint

creature was frequently copied and exaggerated even to the most ridiculous

extent. Demetrius, Oinomaos of Gadara, Demonax (cf. Fritsche, Leips. 186(5),

and Peregrinus Proteus, known through Lucian, belong to these figures. Cf.

J. Bernays, Lukian und die Kyniker (Berlin, 1879).

Of the representatives of religious Platonism who kept at a distance from

the number theory, may be mentioned the eclectic commentators Eudorus and

Arius Didymus, Thrasyllus, the editor of the works of Plato and Democritus,

and especially Plutarch of Chseronea (about 100 A.U.), from whom, in addition

to his famous biographies, a great number of other writings are preserved,

especially philosophical treatises of dogmatic and polemical content (Moralia,

ed. Diibner ; Paris, Didot, Vols. III. and IV. 1855) (cf. H, Volkmann, Leben,

Schriften und Philosophic des P., Berlin, 1872). [Plutarch s Morals, trans, ed.

by Goodwin, 5 vols., Boston, 1870 ; also tr. by Shilleto and by C. W. King, both

in Bohn s lib., Lond. 1888 and 1882 resp.] We mention further Maximus of

Tyre of the time of the Antonines ; his contemporary, Apuleius of Madaura,

who belongs in this series not only on account of his philosophical writings (ed.

by A. Goldbacher, Vienna, 1876), but also on account of his allegorico-satirical

romance, "The Golden Ass" (cf. Hildebrand in the introduction to his col

lected works, Leips. 1842) [The Works of Apuleius, Bohn s lib.]; the oppo

nent of Christianity, Celsus, whose treatise 0X77077$ \6yos (about 180) is known

only from the counter-treati.se of Origen, Kara K.t\&lt;rov (cf. Th. Keim, C. " wahres

Wort," Zurich, 1873); and lastly the physician Claudius Galen, who died about

200, and might, to be sure, with his broad eclecticism be likewise classed as a Peri

patetic and also as a Stoic (cf. K. Sprengel, Beitrage zur Gesch. d. Medicin, I.

117 ff.). From the same circle of ideas arose also the writings circulated under

the name of Hermes Trisrnegistus, which belong to the third century (French

tr. by L. Me nard, Paris, I860 ; partially published by G. Parthey, Berlin, 1854).

Among the Platonists of the second century Nicomachus of Gerasa in Ara

bia, of whose writings arithmetical text-books and (through Photius) an extract

from a work Apie^riKa. 6fo\oyov&gt;j.fva are extant, and Numeiiius of Apamea,

concerning whom we owe our instruction mainly to Eusebius, are strongly Neo-

Pythagorean. Cf. F. Thedinga (Bonn, 1875).

The entrance of Greek philosophy into Jewish theology may be traced back

to the middle of the second century B.C., where it can be recognised in the

Biblical explanation of Aristobulus ; it appears then in a particularly marked

manner, and in a form that is already much nearer the Alexandrian sphere of

thought, in the pseudo-Solomonic Book of Wisdom. Yet these are but weak

forerunners of the important creation of Philo of Alexandria, of whose life

little more is known than that in the year 39, when already in advanced age, he

was a member of an embassy from his native community to the Emperor Calig-

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ula. His numerous writings, among which there is also much that is not

genuine, were edited by Th. Mangey (Lond. 1742), Leips. stereotype ed., 8 vols.,

1851-53 ; [Eng. tr. by C. 1). Yonge, 4 vols., Lond., Bohn s lib.].

F. Dahne, Die jiidisch-alexandrinische Re.ligionsphilosophie (Halle, 18.34).

A.Gfrorer, Philon und die alexandrinisc.he Theosophie (Stuttgart, 1835); M.

Wolff, Die philonische Philosophic (Gothenburg, 1858); Ewald, Gesch. des

Volkes Israel, VI. 231 ft

Among the Christian Apologists whose writings are collected in the Corpus

Apoloyetarum Chrintianorum secundi souculi, ed. by Otto (Jena, 1842 ft .), the

most prominent is Flavins Justin Martyr of Sichem, who lived in the middle of

the second century. Two defensive writings and a dialogue with Trypho the

Jew are preserved [Kng. tr. iu Ante-Nicene Ch. lib., ed. by Roberts and Donald

son, Edinburg, T. & T. Clark, 1807]. K. Semisch (2 vols., Breslau, 1840-42),

and B. Aub6 (Paris, 18(51) treat of him. Further Apologists from the Hellenic

circle of culture are Aristides (whose discourses, discovered in the Armenian

language, were printed with a Latin translation, Venice, 1878), Athenagoras

of Athens (wpeff^fia irtpl Xpiffriavtiv addressed to Marcus Aurelius about 170),

Theophilus of Antioch (a treatise addressed to Autolycus about 180), Melito

of Sardis, Apollinaris of Hierapolis, and others. Latin literature presents

especially Minucius Felix, whose dialogue Octavius was written about 200

(ed. in the Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum, by C. Halm, Vienna,

1867). The rhetorician, Firmianus Lactantius (about 300), is to be placed in

the same series. His main treatise is the Institutions Divinw [tr. of the above

authors in Ante-Nicene lib., see above].

Of the Gnostics our information comes essentially through their opponents,

Iremeus (140-200 ; his treatise "EXe7x os \* a \* AwrpoirT) TT?S \f/fv5uvv/j.ov -yvtiffcus, ed.

by A. Stieren, Leips. 1853), Hippolytus (Kara iraa-uv aipfoeuv \e7xos, ed. by

Duncker and Schneidewin, Gottingen, 1859), Tertullian (Adveiwis Valenti-

nianos), etc. [Eng. tr. of the above writings in Ante-Nicene lib., above]. Of

Gnostic treatises only one, and that by an unknown author, is extant, Harris

ffo&lt;f&gt;ta (ed. by Petermann, Berlin, 1851). Of the main representatives of this

doctrine there were active in the first half of the second century Saturninus of

Antioch, Basilides, a Syrian, and Carpocrates in Alexandria ; toward the

middle of the century Valentinus, the most important of them (died about

160); and toward the end of the century Bardesanes of Mesopotamia. Expo

sitions of the Gnostic Systems by A. W. Neander (Berlin, 1818) [Eng. tr. by

Torrey, Boston, 1865], E. Matter (Paris, 1843), Chr. Baur (Tubingen, 1835),

A. Hilgenfeld (Jena, 1884), same author, BanJpsanes, der letzte Gnostiker

(Leips. 1864). A. Harnack, Zur Quellenkritik der Geschichte des Gnosticismus

(Leips. 1873); [H. L. Mansel, Gnostic Heresies, Lond. 1876].

The most radical opponent of Greek science was Tatian, an Assyrian,

whose treatise n/&gt;6s"E\\77i&gt;as arose about 170, but who later became himself an

adherent of the Valentinian Gnosticism. The passionate Apologist Qu. Sep-

timius Florens Tertullian (105-220, for a time Presbyter in Carthage) ended

likewise in opposition to the Catholic Church, in the sect of the Montanists.

His works have been edited by Fr. Oehler (3 vols., Leips. 1853 f.), recently by

A. Reifferscheid and Wissowa (Vol. I. Vienna, 1890, in Corp. script, cccl. lat.)

[Eng. tr. in Ante-Nicene lib.]. Cf. A. W. Neander, Anti gnostic us, Geist des

Tertullian, etc. (2d ed. Berlin, 1849) [Eng. tr. Bohn s lib. , 1851]; A. Hauck,

TVs Leben und Schriften, Erlangen, 1877). In the same series, but from

a later time, is the African rhetorician Amobius. whose seven books, Adversus

Gentes, were composed about 300 (ed. by A. Reifferscheid in Corp. script, eccl.

lat., Vienna, 1875).

Of the writings of Clement of Alexandria (died about 217) three treatises

are preserved, A6&gt;os irporpewTiKb\* irpds "E\\iji&gt;as IIat5a"xa&gt;76j SrpajyaaTetj (ed.

by J. Potter, Oxford, 1715) [tr. in Ante-Nicene lib.]. From his school (cf. on

the Alex. Catechetical school, Guericke, Halle, 1824 f., and Hasselbach, Stettin,

1826) went forth the founder of Christian theology, Origen. surnamed the Ada

mantine. Born 185 A.D. in Alexandria, equipped with the full education of the

time, he came forward early as a teacher, fell into conflicts on account of his

doctrines with the Synod, was by it removed from his office, and later lived in

Ctesarea and Tyre, dying in the latter place 254. Of his writings, aside from

the above-mentioned treatise against Celsus, his work \\tpi apx&v is of chief

importance ; it is extant almost only in the Latin version of Rutinus (ed. by

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Redepenning, Leips. 1836) [tr. in Ante-Nicene lib.]. Cf. J. Reinkens, De.

Clemente Presbytero Al. (Breslau, 1851); Redepenning, O., Darstellung seines

Lebens und seiner Lehre (Bonn, 1841-46) [cf. Bigg, The Christian Platonists

of Alexandria, Oxford, 1887 ; A. Harnack, Art. Origen in Enc. rit.].

A collection of the sources for all the Church writers of this period has been

issued by J. P. Migne, Patrologice Cursus Completus (Paris, 1840 ff.).

A certain Ammonius Saccus appears in old traditions as the founder of

Neo-Platonism, but nothing is known to justify this tradition. To his pupils

belonged Plotinus, Origen, the rhetorician Longinus (213-273), to whom the

book Ilepi v j/ovs was ascribed, and another Origen.

The true founder of the school was Plotinus (204-269). Born in Lycopolia

in Egypt, and educated in Alexandria, he bicame a member of an expedition

against the Persians in order to promote his religious studies, made a highly

successful appearance as teacher in Rome about 244, and died on a country

estate in Campania. His works, written late in life, were published by his

disciple Porphyry, arranged in six enneads. Ed. by H. Miiller (Leips. 1878-80),

with a German translation [Eng. tr. in part by Th. Taylor, Lend. 1787, 1794,

1817, French tr. by Bouillut, Paris, 1857-60]. Cf. H. Kirchntr, Die Philns. des

PL (Halle, 1851). A. Riehter, Neuplatonische Studien (Halle, 1864 ff.).

H. v. Kleist, Neupl it. Studien (Heidelberg, 1883). [A. Harnack, Art. Xeo-

Platonism in Enc. Brit.]

To the Alexandrian Xeo-Platonism are reckoned further Gentilianus Ame-

lius of Ameria, and the Tyrian Porphyry (about 230-300). Among the ex

tant writings, aside from the biographies of Plotinus and Pythagoras, are to be

mentioned A.&lt;pof&gt;/j.ai Trpos TO. vorjrd, an aphoristic abridgment of the system of

Plotinus (printed in Creuzer s ed. of the works of Plotinus, Paris, 1855), the

treatise On Abstemiousness (irepi OTTOX^J rdiv e /A^xw, important on account of

its use of the Trepi ei)cre/3eas of Theophrastus ; cf. J. Bernays, Berlin, 1866), and

of the commentaries the Elvayuyr) ei s rds KaTyyoplas (ed. by Busse, Berlin, 1877 ;

and also in the Berlin ed. of Aristotle, Vol. IV.).

Syrian Neo-Platonism was founded by Jamblichus of Chalcis in Ccele-

Syria (died about 330), a hearer of Porphyry. His writings were principally

commentaries upon Hellenistic and Oriental theology. The following are par

tially preserved : Ilepi rov llvdayopiKov piov (ed. by Westermann, Paris, 1850),

A6yos irpoTpeirTtKbs et j (pi\offo&lt;plav (ed. by Kiessling, Leips. 1813), Ilepl rrjs KOLVJJS

jua077^aTiK77s tiri&lt;rTri/j.Tjs (ed. by Villoison, Venice, 1781) [Eng. tr. Life of Pyth.

by Taylor, Loud. 1818, Egyptian Mysteries, by same, Chiswick, 1821].

Of the disciples of the school, Dexippus commented on the Aristotelian

Categories (ed. by L. Spengel, Munich, 1859), Sallustius wrote a compendium

of metaphysics (ed. by Orelli, Zurich, 1821), and Themistius (about 317-387)

made himself known as a paraphrast and commentator upon Aristotelian works.

From the same circle comes the treatise De Mystenis ^Eyyptiorum (ed. by G.

Parthey, Berlin, 1857 ; cf. Harless, Munich, 1858).

This movement had a transient political success by the accession of the

Emperor Julian, who hoped by its help to renew the old religion and displace

Christianity. His writings against the Christians have been edited with a

German translation by K. J. Neumann (Leips. 1880). Cf. A. W. Neander,

Ueber den Kaiser J. und sein Zeitalter (Berlin, 1812). 1). Fr. Strauss, .7. der

Abtrunnige, der Romantiker auf dem Throne, der Cdsaren (Mannheim, 1847).

A. Miicke, ./. nach den Quell fn (Gotha, 1866-68).

The founder of Athenian Neo-Platonism was Plutarch of Athens (died

after 430), with his pupils Syrianus and Hierocles. All these, as well as the

following, composed commentaries upon Platonic and Aristotelian or Pythago

rean writings, which are in part preserved. More important was Proclus

(411-485), among whose works the most important is Ilepi TT?S /card nXdrwro

Oeo\oyias (ed. of his works by V. Cousin, Paris, 1820-25) [Eng. tr. by Th.

Taylor]. Cf. H. Kirchner, De Prod. Metaphysica (Berlin, 1846). K. Stein-

hart s Art. in Ersch und Griiber s Enc.

The last head of the Platonic Academy was Damascius, of whose writings

the beginning of a treatise irepi r&v irpwruv dpxwv, and the conclusion of a com

mentary upon the Parmenides are extant (ed. by J. Kopp, Frankfort a. M.

182 J ; cf. E. Heitz in Strass. Abhdl. fur Philos., 1884), and also a biography of

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his teacher Isidorus. Among the commentators of this time Simplicius is

prominent (on the Physics, ed. pr. Venice, 1526, the first four books, Diels,

Berlin, 1882; on the De Cvelo, Karsten, Utrecht, 1865; on the De Anima,

llayduck, Berlin, 1882).

The two latter wandered with their immediate associates for a time toward

Persia, when in the year 529 the Emperor Justinian closed the Academy, con

fiscated its property, and by forbidding lectures on heathen philosophy gave

the external confirmation to its close.

### 18. Authority and Revelation.

The imperturbable self-certainty and self-mastery which the post-

Aristotelian philosophy had sought and in part claimed for the wise

man, had been so deeply shaken with the progress of time that it

had given place to a feeling of the need of help, both in the ethical

and in the theoretical spheres. The philosophising individual no

longer had confidence that he could attain to right insight or to his

soul s salvation by his own strength, and sought his help accord

ingly, partly amid the great monuments of the past, partly in

a divine revelation. Both tendencies, however, are ultimately upon

the same basis, for the confidence which was placed in the men and

writings of a previous time rested only upon the fact that they

were regarded as especially favoured vessels of higher revelation.

Authority, therefore, acquired its value as the mediate, historically

accredited revelation, while the divine illumination of the individ

ual as immediate revelation came to its assistance. Differently as

the relation between these two forms was conceived of, it is yet the

common mark of all Alexandrian philosophy that it regards divine

revelation as the highest source of knowledge. Already in this inno

vation in the theory of knowledge, we find expressed the heightened

value which this period put upon personality, and on personality as

evincing itself in the feelings. The longing of this time desired

that the truth might be found by experience, as an inner commun

ion of man with the Supreme Being.

1. The appeal to authority often makes its appearance in Greek

and Hellenistic philosophy in the sense of a confirmation and

strengthening of an author s own views, but not as a decisive and

conclusive argument. The jurare in verba magistri might be usual

enough among the subordinate members of the schools, 1 but the

heads of schools, and in general the men who engaged in indepen

dent research, maintained an attitude toward the teachings of the

former time that was much more one of criticism than of uncondi

tional subjection ; 2 and though in the schools, chiefly the Academic

1 Though even the well-known oi)r6s &lt;/&gt;o [ipse dixit] of the Pythagoreans is

attested only through later writers (Cicero).

2 Kven th&gt; admiration of Socrates, in which all the following schools were at

one, did not in itself lead to his being regarded as the valid authority for defi

nite philosophical doctriuus.

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and Peripatetic, the inclination to preserve and maintain the

teaching of the founder as an unassailable treasure was fostered by

the custom of commenting upon his works, yet in all the conflict

as to the criteria of truth the principle had never been brought

forward that something must be believed because this or that great

man had said it.

How strongly the need for authority had come to be felt in the

later time, we may recognise even from the countless interpolations

which were the order of the day in the whole Alexandrian litera

ture. Their authors, who, perhaps, for the most part acted in good

faith, since they themselves regarded their thoughts as only devel

opments and continuations of the old doctrines, evidently believed

that they could get a hearing for their works in no better way than

by assigning to them the name of one of the heroes of wisdom, of

an Aristotle, a Plato, or a Pythagoras. This phenomenon appeared

most extensively among the Neo-Pythagoreans, whose chief con

cern it was to invest their new doctrine with the halo of ancient

wisdom. But the more the convictions that were to be established

in this manner bore a religious character, the more lively became

the need to conceive of these authorities themselves as the bearers

of a religious revelation, and therefore all the traits that might

stamp them as such were sought for within them or even read into

them. Not contented, however, with this, the later Greeks believed

that they could give a higher sanction to their philosophy, as well

as to their entire civilisation, by deriving it from the Oriental

religions : thus Numenius l did not hesitate to maintain that

Pythagoras and Plato had presented only the old wisdom of the

Brahmans, Magi, Egyptians, and Jews. As a result of this, the

extent of literary authorities increased extraordinarily ; the later

Neo-Platonists, a Jamblichus and Proclus, commented not only on

Greek philosophers, but also upon the entire Hellenic and barbarian

theology, 2 and credulously adopted myths and miraculous tales

from these sources.

In quite a similar manner Oriental literature testified also to its

esteem for Hellenism. Among the predecessors of Philo, Aristo-

bulus especially appealed to verses which were interpolated in

Orpheus and Linus, in Homer and Hesiod ; and with Philo himself,

the great Jewish theologian, the great men of Greek philosophy

appear side by side with the Old Testament, as bearers of wisdom.

The felt need of authority naturally asserts itself most strongly

in the unconditional faith in religious records. Here the Old Testa-

i In Eus. Prop. Ev. IX. 7. \* Marinus, Prod. Vit. 22.

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ment was from the beginning the firm foundation for the science

and philosophy of Judaism and also for that of (orthodox) Christian

ity. But in the Christian Church the need of establishing a collec

tion of writings in which the system of faith should be defined with

certainty, first developed with Marcion, and then was gradually

satisfied in the completion and conclusion of the New Testament :

with Irenaeus and Tertullian both Testaments already appear with

the full value and validity of churchly authority.

2. If now in this way even scientific thought, which in conse

quence of sceptical disintegration no longer gave itself credit for

the power of truth, subjected itself voluntarily to the authorities of

antiquity and to religious institution, it was yet in nowise bound

thereby to the extent that we might suppose. This relation rather

took the form, along all lines, of extracting from the authoritative

sources, and also of reading into them, the scientific doctrines which

arose from the new religious movements. 1

Where in so doing they did not resort expressly to those inter

polations which are found more or less in the entire literature of

the period as well as in Neo-Pythagoreanism, they employed as

their instrument the method of allegorical interpretation.

This meets us first in Jewish theology. It had its prototype

indeed in the allegorical interpretation of myths, which made its

appearance early in Grecian literature, was employed by the Sophists,

and extensively prosecuted by the Stoics. It was applied to relig

ious documents by Aristobulus, but it was Philo 2 who carried it

through methodically, proceeding from the conviction that a dis

tinction must be made in Scripture between the literal and the

spiritual meaning, between its body and its soul. In order to teach

his commands to the great mass of men, who in their sensuous

nature are unable to apprehend the divine purely, God gave to

revelation the anthropomorphic form, behind which only the spirit

ually mature man penetrates to the true sense. This sense is to be

sought in the philosophical conceptions which lie hidden in the

historical husks. Accordingly, since Philo the task of theology

has been directed toward interpreting religious documents into a sys

tem of scientific doctrines; and if he uses Greek philosophy for this

purpose, and finds in it the higher meaning of the Scripture, he

1 Rven a man like Plutarch of Chaeronea, who follows the writings of Plato

as he would the revelations of a religious document, does not scruple to intro

duce into the teaching of his master Aristotelian and Stoic doctrines as well as

his own religious view.

2 Cf. Siegfried, Philon v. Alexandria als Aualeger des alten Testaments

(Jena, 1875).

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explains this relation on the ground that the thinkers of Greece

have drawn from Mosaic documents. 1

Following his example, the Gnostics then attempted to transform

Oriental myths into Greek conceptions by allegorical interpretation,

and thought thus to develop a secret doctrine of the Apostolic

tradition, the Apologists maintained the harmony of Christian

doctrine with the dogmas of Greek philosophy, even men like

Irenaeus and Tertullian worked upon the New Testament, and

finally Orfgen knew how to bring the philosophy of Christianity

into accord with its documents. The great Alexandrian theologian,

like the Gnostics who first attempted to create a Christian theology,

distinguished between the carnal (somatic), psychical, and spiritual

(pneumatic) conceptions of the religious records, corresponding

to the metaphysico-anthropological ideas of the time (cf. 19 f.).

For him the literal historical tradition yields only a " Christianity

according to the flesh " (x(oi0T&lt;.avio-/u,os o-w/AariKo?), and it is the task of

theology to lead out of this, through the moral significance at which

the " psychical " readers stop, to the ideal content of the Scripture,

which must then illumine the reader as self-evident truth. Only he

who grasps this last belongs to the pneumatic or spiritual readers,

to whom the eternal gospel thus disclosed reveals itself.

This extraction of philosophical meaning from religious tradition

is found in fullest extent among the Neo-Platonists. Jamblichus

practises it, in accordance with the Stoic model, on all forms of

Oriental and Occidental mythology, and Proclus, too, declares ex

pressly that myths veil the truth from sensuous men who are not

worthy of it. 2

3. But in all such doctrines, the interest of science (in the Chris

tian teachings, yi/okris) ultimately predominates over that of faith;

they are accommodations of philosophy to the need of religious

authority, felt at this time. The essential identity of authority and

of rational knowledge obtains, therefore, as the fundamental presuppo

sition ; it obtains in such a degree, that just where it seems threat

ened, all artifices of allegorical interpretation are attempted in order

to rescue it. This confidence, nevertheless, with which science pro

ceeded to develop its own content as that of the religious documents,

rested ultimately upon the conviction that both historical authority

and scientific doctrine are but different revelations of the same divine

Power.

We have seen that the belief in authority in this period grew out

of the felt need of salvation and help. Another psychological root of

i Phil. Vit. Mos. 657 a. (137 m.). 2 Procl. In Kemp. 369.

CHAP. 2, 18.] Authority and Revelation : Origen, Justin. 223

this belief was the enhanced importance of personality. This shows

itself in the lively expression of admiration for the great men of the

past, as we find it in Philo and in all lines of Platonism, and not

less in the unconditional trust of the disciples in their masters,

which, especially in later Neo-Platonism, degenerated to exaggerated

veneration of the heads of schools. 1 This same motive appears in

grandest form as a power in the world s history, in the stupendous,

overpowering impression of the personality of Jesus. Faith in him

was the uniting bond which held together victoriously the various and

manifold tendencies of early Christianity.

But this psychological motive justified itself to theory by the

consideration that the admired personality was regarded, in teach

ing and life, as a revelation of the divine World-reason. The meta

physical and epistemological bases for this were given in Platonism

and especially in Stoicism. Attachment to the Platonic doctrine

that knowledge is recollection, with the turn already expressed in

Cicero that right knowledge is implanted by God in the soul, is innate

within it, the carrying out of the Stoic logos doctrine, and of the

idea contained in it that the rational part of the soul is a consub-

stantial emanation from the divine World-reason, all this led to

regarding every form of right knowledge as a kind of divine revela

tion in man. 2 All knowledge is, as Xumenius said, 3 the kindling of

the small light from the great light which illumines the world.

It was from this point of view that Justin, especially, conceived

of the relationship maintained by him between the old philosophy

and Christianity, and at the same time conceived the superiority of

the latter. God has indeed revealed himself internally through the

rational nature 4 (oW/D/Aa Aoyou e/x&lt;uroi/) of man who is created in

his image, as he has revealed himself externally through the perfec

tion of his creation ; but the development of this universal, more

potential than actual revelation, is retarded by evil demons and

man s sensuous impulses. God has, therefore, for man s help, em

ployed the special revelation, which has appeared not only in Moses

and the prophets, but also in the men of Greek science. 5 Justin

calls the revelation which is extended to the entire human race, the

1 From the point of view of the history of civilisation we may notice the

parallel in the boundless deification of the Koinan Emperors.

2 So also by the Stoics of the time of the Kmpire, philosophy, which among

them likewise aimed to be a cure for sick souls (Epictetus, Dissert. III. 23, 30),

is set forth as a sermon of the deity himself, through the mouth of the wise

man (ib. I. 36).

s In Kuseb. Frcep. Ev. XI. 18, 8.

4 Apol. 11.8; cf. Min. Fol. Oct. 16, 5.

5 On the other hand, to be sure, Justin as well as Philo derives the Greek

philosophy from the Jewish religion, as a borrowing.

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Xoyos &lt;nrepfjM.TiKos. But that which has appeared in former time, so

dispersed and often obscured, is not the full truth : the entire, pure

logos has been revealed in Christ, Son of God, and second God.

In this teaching there prevails, on the one hand, with the Apolo

gists, the effort to set forth Christianity as the true and highest phil

osophy, and to show that it unites in itself all teachings \* of abiding

worth that can be discovered in the earlier philosophy. Christ is

called the teacher (StSao-xaAos), and this teacher is Reason itself.

While Christianity was by this means brought as near as possible to

rational philosophy, and philosophy s principle of knowledge made

essentially equivalent to that of religion, this had yet at the same

time the consequence, that the conception of the religious content

itself became strongly rationalistic with Justin and similar Apolo

gists, such as Minucius Felix : the specifically religious elements

appear more repressed, and Christianity takes on the character of a

moralising deism, in which it acquires the greatest similarity to

religious Stoicism. 2

On the other hand, in this relation the self-consciousness of

Christianity speaks out, for with its perfect revelation it regarded

all other kinds of revelation, universal as well as particular, as super

fluous ; and at this point the Apologetic doctrine became of itself

polemic, as is shown especially in Atfienagoras. Revelation here,

too, is still regarded as the truly reasonable, but just on this account

the reasonable is not to be demonstrated, but only believed. Phil

osophers have not found the full truth, because they have not been

willing or able to learn God from God himself.

4. Thus, although in the Apologetic doctrine the rational is re

garded as supernaturally revealed, there is gradually preparing an

opposition between revelation and knowledge by the reason. The more

the Gnostics, in developing their theological metaphysics, separated

themselves from the simple content of Christian faith, the more

Irenceus 3 warned against the speculations of worldly wisdom, and

the more violently Tatian, with Oriental contempt of the Greeks,

rejected every delusion of the Hellenic philosophy which was

always at variance with itself, and of whose teachers each would

exalt only his own opinions to the rank of law, while the Christians

uniformly subjected themselves to the divine revelation.

This opposition becomes still sharper with Tertullian and Arno-

bius. The former, as Tatian had already done in part, adopted tho

1 Apol. II. 13, foa iraptiL iraffi KaXws etprirai TJ/JLUV XpiffTiavuv ttrriv.

2 Cf. Min. Fel. Oct. 31 ft., where the Christian fellowship of love appears pre

cisely as the Stoic world-state of philosophers.

Bef. II. 25 ff.

CHAP. 2, 18.] Authority and Revelation : Tertullian, Plutarch. 225

Stoic materialism in its metaphysical aspect, but drew from it only

the logical consequence of a purely sensualistic theory of knowledge.

This was carried out in an interesting way by Arnobius, when, to

combat the Platonic and Platonising theory of knowledge, he showed

that a man left in complete isolation from his birth on would re

main mentally empty, and not gain higher knowledge. 1 Since the

human soul is by nature limited solely to the impressions of the

senses, it is therefore of its own power absolutely incapable of

acquiring knowledge of the deity, or of any vocation or destiny of

its own that transcends this life. Just for this reason it needs rev

elation, and finds its salvation only in faith in this. So sensualism

here shows itself for the first time as basis for orthodoxy. The lower

the natural knowing faculty of man, and the more it is limited to

the senses, the more necessary does revelation appear.

Accordingly, with Tertullian, the content of revelation is not only

above reason, but also in a certain sense contrary to reason, in so

far as by reason man s natural knowing activity is to be understood.

The gospel is not only incomprehensible, but is also in necessary

contradiction with worldly discernment : credibile est quia iitep-

tum est ; certum est, quia impossibile est credo quia absurdum. Hence

Christianity, according to his view, has nothing to do with philoso

phy, Jerusalem nothing to do with Athens. 2 Philosophy as natural

knowledge is unbelief ; there is therefore no Christian philosophy.

5. But rationalistic theory also found occasions enough for such

a defining of boundaries between revelation and natural knowledge.

For by their identification the criterion of truth threatened to

become lost. The quantity of that which presented itself as reve

lation, in this time of such agitation in religion, made it indispen

sable to decide on the right revelation, and the criterion for this

could not be sought in turn in the individual s rational knowledge,

because the principle of revelation would be thereby injured. This

difficulty made itself very noticeable, especially in the Hellenistic

line of thought. Plutarch, for example, who regards all knowledge

as revelation, follows the Stoic division of theology into three kinds,

viz. of the poets, of the law-givers, and of philosophers, and

would concede to science or philosophy the supreme decision as to

religious truth, 3 declaring himself vigorously against superstition 4

1 Am. Adv. Gent. II. 20 ff.

2 Tertull. De Carne Chr. 5; De Prcescr. 7. In the latter passage he directs

his polemic also expressly against those who present a Stoic or Platonic Chris

tianity. He is the extreme opponent of the Hellenising of dogma ; he knows

no compromise, and with his hot-blooded nature demands unconditional surren

der to revelation. In a still more popular manner Arnobius sets forth the help

lessness of natural knowledge (Adv. Gent. II. 74 ff.).

8 De laid. G8. \* De Superst. 14.

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; but he shows himself to be ultimately as naive and

credulous as his time, since he takes up into his writings all kinds

of tales of prophecies and miracles ; and the incredible absence of

criticism with which the later Neo-Platonists, a Jamblichus and

Proclus proceeded in this respect, shows itself as the consistent

result of the renunciation of the thinker s own discernment, a

renunciation which the need of revelation brought with it from the

beginning.

Here the development of the Church, which was then in process

of organisation, set in with its principle of tradition and historically

accredited authority. It regards the religious documents of the Old

arid New Testaments as entirely, and also as alone, inspired. It

assumes that the authors, in recording this highest truth, were

always in a state of pure receptivity in their relation to the divine

spirit, 1 and finds the verification of this divine origin, not in the

agreement of this truth with the knowledge derived from human

reason, but essentially in the fulfilment of the prophecies which are

therein contained, and in the purposeful connection of their succession

in time.

The proof from prophecy, which became so extraordinarily impor

tant for the further development of theology, arose accordingly from

the need of finding a criterion for distinguishing true and false

revelation. Since man is denied knowledge of the future through

natural processes of cognition, the fulfilled predictions of the proph

ets serve as marks of the inspiration, by means of which they have

propounded their doctrines.

To this argument a second is now added. According to the doc

trine of the Church, which on this point was supported chiefly by

Irenaeus, 2 Old and New Testaments stand in the following connec

tion : the same one God has revealed himself in the course of time

to man in a constantly higher and purer manner, corresponding to

the degree of man s receptive capacity : to the entire race he

reveals himself in the rational nature, which, to be sure, may be mis

used ; to the people of Israel, in the strict law of Moses ; to entire

humanity again, in the law of love and freedom which Jesus an

nounced. 3 In this connected succession of prophets there is thus

developed the divine plan of education, according to which the reve

lations of the Old Testament are to be regarded as preparations for

1 Just. Apol. I. 31.

2 Bef. III. 12 ; IV. 11 ff.

8 The Alexandrian theology added, as fourth phase of revelation, the "eter

nal gospel," which is to be sought in the pneumatic interpretation of the New

Testament. Cf. the carrying out of these thoughts in Lessing s Education of

the Human Race.

CHAP. 2, 18.] Authority and Revelation : Neo-Platonism, Philo. 227

the New, which in turn confirms them. Here, too, in patristic

literature, the fulfilment of prophecies is regarded as the connect

ing link between the different phases of revelation.

These are the forms of thought in which the divine revelation

became fixed for the Christian Church as historical authority. But

the fundamental psychological power which was active in this pro

cess remained, nevertheless, devotion in faith to the person of

Jesus, who, as the sum total of divine revelation, formed the centre

of Christian life.

6. The development of the doctrine of revelation in the Hellenistic

philosophy took an entirely different direction. Here the scientific

movement lacked the living connection with the Church community,

and therefore the support of a historical authority; here, therefore,

revelation, which was demanded as a supplement for the natural

faculties of knowledge, must be sought in an immediate illumination

of the individual by the deity. On this account revelation is here

held to be a supra-rational apprehension of divine truth, an appre

hension which the individual man comes to possess in immediate con

tact (d^&gt;7/) with the deity itself: and though it must be admitted

that there are but few who attain to this, and that even these attain

only in rare moments, a definite, historically authenticated, special

revelation, authoritative for all, is nevertheless here put aside.

This conception of revelation was later called the mystic conception,

and to this extent Neo-Platonism is the source of all later mysticism.

The origins of this conception again are to be sought with Philo.

For he had already taught that all man s virtue can arise and con

tinue only through the working of the divine Logos within us, and

that the knowledge of God consists only in the renunciation of self,

in giving up individuality, and in becoming merged in the divine

Primordial Being. 1 Knowledge of the Supreme Being is unity of

life with him, immediate contact. The mind that wishes to behold

God must itself become God. 2 In this state the soul s relation is

entirely passive and receptive ; 3 it has to renounce all self-activity,

all its own thought, and all reflection upon itself. Even the vovs,

the reason, must be silent in order that the blessedness of the per

ception of God may come upon man. In this st.ite of ecstasy

(tKo-Tcuns) the divine spirit, according to Philo, dwells in man.

Hence, in this state, he is a prophet of divine wisdom, a foreteller

and miracle-worker. As the Stoa had already traced mantic arts

\* Phil. Leg. AH. 48 e. ; 55 d.; 57 b. (53-62 M.).

\* KiroOeudr)va.L is found also in the Hermetic writings; Poemand. 10. 6 ff.

The 8to\&gt;ff6a.L (dfifiratio) is later a general term of Mysticism.

3 Cf. Hut. DePyth. Orac. 21 ff. (404 ff.).

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to the consubstantiality of human and divine spirits (Trveu/xara), so

too the Alexandrians conceive of this "deification" of man from

the standpoint of his oneness in essence with the ground of the

world. All thought, Plotinus teaches, is inferior to this state of

ecstasy; for thought is motion, a desiring to know. Ecstasy,

however, is certainty of God, blessed rest in him ; l man has share

in the divine Otwpia, or contemplation (Aristotle) only when he has

raised himself entirely to the deity.

Ecstasy is then a state which transcends the self-consciousness of

the individual, as its object transcends all particular determinate-

ness (cf. 20, 2). It is a sinking into the divine essence with an

entire loss of self-consciousness : it is a possession of the deity, a

unity of life with him, which mocks at all description, all percep

tion, and all that abstract thought can frame. 2

How is this state to be attained ? It is, in all cases, a gift of the

deity, a boon of the Infinite, which takes up the finite into itself.

But man, with his free will, has to make himself worthy of this

deification. He is to put off all his sensuous nature and all will

of his own ; he is to turn back from the multitude of individual

relations to his pure, simple, essential nature (airAaxn?) ; 3 the ways

to this are, according to Proclus, love, truth, and faith ; but it is

only in the last, which transcends all reason, that the soul finds its

complete unification with God, and the peace of blessed rapture. 4 As

the most effective aid in the preparation for this operation of divine

grace, prayer 5 and all acts 6 of religious worship are commended.

And if these do not always lead to the highest revelations of the

deity, they yet secure at least, as Apuleius 7 had before this sup

posed, the comforting and helpful revelations of lower gods and

demons, of saints and guardian spirits. So, also, in later Neo-

Platonism, the raptures of prophecy which the Stoics had taught

appear as lower and preparatory forms for the supreme ecstasy of

deification. For, ultimately, all forms of worship are to the Neo-

Platonist but exercises symbolic of that immediate union of the

individual with God.

Thus the theory of inspiration diverged, in Christianity and Neo-

Platonism, into two wholly different forms. In the former, divine

i Plot. Ennead. VI. 7.

2 Ib. V. 3.

8 An expression which is found even with Marcus Aurelius (IIp6i iavr. IV.

1), and which Plotinus also employs (Enn. VI. 7, 35).

4 Procl. Theol. Plat. I. 24 f.

6 Jambl. in Procl. Tim. 64 C.

6 De Myst. ^Eg. II. 11 (96).

7 Apul. De Socr. 6 ff.

CHAP. 2, 19.J Spirit and Matter: Stoics, Neo- Pythagoreans. 229

revelation is fixed as historical authority ; in the latter, it is the

process in which the individual man, freed from all eternal relation,

sinks into the divine original Ground. The former is for the M\*iddle

Ages the source of Scholasticism; the latter, that of Mysticism.

### 19. Spirit and Matter.

Among the arguments in which the felt need of revelation devel

ops in the Alexandrian philosophy, none is so incisive as that which

proceeds from the premise that man, ensnared in the world of sense,

can attain to knowledge of the higher spiritual world only by super

natural help: in this is shown the religious dualism which forms

the fundamental mode of view of the period. Its roots are partly

anthropological, partly metaphysical : the Stoic antithesis of reason

and what is contrary to reason is united with the Platonic distinction

between the supersensuous world, which remains ever the same,

and the sensuous world which is always changing.

The identification of the spiritual and the immaterial, which was in

nowise made complete with Plato although he prepared the way

for it, had been limited by Aristotle to the divine self-consciousness.

All the spiritual and mental activities of man, on the contrary, were

regarded, even by Plato, as belonging to the world of phenomena

(ye veo-is), and remained thus excluded from the world of incorporeal

Being (ouo-ta), however much the rational might be opposed to the

sensuous in the interest of ethics and of the theory of knowledge ;

and while, in the antagonistic motives which crossed in the Aristo

telian doctrine of the i/ous, the attempt had been made to regard

Reason as an immaterial principle, entering the animal soul from

without, the development of the Peripatetic School (cf. 15, 1) at

once set this thought aside again. It was, however, in the doctrines

of Epicurus and the Stoa that the conscious materialising of the

psychical nature and activities attained its strongest expression.

On the other hand, the ethical dualism, which marked off as

strongly as possible, man s inner nature, withdrawn into itself, as

over against the sensuous outer world, became more and more

sharply accentuated, and the more it took on religious form, the

more it pressed, also, toward a theory of the world that made this

opposition its metaphysical principle.

1 [The German " Geist," corresponding to both "mind" and "spirit," as

used in this period leans sometimes to one, sometimes to the other meaning.

In view of the prevailingly religious character of the ideas of the period I have

usually rendered it in this section by "spirit," sometimes by the alternative

"mind or spirit."]

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1. This relation appears in clearest form, perhaps, in the expres

sions of the later Stoics, who emphasise anthropological dualism so

strongly that it comes into palpable contradiction with the meta

physics of the school. The idea of the oneness of man s nature,

which the Stoics had taught hitherto, had indeed been already

questioned by Posidonius, when he expressed the Platonising

opinion, that the passions could not arise from the lyye/xovtKov, but

must come from other irrational parts of the soul. 1 Now, however,

we find in Seneca 2 a bald opposition between soul and "flesh " ; the

body is only a husk, it is a fetter, a prison for the mind. So, too,

Epictetus calls reason and body the two constituent elements of

man, 3 and though Marcus Aurelius makes a distinction in man s

sensuous nature between the coarse material and the psychical

breath or piieuma which animates it, it is yet his intention to sep

arate all the more sharply from the latter the soul proper, the

rational spirit or intelligence (voC? and Stavoiu), as an incorporeal

being. 4 In correspondence with this, we find in all these men an idea

of the deity, that retains only the intellectual marks from the Stoic

conception, and looks upon matter as a principle opposed to the deity,

hostile to reason. 5

These changes in the Stoa are due, perhaps, to the rising influence

of Neo-Pythagoreanism, which at first made the Platonic dualism,

with its motives of ethical and religious values, the centre of its

system. By the adherents of this doctrine the essential difference

of soul and body is emphasised in the strongest manner, 6 and with

this are most intimately connected, 7 on the one hand, the doctrine

which will have God worshipped only spiritually, as a purely

spiritual being, 8 by prayer and virtuous intention, not by outward

acts, and on the other hand, the completely ascetic morals which

aims to free the soul from its ensnarement in matter, and lead it

back to its spiritual prime source by washings and purifications, by

avoiding certain foods, especially flesh, by sexual continence, and

by mortifying all sensuous impulses. Over against the deity, which

is the principle of good, matter (vA^) is regarded as the ground of

all evil, propensity toward it as the peculiar sin of man.

1 Cf. Galen, De Hipp, et Plat. IV. 3 ff.

2 Senec. Epist. (55, 22 ; 92, 13 ; Ad Marc. 24, 6.

3 Epict. Dissert. I. 3, 3.

\* Marc. Aur. Med. II. 2 ; XII. 3.

5 Senec. Ep. 65. 24 ; Epict. Diss. II. 8, 2 ; Marc. Aur. Med. XII. 2.

Claud. Mam. DC Stratu Anim. II. 7.

7 In so far as hero, too, man is regarded as a microcosm. Ps.-Pythag. in

Phot. Cod. 249, p. 440 a.

8 Apollonius of Tyana (ircpl 6v&lt;riC&gt;v) in Eus. Prcep. Ev. IV. 13.

CHAP. 2, 19.] Spirit and Matter : Philo, Plutarch. 231

We meet this same conception ethically, among the Essenes, and

theoretically, everywhere in the teaching of Philo. He, too, dis

tinguishes between the soul, which as vital force of the bodily

organism has its seat in the blood, and the pneuma, which as ema

nation of the purely spiritual deity, constitutes the true essential

nature of man. 1 He, too, finds that this latter is imprisoned in the

body, and retarded in its unfolding by the body s sensuous nature

(a\*&lt;rde&lt;rt?), so that since man s universal sinfulness 2 is rooted in this,

salvation from this sinfulness must be sought only in the extirpa

tion of all sensuous desires ; for him, too, matter is therefore the

corporeal substratum, which has indeed been arranged by the deity

so as to form the purposive, good world, but which, at the same

time, has remained the ground of evil and of imperfection.

2. The Christian Apologists idea is related to this and yet differ

ent. With them the Aristotelian conception of God as pure intel

lect or spirit (vovs TtAetos) is united with the doctrine that God has

created the world out of shapeless matter : yet here matter is not

regarded immediately as an independent principle, but the ground

of evil is sought rather in the perverted use of freedom on the part

of man and of the demons who seduce him. Here the ethical and

religious character of the dualism of the time appears in its com

plete purity : matter itself is regarded as something of an indiffer

ent nature, which becomes good or evil only through its use by

spiritual powers. In the same manner Hellenistic Platonists like

Plutarch, proceeding from the conception of matter as formless Not-

being, sought the principle of evil not in it, but rather in a force or

power, standing in opposition to the good deity, 3 a force which,

to a certain degree, contends with the deity about the formation of

matter. Plutarch found this thought in the myths of different

religions, but he might also have referred to a passage where Plato

had spoken of the evil world-soul in opposition to the good. 4

Meanwhile, the tendency to identify the antithesis of good and

evil with that of mind (or spirit) and matter asserts itself here too,

in the fact that the essence of evil is sought again in a propensity

1 In this connection Philo calls irvev^a that which among the Stoics, Aristo

telians, and Platonists of the time is called roOs ; cf. Zeller V. 3 3!)5, 3. Yet there

occur with him again other expressions in which, quite in the Stoic fashion, the

pneuma appears as air, in the sense of a most refined physical reality. Cf. H.

Siebeck, Gescli. d. toych. I. b 302 ff.

2 It is also characteristic that the sinfulness of all men, a doctrine which

is completely at variance with the old Stoic faith in the realisation of the ideal

of the wise man, is generally acknowledged by the Stoics of the time of the

Empire, and regarded as motive for the necessity of supernatural help. Cf.

Seneca, Benef. I. 10 ; VII. 27 ; Epict. Dissert. II. 11, 1.

a Plut. De Isid. 46 ff.

\* Plat. Laws, 896 E.

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toward the sensuous and fleshly, toward matter ; while the good,

on the contrary, is sought in love to the purely spiritual deity.

This is not only a fundamental feature of the early Christian morals,

but it is found also, in the same form, among the Platonists above

mentioned. For Plutarch, too, liberation from the body is the

necessary preparation for that reception of the working of divine

grace which forms the goal of human life, and when Numenius

carried out his theory further, by teaching that, as in the universe,

so also in man, two souls, one good and one evil, contend with each

other, 1 he yet also seeks the seat of the evil soul in the body and

its desires.

In these doctrines, also, we find everywhere emphasised, not only

the pure spirituality and incorporeality of God, but likewise the

incorpo reality of the individual spirit or mind. With Plutarch this

is shown once more in the form that he would separate the vous, the

rational spirit, from the ^v^v, which possesses the sensuous nature

and the passions together with the power to move the body. So, too,

Iremeus 2 distinguishes the psychical breath of life (irvorj t,^}

which is of a temporal nature and bound to the body, from the ani

mating spirit (irvcvfjia. ^woTroiovv), which is in its nature eternal.

These views of course appear everywhere in connection with the

doctrines of immortality or of the pre-existence and transmigration

of souls, of the Fall through which or as a punishment for which

man has been placed in matter, and of the purification through which

he is to free himself from it again ; and just in this, too, the synthe

sis in question is completed more and more effectively, inasmuch as

the immutable Eternal which remains ever the same (the Platonic

ouo-t a) is recognised in spirit; the perishable and changeable in matter.

3. In these connections we find developing gradually a separa

tion of the two characteristics which had been originally united

in the conception of the soul, the physiological and the psycholog

ical, the characteristic of vital force and that of the activity of con

sciousness. As in the scheme that had already been employed by

Aristotle, so now, side by side with the " soul " which moves the body,

appears the " spirit " as self-subsisting and independent principle,

and in this spirit is found no longer merely a general rational activ

ity, but the proper essence of the individual (as also of the divine)

personality. The triple division of man into body, soul, and spirit

is introduced in all lines, in the most various modes of expression, 3

1 .Iambi, in Stob. Eel. I. 894.

2 Iren. Adv. Hcer. V. 12, 2.

3 Of the various terminology (^vxt, awia, jri/eG^a, spiritus, animus, etc.), in

which these doctrines appear, examples have already been given above, and

CHAP. 2, 19.] Spirit and Matter: Plotinus. 233

and it is easily understood that in this case, the boundaries, on the

one hand between soul and body, and on the other to a still greater

degree between soul and spirit, were very fluctuating ; for the soul

plays here the part of a mean between the two extremes, matter and

spirit.

An immediate consequence of this was that a new and deeper idea

could be gained of the activities of consciousness, which now as

"mental" or "spiritual" were separated from the physiological

functions of the soul. For, when once removed in essence from the

corporeal world, the spirit could not be thought as dependent upon

sensuous influences, either in its activity or in the object of its

activity ; and while, in all Greek philosophy, cognition had been

regarded as the perception and taking up of something given, and

the attitude of thought as essentially receptive, now the idea of

mind or spirit as an independent, productive principle forces its

way through.

4. The beginnings for this lie already in the Neo- Pythagorean

doctrine, in so far as in it the spirituality of the immaterial world

was first maintained. The immaterial substances of Platonic meta

physics, the Ideas, appear no longer as self-subsistent essences, but

as elements constituting the content of intellectual or spiritual activity;

and while they still remain for human cognition something given

and determining, they become original thoughts of God. 1 Thus the

bodiless archetypes of the world of experience are taken up into

the inward nature of mind ; reason is no longer merely something

which belongs to the ova-la or which is only akin to it, it is the

entire oucna itself; the immaterial world is recognised as the world of

mind or spirit. 2

In correspondence with this, the rational spirit or intellect (you?)

is defined by Plotinus 5 as the unity which has plurality within

itself, i.e. in metaphysical language, as duality determined by unity

but in itself indeterminate (cf. 20), and in anthropological Ian-

might very easily be multiplied. This doctrine was developed in an especially

interesting way by Origen (De Princ. III. 1-5), where the "soul" is treated

partly as motive power, partly as faculty of ideation and desire, while the spirit,

on the contrary, is presented as the principle of judging, on the one hand

between good and evil, on the other hand between true and false ; in this alone,

teaches Origen, consists man s freedom. The like triple division appears then

with Plotinus in connection with his whole metaphysical construction. Enn.

II. 9, 2. Cf. 20.

1 Of. Nicnmachus, Arithm. Intr. I. 6.

2 With this change the Platonic doctrine of Ideas passed over to the future,

because I lotinus, and with him all Neo-Platonism, accepted it. Yet this did not

take place without opposition. Longinus at least protested against it, and Por

phyry as his disciple wrote a treatise of his own &TL ew rov vov v&lt;f&gt;^ffrrjKt TO. vorjrd.

Porph. Vit. Plot. 18 ff.

8 Plot. Enn. V. 9, 6 ; 3, 15 ; 4, 2.

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guage, as the synthetic function which produces plurality out of its

higher unity. From this general point of view the Neo-Platonists

carried out the psychology of cognition under the principle of the

activity of consciousness. For according to this, the higher soul can

no longer be looked upon as passive, but must be regarded as essen

tially active in all its functions. 1 All its intelligence (o-weo-ts) rests

upon the synthesis (o-vv&o-is) of various elements; 2 even where the

cognition refers to what is given by the senses, it is only the body

which is passive, while the soul in becoming conscious (o-waurfleo-is

and TrapaKoXou^o-is) is active; 3 and the same is true of the sensuous

feelings and passions. Thus in the field of sensation a distinction

is made between the state of excitation and the conscious perception

of this; the former is a passive or receptive state of the body (or

also of the lower soul); the latter even already in conscious per

ception (dvTi A^is) is an act of the higher soul, which Plotinus

describes as a kind of bending back of thought reflection. 4

While consciousness was thus conceived as the active noting of the

mind s own states, functions, and contents, a theory, which, ac

cording to Philoponus, was carried out especially by the Nee-Pla

tonic Plutarch also, there resulted from this with Plotinus the

conception of self-consciousness (TrapaKoXovOciv catn-w). 5 His conception

of this was that the intellect, as thought active and in motion

(vorjo-is), has for its object itself as a resting, objective thought

(vorjrov) : intellect as knowledge, and intellect as Being, are in this

case identical.

But the conception of self-consciousness takes on also an ethico-

religious colouring in accordance with the thought of the time. The

erwecns is at the same time o-wet Sj/o-is conscience, i.e. man s knowl

edge, not only of his own states and acts, but also of their ethical

worth, and of the commandment by the fulfilment of which the

estimate of this worth is governed ; and for this reason the doctrine

of self-consciousness is developed in the doctrine of the Church

Fathers, not only as man s knowledge of his sins, but also as repent

ance (/xeravota) in actively combating them.

5. The conception of mine? or spirit as self-active, creative principle

did not stop with its significance for psychology, ethics, and theory

1 Porph. Sentent. 10, 19 et al.

2 Plot. Enn. IV. 3, 26.

8 Ib. IV. 4, 18 f. The term awaLffB^ffa whose meaning reminds us besides

of the Koivbv ala6r]T-f)pi.ov in Aristotle, and thus ultimately of Plato, Theast. 184 f.

is found in similar use already in Alexander Aphrodisias, Qucest. III. 7,

p. 177, and so, too, Galen employs the expression Sidyvwffis to designate the

becoming conscious of the change in the bodily organ as contrasted with that

change itself.

\* Plot. Enn. I. 4, 10. 5 Ib. III. 9.

CHAP. 2, 20.] God and the World. 235

of knowledge, but as the ancient world passed out, this conception

rose to be the dominant thought of religious metaphysics. For by

making the attempt to derive matter also from this creative spirit,

this conception offered the possibility of finally overcoming that

dualism which formed the presupposition of the whole movement of

the religious thought of the time.

Hence it became the last and highest problem of ancient philoso

phy to understand the world as a product of spirit, to comprehend

even the corporeal world with all of its phenomena as essentially

intellectual or spiritual in its origin and content. The spiritualisa-

tion of the universe is the final result of ancient philosophy.

Christianity and jSTeo-Platonism, Origen and Plotinus, alike

worked at this problem. The dualism of spirit and matter remains,

indeed, persisting in full force for both so far as they have to do

with the conception of the phenomenal world, and especially when

they treat ethical questions. The sensuous is still regarded as that

which is evil and alien to God, from which the soul must free itself

in order to return to unity with pure spirit. But even this dark

spot is to be illumined from the eternal light, matter is to be recog

nised as a creation of spirit. The last standpoint of ancient philos

ophy is thus spiritual monism.

But in the solution of this common problem the philosophy of

Christianity and that of Neo-Platonism diverge widely; for this de

velopment of the divine spirit into the world of phenomena, even

down to its material forms, must evidently be determined by the

ideas which obtained of the nature of God and of his relation to the

world, and just in this Hellenism found itself working under pre

suppositions that were completely different from those of the doctrine

of the new religion.

### 20. God and the World.

The peculiar suspense between metaphysical monism and ethico-

religious dualism, which defines the character of the entire Alex

andrian philosophy, forces together all the thoughts of the time,

and condenses them into the most difficult of problems, that of the

relation of God and the World.

1. This problem had already been suggested from the purely

theoretical side, by the opposition between the Aristotelian and

the Stoic philosophy. The former maintained the transcendence

of God, i.e. his complete separation from the world, as strongly as

the latter maintained the immanence of God, i.e. the doctrine that

God is completely merged in the world. The problem, and the

fundamental tendency adopted in its solution, may, therefore, be

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recognised already in the eclectic mingling of Peripatetic and Stoic

cosmology, as type of which the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise, Con

cerning the World is regarded. 2 With the Aristotelian doctrine

that the essence of God must be set far above Nature (as the sum-

total of all particular things which are moved), and especially above

the mutation of earthly existence, is connected here the Stoic en

deavour to follow the working of the divine power through the entire

universe, even into every detail. While, accordingly, the world was

regarded among the Stoics as God himself, while Aristotle saw in

it a living being, purposefully moved, whose outermost spheres

were set in revolution only by longing for the eternally unmoved,

pure Form, a revolution communicating itself with ever-lessening

perfection to the lower spheres, here the macrocosm appears as

the system of individual things existing in relations of mutual

sympathy, in which the power of the supra-mundane God is domi

nant under the most varied forms as the principle of life. The

mediation between theism and pantheism is gained, partly by the

distinction between the essence and the power of God, partly by

the graded scale of the divine workings, which descends from the

heaven of the fixed stars to the earth. The pneuma doctrine is

united with the Aristotelian conception of God, by conceiving of

the forces of Nature s life as the workings of pure Spirit. 3

This turn, however, but increased the difficulty already inherent

in the Aristotelian doctrine of the action of the deity upon the

world. For this action was regarded as consisting in the motion of

matter, and it was hard to reconcile this materialisation of the

divine action with the pure spirituality which was to constitute the

essence of the deity. Even Aristotle had not become clear as to the

relation of the unmoved mover to that which was moved (cf. 13. ). 4

2. The problem became more severe as the religious dualism

became more pronounced, a dualism which, not satisfied with con

trasting God as spirit with matter, the supersensuous sphere with

the sensuous, rather followed the tendency to raise the divine being

1 Stratonism as a transformation of the Aristotelian doctrine in the direction

of pantheistic immanence, a transformation allied to the doctrine of the Stoa,

has been treated above, 15, 1.

2 This book (printed among the writings of Aristotle, 301 ff.) may perhaps

have arisen in the first century A.D. Apuleius worked it over into Latin.

3 Cf. principally Ch. 6, 397 b 9.

4 These difficulties in Aristotle s case became condensed in the concept of the

o0i). For since the " contact " of the mover with the moved was regarded as the

condition of motion, it was necessary to speak also of a " contact " between God

and the heaven of the fixed stars. This, however, was liable to objection on

account of the purely spiritual essence of the deity, and the a 0^ in this case

received a restricted and intellectually transformed meaning ("immediate

relation "). Cf. Arist. De Gen. et Corr. I. 6, 323 a 20.

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above all that can be experienced and above every definite content,

and thus to make the God who is above the world also a God above,

mind or spirit. This is found already with the Neo- Pythagoreans,

among whom a wavering between various stadia of dualism lurks

behind their mode of expression in the symbolism of numbers.

When the " One " and the " indefinite duality " are maintained to be

principles, the latter indeed always means matter as the impure, as

the ground of the imperfect and the evil; the One, however, is

treated now as pure Form, as spirit, now also as the "cause of

causes" which lies above all reason, as the primordial being

which has caused to proceed forth from itself the opposition of the

derivative One and duality, of spirit and matter. In this case the

second One, the first-born One (irptaroyovov /) appears as the perfect

image of the highest One. 1

Inasmuch as mind or spirit was thus made a product of the deity,

though the first and most perfect product, this effort led to raising

the conception of the deity even to complete absence of all qualities.

This had been already shown in Philo, who emphasised so sharply

the contrast between God and everything finite that he designated

God expressly as devoid of qualities (aTroios 2 ) : for since God is

exalted above all, it can be said of him only that he has none of the

finite predicates known to human intelligence ; no name names him.

This type of thought, later called " negative theology," we find also

among those Christian Apologists that were influenced in their con

ceptions by Philo, especially with Justin, 3 and likewise in part

among the Gnostics.

The same meets us also in Neo-Platonism in a still more intensi

fied form, if possible. As in the Hermetic writings 4 God had been

considered as infinite and incomprehensible, as nameless, exalted

above all Being, as the ground of Being and Reason, neither of

which exists until created by him, so for Plotinus, the deity is the

absolutely transcendent primordial being, exalted as a perfect unity

above mind, which, as the principle that contains plurality already

in its unity ( 19, 4), must have proceeded forth from God (and

not have been eternal). This One, TO 2v, precedes all thought and

Being; it is infinite, formless, and "beyond" (ITTIKUVO.) the intel

lectual as well as the sensuous world, and therefore without con

sciousness and without activity. 5

1 Nicomachus, Theol. Arithm. p. 44.

2 Phil. Leg. Alleg. 47 a ; Qu. D. S. Immut. 301 a.

8 Just. Apol. 1. 61 ff. \* Poemand. 4 f.

5 It is easy to understand how a state of ecstasy devoid of will and conscious

ness and raised above reason, appeared requisite for man s relation to this supra-

rational God-Being, exalted above all action, will, and thought. Cf. above, 18, 6.

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Finally, while Plotinus still designates this inexpressible First

(TO TrpoJTov) as the One, which is the cause of all thought and of all

Being, and as the Good, as the absolute end of all that comes to

pass, even this did not satisfy the later members of the school.

Jamblichus set above the o&gt; of Plotinus a still higher, completely

ineffable One (iravr^ apprjros apx\*} )&gt; an( ^ Proclus followed him in this.

3. In opposition to such dialectical subtilisations, the development

of Christian thought in the Church preserved its impressive energy

by holding fast to the conception of God as spiritual personality. It

did this, not as the result of philosophical reflection and reasoning,

but by virtue of its immediate attachment to the living belief of the

Church community, and just in this consisted its psychological

strength, its power in the world s history. This faith is breathed in

the New Testament; this is defended by all the supporters of

patristic theology, and just by this are the limits of the Christian

doctrine everywhere defined, as against the Hellenistic solutions of

the chief problem in the philosophy of religion.

Hellenism sees in personality, in however purely spiritual a man

ner it may be conceived, a restriction and a characteristic of the

finite, which it would keep at a distance from the Supreme Being,

and admit only for the particular gods. Christianity, as a living

religion, demands a personal relation of man to the ground of the

world conceived of as supreme personality, and it expresses this

demand in the thought of the divine sonship of man.

If, therefore, the conception of personality as intrinsic spiritual

ity (geistiger Innerlichkeit) expresses the essentially new result, to

yield which, theoretical and ethical motives intertwined in Greek

and Hellenistic thought, then it was Christianity which entered

upon this inheritance of ancient thought, while Neo-Platonism

turned back to the old idea that saw in personality only a transi

tory product of a life which as a tvhole is impersonal. It is the

essential feature of the Christian conception of the world that it

regards the person and the relations of persons to one another as

the essence of reality.

4. In spite of this important difference, all lines of the Alexan

drian philosophy were confronted by the same problem, that of plac

ing the deity, thus taken from the sensible world, in those relations

which religious need demanded. For the more deeply the opposi

tion between God and the world was felt, the more ardent became

the longing to overcome it to overcome it by a knowledge that

should understand the world also through God, and by a life that

should return out of the world to God.

1 Damasc. De Princ. 43.

CHAP. 2, 20.] God and the World : Christianity, Gnostics. 239

Hence the dualism of God and the world, as well as that of spirit

and matter, is but the starting-point taken in the feelings and

the presupposition of the Alexandrian philosophy: its goal is

everywhere, theoretically as well as practically, to vanquish this

dualism. Just in this consists the peculiarity of this period, that

it is anxious to close, in knowledge and will, the cleft which it finds

in its feelings.

This period, to be sure, produced also theories of the world in

which dualism asserted itself so predominantly as to become fixed

as their immovable basis. Here belong primarily Platonists like

Plutarch, who not only treated matter as an original principle side

by side with the deity, because the deity could in nowise be the

ground of the evil, but also assumed beside God, the "evil world-

soul " as a third principle in the formation of this indifferent matter

into a world. A part of the Gnostic systems present themselves

here, however, for especial consideration.

This first fantastic attempt at a Christian theology was ruled

throughout by the thoughts of sin and redemption, and the funda

mental character of Gnosticism consists in this, that from the point

of view of these ruling thoughts the conceptions of Greek philos

ophy were put in relation with the myths of Oriental religions.

Thus with Valentinus, side by side with the deity (irpoira.Tu&gt;p) poured

out into the Pleroma or fulness (TO ir^p^/jua) of spiritual forms,

appears the Void (TO KeVw/xa), likewise original and from eternity;

beside Form appears matter, beside the good appears the evil, and

though from the self-unfolding of the deity (of. 6, below) an entire

spiritual world has been formed in the " fulness " above men

tioned, the corporeal world is yet regarded as the work of a fallen

JEon (cf. 21) who builds his inner nature into matter. So, too,

Saturninus set matter, as the domain of Satan, over against God s

realm of light, and regarded the earthly world as a contested bound

ary province for whose possession the good and evil spirits strive

by their action upon man ; and in a similar manner the mythology

of Bardesanes was arranged, which placed beside the " Father of

Life " a female deity as the receptive power in the formation of the

world.

But dualism reached its culmination in a mixed religion which

arose in the third century under the influence of the Gnostic systems

combined with a return to the old Persian mythology, Mani-

chwittm. 1 The two realms of good and evil, of light and darkness,

1 The founder, Mani (probably 240-280 A.D.), regarded his doctrine as the

consummation of Christianity and as a revelation of the Paraclete. He fell

a victim to the persecution of the Persian priests, but his religion soon became

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of peace and strife, stand here opposed as eternally as their princes,

God and Satan. Here, too, the formation of the world is conceived of

as a mixture of good and evil elements, brought about by a viola

tion of the boundaries ; in man the conflict of a good soul belonging

to the realm of light, and of an evil soul arising from darkness, is

assumed, and a redemption is expected that shall completely sepa

rate both realms again.

Thus at the close of the period it is shown in the clearest manner

that the dualism of the time rested essentially upon ethico-religious

motives. By adopting as their point of view for theoretical explana

tion the judgment of worth, in accordance with which men, things,

and relations are characterised as good or bad, these thinkers came

to trace the origin of the thus divided universe back to two different

causes. In the proper sense of the judgment, only one of these

causes, that of the good, should be regarded as positive and have

the name of deity, but in a theoretical aspect the other also fully

maintains its claim to metaphysical originality and eternity (ov&lt;na).

But even from this relation it may be seen that as soon as the meta

physical relation was completely adapted to the ethical, this must in

itself lead to a removal of the dualism.

5. In fact, dualism, from motives that were most peculiarly its

own, produced a series of ideas through which it prepared its own

overcoming. For the sharper the antithesis between the spiritual

God and the material world, and the greater the distance between

man and the object of his religious longing, the more the need

asserted itself of bringing about again, by intermediate links, a union

of what was thus separated. The theoretical significance of this

was to render comprehensible and free from objections the action

of the deity upon matter alien to him and unworthy of him ; prac

tically these links had the significance of serving as mediators

between man and God, having the power to lead man out of his sen

suous vileness to the Supreme Being. Both interests were alike

suggestive of the methods by which the Stoics had known how to

utilise, in their religion of Nature, the popular faith in the lower

deities.

This mediation theory was first attempted on a large and thorough

plan by Philo, who gave it its definite direction by bringing it into

close relations, on the one hand, with the Neo-Pythagorean doctrine

of Ideas, on the other hand with the doctrine of angels in his

greatly extended, and maintained itself in vigour far on into the Middle Ages.

We are best instructed with regard to it through Augustine, who was himself

for a time an adherent of it. Cf. F. C. Baur, Das manichdische Religions-

system (Tubingen, 1836); 0. Flugel, Mani und seine Lehre (Leips. 1862).

CHAP. L&gt;, 20.] G-od and the World : Philo. 241

religion. The mediating powers, in considering which Philo had in

mind more the theoretical significance and the explanation of the

influence of God upon the world, he designates according to the

changing point of view of his investigation, now as Ideas, now as

acting forces, or again as the angels of God ; but with this is always

connected the thought that these intermediate members have part

in God as in the world, that they belong to God and yet are different

from him. So the Ideas are regarded, on the one hand, in Neo-

Pythagorean fashion as thoughts of God and content of his wis

dom, but again, after the old Platonic thought, as an intelligible

world of archetypes, created by God : and if these archetypes are

held to be at the same time the active forces which shape the unor

dered matter according to their purposeful meaning, the forces

appear in this case sometimes as powers so independent that by

assigning them the formation and preservation of the world, all

immediate relation between God and the world is avoided, and some

times again as something attached to the divine essence and repre

senting it. Finally, as angels they are indeed real mythical forms,

and are designated as the servants, the ambassadors, the messengers,

of God, but on the other hand they represent the different sides and

qualities of the divine essence, which, it is true, is as a whole un

knowable and inexpressible in its depth, but which reveals itself

just in them. This double nature, conditioned by the fundamental

thought of the system itself, brings with it the consequence that

these ideal forces have the significance of the contents of general

conceptions, and yet are at the same time furnished with all the

marks of personality ; and just this peculiar amalgamation of scien

tific and mythical modes of thought, this indefinite twilight in which

the entire doctrine remains, is the essential and important therein.

The same is true of the last inference, with which Philo con

cluded this line of thought. The fulness of Ideas, forces, and

angels was itself in turn an entire world, in which plurality and

motion ruled : between it and the one unmoved, changeless deity

there was need of still a higher intermediate link. As the Idea is

related to the individual phenomena, so the highest of the Ideas

(TO ywKumiTov), the "Idea of the Ideas," must be related to the

Ideas themselves, as force is related to its activities in the world

of sense, so the rational World-force in general must be related to

the forces : the world of angels must find its unitary conclusion in

an archangel. This s\im-total of the divine activity in the world,

Philo designates by the Stoic conception of the Logos. This also

appears with him, on this account, in wavering, changing light.

The Logos is, on the one hand, the divine wisdom, resting within

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itself (o-o^ta Aoyos cVStaforos ; cf. p. 200, note 1), and the producing

rational power of the Supreme Being ; it is, on the other hand,

Reason as coining forth from the deity (Xoyo? Trpcx^opi/cos, " uttered

Reason "), the self-subsistent image, the first-born son, who is not,

as is God, without origin, nor yet has he arisen, as have we men;

he is the second God. 1 Through him God formed the world, and he

is in turn also the high priest, who, through his intercession, creates

and preserves relations between man and the deity. He is know-

able, while God himself, as exalted above all determination, remains

unknowable : he is God in so far as God forms the life-principle

of the world.

Thus the transcendence and immanence of God divide as separate

potencies, to remain united, nevertheless ; the Logos, as the God

within the world, is the "dwelling-place" of the God without the

world. The more difficult the form which this relation assumes

for abstract thought, the richer the imagery in which it is set forth

by Philo. 2

6. With this Logos doctrine the first step was taken toward

filling the cleft between God and the sensible world by a definite

graded succession of forms, descending, with gradual transitions,

from unity to plurality, from unchangeableness to changeableness,

from the immaterial to the material, from the spiritual to the sen

suous, from the perfect to the imperfect, from the good to the bad;

and when this series, thus arranged by rank, was conceived of at

the same time as a system of causes and effects which again were

themselves causes, there resulted from this a new exposition of the

cosmogonic process, in which the world of sense was derived from

the divine essence by means of all these intermediate members.

At the same time, the other thought was not far distant, that the

stages of this process should be regarded also in their reverse order,

as the stages by which man, ensnared in the world of sense, becomes

reunited with God. And so, both theoretically and practically, the

path is broken on which dualism is to be overcome.

A problem was thus taken up again which Plato in his latest

Pythagoreanising period had had in mind, and the oldest Academi

cians as well, when they sought, with the aid of the number theory,

1 Philo in Eus. Prcep. Ev. VII. 13, 1. With a somewhat stronger emphasis

upon personality, these same conceptions are found in Justin, Apol. I. 32 ; Dial,

c. Tryph. 56 f.

2 Connected with all these doctrines is the fact, that with Philo the spiritual

in the world of experience occupies a doubtful position between the immaterial

and the material : the voOs of man, the faculty of thought and will, is a part of

the divine Logos (even the demons are designated after the Stoic analogy as

X6-x&lt;u), and yet it is again characterised as finest pneuma.

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to comprehend how Ideas and things proceeded forth from the

divine unity. But it had been shown at that time that this scheme

of the development of plurality out of the One, as regards its

relation to the predicates of worth, admitted two opposite interpre

tations : viz. the Platonic mode of view, defended by Xenocrates,

that the One is the good and the perfect, and that that which is

derived from this is the imperfect and, ultimately, the bad, and the

opposing theory, held by Speusippus, that the good is only the final

product, not the starting-point of the development, and that this

starting-point is to be sought, on the contrary, in the indefinite, the

incomplete. 1 It is customary to distinguish the above-described

doctrines as the system of emanation and the system of evolution.

The former term arises from the fact that in this system, which was

decidedly prevalent in the religious philosophy of Alexandrianism,

the separate formations of the world-producing Logos were often

designated by the Stoic term, as "emanations" (airoppoiai) of the

divine essence.

Yet the Alexandrian philosophy is not lacking in attempts at

evolutionary systems. In particular, these were especially avail

able for Gnosticism; for, in consequence of the degree to which it

had strained the dualism of spirit and matter, this system was

necessarily inclined to seek the monistic way of escape rather in an

indifferent, original ground, which divided itself into the opposites.

Hence where the Gnostics sought to transcend dualism, and this

was the case with the most important of them, they projected

not only a cosmogonic but a theogonic process, by which the deity

unfolded himself from the darkness of his primeval essence,

through opposition, to complete revelation. Thus, with Basileides,

the nameless, original ground is called the not (yet) existing God

(?&gt; oi&lt;K &lt;fiv 0eos). This being, we hear, produced the world-seed

(irufa-n-fp/jiLa), in which the spiritual forces (VIOTT/TCS) lay unordered

side by side with the material forces (d/u,op&lt;ia). The forming and

ordering of this chaos of forces is completed by their longing for the

deity. In connection with this process the various "sonships," the

spiritual world (vtrcpicMrpta), separate themselves from the material

world (KCXT/XOS), and in the course of the process of generation all the

spheres of the thus developed deity ultimately become separate;

each attains its allotted place, the unrest of striving ceases, and the

peace of glorification rests over the All.

Motives from both systems, that of evolution and that of emana

tion, appear peculiarly mingled in the doctrine of Valentinus. For

1 Cf. Arist. Met. XIV. 4, 1091 b 16 ; XII. 7, 1072 b 31.

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here the spiritual world (irXrjpufJia) or system of the "^Eons," the

eternal essences, is developed first as an unfolding of the dark and

mysterious primitive Depth ((BvOos) to self-revelation, and in the

second place as a descending production of more imperfect forms.

The mythical schema in this is the Oriental pairing of male and

female deities. In the highest pair or " syzygy " there appears side

by side with the original Ground " Silence " (&lt;nyrj ) , which is also called

"Thought " (ei/voia). From this union of the Original Being with

the capacity of becoming conscious there proceeds as the firstborn the

Spirit (here called vows) which in the second syzygy has as its object

" Truth," i.e. the intelligible world, the realm of Ideas. Thus, having

itself come to full revelation, the deity in the third syzygy takes the

form of "Reason" (Aoyos) and "Life" (0)17), and in the fourth

syzygy becomes the principle of external revelation as " Ideal Man "

(av0/ow7ros) and "Community" (cKKAi/ata, church). While the de

scending process has thus already begun, it is continued still farther

by the fact that from the third and fourth syzygies still other /Eons

proceed, which, together with the sacred Eight, form the entire

Pleroma, but which stand farther and farther removed from the

original Ground. It is the last of these ^Eons, " Wisdom "(ao&lt;ia),

that, by sinful longing after the original Ground, gives occasion for

the separation of this Longing and of its being cast into the mate

rial Void, the KWU/JM, there to lead to the formation of the earthly

world.

If we look at the philosophical thoughts which lie back of these

highly ambiguous myth-constructions, it is easy to understand that

the school of the Valentinians diverged into various theories. For

in no other system of that time are dualistic and monistic motives

of both kinds, from the system of evolution as well as from that of

emanation, so intricately mingled.

7. Clarified conceptionally, and freed from mythical apparatus,

the like motives appear in the doctrine of Plotinus, yet in such a

manner that in the system as completed the principle of emanation

almost entirely crowds out the other two.

The synthesis of transcendence and immanence is sought by

Plotinus also in the direction of preserving the essence of God as

the absolutely one and unchangeable, while plurality and changea

bility belong only to his workings. 1 Of the " First," which is ex

alted above all finite determinations and oppositions, nothing what

ever can be predicated in the strict sense (cf. above, 2). It is

1 In so far we find here, coined into theological form, the problem of the

Eleatics and Heraclitus, with which Greek metaphysics began, a problem

which also determined the nature of Platonism.

CHAP. 2, 20.] God and the World : Plotinus. 245

only in an improper sense, in its relation to the world, that it can

be designated as the infinite One, as the Good, and as the highest

Power or Force (-rrp^r-q StW/xis), and the workings of this Power

which constitute the universe are to be regarded, not as ramifica

tions and parts into which the substance of the First divides, and so

not as " emanations " in the proper sense, but rather as overflowing

by-products which in nowise change the substance itself, even

though they proceed from the necessity of its essence.

To express this relation in figurative form Plotinus employs the

analogy of light, an analogy which, in turn, has also an influence

in determining his conception. Light, without suffering at all in its

own essence or itself entering into motion, shines into the darkness

and produces about itself an atmosphere of brightness that decreases

in intensity more and more from the point which is its source, and

finally of itself loses itself in darkness. So likewise the workings

of the One and Good, as they become more and more separate from

their source, proceeding through the individual spheres, become

more and more imperfect and at last change suddenly into the dark,

evil opposite matter.

The first sphere of this divine activity is, according to Plotinus,

mind or rational spirit (vovs), in which the sublime unity differen

tiates itself into the duality of thought and Being, i.e. into that of

consciousness and its objects. In mind the essence of the deity is

preserved as the unity of the thought-function (vcfycns) ; for this

thought which is identical with Being is not regarded as an activity

that begins or ceases, changing as it were with its objects, but as the

eternal, pure perception, ever the same, of its own content, which is

of like essence with itself. But this content, the world of Ideas,

the eternal Being (ouai a in the Platonic sense) as contrasted with

phenomena, is, as intelligible world (KOO-/AOS 1/077765), at the same time

the principle of plurality. For the Ideas are not merely thoughts

and archetypes, but are at the same time the moving forces (i/ol

Swa/xtis) of lower reality. Because, therefore, unity and variety

are united in this intelligible world as the principles of persistence

and of occurrence and change, and are yet again separated, the fun

damental conceptions (categories) of this world are these five, 1 viz.

Being or Existing (TO 6V), Rest (orcuris), Motion or Change (KIV^O-IS),

Identity (TUVTOTI/S), and Difference (crepoTijs). Mind, then, as a

function which has determinate contents, and carries plurality

within itself, is the form through which the deity causes all empiri-

1 Well known from the dialogue, the Sophist, of the Corpus Platonicum. Cf.

254 B. ff.

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cal reality to proceed forth from itself : God as productive principle,

as ground of the world, is mind or rational spirit.

But spirit needs to shine out in a similar manner in order to pro

duce the world from itself ; its most immediate product is the soul,

and this in turn evinces its activity by shaping matter into cor

poreality. The peculiar position of the " soul " therefore consists

in this, that it, perceiving or beholding, receives the content of

spirit, the world of Ideas, and after this archetype (eiKwv) forms

the world of sense. Contrasted with the creative spirit, it is the

receptive, contrasted with matter, the active principle. And this

duality of the relations toward the higher and the lower is here so

strongly emphasised that just as " spirit " divided into thought and

Being, so the soul, for Plotinus, is out and out doubled : as sunk

into the blissful contemplation of the Ideas it is the higher soul,

the soul proper, the ^vyy in the narrower sense of the word ; as

formative power, it is the lower soul, the &lt;ixns (equivalent to the

Aoyos CTTrep/AaTiKos of the Stoics).

All these determinations apply on the one hand to the universal

soul (world-soul Plato), and on the other to the individual souls

which have proceeded from it as the particular forms which it has

taken on, especially therefore to human souls. The &lt;u&lt;ns, the for

mative power of Nature, is distinguished from the pure, ideal world-

soul : from the latter emanate the gods, from the former the demons.

Beneath man s knowing soul, which turns back to the spirit, its

home, stands the vital force which forms the body. Thus the sepa

ration in the characteristics of the concept of the soul a separation

which developed materially from dualism (cf. 19, 3) is here de

manded formally by the connected whole of the metaphysical system.

In this connection, this working of the soul upon matter is of

course conceived of as purposive, that is, as appropriate or adapted

for ends, because it ultimately goes back to spirit and reason

(Aoyos) ; but since it is a work of the lower soul, it is regarded as

undesigned, unconscious direction, which proceeds according to

natural necessity. As the outer portions of the rays of light pene

trate into the darkness, so it belongs to the nature of the soul to

illumine matter with its glory which arises from spirit and from

the One.

This matter, however, and this is one of the most essential

points in the metaphysics of Plotinus, must not be looked upon

as a corporeal mass subsisting in itself beside the One ; it is, rather,

itself without body, immaterial. 1 Bodies are indeed formed out of

: Ennead. III. 6, 7.

CHAI&gt;. a, 20.] God and the World : Plotinus. 247

it, but it is itself no body ; and since it is thus neither spiritual nor

corporeal in its nature, it cannot be determined by any qualities

(UTTOIOS). But for Plotinus, this epistemological indeterminateness

has, at the same time, the force of metaphysical indeterminateness.

Matter is for him absolute negativity, pure privation (or 6/3770-15),

complete absence of Being, absolute Non-being : it is related to the

One as darkness to light, as the empty to the full. This v\rj of

the Neo-Platonists is not the Aristotelian or the Stoic, but is once

more the Platonic ; it is empty, dark space. 1 So far in ancient

thought does the working of the Eleatic identification of empty

space with Non-being, and of the farther extension of this doctrine

by Democritus and Plato, extend: in Neo-Platonism, also, space

serves as the presupposition for the multiplication which the Ideas

find in the phenomenal world of sense. For this reason, with

Plotinus, also, the lower soul, or &lt;/&gt;wns, whose office it is to shine

out upon matter, is the principle of divisibility, 2 while the higher

soul possesses the indivisibility which is akin to the rational spirit.

In this pure negativity lies a ground for the possibility of deter

mining by a predicate of worth this matter thus devoid of quali

ties ; it is the evil. As absolute want (-n-tvia iravrtX^} , as the

negation of the One and of Being, it is also the negation of

the Good, eb-ovo-ia ayaOov. But by introducing the conception

of evil in this manner, it receives a special form : evil is not itself

something positively existent ; it is want, or deficiency ; it is lack

of the Good, Non-being. This conception thus formed gave Plotinus

a welcome argument for theodicy ; if the evil is not, it need not be

justified, and so it follows from the sheer conceptions as so deter

mined that all that is, is good.

For Plotinus, therefore, the world of the senses is not in itself

evil any more than it is in itself good ; but because in it light

passes over into darkness, because it thus presents a mixture of

Being and Non-being (the Platonic conception of yeVetns here comes

into force anew), it is good so far as it has part in God or the

Good; i.e. so far as it is; and on the other hand, it is evil in so far

as it has part in matter or the Evil ; i.e. in so far as it is not [has

no real, positive existence]. Evil proper, the true evil (trpuTov

/caKov), is matter, negation; the corporeal world can be called evil

only because it is formed out of matter : it is secondary evil (Sevrepov

w); and the predicate " evil " belongs to souls only if they give

1 Ennead. III. 6, 18. Universal empty space forms the possibility (viroKeinevov)

for the existence of bodies, while, on the other hand, the particular spatial deter-

minateness is conditioned by the nature of the bodies, II. 4, 12.

2 Ib. III. 9, 1.

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themselves over to matter. To be sure, this entrance into matter

belongs to the essential characteristics of the soul itself ; the soul

forms just that sphere in which the shining forth of the deity

passes over into matter, and this participation in evil is, therefore,

for the soul, a natural necessity which is to be conceived of as

a continuation of its own proceeding forth from the rational

spirit. 1

By this distinction of the world of sense from matter, Plotinus

was able to do justice, also, to the positive element in phenomena. 2

For since the original power works through spirit and soul upon

matter, all that in the world of sense really exists or is, is evidently

itself soul and spirit. In this is rooted the spiritualisation of the

corporeal world, the idealising of the universe, which forms the

characteristic element in the conception of Nature held by Plotinus.

The material is but the outer husk, behind which, as the truly

active reality, are souls and spirits. A body or corporeal substance

is the copy or shadow of the Idea which in it has shaped itself to

matter; its true essence is this spiritual or intellectual element

which appears as a phenomenon in the image seen by sense.

It is in such shining of the ideal essence through its sensuous

phenomenon that beauty consists. By virtue of this streaming of

the spiritual light into matter the entire world of the senses is

beautiful, and likewise the individual thing, formed after its arche

type. Here in the treatise of Plotinus on beauty (Ennead. I. 6)

this conception meets us for the first time among the fundamental

conceptions of a theory of the world; it is the first attempt at

a metaphysical aesthetics. Hitherto the beautiful had always

appeared only in homonomy with the good and the perfect, and the

mild attempts to separate the conception and make it independent,

which were contained in Plato s /Symposium, were now taken up again

for the first time by Plotinus ; for even the theory of art, to which

aesthetic science had restricted itself as it appeared most clearly in

the fragment of the Aristotelian Poetic, considered the beautiful

essentially according to its ethical effects (cf. 13, 14). Ancient

life must run its entire course, and that turning toward the inner

life, that internalising, as it were, which this life experienced in the

religious period, must be completed, to bring about the scientific

1 Therefore, though Plotinus in his ethics emphasised strongly freedom in

the sense of responsibility, the great tendency of his metaphysical thought is

shown just in this, that he did not make this freedom of "power to the con

trary " his explaining principle, but sought to understand the transition of the

world into evil as a metaphysical necessity.

2 Very characteristic in this respect is the treatise (Ennead. II. 9) which he

wrote against the barbarian contempt of Nature shown by the Gnostics.

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consciousness of this finest and highest content of the Grecian

world ; and the conception in which this takes place is on this

account characteristic for the development from which it comes

forth; the beauty which the Greeks had created and enjoyed is

now recognised as the victorious power of spirit in externalising its

sensuous phenomena. This conception also is a triumph of the

spirit, which in unfolding its activities has at last apprehended its

own essential nature, and has conceived it as a world-principle.

As regards the phenomenal world, Plotinus takes a point of view

which must be designated as the interpretation of Nature in terms oj

psychical life, and so it turns out that with reference to this antithe

sis ancient thought described its course from one extreme to the

other. The oldest science knew the soul only as one of Nature s

products side by side with many others, for Neo-Platonism the

whole of Nature is regarded as real only in so far as it is soul.

But by employing this idealistic principle for explaining individ

ual things and processes in the world of sense, all sobriety and

clearness in natural research is at an end. In place of regular,

causal connections appears the mysterious, dreamily unconscious

weaving of the world-soul, the rule of gods and demons, the spirit

ual sympathy of all things expressing itself in strange relations

among them. All forms of divination, astrology, faith in miracles,

naturally stream into this mode of regarding Nature, and man

seems to be surrounded by nothing but higher and mysterious

forces : this world created by spirit, full of souls, embraces him like

a magic circle.

The whole process in which the world proceeds forth from the

deity appears, accordingly, as a timeless, eternal necessity, and

though Plotinus speaks also of a periodical return of the same

particular formations, the world-process itself is yet for him without

beginning or end. As it belongs to the nature of light to shine

forever into the darkness, so God does not exist without the stream

ing forth with which he creates the world out of matter.

In this universal life of spirit the individual personality vanishes,

as a subordinate, particular phenomenon. Released from the all-

soul as one of countless forms in which that unfolds, it is cast into

the sensuous body out of the purer pre-existent state, on account

of its guilty inclination toward what is void and vain, and it is

its task to estrange itself from the body and from material essence

in general, and to "purify" itself again from the body. Only when

it has succeeded in this can it hope to traverse backward the stages

by which it has proceeded forth from the deity, and so to return to

the deity. The first positive step to this exaltation is civic and

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political virtue, by which man asserts himself as a rationally forma

tive force in the phenomenal world ; but since this virtue evinces

itself only in reference to objects of the senses, the dianoetic virtue

of knowledge stands far above it (of. Aristotle), the virtue by which

the soul sinks into its own spiritual intrinsic life. As a help

stimulating to this virtue, Flotinus praises the contemplation of the

beautiful, which finds a presentiment of the Idea in the thing of

sense, and, in overcoming the inclination toward matter, rises from

the sensuously beautiful to the spiritually beautiful. And even

this dianoetic virtue, this aesthetic 6m&gt;pia and self-beholding of the

spirit, is only the preliminary stage for that ecstatic rapture with

which the individual, losing all consciousness, enters into unity with

the ground of the world ( 18, 6). The salvation and the blessed

ness of the individual is his sinking into the All-One.

The later Neo-Platonists, Porphyry first, and, still more, Jamblichus and

Proclus, in the case of this exaltation emphasise, far more than Plotinus, the

help which the individual finds for it in positive religion and its acts of worship.

For these men largely increased the number of different stages through which

the world proceeds forth from the " One," and identified them with the forms

of the deities in the different ethnic religions by all kinds of more or less arbi

trary allegories. It was therefore natural, in connection with the return of the

soul to God, since it must traverse the same stages up to the state of ecstatic

deification, to claim the support of these lower gods : and thus as the metaphys

ics of the Neo-Platonists degenerated into mythology, their ethics degenerated

into theurgic arts.

8. On the whole, therefore, the derivation of the world from God as

set forth by Plotinus, in spite of all its idealising and spiritualising

of Nature, follows the physical schema of natural processes. This

streaming forth of things from the original Power is an eternal

necessity, founded in the essence of this Power; creation is a pur

posive working, but unconscious and without design.

But at the same time, a logical motive comes into play here, which

has its origin in the old Platonic character of Ideas as class-concepts.

For just as the Idea is related to individual things of sense, so in

turn the deity is related to Ideas, as the universal to the particular.

God is the absolute universal, and according to a law of formal

logic, in accordance with which concepts become poorer in contents

or intension in proportion as their extension increases so that the

content must correspond to the extension co, the absolutely uni

versal is also the concept of the " First," void of all content. But

if from this First proceed first the intelligible, then the psychical,

and finally the sensuous world, this metaphysical relation corre

sponds to the logical process of determination or partition. This

point of view, according to which the more general is throughout

regarded as the higher, metaphysically more primitive reality, while

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the particular is held to be, in its metaphysical reality also, a deriv

ative product from the more general, a view which resulted from

hypostatising the syllogistic methods of Aristotle (cf. 12, 3),

was expressed among the older Neo-Flatonists principally by

Porphyry, in his exegesis of Aristotle s categories.

Meanwhile Proclus undertook to carry out methodically this

logical schema of emanation, and out of regard for this principle

subordinated a number of simple and likewise unknowable "henads"

beneath the highest, completely characterless /. In so doing he

found himself under the necessity of demanding a proper dialectical

principle for this logical procession of the particular from the uni

versal. Such a schematism the systematiser of Hellenism found in

the logico-metaphysical relation which Plotinus had laid at the basis

of the development of the world from the deity. The procession of

the Many forth from the One involves, in the first place, that the

particular remains like the universal, and thus that the effect abides

or persists within the cause; in the second place, that this product

is a new self-subsisting entity in contrast with that which has pro

duced it, and that it proceeds forth from the same ; and finally, that

by virtue of just this antithetic relation the individual strives to

return again to its ground. Persistence, procession, and return (/U.OVT;,

TrpooSos, iri(TTpo&lt;f&gt;r)), or identity, difference and union of that which

has been distinguished, are accordingly the three momenta of the

dialectical process; and into this formula of emanistic development,

by virtue of which every concept should be thought of as in itself

out of itself returning into itself, Proclus pressed his entire

combined metaphysical and mythological construction, a construc

tion in which he assigned to the systems of deities of the different

religions their place in the mystical and magical universe, arranging

them in the series divided again and again by threes, according to

his law of the determination of concepts. 1

9. In contrast with this, the peculiarity of Christian philosophy

consists essentially in this, that in its apprehension of the relation

of God to the world, it sought to employ throughout the ethical

point of view of free, creative action. Since from the standpoint of

its religious conviction it held fast to the conception of the person

ality of the Original Being, it conceived of the procedure of the

world forth from God, not as a physical or logical necessity of the

1 Personally, Proclus is characterised by the mingling of a superabundant

credulous piety with a logical formalism carried even to pedantry, a combina

tion which is highly interesting psychologically. Just for this reason he. is,

perhaps, the most pronounced type of this period which is concerned in putting

its ardent religiosity into a scientific system.

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unfolding of his essence, but as an act of will, and in consequence of

this the creation of the world was regarded not as an eternal process,

but as a fact in time that had occurred once for all. The conception,

however, in which these motives of thought became concentrated,

was that of the freedom of the will.

This conception had had at first the meaning (with Aristotle)

of conceding to the finite personality acting ethically the capacity of

a decision between different given possibilities, independently of

external influence and compulsion. The conception had then taken

on, with Epicurus, the metaphysical meaning of a causeless activity

of individual beings. Applied to the absolute, and regarded as a

quality of God, it is developed in the .Christian philosophy into the

thought of " creation out of nothing," into the doctrine of an un

caused production of the world from the will of God. Every attempt

at an explanation of the world is thereby put aside ; the world is

because God has willed it, and it is such as it is because God has

willed it so to be. At no point is the contrast between Neo-Pla-

tonism and orthodox Christianity sharper than at this.

Meanwhile, this same principle of the freedom of the will is

employed to overcome the very difficulties which resulted from it.

For the unlimited creative activity of the omnipotent God forces

the problem of " theodicy " forward still more urgently than in the

other theories of the universe, the problem how the reality of

evil in the world can be united with God s perfect goodness. The

optimism involved in the doctrine of creation, and the pessimism in

volved in the felt need of redemption, the theoretical and the practical,

the metaphysical and the ethical momenta of religious faith strike

.hard against each other. But faith, supported by the feeling of

responsibility, finds its way of escape out of these difficulties in the

assumption that God provided the spirits and human souls which

he created, with a freedom analogous to his own, and that through

their guilt evil came into the good world. 1

This guilt, the thinkers of the Church find not to consist properly

in the inclination toward matter or the sensuous; for matter as

created by God cannot in itself be evil. 2 The sin of free spirits

consists rather in their rebellion against the will of God, in their

1 This is expressed abstractly by Clement of Alexandria (Strom. IV. 13, 605)

in the form, that evil is only an action, not a substance (ov&lt;ria), and that it there

fore cannot be regarded as the work of God.

2 Just for this reason the metaphysical dualism of the Gnostics must be in its

principle heterodox, and that, too, no matter whether it bore the stamp rather

of Oriental mythology or of Hellenistic abstract thought even though in the

ethical consequences which it drew it coincided in great part with the doctrine

of the Church.

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longing after an unlimited power of self-determination, and only

secondarily in the fact that they have turned their love toward God s

creations, toward the world instead of toward God himself. Here

too, therefore, there prevails in the content of the conception of

evil the negative element of departure and falling away from God;

but the whole earnestness of the religious consciousness asserts

itself in this, that this falling away is conceived of not merely as

absence of the good, but as a positive, perverted act of will.

In accordance with this the dualism of God and the world, and

that of spirit and matter, become indeed deeply involved in the

Christian theory of the world. God and the eternal life of the

spirit, the world and the transitory life of the flesh, these are

here, too, sharply enough contrasted. In contradiction with the

divine pneuma the world of sense is filled with "hylic" spirits, 1

evil demons, who ensnare man in their pursuits which are animated

by hostility to God, stifle in him the voice of universal natural reve

lation, and thereby make special revelation necessary ; and without

departure from them and from the sensuous nature there is for the

early Christian ethics, also, no rescue of the soul possible.

But still this dualism is not regarded as being in its intrinsic

nature either necessary or original. It is not the opposition be

tween God and matter, but that between God and fallen spirits ; it

is the purely inner antagonism of the infinite and the finite will. In

this direction Christian philosophy completed through Origen the

metaphysical spiritualising and internalising or idealising of the

world of the senses. In it the corporeal world appears as completely

permeated and maintained by spiritual functions, yes, even as much

reduced to spiritual functions, as is the case with Plotinus ; but

here the essential element in these functions is relations of will.

As the passing over of God into the world is not physical necessity,

but ethical freedom, so the material world is not a last streaming

forth of spirit and soul, but a creation of God for the punishment

and for the overcoming of sin.

To be sure, Origen, in developing these thoughts, took up a motive

which was allied to Neo-Platonism, a motive which brought him

into conflict with the current mode of thought in the Church. For

strongly as he held fast to the conception of the divine personality

and to that of creation as a free act of divine goodness, the scientific

thought which desires to see action grounded in essence was yet

too strong in him to allow him to regard this creation as a causeless

1 In this sense even Origen could call the evil rb OVK 6v (in Joh. II. 7, 65).

2 Tatian, Orat. ad Grcec. 4.

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act taking place once for all in time. The eternal, unchangeable

essence of God demands rather the thought that he is creator from

eternity even to all eternity, that he never can be without creating,

that he creates timelessly. 1

But this creation of the eternal will is, therefore, only one that

relates to eternal Being, to the spiritual world (ova-La). In this

eternal manner, so Origen teaches, God begets the eternal Son, the

Logos, as the sum-total of his world-thoughts (t3x iSeuiv), and

through him the realm of free spirits, which, limited within itself,

surrounds the deity as an ever-living garment. Those of the spirits

that continue in the knowledge and love of the Creator remain in

unchanged blessedness with him ; but those that become weary and

negligent, and turn from him in pride and vainglory, are, for pun

ishment, cast into matter created for this purpose. So arises the

world of sense, which is, therefore, nothing self-subsistent, but

a symbolic eternalvsation of spiritual functions. For what may be

regarded as Real in it is not the individual bodies, but rather the

spiritual Ideas which are present, connected and changing within

them. 2

So, with Origen, Platonism becomes united with the theory of

the creative will. The eternal world of spirits is the eternal prod

uct of the changeless divine will. The principle of the temporal

and the sensuous (yeVecns) is the changing will of the spirits.

Corporeality arises on account of their sin, and will vanish again

with their improvement and purification. Thus will, and the rela-

\* Orig. De Princ. I. 2, 10 ; III. 4, 3.

2 This idealising of the world of sense was treated in great detail, quite ac

cording to the Platonic model, by the most important of the Oriental Church

fathers, Gregory of Nyssa (331-394). His main treatise is the \6yos Karrjx n-

rt/c6s. Edition of his works by Morellus (Paris, 1675) [Eng. tr. in Vol. V., 2d

series, Lib. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, ed. Schaff and Wace, Oxford,

Lond., and N.Y. 1890]. Cf. J. Rupp, G. des Bischofs von N. Loben und

Meinnngen, Leips. 1834. This transformation of Nature into psychical terms

found an extremely poetic exposition among the Gnostics, particularly with the

most ingenious among them, Valentinus. The origin of the world of sense

is portrayed as follows in his theogonic-cosmogonic poetic invention : When

the lowest of the ^Eons, Wisdom (o-o0a), in over-hasty longing, would fain

have plunged into the original Ground and had been brought back again to her

place by the Spirit of Measure (Spos), the Supreme God separated from her her

passionate longing (irddos) as a lower Wisdom (KCITW &lt;ro0ta), called Achamoth,

and banished it into the "void" (cf. 20, 4). This lower &lt;ro&lt;t&gt;la, nevertheless,

impregnated by Spos for her redemption, bore the Demiurge and the world of

sense. On this account that ardent longing of ffoQla. expresses itself in all

forms and shapes of this world ; it is her feelings that constitute the essence of

phenomena ; her pressure and complaint thrills through all the life of Nature.

From her tears have come fountains, streams, and seas ; from her benumbing

before the divine word, the rocks and mountains ; from her hope of redemption,

light and ether, which in reconciliation stretch above the earth. This poetic

invention is farther carried out with the lamentations and penitential songs of

aofyla. in the Gnostic treatise, Ilfo-m &lt;ro&lt;pia.

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tion of personalities to one another, in particular that of the finite to

the infinite personality, are recognised as the ultimate and deepest

meaning of all reality.

### 21. The Problem of Universal History.

With this triumph of religious ethics over cosmological meta

physics, thus sealed by Christianity, is connected the emergence of

a farther problem, to solve which a number of important attempts

were made the problem of the philosophy of history.

1. Here something which is in its principle new comes forward,

as over against the Greek view of the world. For Greek science

had from the beginning directed its questions with reference to the

&lt;u&lt;ris, the abiding essence (cf. p. 73), and this mode of stating

the question, which proceeded from the need of apprehending

Nature, had influenced the progress of forming conceptions so

strongly that the chronological course of events had always been

treated as something of secondary importance, having no meta-

phvsical interest of its own. In this connection Greek science

regarded not only the individual man, but also the whole human

race, with all its fortunes, deeds, and experiences, as ultimately but

an episode, a special formation of the world-process which repeats

itself forever according to like laws.

This is expressed with plain grandeur in the cosmological begin

nings of Greek thought; and even after the anthropological tendency

had obtained the mastery in philosophy the thought remained in

force as theoretical background for every projected plan of the art

of living, that human life, as it has sprung forth from the unchang

ing process of Nature, must flow again into the same (Stoa). Plato

had indeed asked for an iiltimate end of earthly life, and Aristotle

had investigated the regular succession of the forms assumed by

political life ; but the inquiry for a meaning in human history taken

as a whole, for a connected plan of historical development, had

never once been put forward, and still less had it occurred to any

of the old thinkers to see in this the intrinsic, essential nature of

the world.

The most characteristic procedure in just this respect is that

of Neo-Platonism. Its metaphysics, also, follows the religious

motive as its guide ; but it gives this motive a genuine Hellenic

turn when it regards the procession of the imperfect forth from

the perfect as an eternal process of a necessary nature, in which

the human individual also finds his place and sees it as his destiny

to seek salvation alone by himself by return to the infinite.

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2. Christianity, however, found from the beginning the essence

of the whole world-movement in the experiences of personalities:

for it external nature was but a theatre for the development of

the relation of person to person, and especially of the relation of the

h nite spirit to the deity. And to this were added, as a further

determining power, the principle of love, the consciousness of the

solidarity of the human race, the deep conviction of the universal

sinfulness, and the faith in a common redemption. All this led to

regarding the history of the fall and of redemption as the true

metaphysical import of the world s reality, and so instead of an

eternal process of Nature, the drama of universal history as an on

ward flow of events that were activities of free will, became the con

tent of Christian metaphysics.

There is perhaps no better proof of the power of the impression

which the personality of Jesus of Nazareth had left, than the fact

that all doctrines of Christianity, however widely they may other

wise diverge philosophically or mythically, are yet at one in seeking

in him and his appearance the centre of the world s history. By him

the conflict between good and evil, between light and darkness, is

decided.

But this consciousness of victory with which Christianity believed

in its Saviour had still another side : to the evil which had been

overcome by him belonged also the other religions, as by no means

its least important element. For the Christian mode of thought of

those days was far from denying the reality of the heathen gods ; it

regarded them rather as evil demons, fallen spirits who had seduced

man and persuaded him to worship them, in order to prevent his

returning to the true God. 1

By this thought the conflict of religions, which took place in the

Alexandrian period, acquires in the eyes of Christian thinkers a

metaphysical significance : the powers whose struggling forms the

world s history are the gods of the various religions, and the history

of this conflict is the inner significance of all reality. And since

every individual man with his ethical life-work is implicated in

this great complex process, the importance of individuality becomes

raised far above the life of sense, into the sphere of metaphysical

reality.

3. With almost all Christian thinkers, accordingly, the world s

history appears as a course of inner events which draw after them

the origin and fortunes of the world of sense, a course which

takes place once for all. It is essentially only Origen who holds fast

i So even Origen ; cf . Cont. Gels. III. 28.

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to the fundamental character of Greek science (cf. p. 27, ch. 1).

so far as to teach the eternity of the world-process. Between the

two motives, the Christian and the Greek, he found a way of escape

by making a succession of temporal worlds proceed forth from the

eternal spiritual world, which he regarded as the immediate creation

of God, and by holding that these temporal worlds take their origin

with the declension and fall of a number of free spirits, and are to

find their end with the redemption and restitution of the same

The fundamental tendency of Christian thought, on the contrary,

was to portray the historical drama of fall and redemption as a

connected series of events taking place once for all, which begins

with a free decision of lower spirits to sin, and has its turning-

point in the redemptive revelation, the resolve of divine freedom.

In contrast with the naturalistic conceptions of Greek thought,

history is conceived of as the realm of free acts of personalities, taking

place but once, and the character of these acts, agreeably to the entire

consciousness of the time, is of essentially religious significance.

4. It is highly interesting now to see how in the mythico-

metaphysical inventions of the Gnostics, the peculiar relation of

Christianity to Judaism is brought to expression in cosmogonic

garb. In the Gnostic circles the so-called Gentile Christian ten

dency is predominant, the tendency which desires to define the new

religion as sharply as possible, as over against Judaism, and this

tendency just through the Hellenistic philosophy grows to the most

open hostility against Judaism.

The mythological form for this is, that the God of the Old Testa

ment, who gave the Mosaic law, is regarded as the fashioner of the

world of sense, for the most part under the Platonic name of the

Demiurge, and is assigned that place in the hierarchy of cosmic

forms or ^Eons, as well as in the history of the universe, which

belongs to him in accordance with this function.

At the beginning this relation is not yet that of pronounced oppo

sition. A certain Cerinthus (about 115 A.D.) had already distin

guished the God of the Jews as Demiurge, from the Supreme God

who was not defiled by any contact with matter, and had taught

that in contrast with the " law " given by the God of the Jews,

Jesus had brought the revelation of the Supreme God. 2 So, too,

1 Orig. De Princ. III. 1, 3. These worlds, on account of the freedom from

which they proceed, are not at all like one another, but are of the most mani

fold variety; Ib. II. 3, .", f.

2 A distinction which Numenius also adopted, evidently under Gnostic influ

ences. Cf. Euseb. Prcep. Ev. XI. 18.

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with Saturninus, the God of the Jews appears as the head of the

seven planetary spirits, who, as lowest emanation of the spiritual

realm, in their desire to rule tore away a portion of matter to form

from it the world of sense, and set man as guardian over it. But a

conflict arises, since Satan, to conquer back this part of his kingdom,

sends against man his demons and the lower "hylic" race of men.

In this conflict the prophets of the Demiurge prove powerless until

the Supreme God sends the JSon i/oDs as Saviour, in order that he

may free pneumatic men and likewise the Demiurge and his spirits

from the power of Satan. This same redemption of the Jewish God

also is taught by Basilides, who introduces him under the name of

the "great Archon " as an efflux of the divine world-seed, as head

of the world of sense, and represents him as made to tremble by the

Supreme God s message of salvation in Jesus, and as brought to

repentance for his undue exaltation.

In a similar manner, the God of the Old Testament, with Carpo-

crates, belongs to the fallen angels, who, commissioned to form the

world, completed it according to their own caprice, and founded sep

arate realms in which they got themselves reverenced by subordinate

spirits and by men. But while these particular religions are, like

their Gods, in a state of mutual conflict, the Supreme Deity reveals

in Jesus the one true universal religion which has Jesus as its

object, even as he had already before made revelation in the great

educators of humanity, a Pythagoras and a Plato.

In more decided polemic against Judaism Cerdo the Syrian

further distinguished the God of the Old Testament from that of

the New. The God announced by Moses and the prophets, as the

purposeful World-fashioner and as the God of justice is accessible

even to natural knowledge the Stoic conception ; the God re

vealed through Jesus is the unknowable, the good God the

Philonic conception. The same determinations more sharply denned

are employed by Marcion 1 (about 150), who conceives of the Chris

tian life in a strongly ascetic manner, and regards it as a warfare

against the Demiurge and for the Supreme God revealed through

Jesus, 2 and Marcion s disciple Apelles even treated the Jewish God

1 Cf. Volkmar, Pliilosophnumena und Marcion ( Theol. Jahrb. Tubingen,

1854). Same author. Das Evangdium Marcion s (Leips. 1852).

2 An extremely piquant mythological modification of this thought is found

in the sect of the 0/&gt;hites, who gave to the Hebraic narrative of the fall the

interpretation, that the serpent which taught man to eat of the tree of knowl

edge in Paradise made a beginning of bringing the revelation of the true God

to man who had fallen under the dominion of the Demiurge, and that after

man had on this account experienced the wrath of the Demiurge, the revela

tion had appeared victorious in Jesus. For this knowledge which the serpent

desired to teach is the true salvation of man.

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as Lucifer, who brought carnal sin into the world of sense which

had been formed by the good " Demiurge," the highest angel, so that,

at the petition of the Demiurge, the Supreme God sent the Re

deemer against him.

5. In contrast with this view we find the doctrine firmly held,

not only by the Recognitions^ ascribed to Clement of Rome (which

arose about 150 A.D.), but in the entire orthodox development of

Christian doctrine, that the Supreme God and the creator of the

world, the God of the New and the God of the Old Testaments, are

the same. But a well-planned educative development of the divine

revelation is assumed, and in this the history of salvation, i.e. the

inner history of the world, is sought. Proceeding in accordance

with the suggestions of the Pauline epistles, 2 Justin, and especially

Irenaeus, took this standpoint. The theory of revelation did not

become complete until it found this elaboration in the philosophy

of history (cf. 18).

For the anticipations of Christian revelation, that emerge on the

one hand in Jewish prophecy, on the other in Hellenic philosophy,

are regarded from this point of view as pedagogic preparations for

Christianity. And since the redemption of sinful man constitutes,

according to the Christian view, the sole significance and value of

the world s history, and so of all that is real aside from God, the

well-ordered succession of God s acts of revelation appears as the

essential thing in the entire course of the world s events.

In the main, corresponding to the doctrine of revelation, three

stages of this divine, saving activity are distinguished. 3 As divided

theoretically there are, first, the universal-human revelation, given

objectively by the purposiveness of Nature, subjectively through

the rational endowment of the mind ; second, the special revelation

imparted to the Hebrew people through the Mosaic law and the

promises of the prophets ; and third, the complete revelation through

Jesus. Divided according to time, the periods extended from Adam

to Moses, from Moses to Christ, from Christ to the end of the world. 4

This triple division was the more natural for ancient Christianity,

the stronger its faith that the closing period of the world s redemp-

1 Edited by Gersdorf (Leips. 1838). Cf. A. Hilgerifeld, Die clementinischen

Recognitionen und Homilien (Jena, 1848); G. Uhlhorn, Die Homilien und

Recognitionen des Cl. R. (Gottingen, 1854).

2 Which treat the " law " as the " schoolmaster" unto Christ (irauSayuybs et s

XPKTTO ./); Gal. iii. 24.

8 This had been done in part already by the Gnostics, by Basilides at least,

according to Hippolytus.

4 The later (heretical) development of eschatology added to these three

periods yet a fourth, by the appearance of the " Paraclete." Cf., e.g., Ter-

tullian, De Virg. Vel. 1, p. 884 O.

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tion, which had begun with the appearance of the Saviour, would be

ended in a very short time. The eschatological hopes are an essential

constituent of the early Christian metaphysics ; for the philosophy

of history which made Jesus the turning-point of the world s history

had, as by no means its slighest support, the expectation that the

Crucified would return again to judge the world, and to complete

the victory of light over darkness. However varied these ideas

become with time and with the disappointment of the first hopes,

however strongly the tendencies of dualism and monism assert

themselves here also, by conceiving of the last Judgment either as

a definite separation of good and evil, or as a complete overcoming

of the latter by the former (aTro/carao-Tao-is TTO.VTWV with Origen), and

however much a more material and a more spiritual view of blessed

ness and unhappiness, of heaven and hell, interplay here also, in

every case the last Judgment forms the conclusion of the work of

redemption, and so the consummation of the divine plan of salva

tion.

6. The points of view from which the world s history is regarded

by Christian thinkers are thus indeed exclusively religious ; but the

more general principle of a historical teleology gains recognition

within them. While Greek philosophy had reflected upon the pur-

posiveiiess of Nature with a depth and an energy which religious

thought could not surpass, the completely new thought rises here

that the course of events in human life also has a purposeful mean

ing as a whole. The teleology of history becomes raised above

that of Nature, and the former appears as the higher in worth, in

whose service the latter is employed. 1

Such a conception was possible only for a time that from a ripe

result looked back upon the vivid memory of a great development

in the world s history. The universal civilisation of the Roman

Empire found dawning in the self-consciousness of its own inner

life the presentiment of a purpose in that working together of

national destinies through which it had itself come into existence,

and the idea of this mighty process was yielded especially by the

continued tradition of Greek literature embracing a thousand years.

The religious theory of the world, which had developed from this

ancient civilisation, gave to that thought the form that the meaning

of the historical movement was to be sought in the preparations of

God for the salvation of man ; and since the peoples of the ancient

civilisation themselves felt that the time of their efficient working

was complete, it is comprehensible that they believed they saw the

i Cf. Irenseus, Ref. IV. 38, 4, p. 702 f. St.

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end of history immediately before them, where the sun of their day

was sinking.

But hand in hand with this idea of a systematically planned unity

in human history goes the thought of a unity of the human race,

exalted above space and time. The consciousness of common civil

isation, breaking through national boundaries, becomes complete in

the belief in a common revelation and redemption of all men. Inas

much as the salvation of the whole race is made the import of the

divine plan for the world, it appears that among the provisions of

this plan, the most important is that fellowship (cK/cA^aia) to which

all members of the race are called, by sharing in faith the same work

of redemption. The conception of the Church, shaped out from the

life of the Christian community, stands in this connection with the

religious philosophy of history, and accordingly, among its constitu

tive marks or notes, universality or catholicity is one of the most

important.

7. In this way, man and his destiny becomes the centre of the

universe. This anthropocentric character distinguishes the Christian

view of the world essentially from the Neo-Platonic. The latter,

indeed, assigned a high metaphysical position to the human individ

ual, whose psychico-spiritual nature it even held to be capable of

deification ; it regarded the purposeful connected whole of Nature

also from the (Stoic) point of view of its usefulness for man, but

never would Neo-Platonism have consented to declare man, who

for it was a part of the phenomena in which divine efficiency

appears, to be the end of the whole.

Just this, however, is the case in the philosophy of the Fathers.

According to Irenceus, man is the end and aim of creation : it is to

him as a knowing being that God would reveal himself, and for his

sake the rest, the whole of Nature, has been created ; he it is, also,

who by abuse of the freedom granted him, made farther revelation

and redemption necessary ; it is he, therefore, for whose sake all

history also exists. Man as the highest unfolding of psychical life

is, as Gregory of Nyssa teaches, the crown of creation, its master

and king : it is creation s destiny to be contemplated by him, and

taken back into its original spirituality. But with Origen, too, men

are just those fallen spirits, who, for punishment and improvement,

have been clothed with the world of sense: Nature exists only on

account of their sin, and it will cease again when the historical

process has attained its end through the return of all spirits to the

Good.

Thus the anthropological movement, which at first forced its way

into Greek science only as a shifting of the interest, as a change in

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the statement of the problem, developed during the Hellenistic-

Roman period to be more and more the real principle from which

the world was considered, and at last in league with the religious

need it took possession of metaphysics. The human race has gained

the consciousness of the unity of its historical connection and re

gards the history of its salvation as the measure of all finite things.

What arises and passes away in space and time has its true signifi

cance only in so far as it is taken up into the relation of man to his

God.

Being and Becoming were the problems of ancient philosophy

at its beginning : the conceptions with which it closes are God and

the human race.

# PART III. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES.

Rousselot, tftudes sur la Philosophic du Moyen Age. Paris, 1840-42.

B. Haurfiau, De la Philosophic Scholastique. Paris, 1850.

B. llaurfiau, Histoire de la Philosophic Scholastique. Paris, 1872-80.

A. Stockl, Geschichte der Philosophic des Mitte.lalters. Mainz, 1864-66.

WHEN the migration of the peoples broke in devastation over the

Roman Empire, and the latter lacked the political strength to

defend itself against the northern barbarians, scientific civilisation,

also, was in danger of becoming completely crushed out; for the

tribes to whom the sceptre now passed brought still less mind and

understanding for the finely elaborated structures of philosophy

than for the light forms of Grecian art. And, withal, ancient civ

ilisation was in itself so disintegrated, its vital force was so broken,

that it seemed incapable of taking the rude victors into its school.

Thus the conquests of the Greek spirit would have been given

over to destruction beyond hope of rescue, if in the midst of the

breaking down of the old world, a new spiritual power had not

grown strong, to which the sons of the North bowed, and which,

with firm hand, knew how to rescue for the future the goods of

civilisation, and preserve them during the centuries of subversion.

This power was the Christian Church. What the State could not

do, what art and science could not achieve, religion accomplished.

Inaccessible still for the fine workings of aesthetic imagination and

abstract thought, the Germans were laid hold of in their deepest

feelings by the preaching of the gospel, which worked upon them

with all the power of its grand simplicity.

Only from this point of religious excitation, therefore, could the

process of the appropriation of ancient science by the peoples of

the Europe of to-day begin ; only at the hand of the Church could

the new world enter the school of the old. The natural conse

quence, however, of this relation was, that at first only that portion

of the intellectual content of ancient civilisation remained alive

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which had been taken up into the doctrine of the Christian Church,

and that the teaching authority rigidly excluded all else, and espe

cially that which was opposed to her. By this means, to be sure,

confusion in the youthful mind of these nations, which would not

have been able to comprehend and elaborate much and many kinds

of material, was wisely guarded against ; but thereby whole worlds

of the intellectual life sank to the depth from which they could

only be drawn forth again long after, by toil and conflict.

The Church had grown to its great task of becoming the educator

of the European nations, first of all, because from the invisible

beginnings of a religious society it had developed with steadily

growing power to a unified organisation, which amid the dissolution

of political life presented itself as the only power that was firm and

sure of itself. And since this organisation was supported by the

thought that the Church was called to become the means of bring

ing the salvation of redemption to all humanity, the religious edu

cation of the barbarians was a task prescribed by its own nature.

But the Church was all the more able to take this in hand, since in

her inner life she had proceeded with the same certainty amid

numerous deviating paths, and had attained the goal of a unified

and completed system of doctrine. To this was further added the

especially favourable circumstance, that at the threshold of the new

epoch she was presented with the sum-total of her convictions,

worked out into the form of a thorough scientific system by a mind

of the first order, Augustine.

Augustine was the true teacher of the Middle Ages. Not only

do the threads of Christian and Neo-Platonic thought, the ideas of

Origen and of Plotinus, unite in his philosophy, but he also concen

trated the entire thought of his time with creative energy about the

need of salvation and the fulfilment of this need by the church

community. His doctrine is the philosophy of the Christian Church.

Herewith was given, in pregnant unity, the system which became

the basis of the scientific training of the European peoples, and in

this form the Romanic and Germanic peoples entered upon the

inheritance of the Greeks.

But for this reason the Middle Ages retraced in the reverse direc

tion the path which the Greeks had gone over in their relations to

science. In antiquity science had arisen from the pure aesthetic joy

in knowledge itself, and had only gradually entered into the service

of practical need, of ethical tasks, and of religious longings. The

Middle Ages begins with the conscious subordination of knowledge

to the great ends of faith ; it sees in science at the beginning only

the task of the intellect to make clear to itself and express in

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abstract thought that which it possesses surely and unassailably

in feeling and conviction. But in the midst of this work the joy

in knowledge itself w;ikes anew, at first timorously and uncertainly,

then with ever-increasing force and self-certainty ; it unfolds itself

at first sdiolastically, in fields which seem to lie far distant from

faith s unassailable sphere of ideas, and at the end breaks through

victoriously when science begins to define her limits as against

faith, philosophy hers as against theology, and to assume a con

scious independent position.

The education of the European peoples, which the history of the

philosophy of the Middle Ages sets forth, has then for its starting-

point the Church doctrine, and for its goal the development of

the scientific spirit. The intellectual civilisation of antiquity is

brought to modern peoples in the religious form which it assumed

at its close, and develops in them gradually the maturity for prop

erly scientific work.

Under such conditions it is easy to understand that the history

of this education awakens psychological interest and an interest

connected with the history of civilisation, rather than presents new

and independent fruits of philosophical insight. In the appropria

tion of the presented material the peculiar personality of the

disciple may assert itself here and there ; the problems and con

ceptions of ancient philosophy may, therefore, find many fine trans

formations when thus taken up into the spirit of the new peoples,

and in forging out the new Latin terminology in the Middle Ages

acuteness and depth often contend emulously with pedantry and

insipidity ; but in its fundamental philosophical thoughts, mediaeval

philosophy remains enclosed within the system of conceptions of

the Greek and the Hellenistic-Roman philosophy, not only as

regards its problems, but also as regards their solutions. Highly

as we must estimate the worth of its labours for the intellectual

education of European peoples, its highest achievements remain in

the last instance just brilliant productions of scholars or disciples,

not of masters, productions in which only the eye of the most

refined detailed investigation can discover the gently germinating

beginnings of a new thought, but which show themselves to be, on

the whole, an appropriation of the world of thought of the depart

ing antiquity. Mediaeval philosophy is, in its entire spirit, solely

the continuation of the Hellenistic-Roman, and the essential dis

tinction between the two is that what in the first centuries of cm-

era had been coming into existence amid struggles was, for the

Middle Ages, given and regarded as something in the main complete

and definitive.

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This period, in which the humanity of to-day was at school,

lasted a full thousand years, and as if in systematically planned

pedagogic steps its education proceeds toward science by the suc

cessive addition of ancient material of culture. Out of the antith

eses which appear in this material grow the problems of philosophy,

and the ancient conceptions taken up and amplified give the form

to the scientific theories of the world prevalent in the Middle

An original discord exists in this tradition between Neo-Platonism

and the Church doctrine defended by Augustine, a discord which

indeed was not equally strong at all points, since Augustine in very

essential points had remained under the control of Neo-Platonism,

and yet a discord which amounted to an opposition with reference

to the fundamental character of the relation of philosophy to faith.

The system of Augustine is concentrated about the conception of

the Church ; for it philosophy has as its main task to present the

Church doctrine as a scientific system, to establish and develop it :

in so far as it prosecutes this task mediaeval philosophy is the

science of the schools, Scholasticism. The Neo-Platonic tendency,

on the contrary, takes the direction of guiding the individual,

through knowledge, to blessed oneness of life with the deity : in so

far as the science of the Middle Ages sets itself this end it is Mysti

cism.

Scholasticism and Mysticism accordingly supplement each other

without being reciprocally exclusive. As the intuition of the Mystics

may become a part of the Scholastic system, so the proclamation of

the Mystics may presuppose the system of the Scholastics as its

background. Throughout the Middle Ages, therefore, Mysticism is

more in danger than Scholasticism of becoming heterodox ; but it

would be erroneous to see in this an essential mark for distinguish

ing between the two. Scholasticism is, no doubt, in the main

entirely orthodox ; but not only do the theories of the Scholastics

diverge widely in the treatment of dogmas which are still in

the process of formulation, but many of the Scholastics, even in

the scientific investigation of the doctrines which were given, pro

ceeded to completely heterodox theories, the expression of which

brought them into more or less severe conflicts without and within.

As regards Mysticism, the Neo-Platonic tradition often forms the

theoretical background of the secret or open opposition offered to

the monopolising of the religious life on the part of the Church ; \*

i Cf. H. Reuter, Geschichte der religiosen Aufklarung im Mittelalter, 2 vols.

(Berlin, 1875-77). Cf. also H. v. Eicken, Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Welt

anschauung (Stuttgart, 1888).

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but we meet on the other hand enthusiastic Mystics who feel them

selves called to take the true faith into their protection against the

excesses of Scholastic science.

It appears thus to be inappropriate to give to the philosophy of

the Middle Ages the general name of "Scholasticism." It might

rather prove, as the result of a more exact estimate, that in the

maintenance of scientific tradition as well as in the slow adaptation

and transformation of those philosophical doctrines which were

effective for the after time, a part belongs to Mysticism which is

at least as great as the part played by Scholasticism, and that on the

other hand a sharp separation of the two currents is not practicable

in the case of a great number of the most prominent philosophic

thinkers of the Middle Ages.

Finally, it must be added that even when we put together Scholas

ticism and Mysticism, we have in nowise exhausted the character

istics of mediaeval philosophy. While the nature of both these

tendencies is fixed by their relation to the religious presuppositions

of thought, in the one case the established doctrine of the Church,

in the other personal piety, there runs along side by side with

these, especially in the later centuries of the Middle Ages though

noticeable still earlier, a secular side-current which brings in an in

creasing degree the rich results of Greek and Roman experience of

the world, to science building itself anew. Here, too, at the outset

the effort prevails to introduce organically into the Scholastic

system this extensive material and the forms of thought which are

dominant in it ; but the more this part of the sphere of thought

develops into an independent significance, the more the entire lines

of the scientific consideration of the world become shifted, and

while the reflective interpretation and rationalisation of the relig

ious feeling becomes insulated within itself, philosophical knowl

edge begins to mark off anew for itself the province of purely

theoretical investigation.

From this multiplicity of variously interwoven threads of tradi

tion with which ancient science weaves its fabric on into the Middle

Ages, we can understand the wealth of colour in which the philosophy

of this thousand years spreads out before historical research. In

the frequent exchange of friendly and hostile contact, these elements

of a tradition changing in compass and content from century to

century play back and forth to form ever new pictures ; a surprising

fineness in the transitions and shadings becomes developed as these

elements are woven together, and thus there is developed also a

wealth of life in the work of thought, which manifests itself in a

considerable number of interesting personalities, in an astonishing

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amount of literary production, and in a passionate agitation of scien

tific controversies.

Such living variety in form has as yet by no means everywhere

received full justice at the hands of literary-historical research, 1 but

the main lines of this development lie before us clearly and dis

tinctly enough for the history of philosophic principles, which

nevertheless finds but a meagre field in this period for the reasons

already adduced. We must, indeed, be on our guard against aiming to

reduce the complex movement of this process to formulas that are

all too simple, and against overlooking the multitude of positive

and negative relations that have come and gone in shifting forms

between the elements of ancient tradition which found their en

trance in the course of centuries by irregular intervals into mediaeval

thought.

In general, the course of science among the European peoples of

the Middle Ages proceeded along the following lines.

The profound doctrine of Augustine had its first efficiency, not in

the direction of its philosophical significance, but as an authoritative

presentation of the doctrine of the Church. Side by side with this

a Neo-Platonic Mysticism maintained itself, and scientific schooling

was limited to unimportant compendiums, and to fragments of the

Aristotelian logic. Nevertheless, a logico-metaphysical problem of

great importance developed from the elaboration of the logic,

and about this problem arose a highly vigorous movement of

thought, which, however, threatened to degenerate into barren for

malism in consequence of the lack in knowledge to form the content

of thought. In contrast with this the Augustinian psychology

began gradually to assert its mighty force ; and at the same time the

first effects of contact with Arabian science disclosed themselves, a

science to which the West owed, primarily at least, a certain stimulus

toward employment with realities, and further a complete widening

1 The grounds for this lie, certainly in part, in the but gradually vanishing

prejudices which long stood in the way of a just appreciation of the Middle

Ages ; but in no less a degree they lie also in this literature itself. The circum

stantial and yet for the most part sterile prolixity of the investigations, the

schematic uniformity of the methods, the constant repetition and turning of

the arguments, the lavish expenditure of acuteness upon artificial and sometimes

absolutely silly questions, the uninteresting witticisms of the schools, all these

are features which perhaps belong inevitably to the process of learning, appro

priating, and practising, which mediaeval philosophy sets forth, but they bring

with them the consequence that in the study of this part of the history of phi

losophy the mass of the material, and the toil involved in its elaboration, stand

in an unfavourable relation to the real results. So it has come about that just

those investigators who have gone deeply, with industry and perseverance, into

mediaeval philosophy have often not refrained from a harsh expression of ill-

humour as to the object of their research.

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and transformation of its horizon. This development was in the

main attached to the acquaintance gained by such by-ways with the

entire system of Aristotle, and the immediate consequence of this

acquaintance was that the structure of Church doctrine was pro

jected in the grandest style and carefully wrought out in all its

parts with the help of his fundamental metaphysical conceptions.

Meanwhile Aristotelianism had been accepted from the Arabians

(and Jews) not only in their Latin translation, but also with their

commentaries, and in their interpretation which was under strong

Neo-Platonic influence ; and while by this means the Neo-Platonic

elements in previous tradition, even in the Augustinian form, found

vigorous confirmation in various directions, the specific elements of

the Augustinian metaphysics were forced into sharper and more

energetic expression, in violent reaction against the Neo-Platonic

tendency. Thus while both sides lean upon Aristotelianism, a cleft

in scientific thought is produced, which finds its expression in the

separation of theology and philosophy. This cleft became widened

by a new and not less complicated movement. Empirical research

in medicine and natural science had also made its way from the

East, hand in hand with Aristotelianism ; it began now to rise also

among the European peoples ; it conquered the domain of psychology

not without assistance from the Augustinian current, and favoured

the development of the Aristotelian logic in a direction which led

far from the churchly Aristotelian metaphysics. And while thus

the interwoven threads of tradition were separating on all sides, the

fine filaments of new beginnings were already finding their way into

this loosening web.

With such various relations of mutual support or retardation,

and with such numerous changes of front, the thoughts of ancient

philosophy move through the Middle Ages ; but the most important

and decisive turn was doubtless the reception of Aristotelianism, which

became complete about the year 1200. This divides the whole

field naturally into two sections which in their philosophical import

are so related that the interests and the problems, the antitheses

and the movements, of the first period are repeated in broader, and

at the same time deeper, form in the second. The relation of these

two divisions, therefore, cannot be generally designated in this case

by differences in the subject matter.

## CHAPTER I. FIRST PERIOD.

(UNTIL ABOUT 1200.)

W. Kaulich, Geschichte der scholastichen Philosophie, I. Theil. Prague, 1863.

THE line of thought in which mediaeval philosophy essentially

moved, and in which it continued the principles of the philosophy

of antiquity, was prescribed for it by the doctrine of Augustine.

He had moved the principle of internality (Innerlichkeit) , which

had been preparing in the whole closing development of ancient

science, for the first time into the controlling central position of

philosophic thought, and the position to which he is entitled in

the history of philosophy is that of the beginner of a new line of

development. For the bringing together of all lines of the Patristic

as well as the Hellenistic philosophy of his time, which he com

pletely accomplished, was possible only as these were consciously

united in that new thought which was itself to become the germ of

the philosophy of the future. But only of a more distant future :

his philosophical originality passed over his contemporaries and the

immediately following centuries without effect. Within the circuit

of the old civilisation the creative power of thought had become

extinguished, and the new peoples could only gradually grow into

scientific work.

In the cloister and court schools which formed the seats of this

newly beginning civilisation, permission for instruction in dialectic

by the side of the arts most necessary for the training of the clergy

had to be conquered step by step. For this elementary logical

instruction they possessed in the first centuries of the Middle Ages

only the two least important treatises of the Aristotelian Organon,

De Categoriis and De Interpretatione, in a Latin translation with

the introduction of Porphyry, and a number of commentaries of

the Neo-Platonic time, in particular those of Boethius. For the

material of knowledge (of the Quadrivium) they used the com-

pendiums of departing antiquity, which had been prepared by

Marcianus Capella, Cassiodorus, and Isidorus of Sevilla. Of the

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great original works of ancient philosophy, only the Platonic

TimcBus in the translation of Chalcidius was known.

Under these circumstances, scientific activity in the schools was

mainly directed toward learning and practising the schematism of

formal logic, and the treatment even of the material parts of knowl

edge, in particular of religious dogma which was indeed regarded

as something essentially complete and in its contents unassailable,

took the direction of elaborating and setting forth what was given

and handed down by tradition, in the forms and according to the

rules of the Aristotelian-Stoic logic. In this process the main em

phasis must necessarily fall upon formal arrangement, upon the

formation and division of class-concepts, upon correct syllogistic

conclusions. Already in the Orient the ancient school logic had

been put into the service of a rigidly articulated development of

Church doctrine by John Damascenus, and now this took place in

the schools of the West also.

Meanwhile this pursuit, which had its basis in the conditions of

the tradition, had not only the didactic value of a mental exercise

in the appropriation of material, but also the consequence that the

beginnings of independent reflection necessarily took the direction

of an inquiry as to the significance of logical relations, and so we

find emerging early in the Western literature, investigations as to

the relation of the conception on the one hand to the word, and on

the other to the thing.

The problem thus formed became strengthened by a peculiar com

plication. By the side of the Church doctrine there persisted, half

tolerated and half condemned, a mystical transmission of Chris

tianity in Neo-Platonic form. It went back to writings which had

arisen in the fifth century, but which were ascribed to Dionysius

the Areopagite, and it gained wider extension when these writings

were translated in the ninth century by John Scotus Erigena, and

made the basis of his own doctrine. In this doctrine, however,

a main point was that identification of the different grades of ab

straction with the stages of metaphysical reality, which had been

already propounded in the older Platonism and in Neo-Platonism

(cf.20, 8).

In consequence of these incitements the question as to the meta

physical significance of logical genera became, during the next centuries,

the centre of philosophic thought. About this were grouped the

other logical and metaphysical problems, and the answer given to

this question decided the party position of individual thinkers.

Amid the great variety of decisions given in this controversy over

universals, three tendencies are prominent: Realism, which main-

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tains the independent existence of genera and species, is the doctrine

of Anselm of Canterbury, of William of Champeaux, and of the

Platonists proper, among whom Bernard of Chartres is prominent ;

Nominalism, which sees in universals only designations or terms

which apply commonly, is defended in this period principally by

Koscellinus; finally a mediating theory, which has been called

Conceptualism or Sermonism, is attached principally to the name of

Abelard.

These conflicts came to an issue principally in the endless dispu

tations at the Paris University, which for this period and on into

the following period formed the centre of scientific life in Europe;

and these battles, conducted with all the arts of dialectical dexterity,

exercised upon this age a fascinating power like that which the

disputes of the Sophists and Socratic circles had once exercised

upon the Greeks. Here as there the unreflective life of the popular

consciousness was awakened to thought, and here as there wider

circles were seized by a feverish thirst for knowledge, and by a pas

sionate desire to take part in such hitherto unwonted intellectual

games. Far beyond the narrow circles of the clergy, who had pre

viously been the transmitters of scientific tradition, the impulse

toward knowledge, thus awakened, forced its way to the surface.

But this excessive vigour in dialectical development found at the

same time manifold opposition. In fact, it hid within itself a seri

ous danger. This brilliant performance, in which abstract thought

proved its power, lacked all basis of real knowledge. With its dis

tinctions and conclusions it was carrying on to a certain extent a

juggler s game in the open air, which indeed set the formal mental

powers into beneficial motion, but which, in spite of all its turns and

windings, could lead to no material knowledge. Hence, from intelli

gent men like Gerbert, who had received information from the empir

ical studies of the Arabians, went out the admonition to abandon

the formalism of the schools and turn to the careful examination

of Nature and to the tasks of practical civilisation.

But while such a call still echoed mainly unheard, dialectic met a

more forcible resistance in the piety of faith and in the power of the

Church. The result was inevitable that the logical working over of

the metaphysics of the Church s faith, and the consequences which

were developed in the strife about universals, at first without any

reference to their religious bearing, should come into contradiction

with the dogma of the Church ; and the more this was repeated, the

more dialectic appeared not only superfluous for the simply pious

mind, but also dangerous to the interests of the Church. In this

spirit it was attacked, sometimes with extreme violence, by the

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orthodox Mystics, among whom the most combative was Bernard of

Clairvaux, while the Victorines turned back from the excesses of

dialectical arrogance to the study of Augustine, and sought to bring

out the rich treasure of inner experience which his writings con

tained, by transferring the fundamental thoughts of his psychology

from the metaphysical to the empirical sphere.

Aurelius Augustinua (354-430), born at Thagaste in Numidia, and educated

for a jurist there and also in Madaura in Carthage, passed through in his youth

almost all phases of the scientific and religious movement of his time. He

sought at first in Manichseism religious relief for his burning doubts, then fell

into the Academic Scepticism which he had early absorbed from Cicero, passed

over from this gradually to the Neo-Platonic doctrine, and was at last won by

Ambrose, Bishop of Milan, for Christianity, whose philosopher he was to become.

As priest, and later as bishop at Hippo Regius, he was unwearied in practical

and literary activity for the unity of the Christian Church and doctrine; his

doctrinal system was developed especially in the Donatist and Pelagian contro

versies. Among his works (in Migne s collection, 16 vols., Paris, 1835 ft [tr.

ed. by Dods, 15 vols., Edin. 1871-77 ; also in Schaff s lib., IS icene and Post-

Nicene Fathers, Vols. 1-8, Buffalo, 1886-88] ) those of chief importance for

philosophy are his autobiographical Confessions, and further Contra Academi-

cos, De Beata Vita, De Ordie, De Qttantitate Animce, De Libero Arbitrio, De

Trinitate, Soliloquia, Dr Immortalitate Animce, De Civitate Dei. Ct.C. Binde-

mann, Der. hlg. A. (3 Bde. 1844-1869). Fr. Bohringer, Kirchengeschichte in

Biographien, XI. Bd. in 2 Till. (Stuttgart, 1877-78). A. Dorner, A. (Berlin,

1873). W. Dilthey, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, I. (Leips. 1883),

pp. 322 ff. J. Store, Die Philos. des hlg. A. (Freiburg, 1892).

The EUayuyl] e/s rds KaTyyopla.\* of Porphyry (ed. by Busse, Berlin, 1887), in

its translation by Boethius, gave the external occasion for the controversy over

universals. Boethius (470-525), aside from this, exercised an influence upon

the early Middle Ages by his translations and commentaries upon the two

Aristotelian treatises, and upon a number of Cicero s writings. In addition to

his books there were still others which circulated under the name of Augustine.

Cf. Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. im Abendl., II., and A. Jourdain, Recherches critiques

sur Page et Vorigine des traductions latines d Aristotle (Paris, 2 ed., 1843).

Among the scientific encyclopedias of departing antiquity, Marcianus Capella

(from Carthage, the middle of the fifth century), in his Satyricon (ed. by

Eyssenhardt, Leips. 1866), after his whimsical introduction De Nuptiis Mercurii

et Philologice, treats the seven liberal arts, of which, as is well known, in the

activity of the schools grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic formed the Trivium,

arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music, including poetics, the Quadrivium.

A valuable commentary on Capella was written later by Scotus Erigena (ed. by

B. Haurgau, Paris, 1861). The Institutions Divinarum et Scecularium Lec-

tionum and De Artibus ac Disciplinis Litternrum Liberalium of the Senator Cas-

siodorus (480-570, Works, Paris, 1588), and the Originum sice Etymologiarum,

LibriXX. (in Migne) of Isidorus Hispalensis (died 636) are already completely

upon theological ground. John Damascenus (about 700) in his Ilrj-y?; yvuffcws

(Works, Venice, 1748) gave the classical example for the employment of the

ancient school logic in the service of systematising the Church doctrines.

While the storms of the national migrations were blustering upon the conti

nent, scientific study had fled to the British Isles, in particular to Ireland, and

later flourished to a certain extent in the school at York under the Venerable

Bede. From here learned education was won back to the continent through

Alcuin, upon the inducement of Charles the Great ; beside the episcopal and the

cloister schools arose the palatinal school, whose seat was fixed by Charles the

Bald at Paris. The most important cloister schools were those of Fulda and

Tours. At the former worked Rabanus (lihaban) Maurus (of Mainz, 776-856 ;

De Universo, Libri XXII.}, and Eric (Heiricus) of Auxerre; from it went out,

at the end of the ninth century, Remigius of Auxerre and the probable author

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of the commentary Super Porphyrium (printed in Cousin s Ouvrages Inedits

d 1 Abelard, Paris, 183(5). In Tours Alcuin was followed by the Abbot Frede-

gisus, whose letter, De, Nihilo et Tenebris, is preserved (in Migne, Vol. 105).

Later the cloister at St. Gall (Notker Labeo, died 1022) formed a principal seat

of scientific tradition.

Cf. also for the literary relations, the Histoire Litteraire de la France.

The writings ascribed to the Areopagite (cf. Acts of the Apostles, 17 : 34),

among which those of chief importance are irepi nvffTucijs 6eo\oyias and wepl rrjs

tepapx/as ovpavtov (in Migne ; German by Engelhardt, Sulzbach, 1823), show the

same mixture of Christian and Neo-Platonic philosophy which appeared fre

quently in the Orient (the result of Origen s influence) and in an especially

characteristic form in the Bishop Synesius (about 400 ; cf. R. Volkmann, S. von

Gyrene, Berlin, 18(59). The above-named writings of the Pseudo-Dionysius,

which probably arose in the fifth century, are first mentioned, 532, and their

genuineness is there contested; nevertheless, this was defended by Maximus

Confessor (580-662 ; DC Yarns Difficilioribus Locis Patrum Dionysii et Gregorii,

ed. Oehler, Halle, 1857).

In connection witli this Mysticism develops the first important scientific

Personality of the Middle Ages, John Scotus Erigena (sometimes Jerugena,

mm Ireland, about 810-880), of whose life it is certainly known that he was

called by Charles the Bald to the court school at Paris, and was for a time

active there. He translated the writings of the Areopagite. wrote against

Gottschalk the treatise De Praidestinatione, and put his own theories into his

main work, De Divisione Naturce (German by Noack, Leips. 1870-76). The

works form Vol. 122 in Migne s collection. Cf. J. Huber, J. S. E. (Munich, 1861).

Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) came from Aosta, was active for a long

time in the Norman cloister at Bee, and was called to become Archbishop of

Canterbury in 1093. Of his works (Migne, Vol. 155) the most important for

philosophy besides the treatise Cur Dens Homo? are the Monologium and the

Proslogium. The two latter are edited by C. Haas (Tubingen, 18G3), together

with the refutation of a monk, Gaunilo (in the cloister Marmoutier near Tours),

Liber pro Insipiente, and the reply 01 Anselm. Cf. Ch. Remusat, A. de C.,

tableau de la vie monastique et de la Intte du pouvoir spirituel avec le pouvoir

temporel au 11"" siecle (2d ed., Paris, 1868).

William of Champeaux (died 1121 as Bishop of Chalons-sur-Marne) was a

teacher who was much heard at the cathedral school in Paris, and established

studies there in the Augustinian cloister at St. Victor. We are chiefly informed

as to his philosophical views by his opponent Abelard ; his logical treatise is lost.

Cf. E. Michaud, G. de Ch. et les ecoles de Paris au 12 siecle (Paris, 1868).

The Platonism of the earlier Middle Ages attached itself essentially to the

Timwiis, and under the influence of the Neo-Platonic interpretation gave to the

doctrine of Ideas a form which did not completely correspond to the original

sense. The most important figure in this line is Bernard of Chartres (in the

first half of the twelfth century). His work De Mundi Universitate sive Mega-

coxmus et Microcosmus has been edited by C. S. Barach (Innsbruck,. 1876).

William of Conches (Magna de Natnris Philosophia ; Dragmaticon Philnso-

phice) and Walter of Montagne are regarded as his disciples. Adelard of

Bath also wrote in the same spirit (De Eodem et Diver.to ; Questiones Naturales).

Roscellinus of Armorica in Brittany came forward as teacher at various

places, especially at Locmenach where Abelard was his hearer, and was

obliged to retract his opinions at the Council at Soissons. Of his own writings

only a letter to Abelard is extant (printed in the Abhandl. der bair. Akad., 1851) ;

the sources for his doctrine are Anselm, Abelard, John of Salisbury.

Abelard (Abeillard), the most impressive and energetic personality among

the thinkers of this period, was born 1079 at Pallet, in the county of Nantes,

and was a pupil of William of Champeaux and of Roscellinus. His own activity

as a teacher was developed at Melun and Corbeil, and most successfully in

Paris at the cathedral school, and at the logical school St. Genevieve. The

misfortune into which his well-known relationship to Heloise plunged him, and

the conflicts into which his teaching brought him with the Church authority,

chiefly at the instigation of his unwearied prosecutor, Bernard of Clairvaux

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(Synods at Soissons 1121, and Sens 1141), did not allow the restless man to

attain complete clearness in his mind, and impelled him to seek resting-places

in various cloisters : he died 1142 in St. Marcel, near Chalons-sur-Saone. Cf. his

Historia Calamitatum Mearum, and his correspondence with Heloise (M. Car-

riere, A. u. H., 2d ed., Giessen, 1853). His works have been edited by V. Cousin

in two volumes (Paris, 1849-59). Among these the most important are his

Dialectic, Introductio in Theologium, Theologia Christiana, Dialoyus inter

Philosophum, Christianum e,t Judceum, the treatise Sic et Non, and the ethical

treatise Scito Te Ipsum. Cf. Ch. d. Remusat, Abelard (2 vols., Paris, 1845).

A number of anonymous treatises (published by V. Cousin) occupy a position

allied to that of Abelard. Of this description are a commentary on De Interpre-

tatioue, De Intellectibus, and De Generibus et Speciebus (the latter is possibly

from Joscellinus, a Bishop of Soissons who died 1151). Related to Abelard is

also the philosophico-theological position of Gilbert de la Porrfie (Gilbertus

Porretanus, died 1154 as Bishop of Poitiers), who taught in Chartres and Paris,

and was drawn into the prosecution of Abelard by Bernard of Clairvaux.

Besides a commentary on the De Trinitatc and De Dnabus Naturis in Christo

of Pseudo-Boethius, he wrote the De sex Principiis, which was much com

mented upon later.

The consequences of the "dialectic" that were objectionable for the Church

showed themselves at an early date especially with Berengar of Tours (999-

108s), whose doctrine of the Sacrament was combated by Lanfranc (1005-

1089, Anselm s predecessor at Bee and Canterbury). The latter is probably

the author of the treatise formerly ascribed to Anselm and printed among his

works, Elucidarium sive Dialoyus Summam Totius Theologiae Complectens.

In this compendium the effort first appears to give the whole compass of what

had been established by the Church, in the form of a logically arranged text

book, putting aside dialectical innovations. From this proceeded later the

works of the Summists [so called from their writings which took the form of

a "Sum" of theology], among whom the most important is Peter Lombard

(died 1104 as Bishop of Paris). His Libri IV. Sententiartim form Vol. 192 in

Migne. Among the earlier we may perhaps mention Robert Pulleyn (Robertus

Pullus, died 1150) ; among the later, Peter of Poitiers (died 1205) and Alanus

Ryssel ("aft insulin" , died 1203). Cf. on him Baumgartner (Minister, 1890).

Gerbert (died 1003 as Pope Sylvester II.) has the merit of having pointed

out energetically the necessity of the study of mathematics and natural science.

He became acquainted with the work of the Arabians while in Spain and Italy,

and acquired an amount of knowledge that made him an object of amazement

and suspicion to his contemporaries. Cf. K. Werner, G. von Aurillac, die.

Kirche und Wissenschaft seiner Zeit (2d ed., Vienna, 1881). Like him his

disciple, Fulbert (died 1029 as Bishop of Chartres), called men back from

dialectic to simple piety, and in the same spirit Hildebert of Lavardin was

active (1057-1133, Bishop of Tours).

The same thing was done upon a large scale by the orthodox Mysticism of

the twelfth century. As its most zealous supporter we are met by Bernard of

Clairvaux (1091-1 153). Among his writings those prominent are DC Cuntemptu

Mundi, and De Gradibus fhimilifatis (ed. by Mabillon, last ed., Paris, 1839 f.).

Cf. Neander, Der hciliije B. und seine Zeit (3d ed., 18(55) ; Morison, Life and

Times of St. B. (Lond. 1808) ; [R. S. Storrs, B. of C. (N.Y. 1892)].

Mysticism became scientifically fruitful among the Victorines, the conduc

tors of the cloister school of St. Victor, in Paris. The most important was Hugo

of St. Victor (born 1096 as Count of Blankenburg in the Harz, died 1141).

Annum liis works (in Migne, Vols. 175-177) the most important is De Sacra-

mentis Fidei Christiana; for the psychology of Mysticism the most important

works are the Soliloquium de Arrha Animce, De Area Noe and De Vanitate

Mundi, and besides these the encyclopedic work Eruditio Didascalica. Cf. A.

Liebner, H. v. St. V. und die tkeologiteken liichtungen seiner Zeit (Leips. 183(i).

His pupil, Richard of St. Victor (a Scot, died 1173), wrote De Statu, De

Kruilitinni H. mnnis Interioris, De Preparntione Animi ad Contemplationem,

and De Gratia Contemplation in. His works form Vol. 194 in Migne. Cf.

\V. A. Kiiulich, Die Lehren des H. und R. von St. V. (in the Abhandl. der

Bohrn. Ges. der Wiss., 18(i3 f.). His successor. Walter of St. Victor, distin-

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guished himself in a less scientific polemic against the heretical dialectic (7n

Quattuor Labyrinthos Francice}.

At the close of this period appear the beginnings of a Humanist reaction

against the one-sidedness of the work of the schools, in John of Salisbury

(Johannes Saresberiensis, died 1180 as Bishop of Chartres), whose writings Poli-

craticus and Metalogicus (Migne, Vol. 199) form a valuable source for the

scientific life of the time. Cf. C. Schaarschmidt, J. 8. nach Leben und Studien,

Schriften und Philosophic (Leips. 1862).

### 22. The Metaphysics of Inner Experience.

The philosophy of the great Church teacher Augustine is not

presented in any of his works as a complete system; rather, it

develops incidentally in all his literary activity in connection with

the treatment of various subjects, for the most part theological.

But from this work as a whole we receive the peculiar impression

that these rich masses of thought are in motion in two different

directions, and are held together only by the powerful personality

of the man. As theologian Augustine throughout all his investi

gations keeps the conception of the Church in mind, as criterion ; as

philosopher he makes all his ideas centre about the principle of the

absolute and immediate certainty (Selbstgewissheit) of consciousness.

By their double relation to these two fixed postulates, all questions

come into active flux. Augustine s world of thought is like an

elliptic system which is constructed by motion about two centres,

and this, its inner duality, is frequently that of contradiction. 1

It becomes the task of the history of philosophy to separate from

this complicated system those ideas by which Augustine far tran

scended his time and likewise the immediately following centuries,

and became one of the founders of modern thought. All these ideas,

however, have their ultimate ground and inner union in the prin

ciple of the immediate certainty of inner experience (selbstgewissen

Innerlichkeit) , which Augustine first expressed with complete clear

ness, and formulated and used as the starting-point of philosophy.

Under the influence of the ethical and religious interest, metaphys

ical interest had become gradually and almost imperceptibly shifted

from the sphere of the outer to that of the inner life. Psychical

conceptions had taken the place of physical, as the fundamental

factors in the conception of the world. It was reserved for Augus

tine to bring into full and conscious use, this, which had already

become an accomplished fact in Origen and Plotinus. 2

1 It is unmistakable that Augustine himself in the course of his development

transferred the emphasis of his personality more and more from the philosophi

cal to the Church centre. This comes forward with especial distinctness in his

backward look over his own literary activity, the lietractationes.

2 Aug. De Ver. Eel. 39, 72. Noli foras ire ; in te ipsum redi : IN INTERIORS

HOMINK habitat veritas.

CHAP. 1, 22.] Metaphysics of Inner Experience : Augustine. 277

This tendency toward inner experience even constitutes his pecu

liar literary quality. Augustine is a virtuoso in self-observation

and self-analysis ; he has a mastery in the portrayal of psychical

states, which is as admirable as is his ability to analyse these in

reflection and lay bare the deepest elements of feeling and impulse.

Just for this reason it is from this source almost exclusively that

he draws the views with which his metaphysics seeks to compre

hend the universe. So there begins, as over against the Greek

philosophy, a new course of development, which indeed, during

the Middle Ages, made but little progress beyond what was achieved

by Augustine in his first cast, and the full development of which is

not to be found until the modern period.

1. This makes its appearance clearly already in Augustine s

doctrine of the starting-point of philosophical knowledge. In cor

respondence with the course of his personal development he seeks

the way to certainty through doubt, and in this process, sceptical

theories themselves must break the path. At first, to be sure, with

the indomitable thirst of his ardent nature for happiness, he

strikes down doubt by the Socratic postulate that the possession of

truth (without the presupposition of which there is also no proba

bility) is requisite for happiness, and therefore is to be regarded as

attainable : but with greater emphasis he shows that even the

sceptic who denies the external reality of the content of perception,

or at least leaves it undecided, can yet not involve in doubt the

internal existence of the sensation as such. But instead of con

tenting himself with the relativistic or positivistic interpretations

of this fact, Augustine presses forward just from this basis to victo

rious certainty. He points out that together with the sensation

there is given not only its content, which is liable to doubt in one

direction or another, but also the reality of the perceiving subject,

and this certainty which consciousness has in itself follows first of

all from the very act of doubt. In that I doubt, or since I doubt,

he says, I know that I, the doubter, am : and thus, just this doubt

contains within itself the valuable truth of the reality of the con

scious being. Even if I should err in all else, I cannot err in this ;

for in order to err I must exist. 1

This fundamental certainty extends equally to all states of con-

1 Augustine attributed fundamental importance to this line of argument,

which he frequently worked out (De Be,ata Vita, 7; Solil. II. 1 ff. ; De Ver.

Eel. 72 f. ; De Trin. X. 14, etc.). That it, however, was not completely

unknown to Greek literature also is proved by the passage (III. 6 f.) of the

compilation current under the name of "Metaphysics of Herennios." The

source of this passage has not as yet been discovered, but is probably late Stoic.

Cf. on this E. Heitz in Sitz.-Ber. der Berl. Ak. d. W., 1889, pp. 1167 ff.

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sciousness (cogitare), and Augustine sought to show that all the

various kinds of these states are already included in the act of

doubt. He who doubts knows not only that he lives, but also that

he remembers, that he knows, and that he wills : for the grounds

of his doubt rest upon his former ideas ; in estimating the momenta

of the doubt are developed thought, knowledge, and judgment; and

the motive of his doubt is only this, that he is striving after truth.

Without particularly reflecting upon this, or drawing farther con

clusions from it, Augustine proves in this example his deep insight

into the psychical life, since he does not regard the different kinds

of psychical activity as separate spheres, but as the aspects of one

and the same act, inseparably united with one another. The soul

is for him and by this he rises far above Aristotle, and also above

the Neo-Platonists the living whole of personality, whose life is

a unity, and which, by its self-consciousness, is certain of its own

reality as the surest truth.

2. But from this first certainty Augustine s doctrine at once

leads farther, and it is not only his religious conviction, but also

a deep epistemological reflection, that makes him regard the idea

of God as immediately involved in the certainty which the indi

vidual consciousness has of itself. Here, too, the fundamental

fact of doubt is of authoritative importance ; in this case, also, it

already contains implicitly the full truth. How should we come

to question and doubt the perceptions of the external world which

force themselves upon us with such elementary power, asks Augus

tine, if we did not possess, besides these, and from other sources,

criteria and standards of truths by which to measure and examine

these perceptions ? He who doubts must know the truth, for only

for its sake does he doubt. 1 In reality, continues the philosopher,

man possesses, besides sensation (sensus), the higher capacity of

reason (intellectus, ratio), i.e. of the immediate perception of incor

poreal truths ; 2 under the latter Augustine understands, not only

the logical laws, but also the norms of the good and the beautiful ;

in general, all those truths not to be attained by sensation, which

are requisite to elaborate and judge what is given, the principles

of judging. 3

1 De Ver. Eel. 39, 72 f.

2 Aspectus animi, quo per se ipsum non per corpus verum intuetur : De Trin.

XII. 2, 2. Cf. Contra Acad. III. 13, 29.

3 The apprehension of these intelligible truths by human consciousness was

at the first designated by Augustine quite Platonically dva/avT/crts. It was ortho

dox scruples against the assumption of the pre-existence of the soul that led

him to regard the reason as the intuitive faculty for the incorporeal world. Cf.

also J. Stortz, Die Philosophic des hi. Auyustinus (Freiburg i. B. 1882).

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Such norms of reason assert themselves as standards of judg

ment in doubt as in all activities of consciousness ; but they

transcend, as something higher, the individual consciousness into

which they enter in the course of time : they are the same for all

who think rationally, and experience no alteration in this their

worth. Thus the individual consciousness sees itself attached in its

own function to something universally valid and far reaching. 1

But it belongs to the essence of truth that it is or exists. Augus

tine also proceeds from this fundamental conception of the ancient,

as of every nai ve theory of knowledge. But the Being or existence

of those universal truths, since they are absolutely incorporeal in

their nature, can be thought only as that of the Ideas in God

after the Neo-Platonic mode ; they are the changeless Forms and

norms of all reality (principales formce vel rationes rerum stabiles

atque incommutabiles, qu&lt;x, in divino intellect u continentur) , and the

determinations of the content of the divine mind. In him they

are all contained in highest union ; he is the absolute unity, the all-

embracing truth ; he is the highest Being, the highest Good, perfect

Beauty (unum, verum, bonum). All rational knowledge is ulti

mately knowledge of God. Complete knowledge of God, indeed,

even according to Augustine s admission, is denied to human insight

in the earthly life. Perhaps only the negative element in our idea

of him is completely certain ; and, in particular, we have no ade

quate idea of the way in which the different elements of divine

truth which the reason beholds are united in him to form the

highest real unity. For his incorporeal and changeless essence

(essentia) far transcends all forms of relation and association that

belong to human thought ; even the category of substance applies

to him as little as do the rest. 2

3. Directly consistent as these thoughts are with Neo-Platonism, 3

their Christian character is yet preserved in Augustine s presenta

tion by the fact that the religious idea of the deity as absolute

personality is inseparably fused with the philosophical conception

of the deity as the sum and essence of all truth. But just for this

reason the whole Augustinian metaphysics is built up upon the

1 Df Lib. Arb. II. 7 ff.

2 The essential thing in this is the insight, that the categories acquired in

knowing Nature are inadequate for the peculiar nature of spiritual synthesis

(according to which the divine essence should be thqught). The new categories

of internality are, however, with Augustine only in the process of coming into

existence ; cf. the following.

8 In fact, Augustine seeks throughout to identify the voOs of Plotinus with the

X Vyos of Origen ; but by dropping from the Neo-Platonic doctrine the emanistic

derivation of the voOj and its acquirement of independent existence, he abrogates

the physical schema of the world potencies in favour of the psychical.

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self-knowledge of the finite personality ; that is, upon the fact of

inner experience. For so far as a comprehension of the divine

essence is at all possible for man, it can be gained only after the

analogy of human self-knowledge. This, however, shows the fol

lowing fundamental composition of the inner life : the permanent

existence of spiritual Being is given in the sum-total of its content

of consciousness, or reproducible ideas ; its movement and living

activity consists in the processes of uniting and separating these

elements in judgments ; and the impelling force in this motion is

the will, directed toward the attainment of highest blessedness.

Thus the three aspects of psychical reality are idea ( Vorstellung),

judgment, and will : memoria, intellectus, voluntas, 1 and Augustine is

expressly on his guard against conceiving of these modes of func

tioning which are peculiar to personality, as the properties of

bodies are conceived. Just as little do they mean different strata

or spheres of its existence ; they form in their indissoluble unity

the substance of the soul itself. In accordance with these relations

thus recognised in man s mental life, Augustine then not only seeks

to gain an analogical idea of the mystery of the Trinity, but recog-

. nises, also, in the esse, nosse, and velle the fundamental determina

tions of all reality. Being, knowing, and willing comprise all

reality, and in omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness, the

deity encompasses the universe.

The outspoken opinion of the inadequacy of the physical (Aristotelian)

categories reminds us only seemingly of Neo-Platonism, whose intelligible cate

gories (cf. p. 245), as well as its entire metaphysical schema, are throughout

physical. It is Augustine who is first in earnest in the attempt to raise the

peculiar forms of relation characteristic of the inner nature, to metaphysical

principles. Aside from this, his cosmology runs on in the track laid by Xeo-

Platonism without peculiarities worthy of mention. The doctrine of the two

worlds, with its anthropological correlates, forms here the presupposition.

The world of sense is known through perceptions, the intelligible world through

the reason, and these two given constituents of knowledge are brought into

relation with each other by intellectual thought (ratiocinatio) . For apprehend

ing Nature, the teleology conditioned by the doctrine of Ideas presents itself.

The corporeal world also is created out of nothing by divine power, wisdom, and

goodness, and bears in its beauty and perfection the sign of its origin. Evil

(including moral evil, yet cf. below) is here, too, nothing properly real ; it is

not a thing, but an act; it has no causa efficiens, but only a causa deficiens;

its origin is to be sought not in the positive Being (God), but in the lack of

Being of finite natures ; for these latter, as having been created, possess only

a weakened and therefore a defective reality. Augustine s theodicy stands thus

essentially upon the ground of that of Origen and Plotinus.

4. A farther and essential consequence of placing philosophy

upon a consciously anthropological basis is, in Augustine s case, the

central position which he assigned in his theory of the universe to

1 The same triple division of the psychical activities is found among the

Stoics. Cf. p. 187.

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the will. The leading motive in this is doubtless the man s own

experience; himself a nature ardent and strong in will, as he exam

ined and scrutinised his own personality he came upon the will as

its inmost core. On this account the will is for him the essential

element in all : omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt.

In his psychology and theory of knowledge this is shown especially

in the fact that he seeks to set forth on all sides the controlling

position of the will in the entire process of ideation and knowledge. 1

While with reference to sense perception the Neo-Platonists had

distinguished between the state of corporeal stimulation and the

becoming conscious of the same, Augustine demonstrates by an

exact analysis of the act of seeing, that this becoming conscious is

essentially an act of will (intentio animi). And as physical atten

tion is accordingly a matter of the will, so too the activity of the

inner sense (sensus interior) shows a quite analogous dependence

upon the will. Whether we bring our own states and actions as

such to our consciousness or not, depends as truly upon voluntary

reflection as does the intentional consideration of something which

belongs to our memory, and as does the activity of the combining

fantasy when directed toward a definite goal. Finally, the thinking

of the intellect (ratiocinatio), with its judging and reasoning, is

formed completely under the direction of the purposes of the will ;

for the will must determine the direction and the end according to

which the data of outer or inner experience are to be brought under

the general truths of rational insight.

In the case of these cognitions of rational insight the relation

assumes a somewhat more involved form, for in its relation to this

higher divine truth the activity of the human mind cannot be given

the same play as in the case of its intellectual relation to the outer

world and to its own inner world. This is true even on philosophi

cal grounds, for according to the fundamental metaphysical scheme

the active part in the causal connection must belong to the more

universal as the higher and more efficient Being (Sein). The rela

tion of the human mind to this truth, which is metaphysically its

superior, can in the main be only a passive one. The knowledge of

the intelligible world is for Augustine also, essentially illumination,

revelation. Here, where the mind stands in the presence of its crea

tor, it lacks not only the creative, but even the receptive initiative.

Augustine is far from regarding the intuitive knowledge of the

intelligible truths as possibly an independent production of the

1 Cf. principally the eleventh book of the treatise De Trinitate, and besides,

especially W. Kahl, Die Lehre vom Primat des Willens bei Augustinus, Duns

Scotus und Descartes (Strassburg, 1880).

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mind out of its own nature; indeed, he cannot even ascribe to it the

same spontaneity of attention or of directing its consciousness

(intentio) that he ascribes to the empirical cognitions of outer and

inner perception : he must, on the contrary, regard the illumination

of the individual consciousness by the divine truth as essentially an

act of grace (cf. below), in the case of which the individual con

sciousness occupies an expectant and purely receptive attitude.

These metaphysical considerations, which might also have been

possible upon the basis of Neo-Platonism, experience in Augustine s

case a powerful reinforcement by the emphasis which he laid in his

theology upon the divine grace. Knowledge of the truths of reason

is an element in blessedness, and blessedness man owes not to his

own will, but to that of God.

Nevertheless Augustine here, too, sought to save a certain co

operation for the will of the individual, at least at first. He not

only emphasises that God bestows the revelation of his truths upon

him only, who through good endeavour and good morals, i.e. through

the qualities of his will, shows himself a worthy subject for this

revelation ; he teaches also that the appropriation of divine truth is

effected not so much by insight, as through faith or belief. Faith

or belief, however, as ideation plus assent, though without the act

of conception, presupposes indeed the idea of its object, but contains

in the factor of assent, which is determined by no intellectual com

pulsion, an original volitional act of the affirming judgment. The

importance of this fact extends so far, in Augustine s opinion, that

not only in divine and eternal things, but also in the human and

earthly and temporal things, this conviction produced immediately

by the will yields the original elements of thought. The insight

which conceives and comprehends grows out of these elements by

means of the combining reflective procedure of the understanding.

Thus even in the most important things, i.e. in questions of salva

tion, faith in the divine revelation and in its appearance in the tradi

tion of the Church faith dictated by the good will must precede

the knowledge which appropriates and comprehends it intellectually.

Full rational insight is indeed first in dignity, but faith in revelation

is the first in time.

5. In all these considerations of Augustine, the central point

is the conception of the freedom of the will, as a decision, choice, or

assent of the will, independent of the functions of the understand

ing, not conditioned by motives of cognition, but rather determining

these motives without grounds in consciousness for its acts, and

Augustine faithfully exerted himself to maintain this conception

against various objections. In addition to the consciousness of

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ethical and religious responsibility, it is principally the cause of

the divine justice that he here aims to defend : and, on the other

hand, most of his difficulties arise from the attempt to unite un

caused action whose opposite is alike possible and objectively think

able, with the divine prescience. He helps himself here by appealing

to the distinction between eternity (timelessness) and time. In an

extremely acute investigation l he maintains that time has real sig

nificance only for the functions of inner experience as they measure

and compare : its significance for outer experience also arises only

in consequence of this. The so-called foreknowledge of the deity,

which is in itself timeless, has as little causally determining power

for future events as memory has for those of the past. In these

connections, Aristotle is justly regarded as one of the most zealous

and forcible defenders of the freedom of the will.

But in opposition to this view, championed essentially with the

weapons of former philosophy, there now appears in Augustine s

system another line of thought, increasing in force from work to

work, which has its germ in the conception of the Church and in

the doctrine of its redeeming power. Here the principle of histor

ical universality encounters victoriously the principle of the abso

lute certainty of the individual mind. The idea of the Christian

Church, of which Augustine was the most powerful champion, is

rooted in the thought that the whole human race is in need of re

demption. This latter idea, however, excludes the completely unde

termined freedom of the will in the individual man ; for it requires

the postulate that every individual is necessarily sinful, and therefore

in need of redemption. Under the overpowering pressure of this

thought, Augustine set another theory by the side of his theory of

freedom of the will which was so widely carried out in his philo

sophical writings ; and this second theory runs counter to the first

throughout.

Augustine desires to solve the question as to the origin of evil,

which is so important for him personally, and to solve it in

opposition to Manichaeism by the conception of the freedom of

the will, in order to maintain in this, human responsibility and

divine justice; but in his theological system it seems to him to be

sufficient to restrict this freedom of will to Adam, the first man.

The idea of the substantial oneness of the human race an idea

which was a co-operating element in the faith in the redemption of

all by the one Saviour permitted likewise the doctrine that in

1 In the eleventh book of the Confessions. Cf. C. Fortlage, A. De Tempore,

Doctrina (Heidelberg, 1836).

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the one man Adam all humanity had sinned. By the abuse of this

freedom of the will on the part of the first man, the whole human

nature has been so corrupted that it cannot do otherwise than sin

(non posse non peccare) . This loss of freedom applies without ex

ception, to the whole race arising from Adam. Every man brings

with him into the world this corrupted nature which is no longer

capable of good in its own strength or freedom, and this inherited

sin is the punishment for original sin. Just from this it follows

that all men, without exception, are in need of redemption and of

the Church s means of grace. One as little as another deserves to

receive this grace : therefore, thinks Augustine, no injustice can

be seen in the fact that God bestows this grace, to which no one

has any claim, not upon all, but only upon some ; and it is never

known upon whom. But, on the other hand, the divine justice

demands that, at least in the case of some men, the punishment for

Adam s fall should be permanently maintained, that these men,

therefore, should remain excluded from the working of grace and

from redemption. Since, finally, in consequence of their corrupted

nature, all are alike sinful and incapable of any improvement of

themselves, it follows that the choice of the favoured ones takes

place not according to their worthiness (for there are none worthy

before the working of grace), but according to an unsearchable

decree of God. Upon him whom he will redeem he bestows his

revelation with its irresistible power : he whom he does not choose,

he can in nowise be redeemed. Man in his own strength cannot

make even a beginning toward the good : all good comes from God

and only from him.

In the doctrine of predestination, accordingly (and this is its philo

sophical element), the absolute causality of God suppresses the free

will of the individual. The latter is refused both metaphysical

independence and also all spontaneity of action ; the individual is

determined either by his nature to sin or by grace to the good. So

in Augustine s system two powerful streams of thought come into

violent opposition. It will always remain an astonishing fact that

the same man who founded his philosophy upon the absolute and

independent certainty of the individual conscious mind, who threw

the plummet of the most acute examination into the depths of inner

experience and discovered in the will the vital ground of spiritual

personality, found himself forced by the interests of a theological

controversy to a theory of the doctrine of salvation which regards

the acts of the individual will as unalterably determined conse

quences, either of a general corruption or of the divine grace.

Individualism and universalism in the conception of psychical reality

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stand here in bald opposition, and their clashing contradiction is

scarcely concealed by the ambiguity of the word " freedom," which,

in the one line, is defended according to its psychological meaning,

in the other, according to its ethico-religious meaning. The oppo

sition, however, of the two motives of thought which here lie side by

side so irreconcilable, had influence in the succeeding development

of philosophy until long past the Middle Ages.

6. In the light of the doctrine of predestination the grand picture

of the historical development of humanity, which Augustine drew

in the manner and spirit of the old patristic philosophy, takes on

dark colours and peculiarly stiff, inflexible forms. For if not only

the course of the history of salvation taken as a whole, but also,

as in Augustine s system, the position which every individual is to

occupy within it, has been previously fixed by divine decree, one

cannot rid one s self of the gloomy impression that all man s voli

tional life in history, with all its thirst for salvation, sinks to a

play of shadows and puppets, whose result is infallibly fixed from

the beginning.

The spiritual world throughout the whole course of history falls

apart, for Augustine, into two spheres, the realm of God and the

realm of the devil. . To the former belong the angels that have not

fallen, and the men whom God has chosen for his grace ; the other

embraces, together with the evil demons, all those men who are not

predestined to redemption, but are left by God in the state of sin and

guilt : the one is the kingdom of heaven, the other that of the world.

The two occupy in the course of history a relation like that of two

different races which are mingled only in outer action, while in

ternally they are strictly separate. The community of the elect has

no home on earth ; it lives in the higher unity of divine grace. The

community of the condemned, however, is divided within itself by

discord; it fights in earthly kingdoms for the illusory worth of

power and rule. Christian thought at this stage of development

is so little able to master the reality presented by the world, that

Augustine sees in the historical states only the provinces of a com

munity of sinners in hostility to God, condemned to quarrel with

one another. For him, in fact, the kingdom of God is still not of

this world ; and the Church is for him the saving institution of the

divine kingdom, which enters the temporal life.

The course of the world s history under these presuppositions

is so conceived that we find a division entering between the two

realms, which becomes sharper and sharper in the course of history,

and ultimately results in the complete and definitive separation of

the same. In six periods, which correspond to the creative days of

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the Mosaic cosmogony and are attached to dates of Israelitic his

tory, Augustine constructs his history of the world. In this process,

he combines a depreciatory estimate of the Roman world with slight

understanding of the essential nature of the Grecian. The decisive

point in this development is for him, also, the appearance of the

Saviour, by which not only the redemption of those chosen by grace

is brought to completion, but also their separation from the children

of the world. With this begins the last world-period, whose end will

be the Judgment : then after the stress of conflict shall enter the Sab

bath, the peace of the Lord but peace only for the elect ; for those

not predestined to salvation will then be completely separated from

the saints, and entirely given over to the pain of their unhappiness.

However spiritually sublime (though never without attendant

physical imagery) the conception of happiness and pain here pre

sented, and this sublimity is especially noteworthy in the thought

of unhappiness as a weakening of Being, due to the lack of divine

causality, the dualism of the Good and the Evil is yet unmistak

ably, for Augustine, the final issue of the world s history. The man

assailed by so many powerful motives of thought has not overcome

the Manichwism of his youthful belief; he has taken it up into

Christian doctrine. Among the Manichasans the antithesis of

good and evil is held to be original and indelible : with Augustine

this antithesis is regarded as one that has come into being, and yet

as one that is ineradicable. The omnipotent, omniscient, supremely

benevolent God has created a world which is divided forever into

his own realm and that of Satan.

7. Among the complicated problems and ideas of universal his

torical importance which Augustinianism contains, there is still one

to be brought forward. It lies in the conception of blessedness itself

in which all motives of his thought cross. For, strongly as Augus

tine recognised in the will the inmost motive energy of human

nature, deeply as he penetrated the striving after happiness as the

impelling motive of all psychical functions, he yet remained firmly

convinced that the satisfaction of all this stress and urging is to be

found only in beholding divine truth. The highest good is God ; but

God is the truth, and one enjoys truth by beholding it and resting in

its contemplation. All urging of the will is but the path to this

peace in which it ceases. The last task of the will is to be silent in

the gracious working of divine revelation, to remain quiet when

the vision of truth, produced from above, comes over it.

Here are united in common opposition to individualism of will,

the Christian idea of the absolute causality of God, and the contem

plative mysticism of the Neo-Platonists. From both sides, the same

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tendency is at work to bring about the conception of man s sanctifi-

cation as a working of God in him, as a becoming filled and illumined

by the highest truth, as a will-less contemplation of the one, infinite

Being. Augustine, indeed, worked out forcibly the practical conse

quences which the working of grace should have in the earthly life,

purification of the disposition and strictness in the conduct of life,

and just in this is shown the comprehensive breadth of his personal

nature and his spiritual vision. He develops the vigorous energy of

his own combative nature into an ethical doctrine, which, far re

moved from the asceticism of Neo-Platonism with its weariness of

life, sets man in the midst of the world-battle between Good and

Evil as a brave fighter for the heavenly kingdom. But the highest

reward which beckons this fighter for God is yet, for Augustine, not

the restless activity of the will, but the rest of contemplation. For

the temporal life, Augustine demands the full and never-resting

exertion of the struggling and acting soul ; for eternity he offers the

prospect of the peace of becoming absorbed in divine truth. He

indeed designates the state of the blessed as the highest of the

virtues, as love 1 (charitas), but in the eternal blessedness where the

resistance of the world and of the sinful will is no longer to be over

come, where love has no longer any want that must be satisfied,

there this love is no longer anything other than a God-intoxicated

contemplation.

In this duality, also, of the Augustinian ethics, old and new lie

close together. With the tense energy of will which is demanded

for the earthly life, and with the transfer of the ethical judgment

so as to make it apply to the inner disposition, the modern man

appears ; but in the conception of the highest goal of life the ancient

ideal of intellectual contemplation retains the victory.

Here lies in Augustine s doctrine itself a contradiction with the

individualism of the will, here at a decisive point an Aristotelian,

Neo-Platonic element maintains itself, and this internal opposition

unfolds itself in the formation of the problems of the Middle Ages.

### 23. The Controversy over Universals.

Johannes Saresberiensis, Metalogicus, II. cap. 17 f.

J. H. Lowe, Der Kampf zwischen Nnminalismus und Realismus im Mittel-

alter, sein Ursprung und sein Verlauf (Prague, 1876).

The schooling in formal logic which the peoples that entered

upon the scientific movement at the beginning of the Middle Ages

1 In his system the three Christian virtues, faith, hope, and love, are placed

above the practical and dianoetic virtues of Greek ethics.

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were obliged to undergo, developed in connection with the question

as to the logical and metaphysical significance of genera and species

(universalia) . But it would be a grave mistake to suppose that this

question had only the didactic value of serving as a subject for

mental drill, in connection with which the rules of conceptional

thought, division, judgment, and inference, were impressed for cen

turies upon ever new and increasing throngs of scholars. On the

contrary, the tenacity with which the science of the Middle Ages

and it is significant that this occurred independently in the Orient

as well as in the Occident held fast to the elaboration of this

problem in endless discussions, is rather in itself a proof that in this

question a very real and very difficult problem lies before us.

In fact, when Scholasticism, in its timorous beginnings, made the

passage in Porphyry s Introduction 1 to the Categories of Aristotle

which formulated this problem, the starting-point of its own first

attempts at thought, it hit with instinctive sagacity upon precisely

the same problem which had formed the centre of interest during

the great period of Greek philosophy. After Socrates had assigned

to science the task of thinking the world in conceptions, the ques

tion how the class-concepts, or generic conceptions, are related to

reality, became, for the first time, a chief motive of philosophy. It

produced the Platonic doctrine of Ideas and the Aristotelian logic ;

and if the latter had as its essential content (cf. 12) the doctrine

of the forms in which the particular is dependent upon the uni

versal, it is easy to understand that even from so scanty remains

and fragments of this doctrine as were at the service of the earliest

Middle Ages, the same problem must arise with all its power for the

new race also. And it is likewise easy to understand that the old

enigmatic question worked upon the nai ve minds of the Middle

Ages, untrained in thought, in a manner similar to that in which it

worked upon the Greeks. In fact, the delight in logical dispute, as

this developed after the eleventh century at the schools of Paris,

finds its counterpart as a social phenomenon only in the debates of

the philosophers at Athens, and in these latter, too, as numerous

anecdotes prove, the question as to the reality of universals, which

was connected with the doctrine of Ideas, played a leading part.

Nevertheless the problem was renewed under conditions that

were essentially less favourable. When this question emerged for

the Greeks, they possessed a wealth of proper scientific experience

1 The formulation of the problem in the translation of Bogthius is as follows :

" . . . de (/eneribus et speciebus sive sitbsistant sire in nolis nitdis intellectibus

posita sint, sive. subsistentin corporalia an incur/iornlia, et utrum separata a

sensibilibus an in sensibilibus posita et circa hcnc consistentia. . . ."

CHAP. 1, 23.] Controversy over Universal\* : Scotus Erigena. 289

and a store of real information and knowledge, which, if not always,

yet for the most part and on the whole, prevented them from mak

ing their discussion solely a game with the abstractions of formal

logic. But mediaeval science, especially in its beginnings, lacked

just this counterpoise, and on this account was obliged to move so

long in a circle with the attempt to construct its metaphysics out

of purely logical considerations.

That the Middle Ages, in their turn, engaged and persisted so

pertinaciously in this controversy which had previously been waged

principally between Plato and the Cynics, and afterward between

the Academy, the Lyceum, and the Stoa, was not due solely to the

fact that in consequence of the defective character of their tradi

tions the thinkers of the Middle Ages knew as good as nothing of

those earlier debates ; it had yet a deeper ground. The feeling of

the peculiar, intrinsic worth of personality, which had gained so

powerful expression in Christianity and especially in the Augustin-

ian doctrine, found the liveliest echo and the strongest sympathy

among precisely those tribes which were called to become the new

bearers of civilisation ; and in the hearts of these same peoples

surged also the youthful delight in richly coloured reality, in the

living, particular appearance. But with the Church doctrine they

received a philosophy which, with the measured calm of Greek

thought, conceived the essential nature of things to lie in universal

connections, a metaphysics which identified the stages of logical

universality with intensities of Being of varying worths. In this

lay an inconsistency which covertly asserted itself, even in Augus-

tinianism, and became a constant stimulus for philosophical reflec

tion.

1. The question as to the individual s ground of Being or exis

tence, from which mediaeval thought never became free, was the

more natural for it just at its beginning in proportion as the Neo-

Platonic metaphysics still maintained itself under the veil of a

Christian mysticism. Nothing could be more adapted to call out

the contradiction of a natural individualism than the high degree

of consistency with which Scotus Erigena carried through the funda

mental thoughts of the Neo-Platonic Realism. Perhaps no philoso

pher has expressed more clearly and frankly than he the final

consequences of the metaphysics which, from the standpoint of the

Socratic-Platonic principle that the truth, and therefore also Being,

is to be sought in the universal, identifies the stages of universality

with those of the intensity and priority of Being. The universal

(the class-concept or logical genus) appears here as the essential and

original reality, which produces from itself and contains within itself

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the particular (the species and ultimately the individual). The

universals are, therefore, not only substances (res; hence the name

" Realism"), but, as contrasted with the corporeal individual things,

they are the more primitive, the producing and determining sub

stances ; they are the more Real substances, and they are the more

Real in proportion as they are the more universal. In this conception,

therefore, the logical relations of concepts immediately become

metaphysical relations ; formal arrangement contains real signifi

cance. Logical subordination becomes changed into a production

and inclusion of the particular by the general ; logical partition and

determination become transformed into a causal process by means

of which the universal takes on form and unfolds itself in the

particular.

The pyramid of concepts, thus raised to a metaphysical signifi

cance, culminates in the concept of the deity as the most universal.

But the last product of abstraction, the absolutely universal, is that

which has no determinations (of. p. 250). Hence this doctrine

becomes identical with the old "negative theology," according to

which we can predicate of God only what he is not ; 1 and yet here,

too, this highest Being is designated, quite in accord with the

thought of Plotinus, as the "uncreated, but self-creating Nature."

For this most universal Being produces out of itself all things;

these, therefore, contain nothing else than its manifestations, and

are related to it as particular specimens or instances are to the

class ; they are in it and exist only as its modes of appearance.

The result of these presuppositions is thus a logical pantheism : all

things of the world are " theophanies " ; the world is God developed

into the particular, proceeding out of himself to take on a definite

form (deus explicitas). God and the world are one. The same

"Nature" (&lt;wris) is, as creative unity, God, and as created plurality,

the world.

The process of unfolding (egressus) proceeds in the graded scale

of logical universality. Out of God comes at first the intelligible

world as "the Nature which is created and itself creates," the realm

of universals, of Ideas which (as vdi in the sense of Plotinus) form

the working forces in the sensuous world of phenomena. The

Ideas are built up as a heavenly hierarchy according to their various

grades of universality, and therefore also of intensity of Being, and

in connection with this thought Christian Mysticism constructs a

1 In carrying out this Philonic thought (cf. p. 237) the Church Fathers had

already employed a course of thought which proceeds by successive abstraction

to the concept of God as the undetermined. Cf., e.g., Clement Alex. Strum.

V. 11 (689).

CHAP. 1, 23.] Controversy over Universals : Scotus Eriyena. 291

doctrine of angels after a Neo-Platonic pattern. But in every case

beneath the mythical covering the important thought is really

active, that real dependence consists in logical dependence ; the

logical consequence, by which the particular follows from the

general, is spuriously substituted for the causal relation.

Hence, then, even in the world of the senses, it is only the uni

versal that is properly active and efficient : corporeal things, as a

whole, form the " Nature which is created and does not itself

create." 1 In this world the individual thing is not as such active;

it is rather active according to the proportion of universal attri

butes which attain manifestation in it. The individual thing of

sense, accordingly, possesses the least force of Being, the weakest

and completely dependent species of reality : the . Neo-Platonic

Idealism is maintained by Scotus Erigeria in full.

To the stages of unfolding corresponds in a reverse order the

return of all things into God (regressus), the resolution of the

world of individual forms into the eternal primitive Being, the dei

fication of the world. So thought, as the final goal of all genera

tion and change, as the extinction of all that is particular, God is

designated as " the Nature which neither is created nor creates " :

it is the ideal of motionless unity, of absolute rest at the end of the

world-process. All theophanies are destined to return into the

unity of the divine All-Being, that unity which knows no dis

tinctions. Thus, even in the final destiny of things, the superior

reality of the universal, which swallows up all that is particular,

preserves itself.

2. As in antiquity (cf. 11, 5), so here, in consequence of the

effort to assure truth and reality to universals, the peculiar thought

of a graded scale of Being appears. Some things (universals), is

the doctrine, are more than others (particulars). " Being" is looked

upon as, like other qualities, capable of comparison, of increase and

diminution ; it belongs to some things more than to others. So it

became the custom to think that the concept of Being (esse, existere)

has a relation to that which is (essentia), and a relation of different

degrees of intensity, just as other marks and qualities are related

to the objects in which they are formed. As a thing possesses more

or less extension, force, permanence, so it has also more or less

"Being"; and as it can receive or lose other qualities, so it can

receive or lose that of Being. This line of thought, peculiar to

Realism, must be kept in mind to understand a great number of the

1 It need only be briefly mentioned that this "division of Nature" obviously

recalls the Aristotelian distinction of the unmoved mover, the moved mover,

and that which neither moves nor is moved. Cf. 13, 5.

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metaphysical theories of the Middle Ages. It explains, in the first

place, the most important doctrine which Realism produced, the

ontological argument for the existence of God which Anselm of Can

terbury brought forward.

The more universality, the more Keality. From this it follows

that if God is the most universal being, he is also the most Real ;

if he is the absolutely universal being, he is also the absolutely Real

being, ens realissimum. He has, therefore, according to the concep

tion of him, not only the comparatively greatest Reality, but also

absolute Reality ; that is, a Reality than which a greater and higher

cannot be thought.

But through the whole development which this line of thought

had already taken in antiquity, we find that the worth-predicate of

perfection was inseparably fused with the conception of Being.

The degrees of Being are those of perfection ; the more anything

is, the more perfect it is, and, vice versa, the more perfect anything

is, the more it is. 1 The conception of the highest Being is, there

fore, also that of an absolute perfection ; that is, of a perfection such

that it cannot be thought higher and greater : ens perfectissimum.

In accordance with these presuppositions, Anselm is perfectly

correct in his conclusion that, from the mere conception of God as

most perfect and most real Being, it must be possible to infer his

existence. But to do this he attempts various modes of proof. In

his Monologium he follows the old cosmological argument that

because there is Being at all, a highest and absolute Being must

be assumed from which all else that exists has its Being, and which

itself exists only from itself, according to its own essential nature

(aseitas). Whereas every individual existent entity can be also

thought as non-existent, and therefore owes the reality of its essence

not to itself, but to another (the Absolute), the most perfect Being

can be thought only as being or existent, and exists accordingly

only by virtue of the necessity of its own nature. God s essence

(and only God s) involves his existence. The nerve of this argu

ment is thus ultimately the Eleatic basal thought, eortv etvcu, Being

is, and cannot be thought otherwise than as being or existing.

Anselm, however, involved this same thought in a peculiar com

plication, while he intended to simplify it and render it independent

in itself. In the Proslogium he entered upon the ontological argu

ment, properly so called, which maintains that without any reference

to the Being of other things, the mere conception of the most per-

1 A principle which lies at the basis of Augustine s theodicy, in so far as with

both the existent is held to be eo ipso good, and the evil, on the contrary, as not truly existent.

CHAP. 1, 23.] Controversy over Univermh : Anselm. 293

feet Being involves its Reality. Inasmuch as this conception is

thought, it possesses psychical reality : the most perfect being is as

a content in consciousness (esse in intellectu). But if it existed

only as a content in consciousness, and not also in metaphysical

reality (esse etiam in re), a still more perfect being could evidently

be thought, which should possess not only psychical, but also meta

physical reality ; and thus the former would not be the most perfect

being possible. It belongs, accordingly, to the conception of the

most perfect being (quo majus cogitari non potest) that it possesses

not only reality in thought, but also absolute reality.

It is obvious that Anselm in this formulation was not fortunate

in his shift, and that what hovered before him attained in this

proof but a very awkward expression. For it takes little acuteness

to see that Anselm proved only that if God is thought (as most

perfect being), he must be thought also necessarily as being or

existent, and cannot be thought as non-existent. But the ontologi-

cal argument of the Proslogium did not show even in the remotest

degree that God, i.e. that a most perfect being, must be thought.

The necessity for this stood fast for Anselm personally, not only

because of the conviction of his faith, but also by the cosmological

argumentation of the Monologium. When he believed that he

could dispense with this presupposition and with the help of the

mere conception of God arrive at the proof of his existence, he

exemplified in typical manner the fundamental idea of Realism,

which ascribed to conceptions without any regard to their genesis

and basis in the human mind, the character of truth, i.e. of

Reality. It was on this ground alone that he could attempt to

reason from the psychical to the metaphysical reality of the concep

tion of God.

The polemic of Gaunilo, therefore, in a certain respect hit the

vulnerable point. He argued that according to the methods of

Anselm, in quite the same manner the reality of any idea whatever,

e.g. that of an island, if the mark of perfection were only included

within it, might be proved. For the most perfect island, if it were

not really in existence, would evidently be surpassed in perfection

by the real island, which should possess the same other marks; the

former would be inferior to the latter in the attribute of Being.

But instead of showing in his rejoinder, as might have been ex

pected, that the conception of a perfect island is a completely unnec

essary arbitrary fiction, or that this conception contains an inner

contradiction, while the conception of the most real being is neces

sary and not contradictory, Anselm expatiates further upon his

argument, that if the most perfect being is in the intellect, it must

be also in re.

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However slight the cogency of this attempted proof remains for

him who does not, as Anselm does without acknowledging it, regard

the conception of an absolute Being as a necessity of thought, the

ontological argument is yet valuable as the characteristic feature of

mediseval Realism, of which it forms the most consistent expression.

For the thought that the highest being owes its reality only to its

own essential nature, and that therefore this reality must be capable

of being proved from its conception alone, is the natural conclusion

of a doctrine which traces the Being of things of perception back to

a participation in conceptions, and again within the conceptions

themselves sets up a graded scale of reality, employing the degree

of universality as the standard.

3. When now the question arose as to the kind of reality which

belongs to universals, and as to their relation to the individual

things known to the senses, mediaeval Realism found itself involved

in difficulties quite similar to those which had faced the Platonic

Realism. The thought of a second, higher, immaterial world, which

at that former period had to be born, was now indeed received as a

complete and almost self-evident doctrine, and the religiously dis

posed thinking could be only sympathetic in its attitude toward the

Nee-Platonic conception of the Ideas as contents of the divine mind.

Following the pattern of the Platonic Timseus, whose mythical mode

of presentation was favourable to this conception, Bernard of

Chartres sketched an imaginative cosmogonic work of fantastic

grotesqueness, and we find with his brother Theodoric, attempts, sug

gested by the same source, to construct a symbolism of numbers,

which undertook not only, as was done in other instances, to develop

the dogma of the Trinity, but also to develop further fundamental

metaphysical conceptions out of the elements of unity, likeness, and

unlikeness. 1

In addition to this question concerning the archetypal reality of

the Ideas in the mind of God, the question is also, what significance

is to be conceded to them in the created world. Extreme Realism,

as it had been maintained at the outset by William of Champeaux,

taught the full substantiality of the class-concept in this world also ;

the universal is present in all its individuals as the undivided

essence, everywhere identical with itself. The class accordingly

appears as the unitary substance, and the specific marks of the indi

viduals belonging to it appear as the accidents of this substance.

It was Abelard s objection that according to this theory mutually

contradictory accidents would have to be ascribed to the same sub-

1 Cf. the extracts in Haureau, Hist. d. I. ph. sc., I. 396 ff.

CHAP. 1, 23.] Controversy over Universals : Realism. 295

stance, which first forced the defender of Realism to give up this

extreme position and restrict himself to the defence of the proposi

tion, that the class exists in the individuals, individualiter; 1 i.e.

that its universal, identical essence clothes itself in each particular

example in a particular substantial Form. This view was in touch

with the conception of the Neo-Platonists, which had been main

tained by Boethius and Augustine and also occasionally mentioned

in the literature of the intervening period, and its exposition moves

readily in the Aristotelian terminology, according to which the

universal appears as the more indeterminate possibility which

realises itself in individuals by means of their peculiar Forms.

The conception is then no longer substance in the proper sense, but

the common substratum which takes on different forms in individ

ual instances.

Walter of Mortagne sought to remove the difficulty in another

way, by designating the individualising of the classes or genera to

species, and of the species to individual things, as the entering of

the substratum into different states (status), and yet regarding

these states as realiter specialising determinations of the universal.

In both these lines of thought, however, Realism was only with

difficulty held back from a final consequence which at the first lay

in nowise within the purpose of its orthodox supporters. The re

lation of the universal to the particular might be regarded as the

self-realising of the substratum into individual Forms, or as its

specialisation into individual states, in either case one came ulti

mately in the ascending line of abstract conceptions to the idea of

the ens generalissimtim, whose self-realisations, or whose modified

states, formed in descending line the genera, species, and individuals,

i.e. to the doctrine that in all phenomena of the world only the one

divine substance is to be seen. Pantheism inhered in the blood of

Realism by reason of its Neo-Platonic descent and was always

making its appearance here and there; and opponents like Abelard

did not fail to cast this consequence in the face of Realism.

Meanwhile realistic pantheism did not come to be expressly

maintained in this period; on the other hand, Realism in its theory ,

of universals found an instrument for establishing some of the |

fundamental dogmas, and therefore rejoiced in the approbation of

the Church. The assumption of a substantial reality of the logi

cal genera not only seemed to make possible a rational exposi

tion of the doctrine of the Trinity, but also, as was shown by

Anselm and Odo (Odardus) of Cambrey, proved to be a fit phil-

1 For the reading " indifferenter," cf. Lowe, op. cit., 49 ff., and Cl. Bauuikcr,

Arch. f. Gesch. d. Ph., X. 257.

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osophical basis for the doctrines of inherited sin and vicarious

satisfaction.

4. On the same grounds, we find at first the reverse lot befalling

Nominalism, which during this period remained more repressed and

stifled. Its beginnings l were harmless enough. It grew out of the

fragments of Aristotelian logic, in particular out of the treatise De

Categoriis. In this the individual things of experience were desig

nated as the true "first" substances, and here the logico-grammatical

rule was propounded that "substance" could not be predicate in

a judgment: res non predicatur. Since now the logical significance

of universals is essentially that of affording the predicates in the

judgment, (and in the syllogism), it seemed to follow this the

commentary Super Porphyrium had already taught that univer

sals could not be substances.

What are they, then ? It could be read in Marcianus Capella that

a universal was the comprehension of many particularities by one

name (nomen), by the same word (vox); but a word, Boethius had

defined as a "motion of the air produced by the tongue." With

this all elements of the thesis of extreme Nominalism were given :

universals are nothing but collective names, common designations

for different things, sounds (flatus vocis), which serve as signs for a

multiplicity of substances or their accidents.

In what degree the thus formulated Nominalism, which in this

extreme form must have ignored even the real occasions for such

collective names, was actually propounded and defended during that

period 2 can no longer be determined. 3 But the metaphysics of indi

vidualism which corresponds to such a theory of knowledge meets us

clearly and firmly with the claim that only individual things are to

be regarded as substances, as truly real. This was doubtless most

sharply expressed by Roscellinus, when he presented it in a two

fold aspect : as the comprehension of many individuals under the

same name is only a human designation, so, too, the distinguishing

of parts in individual substances is only an analysis for human

thought and communication ; 4 the truly real is the individual thing,

and that alone.

1 Cf. C. S. Barach, Zur Geschichte de.s Nominalismus vor Roscellin (Vienna,

1866).

2 It is certain that this did not as yet occur in the beginnings of Nominalism

(with Eric of Auxerre, with the author of the commentary Super Porphyrium,

etc.), for with these writers we find at the same time the expression of Boethius

that genus is substantialis similitude\* ex diversis speciebus in cogitation? collecta.

3 John of Salisbury says (Policr. VII. 12 ; cf. Metal. II. 17) that this opinion

vanished again with its author lloscellinus.

4 The example of the house and its wall, which, according to Abelard (Ouvr.

Ined. 471), he employed in this connection, was certainly the most unfortunate

that could be thought of. How inferior such considerations are to the begin

nings of Greek thought!

CHAP. 1, 23.] Controversy over Universal\* : Nominalism. 297

The individual, however, is that which is given in the world of

sensible reality ; hence for this metaphysics, knowledge consists

only in the experience of the senses. That this sensualism appeared

in the train of Nominalism, that there were men who allowed their

thinking to go on entirely in corporeal images, we are assured, not

only by Anselm, but also by Abelard : but who these men were

and how they carried out their theory we do not learn.

This doctrine became momentous through its application to theo

logical questions by Berengar of Tours and Roscellinus. The one

contested, in the doctrine of the Sacrament, the possibility of the

transmutation of the substance while the former accidents were

retained ; the second reached the consequence that the three persons

of the divine Trinity were to be looked upon as three different

substances, agreeing only in certain qualities and workings (tri-

theism).

5. In the literary development of these antitheses Realism passed

current as Platonic, Nominalism as Aristotelian. The latter desig

nation was evidently much more distorted than the former, but

when we consider the defective nature of the transmitted material,

we can understand that the mediating tendencies which thrust

themselves in between Realism and Nominalism introduced them

selves with the endeavour to harmonise the two great thinkers of

antiquity. Of such attempts, two are chiefly worthy of mention :

from the party of Realism the so-called Indifferentism, from that of

Nominalism the doctrine of Abelard.

As soon as Realism abandoned the doctrine of the separate

existence of the concepts (the Platonic ^o&gt;ptcr/xos) and supported

only the " universalia in re," the tendency asserted itself to con

ceive of the different stages of universality as the real states of one

and the same substratum. One and the same absolute reality is, in

its different " status," animate being, man, Greek, Socrates. As the

substratum of these states the moderate Realists regarded the uni

versal, and ultimately the ens realissimum; it was therefore a

significant concession to Nominalism when others made the indi

vidual the supporter of these states. The truly existent, these

latter thinkers conceded, is the individual thing, but the individual

thing supports within itself as essential determinations of its own

nature certain qualities and groups of qualities which it has in

common with others. This real similarity (consimilitudo) is the

indifferent ("not different ") element in all these individuals, and

thus the genus is present in its species, the species in its indi

vidual examples, in diffe renter. Adelard of Bath appears as the

chief supporter of this line of thought, yet it must have had a

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wider extension, perhaps with a somewhat stronger nominalistic

accent. 1

6. But it was Abelard 2 with his all-sided activity who formed

the vigorous centre in the controversy over universals. The pupil

and at the same time the opponent both of Roscellinus and of

William of Champeaux, he fought Nominalism and Realism each

by means of the other, and since he takes the weapons of his

polemic now from the one side now from the other, it could not fail

to result that his position should be interpreted and judged oppo

sitely. 3 And yet the outlines of this position are clear and dis

tinct before us. In his polemic against all kinds of Realism, the

thought that the logical consequence of Realism is pantheism

returns so frequently and energetically that we must see in it, not

merely a convenient weapon for use in the ecclesiastical conditions

then prevailing, but rather the expression of an individualistic con

viction easy to understand in the case of a personality so energetic,

self-conscious, and proudly self-reliant. But this individuality had

at the same time its inmost essence in clear, sharp, intellectual

activity, in genuine French rationality. Hence its no less powerful

opposition against the sensualistic tendencies of Nominalism.

Universals, Abelard teaches, cannot be things, but just as little

can they be mere words. The word (vox) as a complex of sounds,

is indeed something singular ; it can acquire universal meaning only

mediately, by becoming a predicate (serrao). Such an employment

of a word for a predicate is possible only through conceptional

thought (conceptus), which, by comparing the contents of percep

tion, gains that which is by its nature adapted to become a predicate

(quod de pluribus natum est prcedicari) . 4 The universal is then the

conceptual predicate (Sermonism) , or the concept itself (Conceptual-

ism). 5 But if the universal as such gains its existence first in

thought and judgment, and in the predicate which is possible only

by this means, and exists only there, it is not therefore entirely

without relations to absolute reality. Universals could not be the

indispensable forms of all knowledge, as they in fact actually are,

if there "vyere not something in the nature of things which we

1 According to the statements in the treatise De Generibus et Speciebus and

the communications of Abelard in his gloss on Isagoge. It seems, too, that Wil

liam of Champeaux inclined toward Indifferentism at the last.

2 Cf. S. M. Deutsch, Peter Abaelard, ein kritischer Theolog. des zwolften

Jahrhnnderts (Leips. 1883).

8 Thus Hitter makes him a Realist ; Haureau, a Nominalist.

\* Cf. Arist. De Interpr. 7, 17 a 39.

5 It seems that Abelard at different times emphasised sometimes the one

alternative, sometimes the other, and perhaps his school also developed differ

ently in accordance with these two lines of thought.

CHAP. 1, 23.] Controversy over Universals : Abelard. 299

apprehend and predicate in these universals. This something is the

likeness or similarity (conformitas) of the essential characteristics

of individual substances. 1 Not as numerical or substantial identity,

but as a multiplicity with like qualities, does the universal

exist in Nature, and it becomes a unitary concept which makes

predication possible, only when it has been apprehended and con

ceived by human thought. Even Abelard, however, explains this

likeness of character in a multiplicity of individuals upon the

hypothesis that God created the world according to archetypes which

he carried in his mind (noys). Thus, according to his view, the

universals exist firstly, before the things, as conceptus mentis in God ;

secondly, in the things, us likeness of the essential characteristics of

individuals; thirdly, after things, in the human understanding as its

concepts and predicates acquired by comparative thought.

Thus, in Abelard the different lines of thought of the time

become united. But he had developed the individual elements of

this theory incidentally, partly in connection with his polemic, and

perhaps, also, at different times with varying emphasis on this or

that element : a systematic solution of the whole problem he never

gave. As regards the real question at issue he had advanced so far

that it was essentially his theory that became the ruling doctrine in

the formula accepted by the Arabian philosophers (Avicenna), "uni-

versalia ante multiplicitatem, in multiplicitate et post multiplidtatem ; "

to universals belongs equally a significance ante rem as regards the

divine mind, in re as regards Nature, and post rem as regards human

knowledge. And since Thomas and Duns Scotus in the main agreed

in this view, the problem of universals, which, to be sure, has not

yet been solved, 2 came to a preliminary rest, to come again into the

foreground when Nominalism was revived (cf. 27).

1 Others, who in the main had the same thought, e.g. Gilbert de la Porree,

aided themselves with the Aristotelian distinction between first and second

substances, or between substance and subsistence ; yet Gilbert uses the latter

terms in a changed meaning as compared with their use by Abelard.

2 Kven if the problem as to the universals be restricted, according to the

mode of Scholasticism, to the reality of the class-concepts, the problem has

gone through essentially new phases in its further development, and cannot be

regarded as finally solved by the position taken by science to-day. Behind this,

however, rises the more general and more difficult question, what metaphysical

significance belongs to those universal determinations, in a knowledge of which

all explanatory science practically consists. Cf. H. Lotze, Logik (Leips. 1874),

313-321. [Kng. tr. ed. by B. Bosanquet, Oxford and N.Y. 1888.]

To the investigators of to-day, therefore, who would throw the controversy

over universals to the lumber pile of past theories, or treat it as a long-outgrown

children s disease, so long as they do not know how to state with complete

certainty and clearness in what consists the metaphysical reality and efficiency

of that which we call a law of Nature, we must still cry, " mutato nomine de te

fnltiln narrata." Cf., also, (). Leibmann, Zur Analysis der Wirklichkeit (2d

ed., Strassburg, 1880), 313 ff., 471 ff., and Gedanken und Thatsachen (1 Heft,

Strassburg, 1882), 89 ff.

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7. But Abelard has a still greater significance than that due to

this central position in the controversy over universals, for he mani

fested in his own person, and expressed in typical form, the attitude

which the dialectic, unfolding in connection with that controversy,

occupied in the mental and spiritual life of that time. He is, so

far as it was possible within the limits of the ideas of his time, the

spokesman of free science, the prophet of the newly awakened im

pulse toward real and independent knowledge. Abelard (and with

him Gilbert) is first of all a rationalist ; thought is for him the norm

of truth. Dialectic has the task of distinguishing between true

and false. He may, indeed, subject himself to revelation preserved

in tradition, but, he says, we believe divine revelation only because it

is reasonable. Hence dialectic has, in his case, no longer really the

task which Anselm, following Augustine, prescribed it, of making

the content of faith comprehensible for the intellect ; he demands

for it also the critical right of deciding in doubtful cases according

to its own rules. Thus, in the treatise "Sic et Non" he set the

views of the Church Fathers over against each other to their recip

rocal disintegration dialectically, in order to find at last what is

worthy of belief only in what is capable of proof. So, too, in his

Dialogus, the cognising reason appears as judge over the various

religions, and while Abelard regards Christianity as the ideal con

summation of the history of religions, there are expressions in his

works x in which he reduces the content of Christianity to the origi

nal moral law, which was re-established by Jesus in its purity.

From this standpoint, too, Abelard was the first to win once more

a free, unbiassed view for the interpretation of antiquity. Little

as he knew of them, he was an admirer of the Greeks ; he sees in

their philosophers Christs before Christianity, and regarding men

like Socrates and Plato as inspired, he asks (reversing the thought

of the Church Fathers, cf. p. 223, note 5) whether religious tradi

tion may not perhaps have been partly created by these philoso

phers. Christianity is regarded by him as the philosophy of the

Greeks made democratic.

Abelard, like almost all the " Enlighteners " of the Middle Ages, 2

was an obedient son of the Church. But if this fact were to put us

in error as to the significance of his personality in the line just

mentioned, a significance rather for the history of religion and

civilisation than as producing something philosophically new, it

would be sufficient to take into account the attacks which he met.

1 Cf. the evidence for what follows in Reuter, Gesch. der Aufklarung im

f.-A., I. 183 ff.

2 A. Harnack, Dogmengeschichte, III. 322.

CHAP. 1, 24.] Dualism of Body and Soul. 301

In fact, his controversy with Bernard of Clairvaux is the conflict of

knowledge with faith, of reason with authority, of science with the

Church. And if Abelard lacked ultimately the weight and staying

power of personality to prevail in such a contest, 1 it will be remem

bered, on the other hand, that a science such as the twelfth century

could offer even aside from the external power to which the

Church at that time had attained must have been inferior to the

mighty inward strength of faith, even if it had not been supported

by so great and high a personality. For that bold postulate, so full

of the future, that only unprejudiced scientific insight should deter

mine faith, what means did it then possess for its fulfilment ?

Its only means were the hollow rules of dialectic ; and the content

which this science had to exhibit, it owed just to that tradition

against which it rebelled with its intellectualistic criticism. This

science lacked the material strength to carry out the part to which

she felt herself called ; but she set herself a problem which, while

she herself was not able to solve it, has never again vanished from

the memory of European peoples.

We hear, indeed, of the disturbing practices of those who would

have everything treated only " scientifically " ; 2 complaints multiply

after the time of Anselm over the growing rationalism of the Zeitgeist,

over the evil men who will believe only what they can comprehend

and prove, over the Sophists who, with impudent dexterity, know

how to dispute pro et contra, over the " deniers," who from ration

alists are said to have become materialists and nihilists ; but not

even the names of the men who answer to this description have

been preserved, to say nothing of their doctrines. And just this

lack in proper material of its own was the reason that the dialectic

movement, whose prince was Abelard, in spite of all its zeal and all

its acuteness, ran out and became exhausted without direct and

immediate results.

### 24. The Dualism of Body and Soul.

On these grounds it is explicable that in the twelfth and, in part,

even in the eleventh century, we find the feeling of the unfruitful-

ness of dialectic as widely extended as the feverish impulse to

attain through it to true knowledge. A tendency that indicates

disillusion is manifested in this period by the side of the ardent

desire for knowledge. Discontented with the subtilties of dialectic,

which, even in men like Anselm, had laid itself under obligation to

1 Cf. Th. Ziegler, AbaelarcTs Ethica, in Strassburg. Abh. z. Philos. (Freiburg,

1884), p. 221.

2 " Puri philosophi."

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place the ultimate mysteries of faith upon a rational basis, some

plunged from unfruitful theory into practical life, " in das Rauschen

der Zeit, ins Rollen der Begebenheit," into the rush of time, the

rolling of events, others plunged into a revelry in supra-rational

Mysticism ; others, finally, into diligent work in empirical research.

All the opposites, into which an intellectual activity that is predom

inantly logical can pass over, develop by the side of dialectic, and

take their position against it in a more or less firmly concluded

league, Practice, Mysticism, and Empiricism.

There resulted from this at first a peculiarly distorted relation to

scientific tradition. Aristotle was known only as the father of

formal logic and master of dialectic, and in consequence of this igno

rance was regarded as the hero of the purely intellectual mode of

considering the world. Plato, on the contrary, was known partly

as the creator of the doctrine of Ideas (unwittingly falsified in

accordance with Neo-Platonic processes), partly, by virtue of the

preservation of the Timceus, as the founder of a philosophy of

Nature whose fundamental teleological character found the live

liest assent in religious thought. Hence when Gerbert, as a counter

poise against the pride of dialectic in which he himself had at first

made some not very successful attempts, commended the study of

Nature, to which he had been stimulated by the example of the

Arabians, and which corresponded to his own vigorous practical

bent toward active life, he could count on approval for this en

deavour only among men who, like him, were working toward an

extension of material information, and who, in aid of this, were

appropriating the results of ancient researches. Thus the return to

antiquity makes here its first appearance as the source of material

knowledge in opposition to the Aristotelian dialectic, a first weak

Renaissance which, half humanistic, half naturalistic, aims to gain

a living content of knowledge. 1 Gerbert s disciple, Fulbert (died

1029), opened the school of Chartres, which, in the following period,

became the seat of the Platonism that was intimately associated

with the study of Nature. Here worked the brothers Theodoric

and Bernard of Chartres ; from this school William of Conches

received his tendency. In their writings the powerful stimulus of

classical antiquity unites with the interest of an active and vigorous

1 The cloister Monte Cassino in Italy formed one of the main seats of this

movement. Here (about 1050) the monk Constantinus Africanus worked, who,

as is known to have been the case also with the I latonist Adelard of Bath,

gathered his learning on his journeys in the Orient, and was especially active

in the translation of medical treatises by Hippocrates and Galen. The effects

of the activity in this cloister are shown not only in literature, but also in the

founding of the famous school of Salerno in the middle of the twelfth century.

CHAP, l, 24.] Body and Soul : School of Chartres. 303

knowledge of Nature. We see here one of the most peculiar shift-

ings that have occurred in the history of literature. Plato and

Aristotle have exchanged their roles : the latter appears as the ideal

of an abstract science of conceptions, the former as the starting-

point for a concrete knowledge of Nature. The knowledge of ex

ternal reality that meets us in this period of mediaeval science is

attached to the name of Plato. So far as there is a natural science

in this age, it is that of the Platonists, of a Bernard of Chartres,

of a William of Conches, and their associates. 1

But this disposition toward concrete reality, which makes the

Platonists of the Middle Ages conspicuous as contrasted with the

high-soaring metaphysics of the dialecticians, assumed still another

form, which was much more valuable. Incapable as yet of gaining

from outer experience better results than those already at its hand

in the transmitted Greek science, the empirical impulse of the

Middle Ages directed its activity to the investigation of the mental

life, and unfolded the full energy of real observation and acute

analysis in the domain of inner experience in psychology. This is

the field of scientific work in which the Middle Ages attained the

most valuable results. 2 In this, the experience of practical life as

well as that of the sublimest piety was filled with a substantial con

tent, and as such set itself in opposition to the dialectical play of

conceptions.

1. The natural leader in this field was Augustine, whose psychologi

cal views exercised a mastery that was the stronger in proportion as

his views were interwoven with the current religious conviction, and

in proportion, also, to the slight extent to which the Aristotelian

psychology was known. But Augustine had maintained in his

system the complete dualism which regarded the soul as an imma

terial substance, and man as a union of two substances, body and

soul. Just for this reason he could riot expect to gain a knowledge

of the soul from .its relations to the body, and took with full con

sciousness of his procedure the standpoint of inner experience.

The new principle of method which had thus arisen from meta

physical presuppositions could unfold itself undisturbed so long as

the monistic metaphysical psychology of the Peripatetic school re-

1 This humanistic natural science of the early Middle Ages was not at all

discriminating in its adoption of ancient tradition ; so, for example, if we may

trust the account of Walter of St. Victor (in the extracts made by Bulaeus,

Miyne, Vol. 190, p. 1170), William of Conches regarded an atomistic conception

of Nature as capable of union with his Platonism. (Migne, Vol. 90, pp. 1132 ff.).

\* Cf. for this and for what follows (as also for 27, later) the articles by

II. Siebeck in Vols. I.-III. of the Archiv fur Geschichtc der Philosophic, and

also in Vols. U3, 94, Zeitschrift fur Philos. u. philos. Krit. (1888-90).

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mained unknown. And this unfolding was furthered emphatically

by those needs which brought the Middle Ages to psychology.

Faith sought knowledge of the soul for the purpose of the soul s

salvation, and this salvation was found just in those transcendent

activities through which the soul, estranged from the body, strives

toward a higher world. It was, therefore, principally the Mystics

who sought to spy out the secrets of the inner life, and thus became

psychologists.

Weightier and philosophically more significant than the individual

doctrines propounded in this line, which were often very fantastic

and hazy, is the fact that by means of these and connected theories,

the dualism of the sensuous and super-sensuous worlds was maintained

in its full strength, and thus formed a strong counterpoise to the

Neo-Platonic monism. But it was not destined to exercise this

metaphysical influence till later: at first, in the more limited form

of the anthropological dualism of body and soul, it became the

starting-point for psychology as the science of inner experienced

It is, therefore, a very noteworthy phenomenon that the sup

porters of this psychology as " natural science of the inner sense,"

as it was later called, are precisely the same men who are faithfully

exerting themselves to gain a knowledge of the outer world from all

available material. Having turned away from dialectic, they seek a

knowledge of what is real in experience, a philosophy of Nature ;

but they divide this into two completely separated fields, physica

corporis and physica animce. Among the Platonists the preference

for the study of external Nature is predominant, among the Mystics

that for the study of the internal Nature. 2

2. But we must regard as the characteristic, the essentially new

and beneficial mark of this empirical psychology, the endeavour,

not only to classify the psychical activities and states, but to appre

hend them in the living stream of mental life, and to comprehend

their development. These men in their pious feelings, in their

struggles for the enjoyment of divine grace, were conscious of an

inner experience, of a history of the soul, and were impelled to write

this history ; and while in so doing they used Platonic, Augustinian,

1 Cf. also K. Werner, Kosmologie und Naturlehre des scholastischen Mit-

telalters, mit specielle.r Be.ziehnng auf Wilhelm von Conches ; and Der Entwick-

lungsgang der mittelalterlichen Psychologie von Alcuin bis Albertus Magnus

(off-prints from the SitzungsberirMen (Vol. 75), and Denkschriften (Vol. 25)

respectively of the Vienna Acad., 1876).

\* Nevertheless it must be mentioned that Hugo of St. Victor not only shows

an encyclopaedic knowledge in his Eruditio DtdcucaliGO, but also shows that he

is acquainted, even to the most exact detail, with the teachings of ancient medi

cine, particularly with the theories of physiological psychology (explanation of

perceptions, temperaments, etc.).

CHAP. 1, 24.] Body and Soul : Victorines. 305

and Neo-Platonic conceptions in motley mixture to designate in

dividual facts, the essential and decisive point is that they under

took to exhibit the development of the inner life.

These Mystics, who were not seeking a metaphysics but already

possessed one in their faith, were not much troubled by the ques

tion which later became so important, of how this duality of body

and soul should be understood. Hugo of St. Victor is indeed con

scious that though the soul is lowest in the immaterial world, and

the human body highest in the material world, the two are yet so

opposite in constitution that their union (unio) remains an incom

prehensible enigma ; but he thinks that in this very fact God has

shown, and desired to show, that for him nothing is impossible.

Instead of racking their brains dialetically upon this point, the

Mystics rather assume this dualism as a presupposition, in order to

isolate the soul for their scientific consideration, and to observe its

inner life.

This life, however, is, for Mysticism, a development of the soul to

God, and so this first form of the psychology of the inner sense is the his

tory of salvation in the individual soul. The Mystics regarded the soul

essentially as Gemiith ["heart," the seat of sentiment and feeling,

rather than intellect]. They show the development of its vital pro

cess out of the feelings, and prove their literary virtuosoship in their

depicting of the states and movements of feeling. They are also

the genuine successors of Augustine in examining, in their analysis

of this process, the motive forces of the will, in investigating the

decisions of the will, by virtue of which faith conditions the course

of knowledge, and finally in the fact that they ultimately regard as

the highest stage in the soul s development the mystical contempla

tion of God, which, to be sure, is here held to be the same with love.

Such, at least, was the activity of the two Victorines, Hugo and

Richard, who were completely sustained by the spirit of science,

while in the case of Bernard of Clairvaux, the practical factor of the

will is much more strongly emphasised. Bernard is unwearied in

denouncing as heathenish that pure impulse after knowledge for its

own sake which comports with all the virtues and vices, and yet,

even for him, the last of the twelve stages of humility is that

ecstasy of deification with which the individual disappears in the

eternal essence, " as the drop of water in a cask of wine."

The psychology of knowledge, also, is built up with the Victorines

\ipon Augustinian lines. Three eyes are given to man, the eye of

flesh to know the corporeal world, the eye of reason to know himself

in his inner nature, the eye of contemplation to know the spiritual

world and the deity. While, then, according to Hugo, cogitatio,

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meditatio, and contemplatio are the three stages of intellectual activ

ity, the degree to which he emphasises the co-operation of the imag

ination (imaginatio) in all kinds of knowledge is interesting and

characteristic of his personality. Even contemplation is a visio

intelledualis, a mental beholding which alone grasps the highest

truth undistorted, while thought is not capable of this.

Old and new are thus variously mingled in the writings of the

Victorines. Fantasies of mystic rapture force their way amid the

most acute observations and the most delicate portrayals of the psy

chical functions. The method of self-observation doubtless falls here,

too, into the danger of leading to Schwarmerei, 1 or ecstatic enthusi

asm ; but, on the other hand, it wins much fruit of its own, it

breaks up the soil for the research of the future, and, above all, it

marks off the field on which modern psychology is to grow.

3. This new science received support and enrichment likewise

from quite another direction : a side-result of the controversy over

universals and that, too, not the worst result came to its aid.

When Nominalism and Conceptualism combated the doctrine that

universals exist in themselves, and declared the species and genera

to be subjective creations in the knowing mind, the duty fell on

them of making intelligible the process by which these universal

ideas arise in the human mind. They found themselves thus sent

directly to the empirical study of the development of ideas, and sup

plemented the sublime poesy of the Mystics with results which were

indeed sober and dry, but all the more valuable on that account.

For, just because the matter in hand required an exhibition of the

origin of purely subjective contents of thought, which were to be

explained as the products of man s development in time, this inves

tigation could become only a contribution to the psychology of inner

experience.

The very thesis of extreme Nominalism afforded its opponents

occasion to treat the relation of word to thought, and in the case of

Abelard led to a searching investigation of the co-operating activity

that belongs to language in connection with the development of

thought. The question as to the meaning of signs and designations

in the movement of ideas was by this means raised anew. A still

deeper entrance into the heart of theoretical psychology was made

by the investigation which is conducted as to the necessary connec

tion between intellect and perception in the treatise De Intellectibus.

It is here shown how sensation, as confused idea (confusa conceptio),

enters into the perception (imaginatio) which grasps and holds it

1 Cf. Kant, Anthropologie, 4.

CHAP. 1, 24.] Body and Soul : John of Salisbury. 307

together with others, and remains preserved reproducible in this

imagination; how, then, the understanding by successively running

through this manifold material (discursive activity) elaborates it to

concepts and judgments ; and how, after all these conditions have

been fulfilled, opinion, faith, arid knowledge arise, in which ulti

mately the intellect knows its object in a single collective perception

or intuition (intuitive activity).

In a similar way John of Salisbury set forth the process of

psychical development : but in his case the tendency peculiar to the

Augustinian conception of the soul asserts itself most strongly, the

tendency to regard the different forms of activity not as strata

lying above one another or beside one another, but as ways of

functioning in which the same living unity manifests itself. He

sees already in the sensation, and in a higher degree in perception

or imagination, an act of judgment; and as union of the newly

entering sensations with those which are reproduced, imagination

contains at the same time the emotional states (passiones) of fear

and hope. Thus out of imagination as fundamental psychical state

develops a twofold series of states of consciousness ; in the

theoretical series appear first, opinion, and by comparison of

opinions, knowledge and rational conviction (ratio), both in con

nection with prudence (prudentia), which is an operation of the

will; finally, by virtue of the striving after calm wisdom (sapientia),

we have the contemplative knowledge of the intellect; in the

practical series are given the feelings of pleasure and pain with all

their diversifications in the changing states of life.

Thus with John we have indicated the whole programme of the

later associational psychology in which his countrymen were to

become leaders. And he may be regarded as their prototype not

only in his problems, but also in the mode of their treatment. He

keeps at a distance from the speculations of dialectic that were so

alien to the active world ; he has the practical ends of knowledge

in his mind, he desires to find his way in the world in which man

is to live, and above all in man s actual inner life, and brings with

him into philosophy a fineness and freedom of mind character

istic of the man of the world, such as aside from him we do not find

at that time. He owes this in no small degree to the education of

the taste and of sound cosmopolitan thought which classical studies

afford ; and in this, too, his countrymen have followed him, not to

their injury. He is the precursor of the English Enlightenment as

Abelard is of the French. 1

1 Renter, op. cit.. II. 80, sets thus Roger Bacon and Abelard over against each

other ; yet precisely the decisive tendency of empirical psychology is present

more strongly in the case of John.

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4. We notice finally Abelard s ethics as a peculiar side-phenomenon

in this process of making more rigid the contrast of outer and inner,,

and of transferring the scientific first principle to the inner nature. 1

Its very title, Scito Te Ipsum, announces it as a science based on

inner experience, and its importance consists just in the fact that

here for the first time ethics is again treated as a proper philo

sophical discipline, and freed from dogmatic metaphysical efforts. 2

This is true of this ethics although it, too, proceeds from the

Christian consciousness of sin as its fundamental fact. But here

it strives to go at once to the heart of the matter. Good and evil,

it says, consist not in the outward act, but in the action s inner

cause. Nor yet do they consist in the thoughts (suggestio), feelings,

and desires (delectatio) which precede the decision of the will, but

solely in this resolve or consent to the deed (consensus). For the

inclination (voluntas), founded in the whole natural disposition and

in part in the bodily constitution, which may lead toward good or

evil, is not itself in the proper sense good or evil. Fault or error

(vitium) to this Abelard reduces inherited sin becomes sin

(jpeccatum) only through the consensus. But if this is present, the

sin is fully and completely there with it, and the bodily executed

action with its external consequences adds nothing ethically.

The essence of the moral is thus placed by Abelard solely in the

resolve of the will (animi intentio). But what now is the norm

according to which this resolve of the will is to be characterised as

good or evil ? Here, too, Abelard rejects with contempt all external

and objective determination by a law ; he finds the norm of judg

ment solely within the deciding individual, and it consists in the

agreement or non-agreement with the conscience (conscientia) . That

action is good which is in accord with the agent s own conviction ;

that only is bad which contradicts this.

And what is conscience ? Where Abelard teaches as a philoso

pher, as the rationalistic dialectician that he was, there conscience

is for him (in accordance with ancient example, Cicero) the natural

moral law, which, though known in varying degree, is common to

all men, and which, as Abelard was convinced, was wakened

to new clearness in the Christian religion, after it had become ob

scured through human sin and weakness (cf. above, 23, 7). But

1 Cf. on this Th. Ziegler in the Strassburgcr Abhdl. z. Phil. (Freiburg,

1884).

2 It throws a surprising light upon the clearness of Abelard s thought when

he incidentally separates the metaphysical conception of the good (perfection =

reality) carefully from the moral conception of the good, with which alone ethics

has to do. He shows in this that he had penetrated this complication of prob

lems, one of the most intricate in history.

CHAP. 1, 24.] Body and Soul: Abelard. 309

for the theologian this lex naturalis is identical with the will of God. 1

To follow the conscience means, therefore, to obey God; to act against

the conscience is to despise God. But where the import of the

natural moral law is in any wise doubtful, the only resort for the

individual is to decide according to his conscience, that is, according

to his knowledge of the divine command.

The ethics of intention 2 which was presented by the head of the

dialecticians and Peripatetics proves itself to be an enhancement of

the Augustinian principles of internalisation and of the individual

ism of the will, which forces its way out of the system of the great

Church teacher and beyond its bounds, to fruitful operation in the

future.

. 1 In his theological metaphysics Abelard seems occasionally to have gone so

far as to reduce the content of the moral law to the arbitrary choice of the

divine will (Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, II. 241).

2 The important contrast here presented in various directions to Church

theory and practice cannot be brought out here.

## CHAPTER II. SECOND PERIOD.

(AFTER ABOUT 1200.)

Karl Werner, Der hl. Thomas von Aquino. % vols., Regensburg, 1858 ff.

Karl Werner, Die Scholastik des spiiteren Mittelalters. 3 vols., Vienna, 1881 S.

THK felt need for real knowledge, which mastered Western science

after the first enthusiasm for dialectic was past, was very soon to

find a satisfaction of unsuspected extent. Contact with the Oriental

civilisation which at first maintained itself victoriously against the

shock of the Crusades, disclosed to the peoples of Europe ne\v worlds

of intellectual life. Arabian, and in its train Jewish, science made

their entry into Paris. They had preserved the tradition of Greek

thought and knowledge more immediately and more completely than

had the cloisters of the West. A stronger and richer stream of

scientific material poured over Bagdad and Cordova than over Rome

and York. But the former brought not much more that was new

with it than did the latter. Rather, as regards thoughts which dis

cover or establish principles, the Oriental philosophy of the Middle

Ages is still poorer than the European. Only, in the breadth and

quantity of tradition, in the compass of learned material and in

the extent of information in matters of science, the East was far

superior, and these treasures now passed over into the possession of

the Christian peoples.

From the point of view of philosophy, however, the matter of

chief importance was that Parisian science became acquainted not

1 The author believes that he may and ought to decline to give a full exposi

tion of the Arabian and Jewish philosophy of the Middle Ages ought to, in so

far as he is here in great part excluded from penetrating to the original sources,

and would therefore find himself forced to reproduce others expositions at

second hand, may, however, because that which passed over with fructifying

influence into European science from this large literature and it is only this

element that could be treated in this presentation of the development of philos

ophy as a whole is found to be, with very small exceptions, the spiritual

possession of antiquity, of the Greek or the Hellenistic philosophy. On this

account there will be given only a brief survey of the Arabian and Jewish phi

losophy in the Middle Ages, which will be found at the close of the introductory

material of this chapter, pp. 31(5-318.

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CHAP. 2.] Second Period. 311

only with the entire logic of Aristotle, but also with all parts of his

philosophy that furnished material knowledge. By this "new

logic " fresh blood was infused into the already dying dialectic, and

while the task of rationally expounding the view of the world held

by faith was attacked anew and with a matured technique of thought,

there was presented at the same time an almost immeasurable mate

rial for arrangement in the metaphysico-religious system.

Mediaeval thought showed itself abundantly ready for the problem

thus enhanced, and solved it under the after-working of the impres

sion of that most brilliant period in the development of the papacy

which Innocent III. had brought about. The Neo-Platonic- Arabian

Aristotelianism, which at the first, with its naturalistic consequences,

seemed only to strengthen the rationalistic courage of dialectic to

victorious pride, was mastered with admirable swiftness and bent to

the service of the system of the Church. This, indeed, was possible

only in a form in which the intellectualistic elements of Augustinian

thought and those allied to Neo-Platonism gained a decided pre

ponderance in this now completely systematic development of a

philosophy conformed to the doctrine of faith. In this way was

completed an adjustment and arrangement of world-moving thoughts

upon the largest and most imposing scale that history has seen,

and that, too, without the creative activity of any properly new

philosophical principle as its impulse toward the formation of a

system. The intellectual founder of this system was Albert of Boll-

stddt. It owes its organic completion in all directions, its literary

codification, and thus its historical designation, to Thomas Aquinas,

and finds its poetical exposition in Dante s Divine Comedy.

But while Hellenistic science and Christian faith seemed to be

brought into complete harmony in Thomism, the opposition between

them broke forth at once all the more violently. Under the influ

ence of Arabian doctrines, the pantheism involved in the logical

consequence of Realism from being potential became actual in ex

tended circles, and immediately after Thomas, his fellow-Domin

ican, Master Eckhart, developed scholastic intellectualism to the

heterodoxy of an ideoMstic Mysticism.

Hence it is comprehensible that Thomism also encountered the

resistance of a Platonic- Augustinian tendency, which indeed gladly

adopted the increase in the knowledge of Nature (as had been the

case before) and the perfection of the logical apparatus, but put

aside the intellectualistic metaphysics and developed all the more

energetically the opposite elements of Augustinianism.

This tendency reached its full strength in the acutest and deepest

thinker of the Christian Middle Ages, Duns Scotus, who brought the

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germs of the philosophy of the will, contained in Augustine s

system, to their first important development, and so from the meta.

physical side gave the impulse for a complete change in the direc

tion of philosophical thought. With him religious and scientific

interests, whose fusion had begun in the Hellenistic philosophy,

begin to separate.

The renewal of Nominalism, in which the intellectual movement

of the last century of the Middle Ages culminated in an extremely

interesting combination, led to the same result with still more last

ing force. Dialectic, which had anew obtained the mastery and

was flaunting itself in various disputations, developed in its text

books on logic the Aristotelian schematism. This was worked out

especially on the grammatical side, and there developed to a theory

which attached the doctrine of judgment and the syllogism to the

view that regarded the concepts (termini) as subjective signs for

really existing individual things. This Terminism became united

in William of Occam with the naturalistic tendencies of the Arabian-

Aristotelian theory of knowledge, and these combined combated

Kealism, which had been maintained alike in Thomism and Scotism.

But Terminism also became united with the Augustinian doctrine

of the will into a powerful individualism, with the beginnings of

the empirical psychology which studied the history of develop

ment, to a kind of idealism of the inner experience, and with the

natural investigation which was conquering wider and wider territory,

to an empiricism that was to be fruitful in the future. Thus under

the scholastic covering were sprouting the germs of new thought.

Here and there in this extremely diversified movement men still

vainly appear with the confidence that they can create a rational

system of religious metaphysics, and finally a man of the signifi

cance of Nicolaus Cusanus sought vainly to force all these elements

of a new secular science back under the power of a half scholastic,

half mystic intellectualism : it was just from his system that those

elements exercised an influence upon the future, that was all the

stronger because of his work.

The reception of Aristotle falls in the century 1150-1250 (for this topic see

principally the work of A. Jourdain, cited p. 273). It began with the more val

uable parts of the Oryanon, hitherto unknown (vetus nova logica), and pro

ceeded to the metaphysical, physical, and ethical books, always accompanied

by the introduction of the Arabian explanatory writings. The Church slowly

admitted the new logic, although dialectic was again set in fluctuation thereby ;

for it soon became convinced that the new method which was introduced with

the aid of the doctrine of the syllogism, was advantageous for presenting its

own teachings.

This scholastic method in the proper sense is as follows : a text used as

the basis for discussion is broken up by division and explanation into a number

of propositions ; questions are attached and the possible answers brought to-

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gether ; finally the arguments to be adduced for establishing or refuting these

answers are presented in the form of a chain of syllogistic reasoning, leading

ultimately to a decision upon the subject.

This scheme was first employed by Alexander of Hales (died 1245) in his

Summa Universes Theologies, with a mastery which was far superior to the

mode of treatment of the earlier Summists in wealth of contents, clearness of

development, and definiteness of results, and was scarcely surpassed even later.

An analogous change in method was worked out with regard to the material

in the encyclopaedias of natural science by Vincent of Beauvais (Vincentius

Bellovacensis, died about 1205), by his Speculum Quadruplex, and Johannes

Fidanza, called Bonaventura (1221-1274), did the same work for the doctrines

of Mysticism, especially those of the Victorines. Among Bonaventura s works

the lieductio Artium ad Theologiam is especially characteristic. Cf. K. Werner,

Die Psychologic, und Erkenntnisslehre des B. (Vienna, 1876).

The Church proceeded in a much more hesitating manner in regard to Aris

totle s Metaphysics and Physics, because these made their entrance in intimate

connection with Averroism, and because this latter theory had developed to

open pantheism the Neo-Platonic Mysticism which had never been entirely

forgotten since Scotus Erigena. As the defenders of such a system appear

Amalrich of Bena near Chartres, and David of Dinant, about 1200, concern

ing whose doctrines we are informed only by later writers, especially Albert

and Thomas. With the widely extended sect of the Amalricans, which, after

the Lateran council of 1215, was persecuted with fire and sword, the "Eternal

Gospel" of Joachim Floris was also connected. Cf. on this J. N. Schneider

(Dillingen, 1873).

The judgment of condemnation passed upon the Averroistic Pan-psychism

(cf. 27) applied at first to Aristotle also. It is the service of the two men

dicant orders, the Dominicans and Franciscans, to have broken this connec

tion, and to have brought over the power of the Church to the recognition of

the Peripatetic system. By a long conflict, which frequently wavered this way

and that, they succeeded in founding two chairs of the Aristotelian philosophy

at the University of Paris, and finally in having them taken into the faculty

(cf. Kaufmann, Gesch. d. Univ., I. 275 ff.). After this victory in 1254, respect

for Aristotle rose fast, until he became the highest philosophical authority. He

was praised as the forerunner of Christ in matters of Nature as was John

the Baptist in matters of grace, and from this time on Christian science (like

Averroes) held him to be in such a sense the incarnation of scientific truth, that

in the following literature he is often cited only as " Philosophus."

The doctrine of the Dominicans, which has remained until the present time

the official doctrine of the Catholic Church, was created by Albert and Thomas.

Albert of Bollstadt (Albertus Magnus) was born 1193 at Lauingen in

Swabia, studied in Padua and Bologna, taught in Cologne and Paris, became

Bishop of Regensburg, and died in Cologne in 1280. His writings consist for

the most part of paraphrases and commentaries upon Aristotle ; aside from the

Summa his Botany is particularly of independent value (De Vegetabilibus,

Libri VII. ; ed. by Meyer and Jessen, Berlin, 1867). Cf. J. Sighart, Al. Mag.

st in Leben und seine \Visse.nschaft (Kegensburg, 1857) ; v. Hertling, Al. Mag.

und die Wissenschaft seiner Zeit (in Hist.-pol. Bliitter, 1874) ; J. Bach, Al.

Mag. (Vienna. 1888).

Thomas of Aquino, born 1225 or 27 in Roccasicca, Lower Italy, was edu

cated at first in the cloister Monte Cassino, famous of old for study in natural

science, then in Naples, Cologne, and Paris. After this he taught alternately

at these universities and also at Rome and Bologna, and died, 1274, in a cloister

near Terracina. Besides minor treatises, his works contain commentaries on

Aristotle, on the Liber de Causis and the Sentences of Peter Lombard, and

in addition to these, principally the Summa Thrologite and the treatise De

veritate fidei Catholics contra gentiles (Snmma contra gentiles}. The treatise

De Jiegimine Principum belongs to him only in part. From the very copious

literature concerning him, the following may be named : Ch. Jourdain, La

PkilotOfMe de St. Th. (Paris, 1858); Z. Gonzalez, Studien iiber die Philos.

des. hi. Th. v. A., translated from the Spanish by Nolle (Regensburg, 1885);

R. Kucken, Die Philos. d. Th. v. A. und die Cultus der Neuzeit (Halle, 1880);

A. Frohschammer, Die Philosophic des Th. v. A. (Leips. 1889).

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The philosophical importance of Dante Alighieri has been best recognised

among his editors by Philalethes in the commentary on his translation of the

Divina Commedia. Besides his great world-poem, the treatise De Monarchia

should not be forgotten in a philosophical consideration. Cf. A. F. Ozanam,

D. et la Philosophic Catholigue au 23"" Siecle (Paris, 1845); G. Baur, Boethius

und Dante (Leips. 1873).

Interest in other Thomists, whose number is great, is only literary -historical.

To the Dominican Order belonged also the father of German Mysticism,

Master Eckhart, a younger contemporary of Thomas. Born in the middle of

the thirteenth century, probably in Saxony, at about 1300 he was Professor of

Philosophy in Paris, became then Provincial of his Order for Saxony, lived for

a time in Cologne and Strassburg, and died during the painful discussions con

cerning the orthodoxy of his doctrine in 1329. The extant writings (collected

by F. Ffeiffer, II. Leips. 1857) are principally sermons, tracts, and aphorisms.

Cf. C. Ullman, Refnrmatoren vor der Reformation, Vol. II. (Hamburg, 1842);

W. Preger, Gesch. d. deutschen Mystik im Mittelalter (Leips. 1875, 1881) ; also

the different editions and articles by S. Denifle. On Eckhart in particular,

J. Bach, M. E. der Vater der deutschen Speculation (Vienna, 1864); A. Lasson,

M. E. d&lt;:r Mystiker (Berlin, 1868).

In its farther development German Mysticism branched into the heresies of

the Beghards and of the " Friends of God " of Basle ; in the case of the former it

led to the most radical connection with the Averroistic pantheism. It took the

form of popular preaching with John Tauler at Strassburg (1300-1361), and

of poetic song with Heinrich Suso of Constance (1300-1365). Its theoretical

doctrines maintained themselves, while the heterodoxy was diminished, in the

" Gn-man Theology 1 (first edited by Luther, 1516).

The Augustinian Platonic opposition against the suspected Aristotelianism

of the Arabians has as its main supporters :

"William of Auvergne, from Aurillac, teacher and Bishop in Paris, where he

died in 1249, author of a work De Universo. He is treated by K. Werner, Die

Philosophic des W. v. A. (Vienna, 1873).

Henry of Ghent (Henricus Gandavensis, Heinrich Crethals of Muda near

Ghent, 1217-1293), the valiant defender of the prim;icy of the will against

Tliomism. Besides a theological compendium, he wrote a Summa Qucestionum

Ordinarium, and principally Quodlibeta Theologica. Cf . K. Werner, H. v. ft. als

lieprasentant dex chrixtlichen Platonismus im 13 Jahrhundert (Vienna, 1878).

Richard of Middletown (R. de Mediavia, died 1300) and William de la

Marre, the author of a violent Corrpctorium Fratris Thomce, may also be

named here. In the following centuries an Augustinian theology proper main

tained itself by the side of Thomism and Scotism. ^Egydius of Colonna is

regarded as its leader (JRg. Romanus, 1247-1316). Cf. K. Werner, Schol. d.

spat. M.-A., III.

The sharpest opposition to Thomism grew out of the Franciscan order.

Roger Bacon s was a mind fruitfully stimulating in all directions, but not

appearing in a fixed and definite form in any one of them. He was born in

1214, near Ilchester, educated in Oxford and Paris, several times persecuted on

account of his occupations and theories, which were directed in the line of

natural research, protected only for a time by Pope Clement IV., and died soon

after 1292. His doctrines are embodied in the Opus Mains (ed. by Bridges,

Oxford, 1897), and in the form of extracts in his Opus Minus (ed. by Brewer,

Lond. 1859). Cf. E. Charles, li. B., sa vie, ses ouvrages, ses doctrines (Paris,

1861), and K. Werner, in two articles on his psychology, theory of knowledge,

and physics (Vienna, 1879).

The most important thinker of the Christian Middle Ages was Johannes

Duns Scotus. His home (Ireland or Northumberland) and the year of his

birth, which was about 1270, are not certainly known. At first a scholar and

teacher in Oxford, he then won high reputation at Paris, where he was active

after 1304, and in 1308 moved to Cologne, where he died soon after his arrival

all too early. The edition of his works prepared by his Order (12 vols.,

Lyons, 1639) contains, besides the genuine writings, much that is not genuine

or that has been worked over, and especially transcripts of his disputations and

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lectures. To the latter belongs the so-called Opus Parisie.nse, which forms a com

mentary upon the Sp.ntPnc.ps of the Loin bard. The (juestiones Qundlibetales have

a similar origin. The Opus Oxoniense, the original commentary upon the Lom

bard, is his own writing. Besides this there are his commentaries upon Aristo

telian writings and some smaller treatises. His doctrine is expounded in Werner

and Stockl. No exhaustive monograph, corresponding to his importance, exists.

Among his numerous adherents, Francis of Mayro, who died 1325, is the best

known. The controversy between Thomists and Scotists was a very active one

at the beginning of the fourteenth century, and brought many intermediate

theories into the field ; but soon both parties had to make common cause in

defence against Terminism.

Among the logical school books of the later Scholasticism, the most influen

tial was that of Petrus Hispanus, who died 1277 as Pope John XXI. His

Summulce Logicales were a translation of a Byzantine-Greek text-book, the

Syw^ts eis ryv Apt&lt;rTOT&lt;?\oi/s \oytKriv iiriffTJwv by Michael Psellos (in the eleventh

century). Imitating the processes in this latter treatise (ypdnnara typtvj/f ypa-

(j&gt;i8i Tex"iK6s), the well-known barbarous mnemonic designations for the modes

of the syllogism were introduced in the Latin version (Barbara, celarent, etc.).

Terminism, developed in the nominalistic direction from this rhetorical and

grammatical logic, contrasted itself as logica moderna with the logica antiqua

of the Realists, including both Scotists and Thomists under this latter title.

In the renewal of Nominalism we find William Durandus of St. Pour-

9ain, who died 1332 as Bishop of Meaux, and Petrus Aureolus, who died at

Paris, 1321, the former coming from Thomism, the latter from Scotism. Much

more important is William of Occam, the Abelard of the second period. With

a broad and keen vision for reality, and with a bold, unresting eagerness for

innovation, he unites in himself all the elements with the help of which the

new science forced its way out of Scholasticism. Born in a village in the

County of Surrey, trained under Duns Scotus, he became Professor at Paris,

then took an active part in the conflicts of his time between Church and State

by joining with Philip the Fair and Lewis of Bavaria in combating the papacy,

(Diaputatio inter clericum et militem super potentate ecclesiastica prailatis atque

principibus terrarum commissa, and the Defensorium against Pope John XXII.),

and died 1347 at Munich. There is no complete edition of his works, but the

most important are : Summa Totius Logices, Expositio Aurea super Artem

Ve.tere.m, Quodlibeta Septem, Centilogium Theologicum, and a commentary on

Peter Lombard. Cf. W. A. Schreiber, Die politischen und religiosen Doctrinen

unter Ludwig dem Baier (Landshut, 1858). C. Prantl, Der Universalie.nstre.it

im dreizehnten und vierzehnten Jahrhundert (Sitz.-Ber. der Miinchener Akad.,

1874). Occam, too, still waits his philosophically competent biographer.

Of the supporters of terministic Nominalism in the fourteenth century,

Johannes Buridan, Hector of the University at Paris, and co-founder of that at

Vienna, and Marsilius of Inghen, one of the first teachers at Heidelberg, are

usually named. A union of mystical doctrines with the nominalistic rejection

of metaphysics is found in Pierre d Ailly (Petrus de Alliaco, 1350-1425), and in

Johannes Gerson (Charlier, 1363-142!)).

The attempt at a purely rational exposition of Church doctrine in the interest

of apologetics and propagation was made by Raymundus Lullus of Catalonia

(1235-1315), who is principally known by his curious discovery of the "Great

Art," that is, a mechanical device which by combining the fundamental concepts

was intended to present the system of all possible cognitions. An extract from

this may be found in J. E. Erdmann, History of Phil., I. 206 [Eng. tr. ed. by

HoughJ. His efforts were repeated in the fifteenth century by Raymund of

Sabunde, a Spanish physician, who taught in Toulouse and gained respect by his

Theologia Naturalis (sive, Liber Creaturarum) . On him cf. D. Matzke (Breslau,

1846); M. Huttler (Augsburg, 1851).

The, philosophy of Nicolaus Cusanus (Nicolaus Chrypffs, born in Kues (Cusa)

near Trier, 1401, died as Cardinal and Bishop of Brixen, 1464), offers an inter

esting comprehensive view of the intellectual condition of the departing Middle

Ages. The main treatise bears the title De Docta lynorantia (ed. in German

together with his other most important writings by F. A. Scharpff, Freiburg i. B.

1862). Cf. U. Falckenberg, Grundzuge der Philos. des N. v. C. (Breslau, 1880).

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Brief Survey of the Arabian and Jewish Philosophy of the Middle

Ages.

This period is certainly more interesting from a literary and historical point

of view than from that of philosophy, and as yet no competent presentation of

the period as a whole has been made. Nor has complete clearness been attained

as yet by investigation, but from the literature concerning it the following are

to be emphasised :

Mohammed al Schahrestani, History of Religious and Philosophical Sects

among the Arabs (German by Haarbrucker, Halle, 1850 f.); A Schmolders,

Documenta Philosophic Arabum (Bonn, 1886), and Essai sur les Ecoles Phi-

losophiques chez les Ar. (Paris, 1812); Fr. Dieterici, Die Philosophic der Ar. im

zehnten Jahrhunrlert (8 Hefte, Leips. 1865-76). Cf. also Hammer-Purgstall,

Gesch. der arabischen Litteratur.

S. Mimk, Melanges de philosophic juive et arabe (Paris, 1859), and the same

author s articles on the individual philosophers in the Dictionnaire des Sciences

Philosophiques. [W. Wallace, Art. Arabian Phil, in Enc. Brit., Ueberweg,

Erdmann. ]

M. Eisler, Vorlesungen uber die jiidischen Philosophen des J\ffttelalters (3

vols., Vienna, 1870-84); M.Joel, Beitrdge zur Geschichte der Philosophic (Bres-

lau, 1876). Cf. also Fiirst s Bibliotheca Judaica, and histories of Judaism by

Graetz and Geiger.

Close as the relations may be which the philosophy of the two civilised Semitic

peoples sustained to their religious interests, Arabian science especially owes

its peculiar character to the circumstance that its founders and supporters

were, for the most part, not members of the clergy, as in the West, but physi

cians (cf. F. Wiistenfeld, Gesch. der arab. Aerzte und Naturforscher, Gottingen,

1840). Thus from the beginning the study of ancient medicine and natural

science went on hand in hand with that of philosophy. Hippocrates and Galen

were as much translated (in part through the medium of the Syrian) and read

as were 1 lato, Aristotle, and the Neo-Platonists. Hence in Arabian metaphysics

dialectic is always balanced by natural philosophy. But well as this was adapted

to afford scientific thought a broader basis of knowledge of facts, we must not,

on the other hand, overestimate the independent achievements of the Arabs in

medicine and natural science. Here, too, mediaeval science is essentially learned

tradition. The knowledge which the Arabs were later able to deliver to the

West had its origin, in the main, in the books of the Greeks. Nor did even

experimental knowledge experience an essential extension through the Arabs

own work ; only in some fields, as, for example, chemistry and mineralogy and

in some parts of medicine, e.g. physiology, do they appear more independent.

In their method, however, in their principles by which they apprehend the uni

verse, and in their entire system of philosophical conceptions, they stand, so far

as our information on the subject reaches, entirely under the combined influence

of Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism ; and the same is true of the Jews. Nor

can it be maintained that a national peculiarity becomes disclosed in their appro

priation of this material. It is rather the case that this whole scientific culture

was artificially grafted upon the Arabian civilisation, it can strike no true roots

into it, and after a short period of bloom it withers away without vital force.

In the history of science as a whole, its mission is only to give back in part to

the development of the Western mind the continuity which the latter had itself

temporarily lost.

From the nature of the case, the appropriation of ancient science in this case

also was completed gradually and by working backward. Beginning with the

Neo-Platonism which was still current in Syrian tradition, and which was

received with sympathy on account of its religious colouring, the Arabian

thinkers proceeded to ascend to the better sources ; but the consequence

remained that they saw Aristotle and Plato through the spectacles of Plotinus

and Proclus. During the rule of the Abassidse an active scientific life prevailed

in Bagdad, stimulated especially by the Caliph Almamun at the beginning of

the ninth century. The Neo-Platonists, the better commentators, almost the

( ntire didactic writings of Aristotle, and the Republic, Laws, and Timteus of

1 lato, were known in translations.

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The first distinctly emerging personalities, Alkendi, who died about 870, and

Alfarabi, who died 950, are scarcely to be distinguished in their teachings from

the Neo-Platonic elucidators of Aristotle. A greater importance belongs to

Avicenna (Ibn Sina, 980-1037), whose "Canon" became the fundamental

book of mediaeval medicine in the West, as well as in the East, and who also

exercised a powerful influence by his extremely numerous philosophical writ

ings, especially his Metaphysics and Logic. His doctrine comes nearer again to

pure Aristotelianism, and perhaps the nearest among all the Arabians.

But the extension of these philosophical views was regarded with jealous eyes

by Mohammedan orthodoxy, and the scientific movement experienced, so vio

lent persecutions in the tenth century that it took refuge in the secret league of

the "Pure Brothers." Avicenna himself was also persecuted. The above-

named league embodied the extremely excellent compass of the knowledge of

the time in a number of treatises (on this see above, Dieterici), which neverthe

less, in contrast with Avioenna, seem to show a stronger leaning toward Neo-

Plstoniam.

Of the scientific achievements of their opponents we know on the one hand

the strange metaphysics of the orthodox Motekallemin, who, as against the

Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic view of Nature as a living whole, developed an

extreme exaggeration of the sole causality of God, and resorted to a distorted

Atomism in the greatest metaphysical embarrassment ; on the other hand, in

the writings of Algazel (1059-1111, Destructio Philosophorum) there appears

a sceptical and mystical analysis of philosophy.

These latter tendencies won the victory in the Orient the more readily, as the

spiritual exaltation of Mohammedanism quickly declined in that quarter. The

continuance of Arabian science is to be sought in Andalusia, where Mohamme

dan civilisation found its short after-bloom. Here, under freer conditions,

philosophy developed to vigorous naturalism, which in turn bore a strongly

Neo-Platonic stamp.

A characteristic exposition of the doctrine of knowledge in this philosophy is

found in the Conduct of the Solitary by Avempace, who died 1138, and similar

thoughts culminate with Abubacer (Ibn Tophail, died 1185) in an interesting

comparison of natural with positive religion. The latter author s philosophi

cal romance The Living One, the Son of the Waking One, which sets forth the

intellectual development of a man upon a lonely island, excluded from all his

torical and social relations, was published in a Latin translation by Pocock as

Philosophus Autodidactus (Oxford, 1G71 and 1700, not twenty years before the

appearance of Defoe s Robinson Crusoe ! ) and in a German translation as

Der Naturmensch by Eichhorn (Berlin, 1783).

But the most important and independent among Arabian thinkers was

Averroes, who was born 1120 in Cordova, was for a time judge, and then

physician in ordinary to the Caliph, was driven afterward by religious perse

cution to Morocco, and died in 1198. He treated in paraphrases and longer or

shorter commentaries, which were printed in the older editions of Aristotle,

almost all the didactic writings of Aristotle, who was esteemed by him as the

highest teacher of truth. Of his own works (Venice, 1553 ; some exist now

only in the Hebrew version) the refutation of Algazel, Destructio Destructions,

is most important. Two of his treatises on the relation of philosophy and the

ology have been published in German translation by M. J. Miiller (Munich,

1875). Cf. E. Kenan, Averroes et VAverroisme (3d ed., Paris, 18(59).

With the expulsion of the Arabians from Spain traces of their philosophical

activity are lost.

Jewish philosophy of the Middle Ages is, in the main, an accompaniment

of the Arabian, and dependent upon it. The only exception to this is the Cab

bala, that fantastic secret doctrine whose fundamental outlines, which, to be

sure, were later much elaborated, show the same peculiar amalgamation of

Oriental mythology with ideas of Hellenistic science as does Christian Gnosti

cism, and go back to the same period and to the same agitated condition of

thought attendant upon the mingling of religions. Cf. A. Franck, Systeme de

la Kabbah (Paris, 1842; German by Jellinek, Leips. 1844); H. Joel, Die

ii-liijionxphilnsnphie des Sohar (Leips. 1849). On the other hand, the main

works of Jewish philosophy were originally written in Arabic, and not trans

lated into Hebrew until a relatively late time.

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The book of Saadjah Fajjumi (died 942), Concerning Religions and Philoso

phies, which aims to furnish an apology for Jewish doctrine, is related to the

earliest Arabian Aristotelianism, and still more closely to the free-thinking

Mohammedan theologians, the so-called Mutazilin. In the Neo-Platonic line

we meet Avicebron (Ibn Gebirol, a Spanish Jew of the eleventh century), of

whose Fons Vitaz, Hebrew and Latin versions are extant. Moses Maimonides

(1135-1204) is regarded as the most important Jewish philosopher of the Middle

Ages. In his culture and doctrine he belongs to the phase of Arabian doctrine

which has Averroes as its centre. Mis main treatise, Guide to the Perplexed

(Doctor Perplexorum) , has been published in Arabic and French with a com

mentary by Munk (3 vols., Paris, 18o6-&lt;56) [Eng. tr. by Friedlander, Trubner,

Lend.]. The attachment to Averroes is still closer in the case of Gersonides

(Levi ben Gerson, 1288-1344).

The Jews, by means of their widely extended mercantile relations, were the

chief contributors to the extension of Oriental philosophy in the West, by sale

and translation ; in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries especially their

schools in Southern France formed the medium for this wide-reaching activity.

To the Arabian and Jewish literature, which was taken up by Christian

science about 1200, belongs finally a number of pseudonymous and anonymous

writings, which arose in the latest periods of Neo-Platonism, and in part per

haps were of still later date. Among these the principal are the Theology of Aris

totle (Arabic and German by Dieterici, Leips. 1882-83), and the Liber de Caitsis

(De essentia pur(R boniUitis), an extract from the ffToix ^ lj}(ri ^ 6fo\oyiK^i ascribed

to Proclus, published in Arabic, Latin, and German by O. Bardenhewer (Frei

burg i. li. 1882).

### 25. The Realm of Nature and the Realm of Grace.

Among all the philosphers of the Middle Ages we find existing,

with greater or less clearness, a lively feeling of the twofold tradi

tion which forms the presupposition of their thought. In the

earlier period all knowledge and thought had arranged itself, as it

were, of its own accord within the system of religious metaphysics ;

and now there appeared by the side of this a powerful, finely articu

lated, coherent body of thought which the age, thirsting after real

contents in its barren dialectic, was ready to take up eagerly. The

manifold relations between these two systems which mutually laid

hold upon one another and interpenetrated, determine the scientific

character of the last centuries of the Middle Ages, and the general

course of the development was, that these antagonistic systems,

starting from an attitude of abrupt opposition, strove toward recon

ciliation and adjustment, only to diverge all the more violently after

the goal seemed to have been reached. This course of things

appeared as necessarily in the conception of the reciprocal relations

of the different sciences, as in the view of the ultimate relations

of things. In both lines the attempt at synthesis was followed by

a separation that went all the deeper.

The religious thought of the West, whose highest problem had

been to understand the working of divine grace, was confronted by

Oriental philosophy in which the old Grecian philosophical tendency

toward knowledge of Nature had at last attained metaphysical

CHAP. 2, 25.] The Two Realms : Averroinm. 319

supremacy : and here, too, again the process of appropriation began

with the adoption of the last consequences, to ascend only by

degrees back to the premises.

1. Hence the form in which Arabian science was first taken up

was that of Averroism. In this, however, science had marked off its

boundaries in the most definite manner as against positive religion.

This had taken place not only in reaction against the attacks to

which the philosophical movement in the East had been subjected,

but still more in consequence of the great mental revolutions which

the age of the Crusades experienced through the intimate contact

of the three monotheistic religions. The more ardently these relig

ions fought in the sphere of historical reality, the more the sharp

ness of their contrasting doctrines became blunted from the point

of view of theory. Those who passed through this conflict of relig

ions as thinking observers could not resist the impulse to seek the

common element behind the differences, and to establish above the

fields of battle the idea of a universal religion. 1 In order to attain

this, every form of special historical revelation must be stripped off,

and the path of universally valid scientific knowledge must be taken.

So with the aid of Neo-Platonic memories, a return was made to the

thought of a universal religion, founded upon science, and the ulti

mate content of this common conviction was formed by the moral law.

As Abelard in his own way had already reached this result, so

Eoger Bacon later, under Arabian influences, designated morality as

the content of the universal religion.

This scientific natural religion, however, had had stamped upon it

more and more by the Arabs the exclusive character of an esoteric

doctrine. The distinction originating with Fhilo, and current in the

entire patristic thought, between a verbal-historical and a spiritually

timeless sense 2 of religious documents (cf. 18, 2) here became the

doctrine that positive religion is an indispensable need for the mass

of the people, while the man of science seeks the real truth back of

religion, and seeks it only there, a doctrine in which Averroes

and Maimonides were at one, and which completely corresponded to

the social relations of Arabian science. For Arabian science always

moved within narrow and closed circles, and as a foreign growth

1 The court of the highly cultured Hohenstaufen Frederick II. in Sicily

appears as a chief seat of this mode of thought, and in general of the exchange

of thought between East and West.

- Representing this opinion, the Eternal Gospel of Joachim of Floris was

circulated among the Averroistic Amalricans. This completed for the entire

compass of Christian dogma, the transformation of everything external into the

internal, all the historical into the timelessly valid : the "pneumatic gospel " of

Origen (cf. 18, 2) was asserted to have here attained reality, the period of the

"spirit" to have begun. Cf. ,1. N. Schneider (Dillingen, 1874).

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never gained true sympathy with the mass of the people: Averroes,

nevertheless, expressly honours Aristotle as the founder of this high

est, most universal religion of the human race.

Thus in line with this thought, Abubacer made his " Man in a

Stute of Nature" who had attained in his isolation to the philosoph

ical knowledge of God, come into contact again at last with histori

cal humanity, and in so doing discover that what he had known

clearly and in abstract thought, is here believed in its picturate

wrappings, and that what holds for him as a self-evident demand of

the reason is here extorted from the multitude by means of reward

and punishment.

If now it is hereby admitted that natural and revealed religion

have ultimately the same content, it still follows that they necessa

rily differ, at least in their expression of the common truth, that

the conceptions which form the expression of philosophical religion

are not understood by believers, while the picturate ideas of believ

ers are not regarded as the full truth by philosophers. If, then, by

theology, we understand the exposition of the positive doctrine of

religion, arranged and defended according to the formal laws of

science, i.e. Aristotelian logic, and this was the form which the

relation of theology to religion had taken in the West as in the

East, it follows that something may be true theologically which

is not true philosophically, and vice versa. Thus is explained that

doctrine of the twofold truth, 1 theological and philosophical, which

went through the entire later Middle Ages, although we cannot

exactly fix the authorship of this formula. 2 It is the adequate

expression of the mental state necessarily brought about by the

opposition of the two authorities under which the Middle Ages

stood, viz. Hellenistic science and religious tradition ; and while at

a later time it often served to protect scientific theories from the

persecution of the Church, it was for the most part, even in these

cases, the honest expression of the inner discord in which just the

most important minds of the age found themselves.

2. The science of the Christian peoples accepted this antithesis,

and while the doctrine of the twofold truth was expressly pro

claimed by bold dialecticians such as Simon of Tournay, or John of

Brescia, and was all the more rigidly condemned by the power of

1 Cf. M. Maywald, Die Lehre von der zweifachen Wahrheit (Berlin, 1871).

2 As little can it be fixed with certainty what the origin of that widely ex

tended formula was, which designated the founders of the three great positive

religions as the three "deceivers" of mankind. Unhistorical, as is every

Enlightenment, the philosophical opposition of that day could explain to itself

only by empirical interests the mythical which could not stand before compara

tive criticism.

CHAP. 2, 25.] The Two Realms : Albert, Thomas. 321

the Church, the leading minds could not evade the fact that philos

ophy, as it had been developed under the influence of Aristotle and

the Arabians, was, and must remain, in its inner nature, alien to

precisely those doctrines of the Christian religion which were spe

cific and distinctive. With a full consciousness of this opposition,

Albert proceeded to his great task. He understood that the distinc

tion between natural and recealed religion, which he found in exist

ence, could no longer be put out of sight, that philosophy and

theology could no longer be identified, but he hoped and laboured

with all his strength that this distinction might not be allowed to

become a contradiction. He abandoned the doctrine that the " mys

teries" of theology, the doctrines of the Trinity and of the Incar

nation, can be made rational, and, on the other hand, he corrected in

favour of the Church doctrine the teaching of the " Philosopher "

on such important points as the question concerning the eternity or

temporal duration of the world. He sought to show that all which

is known in philosophy by the "natural light" (lumine naturali)

holds good also in theology, but that the human soul can know

completely only that, the principles of which it carries within itself,

and that, therefore, in such questions as those in which philosophical

knowledge comes to no finally valid decision and must remain

standing before the antinomy of different possibilities, revelation

gives the decision, a view in which Albert follows mainly the

results of Maimonides. Faith is meritorious just because it cannot

be proved or established by any natural insight. Revelation is above

reason, but not contrary to reason.

This standpoint for harmonising natural and revealed theology

is essentially that taken by Thomas, although he seeks to limit still

more, if possible, the extent of that which is to be withdrawn from

philosophical insight and given into the possession of faith. Accord

ing to the fundamental thoughts of his system, moreover, he

apprehends this relation as a relation of different stages of

development, and sees accordingly, in philosophical knowledge, a

possibility given in man s natural endowment, which is brought

to full and entire realisation only by the grace active in revela

tion.

It is therefore important to notice that Scholasticism, just in this

its highest point, was far from identifying philosophy and theology,

or from making the task of the former, as has often been repre

sented, an unresting comprehension of dogma. This conception

belongs to the beginnings of mediaeval science, e.g. to Anselm, and

is found sporadically in the times when Scholasticism was entering

upon its dissolution. So, for example, Raymundus Lullus projected

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his " Great Art " l essentially in the opinion that this, by making

possible a systematic explanation of all truths, will be adapted to

convince all " unbelievers " of the truth of the Christian religion.

So, too, later, Raymond of Sabunde aimed to prove with the help of

Lull s Art that if God has revealed himself in a double manner, in

the Bible (liber scriptus) and in Nature (liber vivus), the contents

of these two revelations, of which the one lies at the basis of theol

ogy, the other at the basis of philosophy, must evidently be the

same. But in the classical time of Scholasticism the distinction

between natural and revealed theology was always kept in mind,

and was drawn the more sharply, the more the Ctrirch had occasion

to guard against the confusion of its doctrine with " natural

theology."

3. Hence there were very faithful sons of tos Church who

broadened again the cleft between philosophy and :haology, and ulti

mately made it so wide that it could not be bridged At their head

stands Duns Scotus, who taught that theology shoi. d be conceived

and treated only as a practical discipline ; philosop y, on the con

trary, as pure theory. Hence for him and for the coatinuers of his

doctrine, the relation between the two is no longer ;hat of supple

mentation, but that of separation. Between the two opposing terri

tories of revelation and of rational knowledge, natural theology

shrivels into an extreme poverty of domain. The compass of the

mysteries of theology that are inaccessible for natural knowledge

increases more and more ; with Duns Scotus the beginning of the

created world in time and the immortality of the human soul belong

to this sphere ; and Occam even denies the cogency of the usual

arguments with which rational theology was wont to prove the

existence of God.

This criticism is rooted essentially in the purpose to assure to

faith its just right, and in this purpose it is completely honest. In

connection with the metaphysical dualism which had again become

pronounced (see below, No. 5) the knowledge of the understanding,

bound as it was to sense-perception, seemed incapable of searching

1 This wrong-headed, and yet in many respects interesting and therefore

frequently attempted, discovery, consisted in a system of concentric rings, each

of which bore a group of concepts divided into circular compartments. By

shifting these rings, all possible combinations between concepts were to be

brought about, problems given, and their solutions stated. Thus there was a

Figura A (Dei) which contained the whole theology, a Figura Animse which

contained psychology, etc. Mnemo-technic attempts, and such as aim at the

discovery of a universal language, or of a system of symbols for expressing

philosophical thoughts, have frequently been attached to this ars combinatoria.

The introduction of the algebraic method of reckoning by letters is also con

nected with these efforts.

CHAP. 2, 125.] The Two Realms : Duns Scotus, Occam. 323

the mysteries of the supernatural world. Thus men like Gerson

based their mystical doctrine precisely upon Nominalism. The

difference between philosophy and theology is necessary; the con

tradiction between knowledge and faith is unavoidable. Revelation

has its source in grace, and has the divine realm of grace for its con

tent ; rational knowledge is a natural process of reciprocal inter

action between the knowing mind and the objects of perception.

Therefore, though Nominalism escaped from the scholastic method

with difficulty, and was late in reaching its goal, it necessarily

ended in regarding Nature as the sole object of science. At all

events, philosophy now set itself as secular science, over against

theology as divine science.

So Duns Scotus and Occam employed language which externally

is quite in harmony with the " twofold truth." That definition of

the boundaries was intended to assert, that in matters of faith dia

lectic has nothing to say. But it could not fail to be the result,

that in the case of others, this separation would lead to the oppo

site consequence and back to the original meaning of the claim of

a double truth. It became a charter of liberty for the "secular

philosophy." Dialectical investigation could be pursued even to

the boldest propositions, and yet all offence might be avoided if one

only added that the proposition was so secundum rationem, but that

seen ndum Jidem the opposite was of course true. This occurred so

frequently that the Thomists and Lullists became zealous against it.

In the case of many, to be sure, who availed themselves of this

principle, we cannot doubt that this was their honest opinion ; but

it is just as sure that others, with full consciousness of their pro

cedure, found in this only a convenient pretext, in order to present

under the protection of this restriction the doctrines of a philosophy

that in its inner spirit was at variance with faith. At all events,

this applies to the school of the Averroists which flourished in

Padua toward the end of the fifteenth century.

4. Parallel to this changeful process of transformation in the

relation between theology and philosophy, and in closest connection

with it, goes an analogous development of metaphysical psychology,

and both have reference in like measure to the fundamental relation

between the supersensuous and the sensuous worlds. Here, too,

dualism is the starting-point, and afterwards again the end. This

dualism had been developed to an especial degree of sharpness by

the Victorines at the close of the first period. In this Mysticism

the last bonds between body and soul were cut, and reconciliation

was made impossible. The spiritual and material worlds fell apart

as separate spheres of the universal reality.

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Now, however, Aristotelianism fulfilled its historical mission of

overcoming the two-worlds theory in Augustine, as formerly in

Plato, and in the Thomist psychology the conception of development,

and of the gradual building up of phenomena, was intended to

bridge that separation. While Hugo of St. Victor had drawn the

dividing line in the created world through the midst of man s nature,

by emphasising the complete impossibility of any comparison be

tween the two substances there brought together, the human soul

was now to be understood as just that connecting link, through the

medium of which the two worlds come into organic interaction in

the one course of development of all things.

Thomas attains this result by an extraordinarily acute transfor

mation of the Aristotelian doctrine of Forms and their relation to

matter. The material and the immaterial worlds are characterised

by the fact that, in the latter, pure Forms (format, separator; called

also subsistent Forms) are real or actual as active intelligences with

out any attachment to matter, while in the former, Forms realise

themselves only in union with matter (inherent Forms). The hu

man soul, as lowest of the pure intelligences, is a forma separata

(on which rests its immortality) and, at the same time, as entelechy

of the body, it is the highest of those Forms which realise them

selves in matter. But these two sides of its nature are bound

together in it to an absolute substantial unity, and this unity is the

only Form which is at the same time subsistent and inherent. 1 In

this way the series of individual beings proceeds from the lowest

Forms of material existence, on past plant and animal life, through

the human soul, with uninterrupted continuity over into the world

of pure intelligences the angels, 2 and finally to the absolute Form

the deity. The cleft between the two worlds is closed in Thomism

by this central position of metaphysical psychology.

5. But it seemed to the following period that the cleft was closed

only by being plastered over, as it were, and that- the union of so

heterogeneous attributes as the entelechy of the body and the sub

sistence of a pure intelligence was more of a load than the con

ception of individual substance was able to bear. Hence Duns

Scotus, whose metaphysics likewise moves naturally within the

Aristotelian terminology, introduced an (inherent) forma corporei-

tatis between the intelligent soul, which he too designates as the

" essential Form " of the body, and the body itself ; and thus the

1 In this is concentrated in a conception the anthropocentric way of viewing

the world, which even Thomism did not overcome.

2 Thomas constructs his scale of forms in the material world according to

Aristotle, in the spiritual world according to Dionysius the Areopagite.

CHAP. 2, 25.] The Two Realms : Thomas, Scotus, Occam. 325

Augustinian and Victorinian separation of the conscious essence

from the physiological vital force was again re-established.

Occam not only made this distinction his own, but, forced to

insert another gradation, analysed the conscious soul into an intel

lectual and a sensitive part, and ascribed real importance to this

separation. It seems to him that the sensuous activities of con

sciousness can as little be united with the rational nature whose

vocation it is to behold the immaterial world, as can the form and

motion of the body. Thus for him the soul is split up into a num

ber of individual faculties, to determine the relation of which

occasions great difficulties, especially with regard to their spatial

inter-relation.

6. The essential thing in this is that the world of conscious

ness and that of corporeal bodies become again completely sepa

rated ; and this is shown especially in Occam s theory of knowledge,

which proceeded from these presuppositions to an extremely signifi

cant innovation.

In their doctrine of the " species intelligibiles " the two "Realists,"

Thomas and Duns Scotus, had alike followed, though with some vari

ations, the old Greek idea, that in the knowing process, by means of

the co-operation of the soul and of the external object, a copy of

the latter arises, which is then apprehended and beheld by the soul.

Occam strikes out these species intelligibiles as a useless doubling \* of

the external reality, which according to this view, in so far as it is

an object of knowledge, would be assumed as having still another

existence (in psychical reality). But by this act sensuous knowledge

loses for him its character of being a copy as compared with its object.

An idea (concept us, intellectio rei) is as such a state or an act of the

soul (passio intentio am mce), and forms in this a sign (signum)

for the corresponding external thing. But this inner structure is

something of a different nature from the outer reality of which it is

the sign, and therefore it is no copy of it. We can speak of a " re

semblance " only in so far as in this case the inner reality (esse

objective = content of consciousness) and the outer reality (esse for-

maliter or subjective = objective reality in the present sense of the

word "objective" 2 ) necessarily relate to each other, and, so to speak,

form corresponding points in the two heterogeneous spheres.

Thus the beginning of a psychological and epistemological idealism

1 According to his methodical principle : entia prceter necessitatem non esse

multiplicanda.

2 The terms " objective " and " subjective " in the Middle Ac;es have accord

ingly a meaning exactly the reverse of that which they have in present

usage.

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develops among the Terminists out of the old duality of mind

and body : the world of consciousness is another world than the

world of things. What is found in the former is not a copy, but

only a sign for something without which corresponds to it. Things

are other than our ideas (tdece) of them.

7. Lastly, Augustine s dualism appeared in its complete bald

ness in his conception of history. The realm of God and that of the

devil, the Church and the political state, here confronted each other

in rigid antithesis. The historical conditions of which this doctrine

was the reflex, had become changed completely since Augustine s

day. But hitherto the Middle Ages had not only lacked historical

conceptions which would have been adapted to correct this doctrine,

but scientific thought had been employed in such a one-sidedly theo

logical and dialectical manner, that ethical and social problems had

remained farther outside the horizon of philosophers than had phys

ical problems. And yet at the same time, history was seeing move

ments of such grand dimensions that science also must necessarily

take a position with regard to it. If she was able to do this in the

second period in a manner completely worthy of the greatness of

the subject, she owed her strength for this again to the Aristotelian

system, which gave the means into her hand of mastering in thought

the great connected structures of political and historical life, of

arranging in her metaphysics these forms of the series of develop

ment, and thus of putting into conceptions the mighty import of

that which she was living through. Indeed, in this line in which

the Arabian commentators had not gone before lies the most brilliant

achievement of mediaeval philosophy, 1 and since Albert s interest lay

more on the side of physics, the chief credit here falls to Thomas.

Thomas regards the political state, not as did Augustine, as a con

sequence of the fall, but as a necessary member in the world s life.

In his view, therefore, law or right also flows from the divine nature

and must be so conceived ; above all human institutions stands the

lex naturalis, upon which rest morality and the life of society. In

particular, however, as is proved by language, by the need of help

which the individual feels, and by the impulse toward society, man

is by his nature destined for life in a state. The end of the state is,

according to Aristotle s teaching, to realise virtue, and from this end

all the characteristics of the state are to be developed (in philosoph

ical law Natural Right or Law) . But and here the new thought

begins that civic virtue to which the state should educate its

citizens does not exhaust man s destiny. In this he fulfils only his

i Cf . W. Dilthey, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, I. 418 f.

CHAP. 2, 25.] The Two Realms : Thomas, Dante. 327

purpose as an earthly being ; his higher destiny is the salvation

which grace offers him in the community of the Church. But as

the higher everywhere realises itself through the lower, and the

lower exists for the sake of the higher, the political community is

to be the preparation for that higher community of the State of

God. Thus the state becomes subordinate to the Church as the

means to the end, as the preparatory to the complete. The com

munity of the earthly life is the school for that of the heavenly

PR^AMBULA GRATIS.

By the side of the teleology of Nature which Greek philosophy had

worked out, patristic thought had set the teleology of history (cf.

21, 6) ; but the two had remained unconnected. The doctrine of the

state set forth by Thomas subordinates the one to the other in a

system of thought, and in so doing completes the most deeply and

widely reaching union of the ancient and Christian conceptions of

the world that has ever been attempted.

With this the capstone is fitted to the metaphysical structure of

Thomism. By this transition from the community of Nature into

that of grace, man fulfils the task which his position in the universe

assigns him, but he fulfils it, not as an individual, but only in the

race. The ancient thought of the state lives again in Christianity ;

but the state is no longer an end in itself, it is the best means for

carrying out the divine world-plan. Gratia naturam non tollit sed

perficit.

8. But even this highest synthesis did not long endure. As in

political life, so also in theory, the relation of Church and state took

on a form that was very much less harmonious. With Dante the

relation of subordination is already exchanged for that of co-ordina

tion. The poet shares with the metaphysician the thought that

because man s destined end is to be attained only in the race, this

makes a perfect unity in political organisation requisite. Both de

mand the universal state, the " monarchia " and see in the Empire the

fulfilment of this postulate. But the great Ghibelline cannot think

theocratically, as does the Dominican monk ; and where the latter

assigns to the imperium the place of subordination beneath the sacer-

dotium, the former sets the two over against each other as powers of

like authority. God has destined man for earthly and for heavenly

happiness in like measure : to the former he is conducted by the

state, by the natural knowledge of philosophy ; to the latter he is

guided by the Church, by means of revelation. In this co-ordination

the joy in the world, characteristic of the Renaissance, bursts forth

as victoriously as does the feeling of strength which belongs to the

secular state.

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And along this line the development proceeded. When the graded

scale of reality constructed by Thomas was severed in the midst of

man s nature, the spiritual and political powers fell apart, as did the

spiritual and corporeal worlds ; and the theory afforded the con

venient means of banishing the saccrdotium to the supra-mundane

inner nature, and putting the imperium into sole control within

the world of sense. This is precisely the point of view from which

Occam, in his Disputatio with reference to the controversy between

the papacy and the temporal power, took his position upon the side

of the latter. Nor yet is it any longer possible, in accordance with

his presuppositions, to base the theory of the state upon the realistic

thought of the human race as a whole, bound together for the real

isation of one end. The Nominalist sees as a substantial back

ground in social and historical life, only the individuals who will,

and he regards state and society as products of interests (bonum

commune). In theory, as in life, individualism prevails. 1

### 26. The Primacy of the Will or of the Intellect.

W. Kahl, Die Lehre vom Primat des Willens bei Augustinus, Duns Scotus

und Descartes.

In closest connection with all these general questions stands a spe

cial psychological problem, which was vigorously discussed through

out this whole period, and in reference to which the points of

opposition between the parties of the time may be recognised upon a

smaller scale, but all the more sharply focussed. It is the question

whether among the powers of the soul the higher dignity belongs

to the will or to the intellect (utra potentia nobilior). It takes so

broad a space in the literature of this period that the attempt might

have been made to look upon the psychological antithesis which

unfolds in connection with it as the leading motive of the whole

period. But the course of the development shows too clearly that

the real impelling forces lay in religious metaphysics, and the

rigidity of systematic conception which distinguishes the philoso

phical doctrines of this period explains sufficiently why it is that

their position with reference to an individual problem may appear

as typical for the different thinkers. It still remains characteristic

that this problem is a question taken from the domain of the inner

world.

1 This doctrine of Occam s concerning secular power and law is followed out

to the extreme consequence of the omnipotence of the state by Occam s friend,

Marsilius of Padua, whose treatise, Defensor Pads (1346), carries out in

rigorous lines the attempt to establish the theory of the state upon the utilitarian

and nominalistic basis using the Epicurean theory of compact (above, 14, 6).

CHAP. 2, 20.] Will and Intellect : Thomism, Scotism. 329

In this question, also, the two main bodies of tradition, Augus-

tinianism and Aristotelianism, were not at one ; but their relation was

here in nowise that of an outspoken opposition. For Augustinianism

the question was in general awkwardly stated. For in this system

the oneness of nature in the personality was so strongly emphasised,

and the inter-relation of the different sides of its activity was so

often made prominent, that a relation of rank in the proper sense was

really out of the question. But on the other hand, especially in his

doctrine of knowledge, Augustine had assigned to the will as the

impelling power even in the process of ideation a position

so central that it was not shaken in its importance for empirical

facts, even though the Neo-Platonic contemplation of the deity was

maintained as the final goal of development. On the contrary, the

intellectualism of the Aristotelian system was quite undoubted,

and if it still admitted any increase, it had received it from the

Arabian philosophy, especially from Averroism. Thus antitheses

presented themselves which were soon enough to break forth to

open controversy.

Thomism in this point, also, followed Aristotle unconditionally,

finding at its side in this case the nearly related German Mysticism,

and as its opponents the Augustinians, Scotists, and Occamists, so

that, as thus grouped, the opposition between the Dominicans and

the Franciscans finds general expression.

1. The question as to the pre-eminence of the will or of the intel

lect develops at first as a purely psychological controversy, and de

mands a decision upon the point, whether in the course of the psychical

life the dependence of the will s decisions upon ideas, or that of the

movements of ideas upon the will, is the greater. It was there

fore adapted to further the beginnings of a treatment of psychology

that concerned itself especially with the history of mental develop

ment (cf. 24), and it would have been able to do this in a higher

degree than was actually the case if it had not always been trans

ferred to the ground of dialectic or to the metaphysical domain.

This latter transfer occurred principally in consequence of the fact

that the conception of freedom, which always involves ethical and

religious questions, was looked upon as the point in controversy.

Both parties, indeed, desired to maintain or defend man s " freedom "

in the interest of responsibility ; but this was possible only as they

gave different meanings to the word.

Now, in individual cases, Thomas admits an influence of the will,

not only upon motion, but also upon affirmation or denial of ideas.

In particular, he recognises absolutely such an influence in belief.

But ;n general he regards the will, quite according to the ancient

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model, as determined by knowledge of the good. The intellect not

only apprehends in general the idea of the good, but also, in each

individual case, discerns what is good, and thereby determines the

will. The will necessarily strives for that which is known to be

good ; it is therefore dependent upon the intellect. The latter is

the supremus motor of the psychical life ; " rationality," so said

Eckhart also, is the head of the soul, and even romantic love

("Minne") clings only to knowledge. Freedom (as ethical ideal)

is hence, according to Thomas, that necessity which exists upon the

basis of knowledge, and, on the other hand, (psychological) freedom

of choice (facultas electiva) is nevertheless only possible by reason

of the fact that the understanding presents to the will various pos

sibilities as means toward its end, the will then deciding for that

which is known to be best, the view held by Albert also. This

intellectualistic determinism, in connection with which Thomas him

self always insisted that the decision of the will depends only upon

purely internal knowing activities, was extended by his contemporary

Gottfried of Fontaine to the point of making even the sensuous

presentation (pliantasma) the causa ejficiens of the will s activity.

But the opponents made their attack just in connection with this

conception of necessary determination. The rising of ideas, so

Henry of Ghent had already taught, and after him Duns Scotus, and

still later Occam, is a natural process, and the will becomes un

avoidably entangled in this if it is to be completely dependent upon

ideas. But with this, said Scotus, contingency (i.e. possibility of

being otherwise or " power to the contrary ") in the will s functions

is irreconcilable : for the process of Nature is always determined in

one way ; where it prevails there is no choice. With contingency,

however, responsibility also falls to the ground. Responsibility can

therefore be preserved only if it is acknowledged that the intellect

exercises no compelling power over the will. To be sure, the co

operation of the ideational faculty is indispensable in the case of

every activity of the will : it presents the will its objects and the

possibilities of its choice. But it does this only as the servant, and

the decision remains with the master. The idea is never more than

the occasioning cause (causa per accidens) of the individual volition;

the doctrine of Thomas confuses practical consideration with pure

intellect. If the latter gives the object, the decision is still solely

a matter of the will; the will is the movens per se; to it belongs

absolute self-determination.

Indeterminism, as Scotus and Occam teach it, sees therefore in the

will the fundamental power of the soul, and maintains conversely,

that as a matter of fact the will on its side determines the develop-

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ment of the intellectual activities. Following the procedure of

Henry of Ghent, 1 according to whom the theoretical functions

become more active according as they are more immaterial, Scotus

attempted to prove the proposition just stated, in a highly interest

ing manner. The natural process, he says, produces as the first

content of consciousness (cogitatio prima) a multitude of ideas

which are more or less confused (confusce indistinctce) and im

perfect. Of these only those become distinct (distincta) and perfect

on which the will, which in this process is determined by nothing

further, fixes its attention. Scotus also teaches at the same time

that the will strengthens in their intensity these ideas which it

raises from the confused to the distinct condition, and that the

ideas to which the will does not apply itself ultimately cease to

exist, on account of their weakness.

In addition to these psychological arguments, we find appearing

in the controversy appeals to the authority of Anselm and Aristotle

on the one side, and to that of Augustine on the other, and further

a series of other arguments. These are in part of a purely dia

lectical nature. Such is the case when Thomas claims that

the verum toward which the intellect aims is higher in rank than the

bonnm toward which the will strives, and when Scotus doubts the

authority for this gradation ; and so again when Thomas expresses

the opinion that the intellect apprehends the pure, single conception

of the good, while the will is concerned only with the special

empirical forms assumed by the good, and when Henry of Ghent

and Scotus, exactly reversing this statement, develop the thought

that the will is always directed only toward the good as such, while

the understanding has to show in what the good consists in a

particular case. With such variations the matter was later tossed

to and fro a great deal, and Johannes Bur id an is an example of

those who stand undecided between determinism and indeterminism.

For the latter view speaks responsibility, for the former the prin

ciple that every event is necessarily determined by its conditions.

Other arguments which become interwoven in the controversy

trench upon the more general domains of the conceptions of the

world and of life.

2. To this class belongs, first of all, the transfer of the question

of the relative rank of will and intellect to God. The extreme

intellectualism of the Arabians had, in Aver roes, excluded the

faculty of will from the Supreme Being, in accordance with the

Aristolelian motif, that every act of will implies a want, a state of

1 Whose view in this respect Richard of Middletown also completely adopted.

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imperfection and dependence ; on the contrary Avicebron, who ex

ercised a strong influence upon Duns Scotus, had defended the

religious principle that the world was created by the divine will,

and in a similar line of thought William of Auvergne had main

tained the originality of the will as existing side by side with the

intellect in the essence of God and in his creative activity. These

antitheses were now continued in the controversy between Thomism

and Scotism.

Thomas, indeed, as a matter of course, recognises the reality of

the divine will, but he regards it as the necessary consequence of the

divine intellect, and as determined in its content by the latter. God

creates only what in his wisdom he knows to be good ; it is neces

sarily himself, i.e. the ideal content of his intellect, that forms the

object of his will ; he necessarily wills himself, and in this consists

the freedom, determined only by himself, with which he wills indi

vidual things. Thus the divine will is bound to the divine wisdom,

which is superior to it.

But just in this the opponents of Aquinas see a limitation of

omnipotence which does not comport with the conception of the

ens realissimum. A will seems to them sovereign, only if there is

for it no kind of determination or restriction. God created the

world, according to Scotus, solely from absolute arbitrary will ; he

might have created it, if he had so willed, in other forms, relations,

and conditions ; and beyond this his completely undetermined will,

there are no causes. The will of God with its undetermined crea

tive resolves is the original fact of all reality, and no further ques

tions must be asked as to its grounds, even as the decision made

by the will of a finite being with its liberum arbitrium indifferentice,

when placed before given possibilities, creates in every instance a

new fact which cannot be understood as necessary.

3. The sharpest formulation of this antithesis comes to light in

the fundamental metaphysical principles of ethics. On both sides

the moral law is naturally regarded as God s command. But

Thomas teaches that God commands the good because it is good,

and is recognised as good by his wisdom ; Scotus maintains that it is

good only because God has willed and commanded it, and Occam

adds to this that God might have fixed something else, might have

fixed even the opposite as the content of the moral law. For

Thomas, therefore, goodness is the necessary consequence and mani

festation of the divine wisdom, and Eckhart also says that " be

neath the garment of goodness " the essential nature of God is

veiled; intellectual! sm teaches the perse itas boni, the rationally of

the good. For intellectualism, morals is a philosophical discipline

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whose principles are to be known by the " natural light." " Con

science " (synteresis ! ) is a knowledge of God sub ratione boni. With

Scotus and Occam, on the contrary, the good cannot be an object of

natural knowledge, for it might have been otherwise than it is ; it

is determined not by reason, but by groundless will. Nothing, so

Pierre d Ailly teaches with extreme consistency, is in itself, or

per se, sin ; it is only the divine command and prohibition which

make anything such, a doctrine whose range is understood when

we reflect that, according to the view of these men, God s com

mand becomes known to man only through the mouth of the

Church.

It is also closely connected with this that theology, which for

Thomas still remained a "speculative" science, became with his

opponents, as has been already indicated above (25, 3), a "prac

tical " discipline. Albert had already made intimations of this sort,

Richard of Middletown and Bonaventura had emphasised the fact

that theology deals with the emotions ; Roger Bacon had taught

that while all other sciences are based on reason or experience,

theology alone has for its foundation the authority of the divine

will: Duns Scotus completed and fixed the separation between

theology and philosophy by making it a necessary consequence of

his metaphysics of the will.

4. The same contrast becomes disclosed with like distinctness

in the doctrines of the final destiny of man, of his state in eternal

blessedness. The ancient Qtupia, the contemplation of the divine

majesty, free from will and from want, had in Augustine s teaching

formed the ideal state of the pardoned and glorified man, and this

ideal had been made to waver but little by the doctrines of the ear

lier Mystics. Now it found new support in the Aristotelian intel-

lectualism, in accordance with which Albert thought that man, in so

far as he is truly man, is intellect. The participation in the divine

being which man attains by knowledge is the highest stage of life

which he can reach. On this account Thomas, too, sets the dianoetic

virtues above the practical, on this account the visio divince essentice,

the intuitive, eternal vision of God, which is removed beyond all

that is temporal, is for him the goal of all human striving. From

this vision follows eo ipso the love of God, just as every determinate

1 This word (written also sinderesis, scinderesis} has, since Albert of Boll-

stadt, occasioned much etymological cudgelling of brains. Since, however,

among the later physicians of antiquity (Sext. Emp.) ri^em appears as a

technical term for "observation," it may be that o-yvTifarjcrts, which is attested

in the fourth century, originally signified "self-observation" in analogy with

the Neo-Platonic usage in ffwalo-Brja-Ls or o-vvel5r)&lt;ri.s (cf. p. 234), and thus took

on the ethico- religious sense of " conscience " (coxscientia).

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state of the will is necessarily attached to the corresponding state

of the intellect. Just this tendency of Thomism was given its most

beautiful expression by Dante, the poet of the system. Beatrice is

the poetic embodiment of this ideal, for all time.

Meanwhile a counter-current manifests its force on this point also.

Hugo of St. Victor had characterised the supreme angel choir by

love, and the second by wisdom ; and while Boriaventura regarded

contemplation as the highest stage in the imitation of Christ, he

emphasised expressly the fact that this contemplation is identical

with "love." Duns Scotus, however, taught with a decided polemi

cal tendency that blessedness is a state of the will, and that, too, of

the will directed toward God alone ; he sees man s last glorification,

not in contemplation, but in love, which is superior to contemplation,

and he appeals to the word of the Apostle, "The greatest of these is

love."

Hence as Thomas regarded the intellect, and Duns Scotus the

will, as the decisive and determining element of man s nature,

Thomas could hold fast to Augustine s doctrine of the gratia irresisti-

bilis, according to which revelation determines irresistibly the intel

lect and with it the will of man, while Duns Scotus found himself

forced to the " synergistic " view, that the reception of the opera

tion of divine grace is to a certain extent conditioned by the free will

of the individual. So the great successor of Augustine, with strict

logical consistency, decided against the Augustinian doctrine of pre

destination.

5. On the other hand, the intellectualism of Thomas develops its

extreme consequences in German Mysticism, whose founder, Eckhart,

is entirely dependent upon the teacher of his Order in the con-

ceptional outlines of his doctrine. 1 Eckhart goes far beyond his

master only in the one respect that as a much more original person

ality he is unwearied in his effort to translate the deep and mighty

feeling of his piety into knowledge, and thus urged on by his inner

nature he breaks through the statutory restrictions before which

Thomas had halted. Convinced that the view of the world given in

the religious consciousness must be capable of being made also the

content of the highest knowledge, he sublimates his pious faith to a

speculative knowledge, and in contrast with the pure spirituality of

this he looks upon the Church dogma as only the external, temporal

symbol. But while this tendency is one that he shares with many

iCf. S. Denifle in the Archiv fur Litterat.- u. Kult.-Gesch. d. M.-A.,II.

417 ff. So far, therefore, as Eckhart was really to be the "Father of German

speculation," this speculation had its source in Thomas Aquinas and his teacher

Albert.

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other systems, it is his peculiarity that he does not wish to have the

inmost and truest truth kept as the privilege of an exclusive circle,

but desires rather to communicate it to all people. He believes

that the right understanding for this deepest essence of religious

doctrine is to be found precisely in connection with simple piety, 1

arid so he throws down from the pulpit among the people the finest

conceptions constructed by science. With a mastery of language

that marks the genius he coins Scholasticism into impressive preach

ing, and creates for his nation the beginnings of its philosophical

modes of expression, beginnings which were of determining in

fluence for the future.

But in his teaching the combined mystical and intellectualistic

elements of Thomism become intensified by the Neo-Platonic ideal

ism, which had probably reached him through the medium of Scotus

Erigena, to the last logical consequence. Being and knowledge are

one, and all that takes place in the world is in its deepest essence a

knowing process. The procedure of the world forth out of God is

a process of knowledge, of self-revelation, the return of things

into God is a process of knowledge, of higher and higher intuition.

The ideal existence of all that is real so at a later time said

Nicolaus Cusanus, who made this doctrine of Eckhart s his own -

is truer than the corporeal existence which appears in space and

time.

The original ground of all things, the deity, must therefore lie

beyond Being and knowledge ; 2 it is above reason, above Being ; it

has no determination or quality, it is " Nothing." But this " deity "

(of negative theology) reveals itself in the triune God, 3 and the

God who is and knows creates out of nothing the creatures whose

Ideas he knows within himself ; for this knowing is his creating.

This process of self-revelation belongs to the essence of the deity;

it is hence a timeless necessity, and no act of will in the proper

sense of the word is required for God to produce the world. The

deity, as productive or generative essence, as " un-natured Nature "

[or Nature that has not yet taken on a nature], is real or actual only

by knowing and unfolding itself in God and the world as produced

1 German Mysticism is thus connected with the more general phenomenon,

that the fast increasing externalisation which seized upon the life of the Church

in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries drove piety everywhere into paths

that lay outside the Church.

2 Evidently the same relation that subsisted in the system of Plotinus between

the Zv and the /oDs, a relation in which thought and Being were held to coincide.

3 The distinction between deity and God (divinitas and deus) was made dia-

lectically by Gilbert de la Porree in connection with the controversy over uni-

versals and its relations to the doctrine of the Trinity.

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reality, as natured Nature. 1 God creates all said Nicolaus Cusa-

nus that is to say, he is all. And on the other hand, according

to Eckhart, all things have essence or substance only in so far

as they are themselves God ; whatever else appears in them as

phenomena, their determination in space and time, their "here" and

"now" ("Hie " und " Nu" hie et nunc with Thomas), is nothing. 2

The human soul, also, is therefore in its inmost nature of the

divine essence, and it is only as a phenomenon in time that it

possesses the variety of " powers " or " faculties " with which it is

active as a member of the natura naturata. That inmost essence

Eckhart calls the " Spark," 3 and in this he recognises the living

point at which the world-process begins its return.

For to the "Becoming" corresponds the reverse process, the

"Anti-becoming" (" Entwerden"), the disappearing. And this,

too, is the act of knowledge by means of which the things

which have been made external to the deity are taken back

into the original Ground. By being known by man the world of

sense finds again its true spiritual nature. Hence human cogni

tion, with its ascent from sense perception to rational insight, 4

consists in the " elimination " (" Abscheiden ") of plurality and mul

tiplicity; the spiritual essence is freed from its enveloping husks.

And this is man s highest task in the temporal life, since knowledge

is the most valuable of man s powers. He should indeed be also

active in this world, and thus bring his rational nature to assert

itself and gain control, but above all outer action, above the right

eousness of works which belongs to the sphere of sense, stands first

the "inner work," cleanness of disposition, purity of heart, and

above this in turn stands retirement or "decease" (Abgeschieden-

hdt) and " poverty " of soul, the complete withdrawal of the soul from

the outer world into its inmost essence, into the deity. In the act

of knowing it reaches that purposelessness of action, that action not

constrained by an end, that freedom within itself, in which its beauty

consists.

But even this is not perfect so long as the knowing process does

not find its consummation. The goal of all life is the knowledge of

1 On the terms natura naturans and natura naturata, which were probably

brought into use by Averroism (cf. 27, 1), cf. H. Siebeck, Archiv f. Gesch. d.

Phil., III. 370 ff.

2 Accordingly without accepting the dialectical formulas, Eckhart treats the

Thomistic doctrine of Ideas quite in the sense of the strict Realism of Scotus

Erigena. He speaks slightingly of the Nominalists of his time as "little

masters."

3 Also the " Gemuthe" or Synteresis - scintilla conscientm.

\* The single stages of this process are developed by Eckhart according to the

Thomistic-Augustinian scheme.

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God, but knowing is Being ; it is a community of life and of Being

with that which is known. If the soul would know God, it must

be God, it must cease to be itself. It must renounce not only sin

and the world, but itself also. It must strip off all its acquired

knowledge, and all present knowing of phenomena ; as the deity is

" Nothing," so it is apprehended only in this knowledge that is a

not-knowing doctaignomntia, it was later called by Nicolaus; and

as that " Nothing " is the original ground of all reality, so this not-

knowing is the highest, the most blessed contemplation. It is no

longer an act of the individual, it is the act of God in man ; God

begets his own essence within the soul, and in his pure eternal

nature the "Spark" has stripped off all its powers through which it

works in time, and has effaced their distinction. This is the state

of supra-rational knowing when man ends his life in God, the

state, of which Nicolaus of Cusa said, it is the eternal love (charitas),

which is known by love (amore) and loved by knowledge.

### 27. The Problem of Individuality.

The doctrine of German Mysticism, which had arisen from the

deepest personal piety and from a genuine individual need felt in

a life whose religion was purely internal, thus runs out into an ideal

of exaltation, of self-denial, of renunciation of the world, in the

presence of which everything that is particular, every individual

reality, appears as sin or imperfection, as had been the case in the

ancient Oriental view. In this thought the contradiction that was

inherent in the depths of the Augustinian system (cf. p. 287) became

fully developed and immediately palpable, and it thus becomes evident

that the Neo-Platonic intellectualism, in whatever form it appeared

from the time of Augustine to that of Master Eckhart, was in itself

alone always necessarily inclined to contest the metaphysical self-

subsistence of the individual, while the other party maintained this

self-subsistence as a postulate of the doctrine of the will. Accord

ingly, when in connection with the increase of intellectualism the

universalistic tendency increased also, the counter-current was neces

sarily evoked all the more powerfully, and the same antithesis in

motives of thought which had led to the dialectic of the controversy

over universals (cf. p. 289) now took on a more real and metaphys

ical form in the question as to the ground of existence in individual

beings (principium indi v id ua tionis).

1. The stimulus for this was furnished by the far-reaching conse

quences to which universalism and intellectualism had led among

the Arabians. For the Arabians, in interpreting the Aristotelian

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system, had proceeded in the direction which had been introduced

in antiquity by Strato (cf. p. 179 f.), and which among the later com

mentators had been maintained chiefly by Alexander of Aphrodisias.

This direction was that of naturalism, which would fain remove

from the system of the Stagirite even the last traces of a metaphys

ical separation between the ideal and the sensuous. This effort had

become concentrated upon two points : upon the relation of God to

the world, and upon that of the reason to the other faculties. In

both these lines the peculiar nature of the Arabian Peripatetic doc

trine developed, and this took place by complicated transformations

of the Aristotelian conceptions of Form and Matter.

In general, we find in this connection in the Andalusian philoso

phy a tendency to make matter metaphysically self-subsistent. It

is conceived of, not as that which is merely abstractly possible, but

as that which bears within itself as living germs the Forms peculiar

to it, and brings them to realisation in its movement. At the same

time Averroes, as regards particular cosmic processes, held fast to

the Aristotelian principle that every movement of matter by which

it realises out of itself a lower Form, must be called forth by a

higher Form, and the graded series of Forms finds its termination

above in God, as the highest and first mover. The transcendence

of God could be united with this view, as the doctrine of Avicebron

shows, only if matter were regarded as itself created by the divine

will. But on the other hand, this same Jewish philosopher, pro

ceeding from the same presuppositions, insisted that with the excep

tion of the deity, no being could be thought of otherwise than as

connected with matter, that accordingly even the spiritual Forms

need for their reality a matter in which they inhere, and that finally

the living community of the universe demands a single matter as

basis for the entire realm of Forms. The more, however, in the

system of Averroes, matter was regarded as eternally in motion

within itself, and as actuated by unity of life, the less could the

moving Form be separated from it realiter, and thus the same divine

All-being appeared on the one hand as Form and moving force

(natura naturans), and on the other hand as matter, as moved world

(natura naturata).

This doctrine with regard to matter, that it is one in nature, is

informed within, and is eternally in motion of itself, became ex

tended with Averroism as an extremely naturalistic interpretation

of the philosophy of Aristotle. It now became reinforced by those

consequences of dialectical Realism which compelled the view that

God, as the ens generalissimum, is the only substance, and that in

dividual things are but the more or less transient Forms in which

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this single substance becomes realised (cf. 23). The Amalricans

thus teach that God is the one single essence (essentia) of all things,

and that creation is only an assuming of form on the part of this

divine essence, a realising, completed in eternal movement, of all

possibilities contained in this one single matter. David of Dinant 1

establishes this same pantheism with the help of Avicebron s con

ceptions, by teaching that as "hyle" (i.e. corporeal matter) is the

substance of all bodies, so mind (ratio mens) is the substance of

all souls ; that, however, since God, as the most universal of all es

sences, is the substance of all things whatever, God, matter, and

mind are, in the last resort, identical, and the world is but their

self-realisation in particular forms.

2. But the metaphysical self-subsistence of the individual mind

was involved in doubt by yet another line of thought. Aristotle

had made the vows, as the everywhere identical rational activity,

join the animal soul " from without," and had escaped the difficul

ties of this doctrine because the problem of personality, which

emerged only with the Stoic conception of the lyye^oviKov, did not

as yet lie within the horizon of his thought. But the commenta

tors, Greek and Arabian, who developed his system did not shrink

before the consequences that resulted from it for the metaphysical

value of mental and spiritual individuality.

In the thought of Alexander of Aplirodisias we meet, under the

name of the "passive intellect" (cf. p. 150), the capacity of the in

dividual psyche to take up into itself, in accordance with its whole

animal and empirical disposition, the operation of the active reason,

and this intellectus agens (agreeably to the naturalistic conception of

the whole system) is here identified with the divine mind, which is

still thought only as "separate Form" (intellectus separatus). But

with Simplicius, in accordance with the Neo-Platonic metaphysics, this

intellectus agens which realises itself in man s rational knowledge

has already become the lowest of the intelligences who rule the sub

lunary world. 2 This doctrine finds an original development in the

thought of Averroes. 3 According to his view, the intellectus passivus

is to be sought in the individual s capacity for knowledge, a capacity

which, like the individual himself, arises and perishes as Form of

the individual body ; it has validity, therefore, only for the indi

vidual, and for that which concerns the particular. The intellectus

1 Following the Liber de Causis and the pseudo-Boethian treatise De Uno e.t

Unitate; cf. B. Haureau in the Memoires de VAcad. des Inscript., XXIX. (1877),

and also A. Jundt, Ilistoire du Pantheisme Populaire au M.-A. (Paris, 1875).

2 The so-called "Theology of Aristotle" identifies this roOj with the Xo -yos.

For particulars, see E. Renan, Av. et VAv., II. 6 ff .

8 Gf. principally his treatise De Animce Beatitudine.

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agens, on the contrary, as a Form existing apart from empirical in

dividuals and independent of them, is the eternal generic reason of

the human race, which neither arises nor perishes, and which con

tains the universal truths in a manner valid for all. It is the sub

stance of the truly intellectual life, and the knowing activity of

the individual is but a special manifestation of it. This (actual)

knowing activity (as intellects acquisitus) is indeed in its con

tent, in its essence, eternal, since in so far it is just the active rea

son itself ; on the contrary, as empirical function of an individual

knowing process, it is as transitory as the individual soul itself.

The completest incarnation of the active reason has, according to

Averroes, been given in Aristotle. 1 Man s rational knowing is,

then, an impersonal or supra-personal function : it is the individual s

temporal participation in the eternal generic reason. This latter is

the unitary essence which realises itself in the most valuable activi

ties of personality.

Intimations of this pan-psychism occasionally appear in the train

of Neo-Platonic Mysticism at an earlier period in Western literature ;

as an outspoken and extended doctrine it appears by the side of

Averroism about 1200 ; the two are everywhere named in conjunc

tion at the first when the erroneous doctrines of the Arabian

Peripatetic thought are condemned, and it is one main effort of

the Dominicans to protect Aristotle himself from being confused

with this doctrine. Albert and Thomas both write a De Unitate

Intellectus against the Averroists.

3. Pan-psychism encounters with Christian thinkers an oppo

sition in which the determining factor is the feeling of the meta

physical value of personality, the feeling which had been nour

ished by Augustine. This is the standpoint from which men like

William of Auvergne and Henry of Ghent oppose Averroes. And

this is also the real reason why the main systems of Scholasticism

in diametrical contrast with Eckhart s Mysticism did not allow

the Realism which was inherent in the intellectualistic bases of

their metaphysics to come to complete development. Thomism

was here in the more difficult case, for it maintained indeed, follow

ing Avicenna s formula (cf. p. 299), that universals, and therefore

also the genus "soul," exist only "individualised," i.e. in the indi

vidual empirical examples as their universal essence (quidditas),

but it ascribed to them, nevertheless, metaphysical priority in the

divine mind. It was therefore obliged to explain how it comes

1 And with this the unconditional recognition of the authority of the Stagirite

is theoretically justified by Averroes.

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about that this one essence as universal matter presents itself in

such manifold forms. That is to say, it asked after the PKINCIPIUM

INDIVIDUATIONIS, and found it in the consideration that matter in

space and time is quantitatively determined (materia signatd). In

the capacity of matter to assume quantitative differences consists the

possibility of individuation, i.e. the possibility that the same Form

(e.g. humanity) is actual in different instances or examples as indi

vidual substances. Hence, according to Thomas, pure Forms (sepa

ratee sive subsistentes} are individualised only through themselves ;

that is, there is but one example which corresponds to them. Every

angel is a genus and an individual at the same time. The inherent

Forms, on the contrary, to which the human soul also belongs in

spite of its subsistence (cf. p. 324), are actual in many examples, in

accordance with the quantitative differences of space and time

which their matter presents.

This view was opposed by the Franciscans, whose religious and

metaphysical psychology had developed in intimate relation with

Augustine s teaching. In their thought, first the individual soul,

and then, with a consistent extension in general metaphysics,

individual beings in general, are regarded as self-subsisting realities.

They rejected the distinction of separate and inherent Forms.

Bonaventura, Henry of Ghent, and still more energetically Duns

Scotus, maintained, following Avicebron, that even intellectual

Forms have their own matter, and Scotus teaches that the " soul " is

not individualised and substantialised only after, and by means of,

its relation to a definite body, as Thomas had taught, but that it is

already in itself individualised and substantialised. On this point

Scotism shows a discord which had evidently not come to notice in

the mind of its author. It .emphasises on the one hand, in the

strongest manner, the Reality of the universal, by maintaining the

unity of matter (materia primo-prima) quite in the Arabian sense,

and on the other hand it teaches that this universalis only actual

by being realised by the series of Forms descending from the uni

versal to the particular, and ultimately by means of the definite

individual Form (hcecceitas) . This individual Form is therefore

for Duns Scotus an original fact; no farther question as to its

ground is permissible. He designates individuality (both in the

sense of individual substance and in that of individual occurrence)

as the contingent (contingens) ; that is, as that which is not to be

deduced from a universal ground, but is only to be verified as actual

fact. For him, therefore, as for his predecessor Roger Bacon, the

inquiry for the principle of individuation has no meaning : the indi

vidual is the " last " Form of all reality, by means of which alone

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universal matter exists, and the question rather is, how, in presence

of the fact that the individual being with its determined form is

the only Reality, one can still speak of a Reality of universal

" natures." 1

From this noteworthy limitation of the doctrine of Scotus it

becomes explicable that while some of its adherents, as for example

Francis of Mayron, proceeded from it to extreme Realism, it sud

denly changed with Occam into the renewal of the nominalistic

tJiesis, that only the individual is real and that the universal is but

a product of comparative thought.

4. The victorious development which Nominalism experienced in

the second period of mediaeval philosophy rests upon an extremely

peculiar combination of very different motives of thought. In the

depths of this stream of development is dominant the Augustinian

moment of feeling, which seeks to see the proper metaphysical value

secured to the individual personality ; in the main philosophical

current the anti-Platonic tendency of the Aristotelian theory of

knowledge, now just becoming known, asserts itself, throwing its

influence toward conceding the value of "first substance" to the

empirical individual only; and on the surface plays a logico-gram-

matical schematism, which has its origin in the first operation of

the Byzantine tradition of ancient thought. 2 All these influences

become concentrated in the impassioned, impressive personality of

William of Occam.

In their exposition of the doctrine of concepts and its application

to the judgment and syllogism, the text-books of " modern " logic,

as type of which that of Petrus Hispanus may serve, lay an impor

tant emphasis upon the theory of " supposition " in a manner which

is not without its precedent in antiquity. 3 According to this theory

a class-concept or term (terminus) may, in language, and, as was

then supposed, in logic also, stand for the sum of its species, and a

species-concept for the sum of all its individual examples (homo =

omnes homines), so that in the operations of thought a term is

employed as a sign for that which it means. Occam develops Nom

inalism in the forms of this Terminism\* (cf. pp. 325 f). Individual

1 This method for the solution of the problem of universals, peculiar to Duns

Scotus, is usually called Formalism.

2 In fact, we may see in the working of the text-book of Michael Psellos the

first impetus of that accession of ancient material of culture which the West

received by way of Byzantium, and which later in the Renaissance became

definitely united with the two other lines of tradition that came, the one by

way of Home and York, the other by way of Bagdad and Cordova.

3 The reader need only be reminded of the investigations of Philodemus on

signs and things siimitied (p. 102 ; cf. also p. 198).

\* Cf. K. Prantl in the Sitz.-Bcr. dc.r Munch. A cad., 1864, II. a 58 ff.

CHAP. 2, 27.] Problem of Individuality : Terminism. 348

things, to which Occam, following Scotus, concedes the Reality of

original Forms, are represented in thought by us intuitively, without

the mediation of species intelligibiles ; but these ideas or mental rep

resentations are only the " natural " signs for the things represented.

They have only a necessary reference to them, and have real simi

larity with them as little as any sign is necessarily like the object

designated. This relation is that of " first intention." But now as

individual ideas stand for (supponunt) individual things, so, in

thought, speech, and writing, the " undetermined " general ideas of

abstract knowledge, or the spoken or written words which in turn

express these general ideas, may stand for the individual idea. This

"second intention," in which the general idea with the help of the

word refers no longer directly to the thing itself, but primarily to the

idea of the thing, is no longer natural, but arbitrary or according

to one s liking (ad placitum instituta). 1 Upon this distinction Occam

rests also that of real and rational science : the former relates imme

diately or intuitively to things, the latter relates abstractly to the

immanent relations between ideas.

It is clear, according to this, that rational science also presupposes

" real " science and is bound to the empirical material presented in

the form of ideas by this real science, but it is also clear that even

" real " knowledge apprehends only an inner world of ideas, which

may indeed serve as " signs " of things, but are different from things

themselves. The mind so Albert had incidentally said, and Nico-

laus Cusanus at a later time carried out the thought knows only

what it has within itself; its knowledge of the world, terministic

Nominalism reasons, refers to the inner states into which its living

connection with the real world puts it. As contrasted with the true

essence of things, teaches Nicolaus Cusanus, who committed himself

absolutely to this idealistic Nominalism, human thought possesses

only conjectures, that is, only modes of representation which corre

spond to its own nature, and the knowledge of this relativity of all

positive predicates, the knowledge of this non-knowledge, the docta

ignorant ia, is the only way to go beyond rational science and attain

to the inexpressible, signless, immediate community of knowledge

with true Being, the deity.

5. In spite of this far-reaching epistemological restriction, the

real vital energy of Nominalism was directed toward the develop

ment of natural science ; and if its results during the fourteenth and

fifteenth centuries remained very limited, the essential reason for this

1 The agreement of this with the contrast between 06m and 0i)&lt;m, which had

been asserted also in the ancient philosophy of language (Plato s Cratylus),

is obvious.

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was that the scholastic method with its bookish discussion of authori

ties, which had now attained full perfection, controlled absolutely

later as well as earlier the prosecution of science, and that the

new ideas forced into this form could not unfold freely, a phe

nomenon, moreover, which continues far into the philosophy of the

Renaissance. For all that, Duns Scotus and Occam gave the chief

impetus to the movement in which philosophy, taking its place

beside the metaphysics whose interests had hitherto been essentially

religious, made itself again a secular science of concrete, actual fact,

and placed itself with more and more definite consciousness upon

the basis of empiricism. When Duns Scotus designated the hcecceitas

or original individual Form, as contingent, this meant that it was to

be known, not by logical deduction, but only by actual verification

as fact ; and when Occam declared the individual being to be the

alone truly Real, he was thereby pointing out to " real science " the

way to the immediate apprehension of the actual world. But in

this point the two Franciscans are under the influence of Roger

Bacon, who with all his energy had called the science of his time

from authorities to things, from opinions to sources, from dialectic

to experience, from books to Nature. At his side in this movement

stood Albert, who supported the same line of thought among the

Dominicans, knew how to value the worth of original observation

and experiment, and gave brilliant proof in his botanical studies

of the independence of his own research. But strongly as Roger

Bacon, following Arabian models, urged quantitative determinations

in observation, and mathematical training, the time was not yet

ripe for natural research. Attempts like those of Alexander

Nekkam (about 1200), or those of Nicolaus d Autricuria, at a later

time (about 1350), passed away without effect.

The fruitful development of empiricism during this period was

only in the line of psychology. Under the influence of the Arabs,

especially of Avicenna and of the physiological optics of Alhacen,

investigations concerning the psychical life took on a tendency

directed more toward establishing and arranging the facts of expe

rience. This had been begun even by Alexander of Hales, by his

pupil, Johann of Rochelle, by Vincent of Beauvais, and especially

by Albert; and in the system of Alfred the Englishman (Alfred de

Sereshel, in the first half of the thirteenth century) we find a

purely physiological psychology with all its radical consequences.

These stirrings of a physiological empiricism would, however, have

been repressed by the metaphysical psychology of Thomism, if they

had not found their support in the Augustinian influence, which

held fast to the experience which personality has of itself, as its

CHAP. 2, 27.] Problem of Individuality : Nicolaus Cusanus. 345

highest principle. In this attitude Henry of Ghent, especially, came

forward in opposition to Thomism. He formulated sharply the

standpoint of inner experience and gave it decisive value, particu

larly in the investigation of the states of feeling. Just in this

point, in the empirical apprehension of the life of feeling, the

theory of which became thus emancipated at the same time from

that of the will and that of the intellect, he met support in Royer

Bacon, who, with clear insight and without the admixture of meta

physical points of view, distinctly apprehended the difference in

principle between outer and inner experience.

Thus the remarkable result ensued, that purely theoretical science

developed in opposition to intellectualistic Thomism, and in connec

tion with the Augustinian doctrine of the self-certainty of person

ality. This self-knowledge was regarded as the most certain fact of

"real science," even as it appeared among the nominalistic Mystics

such as Pierre d Ailly. Hence " real science " in the departing

Middle Ages allied itself rather to active human life than to Nature ;

and the beginnings of a " secular " science of the inter-relations of

human society are found not only in the theories of Occam and

Marsilius of Padua (cf. p. 328), not only in the rise of a richer,

more living, and more " inward " writing of history, but also in an

empirical consideration of the social relations, in which a Nicolas

d Oresme, 1 who died 1382, broke the path.

6. The divided frame of mind in which the departing Middle

Ages found itself, between the original presuppositions of its

thought and these beginnings of a new, experientially vigorous

research, finds nowhere a more lively expression than in the phil

osophy of Nicolaus Cusanus, which is capable of so many interpre

tations.- Seized in every fibre of his being by the fresh impulse of

the time, he nevertheless could not give up the purpose of arrang

ing his new thoughts in the system of the old conception of the

world.

This attempt acquires a heightened interest from the conceptions

which furnished the forms in which he undertook to arrange his

thoughts. The leading motive is to show that the individual, even

in his metaphysical separateness, is identical with the most uni

versal, the divine essence. To this end Nicolaus employs for the

first time, in a thoroughly systematic way, the related conceptions

of the infinite and the finite. All antiquity had held the perfect to

be that which is limited within itself and had regarded only

indefinite possibility as infinite. In the Alexandrian philosophy,

1 Cf. concerning him W. Roscher, Zcitschr. f. Staatswissenschaft, 1863, 305 ff.

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on the contrary, the highest being was stripped of all finite at

tributes. In Plotinus the " One " as the all-forming power is

provided with an unlimited intensity of Being on account of the

infinity of matter in which it discloses itself ; and also in Christian

thought the power, as well as the will and the knowledge of God,

had been thought more and more as boundless. Here the main

additional motive was, that the will even in the individual is felt

as a restless, never quiet striving, and that this infinity of inner ex

perience was exalted to a metaphysical principle. But Nicolaus was

the first to give the methtxl of negative theology its positive ex

pression by treating infinity as the essential characteristic of God in

antithesis to the world. The identity of God with the world,

required as well by the mystical view of the world as by the

naturalistic, received, therefore, the formulation that in God the

same absolute Being is contained infinitely, which in the world

presents itself in finite forms.

In this was given the farther antithesis of unity and plurality.

The infinite is the living and eternal unity of that which in the

finite appears as extended plurality. But this plurality and

Cusanus lays special weight on this point is also that of opposites.

What in the finite world appears divided into different elements,

and only by this means possible as one thing by the side of another

in space, must become adjusted and harmonised in the infinitude

of the divine nature. God is the unity of all opposites, the coin-

cidentia oppositorum. 1 He is, therefore, the absolute reality in

which all possibilities are eo ipso realised (possest, can-is), while

each of the many finite entities is in itself only possible, and is real

or actual only through him. 2

Among the oppositions which are united in God, those between him

and the world, that is, those of the infinite and the finite, and of

unity and plurality, appear as the most important. In consequence

of this union the infinite is at the same time finite ; in each of his

manifestations in phenomena the unitary deus implicitus is at the

same time the deus explicitus poured forth into plurality (cf. p.

290). God is the greatest (maximum) and at the same time also

1 Nicolaus also designates his own doctrine, in contrast with opposing sys

tems, as a coincidentia oppositorum, since it aims to do justice to all motives of

earlier philosophy. Cf. the passages in Falckenberg, op. cit., pp. 00 ff.

2 Thomas expressed the same thought as follows : God is the only necessary

being, i.e. that which exists by virtue of its own nature (a thought which is to be

regarded as an embodiment of Anselm s ontological argument, cf ; 23, 2), while

in the case of all creatures, essence (or quidditas whatness) is really separate

from existence in such a way that the former is in itself merely possible and

that the latter is added to it as realisation. The relation of this doctrine to the

fundamental Aristotelian conceptions, actus and potentia, is obvious.

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the smallest (minimum). But, on the other hand, in consequence

of this union it follows also that this smallest and finite is in its

own manner participant in the infinite, and presents within itself,

as does the whole, a harmonious unity of the many.

Accordingly, the universe is also infinite, not indeed in the same

sense in which God is infinite, but in its own way; that is, it is

unlimited in space and time (interminatum, or privitively infinite).

But a certain infinity belongs likewise to each individual thing,

in the sense that in the characteristics of its essence it carries

within itself also the characteristics of all other individuals. All

is in all : omnia ubique. In this way every individual contains

within itself the universe, though in a limited form peculiar to this

individual alone and differing from all others. In omnibus part ibus

relucet totum. Every individual thing is, if rightly and fully known,

a mirror of the universe, a thought which had already been ex

pressed incidentally by the Arabian philosopher Alkendi.

Naturally this is particularly true in the case of man, and in his

conception of man as a microcosm Nicolaus attaches himself

ingeniously to the terministic doctrine. The particular manner in

which other things are contained in man is characterised by the

ideas which form in him signs for the outer world. Man mirrors

the universe by his " conjectures," by the mode of mental repre

sentation peculiar to him (of. above, p. 343).

Thus the finite also is given with and in the infinite, the individ

ual with and in the universal. At the same time the infinite is

necessary in itself; the finite, however (following Duns Scotus), is

absolutely contingent, i.e. mere fact. There is no proportion

between the infinite and the finite ; even the endless series of the

finite remains incommensurable with the truly infinite. The deri

vation of the world from God is incomprehensible, and from the

knowledge of the finite no path leads to the infinite. That which

is real as an individual is empirically known, its relations and the

oppositions prevailing in it are apprehended and distinguished by

the understanding, but the perception or intuition of the infinite

unity, which, exalted above all these opposites, includes them all

within itself, is possible only by stripping off all such finite knowl

edge, by the mystical exaltation of the docta ignorantia. Thus the

elements which Cusanus desired to unite fall apart again, even in

the very process of union. The attempt to complete the mediaeval

philosophy and make it perfect on all sides leads to its inner

disintegration.

# PART IV. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE.

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THE antitheses which make their appearance in mediaeval philoso

phy at the time of its close have a more general significance ; they

show in theoretical form the self-conscious strengthening of secular

civilisation by the side of that of the Church. The undercurrent,

which for a thousand years had accompanied the religious main

movement of the intellectual life among the Western peoples,

swelling here and there to a stronger potency, now actually forced

its way to the surface, and in the centuries of transition its slowly

wrested victory makes the essential characteristic for the beginning

of modern times.

Thus gradually developing and constantly progressing, modern

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science freed itself from mediaeval views, and the intricate process

in which it came into being went hand in hand with the multifold

activity with which modern life in its entirety began. For modern

life begins everywhere with the vigorous development of details ;

the tense (lapidare) unity into which mediaeval life was concen

trated, breaks asunder in the progress of time, and primitive vigour

bursts the band of common tradition with which history had

encircled the mind of the nations. Thus the new epoch announces

itself by the awakening of national life; the time of the world-

empire is past in the intellectual realm also, and the wealth and

variety of decentralisation takes the place of the unitary concen

tration in which the Middle Ages had worked. Rome and Paris

cease to be the controlling centres of Western civilisation, Latin

ceases to be the sole language of the educated world.

In the religious domain this process showed itself first in the fact

that Koine lost its sole mastery over the Church life of Christianity.

Wittenberg, Geneva, London, and other cities became new centres

of religion. The inwardness of faith, which in Mysticism had

already risen in revolt against the secularisation of the life of the

Church, rose to victorious deliverance, to degenerate again at once

into the organisation which was indispensable for it in the outer

world. But the process of splitting into various sects, which set

in in connection with this external organisation, wakened all the

depths of religious feeling, and stirred for the following centuries

the passion and fanaticism of confessional oppositions. Just by this

means, however, the dominance at the summit of scientific life of a

complete and definitive religious belief was broken. What had

been begun in the age of the Crusades by the contact of religions

was now completed by the controversy between Christian creeds.

It is -not a matter of accident that the number of centres of

scientific life in addition to Paris was also growing rapidly. While

Oxford had already won an importance of its own as a seat of

the Franciscan opposition, now we find first Vienna, Heidelberg,

Prague, then the numerous academies of Italy, and finally the

wealth of new universities of Protestant "Germany, developing their

independent vital forces. But at the same time, by the invention of

the art of printing, literary life gained such an extension and such a

widely ramifying movement that, following its inner impulse, it

was able to free itself from its rigid connection with the schools,

strip off the fetters of learned tradition, and expand unconstrained

in the forms shaped out for it by individual personalities. So

philosophy in the Renaissance loses its corporate character, and

becomes in its best achievements the free deed of individuals ; it

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seeks its sources in the broad extent of the real world of its own

time, and presents itself externally more and more in the garb of

modern national languages.

In this way science became involved in a powerful fermentation.

The two-thousand-year-old forms of the intellectual life seemed to

have been outlived and to have become unusable. A passionate, and

at the first, still unclear search for novelty filled all minds, and

excited imagination gained the mastery of the movement. But, in

connection with this, the whole multiplicity of interests of secular

life asserted themselves in philosophy, the powerful development

of political life, the rich increase in outward civilisation, the exten

sion of European civilisation over foreign parts of the world, and

not least the world-joy of newly awakened art. And this fresh and

living wealth of new content brought with it the result that philos

ophy became pre-eminently subject to no one of these interests, but

rather took them all up into itself, and with the passing of time

raised itself above them again to the free work of knowing, to the

ideal of knowledge for its own sake.

The new birth of the purely theoretical spirit is the truf meaning of

the scientific " Renaissance," and in this consists also its kinship of

spirit with Greek thought, which was of decisive importance for its

development. The subordination to ends of practical, ethical, and

religious life which had prevailed in the whole philosophy of the

Hellenistic-Roman period and of the Middle Ages, decreased more

and more at the beginning of the modern period, and knowledge of

reality appeared again as the absolute end of scientific research.

Just as at the beginnings of Greek thought, so now, this theoretical

impulse turned its attention essentially to natural science. The

modern mind, which had taken up into itself the achievements of

later antiquity and of the Middle Ages, appears from the beginning

as having attained a stronger self-consciousness, as internalised, and

as having penetrated deeper into its own nature, in comparison

with the ancient mind. But true as this is, its first independent

intellectual activity was the return to a disinterested concep

tion of Nature. The whole philosophy of the Renaissance pressed

toward this end, and in this direction it achieved its greatest

results.

Feeling such a relationship in its fundamental impulse, the

modern spirit in its passionate search for the new seized at first

upon the oldest. The knowledge of ancient philosophy brought out

by the humanistic movement was eagerly taken up, and the systems of

Greek philosophy were revived in violent opposition to the mediaeval

tradition. But from the point of view of the whole movement of

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history this return to antiquity presents itself as but the instinctive

preparation for the true work of the modern spirit, 1 which in this

Castalian bath attained its youthful vigour. By living itself into the

world of Greek ideas it gained the ability to master in thought its

own rich outer life, and thus equipped, science turned from the sub-

tility of the inner world with full vigour back to the investigation

of Nature, to open there new and wider paths for itself.

The history of the philosophy of the Renaissance is therefore in

the main the history of the process in which the natural science

mode of regarding the world is gradually worked out from the

humanistic renewal of Greek philosophy. It falls, therefore, appro

priately into two periods, the humanistic period and the natural

science period. As a boundary line between the two we may per

haps regard the year 1600. The first of these periods contains the

supplanting of mediaeval tradition by that of genuine Grecian

thought, and while extremely rich in interest for the history of

civilisation and in literary activity, these two centuries show from

a philosophical point of view merely that shifting of earlier thoughts

by which preparation is made for the new. The second period in

cludes the beginnings of modern natural research which gradually

conquered their independence, and following these the great meta

physical systems of the seventeenth century.

The two periods form a most intimately connected whole. For

the inner impelling motive in the philosophical movement of Hu

manism was the same urgent demand for a radically new knowledge

of the world, which ultimately found its fulfilment in the process in

which natural science became established and worked out according

to principles. But the manner in which this work took place, and

the forms of thought in which it became complete, prove to be in

all important points dependent upon the stimulus proceeding from

the adoption of Greek philosophy. Modern natural science is the

daughter of Humanism.

1 In this respect the course of development of science in the Renaissance ran

exactly parallel to that of art. The line which leads from Giotto to Leonardo,

Raphael, Michael Angelo, Titian, Diirer, and Rembrandt, passes gradually from

the reanimation of classical forms to independent and immediate apprehension

of Nature. And Goethe is likewise proof that for us moderns the way to

Nature leads through Greece.

## CHAPTER I. THE HUMANISTIC PERIOD.

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THE continuity in the intellectual and spiritual development of

European humanity manifests itself nowhere so remarkably as in

the Renaissance. At no time perhaps has the want for something

completely new, for a total and radical transformation, not only in

the intellectual life, but also in the whole state of society, been felt

so vigorously and expressed so variously and passionately as then,

and no time has experienced so many, so adventurous, and so ambi

tious attempts at innovation as did this. And yet, if we look closely,

and do not allow ourselves to be deceived, either by the grotesque

self-consciousness o\*r by the nai ve grandiloquence which are the

order of the day in this literature, it becomes evident that the whole

multiform process goes on within the bounds of ancient and mediae

val traditions, and strives in obscure longing toward a goal which

is an object rather of premonition than of clear conception. It was

not until the seventeenth century that the process of fermentation

became complete, and this turbulent mixture clarified.

The essential ferment in this movement was the opposition

between the inherited philosophy of the Middle Ages, which was

already falling into dissolution, and the original works of Greek

thinkers which began to be known in the fifteenth century. A new

stream of culture flowed from Byzantium by the way of Florence

and Rome, which once more strongly diverted the course of Western

thought from its previous direction. In so far the humanistic

Renaissance, the so-called re-birth of classical antiquity, appears as

a continuation and completion of that powerful process of appropri-

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ation presented by the Middle Ages (cf. pp. 264 ff., 310 f.) ; and if this

process consisted in retracing in reverse order the ancient move

ment of thought, it now reached its end, inasmuch as essentially all

of the original ancient Greek literature which is accessible to-day,

now became known.

The becoming known of the Greek originals, and the spread of

humanistic culture, called out a movement of opposition to Scholas

ticism, at first in Italy, then also in Germany, France, and England.

As regards subject-matter, this opposition was directed against the

mediaeval interpretations of Greek metaphysics ; as regards method,

against authoritative deduction from conceptions taken as assump

tions ; as regards form, against the tasteless stiffness of monastic

Latin : and with the wonderful restoration of ancient thought, with

the fresh imaginative nature of a life-loving race, with the refine

ment and wit of an artistically cultivated time for its aids this oppo

sition won a swift victory.

But this opposition was divided within itself. There were Plato-

nists, who for the most part would better be called Neo-Platonists ;

there were Aristotelians, who, in turn, were again divided into differ

ent groups, vigorously combating one another, according to their

attachment to one or another of the ancient interpreters. There,

too, were the reawakened older doctrines of Greek cosmology, of

the lonians and Pythagoreans; the conception of Nature held by

Democritus and Epicurus rose to new vigour. Scepticism and the

mixed popular and philosophical Eclecticism lived again.

While this humanistic movement was either religiously indiffer

ent or even engaged together with open " heathenism " in warfare

against Christian dogma, an equally violent controversy between

transmitted doctrines was in progress in the life of the Church.

The Catholic Church intrenched itself against the assault of thought

more and more firmly behind the bulwark of Thomism, under the

leadership of the Jesuits. Among the Protestants, Augustine was the

leading mind a continuation of the antagonism observed in the

Middle Ages. But when dogmas were thrown into philosophical

form in the Protestant Church, the Reformed branch remained

nearer to Augustine, while in the Lutheran Church, in consequence

of the influence of Humanism, a tendency toward the original form

of the Aristotelian system prevailed. In addition to these ten

dencies, however, German Mysticism, with all the widely ramified

traditions which united in it (cf. 26, 5), maintained itself in the

religious need of the people, to become fruitful and efficient for the

philosophy of the future, more vigorous in its life than the Clmrch

erudition that sought in vain to stifle it.

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The new which was being prepared in these various conflicts was

the consummation of that movement which had begun with Duns

Scotus at the culmination of mediaeval philosophy, viz. the separa

tion of philosophy from theology. The more philosophy established

itself by the side of theology as an independent secular science, the

more its peculiar task was held to be the knowledge of Nature. In this

result all lines of the philosophy of the Renaissance meet. Philoso

phy shall be natural science, this is the watchword of the time.

The carrying out of this purpose, nevertheless, necessarily moved

at first within the traditional modes of thought; these, however,

had their common element in the anthropocentric character of their

Weltanschauung, which had been the consequence of the develop

ment of philosophy as a theory and art of life. For this reason the

natural philosophy of the Renaissance in all its lines takes for its

starting-point, in constructing its problems, man s position in the

cosmos ; and the revolution in ideas which took place in this aspect,

under the influence of the changed conditions of civilisation, became

of decisive importance for shaping anew the whole theory of the

world. At this point metaphysical imagination and fancy was most

deeply stirred, and from this point of view it produced its cosmical

poetry, prototypal for the future, in the doctrines of Giordano

Bruno and Jacob Boehme.

The following treat in general the revival of ancient philosophy : L. Heeren,

Geschichte der Studien der classischen Litteratur (Gottingen, 1797-1802) ;

G. Vogt, Die Wiederbdehung des classischen Alterthums (Berlin, 1880 f.).

The main seat of Platoiiism was the Academy of Florence, which was

founded by Cosmo de Medici, and brilliantly maintained by his successors.

The impulse for this had been given by Georgius Gemistus Pletho (1355-1450),

the author of numerous commentaries and compendiums, and of a treatise in

Greek on the difference between the Platonic and the Aristotelian doctrine.

Cf. Fr. Schultze, G. G. P. (Jena, 1874). Bessarion (born 1403 in Trebizond,

died as Cardinal of the Roman church in Ravenna, 1472) was his influential

pupil. Bessarion s main treatise, Adversus Calumniator em Platonis, appeared

at Rome, 14(59. Complete Works in Migne s coll. (Paris, 180(5). The most

important members of the Platonic circle were Marsilio Ficino of- Florence

(1433-1499), the translator of the works of Plato and Plotinus, and author

of a Theologia Platonic.a (Florence, 1482), and at a later time, Francesco

Patrizzi (1529-1597). who brought the natural philosophy of this movement to

its completes! expression in his Nova de fJniversis Philosophia (Ferrara, 1591).

A similar instance of Xeo-Platonism alloyed with Neo-Pythagorean and

ancient Pythagorean motives is afforded by John Pico of Mirandola (1463-94).

The study of Aristotle in the original sources was promoted in Italy by

Georgius of Trebizond (1396-1484 ; Comparatio Platonis et Aristotelit,

Venice, 1523) and Theodoras Gaza (died 1478), in Holland and Germany

by Rudolf Agricola (1442-1485), and in France by Jacques Lefevre (Faber

Stapulensis, 1455-1537).

The Aristotelians of the Renaissance (aside from the churchly-scholaslic

line) divided into the two parties of the Averroists and the Alexandrists.

The University of Padua, as the chief seat of Averroism, was also the place

of the liveliest controversies between the two.

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As representatives of Averroism we mention Nicoletto Vernias (died

1499), especially Alexander Achillini of Bologna (died 1518 ; works, Venice,

1545); further, Augostino Nifo (1473-1546 ; main treatise, De Intellectu et

Dcemonibus ; Opuscula, Paris, 1654), and the Neapolitan Zimaia (died 1532).

To the Alexandrists belong Eimolao Barbaro of Venice (1454-1493 ;

Compendium Sciential Naturalis ex Aristotele, Venice, 1547), and the most

important Aristotelian of the Renaissance, Pietro Pomponazzi (born 1402 in

Mantua, died 1524 in Bologna. His most important writings are De Immortali-

tate Animai with the Defensorium against Niphus, De fato libero arbitrio prce-

denlinatione providentia dei libri quinque , cf. L. Ferri, La Psicolo(jia di P. P.,

Rome, 1877), and his pupils, Gasparo Contarini (died 1542), Simon Porta

(died 1555), and Julius Caesar Scaliger (1484-1558).

Among the later Aristotelians, Jacopo Zabarella (1532-1589), Andreas

Ceesalpinus (1519-1603), Cesare Cremonini (1552-1031) and others seem

rather to have adjusted the above oppositions.

Of the renewals of other Greek philosophers, the following are especially to

be mentioned :

Joest Lips (1547-1606), Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam (Antwerp,

1604), and other writings ; and Caspar Schoppe, Elementa Stoicce Philosophies

Moralis (Mainz, 1606).

Dav. Sennert (1572-1637), Physica (Wittenberg, 1618) ; Sebastian Basso

(Philosophic yatitrnUft adversus Aristotelem, Geneva, 1621) ; and Johannes

Ma&nenus, Democritus Jteviviscens (Pavia, 1646).

Claude de B^rigard as renewer of the Ionic natural philosophy in his

Cerotli Pisani (Udine, 1643 ff.).

Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655), De Vita Moribus et Doctrina Epicuri (Ley-

den, 1647) [works, Lyons, 1658 J, and lastly

Emanuel Maignanus (1601-1671), whose Cursus Philosophicus (Toulouse,

1652) defends Empedoclean doctrines.

The following wrote in the spirit of the ancient Scepticism : Michel de

Montaigne (1533-1592 ; Essais, Bordeaux, 1580, new editions, Paris, 1865,

and Bordeaux, 1870) [Kng. tr. by Cotton, ed. by Hazlitt, Lond. 1872 ; also by

Florio, ed. by Morley, Lond. 1887J, Frangois Sanchez (1562-1632, a Portu

guese who taught in Toulouse, author of the Tractatus de multum nobili et

prima universali scientia quod nihil scitur, Lyons, 1581 ; cf. L. Gerkrath, F. S.,

Vienna, 1860), Pierre Charron (1541-1603; De la Sayesne, Bordeaux, 1601) ;

later Francois de la Motte le Vayer (1586-1672, Cinq Dialogues, Mons, 1673),

Samuel Sorbiere (1615-1670, translator of Sextus Empiricus), and Simon

Foucher (1644-96, author of a history of the Academic Sceptics, Paris, 1690).

The sharpest polemic against Scholasticism proceeded from those Humanists

who set against it the Roman eclectic popular philosophy of sound common

sense in an attractive form, and as far as possible in rhetorical garb. Agricola

is to be mentioned here also, with his treatise De Inventions Dialectica (1480).

Before him was Laurentius Valla (1408-1457 ; Dialectica; Disputationes contra

Aristoteleos, Ven. 1499), Ludovico Vives (born in Valencia, 1492, died

in Brugge, 1546; De tiisciplinis, Brugge, 1531, works, Basel, 1555; cf. A.

Lange in Schmidt s Encyclopadie der Padagogik, Vol. IX.), Marius Nizolius

(1498-1576; De pcria principiis et vera ratione phflosophandi, Parma, 1553),

finally Pierre de la Ram^e (Petrus Ramus, 1515-1572, Institittiones Dialec

tic^ Paris, 1543; cf. Ch. Waddington, Paris, 1849 and 1855).

The tradition of Thomistic Scholasticism maintained itself most strongly

at the Spanish universities. Among its supporters the most prominent was

Francis Suarez of Granada (1548-1617; Disputationes Metaphysics, 1605,

works, 26 vols., Paris, 1856-66 ; cf. K. Werner, A , und die Scholastik der

letzten Jahrhunderte, Regensburg, 1861) ; the collective work of the Jesuits of

Coimbra, the so-called Collegium Conembricense, is also to be mentioned.

Protestantism stood from the beginning in closer relation to the humanistic

movement. In Germany especially the two went frequently hand in hand; cf.

K. Hagen, Deutschlands litterarixche und religiose Verhaltnisse im Refonna-

tionszeitalter, 3 vols., Frankfort, 1868.

At the Protestant universities Aristotelianism was introduced principally

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by Philip Melancthon. In the edition of his works by Bretschneider and

Bindseil the philosophical works form Vols. 13. and 16. Of chief importance

among them are the text-books on logic (dialectic) and ethics. Cf. A. Richter,

MSs Verdienste um den philosophischen Unterricht (Leips. 1870); K. Hart-

felder, M. als Praiceptor Germanice (Berlin, 1889).

Luther himself stood much nearer the position of Augustinianism (cf. Ch.

Weisse, Die Chrixtologie Luther s, Leips. 1852). This was still more the case

with Calvin, while Zwingli was friendlier inclined toward contemporaneous

philosophy, especially the Italian Neo-Platonism. The scientific importance of

all three great reformers lies, however, so exclusively in the theological field

that they are to be mentioned here only as essential factors of the general intel

lectual movement in the sixteenth century.

Protestant Aristotelianism found its opponents in Nicolaus Taurellus

(1547-1606, Professor in Basel and Altorf ; Philosophic Triumphus, Basel,

1573 ; Alpes Ccesiv, Frankfort, 1597 ; cf. F. X. Schmidt-Sehwarzenberg, N. T.,

Der erste dentsche Philosophy Erlangen, 1864), further in Sociniamsm founded

by Lelio Sozzini of Sienna (1525-1562) and his nephew Fausto (1539-1604 ;

cf. A. Fock, Der Sodniniiismus, Kiel, 1847, and the article A , by Herzog in his

Theol. Enc., 2d ed., XIV. 377 ff), and especially in the popular movement of

Mysticism. Among the representatives of this movement are prominent

Andreas Osiander (1498-1552), Caspar Schwenckfeld (1490-1561), Sebas

tian Franck (1500-1545; cf. K. Hagen, op. cit., III. chap. 5) and especially

Valentine Weigel (155:5-1588 ; Libellus de Vita Beata, 1606, Der guldne Griff,

1613, Vom Ort der Welt, 1613, Dialogns de Christianismo, 1614, YvuQi a-ai/Tov,

1615 ; cf. J. O. Opel, V. W., Leips. 1804).

The tendency toward natural philosophy in attachment to Nic. Cusanus

appears more strongly in Charles Bouille (Bovillus, 1470-1553 ; De, Intellectu

and De Sensibus ; De Sapientia. Cf. J. Dippel, Versuch einer system. Darstel-

lung der Philos. des O. B., Wiirzburg, 1862), and Girolamo Cardano (1501-

1576 ; De Vita Propria, De Varietate Berum, De Subtilitate ; works, Lyons,

1663). Cf. on this and the following, Rixner und Siber, Leben und Lehrmeinun-

gen berithmter Physiker im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert, 1 Hefte, Sulzbach, 1819 ff.).

The most brilliant among the Italian natural philosophers is Giordano Bruno

of Nola, in Campania. Born in 1548, and reared in Naples, he met so much sus

picion in the Dominican Order, into which he had entered, that he fled, and from

that time on, led an unsettled life. He went by way of Rome and upper Italy

to Genoa, Lyons, Toulouse, held lectures in Paris and Oxford, then in Witten

berg and Helmstadt, visited also Marburg, Prague, Frankfort, and Zurich, and

finally, in Venice, met the fate of coming into the hands of the Inquisition by

treachery. He was delivered to Rome, and there, after imprisonment for sev

eral years, was burned, 1600, on account of his steadfast refusal to retract.

His Latin works (3 vols., Naples, 1880-91) concern partly the Lullian art (esp.

De Imaginum Signorum et Idearnm Composition^) , and in part are didactic

poems or metaphysical treatises (De Monade Numero et Fiynra ; De Triplici

Minimi &gt;) : the Italian writings (ed. by A. Wagner, Leips. 1829, new ed. by P. de

Lagarde, 2 vols., Gottingeri, 1888) are partly satirical compositions (II Candelajo,

La Cena delle Cineri, Spaccio della Bestia Trionfante, German by Kuhlenbeck,

Leips. 1890, Cabala del Cavallo Pegaseo\*), and on the other hand, the most

complete expositions of his doctrines : Dialoghi della Causa Principio ed Uno,

German by Lasson (Berlin, 1872) ; Degli Eroici Fnrori ; DelP Injinito, Universo

e Dei Mondi. Cf. Bartholmess, G. B. (Paris, 1816 f.) ; Dom. Berti, Vita di G. B.

(Turin, 1867), and Documenti Intorno a G. B. (Turin, 1880) ; Chr. Sigwart in

Kleine Sehriften, I. (Freiburg, 1889) ; II. Hrunnhofer, G. B. s Weltanschauung

und Verhdngniss (Leips. 1882). [. Bruno, by I. Frith, Lond., Triibner ; T.

Whitaker in Mind, Vol. IX.].

Another tendency is represented by Bernardino Telesio (1508-1588; De

rerum natura juxta propria principia, Rome, 1565 and Naples, 1586. On him

see F. Fiorentino, Florence, 1872 and 1874 ; L. Ferri, Turin, 1873), and his more

important successor, Tommaso Campanella. Born 1568, in Stilo of Calabria,

he early became a Dominican, was rescued and brought to France after many

persecutions and an imprisonment of several years. There he became intimate

with the Cartesian circle, and died in Paris, 1639, before the completion of the

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full edition of his writings, which was to be called Instauratio Scientiarum. A

new edition, with biographical introduction by d Ancona has appeared (Turin,

1854). Of his very numerous writings may be mentioned: Prodromus Philos

ophic Instanrqndce, 1617 ; liealis Philosophies Partes Qualuor (with the ap

pendix, Civitas Soils}, 1623 ; De MonarcMa Hispanica, 1625 ; Philosophies

Rationalis Partes fyuinque, 1638 ; Universally Philosophic sen metaphysicarum

rerum juxta propria principiapartes tres, 1638. Cf. Baldachiui, Vita f. Filosojia

di T. C. (Naples, 1840 and 1843) ; Dom. Berti, Nuovi Documents di T. C.

(Rome, 1881).

Theosophical-magical doctrines are found with John Reuchlin ( 1455-1 522 ;

DeVerbo Mirifico, De Arte Cabbalistica), Agrippa of Nettesheim (1487-1535;

De Occuita Philosophia ; De Incertitudine et Vanitate Scientiarum), Francesco

Zorzi (1460-1540, De Harmonia Mundi, 1 aris, 1549).

A more important and independent thinker is Theophrastus Bombastus Par

acelsus of Ilohenheitn (born 1493 at Kinsiedeln, he passed an adventurous life,

was Professor of Chemistry in Basel, and died in Salzburg, 1541). Among his

works (ed. by Huser, Strassburg, Itil6-18), the most important are the Opus

Paramirum, Die yrosse Wundarznei, and De Nature, Iferum. Cf. K. Eucken,

Beitraye zur Gesch. der neueren Philos., Heidelberg, 1886. Of his numerous

pupils the most important are Johann Baptist van Helmont (1577-l(i44 ; Ger

man ed. of his works, 1683), and his son, Franz Mercurius, also Robert Fludd

(1574-1637, Philosophia Mosaica, Guda, 1638), and others.

The most noteworthy deposit of these movements is formed by the doctrine

of Jacob Boehme. He was born, 1575, near Gorlitz, absorbed all kinds of

thoughts in his wanderings, and quietly elaborated them. Settled as a shoe

maker at Gorlitz, he came forward, 1610, with his main treatise Aurora, which

at a later time after he had been temporarily forced to keep silence, was followed

by many others, among them especially Vierzig Frayen von der 8eele (1620),

Mysterium Magnum (1623), Von der Gnademcahl (1623). He died 1624. Coll.

works ed. by Schiebler, Leips. 1862. Cf. H. A. Fechner, J. B., sein Leben und

seine Schriften, Gorlitz, 1853 ; A. Peip, J. B. der deutsche Philosoph, Leips. 1860.

### 28. The Struggle between the Traditions.

The immediate attachment to the Greek philosophy which became

prevalent in the Renaissance, was not entirely without its precedent

in the Middle Ages, and men like Bernard of Chartres and William

of Conches (cf. p. 302) were prototypes of the union of an increas

ing interest for knowledge of Nature with the humanistic move

ment. It is noteworthy, and characteristic of the changing fortune

of transmitted doctrines, that now, as then, the union between

Humanism and natural philosophy attaches itself to Plato, and

stands in opposition to Aristotle.

1. In fact, the revival of ancient literature showed itself at first

in the form of a strengthening of Platonism. The humanistic move

ment had been flowing on since the days of Dante, Petrarch, and

Boccaccio, and arose from the interest in Roman secular literature

which was closely connected with the awakening of the Italian

national consciousness ; but this current could not become a vic

torious stream until it received the help of the impulse from with

out which proceeded from the removal of the Byzantine scholars to

Italy. Among these the Aristotelians were of like number and im

portance with the Piatonists, but the latter brought that which was

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relatively less known, and therefore more impressive. In addition

to this, Aristotle was regarded in the West as the philosopher who

was in agreement with the Church doctrine, and thus the opposition,

which longed for something new, hoped much more from Plato; and

still further there was the aesthetic charm that comes from the writ

ings of the great Athenian, and for which no time was more keenly

susceptible than this. Thus Italy first became intoxicated with an

enthusiasm for Plato that matched that of departing antiquity. As

if to connect itself immediately with this latter period, the Academy

was again to live in Florence, and under the protection of the

Medicis a rich scientific activity actually developed here, in which

a reverence was paid to the leaders like Gemistus Pletho and Bes-

sarioii which was not less than that once given to the Scholarchs of

Neo-Platonism.

But the relationship with this latter system of thought went

deeper; the Byzantine tradition, in which the Platonic doctrine was

received, was the Neo-Platonic tradition. What at that time was

taught in Florence as Platonism was in truth Neo-Platonism. Mar-

silio Ficino translated Plotinus as well as Plato, and his " Platonic

Theology" was not much different from that of Proclus. So, too,

the fantastic natural philosophy of Patrizzi is in its conceptional

basis nothing but the Neo-Platonic system of emanation ; but it is

significant that in this case the dualistic elements of Neo-Plato

nism are entirely stripped off, and the monistic tendency brought out

more purely and fully. On this account the Neo-Platonist of the

Renaissance places in the foreground the beauty of the universe; on

this account even the deity, the Unomnia (One-all) is for him a

sublime world-unity which includes plurality harmoniously within

itself ; on this account he is able to glorify even the infinity of the

universe in a way to fascinate the fancy.

2. The pantheistic tendency, which is so unmistakable in this,

was enough to make this Platonism an object of suspicion to the

Church, and thus to give its Peripatetic opponents a welcome in

strument with which to combat it ; and an instrument that was

used not only by the scholastic Aristotelians, but also by the others.

On the other hand, to be sure, the Platonists could reproach the

new humanistic Aristotelianism for its naturalistic tendencies, and

praise their own tendency toward the super-sensuous, as allied to

Christianity. Thus the two great traditions of Greek philosophy

fought their battle over again, while each charged the other with

its unchristian character. 1 In this spirit Pletho, in his v6p.uv a-vy-

1 Quite the same relation is repeated in the case of the different groups of

Aristotelians, each of which wished to be regarded orthodox, even at the price

CHAP. 1, 28.] Warring Traditions : Platonists, Aristotelians. 359

ypa&lt;j&gt;ij, conducted his polemic against the Aristotelians, and incurred

thereby condemnation from the Patriarch Gennadios in Constanti

nople ; in this spirit George of Trebizond attacked the Academy,

and in the same spirit, though milder, Bessarion answered him.

Thus the animosity between the two schools, and the literary stir

it produced in antiquity, were transferred to the Renaissance, and

it was in vain that men like Leonicus Thomseus of Padua (died

15,33) admonished the combatants to understand the deeper unity

that subsists between the two heroes of philosophy.

3. Meanwhile there was absolutely no unity among the Aristote

lians themselves. The Grecian interpreters of the Stagirite and

their adherents looked down with as much contempt upon the

Averroists as upon the Thomists. Both passed for them in like

manner as barbarians ; they themselves, however, were for the most

part prepossessed in favour of that interpretation of the Master

which was closely allied to Stratonism, and which was best repre

sented among the commentators by Alexander of Aphrodisias. Here,

too, one transmitted theory stood in opposition to the others. The

conflict was especially severe in Padua, where the Averroists saw

their fortress threatened by the successful activity of Pomponatius

as a teacher. The main point of controversy was the problem

of immortality. Neither party admitted a full, individual immor

tality, but Averroism believed that it possessed at least a compensa

tion for this in the unity of the intellect, while the Alexandrists

attached even the rational part of the soul to its animal conditions,

and regarded it as perishable with them. Connected with this were

the discussions on theodicy, providence, destiny and freedom of the

will, miracles and signs, in which Pomponazzi frequently inclined

strongly to the Stoic doctrine.

In the course of time this dependence upon commentators and

their oppositions was also stripped off, and the way prepared for a

pure, immediate apprehension of Aristotle. This succeeded best

with Caesalpinus, who avowed his complete allegiance to Aristotle.

An equally correct understanding of the Peripatetic system was

gained by the German Humanists from a philological standpoint,

but following Melancthon s precedent they adopted this in their

own doctrine only in so far as it agreed with Protestant dogma.

4. In all these cases the adoption of Greek philosophy led to an

opposition to Scholasticism as regards the real content or matter of

of the " twofold truth." In this the Averroists, especially, were ready, and so

it came about that one of them, Nifo, had himself entrusted by the Pope with

the refutation of Pomponazzi s doctrine of immortality. The latter, indeed, also

covered himself with the same shield.

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the opposing systems. Another line of Hamanism, which was more

in sympathy with Roman literature, inclined to a predominantly

formal opposition, of which John of Salisbury may be regarded as

a mediaeval forerunner. The taste of the Humanists rebelled against

the barbarous outward form of mediaeval literature. Accustomed to

the polished refinement and transparent clearness of the ancient

writers, they were not able to value rightly the kernel so full of

character, which lay within the rough shell of the scholastic termi

nology. The minds of the Renaissance, with their essentially aes

thetic disposition, had no longer any feeling for the abstract nature

of that science of abstract conceptions. Thus they opened the battle

in all directions, with the weapons of jest and of earnest ; instead of

conceptions they demanded things; instead of artificially constructed

words, the language of the cultivated world ; instead of subtle proofs

and distinctions, a tasteful exposition that should speak to the

imagination and heart of the living man.

Laurentius Valla was the first to make this cry resound. Agric-

ola took it up in lively controversy, and Erasmus also joined in.

The models of these men were Cicero and Quintilian, and when at

their hand the method of philosophy was to be changed, the scho

lastic dialectic was dislodged and in its place were introduced the

principles of rhetoric and grammar. The true dialectic is the

science of discourse. 1 The "Aristotelian " logic therefore becomes

the object of most violent polemic ; the doctrine of the syllogism is

to be simplified and driven from its commanding situation. The

syllogism is incapable of yielding anything new ; it is an unfruitful

form of thought. This was later emphasised by Bruno, Bacon, and

Descartes, as strongly as by these Humanists.

But the more closely the dominance of the syllogism was con

nected with dialectical " Realism," the more nominalistic and termi-

nistic motives connected themselves with the humanistic opposition.

This shows itself in the cases of Vives and Nizolius. They are

zealous against the reign of universal conceptions; in this, according

to Vives, lies the true reason for the mediaeval corruption of the

sciences. Universals, Nizolius teaches, 2 are collective names which

arise by " comprehension," not by abstraction ; individual things

with their qualities constitute reality. It concerns us to apprehend

these, and the secondar}^ activity of the understanding which com

pares, is to be carried out as simply and unartificially as possible.

Hence all metaphysical assumptions, which have made so great a

1 Petr. Kamus, Dialect. Instil., at the beginning.

2 Mar. Nizolius, De Ver. Princ., I. 4-7 ; III. 7.

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difficulty in previous dialectic, must be banished from logic. Em

piricism can use only & purely formal logic.

The "natural" dialectic, however, was sought in rhetoric and

grammar, for, Ramus held, it should teach us only to follow in our

voluntary thinking the same laws which, according to the nature of

reason, control also our involuntary thinking, and present themselves

spontaneously in the correct expression of this involuntary process

of thought. In all reflection, however, the essential thing is to

discover the point of view that is determinative for the question,

and then to apply this correctly to the subject. Accordingly Ramus,

following a remark of Vives, 1 divides his new dialectic into the doc

trines of Inventio and Judicium. The first part is a kind of general

logic, which yet cannot avoid introducing again in the form of the

" loci " the categories, such as Causality, Inherence, Genus, etc., and

thus, enumerating them without system, falls into the nai ve meta

physics of the ordinary idea of the world. The doctrine of judgment

is developed by Ramus in three stages. The first is the simple de

cision of the question by subsuming the object under the discovered

point of view ; here the doctrine of the syllogism has its place,

which is accordingly much smaller than formerly. In the second

place the judgment is to unite cognitions that belong together to a

systematic whole, by definition and division ; its highest task, how

ever, it fulfils only when it brings all knowledge into relation to

God, and finds it grounded in him. Thus natural dialectic culminates

in theosophy. 2

Slight as was the depth and real originality of this rhetorical

system, it yet excited great respect in a time that was eager for the

new. In Germany, especially, Eamists and anti-Ramists engaged

in vehement controversy. Among the friends of the system, Jo

hannes Sturm is especially worthy of note, a typical pedagogue of

Humanism, who set the task for education of bringing the scholar

to the point where he knows things, and how to judge concerning

them from a correct point of view, and to speak in cultivated

manner.

5. A characteristic feature of this movement is its cool relation

toward metaphysics ; this very fact proves its derivation from the

Roman popular philosophy. Cicero, to whom it especially attached

itself, was particularly influential by virtue of his Academic Scepti

cism or Probabilism. Surfeit of abstract discussions alienated

a considerable part of the Humanists from the great systems of

1 Lud. Vives, De Causis Corr. Art. (first part of De DiscipUnis}, III. 5.

2 Cf. E. Laas, Die Piidaqogik des ./. St. kritisch und historisch beleuchtet

(Berlin, 1872).

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antiquity also. The extension of religious unbelief or indifferent-

ism was an additional motive to make scepticism appear in many

circles as the right temper for the cultivated man. The charm of

outer life, the glitter of refined civilisation, did the rest to bring

about indifference toward philosophical subtleties.

This scepticism of the man of the world was brought to its

complete expression by Montaigne. With the easy grace and fine

ness of expression of a great writer, he thus gave French literature

a fundamental tone which has remained its essential character.

But this movement also runs in the ancient track. Whatever of

philosophical thought is found in the " Essays " arises from Pyr

rhonism. Hereby a thread of tradition which had for a long time

been let fall is again taken up. The relativity of theoretical opin

ions and ethical theories, the illusions of the senses, the cleft

between subject and object, the constant change in which both are

involved, the dependence of all the work of the intellect upon such

doubtful data, all these arguments of ancient Scepticism meet us

here, not in systematic form, but incidentally in connection with

the discussion of individual questions, and thus in a much more

impressive manner.

Pyrrhonism was at the same time revived in a much more scho

lastic form by Sanchez, and yet in a lively manner, and not without

hope that a sure insight might yet at some time be allowed to man.

He concludes individual chapters, and the whole work, with

"Nescis? At ego nescio. Quid?" To this great "Quid? "he has

indeed given no answer, and guidance to a true knowledge was a

debt that he did not discharge. But he left no doubt as to the

direction in which he sought it. It was the same which Montaigne

also pointed out : science must free itself from the word-lumber of

the wisdom of the schools, and put its questions directly to things

themselves. Thus Sanchez demands a new knowledge, and has,

indeed, a dim foreboding of it, but where and how it is to be sought

he is not prepared to say. In many passages it seems as though he

would proceed to empirical investigation of Nature, but just here he

cannot get beyond the sceptical doctrine of outer perception, and if

he recognises the greater certainty of inner experience, this inner

experience in turn loses its value because of its indefiniteness.

Charron comes forward with firmer step, since he keeps before

him the practical end of wisdom. Like his two predecessors he

doubts the possibility of certain theoretical knowledge ; in this

respect all three set up the authority of the Church and of faith :

a metaphysics can be revealed only ; the human power of knowl

edge is not sufficient for it. But, proceeds Charron, the human

CHAP. 1, 28.] Warring Traditions : Sanchez, Catholicism. 363

knowing faculty is all the more sufficient for that self-knowledge

which is requisite for the moral life. To this self-knowledge

belongs, above all, the humility of the sceptic who has no confidence

that he knows anything truly, and in this humility is rooted the

freedom of spirit with which he everywhere withholds his theoretical

judgment. On the other hand, the ethical command of righteous

ness and of the fulfilment of duty is known without a doubt in

this self-knowledge.

This diversion toward the practical realm, as might be expected

from the general tendency of the time, was not permanent. The

later Sceptics turned the theoretical side of the Pyrrhonic tradi

tion again to the front, and the effect which resulted from this

tendency for the general tone of the time applied ultimately, for the

most part, to the certainty of dogmatic convictions.

6. The Church doctrine could no longer master these masses of

thought which now made their way so powerfully into the life of

this period, as it had succeeded in doing with the Arabian-Aristote

lian invasion: this new world of ideas was too manifold and too full

of antitheses, and, on the other hand, the assimilative power of the

Church dogma was too far exhausted. The Roman Church limited

itself, therefore, to defending its spiritual and external power with

all the means at its disposal, and was only concerned to fortify its

own tradition and make it as sure as possible within itself. In this

changed form the Jesuits now performed the same task that in the

thirteenth century had fallen to the mendicant orders. With their

help the definitive and complete form of Church dogma was fixed

against all innovations at the Council of Trent (1563), and Thomism

declared to be authoritative in essentials for philosophical doctrine.

Thereafter there could be no more any question as to changes of

principle, but only as to more skilful presentations and occasional

insertions. In this way the Church excluded itself from the fresh

movement of the time, and the philosophy dependent upon it fell

into unavoidable stagnation for the next following centuries. Even

the short after-bloom which Scholasticism experienced about 1600

in the universities of the Iberian peninsula bore no real fruit.

Suarez was an important writer, clear, acute, accurate, and with a

great capacity for a luminous disposition of his thoughts ; he sur

passes also, to a considerable degree, most of the older Scholastics in

the form of his expression ; but in the content of his doctrine he is

bound by tradition, and a like constraint will be understood as a

matter of course in the case of the collective work of the Jesuits of

Coimbra.

Over against this form of religious tradition, another now made

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its appearance in the Protestant churches. Here, too, the opposition

claimed the older tradition, and put aside its mediaeval modifications

and developments. The Kefonnation desired to renew original Chris

tianity as against Catholicism. It drew the circle of the canonical

books narrower again ; putting aside the Vulgate, it recognised only

the Greek text as authoritative ; it returned to the Nicene creed. The

controversy over dogmas in the sixteenth century theoretically

considered hinges upon the question, which tradition of Chris

tianity shall be the binding one.

But the theological antithesis drew the philosophical antithesis

after it, and here again a relation was repeated which had appeared

at many points during the Middle Ages. In the doctrine of Augus

tine, the religious need found a deeper, richer satisfaction, and a

more immediate expression than in the conceptions worked out by

the Scholastics. Earnestness in the consciousness of sin, passionate

longing for redemption, faith that was internal in its source and

its nature, all these were traits of Augustine s nature which

repeated themselves in Luther and Calvin. But it is only in the

doctrine of Calvin that the permanent influence of the great Church

Father is shown ; and yet just by this means an antagonism between

Thomism and Augustinianism was once more created, which evinced

itself as especially important in the French literature of the seven

teenth century (cf. 30 f.). For the Catholics under the guidance

of Jesuitism, Thomas was the ruling authority; for the Reformed

Churches, and for the freer tendencies in Catholicism itself, Augus

tine held the same position.

German Protestantism followed other courses. In the develop

ment of the Lutheran dogma, Luther s genius was aided by the co

operation of Melancthon and thus of Humanism. Little as the

theoretico-aesthetical and religiously indifferent nature of the

Humanists 1 might accord with the mighty power of Luther s soul

with its profound faith, he was, nevertheless, obliged, when he would

give his work scientific form, to accommodate himself to the neces

sity of borrowing from philosophy the conceptions with which to lay

his foundations. Here, however, Melancthon s harmonising nature

came in, and while Luther had passionately rejected scholastic

Aristotelianism, his learned associate introduced humanistic Aris-

totelianism as the philosophy of Protestantism, here, too, opposing

the older tradition to the remodelled tradition. This original

Aristotelianism had to be corrected in many passages, to be sure, by

1 On the relation of the Reformation and Humanism cf. Th. Ziegler, Gesch.

derEthik, II. 414 ff.

CHAP. 1, 28.] Warring Traditions : Protestantism. 365

means of the Scriptures, and the combination of doctrines could not

reach such an. organic union as had been attained by the slow ripen

ing of Thomism in the Middle Ages ; but the Peripatetic system was

in this instance treated rather as but a supplement to theology in the

department of profane science, and for this end, Melancthon knew

how to sift, arrange, and set forth the material in his text-books with

so great skill that it became the basis for a doctrine which was in

the main one in its nature, and as such was taught at the Protestant

universities ior two centuries.

7. But in Protestantism there were still other traditional forces

active. Luther s work of liberation owed its origin and its success

not least to Mysticism, not indeed to that sublime, spiritualised

form of viewing the world to which the genius of Master Eckhart

had given expression, but to the movement of deepest piety which,

as " practical Mysticism," had spread from the Rhine in the " League

of the Friends of God," and in the "Brothers of the Common Life."

For this Mysticism, the disposition, purity of heart, and the imita

tion of Christ were the sole content of religion; assent to dog

mas, the external works of holiness, the whole worldly organisation

of Church life, appeared to be matters of indifference and even

hindrances : the believing soul demands only the freedom of its own

religious life, a demand that transcends all these outward works.

This was the inner source of the Reformation. Luther himself had

not only searched Augustine, he had also edited the " German The

ology " : and his word let loose the storm of this religious longing,

with which, in the conflict against Koine, an impulse of national

independence was also mingled.

But when the Protestant State Church became again consolidated

in the fixed forms of a theoretical system of doctrine, and clung to

this the more anxiously in proportion as it was obliged to struggle

for its existence in the strife of Confessions, then the supra-confes-

sional impulse of Mysticism became undeceived, as did also the

national consciousness. The theological fixation of the thought of

the Reformation appeared as its ruin, and as Luther had once waged

his warfare against the "sophistry" of the Scholastics, so now a

movement of Mysticism that was quietly stirring farther and wider

among the people, directed itself against his own creation. In men

like Osiander and Schwenckfeld he had to contend against parts of

his own nature and its development. But in this movement it

became evident that the doctrines of mediaeval Mysticism had been

quietly maintained and continued in legendary form amid all kinds

of fantastic ideas and obscure imagery. The Mysticism which comes

to light in the teachings of men like Sebastian Franck, or in the

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secretly circulated tracts of Valentine Weigel, has its support in the

idealism of Eckhart, which transformed all the outer into the inner,

all the historical into the eternal, and saw in the process of Nature

and history but the symbol of the spiritiial and divine. This con

stituted, though frequently in strange form, the deeper ground of

the battle which the Mystics of the sixteenth century waged in

Germany against the " letter " of theology.

8. Look where we will in the intellectual movement of the fif

teenth and sixteenth centuries, we see everywhere tradition arrayed

against tradition, and every controversy is a battle between trans

mitted doctrines. The spirit of the Western peoples has now taken

up into itself the entire material which the past offers for its cul

ture, and in the feverish excitement into which it is finally put by

direct contact with the highest achievements of ancient science, it

struggles upward to the attainment of complete independence. It

feels sufficiently hardened to execute work of its own, and overflow

ing with its wealth of thought, it seeks new tasks. One feels the

impulsive blood of youth pulsate in its literature, as though some

thing unheard of, something which had never before been, must

now come into being. The men of the Renaissance announce to us

nothing less than the approach of a total renovation of science and

of the state of humanity. The warfare between the transmitted

doctrines leads to a surfeit of the past; learned research into the

old wisdom ends with throwing aside all book-rubbish, and full of

the youthful joy of dawning, growing life, the mind goes forth into

the cosmic life of Nature ever young.

The classical portrayal of this temper of the Renaissance is the

first monologue in Goethe s Faust.

### 29. Macrocosm and Microcosm.

By Scotism and Terminism the faith -metaphysics of the Middle

Ages had become disintegrated and split in twain : everything

supersensuous had been given to dogma, and as the object of philos

ophy there remained the world of experience. But before thought

had as yet had time to become clear as to the methods and special

problems of this secular knowledge, Humanism, and with it above

all, the Platonic Weltanschauung, burst in. No wonder that the solu

tion of the problem, which was itself at first seen but dimly, was first

sought in connection with this theory : and this doctrine must have

been the more welcome, especially in its Neo-Platonic form, as it

showed the world of the supersensuous presageful in the back

ground, but made the particulars of the world of sense stand out

CHAI. 1, 29.] Macrocosm and Microcosm: Bruno, Boehme. 367

distinctly in purposefully defined outlines. The supersensuous

itself, and all therein that was connected with man s religious life,

might be cheerfully set off to theology ; philosophy could dedicate

itself to the task of being natural science, with all the calmer con

science in proportion as it followed the Neo-Platonic precedent of

apprehending Nature as a product of spirit, and thus believed that

in the conception of the deity it retained a point of unity for the

diverging branches of science, the spiritual and the secular. Did

theology teach how God reveals himself in the Scripture, it was now

the business of philosophy to apprehend with admiration his revela

tion in Nature. On this account the beginnings of modern natural

science were theosophical and thoroughly Neo- Platonic.

1. The characteristic fact, however, is that in this revival of

Neo-Platonism, the last dualistic motives which had belonged to the

same were also completely set aside. They disappeared together

with the specifically religious interest which had supported them,

and the theoretical element of recognising in Xature the creative

divine power came forward pure and unmixed. 1 The fundamental

tendency in the natural philosophy of the Renaissance was therefore

the fanciful or imaginative conception of the divine unity of the liv

ing All, the admiration of the macrocosm : the fundamental thought

of Plotinus of the beauty of the universe has been taken up by no

other time so sympathetically as by this ; and this beauty was now

also regarded as a manifestation of the divine Idea. Such a view

is expressed in almost entirely Neo-Platonic forms by Patrizzi, in a

more original form and with strongly poetical quality by Giordano

Bruno, and likewise by Jacob Boehme. With Bruno the symbol of

the all-forming and all-animating primitive light is still dominant

(cf. p. 245) ; with Boehme, on the contrary, we find that of the

organism ; the world is a tree which from root to flower and fruit

is permeated by one life-giving sap, and which is formed and ordered

from within outward by its own germinal activity. 2

In this inheres naturally the inclination to complete monism and

pantheism. Everything must have its cause, and the last cause can

be but one, God. 3 He is, according to Bruno, at the same time

the formal, the efficient, and the final cause ; according to Boehme

he is at once the rational ground and efficient cause (" Urgrund"

and " Ursache ) of the world (principium and causa with Bruno).

1 In a certain sense this might also be expressed by saying that thereby the

Stoic elements of Neo-Platonism came with controlling force into the fore

ground.

2 Cf. the remarkable agreement between Bruno, Delia Causa Pr. e. U., II.

(Lag. I. 231 f.) and Boehme, Aurora, Vorrede.

8 Aurora, Chap. III.

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Hence the universe is also nothing but "the essential nature of God

himself made creatural." l And yet the idea of the transcendence

of God is here, too, connected with this view, as it had been in Neo-

Platonism. Boehme holds that God should be thought not as a

force devoid of reason and "science," but as the "all-knowing, all-

seeing, all-hearing, all-smelling, all-tasting" spirit: and Bruno adds

another analogy; for him God is the artist who works unceasingly

and shapes out his inner nature to rich life.

Harmony is accordingly, for Bruno also, the inmost nature of the

world, and he who can apprehend it with the gaze of enthusiasm

(as does the philosopher in the dialogues and poetic inventions Deyli

Eroici Furori), for him the apparent defects and imperfections of

detail vanish in the beauty of the whole. He needs no special the

odicy ; the world is perfect because it is the life of God, even down

to every detail, and he only complains who cannot raise himself to

a view of the whole. The world-joy of the aesthetic Renaissance

sings philosophical dithyrambs in Bruno s writings. A universalistic

optimism that carries everything before it prevails in his poetic

thought.

2. The conceptions which lie at the basis of this unfolding of the

metaphysical fantasy in Bruno had their source in the main in

Nicolaus Cusanus, whose teachings had been preserved by Charles

Bouille, though in his exposition they had to some degree lost their

vivid freshness. Just this the Nolan knew how to restore. He not

only raised the principle of the coincidentia oppositorum to the artis

tic reconciliation of contrasts, to the harmonious total action of

opposing partial forces in the divine primitive essence, but above all

he gave to the conceptions of the infinite and the finite a far wider

reaching significance. As regards the deity and its relation to the

world, the Neo-Platonic relations are essentially retained. God

himself, as the unity exalted above all opposites, cannot be appre

hended through any finite attribute or qualification, and there

fore is unknowable in his own proper essence (negative theology) ;

but at the same time he is still thought as the inexhaustible, infinite

world-force, as the natura naturans, which in eternal change forms

and "unfolds" itself purposefully and in conformity with law, into

the natura naturata. This identification of the essence of God and

the world is a general doctrine of the natural philosophy of the

Renaissance ; it is found likewise in Paracelsus, in Sebastian Franck,

in Boehme, and finally also with the whole body of the " Platonists."

That it could also assume an extremely naturalistic form, and could

1 Aurora, Chap. II.

CHAP. 1, 29.] Macrocosm and Microcosm : Bruno. 369

lead to the denial of all transcendence, is proved by the agitative and

boastfully polemical doctrine of Vanini. 1

For the natura naturata, on the other hand, for the " universe "

the sum-total of creatures the characteristic of true "infinity" is

not claimed, but rather that of unlimitedness in space and time.

This conception gained an incomparably clearer form and more

fixed significance by the. Copernican theory. The spherical form of

the earth and its revolution about its axis had been a familiar idea

to Cusanus as well as to the old Pythagoreans, perhaps, indeed,

through them ; but only the victoriously proved hypothesis of the

motion of the earth about the sun could furnish a rational basis for

the completely new view of man s position in the universe, which is

peculiar to modern science. The anthropocentric idea of the world

which had ruled the Middle Ages became out of joint. Man, as

well as the earth, must cease to be regarded as centre of the universe

and centre of the world. Men like Patrizzi and Boehme also raised

themselves above such " restriction " on the basis of the teaching of

Copernicus, which for that reason was condemned by the dogmatic

authorities of all confessions ; but the fame of having thought out

the Copernican system to its end, both in natural philosophy and in

metaphysics, belongs to Giordano Bruno.

He developed from this system the theory that the universe forms

a system of countless worlds, each of which moves about its central

sun, leads its own proper life, grows from chaotic conditions to clear

and definite formation, and again yields to the destiny of dissolution.

The tradition of Democritus and Epicurus had perhaps a share in

the formation of this conception of a plurality of worlds arising and

perishing again ; but it is the peculiar feature of Bruno s doctrine,

that he regarded the plurality of solar systems not as a mechanical

juxtaposition, but as an organic living whole, and regarded the pro

cess of the growth and decay of worlds as maintained by the pulse-

beat of the one divine All-life.

3. While in this way universalism, with its bold flight into spatial

and temporal boundlessness, threatened to claim the fantasy entirely

for its own, there was an effective counterpoise in the Peripatetic-

Stoic doctrine of the analogy between macrocosm and microcosm,

which found in man s nature the sum, the " quintessence " of the

cosmical powers. We see this doctrine reviving in the most varied

1 Lucilio Vanini (born 1585 at Naples, burned 1619 at Toulouse), a dissolute

adventurer, wrote Amphitheatrum ^Eternce Providentice (Lyons, 1(515) and De

admirandis naturae ref/ince deceque mortalium arcanis (Paris, 1616).

2 Nicolaus Copernicus, De Revolutionists Orbium Cortestium (Nuremberg,

1543).

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forms during the Renaissance ; it controls entirely the theory of

knowledge at this period, and moreover the Neo-Platonic triple

division is almost universally authoritative in connection with it,

furnishing a scheme for a metaphysical anthropology. One can know

only what one himself is, is the mode in which this was expressed

by Valentine Weigel : man knows the all in so far as he is the all.

This was a pervading principle of Eckhart s Mysticism. But this

idealism now took on a definite form. As body, man belongs to the

material world ; indeed, he unites within himself, as Paracelsus, and

following him Weigel and Boehme teach, the essence of all material

things in finest and most compact form. Just on this account he is

competent to understand the corporeal world. As intellectual being,

however, he is of " sidereal " origin, and is therefore able to know

the intellectual world in all its forms. Finally, as a divine " spark,"

as spiraculum vitce, as a partial manifestation of the highest princi

ple of life, he is also able to become conscious of the divine nature

whose image he is.

A more abstract application of this same principle, according to

which all knowledge of the world is rooted in man s knowledge of

himself, is found in the thought of Campanetta, involving not the

Neo-Platonic separation of world-strata (although this too is present

in Campanella), but the fundamental categories of all reality. Man

is the thought here too knows in the proper sense only himself,

and knows all else only from and through himself. All knowledge

is perception (sentire), but we perceive, not the things, but only

the states into which these set us. In this process, however, we

learn by experience that inasmuch as we are, we can do something,

we know something and will something, and further, that we find

ourselves limited by corresponding functions of other beings. From

this it follows that power, knowledge, and will are the"primali-

ties " of all reality, and that if they belong to God in an unlimited

degree, he is known as all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good.

4. The doctrine that all knowledge of God and of the world is

ultimately locked up in man s knowledge of himself, is nevertheless

only an epistemological inference from the more general metaphys

ical principle according to which the divine nature was held to be

fully and entirely contained in each of its finite manifestations.

Giordano Bruno follows the Cusan also in holding that God is the

smallest as well as the greatest, as truly the vital principle of the

individual being as that of the universe. And accordingly every

individual thing, and not merely man, becomes a " mirror " of the

world-substance. Each without exception is according to its essen

tial nature the deity itself, but each in its own way, which is

CHAP. 1, 29.] Macrocosm and Microcosm: Campanella, Bruno. 371

different from all the rest. This thought Bruno incorporated in his

conception of the monad. He understood by this the individual

substance (Einzelwesen), which, as continually "formed" matter,

constitutes one of the partial manifestations of the world-force, in the

interaction of which the world-life consists. It is living from the

beginning, and is imperishable ; it is corporeal as well as spiritual

in its nature. Each monad is a form in which the Divine Being

finds individual existence, a finite existence-form of the infinite

essence. Since, now, there is nothing but God and the monads, the

universe is animated even to the smallest nook and corner, and the

infinite all-life individualises itself at every point to a special and

peculiar nature. It results from this that each thing, in the move

ments of its life, follows in part the law of its special nature, and

in part a more general law, just as a planet or heavenly body

moves at the same time on its own axis and about its sun. Cam-

panella, who took up this doctrine also in connection with the

Copernican system, designated this striving toward the whole, this

tendency toward the original source of all reality, as religion, and

spoke in this sense of a "natural" religion, that is of religion as

"natural impulse," one would now perhaps say centripetal im

pulse, which he with logical consistency ascribed to all things in

general, and which in man was held to assume the special form of

"rational" religion; that is, of the striving to become one with God

by love and knowledge.

This principle of the infinite variability of the divine ground of

the world which presents itself in a special form in every particular

thing, is found in a similar form also with Paracelsus. Here, as

with Nicolaus Cusanus, it is taught that all substances are present

in everything, that each thing therefore presents a microcosm, and

yet that each has also its special principle of life and activity.

This special mind or spirit of the individual is called by Paracelsus

the Archeus ; Jacob Boehme, to whom this doctrine passed over, calls

it the Prinms.

With Bruno the conception of the monad connects itself in a very

interesting manner, though without further effect upon his physical

views, with that of the atom, which was brought to him, as to the

earlier period, by the Epicurean tradition through Lucretius. The

"smallest" in metaphysics the monad, in mathematics the point

is in physics the atom, the indivisible spherical element of the

corporeal world. Memories of the Pythagorean and Platonic theory

of the elements, and of the related atomic theory of Democritus,

became thus alive in the midst of Neo-Platonism ; they found also

an independent revival with men like Basso, Sennert, and others,

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and so led to the so-called corpuscular theory, according to which

the corporeal world consists of inseparable atom-complexes, the cor

puscles. In the atoms themselves, the theory assumed in connec

tion with their mathematical form an original and unchangeable

law of action, to which, it held, the mode of action of the corpuscles

is also to be traced. 1

5. Here the workings of mathematics assert themselves in the old

Pythagorean form, or as modified by Democritus and Plato. The

ultimate constituents of physical reality are determined by their

geometrical form, and the qualitative determinations of experience

must be traced back to this. The combination of elements presup

poses numbers and their order as the principle of multiplicity. 2

Thus spatial forms and number-relations again make their appear

ance as the essential and original in the physical world, and thereby

the Aristotelian-Stoic doctrine of the qualitatively determined forces,

of the inner Forms of things, of the qualitates occultce, was displaced.

As this latter doctrine had formerly gained the victory over the

principle of Pythagoras, Democritus, and Plato, so it must in turn

yield to this : and herein lies one of the most important prepara

tions for the origin of modern natural science.

The beginnings of this are found already with Nicolaus Cusanus ;

but now they receive an essential strengthening from the same

source from which their presence in his thought is explained:

namely, from the old literature, and in particular from the Neo-

Pythagorean writings. Just for this reason, however, they still

have the fantastic metaphysical garb of -number-mysticism and num

ber-symbolism. The book of Nature is written in numbers ; the har

mony of things is that of the number-system. All is arranged by

God according to measure and number ; all life is an unfolding of

mathematical relations. But just as in antiquity, so here, this

thought is unfolded at first as an arbitrary interpretation of concep

tions, and a mysterious speculation. The procedure of the world

forth from God, from the construction of the Trinity on, as, for

example, in the attempt of Bouille, is again to be conceived as the

process of the transformation of unity into the number-system. Such

fantasies were followed by men like Cardan and Pico. Reuchlin

added further the mythological creations of the Jewish Cabbala.

6. Thus the principle which was destined for the most fruitful

development made its entrance into the new world wrapped again

in the old metaphysical fantasticalness, and fresh forces were

1 Cf. K. Lasswitz, Geschichte des Atomismus, I. pp. !

Leips. 1890).

2 Cf. for this especially G. Bruno, De Triplici Minima.

ff. (Hamburg and

CHAP. 1, 29.] Macrocosm and Microcosm : Paracelsus. 373

needed to strip off this covering, and free it for its right working.

Meanwhile, however, it became mingled with quite other efforts,

which likewise had their origin in the Neo-Platonic tradition. To

the idea of a universal psychical life, to the fanciful spiritualisation

of Nature, belonged also the impulse to interfere in the course of

things with mysterious means, with conjurations and magic arts,

and so to guide it according to the will of man. Here, too, a higher

thought hovered before the fantastic impulse of the excited age,

the thought of mastering Nature by a knowledge of the forces

working in it. But this thought was also received in the wrappings

of ancient superstition. If, as was the case with the Neo-Platonists,

the life of Nature was regarded as a dominance of spirits, as a mys

teriously connected system of internal forces, it was a proper aim

to make these subject by knowledge and will. Thus magic became

a favourite subject of thought in the Renaissance, and science again

concerned itself with the task of bringing system into superstition.

Astrology, with its influences of the stars upon human life, the

interpretation of dreams and signs, necromancy, with its conjura

tions of spirits, the predictions of persons in the ecstatic state, all

these elements of the Stoic and Neo-Platonic divination were then in

most luxuriant bloom. Pico and Reuchlin brought them into con

nection with the number-mysticism ; Agrippa of Nettesheim adopted

all the sceptical attacks against the possibility of rational science,

in order to seek help in mystical illuminations and secret magic

arts. Cardan proceeded with all seriousness to the task of deter

mining the laws of these operations, and Campanella conceded them

an unusually wide space in his idea of the world.

Physicians especially, whose vocation demanded an interference

in the course of Nature and might seem permitted to expect special

advantage in secret arts, showed an inclination toward these magic

arts. From this point of view Paracelsus desired to reform medi

cine. He also proceeds from the sympathy of all things, from the

idea of the universe as a spiritually connected system. He finds

the essence of disease in the injuring of the individual vital prin

ciple, the Archeus, by foreign powers, and seeks the means where

with to free and strengthen the Archeus. Since this latter process

must come about by a corresponding composition of materials, all

sorts of magical drinks, tinctures, and other secret remedies must be

brewed, and thus the arts of alchemy were set in motion, which, in

spite of all its fantastic performances, ultimately yielded a number

of useful results for chemical knowledge in the course of its incred

ibly extended pursuits.

In this connection the fundamental metaphysical presupposition

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of the unity of all vital force led of itself to the thought that there

must be also a simple, most efficacious, universal remedy for the

strengthening of every Archeus whatever, a panacea against all

diseases and for the maintenance of all the vital forces ; and con

nection with the macrocosmic efforts of magic nourished the hope

that the possession of this secret would lend the highest magic

power, and afford the most desirable treasures. All this was to be

achieved by the " philosopher s stone " ; it was to heal all diseases,

transmute all substances into gold, conjure all spirits into the power

of its possessor. And thus the purposes which it was thought

would be satisfied in the ventures of alchemy, were ultimately very

real and sober.

7. The introduction of this magical view of Nature into the subtle

religious system of German Mysticism constitutes the peculiar feat

ure of Boehme s philosophy. He, too, is seized by the thought that

philosophy should be knowledge of Nature ; but the deep earnest

ness of the religious need which lay at the basis of the German

Reformation did not allow him to content himself with the separa

tion of religious metaphysics and natural science, customary at his

time, and he sought to work the two into one again. Similar efforts

which tended to transcend the dogmatic, fixed form of Protestant

ism, and hoped to solve the problems of the new science with the

aid of a Christian metaphysics, throve also by the side of the official

Peripatetic system. Taurellus aimed to produce such a supra-con-

fessional philosophy of Christianity, and with a true instinct for his

purpose, adopted many elements of the Augustinian doctrine of the

will, but was not able to work enough real material from the inter

ests of his time into these thoughts, and so came ultimately rather

to a complete separation of empirical research from all metaphysics.

A similar process went on in the mystical movement, which grew

with the popular opposition against the new orthodoxy all the more

in proportion as the latter dried and hardened within itself. The

mystical doctrines also remained suspended in vague generality until

the teaching of Paracelsus was brought to them, at first by Weigel,

and then completely by Boehme.

In Boehme s doctrine Neo-Platonism assumes again a completely

religious colouring. Here, too, man is regarded as the microcosm

from and by which the bodily, the " sidereal," and the divine worlds

can be known, if one follows the right illumination and is not mis

led by learned theories. Self-knowledge, nevertheless, is religious

knowledge, which finds the opposition of good and evil as a funda

mental trait of human nature. The same opposition fills the whole

world; it rules in heaven as on earth, and since God is the sole

CHAP. I, 29.] Macrocosm and Microcosm : Boehme. 375

cause of all, this opposition must be sought in him also. Boehme

extends the coincidentia oppositorum to the extreme limit, and finds

the ground of duality in the necessity of the self-revelation of the

divine Primordial Ground. As light can be revealed only in con

nection with darkness, so God s goodness can be revealed only in

connection with his anger. Thus Boehme portrays the process of

the eternal self-generation of God, describing how from the dark

ground of Being within him the urgent impulse ("Drang"), or will,

which has only itself for its object, attains self-revelation in the

divine wisdom, and how that which lias thus become revealed forms

itself into the world. While the theogonic development thus passes

over immediately into the cosmogonic, the effort is everywhere

shown in this latter development to carry the fundamental religious

antithesis into the physical categories of the system of Paracelsus.

Thus three kingdoms of the world and seven forms, or " qiialia "

(" Qualen"), are constructed, which ascend from the material forces

of attraction and repulsion to those of light and warmth, and from

there on to those of the sensible and intellectual functions. To this

portrayal of the eternal nature of things is then attached the history

of the earthly world, which begins with the fall of Lucifer and

the process of rendering the spiritual essence perceptible to the

senses, and ends with the overcoming of the proud infatuation

(" Vergafftsein") for the creature, with the mystical devotion of

man to the deity, and ultimately with the restoration of the spiritual

nature. All this is presented by Boehme in prophetic discourse,

full of deep conviction, with a unique mingling of profundity and

dilettantism. It is the attempt of the Eckhartian Mysticism to

become master of the modern interests of science, and the first still

tentatively uncertain step toward raising natural science into an

idealistic metaphysics. But because this is made from the stand

point of the deepest religious life, the intellectualistic features of

the older Mysticism retreat, with Boehme, more into the background.

While with Eckhart, the world-process both in its arising and in its

passing was regarded as a knowing process, with Boehme it is rather

a straggling of the will between good and evil.

8. In all these ways the result of the separation of philosophy

from dogmatic theology always was that the knowledge of Nature

that was sought took on the form of the older metaphysics. This

procedure was inevitable so long as the desire for a knowledge of

Nature could provide neither a material of facts which it had itself

acquired, nor new conceptions to serve as forms for the elaboration

of this material. As a prerequisite for this, it was necessary to see

the inadequacy of metaphysical theories, and putting them aside,

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to turn to empiricism. This service was rendered to the genesis of

modern thought by the tendencies of Nominalism and Terminism,

in part, also, by the rhetorical and grammatical opposition to the

science of the schools, and also by the revival of ancient Scepticism.

The writings of Ludovico Vives must be regarded as a common

starting-point for these various efforts ; but they prove also that

the importance of these endeavours is essentially negative in char

acter. In place of the obscure words and arbitrary conceptions of

metaphysics, a demand is made in nominalistic fashion for the im

mediate, intuitive apprehension of things themselves by experience :

but the remarks as to the manner in which this should be scientifi

cally set about are meagre and uncertain ; he speaks of experiment,

but without any very deep insight into its nature. Quite so lies

the case at a later time with Sanchez. And if the artificial subtle

ties of the syllogistic method were attacked with great hue and cry,

this line of thought had ultimately only the Ramistic fancies of

" natural logic " to put in their stead.

Further, this empiricism, just by virtue of its origin from Termin-

ism, could move only with a very uncertain step in the presence of

external Nature. It could not deny the background of Occam s

dualism. Sense-perception was held to be, not a copy of a thing,

but an inner state of the subject corresponding to the presence of

the thing. These scruples could be only strengthened by the

theories of ancient Scepticism, for this added the doctrine of the

deceptions of the senses and the consideration of the relativity and

change of all perceptions. Hence this empiricism of the Humanists

now also threw itself more upon inner perception, which was univer

sally regarded as much surer than outer perception. Vives is most

fortunate where he speaks the language of empirical psychology;

men like Nizolius, Montaigne, and Sanchez shared this view, and

Charron gave it practical significance. Strenuously as all these urge

toward looking at things themselves, outer perception ultimately

turns out comparatively empty.

How little certain of itself, and how little fruitful in principles

this empiricism was at that time, is shown best of all by its two

main representatives in Italy, Telesio and Campanella. The former,

one of the most stirring and influential opponents of Aristotelianism ?

is everywhere famous even in his own time (and also with Bruno

and Bacon), as he who demanded most strongly that science

should build only on the basis of facts perceived by the senses. He

founded in Naples an academy which he called the Academia Cosen-

tina, after the name of his home, and, in fact, contributed much

toward the cultivation of the sense for empirical natural science.

CHAP. 1, 29.] Macrocosm and Microcosm : Campanella. 377

But if we look to see how he treats Nature "juxta prapriajnrincipia,"

we are met by genuinely physical theories which from few observations

hastily leap over to most general metaphysical principles quite after

the fashion of the ancient Ionics. The dry-warm and the moist-cold

are set forth as the two opposing fundamental forces, out of whose

conflict both the macrocosmic and the microcosmic life are to be ex

plained. This same inner contradiction appears almost more promi

nent still in Campanella. He teaches the most pronounced sens

ualism. All knowledge is for him a "feeling" (sentire) ; even

recollection, judgment, and inference are for him but modified

forms of that feeling. But in his case also, sensualism tilts over

into psychological idealism ; he is far too good a Nominalist not to

know that all perception is but a feeling of the states of the percip

ient himself. Thus he takes his starting-point in inner experience,

and following the principle of the analogy of macrocosmus and

microcosmus, builds upon a simple aper$u (cf. above) an extended

ontology. Into this he then draws also the quite scholastic antith

esis of Being and Non-being (ens and non-ens), which, following the

Neo-Platonic example, is identified with that of the perfect and

imperfect, and between the two he spreads the variegated meta

physical picture of a world-system arranged in successive strata.

So tenaciously do the long-wonted habits of metaphysical thought

cling everywhere to the beginnings ol the new research.

## CHAPTER II. THE NATURAL SCIENCE PERIOD.

Damiron, Essai sur VHistoire de la Philosophic au 17 me Siecle. Paris, 1846.

Kuno Fischer, Francis Bacon und seine Nachfolger. 2d ed., Leips. 1875.

Ch. de Rfimusat, Histoire de la Philosophic en Angleterre depuis Bacon jusqu^a

Locke. 2 vols., Paris, 1875.

Natural science acquired its decisive influence upon the develop

ment of modern philosophy by first gaining its own independence

with the aid of a conscious use of a scientific method, and then from

this position being able to determine the general movement of

thought as regards both form and content. In so far the develop

ment of the method of natural science from Kepler and Galileo

down to Newton is not indeed itself the evolution of modern philos

ophy, but is yet that series of events in reference to which this

evolution constantly proceeds.

For this reason the positive beginnings of modern philosophy are

in general to be sought, not so much in neV conceptions with new

content, as in methodical reflection, out of which, with the progress

of time, there resulted of course new material and so new points of

view for the treatment of both theoretical and practical problems.

But at first the points of departure of modern thought were in all

cases where permanently fruitful conceptions of the task and thereby

conditioned procedure of the new science grew out of the humanistic

opposition against Scholasticism, and out of the excited metaphysical

fantasies of the transitional period.

In this consists from the outset an essential difference between

modern and ancient philosophy. The former is as reflective in its

beginning as the latter was nai ve, and this is self-explaining, since

the former must develop out of those traditions which the latter

created. In this way it is characteristic of the greater number of

the systems of modern philosophy to seek the path to the real or

" material " problems by considering the science of method and the

theory of knowledge ; and in particular the seventeenth century with

respect to its philosophy may be characterised as a strife of methods.

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While, however, the movement of the humanistic period had

in the main taken place in Italy and Germany, the cooler and more

considerate temper of the two western civilised peoples now became

prominent. Italy was made dumb by the counter-reformation, Ger

many was crippled by the ruinous war between the confessions.

England and France, on the contrary, experienced in the seventeenth

century the bloom of their intellectual civilisation, and between

them the Netherlands became a flourishing seat of art and science.

In the development of the method of natural science the lines of

empiricism and of mathematical theory converged : in philosophical

generalisation the two came forward in an independent attitude.

The programme of the experience philosophy was laid down by Bacon,

but the method which formed its fundamental thought was not car

ried out by him in the fruitful manner which he had anticipated.

Much more comprehensive was the form in which Descartes brought

together the scientific movement of his time to establish rationalism

anew, by filling the scholastic system of conceptions with the rich

content of the Galilean research. From this resulted far-reaching

metaphysical problems, which in the second half of the seventeenth

century called forth an extraordinarily vigorous movement of philo

sophical thought, a movement in which the new principles entered

into manifold antithetical combinations with the principles of mediiB-

val philosophy. Out of the Cartesian school rose Occasionalism, of

which Geulincx and Malebranche are the chief representatives. But

the complete issue of this development was found in the two great

philosophical systems brought forward by Sj)inoza and Leibniz.

The influence which the powerful development of theoretical phil

osophy exercised also upon the treatment of practical problems shows

itself principally in the field of the philosophy of law (or right). In

this department Hobbes, who was in like measure a disciple of Bacon

and of Descartes, and as such marks an important point in the line

of development of methods and metaphysics above noted, takes the

decisive position as the introducer of an ethical naturalism which is

found in altered form even with his opponents, such as Herbert of

Cherbury and Cumberland. In these antitheses the problems of the

philosophy of the Enlightenment are in process of preparation.

The series of great natural scientists who exercised an immediate influence

also upon philosophical questions was opened by Johann Kepler (1501-1630)

of Weil, a town in Wiirttemberg, who died in Regensburg after a life spent in

struggle with need and anxiety. Among his works (ed. by Frisch, Frankfurt,

18f)8-71, 8 vols.), the most important are Myxterium Cosmographicum, Harmo-

nice Mwtdt, Axtronomia Nova sen Physica Ccelcstis Tradiia Commentariis de

Motibnx SMlcK Mortis. Of. Chr. Sigwart, Kleine Schriften, I. 182 ff. ; R. Eucken,

PMlos. Monatsh., 1878, pp. 30 ff. In immediate attachment to him stands

Galileo Galilei (born 1564 at Pisa, died 1642 at Arcetri). His works were

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published in 15 vols. (Florence, 1842-56) with a biographical supplementary

volume by Arrago. Vols. 11-14 contain the Fisico-Mathe matica ; among which

we notice II Saggiatore (1623) and the dialogue on the Ptolemaic and the

Copernican systems (1632). Cf. H. Martin, Galileo, Us droits de la science

et la methode des sciences physiques (Paris, 1668) ; P. Natorp, Gal. als Philo-

soph. (Philos. Monatsh., 1882, pp. 193 ff.). Isaac Newton (1642-1727) comes

into consideration chiefly on account of his Philosophic Naturalis Principia

Mathematica (1687; 2d ed. by Cotes, 1713; German by Wolfers, 1872) and

his Optics (1704). Of his contemporaries we notice the chemist, Robert Boyle

(1626-1691; Chemista Scepticus ; Origo Formarum et Qualitatum ; De Ipsa

Natura^, and the Netherlander, Christian Huyghens (1629-1695 ; De Causa

Gravitatis ; De Lumine).

Cf. W. Whewell, History of the Inductive Sciences (Lond. 1837; German by

Littrow, Leips. 1839 ff.) ; E. F. Apelt, Die Epochen der Geschichte der Mensch-

heit (Jena, 1845) ; E. Diihring, Kritische Geschichte der Principien der

Mechanik (Leips. 1872) ; A. Lange, Gesch. des Materialism us, 2d td., Iseiiohn,

1873 [Eng. tr. History of Materialism by E. C. Thomas, Lond., 4th ed., 1892J ;

K. Lasswitz, Gesch. der Atomistik, 2 vols. (Hamburg and Leips. 1890).

Francis Bacon, Baron of Verulam, Viscount of St. Albans, was born in

1561, studied in Cambridge, had a brilliant career under the reigns of Elizabeth

and James I., until, as the result of political opposition, he was proceeded

against, convicted of venality, and deposed from the position of Lord High

Chancellor. He died 1626. The latest edition of his works is that by Spedding

and Heath (Lond. 1857 ff.). Aside from the Essays (Sermones Fideles) the

main writings are De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum (1623 ; originally

published under the title, The Two Books of Francis Bacon on the Projicience

and Advancementof Learning, Divine and Human, 1605) and Novum Organon

Scientiarum (1620 ; originally under the title, Cogitata et Visa, 1612). i Cf.

Ch. de Remusat, Bacon, Sa vie, son temps, sa philosophic et son influence

jusqu a nos jours (Paris, 1854) ; H. Heussler, Fr. B. und seine geschichtliche

Stellung (Breslau, 1889) ; [Bacon, by J. Nichol, in Blackwood s series, Edin.

1888 : Ed. of the Novum Organum by Fowler, Oxford, 1878].

Uen6 Descartes (Cartesius), born 1596, in Touraine, and educated in the

Jesuit school at La Fleche, was originally destined for a soldier and took part in

the campaigns of 1618-1621 in the service of various leaders, but then betook

himself for the first time to Paris, and later, withdrew for many years, at differ

ent places in the Netherlands, into a scientific solitude, which he kept in the

most diligent and careful manner. After controversies in which his doctrine

had become involved at the universities in that country had rendered this place

of residence disagreeable, he accepted, in 1649, an invitation of Queen Christine

of Sweden to Stockholm, where he died the following year. His works have

been collected in Latin in the Amsterdam editions (1650, etc.), and in French

by V. Cousin (11 vols., Paris, 1824 ff.) ; the important writings have been trans

lated into German by Kuno Fischer (Mannheim, 1863) [Eng. tr. of the Method,

Meditations and Selections from the Principles by J. Veitch, Edin. and Lond.,

1st ed., 1850-52, 10th ed., 1890 ; of the Meditations by Lowndes, Lond. 1878,

also in Jour. Spec. Phil., Vol. IV., 1870, by W. K. Walker; and of the Rules for

the Direction of the Mind, with selections from the Med. s, The. World, The

Passions of the Soul, etc., by H. A. P. Torrey, N.Y. 1892]. The main works

are Le Monde ou Traite de la Lumiere (posthumously printed, 1654) ; Essays,

16 !7, among them the Discours de la Methode and the Dioptrics; Meditationes

df, Prima Philosophia, 1641, supplemented by the objections of various savants

and Descartes replies ; Principia Philosophic. 1644 ; Passions de I Ame, 1650.

Cf. F. Bouillier, Histoire de la Philosophic. Cartesienne (Paris, 1854) ; X. Schmid-

1 It is well known that very recently much noise has been made over the

discovery that Lord Bacon wrote Shakspere s works also, in his leisure hours.

To fuse two great literary phenomena into one may have something alluring in

it, but in any case a mistake has been made in the person. For it would be

much more probable that Shakspere had incidentally composed the Baconian

philosophy. [The Germans seem to take this " noise " much more seriously

than Shakspere s countrymen. Tr.]

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schwarzenberg, E. D. und seine Reform der Philosophic (Nordlingen, 1859) ;

G. Glogau in Zeitschr. f. Philos., 1878, pp. 209 ft . ; P. Natorp, Z&gt;. s Erkenntniss-

theorie (Marburg, 1882). [Descartes by .1. P. Mahaffy in Blackwood s series,

Edin. and Phila., 1881 ; W. Wallace, Art. Descartes in Enc. Brit. ; H. Sidgwick

in Mind, Vol. VII. ; Rhodes in Jour. Spec. Phil., XVII.

Between these two leaders of modern philosophy stands Thomas Hobbes,

born 1588, educated at Oxford, who was early drawn over to France by his

studies, and frequently afterwards returned thither, was personally acquainted

with Bacon, Gassendi, Campanella, and the Cartesian circle, and died 1079.

Complete edition of his works, English and Latin by Molesworth, Lond. 1839 ff.

His h rst treatise, Elements of Law, Natural and Political (1(539), was pub

lished by his friends in 1(550, in two parts, Human Nature and De Corpore

Politico. He published previously Elementa Philosophic de Cive, 1(542 and 1(547,

and further Leviathan or The Matter, Form, and Authority of Government, 1651.

A comprehensive statement is given in the Elementa Philosophic, I., De Cor

pore, II., De Hnmine, Ki(i8 (both previously in English in 1(555 and 1058. Cf.

F. Tonnies in Vierteljahrwhr. f. w. Philos., 1879 ft. [Hobbes, by G. C.Robert

son in Blackwood s series, Edin. and Phil. 1880, also Art. Hobbes, in Enc.

lint, by same author.] F. Tonnies. Hobbes (Stuttgart, 1890).

Of the Cartesian School (cf. Bouillier, op. cit.) are to be noted the Jansen-

ists of Port-Koyal, from whose circles came the Loyique ou Vart depenser (1002),

ed. by Anton Arnauld (1012-1094), and Pierre Nicole (1025-1095) ; also the

Mystics, Blaise Pascal (1(523-1(502 ; Pe.nxees sur la Iteliyion ; cf. the monographs

by J. G. Dreydorff, Leips. 1870 and 1875), and Pierre Poiret (1040-1719; De

Eruditione Triplici, Solida Superjicinria et Falxa.

The development to Occasionalism proceeds gradually in Louis de la Forge

(TraitedeV Esprit Humain. 10(50;, Clauberg( 1022-1005 ; De Conjunction Corpo-

ris et Animce in Homine ), Cordemoy (Le Discernement du Corps et de VAme,

1(500), but finds its complete development independently of these thinkers in

Arnold Geulincx (1025-10(59; a university teacher in Loewen and Leyden).

His main works are the Ethics (1605; 2d ed. with notes, 1675); Logic, 1002,

and Methodus, 1663. New ed. of his works by J. P. N. Land (3 vols., The

Hague, 1891-3). Cf. E. Pfleiderer, A. G. als Hauptvertrt-ler der occ. Metaphyxik

und Ethik (Tiibingen, 1882) ; V. van der Hseghen, G. Etude sur sa Vie, sa

Philosophic et ses Onvrayes (Liittich, 1880).

From the Oratorium founded by Cardinal Berulle, a friend of Descartes, to

which Gibieuf also belonged (De Libertate Dei et Creature, Paris, 1030), wt nt

forth Nicole Malebranche (1038-1715). His main work, De. la Recherche de la

Verite, appeared 1(575, the Entretiens sur la Metaphysique et sur la lleliyion in

1(588. Coll. works by J. Simon (Paris, 1871).

Haruch (Benedict de) Spinoza, born in 1(532 at Amsterdam in the commu

nity of Portuguese Jews, and later expelled from this community on account

of his opinions, lived in noble simplicity and solitude at various places in Hol

land, and died at The Hague 1677. He had published an exposition of the

Cartesian philosophy with an independent metaphysical appendix (1663) and

the Tractatns Theoloyico-politicus (anonymously in 1070). After his death

appeared in his Opera Posthnma (1077), his main work, Ethira More, Ceometrico

Demonstrata, the Tractatus Politicus, and the fragment De Intellectus Emenda-

tione. His correspondence and his recently discovered youthful work, Tractatus

(brevis) de Deo et Homine ejusque Felicitate, also come into consideration.

On the latter cf. Chr. Sigwart (Tubingen, 1870). The best edition of his works

is that by Van Vloten and Land (2 vols., Amsterdam, 1882 f.). Cf. T. Camerer,

Die Lehre #;&gt;. (Stuttgart, 1877). [Spinoza, by J. Caird, Edin. 1888; Spinoza

by Martineau, Lond. 1883; also in Types of Ethical Theory, Oxford, 1886; F.

Pollock, Spinoza, His Life and Phil., Lond. 1880 ; Seth, Art. Spinoza, in Enc.

Ilrif ; Arts, in Jour. Spec. Phil., Vols. 11 and 16, by Morris and Dewey ; Eng.

tr. of priii. works by Elwes, Bohn Lib., 1884, of the gtkic\* by White, Lond. 1883,

and of Selections by Fullerton, N.Y. 1892.]

Of philosophical writers in Germany who attached themselves to the train of

the movement among the two civilised peoples of the West are to be mentioned

Joachim Jung (1-J87-1057 ; Loyica Hamburyiensis, 1638); cf. G. E. Guhrauer,

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J. J. und sein Zeitalter (Stuttg. and Tub. 1859); the Jena mathematician,

Erhard VVeigel, the teacher of Leibniz and Puffendorf ; Walther von Tschirn-

hausen (1(551-1708; Medicina Mentis sive Artis Inveniendi Praecepta Generalia,

Amsterdam, 1(587), and Samuel Puffendorf (1632-1604; under the pseudonym

Severinus a Monzambano, De Statu Eei publiae Germanicce, 16(57, German by

H. Bresslau, Berlin, 1870 ; De Jure Naturae et Gentium, London, 1672).

Leibniz belongs in this period, not only in point of time, but also as regards

the origination and the motives of his metaphysics, while with other interests

of his incredibly many-sided nature, he ranges on into the age of the Enlighten

ment ; cf. on this, Part V. Here, therefore, we have to consider principally his

methodological and metaphysical writings : De Principio IndMdui, 1663 ; De

Arte Combinatoria, 1666 ; Nova Methodus pro Maximis et Minimis, 1684 ; De

Scientia Universali sen Calculo Philosophico, 1684 (cf. A. Trendelenburg, Hist.

Beitrage zur Philos., III. 1 ff.); De Primes Philosophies Emendatione, 1694;

Systeme Nouveau de la Nature, 1695, with the three Eclaircissements connected

with it, 1696 ; also the Monadologie, 1714, the Principes de la Nature et de la

Grace, 1714, and a great part of his extended correspondence. Among the

editions of his philosophical writings the excellent edition by J. E. Erdmann

(Berlin, 1840) has now been surpassed by that of C. J. Gerhardt (7 vols., Ber

lin, 1875-91). On the system as a whole cf. L. Feuerbach, Darstellung, Ent-

wicklung und Kritik der Leibnizischen Philos. (Ansbach, 1837), A. Nourisson,

La Philos. de L. (Paris, 1830); E. Wendt, Die Entwicklung der LSschen Mo-

nadenlehre bis 1695 (Berlin, 1886). [E. Dillmann, Eine neue Darst. der

L. schen Monadenlchr? . Leips. 1891. See also the lit. on p. 444.]

On the historical and systematic relation of the systems to one another: II.

C. W. Sigwart, Ueber den Zusammenhang des Spinozismus mit der cartes.

Philos. (Tub. 1816) and Die Leibniz 1 sche Lehre von der prastabilirten Harmonie

in ihrem Zusammenhany mit fraheren Philosop hemen (ib. 1822) ; C. Schaar-

schmidt, Descartes und Spinoza (Bonn, 1850) ; A. Foucher de Careil, Leibniz,

Descartes et Spinoza (Paris, 1863) ; E. Pfleiderer, L. und Geulincx (Tub. 1884);

E. Zeller, Sitz.-Ber. d. Berliner Akad, 1884, pp. 673 ff. ; F. Tonnies, Leibniz und

Jfobbes in Philos. Monatsh ; 1887, pp. 357 ff. ; L. Stein, Leibniz und Spinoza

(Berlin, 1890). [E. Caird, Art Carfrsianism, in Enc. Brit., reprinted in Vol. 2

of his Essays, Lond. and N.Y. 1892 ; Saisset s Modern Pantheism.]

To the founders of the philosophy of law (cf. C. v. Kaltenborn, Die Vorlaufer

des Hugo Grotius, Leips. 1848 ; and R. v. Mohl, Gesch. und Litteratur der

Staatswissenschaften, Erlangen, 1855-58) belong Nicolo Macchiavelli (1469-

1527 ; II Principe, Discorsi sulla prima decade di Tito Livio ; [Works, tr. by C.

E. Detmold, Boston, 1883.] Thomas More (1480-1535 ; De Optimo Eei publican

Statu sive de Nova InsulaUtopia, 1516); Jean Bodin (1530-1597); SixLivresde

la Republique, 1577; an extract from the Heptaplomeres has been given by

Guhrauer, Berlin, 1841) ; Albericus Gentilis (1551-1611 ; De Jure Belli, 1588) ;

Johannes Althus (1557-1638; PolUica, Groningen, 1610, cf. O. Gierke, Unters.

z. deut\*ch. Staats- u. Eechtsgesch., Breslau, 1880); Hugo de Groot (1583-1645 ;

De Jure Belli et Pads, 1645; cf. H. Luden, H. G., Berlin, 1806).

Of the Protestants who treat of the philosophy of law may be named, be

sides Melancthon, J. Oldendorf (Elementaris Introductio, 1539), Nic. Hemming

(De Lege Naturae, 1562), Ben Winkler (Principia Juris, 1615) ; of the Catho

lics besides Suarez, Rob. Bellarmin (1542-1621 ; De Potestate Pontificis in

Temporalibus) and Mariana (1537-1624 ; De Eege et Regis Institutions).

Natural religion and natural morals in the seventeenth century found in

England their main supporters in Herbert of Cherbury (1581-1(548 ; Tractatus

de Veritate, 1624 ; De Eeligione GentiUum Errorumque apud eos Causis, 1663 ;

on him Oh. de Ketnusat, Paris, 1873), and Richard Cumberland (De Legibus

Naturae Disquisitio Philosophica, Lond. 1672). Among the Platonists or Neo-

Platonists of England at the same time are prominent Ralph Cudworth (1617-

1688 ; The Intellectual System of the Universe, Lond. 1678, Latin, Jena, 1733)

and Henry More (1614-1687 ; Encheiridion Metaphysicum. His correspondence

with Descartes is printed in the latter s works, Vol. X., Cousin s ed.). [Phil,

of Cudworth, by C. E. Lowrey, with bibliog., N.Y. 1884 ; Tulloch s Eational

Theol. and Christian Phil, in Eng. in \lth Cent. ] Theophilus Gale and his

son, Thomas Gale, may be added to the authors above.

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### 30. The Problem of Method.

All beginnings of modern philosophy have in common an impul

sive opposition against " Scholasticism," and at the same time a

nai ve lack of understanding for the common attitude of dependence

upon some one of its traditions, which they nevertheless all occupy.

This fundamental oppositional character brings with it the conse

quence, that in all cases where it is not merely wants of the feelings,

or fanciful views that are set over against the old doctrines, reflec

tion on new methods of knowledge stands in the foreground. Out of

the insight into the unfruitf ulness of the " syllogism," which cbuld

merely set forth in proof or refutation that which was already

known, or apply the same to a particular case, arises the demand

for an ars inveniendi, a method of investigation, a sure way to the

discovery of the new.

1. If now nothing was to be accomplished with the help of

rhetoric, the nearest expedient was to attack the matter by the

reverse method, proceeding from the particular, from the facts.

This had been commended by Vives and Sanchez, and practised by

Telesio and Campanella. But they had neither gained full confi

dence in experience nor known afterwards how to make any right

beginning with their facts. In both lines Bacon believed that he

could point out new paths for science, and in this spirit he set up

his "New Organon" as over against the Aristotelian.

Every -day perception he confesses, admitting the well-known

sceptical arguments offers, indeed, no sure basis for a true knowl

edge of Nature ; in order to become an experience that can be used

by science it must first be purified from all the erroneous additions

which have grown together with it in our involuntary way of regard

ing things. These perversions or falsifications of pure experience

Bacon calls idols, and presents his doctrine of these fallacious images

in analogy with the doctrine of the fallacious conclusions in the old

dialectic. 1 There are first the "idols of the tribe" (idola tribus),

the illusions that are given in connection with human nature in

general, following which we are always suspecting an order and an

end in things, making ourselves the measure of the outer world,

blindly retaining a mode of thought which has once been excited by

impressions, and the like; then the "idols of the cave" (idola

specus) , by reason of which every individual by his natural disposi

tion, and his situation in life, finds himself shut into his cave ; 2

1 Nov. Org. I. 39 ff.

2 Ilacon s strongly rhetorical language, rich in imagery, aims by this term

(cf. De Augm. V. ch. 4) to recall Plato s well-known parable of the Cave (Hep.

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then the "idols of the market" (idola fori), the errors which are

everywhere brought about by intercourse among men, especially by

language, and by adherence to the word which we substitute for the

idea; finally, the "idols of the theatre" (idola theatri), the illusory

phantoms of theories which we credulously receive from human

history and repeat without subjecting them to any judgment of our

own. In this connection Bacon finds opportunity to direct a most

violent polemic against the word-wisdom of Scholasticism, against

the rule of authority, against the anthropomorphism of earlier

philosophy, and to demand a personal examination of things them

selves, an unprejudiced reception of reality. Nevertheless he does

not get beyond this demand ; for the statements as to how the

mera experientia is to be gained and separated from the enveloping

husks of the idols are extremely meagre, and while Bacon teaches

that one must not limit himself to accidental perceptions, but must

set about his observation methodically, and supplement it by

experiment x which he thinks out and makes for himself, this also is

but a general designation of the task, and a theoretical insight into

the essential nature of experiment is still wanting.

Quite similar is the case with the method of Induction, which

Bacon proclaimed as the only correct mode of elaborating facts.

With its aid we are to proceed to general cognitions (axioms), in

order that we may ultimately from these explain other phenomena.

In this activity the human mind, among whose constitutional errors

is over-hasty generalisation, is to be restrained as much as possible;

it is to ascend quite gradually the scale of the more general, up to

the most general. Healthy and valuable as these prescriptions are,

we are the more surprised to find that with Bacon their more de

tailed carrying out is completed in conceptions and modes of view

which are entirely scholastic. 2

All knowledge of Nature has for its end to understand the causes

of things. Causes, however, are according to the old Aristotelian

scheme formal, material, efficient, or final. Of these only the

" formal " causes come into consideration ; for all that takes place

has its grounds in the " Forms," in the " natures " of things. Hence

when Bacon s Induction searches for the "Form" of phenomena,

e.g. for the Form of heat, Form is here understood quite in the

sense of Scotism as the abiding essence or nature of phenomena.

The Form of that which is given in perception is composed out of

514), which is the more unfortunate as, in the Platonic passage, it is precisely

the general limited nature of knowledge by the senses that is dealt with.

1 Nov. Org. I. 82.

2 Cf. the circumstantial exposition in the second book of the Nov. Org

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simpler "Forms" and their "differences," and these it is important

to discover. To this end as many cases as possible in which the

phenomenon in question appears, are brought together into a tabula

prcesentice, and in like manner, those in which the phenomenon is

lacking are brought together into a tabula absentia^; to these is

added, in the third place, a tabula graduum, in which the varying

intensity with which the phenomenon appears is compared with the

varying intensity of other phenomena. The problem is then to be

solved by a progressive process of exclusion (exclusio). The Form

of heat, for example, is to be that which is everywhere present

where heat is found, which is nowhere where heat is lacking, and

which is present in greater degree where there is more heat, and

in lesser degree where there is less heat. 1 AVhat Bacon presents

accordingly as Induction is certainly no simple enumeration, but

an involved process of abstraction, which rests upon the meta

physical assumptions of the scholastic Formalism 2 (cf. 27, 3); the

presage of the new is still quite embedded in the old habits of

thought.

2. It is accordingly comprehensible that Bacon was not the man

to bring to the study of Nature itself methodical or material

furtherance : but this derogates nothing from his philosophical

importance, 3 which consists just in this, that he demanded the gen

eral application of a principle, to which he yet was unable to give

any useful or fruitful form in the case of the most immediate

object for its use : namely, the knowledge of the corporeal world.

He had understood that the new science must turn from the endless

discussion of conceptions back to things themselves, that it can

build only upon direct perception, and that it must rise from this

only cautiously and gradually to the more abstract, 4 and he had

understood no less clearly that in the case of this Induction, the

point at issue was nothing other than the discovery of the simple

1 In which case it turns out that the Form of heat is motion, and, indeed, a

motion which is expansive, and thus divided by inhibition and communicated

to the smaller parts of the body [motus expansivus, cohibitus et nitens per paries

minores] .

2 Cf. Chr. Sigwart, Logik, IT. 93, 3.

8 Cf. Chr. Sigwart in the Preuss. Jahrb., 1863, 93 ff.

4 The pedagogical consequences of the Baconian doctrine as contrasted with

Humanism, with which, in general, the movement of natural science came in

conflict in this respect, were drawn principally by Amos Comenius (1592-1671).

His Didncticn Magna presents the course of instruction as a graded ascent from

the concrete and perceptive to the more abstract ; his Orbis Pictus aims to give

for the school a perceptional basis for instruction aboi:t things ; his Janua Lin-

guarum Iteserrata, finally, aims to have the learning of foreign languages

arranged so as to be taught only as it is requisite as a means for acquiring

knowledge about things. The pedagogical views of Rattich are similar (1571-

1035).

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teSite^X;pteiried3ilJtj^irtctitgi^hef thought, will find the Forms by which

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greafijsjiehievement of the Copernican

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In this, Bacon expressed what was moving^ the heart of thousands

at his time, under the^^p^-^^ Qf^^e^ ^e^, With that series

5, adventures,

2 Cl. O. Peschel, Gesch. des Zcitalters der Entdeckungen, 2d ed., Leips..(KK79t

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change had been introduced within a short time into the greater as

well as the lesser life of man. A new epoch of civilisation seemed

to be opened, and an exotic excitement seized upon men s fancy.

Unheard-of things should succeed; nothing was to be impossible

any longer. The telescope disclosed the mysteries of the heavens,

and the powers of the earth began to obey the investigator.

Science would be the guide of the human mind in its victorious

journey through Nature. By her inventions, human life should be

completely transformed. What hopes in this respect set free the

fancy for its flights we see from Bacon s Utopian fragment of the

Nova Atlantis, and also from Campanella s Civitas Soils. The

English Chancellor, however, held that the task of the knowledge

of Nature was ultimately to make of invention, which had hitherto

been for the most part a matter of chance, a consciously exercised

art. To be sure, he gave life to this thought only in the fantastic

picture of Solomon s house, in his Utopia ; he guarded himself from

seriously carrying it out ; but this meaning which he attributed to

the ars inveniendi made him an opponent of purely theoretical and

" contemplative " knowledge ; just from this point of view did he

combat Aristotle and the unfruitfulness of monastic science. In

his hand philosophy was in danger of falling from the rule of a

religious end under that of technical interests.

But the issue proved again that the golden fruits of knowledge

ripen only where they are not sought. In his haste for utility

Bacon missed his goal, and the intellectual creations which have

enabled natural science to become the basis of our external civilisa

tion proceeded from the superior thinkers, who, with pure disinter

ested thought, and without any eagerness to improve the world,

desired to understand the order of Nature which they admired.

3. His tendency toward the practical end of invention blinded

Bacon to the theoretical value of mathematics. This value had at

first come to consciousness in the fantastic forms which praised the

number-harmony of the universe in Neo-Platonic exuberance (cf.

29, 5), imitating the Pythagorean methods. The great investiga

tors of Nature set out from a like admiration for the beauty and

order of the universe ; but the new in their teachings consists in

just this, that they no longer seek this mathematical significance of

the cosmical order in symbolic number-speculations, but aim to

understand and prove it from facts. Modern investigation of Nature

was born as empirical Pythagoreanism. This problem had been seen

already by Leonardo da Vinci 1 to have been the first to solve it

1 Cf. with regard to him as a philosopher, K. Prantl, SUz.-Ber. der Mun-

chcner Akad., 1885, 1 ff.

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is the glory of Kepler. The psychological motive of his research

was the philosophical conviction of the mathematical order of the

universe, and he verified his conviction by discovering the laws of

planetary motion by means of a grand induction.

In this procedure it became evident, on the one hand, that the true

task of induction in natural science consists in finding out that

mathematical relation which remains the same in the entire series

of the phenomena determined by measurement, and, on the other

hand, that the object, in connection with which this task can be

performed by research, is none other than motion. The divine

arithmetic and geometry which Kepler sought in the universe was

found in the laws of occurrence and change (Geschehens) . Proceed

ing from this principle, with a more distinct methodical conscious

ness, Galileo created mechanics as the mathematical theory of motion.

It is extremely instructive to compare the thoughts which the latter

presents in the Saggiatore with Bacon s interpretation of Nature.

Both aim to analyse into their elements the phenomena given in per

ception, in order to explain phenomena from the combination of

these elements. But where Bacon s Induction seeks the " Forms, "

Galileo s method of resolution (analysis) searches out the simplest

processes of motion capable of mathematical determination ; and

while interpretation with the former consists in pointing out how

the natures co-operate to form an empirical structure, the latter

shows in his method of composition (synthesis) that the mathemati

cal theory under the presupposition of the simple elements of

motion leads to the same results which experience exhibits. 1 From

this standpoint experiment also acquires quite another significance :

it is not merely a shrewd question put to Nature, but is the intelli

gent and intentional interference by which simple forms of occur

rence are isolated in order to subject them to measurement. Thus,

all that Bacon had merely presaged receives with Galileo a definite

significance usable for the investigation of Nature, by means of the

mathematical principle and its application to motion ; and in accord

ance with these principles of mechanics Newton was able by his

hypothesis of gravitation to give the mathematical theory for the

explanation of Kepler s laws.

With this, the victory of the principle of Democritus and Plato,

that the sole object which true knowledge of Nature can deal with

is what is capable of quantitative determination, was sealed in a

completely new form ; but this time the principle was applied not

to the Being, but to the Becoming or change in Nature. Scientific

1 This methodical standpoint Hobbes makes entirely his own (cf. De Corp.,

ch. 6), and indeed in expressly rationalistic antithesis to the empiricism of Bacon.

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insight reaches as far as the mathematical theory of motion extends.

Exactly this standpoint of the Galilean physics is taken in theoreti

cal philosophy by Hobbes. 1 Geometry is the only certain discipline ;

all knowledge of Nature is rooted in it. We can know only such

objects as we can construct, so that we derive all further conse

quences from this our own operation. Hence knowledge of all

things, in so far as it is accessible for us, consists in tracing back

what is perceived to motion of bodies in space. Science has to

reason from phenomena to causes, and from these latter in turn to

their effects : but phenomena are, in their essence, motions ; causes

are the simple elements of motion, and effects are again motions.

Thus arises the apparently materialistic proposition : philosophy is

the doctrine of the motion of bodies ! This is the extreme conse

quence of the separation of philosophy from theology, which began

with the English Franciscans.

The essential result for philosophy in these methodical begin

nings of natural research is, therefore, twofold : empiricism was

corrected by mathematics, and the shapeless Pythagoreanism of the

humanistic tradition was made by empiricism definite mathemati

cal theory. These lines meet and are bound together in Galileo.

4. In mathematical theory, accordingly, was found that rational

factor which Giordano Bruno had demanded in his treatment of the

Copernican doctrine for a critical elaboration of sense perception. 2

Rational science is mathematics. Proceeding from this conviction,

Descartes undertook his reform of philosophy. Educated in the

Scholasticism of the Jesuits, he had attained the personal convic

tion 3 that satisfaction for an earnest craving for truth was to be found

neither in metaphysical theories nor in the learned polymathy of

the empirical disciplines, but in mathematics alone ; and by follow

ing the pattern of mathematics, himself, as is well known, a cre

ative mathematician, he thought to transform all the rest of human

knowledge : his philosophy aims to be a universal mathematics. In

the generalisation of the Galilean principle requisite for this pur

pose, some of the factors which made the principle fruitful for the

special tasks of natural research fell away, so that Descartes teach

ing is not usually counted as an advance in the history of physics;

but the power of his influence upon the philosophical development,

in which he was the ruling mind for the seventeenth century and

beyond, was all the greater.

To those methodical thoughts which are common to Bacon and

1 Cf. the bejrinninsr of DP Corpore.

8 G. Bruno, DeW Inf. Univ. e Mond. 1 in. (L. 307 f.).

8 Cf. the fine exposition in the Disco urs de la Method\*.

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Galileo, Descartes added a postulate of the greatest importance : he

demanded that the method of induction or resolution should lead to

a single principle of highest and absolute certainty, from which after

wards, by the method of composition, the whole compass of experi

ence must find its explanation. This demand was entirely original,

and had its root in the felt need for a systematic, connected whole

of all human knowledge ; it rested ultimately upon his surfeit of

the traditional reception of historically collected knowledge, and

upon his longing for a new philosophical creation from one mould.

Descartes will, then, by an inductive enumeration and a critical

sifting of all ideas, press forward to a single, certain point, in order

from this point to deduce all further truths. The first task of phil

osophy is analytic, the second synthetic.

The classical carrying out of this thought is presented in the

Meditations. The philosopher portrays his struggle after truth in

a dramatic dialogue with himself. Proceeding from the principle

" de omnibus dubitandum," the whole circuit of ideas is reviewed

on all sides, and in the process we meet the whole apparatus of

sceptical arguments. We experience the change of opinions and the

deceptions of the senses too often, says Descartes, to permit of our

trusting them. In the face of the variety of impressions which the

same object makes under different circumstances, it is not possible

to decide which of these impressions, and, indeed, whether any one

of them, contains the true essence of the thing ; and the liveliness

and sureness with which we can dream in our actual experience

must excite in us the scruple which can never be completely set

aside, as to whether we are not perhaps dreaming even when we

believe that we are awake and perceiving. Meanwhile, at the basis

of all the combinations which the imagination can produce lie the

simple elementary acts of consciousness, and in connection with

these we meet with truths of which we are undeniably obliged to

say that we cannot help recognising them, as, for example, the

simple propositions of arithmetic 2x2 = 4, and the like. But

how if now we were so constituted that from our very nature we

must necessarily err ? how if some demon had created us, whose

pleasure it was to give us a Reason that would necessarily deceive

while it supposed itself to be teaching the truth ? Against such a

delusion we should be defenceless, and this thought must make us

mistrustful even with reference to the most evident utterances of

reason.

After fundamental doubt has been thus pressed even to the far

thest extreme, it proves that the doubt breaks off its own point,

that it itself presents a fact of completely unassailable certainty :

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in order to doubt, in order to dream, in order to be deceived, I must

be. Doubt itself proves that I, as a thinking conscious being (res

cogitans), exist. The proposition cogito sum is true as often as I

think or pronounce it. And, indeed, the certaionty of Being is con-

tained in none of my activities except that of consciousness. That

I go to walk I can imagine in my dream :1 that I am conscious can-

not be merely my imagination, for imagination is itself a kind of

consciousness. 2 The *certainty of the Being or existence of conscious-*

*ness* is the one fundamental truth which Descartes finds by the

analytic method.

Rescue from doubt consists therefore in the *Augustian argument*

*of the Reality of the conscious nature or essence* (cf. § 22,1). But

its application with Descartes 3 is not the same as with Augustine

himself and with the great number of those on whom his doctrine

was influential just in the transition period. For Augustine, the

self-certainty of the soul was valued as the surest of all experiences

as the fundamental fact of inner perception by means of which the

latter obtains for the theory of knowledge a preponderance over

outer perception. Thus - not to recall again Charron’s moralising

interpretation - Campanella particularly had employed the Augus-

tinian principle when, not unlike the great Church Father, he gave

to the elements of this experience of self the meaning of metaphysic-

cal prime elements (cf. 29, 3). In a completely analogous manner

* not to speak of Locke 4 - *Tschirnhausen*, in a supposed adherence

to Descartes, had later regarded self-knowledge as the *experimenta evi-*

*dentissima*,5 which is therefore to serve as the a *posterieri* beginning of

philosophy (cf. below, No. 7), so that from it all further knowledge

can be constructed *a priori*; for in self-knowledge is contained the

threefold trlith, that we are effected by some things, well and by

others ill, that we understand some and not others, and that in the

process of ideation we occupy a passive attitude with reference to

1 Descartes reply to Gassendi s objection (V. 2) ; cf. Princ. Phil. I. 9.

2 The ordinary translation of cogitare, cogitatio by "think" (*Denken*) is

liable to occasion misunderstanding, since Denken in German [and the same is

true of think, in English, at least in philosophical terminology] signifies a par-

ticular kind of theoretical consciousness. Descartes himself elucidates the meaning of cogitare (Mfd. III.; Princ. Phil. I. 9), by enumeration : he understands by it to doubt, affirm, deny, understand, will, abhor, imagine, feel a sensation, etc. For that which is common to all these functions we have in-German scarcely any word but " Bewusstsein " [consciousness]. The same is true with regard to Spinoza s use of the term ; cf. his Princ. Phil. Cart. I., Prop. IV., Schol., and also Eth. II., Ax. III., and elsewhere.

3 Who besides, at the outset, seems not to have known the historical oi^jjn

this argument. Cf. Obj. IV., and Eesp.

\* Cf. below, 33 f.

6 Tschirnhausen, Med. Ment. (1695), pp. 290-94.

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the outer world, three points of attachment for the three rational

sciences, ethics, logic, and physics.

5. With Descartes, on the contrary, the proposition cogito sum

has not so much the meaning of an experience, as rather that of the

first fundamental rational truth. Nor is its evidence that of an infer

ence, 1 but that of immediate intuitive certainty. The analytic method

seeks here, as with Galileo, the simple, self -intelligible elements, out

of which all else is to be explained ; but while the physicist discovers

the perceptional elementary form of motion, which is to make com

prehensible all that takes place in the corporeal world, the meta

physician is hunting for the elementary truths of consciousness. In

this consists the rationalism of Descartes.

This rationalism expresses itself in the fact that the superiority

of self-consciousness is found in its complete clearness and distinct

ness, and in the fact that Descartes propounded as his principle for

the synthetic method the maxim, Everything must be true which is as

clear and distinct as self-consciousness, i.e. which presents itself before

the mind s vision as surely and underivably as the mind s own exist

ence. " Clear " is defined by Descartes 2 as that which is intuitively

present and manifest to the mind, " distinct " as that which is en

tirely clear in itself and precisely determined. And those mental

presentations or ideas, 3 as he calls them after the manner of later

Scholasticism which are in this sense clear and distinct, whose

evidence is not to be deduced from any others, but is grounded

solely in themselves, he calls innate ideas\* With this expression

he indeed incidentally connects also the psycho-genetic thought that

these ideas are imprinted upon the human soul by God, but for the

most part he desires to give only the epistemological significance of

immediate, rational evidence.

These two meanings are peculiarly mingled in Descartes proofs

for the existence of God, which form an integrant constituent of his

theory of knowledge, in so far as this "idea" is the first for which,

in the synthetic procedure of his method a clearness and distinct

ness or intuitive evidence of the " natural light," equal to that of

self-consciousness, is claimed. The new (so-called Cartesian) proof

which he introduces in this connection, 5 has a multitude of scholastic

1 Resp. ad Obj. II. 2 Princ, Phil I. 45.

3 [German Idee. I follow the ordinary English usage in spelling the word as

used by Descartes without a capital.]

4 Cf. E. Grimm, D. s Lehre von den angeborenen Ideen (Jena, 1873), and also

P. Natorp, Z&gt;. s Erkenntnisstheorie (Marburg, 1882). That innatus is better

translated by eingeboren than by the usual angeboren has been remarked by

11. Kucken, Geschichte und Kritik der Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart, p. 73.

5 Med. III.

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assumptions. Hd argues that the individual self-consciousness

knows itself to be finite, and therefore imperfect (according to the

old identification of determinations expressing value with ontological

gradations), and that this knowledge can be derived only from the

conception of an absolutely perfect being (ens perfectissinuim) . This

latter conception which we find within us must have a cause which,

nevertheless, is not to be found within our own selves, nor in any

other finite things. For the principle of causality requires that at

least as much Reality be contained in the cause as there is in the

effect. This in the scholastic sense realistic principle is now

applied, in analogy to Anselm s argument, to the relation of the

idea in the mind (esse in intellectu or esse objective) to the Real

(esse in re or esse formaliter), in order to give the inference -that we

should not have the idea of a most perfect being if the idea had not

been produced in us by such a being himself. This anthropologico-

metaphysical proof has then with Descartes the significance that

by it that former sceptical hypothetical phantom of a deceiving

demon is again destroyed. For since the perfection of God involves

his veracity, and it is impossible that he should so have created us

that we should necessarily err, confidence in the lumen naturale, that

is, in the immediate evidence of rational knowledge, is restored, and

thus definitively grounded. Thus modern rationalism is introduced

by Descartes by thS circuitous route of Scholasticism. For this

proof gives the charter for acknowledging with complete certainty

as true all propositions which manifest themselves in clear and dis

tinct light before the reason. Here belong, firstly, all truths of

mathematics, but here belongs also the ontological proof for the

existence of God. For with the same necessity of thought thus

Descartes takes up Anselm s argument 1 with which the geometri

cal propositions with regard to a triangle follow from the definition

of the triangle, it follows from the mere definition of the most Real

being that the attribute of existence belongs to him. The possibility

of thinking God suffices to prove his existence.

In this way it follows from the criterion of clearness and distinct

ness, that of finite things also, and especially of bodies, so much can

be known as is clearly and distinctly perceived. But this is for

Descartes the mathematical element, and is limited to the quantitative

determinations, while all the sensuous-qualitative elements in percep

tion are regarded by the philosopher as unclear and confused. On this

account metaphysics and the theory of knowledge terminate for him,

too, in a mathematical physics. He designates 2 the sensuous appre-

1 Med. V. 2 Med. VI.

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hension of the qualitative, "imagination" (imaginatio). The appre

hension of that which can be mathematically constructed he terms, on

the other hand, "intellectual" knowledge (intellectio) , and strongly as

he knows how to prize the help which experience gives in the former,

a really scientific insight rests, in his opinion, only upon the latter.

The distinction between distinct and confused presentations

(which goes back to Duns Scotus and farther) serves Descartes

also to solve the problem of error, which results for him out of his

principle of the veracitas dei, because it does not seem possible to

see how, in accordance with that principle, perfect deity could so

arrange human nature as to allow it to err at all. Here Descartes

helps himself 1 by a peculiarly limited doctrine of freedom, which

might be consistent with either Thomistic determinism or Scotist

indeterminism. It is assumed, that is, that only clear and distinct

presentations exercise so cogent and compelling a power upon the

mind that it cannot avoid recognising them, while with reference to

the unclear and confused presentations it retains the boundless and

groundless activity of the liberum arbitrium indijfer entice (its farthest-

reaching power, which in the Scotist fashion is set in analogy with

the freedom of God). Thus error arises when affirmation and nega

tion follow arbitrarily (without rational ground) in the case of

unclear and indistinct material for judgment. 2 The demand which

follows from this of withholding judgment in all cases where a suffi

ciently clear and distinct insight is not present recalls too distinctly

the ancient firo^ij ("suspense") to permit us to overlook the rela

tionship of this theory of error, with the doctrines of the Sceptics

and Stoics as to the &lt;rvyKaTa#ecris (cf . pp. 167, 208) . 3 In fact, Descartes

recognised distinctly the will-factor in judgment (agreeing here,

too, with the epistemology of Augustine and Duns Scotus), and

Spinoza followed him in this, so far as to designate affirmation or

denial as a necessary characteristic of every idea, and thus to teach

that man cannot think without at the same time willing. 4

6. Descartes mathematical reform of philosophy had a peculiar

fate. Its metaphysical results began a rich and fruitful develop

ment; its tendency as regards method, however, soon became sub-

1 Med. IV.

2 Error appears accordingly as an act of free will parallel to the act of sin,

and thus as guilt ; it is the guilt or fault of self-deception. This thought was

carried out particularly by Malebranche (Entret. III. f.).

3 This relationship extends consistently to Descartes ethics also. From the

clear and distinct knowledge of reason follows necessarily right willing and act

ing ; from the obscure and confused impulses of the sensibility result practically

sin and theoretically error, by abuse of freedom. The ethical ideal is the

Socratic-Stoic ideal of the rule of reason over the sensibility.

\* Eth. II., Prop. 49.

CHAP. 2, 30.] Problem of Method : Cartesians. 395

jected to a misunderstanding which exactly reversed its meaning.

The philosopher himself desired to see the analytical method em

ployed in a great proportion of instances, even in the case of par

ticular problems, and thought of the synthetic method as a progress

in discovery from one intuitive truth to another. His disciples,

however, confounded the creatively free intellectual activity, which

Descartes had in mind, with that rigidly demonstrative system of

exposition which they found in Euclid s text-book of geometry. The

monistic tendency of the Cartesian methodology, the fact that it set

up a highest principle from which all other certainty should follow,

favoured this exchange, and out of the new method of investigation

there came into being again an ars demonstrandi. The ideal of

philosophy appeared to be the task of developing from its funda

mental principle all its knowledge as a system of as rigidly logical

consistency as that with which Euclid s text-book deduces geome

try with all its propositions from axioms and definitions.

A request of this sort had been answered by Descartes with a

tentative sketch, though with express reference to the doubtfulness

of this transfer; 1 but the allurement to find the significance of

mathematics for philosophical method in the circumstance, that it is

the ideal of demonstrative science, seems only to have been strength

ened thereby. At least, it was in this direction that the influence

of the Cartesian philosophy proved strongest for the following

period. In all the change of epistemological investigations until

far into the eighteenth century this conception of mathematics was

a firmly established axiom for all parties. Indeed, it became even

a lever for scepticism and mysticism, under the direct influence of

Descartes, in the case of men like Pascal. Since no other human

science, so the latter argued, neither metaphysics nor the empirical

disciplines, can attain mathematical evidence ; man must be modest

in his efforts after rational knowledge, and must the more follow

the impulse of his heart toward presageful faith, and the feeling of

tact which belongs to a noble conduct of life. The Mystic Poiret

(influenced by Boehme), also, and the orthodox sceptic Huet, 2

turned away from Cartesianism because it could not pause in its

programme of universal mathematics.

Positive beginnings toward a transformation of the Cartesian

method into the Euclidean line of proof we found in the Port-Koyal

1 Itesp. ad Ob). II.

2 Pierre Daniel Huet (16:50-1721), the learned Bishop of Avranches, wrote

Cen.wra Phil nsoph ire, Cartrsiaiice (1(589), and Trnite de la Faiblesse de VJfsprit

Humain (1723). His Autobiography (1718) is also instructive on the point

mentioned above. Cf. on him Ch. Barthohness (Paris, 1850).

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logic and in the logical treatises of Geulincx ; but in the system of

Spinoza this methodical schematism stands before us complete and

perfect as from one mould. He first gave an exposition of the Car

tesian philosophy " more geometrico," by developing the content of

the system step by step in propositions, after first setting up defini

tions and axioms. Each of these propositions was proved from the

definitions, axioms, and preceding propositions ; while corollaries

and scholia giving freer elucidations were added to certain of the

propositions. Into this same rigid, unwieldy form Spinoza pressed

his own philosophy also in the Ethics, and believed that it was thus

as surely demonstrated as the Euclidean system of geometry. This

presupposed not only the flawless correctness of the demonstrative

process, but also an unambiguous evidence and an unassailable

validity of the definitions and axioms. A look at the beginning of

the Ethics (and not only of the first, but also of the following

books) suffices to convince one of the naivete with which Spinoza

brings forward the complicated and condensed constructions of

scholastic thought as self-evident conceptions and principles, and

thereby anticipates implicitly his whole metaphysical system.

This geometrical method has, however, in Spinoza s thought and

in this consists its psycho-genetic justification at the same time

its material as well as formal significance. The fundamental re

ligious conviction that all things necessarily proceed from the

unitary essence of God seemed to him to require a method of philo

sophical knowledge, which in the same manner should derive from

the idea of God the ideas of all things. In the true philosophy the

order of ideas ought to be the same as the real order of things. 1 But

from this it follows of itself that the real process of the procedure

of things forth from God must be thought after the analogy of the

logical procedure of the consequent from its ground or reason, and

thus the character of the method which Spinoza fixed upon for the

problem of philosophy involved in advance the metaphysical char

acter of its solution ; cf. 31.

7. Little as men dared, in the immediately following period, to

make the content of the Spinozistic philosophy their own, its method

ical form exercised, nevertheless, an impressive influence : and the

more the geometrical method became settled in the philosophy of

the schools, the more the syllogistic procedure entered again with it,

since all knowledge was to be deduced from the highest truths by

1 The view that true knowledge as genetic definition must repeat the process

by which its object arises was carried out especially by Tschirnhausen, who did

not shrink from the paradox that a complete definition of laughter must be able

to produce laughter itself ! (Med. Ment., 67 f.)

CHAP. 2, 30.] Problem of Method : Spinoza, Leibniz. 397

regular inferences. Especially did the mathematically schooled

Cartesians in Germany take up the geometrical method along this

line: this was done by Jung and Weigel, and the academic impulse

to the preparation of text-books found in this method a form with

which it could have the utmost sympathy. In the eighteenth cen

tury Christian Wolff (of. Part V.) pursued this line in the most

comprehensive manner with his Latin text-books, and for the sys-

tematisation of a firmly established and clearly thought out material

there could be in fact no better form. This was shown when Puffen-

dorf undertook to deduce the entire system of Natural Right by the

geometrical method, as a logical necessity from the single principle

of the need of society.

When this view was in process of coming into existence Leibniz

came into sympathy with it under the especial influence of Erhard

Weigel, and was at the beginning one of its most consistent sup

porters. He not only made the jest of giving this unwonted garb

to a political brochure, 1 but was seriously of the opinion that philo

sophical controversies would find their end for the first time when

a philosophy could once make its appearance in as clear and certain

a form as that of a mathematical calculation. 2

Leibniz pursued this thought very energetically. The stimulus

of Hobbes, who also though with quite another purpose, cf . 31, 2

declared thinking to be a reckoning with the conceptions! signs

of things, may have been added; the Art of Lull and the pains

which Giordano Bruno had taken with its improvement were well

known to him. In Cartesian circles, also, the thought of transform

ing the mathematical method to a regular art of invention had been

much discussed : besides Joachim Jung, the Altorf Professor Joh.

Christopher Sturm, 3 had also exercised an influence upon Leibniz in

this respect. Finally, the thought of expressing the fundamental

metaphysical conceptions, and likewise the logical operations of

their combination after the manner of the mathematical sign-lan

guage by definite characters, seemed to offer the possibility of writ

ing a philosophical investigation in general formulae, and by this

means raising it beyond the capability of being expressed in a

definite language an effort toward a universally scientific lan

guage, a "Lingua Adamica," which likewise appeared at the time

1 In the pseudonymous Specimen demonstrationum politicnrum pro rege Polo-

norum eligendo (1069), he proved by "geometrical method" in sixty proposi

tions and demonstrations that the Count Palatine of Neuburg must be chosen

king of the Poles.

2 De Scientia Universali sen Calculo Philosophico (1084).

8 The author of a Compendium Universalium sen Metaphysicce EudidecR.

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of Leibniz in numerous supporters. 1 So, too, Leibniz busied himself

to an extraordinary degree with the thought of a characteristica uni-

versalis, and a method of philosophical calculus. 2

The essential outcome of these strange endeavours was, that an

attempt was necessarily made to establish those highest truths,

from the logical combination of which all knowledge was to be

deduced. So Leibniz, like Galileo and Descartes, must proceed to

search out that which, as immediately and intuitively certain, forces

itself upon the mind as self-evident, and by its combinations grounds

all derived knowledge. In the course of these reflections Leibniz

stumbled upon the discovery 3 (which Aristotle had made before

him), that there are two completely different kinds of this intuitive

knowledge : universal truths self-evident to reason, and facts of

experience. The one class has timeless validity ; the other, validity

for a single instance : verites eternelles and verites defait. Both have

in common that they are intuitively certain, i.e. are certain in them

selves and not by deduction from anything else ; they are called,

therefore, pnm f e veritates, or, also, primoe possibilitates, because in

them the possibility of all that is derivative has its ground. For

the " possibility " of a conception is known either by a " causal

definition" which derives the same from the first possibilities, that

is, a priori; or by the immediate experience of its actual existence,

that is, a posteriori.

These two kinds of " primitive truths" the rational and the

empirical, as we see Leibniz attached in a very interesting manner

to the two Cartesian marks of intuitive self-evidence, clearness and

distinctness. To this end he shifts to a slight extent the meaning

of both expressions. 4 That idea is clear which is surely distin

guished from all others and so is adequate for the recognition of its

object; that idea is distinct which is clear even to its particular

constituent parts and to the knowledge of their combination.

According to this, the a priori, " geometrical " or " metaphysical "

eternal truths are clear and distinct ; while on the other hand the

a posteriori, or the truths relating to facts, are clear, indeed, but not

distinct. Hence the former are perfectly transparent, conjoined

with the conviction of the impossiblity of the opposite, while in the

case of the latter the opposite is thinkable. In the case of the

former the intuitive certainty rests upon the Principle of Contradic-

1 Such attempts had been projected by J. J. Becker (1661), G. Dalgarn (1661),

Athanasius Kircher (1603), and J. Wilkins (1668).

2 Cf. A. Trendelenburg, Historische Beitrdge zn Philosophic, Vols. II., III.

8 Meditationes de Cognitione Veritate et Ideis (1684).

\* Ib. at the beginning, Erd s. ed., p. 79.

CHAP. 2, 31.] Substance and Causality. 399

tion; in the case of the latter the possibility guaranteed by the

actual fact needs still an explanation in accordance with the Prin

ciple of Sufficient Reason.

At the beginning, Leibniz intended this distinction only with

reference to the imperfection of the human understanding. In the

case of rational truths we see into the impossibility of the opposite ;

with empirical truths this is not the case, and we must content our

selves with establishing their actuality : \* but the latter also, in the

natura rerum and for the divine understanding, are so grounded

that the opposite is impossible, although it remains thinkable for

us. If Leibniz compared this distinction with that of commensur

able and incommensurable magnitudes, he meant at the beginning

that incommensurability lies only in man s limited knowing capacity.

But in the course of his development this antithesis became for

him an absolute one ; it gained metaphysical significance. Leibniz

now distinguished realiter between an unconditional necessity, which

involves the logical impossibility of the opposite, and a conditional

necessity, which has " only " the character of a matter of fact. He

divided the principles of things into those of which the opposite is

unthinkable, and those of which the opposite is thinkable : he dis

tinguished metaphysically, also, between necessary and contingent

truths. This, however, cohered with metaphysical motives, which

arose from an after-working of the Scotist theory of the contin

gency of the finite, and overthrew the geometrical method.

### 31. Substance and Causality.

The real [as contrasted with formal] result of the new methods

was in metaphysics, as in natural science, a transformation of the

fundamental ideas of the nature of things, and of the mode of

their connection in the processes of Nature : the conceptions of sub

stance and causality acquired a new content. But this change

could not proceed so radically in metaphysics as in natural science.

In this latter more limited realm, after the Galilean principle had

once been found, it was possible in a certain measure to begin ab ovo

and produce a completely new theory : in the more general philo

sophical doctrines the power and authority of tradition were much too

great to make it possible or permissible that it should be completely

set aside.

This distinction asserted itself already in connection with the

delicate relation sustained to religious conceptions. Natural science

1 The Aristotelian distinction of Si6n and Sn.

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could isolate itself absolutely from theology, and maintain toward

it an attitude of complete indifference : metaphysics, by its concep

tion of the deity- and by its theory of the mental or spiritual

world, was brought again and again into hostile or friendly contact

with the religious sphere of ideas. A Galileo declared that the

investigations of physics, whatever their result might be, had not

the least thing to do with the teaching of the Bible, 1 and a Newton

was not prevented by his mathematical natural philosophy from

burying himself with the most ardent piety in the mysteries of the

Apocalypse. But the metaphysicians, however indifferent their

thought as regards religion, and however strictly they might prose

cute their science in the purely theoretical spirit, were still always

obliged to consider that they had to do with objects concerning

which the Church doctrine was fixed. This gave modern philosophy

a somewhat delicate position : mediaeval philosophy had brought to

the objects of Church dogma an essentially religious interest of its

own as well ; modern philosophy regarded them, if at all, from the

theoretical standpoint only. Hence those felt themselves most

secure who, like Bacon and Hobbes, restricted philosophy also

entirely to natural research, declined to enter upon a metaphysics

proper, and were willing to let dogma speak the only words with

regard to the deity and the super-sensible destiny of man. Bacon

did this with large words behind which it is difficult to recognise

his true disposition ; 2 Hobbes rather let it be seen that his natural

istic opinion, like the Epicurean, saw in ideas as to the supernatural

a superstition resting upon a defective knowledge of Nature, a

superstition which by the regulation of the state becomes the bind

ing authority of religion. 3 Much more difficult, however, was the

position of those philosophers who held fast to the metaphysical

conception of the deity in their very explanation of Nature; Des

cartes whole literary activity is filled with an anxious caution

directed toward avoiding every offence to religion, while Leibniz

could attempt to carry through in a much more positive manner the

conformity of his metaphysics to religion ; and on the other hand

the example of Spinoza showed how dangerous it was if philosophy

openly brought to the front the difference between its conception of

God and the dogmatic conception.

1. The main difficulty of the case inhered in the circumstance

that the new methodical principle of mechanics excluded all tracing of

1 Cf. the letter to the Grand Duchess Christine, Op. II. 26 ff.

2 De Augm. Scient. IX., where the supernatural and incomprehensible is set

forth as the characteristic and serviceable quality of faith.

8 Leviathan, I. 6 ; cf. the drastic expression, ib. IV. 32.

CHAP. 2, 31.] Substance and Causality : Bacon. 401

corporeal phenomena back to spiritual forces. Nature was despiritu-

alised; science would see in it nothing but the movements of smallest

bodies, of which one is the cause of the other. No room remained

for the operation of supernatural powers. So first of all, at one

stroke, magic, astronomy, and alchemy, in which the Neo-Platonic

ghosts and spirits had held sway, became for science a standpoint of

the past. Leonardo had already demanded that the phenomena of the

external world should be explained by natural causes only ; the great

systems of the seventeenth century without exception recognise only

such, and a Cartesian, Balthasar Bekker, wrote a book l to show that

in accordance with the principles of modern science, all appear

ances of ghosts, conjurations, and magic arts must be reckoned as

injurious errors, a word of admonition which was very much in

place in view of the luxuriant superstition of the Renaissance.

But with the spirits, teleology, also, was obliged to give place.

The explanation of natural phenomena by their purposiveness

always came ultimately in some way or other to the thought of a

spiritual creation or ordering of things, and so was contradictory

to the principle of mechanics. At this point the victory of the

system of Democritus over the natural philosophy of Plato and

Aristotle was most palpable ; this, too, was emphasised most forcibly

by the new philosophy. Bacon counted the teleological mode of -

regarding Nature as one of the idols, and, indeed, as one of the

dangerous idols of the tribe, the fundamental errors which become

a source of illusion to man through his very nature : he taught that

philosophy has to do only with formal or efficient causes, and ex

pressed his restriction of philosophy to physics and his rejection of

metaphysics precisely by saying that the explanation of Nature is

physics if it concerns causce ejjicientes, metaphysics if it concerns "&gt;

causce finales." 1 In the case of Hobbes, who was the disciple of

Bacon and Galileo, the same view is self-explaining. But Descartes,

also, desires to see all final causes kept at a distance from the

explanation of Nature he declares it audacious to desire to know

the purposes of God. 3 Much more open, and keenest by far, is the

polemic of Spinoza\* against the anthropomorphism of teleology.

In view of his idea of God and God s relation to the world, it is

absurd to speak of ends of the deity, and especially of such as have

reference to men ; where all follows with eternal necessity from the

essential nature of the deity, there is no room for an activity accord

ing to ends. The English Neo-Platonists, such as Cudworth and

1 Balthasar Bekker (1634-1698), De Betoverte Wercld (1690).

2 De Augm. III. 4. \* Med. IV.

\* Cf. principally Eth. I. Append.

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Henry More, combated this fundamental mechanico-antiteleological

feature of the new metaphysics with all the eloquence of the old

arguments, but without success. The teleological conviction was

obliged to renounce definitively the claim of affording scientific

explanation of particular phenomena, and only in the metaphysical

conception of the whole did Leibniz (cf. below, No. 8), and similarly

a part of the English students of Nature, find ultimately a satisfac

tory adjustment between the opposing principles.

With the exclusion of the spiritual from the explanation of

Nature, still a third element of the old view of the world fell away,

viz. the thought of the difference in kind and in value of the

spheres of Nature, as it had been embodied most distinctly in

the Neo-Platonic graded realm of things, following the ancient

Pythagorean precedent. In this respect the fantastic natural

philosophy of the Renaissance had already done a forcible work of

preparation. The Stoic doctrine of the omnipresence of all sub

stances at every point of the universe had been revived by Nicolaus

Cusauus ; but it was in connection with the victory of the Coperni-

can system, as we see in Bruno, that the idea of the homogeneity of

all parts of the universe first completely forced its way to recogni

tion. The sublunary world could no longer be contrasted as the

realm of imperfection, with the more spiritual spheres of the stellar

heaven ; matter and motion are alike in both. It was from this

thought that Kepler and Galileo proceeded, and it became complete

when Newton recognised the identity of force in the fall of the

apple and the revolution of the stars. For modern science, the old

distinction in essence and in value between heaven and earth exists

no longer. The universe is one in nature throughout. This same

view, moreover, presented itself in opposition to the Aristotelian

and Thomistic development system of Matters and Forms. It did

away with the whole army of lower and higher forces the much

combated qualitates occultce; it recognised the mechanical principle

of motion as the only ground of explanation for all phenomena, and

therefore, removed also the distinction in principle between the ani

mate and the inanimate. Though here Neo-Platonism had co

operated toward overcoming this antithesis by its view of the

animation of the entire universe, the reverse task now arose for

the Galilean mechanics, namely, that of explaining mechanically

the phenomena of life also. The discovery of the mechanism of the

circulation of the blood by Harvey 1 (1626) gave to this tendency a

1 In which he had been anticipated by Michael Servetus (burned 1553 in

Geneva by Calvin s instrumentality).

CHAP. 2, 31.] Substance and Causality: Descartes, Locke. 403

vigorous impulse ; Descartes expressed it in principle in his state

ment that the bodies of animals are to be regarded scientifically as

most complex automata, and their vital activities as mechanical

processes. Hobbes and Spinoza carried out this thought more

exactly ; a zealous study of reflex motions began in the medical

schools of France and the Netherlands, and the conception of the

soul as vital force became completely disintegrated. Only the

Platonists and the adherents of the vitalism of Paracelsus and

Boehme, such as Van Helmont, held fast to this conception in the

old manner.

2. This mechanistic despiritualisation of Nature corresponded

completely to that dualistic theory of the world, which from episte-

mological motives had been in course of preparation in terministic

Nominalism, the theory of a total difference between the inner and

the outer world. To the knowledge of their qualitative difference

was now added that of their real and causal separateness. The

world of bodies appeared not only quite different in kind from that

of mind, but also as entirely sundered from it in its existence

and in the course of its motions. The doctrine of the intellectuality

of the sense qualities, revived in the philosophy of the Renaissance

by the Humanists, had contributed an extraordinary amount toward

sharpening the above antithesis. The doctrine that colours, tones,

smells, tastes, and qualities of pressure, heat, and touch are not

real qualities of things, but only signs of such in the mind, had

passed over from the Sceptical and Epicurean literature into most of

the doctrines of modern philosophy with a repetition of the ancient

illustrations. Vives, Montaigne, Sanchez, and Campanella were at

one in this ; Galileo, Hobbes, and Descartes revived the teaching of

Democritus, that to these qualitative differences of perception noth

ing but quantitative differences correspond in the natura rerum, and

this in such a way that the former are the inner modes of mentally

representing the latter. Descartes regarded sense qualities as ob

scure and confused ideas, while the conception of the quantitative

determinations of the outer world, on account of its mathematical

character, was for him the only clear and distinct idea of them.

According to Descartes, therefore, not only the sensuous feelings,

but also the contents of sensation, belong not to the spatial, but to

the psychical world only, and represent in this sphere the geomet

rical structures of which they are the signs. In our examination of

an individual object we can, 1 to be sure, gain a knowledge of this

1 Cf. Med. VI. which allows perhaps the plainest view of the very close

relation which Descartes physical research had to experience.

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true mathematical essence of bodies only by the aid of perceptions,

and in these perceptions the true mathematical essence is always

alloyed with the qualitative elements of the " imagination." But

just in this consists the task of physical research, to dissolve out

this real essence of bodies from the subjective modes of our mental

representation by means of reflection upon the clear and distinct ele

ments of perception. John Locke, who later adopted and made

popular this view of Descartes, designated 1 those qualities which

belong to bodies in themselves as primary, and called those sec

ondary, on the other hand, which belong to a body only by virtue of

its action upon our senses. 2 Descartes allowed as primary qualities

only shape, size, position, and motion, so that for him the physical

body coincided with the mathematical (cf. below, No. 4). In order

to maintain a distinction between the two, Henry More, 3 on the con

trary, demanded that impenetrability, regarded as the property of

filling space, should also be reckoned to the essential nature of bodies,

and Locke, 4 in accordance with this view, took up " solidity " into

the class of primary qualities.

With Hobbes 5 these thoughts become modified more in accordance

with the terministic conception. He regards space (as phantasma

rei existentis) and time (as phantasma motus) as also modes of men

tal representation, and it is just because we can therefore construct

these ourselves that mathematical theory has the advantage of being

the sole rational science. But instead of drawing phenomenalistic

conclusions from this premise, he argues that philosophy can treat

only of bodies, and must leave everything spiritual to revelation.

Scientific thought consequently consists, for him, only in the imma

nent combination of signs. These are partly involuntary in percep

tions, partly arbitrary in words (similarly Occam, cf. 27, 4). It

is only by means of the latter that general conceptions and proposi

tions become possible. Our thinking is hence a reckoning with

verbal signs. It has its truth in itself and stands as something

completely heterogeneous by the side of the outer world to which

it relates.

3. All these suggestions become compressed in the system of

Descartes to form the doctrine of the dualism of substances. The

analytic method was intended to discover the simple elements of

reality which were self-explanatory and not susceptible of farther

1 Essay, Human Understanding, II. 8, 23 f.

2 As tertiary qualities, Locke added further the " powers " for the operation

of one body upon others.

8 Desc. CEuv. (C.), X. pp. 181 ff.

\* Essay, II. 4.

5 Human Nature, chs. 2-5 ; Leviathan, chs. 4 ff.

CHAP. 2, 31.] Substance and Causality: Hobbes, Descartes. 405

deduction. Descartes discovered that all that can be experienced is

a species either of spatial or of conscious Being or existence. Spa-

tiality, or the quality of filling space, and consciousness (" extension "

and "thought" according to the usual translation of extensio and cogi-

tatio) are the ultimate, simple, original attributes of reality. All

that is is either spatial or conscious. For these two prime predi

cates are related disjunctively. What is spatial is not conscious ;

what is conscious is not spatial. The self-certainty of mind is only

that of the personality as a conscious being. Bodies are real in so

far as they have in themselves the quantitative determinations of

spatial existence and change, of extension and motion, All things

are either bodies or minds ; substances are either spatial or con

scious : res extensce and res cogitantes.

The world falls thus into two completely different and completely

separated realms : that of bodies and that of minds. But in the

background of this dualism there stands in the thought of Descartes

the conception of the deity as the ens perfectissimum or perfect sub

stance. Bodies and minds are finite things; God is infinite Being. 1

The Meditations leave no doubt as to the fact that Descartes ac

cepted the conception of God quite in accordance with the inter

pretation of scholastic Realism. The mind in its own Being, which

it recognises as a limited and imperfect one, apprehends with the

same intuitive certainty the Keality of the perfect, infinite Being

also (cf. above, 30, 5). To the ontological argument is added the

relation of God and the world in the form brought forward by

Nicolaus Cusanus, namely, that of the antithesis of the infinite and

the finite. But the above-mentioned relationship with the Kealism

of the Middle Ages appears most distinctly in the development of

metaphysics that succeeded Descartes : for the pantheistic conse

quences of this presupposition, which had been carefully held back

in the scholastic period, were now spoken out with complete clear

ness and sureness. And if we find in the doctrines of Descartes

successors a strong similarity with those which in the Middle Ages

could lead but a more or less repressed existence, this is intelligible

even without the assumption of a direct historical dependence,

merely by the pragmatic connection and the logical necessity of the

conclusions.

4. The common metaphysical name of "substance," applied to

God in the infinite sense, and to minds and bodies in a finite sense,

could not permanently cover the problems which were hidden be-

1 So likewise Malebranche said (Eech. III. 2, 9 a. E.) that God could properly

be called only Celui qui est, he is Vetre sans restriction, tout etre infini est

universel.

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neath it. The conception of substance had come into a state of flux,

and needed further re-shaping. It had almost lost touch with

the idea of "thing," the category of inherence; for just the combi

nation of a multiplicity of determinations into the idea of a unitary

concrete entity, which is essential to this category, was completely

lacking in Descartes conception of finite substances, since these

were held to be characterised by one fundamental quality, spatiality

or consciousness. All else that was found in substances must there

fore be regarded as a modification of its fundamental quality, of its

attribute. All qualities and states of bodies are modes of their spa

tiality or extension: all qualities and states of mind are modes of

consciousness (modi cogitandi).

It is involved in this that all particular substances belonging to

either class, all bodies on the one hand and all minds on the other,

are alike in their essence, their constitutive attribute. But from

this it is only a step farther to the idea in which this likeness is

thought as metaphysical identity. All bodies are spatial, all minds

are conscious ; individual bodies are distinguished from one another

only by different modes of spatiality (form, size, situation, motion) ;

individual minds are distinguished from one another only by differ

ent modes of consciousness (ideas, judgments, activities of will).

Individual bodies are modes of spatiality, individual minds are

modes of consciousness. In this way the attribute obtains meta

physical preponderance over individual substances, which now

appear as its modifications ; the res extensce become modi extensionis /

the res cogitantes, modi cogitationis.

Descartes himself drew this conclusion only in the domain of nat

ural philosophy, to which in general he restricted the carrying out of

his metaphysical doctrine in its principles. Here, however, the

general conception of modification took on, of itself, a definite sig

nificance, and one capable of apprehension by perception or imagina

tion, viz. that of limitation (determinatio) . Bodies are parts of space,

limitations of the universal space-filling quality or extension. 1 Hence

for Descartes the conception of body coincides with that of a limited

spatial magnitude. A body is, as regards its true essence, a portion

of space. The elements of the corporeal world are the " corpuscles," 2

1 Cf. Princ. Phil. II. 9 f., where, at the same time, it appears quite clearly

that this relation of the individual body to universal space is made equivalent

to that of individual and species.

2 For the corpuscular theory, Descartes found many suggestions in Bacon,

Hobbes, Basso, Sennert, and others. The variety in the development of this

theory, which rests upon the dialectic between the mathematical and the physi

cal momenta, has more interest for natural science than for philosophy. An

excellent exposition is found in Lasswitz, Geschichte der Atomistik.

CHAP. 2, 31.] Substance and Causality : Malebranche. 407

i.e. the firm spatial particles which realiter are no longer divisible :

as mathematical structures, however, they are infinitely divisible ;

that is, there are no atoms. From these presuppositions follow,

likewise, for Descartes, the impossibility of empty space, and the

infinitude of the corporeal world.

For the mental world the analogous claim was pronounced by

Malebranche. In connection with the epistemological motives (of.

below, No. 8) which made it seem to him that no knowledge of

things is possible except in God, he came 1 to the conception of the

raison universelle, which, as being alike in all individual minds, can

not belong to the modes of the finite mind, but is rather that of

which finite minds are themselves modifications, and can, just on

this account, be none other than an attribute of God. God is in so

far the " place of minds " or spirits, just as space is the place of

bodies. Here, also, as the expression proves, the relation which

obtains in conceptions between the universal and the particular

underlies the thought, and following the analogy of the Cartesian

conception of space and body this relation is thought in percep

tional or picturate terms as participation. 2 All human insight is a

participation in the infinite Reason, all ideas of finite things are but

determinations of the idea of God, all desires directed toward the

particular object are but participations in that love toward God as

the ground of its essence and life, which necessarily dwells in the

finite mind. To be sure, Malebranche came into a very critical

situation by thus making the finite mind disappear completely in

the universal divine mind, as its modification. For how, in accord

ance with this, should he explain the self-subsistence and self-

activity which it seemed were quite notoriously present in those

inclinations and volitions of man which opposed God ? In this

difficulty nothing availed but the word " freedom," in using which

Malebranche was indeed obliged to confess that freedom was an

impenetrable mystery. 3

5. Iii this course of thought pursued by Malebranche appears

clearly the inevitable logical consistency with which the attributes,

which were regarded by Descartes as the common essence belonging

to either of the two classes of finite substances, could ultimately be

thought only as the attributes of the infinite substance or deity. But

precisely in this point consists the fundamental motive of Spi-

nozism, which developed along this line out of Cartesianism directly

and at the outset, and at the same time developed to the farthest

1 Rech. de la Ver. III. 2, 6; Entret. I. 10.

2 Recall the Platonic /\*^0e ! 8 Cf. above, p. 394, note 2.

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consequence. Spinozism likewise holds as firmly to the qualitative

as to the causal dualism of spatiality and consciousness. The spa

tial and the spiritual worlds are entirely heterogeneous and abso

lutely independent of each other. But the whole endless series of

bodies, with their divisions, forms, and motions, are only the modes

of extension, just as the endless series of minds with their ideas

and volitions are only the modes of consciousness. Hence these

finite " things " are no longer entitled to the name of " substance."

That only can be called substance, whose attributes are extension

and consciousness themselves, viz. the infinite existence or Being,

the deity. But its essence, in turn, cannot be exhausted in these

two attributes which are accessible to human experience ; the ens

realissimum involves within itself the actuality of the infinite num

ber of all possible attributes.

The ultimate ground of this position also lies in the scholastic-

realistic conception of the most real being. Spinoza s definition of

substance or the deity, as the essence (essentia) which involves its

own existence, is only the condensed expression of the ontological

proof for the existence of God: the "ase itas" is preserved in the

term " causa sui " / substance as that " quod in se est et per se con-

cipitur" is again but another transcription of the same thought.

Proceeding from these definitions, the proof for the oneness and

infinitude of substance 1 followed as a matter of course.

That, however, we have here to do with an entirely realistic

course of thought becomes clearly manifest from Spinoza s doctrine

of the nature of substance itself and of its relation to the attributes.

For the Spinozistic system says absolutely nothing of substance or

of the deity farther than the formal determinations contained in the

conception of the ens realissimum, of absolute Being. Every predi

cate expressing any content is, on the contrary, expressly denied :

and in particular Spinoza is especially careful to refuse 2 to the divine

essence the modifications of consciousness, such as intellectual cog

nition [\_intellectus, ErJcenntniss ] and will. Just as little of course

does he recognise the modifications of extension as being predicates

of the divine essence, though he had no polemical inducement to

express this especially. God himself is therefore neither mind

nor body ; of him it can only be said, that he is. It is evident that

the old principle of negative theology is here present with a changed

form of expression. Knowledge of all finite things and states leads

to two highest universal conceptions : space-filling quality or exten

sion, and consciousness. To both of these a higher metaphysical

1 Eth. I. Props. 1-14. 2 Ib . L 3 L

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dignity is ascribed than to finite things ; they are the attributes,

and the things are their modes. But if the process of abstraction

now rises from these two determinations, the last which contain any

content, to the most general, to the ens generalissimum, then all

definite content falls away from the conception of this being, and

only the empty Form of substance is left. For Spinoza, also, the

deity is all and thus nothing. His doctrine of God lies quite

along the path of Mysticism. 1

But if God is thus the general essence of finite things, he does

not exist otherwise than in them and with them. This applies first

of all to the attributes. God is not distinct from them, and they are

not distinct from him, just as the dimensions of space are not dis

tinct from space itself. Hence Spinoza can say also that God con

sists of countless attributes, or Deus SIVE omnia ejus attributa. 2 And

the same relation is afterwards repeated between the attributes and

the modes. Every attribute, because it expresses the infinite essence

of God in a definite manner, is again infinite in its own way ; but

it does not exist otherwise than with and in its countless modifica

tions. God then exists only in things as their universal essence,

and they only in him as the modes of his reality. In this sense

Spinoza adopts from Nicolaus Cusanus and Giordano Bruno the

expressions natura naturans and natura naturata. God is Nature :

as the universal world-essence, he is the natura naturans; as sum-

total of the individual things in which this essence exists modified,

he is the natura naturata. If in this connection the natura naturans

is called occasionally also the efficient cause of things, this creative

force must not be thought as something distinct from its workings ;

this cause exists nowhere but in its workings. This is Spinoza s

complete and unreserved pantheism.

Finally this relation is repeated yet again in the distinction which

Spinoza establishes between the infinite and the finite modes. 3 If

each of the countless finite things is a mode of God, the infinite

connection or coherence which exists between them must also be

regarded as a mode, and, indeed, as an infinite mode. Spinoza affirms

three of these. 4 The deity as the universal world-thing appears in

individual things, which are finite modes ; to them corresponds as

1 To this corresponds also his theory of cognition with its three stages,

which sets "intuition, 1 as the immediate apprehension of the eternal logical

resulting of all things from God, as knowledge sub specie ceternitatis, above

perception and the activity of the intellect.

2 Which, however, is in nowise to be interpreted as if the attributes were

self-subsistent prime realities and " CJod " only the collective name for them

(as K. Thomas supposed, Sp. als Metaphysiker, Konigsberg, 1840). Such a

crassly nominalistic cap-stone would press the whole system out of joint.

8 Eth. I. 23 and 30 ff. \* Ep. 64 (Op. 11. 219).

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infinite mode the universe. In the attribute of extension the finite

modes are the particular space-forms ; the infinite mode is infinite

space, or matter J itself in its motion and rest. For the attribute of

consciousness, the intellectus infinitus 2 stands beside the particular

functions of ideation and will. Here Spinoza reminds us imme

diately of the realistic pantheism of David of Dinant (of. 27, 1).

His metaphysics is the last word of mediaeval Kealism. 3

6. With these motives relating to the problem of the qualitative

difference of substances modern philosophy struggled out of its

dualistic presuppositions to a monistic adjustment ; but at the

same time, still more powerful motives became mingled in the

process, motives which grew out of the real and causal separation

of the spatial and the conscious worlds. At first, indeed, it was the

principles of mechanics themselves which demanded the attempt to

isolate completely the course of events in each of the two spheres

of finite substances.

This succeeded in the corporeal world in a relatively simple

manner. In this domain, the idea of cause had acquired a completely

new significance through Galileo. According to the scholastic con

ception (which even in Descartes Meditations, in a decisive passage,

was still presented with axiomatic validity) causes were substances

or things, while effects, on the other hand, were either their activities

or were other substances and things which were held to come about

only by such activities : this was the Platonic-Aristotelian concep

tion of the alria. Galileo, on the contrary, went back to the idea of

the older Greek thinkers (of. 5), who applied the causal relation

only to the states that meant now to the motions of substances

not to the Being of the substances themselves. Causes are motions,

and effects are motions. The relation of impact and counter-impact,

of the passing over of motion from one corpuscle to another, 4 is the

original fundamental form of the causal relation, the form which is

clear to perception or imagination (anscliaulich), is intelligible in

1 This equivalence holds good with Spinoza as well as with Descartes.

2 This intellectns infinitns appears again in the ethical part of the Spinozistie

system as amor intellectualis quo dens se ipsum amat. In both cases Male-

branche s " raison universMe " amounts to the same thing.

3 Geulincx also, in a manner similar to that of Spinoza and Malebranche,

regards finite bodies and minds as only "limitations," " prcecisiones " of the

universal infinite body and the divine mind. Cf. Met. p. 56. If we think away

limitation from ourselves, he says, ib. 237 ff., there is left God.

4 Hence for Descartes the mechanical principle excluded possibility of action

at a distance, just as it excluded empty space. This forced him to the artificial

hypotheses of the vortex theory, by which he aimed to give a physical ground for

the Copernican view of the world (popular exposition by Fontenelle, Entretiens

sur la Pluralite des Mondes, 1686). The grounds on which this doctrine was

displaced by the Newtonian theory of gravitation are no longer philosophical,

but purely physical in their nature.

CHAP. 2, 31.] /Substance and Causality : Galileo, Descartes. 411

itself, and explains all others. And the question as to the nature

of this fundamental relation was answered by the principle of math

ematical equality, which, in turn, passed over into that of metaphysi-

cal identity. So much motion in the cause, so much in the effect

also. Descartes formulated this as the law of the conservation of

motion in Nature. The sum of motion in Nature remains always

the same : what a body loses in motion it gives to another. As

regards the amount of motion, there is in Nature nothing new,

especially no impulse from the spiritual world. 1 Even for the king

dom of organisms this principle was carried through, at least as a

postulate, though as yet with very weak grounds. Animals, also,

are machines whose motions are evoked and determined by the

mechanism of the nervous system. Descartes thought of this

mechanism more precisely (and with him Hobbes and Spinoza) as

a motion of finest (gaseous) substances, the so-called spiritus ani-

males, 2 and sought the point of transition from the sensory to the

motor nervous system in man, in a part of the brain which has no

correlative, i.e. is a single and not a paired organ, the pineal gland or

conarium.

The other part of the task proved much more difficult : namely,

that of understanding the mental life without any relation to the

corporeal world. Easy and clear to perception as was the action of

one body upon another, it did not yield a mode of representing an

incorporeal connection between different minds, that could be used

scientifically. Spinoza, for example, expressed the general meta

physical postulate very energetically, when he promised in entering

upon the third book of the Ethics, that he would treat the actions

and desires of man as if lines, surfaces, and bodies were the subject

of discussion ; for the important thing is neither to asperse them nor

to deride them, but to understand them. But the solution of this

problem was limited in advance to investigating the causal connec

tion between the activities of consciousness in the individual mind :

dualism demanded a psychology free from all physiological constitu

ents. It is all the more characteristic of the predominance of the

spirit of natural science in the seventeenth century, that it attained

this psychology demanded by the theory, only in the most limited

degree. And even the beginnings toward this are ruled by the

endeavour to apply the methodical principle of mechanics, which

1 Hence Hobbes excluded from physics the Aristotelian and Thomistic concep

tion of the unmoved mover, while Descartes, who in this point also proceeded

more metaphysically, made motion to have been communicated to matter at the

beginning by God.

2 An inheritance from the physiological psychology of the Greeks, in particu

lar from that of the Peripatetics.

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was celebrating its triumphs in the theory of outer experience, to

the comprehension of the inner world also.

For just as the investigation of Nature from Galileo to Newton

directed its energies toward finding out the simple fundamental

form of corporeal motion, to which all complex structures of outer

experience could be reduced, so Descartes desired to establish the

fundamental forms of psychical motion, out of which the multiplic

ity of inner experiences would become explicable. In the theoreti

cal domain this seemed attained by establishing the immediately

evident truths (the innate ideas) ; in the practical field there grew

out of this demand the new problem of a statics and a mechanics of

the movements of feeling (Gemiithsbewegungen) . In this spirit Des

cartes and Spinoza produced their natural history of the emotions

(Affecte) and passions, 1 the latter author by combining the thoughts

of the former with those of Hobbes. Thus Descartes derives the

whole host of particular passions, as species and sub-species, from

the six fundamental forms of wonder (admiratio), love, and hate,

desire (desir), pleasure and pain [or joy and sadness, Lust und

Unlusf} (Icetitia Iristitia) ; thus Spinoza develops his system of

the emotions out of desire, pleasure, and pain (appetitus, Icetitia,

tristitia) by pointing out the ideational processes in connection

with which these emotions have become transferred from their

original object, the self-preservation of the individual, to other

ideas."

A peculiar side-attitude is taken in this regard by the two English

thinkers. For Bacon and Hobbes, a mechanical conception of the

mental is the more natural in proportion as they endeavour to

draw the mental more closely into the circle of the physical. Both,

that is, regard the empirical psychical life, and therefore, also, the

sphere of consciousness which in Descartes system was to have

nothing to do with the corporeal world, as something which essen

tially belongs thereto ; on the other hand, there is set over against

the whole world of perception rather a something spiritual [spirit

ual in the religious sense, Geiatliche8~\ than a something mental or

intellectual [Geistiges"]. Ideas and volitions as they are known by

experience are held to be at bottom activities of the body also, and

if besides these we speak yet of an immortal soul (spiraculum) , of

a spiritual world and of the divine mind or spirit, this should fall

to the province of theology. But according to this view the natural

science theory cannot be characterised much otherwise than as an

1 Descartes, Les Passions de VAme; Spinoza, Eth. III., and Tract. Brev. II.

6 ft. Cf . below, No. 7.

CHAP. 2, 31.] Substance and Causality: Descartes, Hobbes. 413

anthropological materialism; for it aims to understand tlie entire

series of empirical psychical activities as a mechanical process con

nected with the bodily functions. This problem was propounded by

Bacon ; Hobbes attempted to solve it, and in doing so became the

father of the so-called associational psychology. With the same

outspoken sensualism as Campanella, of whose deductions his own

frequently remind us, especially with regard to the mechanism of

ideas, he seeks to show that sense-impressions give the only ele

ments of consciousness, and that by their combination and trans

formation memory and thought also come about. In the practical

domain the impulse toward self-preservation and the feelings of

pleasure and pain which arise in connection with impressions are

then characterised analogously as the elements out of which all

other feelings and activities of will arise. Hobbes, too, projected

thus a "natural history" of the emotions and passions, and this

was not without influence upon that of Spinoza, whose theory of

the emotions is always looking towards the other attribute [i.e.

extension].

From these presuppositions of method the denial of the freedom

of the will in the sense of indeterminism followed with inexorable

consistency for Hobbes and for Spinoza. Both attempted and

Spinoza did it in the baldest form that can be conceived to exhibit

the strict necessity which prevails even in the course of the process

of motivation : they are types of determinism. For Spinoza, there

fore, there is no freedom in the psychological sense. Freedom can

mean only, on the one hand, metaphysically, the absolute Being of

the deity determined by nothing but itself, and, on the other hand,

ethically, the ideal of the overcoming of the passions through

reason.

7. In this it became already evident that in the presence of the

facts of psychology, that absolute separation between the corporeal

and the mental world which metaphysics demanded was not to be

maintained. But Descartes himself met quite the same experience.

The nature of the mind itself might, indeed, explain the clear and

distinct ideas and the forms of the rational will which resulted

from these, but it could not explain the obscure and confused ideas,

and the emotions and passions connected with them. These present

themselves rather as a disturbance of the mind 1 (perturbationes

aiiimi), and since this perturbation which gives occasion for the

1 This is the interest, not only ethical, but also theoretical, which induced Des

cartes to treat states psychologically so different as emotions and passions, from

the same point of view and in one line. Cf. for the following Passions de I Ame,

L, and Meds. V. and VI.

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abuse of freedom (cf. above, 30, 5) cannot be due to God, its

origin must be sought ultimately in an influence exercised by the

body. In the disturbances of the feeling there is, therefore, for

Descartes an indubitable fact, which cannot be explained from the

fundamental metaphysical principles of his system. Here, there

fore, the philosopher sees himself forced to recognise an exceptional

relation, and he adjusts this for himself in a way that had been

foreshadowed by the anthropology of the Victorines (cf. 24, 2).

The nature (nature,) of man, he teaches, consists in the inner union

of two heterogeneous substances, a mind and a body, and this marvel

lous (i.e. metaphysically incomprehensible) union has been so

arranged by God s will that in this single case the conscious and

the spatial substances act upon each other. Animals remain, for

Descartes, bodies ; their " sensations " are only nervous movements,

out of which stimulations of the motor system arise in accordance

with the reflex mechanism. In the human body, however, the

mental substance is present at the same time, and in consequence

of this co-existence the storm of the animal spirits in the pineal

gland excites a disturbance in the mental substance also, which

manifests itself in the latter as an unclear and indistinct idea, i.e.

as sense-perception, as emotion, or as passion. 1

With the disciples, the systematic impulse was greater than with

the master. They found in this influxus physicus between mind

and body the vulnerable point in the Cartesian philosophy, and ex

erted themselves to set aside the exception which the philosopher

had been obliged to assert in the anthropological facts. This, how

ever, did not go on without effecting a new, and in a certain sense

regressive, alteration in the conception of causality, in that the

metaphysical moment once more gained preponderance over the me

chanical. The immanent causal processes of the spatial and of the

conscious worlds were regarded as intelligible in themselves ; but

the transcendent causal process from one of these worlds into the

other formed a problem. No difficulty was found in the idea that

one motion transformed itself into another or that one function of

1 On this Descartes then builds his Ethics. In such perturbations the mind

occupies a passive attitude, and it is its task to free itself from these in clear

and distinct knowledge. Spinoza carried out this intellectualistic morals in an

extremely grand and impressive manner (Eth. IV. and V.). The antithesis of an

active and passive attitude of the finite mind is indeed gained from the stand

point of his metaphysics only artificially (Eth. III., Def. 2) : but he carried

through with compelling consistency the thought, that the overcoming of the

passions follows from a knowledge of them, from the insight into the necessary

divine system of all things ; he taught that human nature must perfect itself in

the blessedness of the active emotions which consist only in the activity of the

pure impulse toward knowledge (Eth. V. 15 ff.), and thus set up an ideal of

life which reaches the height of the Greek Btupla,.

CHAP. 2, 31.] Substance and Causality : Geulincx. 415

consciousness for example, a thought should pass over into an

other : but it seemed impossible to understand how sensation should

come out of motion, or motion out of will. Physical and logical caus

ality seemed to offer no difficulty ; so much the greater was that

presented by psycho-physical causality. In the case of the latter the

consciousness dawned that the relation of equality or identity

between cause and effect, by means of which mechanical and logi

cal dependence seemed intelligible, does not exist. Hence an

inquiry must here be made for the principle by which the two ele

ments of the causal relation, cause and effect, which do not in them

selves belong together, are connected with each other. 1 Where this

principle was to be sought could not be a matter of doubt for the

disciples of Descartes : God, who produced the union of the two

substances in man s nature, has also so arranged them that the

functions of the one substance are followed by the corresponding

functions of the other. But on this account these functions in

their causal relation to one another are not properly, and in their

own nature, efficient causes, but only occasions in connection with

which the consequences determined by divine contrivance appear in

the other substance, not causce efficientes, but causce occasionales.

The true " cause " for the causal connection between stimuli and

sensations, and between purposes and bodily movements, is God.

Such considerations are multiplied in the whole development of

the Cartesian school. Clauberg brings them into use for the theory

of perceptions, Cordemoy for that of purposive motion ; their full

development is attained in the " Ethics " of Geulincx. Yet in the

latter author doubt is not entirely excluded as to whether God s

causality in this connection is regarded as a special intervention in

each individual case, or as a general and permanent arrangement.

In some passages, indeed, the former is the case, 2 but the spirit of

the doctrine, taken as a whole, doubtless involves the latter. Geu

lincx expresses himself most clearly in the illustration of the clocks : 3

as two clocks which have been made alike by the same artificer

continue to move in perfect harmony, " absque ulla causalitate qua

alterum hoc in altero causat, sed propter meram dependentiam, qua

utrumque ab eadem arte et simili industria constitutum est," so the

1 That the fundamental difficulty in all causal relations was in this actually

stumbled upon, first became clear at a later time through Hume. Cf. 34.

2 For example, in the analogy of the child in the cradle, Eth. 123. It seems,

besides, that the first edition of the Ethics (1605), in fact, introduced more the

deus ex, machina, while the annotations added in the second edition (1675) pre

sent throughout the profounder view.

\* Eth., p. 124, note 19.

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corresponding functions of mind and body follow each other in

accordance with the world-order once determined by God. 1

8. This anthropological rationale of Occasionalism fits from the

beginning into a more general metaphysical course of thought. The

Cartesian system already contained the premises for the inference

that in the case of all that takes place in finite substances, the effi

cient principle derives, not from these substances themselves, but from

the deity. Thinking in minds takes place by means of the inborn

ideas which God has given them; to the corporeal world he has

communicated a quantum of motion which changes only in its dis

tribution among the individual corpuscles, but in the case of the

individual body it is, so to speak, only temporarily concealed.

Minds can create new ideas as little as bodies can create new mo

tion ; the sole cause is God.

The Cartesians had all the more occasion to emphasise the sole

causality of God, as their doctrine encountered violent contradiction

in the orthodoxy of both Confessions, and became involved in the

theological controversies of the time. Friend and foe had quickly

recognised the relationship of Cartesianism with the doctrine of

Augustine ; 2 and while on this account the Jansenists and the

Fathers of the Oratory, who lived in the Augustinian-Scotist atmos

phere, were friendly to the new philosophy, the orthodox Peripa

tetics, and especially the Jesuits, made war upon it all the more

violently. Thus the old opposition between Augustianism and Thorn-

ism came out in the controversy over Cartesianism. The conse

quence was that the Cartesians brought into the foreground as far

as possible those elements in which their doctrine was allied to the

Augustinian. So Louis de la Forge 3 attempted to prove the com

plete identity of Cartesianism with the doctrine of the Church

Father, and emphasised especially the fact that according to both

thinkers the sole ground of all that takes place in bodies as well as

minds is God. Just this was later designated by Malebranche 4 as

the sure mark of a Christian philosophy, while the most dangerous

1 If, therefore, Leibniz, when he later claimed for his "pre-established har

mony " (J?c/airc. 2 and 3) this same analogy in frequent use at that time, charac

terised the Cartesian conception by an immediate dependence of the two clocks

upon one another, and the Occasionalistic by a constantly renewed regulation of

the clocks on the part of the clock-maker, this was applicable at most to some

passages in the first edition of the Ethics of Geulincx.

2 Kinship and opposition apply also to still other points. Descartes and the

priests of the Oratory (Gibieuf, Malebranche) are at one against Thomism in

the Augustinian and Scotist doctrine of the boundless freedom of the deity ;

they maintain again that the good is good because God so willed it, not per se

(cf. 26, 2, 3), etc.

3 Trait, de I Espr. Hum., Pref. 4 Recherche, VI. 2, 3.

CHAP. 2, 31.] Substance and Causality : Occasionalism. 417

error of heathen philosophy consists in the assumption of metaphys

ical self-subsistence and capacity for spontaneous action on the part

of finite things.

With Geulincx, likewise, all finite things are deprived of the

causal moment or element of substantiality. In this he proceeds

from the principle that one can himself do that only of which he

knows how it is done. From this it follows in the anthropological

field, that the mind cannot be the cause of the bodily movements

no one knows how he sets to work even but to raise his arm ; it

follows farther in the cosmological field, that bodies which have no

ideas whatever cannot operate at all, and finally, for the theory of

knowledge, that the cause of perceptions is to be sought not in the

finite mind for this does not know how it comes to perceive

nor in bodies; therefore it is to be sought only in God. He pro

duces in us a world of ideas which in its wealth of qualities is much

richer and more beautiful than the actual corporeal world itself. 2

The epistemological motif finds finally with Malebranche 9 a still

more profound apprehension. Cartesian dualism makes a direct

knowledge of the body by mind absolutely impossible : such a knowl

edge is excluded not only because no iiijluxus physicus is possible

between the two, but also because, in view of the total heterogeneity

of the two substances, it is not possible to see how even an idea of

the one is thinkable in the other. In this respect, also, mediation

is possible only through the deity, and Malebranche takes refuge in

the Neo-Platonic world of Ideas in God. Man does not know bodies ;

he knows their Ideas in God. This intelligible corporeal world in God

is, on the one hand, the archetype of the actual corporeal world cre

ated by God, and on the other hand, the archetype of those ideas

which God has communicated to us of this actual corporeal world.

Our knowledge is like the actual bodies, just as two magnitudes

which are equal to a third are equal also to each other. In this

sense Malebranche understood that philosophy teaches that we

behold all things in God.

9. Quite different was the solution which Spinoza gave to the

Occasionalistic problems. The explanation of any mode of the one

attribute by a mode of the other was excluded by the conception of

1 Kth.,p. 113; Met., p. 26.

2 The remnant of self-activity in finite beings that remains in the system of

Geulincx consists in the immanent mental activity of man. Cf. Eth. 121 f.

The " autology," or inspectio sni, is, therefore, not only the epistemological

starting-point of the system, but .also its ethical conclusion. Man has nothing

to do in the outer world. Ubi nihil vales, ibi nihil velis. The highest virtue is

a modest contentment, submission to God s will humility, dc.tfpo tio sui.

3 Rech. III. 2.

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the attribute as he had defined it (see above, No. 5) ; it held of the

attribute as of substance, 1 in se est et per se concipitur. Accordingly

there could be no question of the dependence of the spatial upon

consciousness, or vice versa; the appearance of such a dependence

which presents itself in the anthropological facts needed, therefore,

another explanation, and as a matter of course this was to be sought

by the aid of his conception of God. If, however, the doctrine that

God is the sole cause of all that takes place is for this reason found

also with Spinoza, his agreement with the Occasionalists exists only

in the motive and the word, but not in the meaning or spirit of the

doctrine. For according to Geulincx and Malebranche, God is the

creator ; according to Spinoza, he is the universal essence or nature

of things ; according to the former, God creates the world by his

will ; according to the latter, the world follows necessarily from the

nature of God [or is the necessary consequence of the nature of God].

In spite of the likeness in the word causa, therefore, the causal rela

tion is reallv thought here in a sense entirely different from that

which it has there. With Spinoza it means not, "God creates the

world," but, "he is the world."

Spinoza always expresses his conception of real dependence, of

causality, by the word " follow " (sequi, consequi) and by the addi

tion, "as from the definition of a triangle the equality of the sum

of its angles to two right angles follows." The dependence of the

world upon God is, therefore, thought as a mathematical consequence. 2

This conception of the causal relation has thus completely stripped

off the empirical mark of "producing " or " creating " which played

so important a part with the Occasionalists, and replaces the percep

tional idea of active operation with the logico-mathematical relation

of ground and consequent [or reason and consequent; Grund und

Folge~\. Spinozism is a consistent identification of the relation of

cause and effect with that of ground and consequent. The causality

of the deity is, therefore, not in time, but is eternal, that is, timeless ;

and true knowledge is a consideration of things sub quadam ceterni-

tatis specie. This conception of the relation of dependence resulted

of itself from the conception of the deity as the universal essence or

nature : from this nature all its modifications follow timelessly, just

as all propositions of geometry follow from the nature of space.

The geometrical method knows no other causality than that of the

"eternal consequence"; for rationalism, only that form of depend

ence which is peculiar to thought itself, namely, the logical proced-

1 Eth. I., Prop. 10.

2 Cf. Schopenhauer, Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden

Grundf, ch. 6. [Fourfold Hoot, etc., Bohn Lib.]

CHAP. 2, . 51 .] Substance and Causality: Spinoza. 419

ure of the consequent from its antecedent reason, passes as in itself

intelligible, and on this account as the schema also for events or

cosmic processes : l real dependence also should be conceived neither

mechanically nor teleologically, but only logico-mathematically.

But now, as in geometry, all follows indeed from the nature of

space, and yet each particular relation is fixed by other particular

determinations, so, too, in the Spinozistic metaphysics the Acces

sary procedure of things forth from God consists in the determina

tion of every individual finite entity by other finite things. The

sum of finite things and the modes of each attribute form a chain

of strict determination, a chain without beginning and without end.

The necessity of the divine nature rules in all ; but no mode is nearer

to the deity, or farther from the deity, than is any other. In this

the thought of Nicolaus Cusanus of the incommensurability of the

finite with the infinite asserts itself no series of stages of emana

tion leads from God down to the world : everything finite is deter

mined again by the finite, but in all God is the sole ground of their

essence or nature.

If this is the case, the unity of essence must appear also in the

relation of the attributes, however strictly these may be separated

qualitatively and causally. It is still the same divine essence which

exists here in the form of extension, and there in the form of con

sciousness. The two attributes are then necessarily so related to

each other that to every mode of the one a definite mode of the

other corresponds. This correspondence or parallelism of the attri

butes solves the enigma of the connection of the two worlds : ideas

are determined only by ideas, and motions only by motions ; but it

is the like cosmic content of the divine essence which forms the con

nection of the one class, and also that of the other ; the same con

tent is in the attribute of consciousness as in the attribute of

extension. This relation is presented by Spinoza in accordance

with the scholastic conceptions of the esse in intellectu and the esse

in re. The same that exists in the attribute of consciousness as

object (objective), as the content of our ideas, exists in the attribute

of extension as something actual, independent of any idea or mental

representation (formaliter) . 2

1 Spinoza s pantheism has therefore the closest resemblance to the scholastic

mystical Realism of Scotus Erigena (cf. 23, 1), only that in the latter s

system it is still more the case that the logical relation of the general to the

particular forms the only schema ; from this resulted, in his case, the emanistic

character which is lacking in Spinoza.

2 But neither of these two modes of existence is more original than the other,

or forms a prototype for the other: both express equally the nature of God

(exprimere ) . Hence an idealistic interpretation of Spinoza is as incorrect as

a materialistic, although both might be developed out of his system.

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Spinoza s conception, then, is this: every finite thing as a mode

of the divine essence, e.g. man, exists in like measure in both attri

butes, as mind and as body : and each of its particular functions

belongs also in like measure to both attributes, as idea and as

motion. As idea, it is determined by the connection of ideas, as

motion by that of motions ; but in both, the content is the same by

virtue of the correspondence of the attributes. The human mind is

the idea (Idee) of the human body, both as a whole and in detail. 1

10. The conclusion of this movement of thought which had

passed through so many divar in cations was reached in the meta

physical system of Leibniz, a system which is equalled by none

in the entire history of philosophy in all-sidedness of motives and

in power of adjustment and combination. It owes this importance

not only to the extensive learning and the harmonising mind of its

author, but especially to the circumstance that he was at home in

the ideas of ancient and mediaeval philosophy with as deep and fine

an understanding of their significance as he had for the conceptions

formed by the modern study of Nature. 2 Only the inventor of the

differential calculus, who had as much understanding for Plato and

Aristotle as for Descartes and Spinoza, who knew and appreciated

Thomas and Duns Scotus as well as Bacon and Hobbes, only he

could become the creator of the " pre-established harmony."

The reconciliation of the mechanical and the ideological views of the

world, and with this the uniting of the scientific and the religious

interests of his time, was the leading motive in the thought of Leib

niz. He wished to see the mechanical explanation of Nature, the

formulation of which in its scientific conceptions he himself essen

tially furthered, carried through to its full extent, and at the same

time he cast about for thoughts by the aid of which the purposeful

living character of the universe might nevertheless remain compre

hensible. The attempt must therefore be made an attempt for

which there were already intimations in the doctrine of Descartes

to see whether the whole mechanical course of events could not be

ultimately traced back to efficient causes, whose purposeful nature

should afford an import and meaning to their working taken as a

whole. The whole philosophical development of Leibniz has the

aim to substitute for the corpuscles, " entelechies," and to win back

for the indifferent God of the geometrical method the rights of the

Platonic atria. The ultimate goal of his philosophy is to under-

1 The difficulties which arose in this connection from self-consciousness, and

those also from the postulate of the countless attributes, Spinoza did not solve :

cf. the correspondence with Tschirnhausen, Op. II. 219 f.

8 Cf. Syst. Nouv. 10.

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stand the mechanism of the cosmic processes as the means and phe

nomenal form by which the living content or import of the world

realises itself. For this reason he could no longer think "cause " as

only "Being," could no longer think God merely as ens perfectissi-

mum, could no longer think " substance " as characterised merely by

an attribute of unchangeable existence, and could no longer think its

states merely as modifications, determinations, or specifications of

such a fundamental quality : cosmic processes or change became

again for him active working (Wirken) ; substances took on the

meaning of forces, 1 and the philosophical conception of God also

had, for its essential characteristic, creative force. This was Leib

niz fundamental thought, that this creative force evinces itself in

the mechanical system of motions.

Leibniz attained this dynamical standpoint first in his theory of

motion, and in a way which of itself required that the same stand

point should be carried over into metaphysics. 2 The mechanical

problem of inertia and the process begun by Galileo of resolving

motion into infinitely small impulses, which together formed the

starting-point for the authoritative investigations in natural science

by Huyghens and Newton, led Leibniz to the principle of the infini

tesimal calculus, to his conception of the " vis viva, " and es

pecially, to the insight that the essential nature of bodies, in which

the ground of motion is to be sought, consists not in extension, nor

yet in their mass (impenetrability), but in their capacity to do

work, in force. But if substance is force, it is super-spatial and im

material. On this account Leibniz finds himself compelled to think

even corporeal substance as immaterial force. Bodies are, in their

essential nature, force; their spatial form, their property of filling

space and their motion are effects of this force. The substance of

bodies is metaphysical. 3 In connection with Leibniz doctrine of

knowledge this purports that rational, clear, and distinct cognition

apprehends bodies as force, while sensuous, obscure, and confused

cognition apprehends them as spatial structures. Hence, for Leib

niz, space is neither identical with bodies (as in Descartes), nor the

presupposition for them (as with Newton), but a force-product of

substances, a phcenomenon bene fundatum, an order of co-existence,

1 La substance est un etre capable d action. Princ. de la Nat. et de la Grace,

I. Cf. Syst. Nouv. 2 f., "Force primitive."

2 Siist. Nouv. 3.

8 With this the co-ordination of the two attributes, extensio and cogitatio, was

again abolished ; the world of consciousness is the truly actual, the world of

extension is phenomenon. Leibniz sets the intelligible world of substances over

against the phenomena of the senses or material world in a completely Platonic

fashion (Nouv. Ess. IV. 3). Cf. 33 f.

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not an absolute reality, but an ens mentale. 1 And the same holds

true, mutatis mutandis, of time. From this it follows further, that

the laws of mechanics which refer to these spatial manifestations

of bodies are not rational, not " geometrical " truths, but truths

which relate to matters of fact, and are contingent. They could be

thought otherwise \\_i.e. the opposite is not inconceivable]. Their

ground is not logical necessity, but purposiveness or appropriate

ness. They are lois de convenance; and have their roots in the choix

de la sagesse. 2 God chose them because the purpose of the world

would be best fulfilled in the form determined by them. If bodies

are machines, they are such in the sense that machines are purpos-

ively constructed works. 3

11. Thus again in Leibniz, but in a maturer form than in Neo-

Platonism, life becomes the principle for explaining Nature ; his

doctrine is vitalism. But life is variety, and at the same time unity.

The mechanical theory led Leibniz to the conception of infinitely

many individual forces, metaphysical points, 4 as likewise to the

idea of their continuous connection. He had originally leaned

toward the atomic theory of Democritus and the nominalistic meta

physics ; the Occasionalist movement, and above all, the system of

Spinoza, made him familiar with the thought of the All-unity ; and

he found the solution, as Nicolaus Cusanus and Giordano Bruno had

found it before, in the principle of the identity of the part with the

whole. Each force is the world-force, the cosmic force, but in a

peculiar phase ; every substance is the world-substance, but in par

ticular form. Hence Leibniz gives to the conception of substance

just this meaning : it is unity in plurality. 5 This means that every

substance in every state " represents " the multitude of other sub

stances, and to the nature of " representing " belongs always the

unifying of a manifold. 6

With these thoughts are united, in the system of Leibniz, the

1 Cf. chiefly the correspondence with des Bosses.

2 Princ. 11. 3 Ib 3.

4 Syst. Nouv. 11. 6 Monad. 13-16.

6 Leibniz is here served a very good turn (cf. op. cit.} by the ambiguity in

the word " representation " (which applies also to the German " vorstdlen " [and

to the English "representation "]), in accordance with which the word means,

on the one hand, to supply the place of or serve as a symbol of, and on the

other hand, the function of consciousness. That every substance "repre

sents" the rest means, therefore, on the one hand, that all is contained in all

(Leibniz cites the ancient ffv^-rrvoia -jrdvra. and also the omnia ubique of the

Renaissance), and on the other hand, that each substance "perceives" all the

rest. The deeper sense and justification of this ambiguity lies in the fact that

we cannot form any clear and distinct idea whatever of the unifying of a

manifold, except after the pattern of that kind of connection which we expe

rience within ourselves in the function of consciousness ("synthesis" in Kant s

phraseology) .

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postulates which had been current in the metaphysical movement

since Descartes; namely, that of the isolation of substances with

reference to one another, and that of the correspondence of their

functions having its origin in the common world-ground. Both motifs

are most perfectly brought out in the Monadology. Leibniz calls his

force-substance monad, an expression which might have come to

him along various lines of Renaissance tradition. Each monad is

with reference to the rest a perfectly independent being, which can

neither experience nor exercise influence. The monads "have no

windows," and this " windowlessness " is to a certain extent the

expression of their " metaphysical impenetrability." \* But this

quality of being completely closed to outward influence receives

first of all a positive expression from Leibniz in his declaration

that the monad is a purely internal principle : 2 substance is hence a

force of immanent activity : the monad is not physical, but psychical

in its nature. Its states are representations (Vorstellungen), and

the principle of its activity is desire (appetition),ihe "tendency" to

pass over from one representation to another. 3

Each monad is nevertheless, on the other hand, a " mirror of the

world " ; it contains the whole universe as a representation within

itself; in this consists the living unity of all things. But each is

also an individual, distinct from all others. For there are no two

substances in the world alike. 4 If now the monads are not distin

guished by the content which they represent, for this is the same

with all, 5 their difference can be sought only in their mode of

representing this content, and Leibniz declares that the difference

between the monads consists only in the different degree of clearness

and distinctness with which they " represent " the universe. Descartes

epistemological criterion thus becomes a metaphysical predicate by

reason of the fact that Leibniz, like Duns Scotus (cf. p. 331), con

ceives of the antithesis of distinct and confused as an antithesis in

the force of representation or in intensity. Hence the monad is re

garded as active in so far as it represents clearly and distinctly, as

passive in so far as it represents obscurely and confusedly : 6 hence,

also, its impulse (appetition) is directed toward passing from obscure

1 Monad. 7. Cf. Syst. Nouv. 14, 17.

2 Monad. 11. 8 Ib. 15-19.

4 Leibniz expressed this as the principium identitatis indiscernibilium

(Monad. 9).

5 Here, to be sure, Leibniz overlooked the fact that no real content is reached

in this system of mutual representation of substances. The monad a represents

the monads 6, c, d, . . . x. But what is the monad b ? It is in turn the repre

sentation of the monads a, c, d, . . . x. The same is true for c, and so on in

infinitum.

6 Monad. 49.

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to clear representations, and the "clearing up" of its own content is

the goal of its life. To this above-mentioned intensity of the repre

sentations Leibniz applies the mechanical principle of infinitely

small impulses : he calls these infinitely small constituent parts of

the representative life of the monads petites perceptions, 1 and needs

this hypothesis to explain the fact, that according to his doctrine the

monad evidently has very many more representations than it is con

scious of (cf. below, 33). In the language of to-day the petites per

ceptions would be unconscious mental states ( Vorstellungen) .

Of such differences in degree of clearness and distinctness there

are infinitely many, and in accordance with the law of continuity

natura non facit saltum the monads form an uninterrupted graded

series, a great system of development, which rises from the " simple "

monads to souls and minds. 2 The lowest monads, which represent

only obscurely and confusedly, i.e. unconsciously, are therefore only

passive ; they form matter. The highest monad, which represents

the universe with perfect clearness and distinctness, just for this

reason there is but one such, and is accordingly pure activity, is

called the central monad God. Inasmuch as each of these monads

lives out its own nature, they all harmonise completely with each

other at every moment 3 by virtue of the sameness of their content,

and from this arises the appearance of the action of one substance

upon others. This relation is the harmonie preetablie des substances

a doctrine in which the principle of correspondence, introduced

by Geulincx and Spinoza for tne relation of the two attributes,

appears extended to the totality of all substances. Here as there,

however, the principle as carried out involves the uninterrupted

determination in the activity of all substances, the strict necessity

of all that takes place, and excludes all chance and all freedom in

the sense of uncaused action. Leibniz also rescues the conception

of freedom for finite substances only in the ethical meaning of a

control of reason over the senses and passions. 4

The pre-established harmony this relationship of substances in

their Being and life needs, however, a unity as the ground of its

explanations, and this can be sought only in the central monad.

God, who created the finite substances, gave to each its own content

1 Ib. 21.

2 Princ. 4. In this connection the "soul" is conceived of as the central

monad of an organism, in that it represents most distinctly the monads consti

tuting this, and accordingly only with a lesser degree of distinctness the rest of

the universe. Monad. 61 ff.

8 Syst. Noun. 14.

4 Eo magis est Ubertas quo magis agitur ex ratione, etc. Leibniz, De Libert.

(Op., Erd. ed.,069).

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in a particular grade of representative intensity, and thereby so

arranged all the monads that they should harmonise throughout.

And in this necessary process in which their life unfolds, they

realise the end of the creative Universal Spirit in the whole

mechanical determination of the series of their representations.

This relation of mechanism to teleology makes its way finally, also,

into the epistemological principles of Leibniz. The deity and the

other monads sustain the same relation to each other as the infinite

and finite substances sustain in the system of Descartes. But for

the rationalistic conception of things, only the infinite is a necessity

of thought, while the finite, on the contrary, is something " contin

gent," in the sense that it might also be thought otherwise, that the

opposite contains no contradiction (cf. above, 30, 7). Thus the

antithesis of eternal and necessary truths takes on metaphysical

significance : only God s Being is an eternal truth; he exists, accord

ing to the principle of contradiction, with logical or absolute necessity.

Finite things, however, are contingent; they exist only in accordance

with the principle of sufficient reason, by virtue of their determina

tion by another; the world and all that belongs to it has only

conditioned, hypothetical necessity. This contingency of the world,

Leibniz, in agreement with Duns Scotus, 1 traces back to the will of

God. The world might have been otherwise ; that it is as it is, it

owes to the choice which God made between the many possibilities\*

Thus in Leibniz all threads of the old and the new metaphysics

run together. With the aid of the conceptions formed in the school

of mechanics he formulated the presages of the philosophy of the

Renaissance into a systematic structure, where the ideas of Greece

found their home in the midst of the knowledge acquired by modern

investigation.

### 32. Natural Right.

The Philosophy of Right of the Renaissance was also dependent,

on the one hand, upon the stimulus of Humanism, and on the other,

upon the needs of modern life. The former element is shown not

only in the dependence upon ancient literature, but also in the re

vival of the ancient conception of the state, and in the attachment

to its traditions ; the latter make their appearance as a theoreti

cal generalisation of those interests, in connection with which the

1 The relations of Leibniz to the greatest of the Scholastics are to be recog

nized not only in this point, but also in many others ; though as yet they have

unfortunately not found the consideration or treatment that they deserve.

2 Cf., however, in addition, below, 35.

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secular states during this period took on the form of autonomous

life.

1. All these motives show themselves first in Maccliiavelli. In

his admiration of Rome, the Italian national feeling speaks imme

diately, and it was from the study of ancient history that he gained

his theory of the modern state, at least as regards its negative side.

He demanded the complete independence of the state from the

Church, and carried Dante s Ghibelline doctrine of the state to its

farthest consequence. He combats the temporal sovereignty of the

Papacy as the permanent obstacle to an Italian national state, and

so that separation between the spiritual and the secular, which is

common to all the beginnings of modern thought, is completed for

the practical field in his system, as it had been before with Occam

and Marsilius of Padua (cf. p. 328). The consequence of this,

however, as with the Nominalists just mentioned, was that the state

was conceived not teleologically, but in purely naturalistic fashion

as a product of needs and interests. From this fact is explained

the singleness of aim and regardlessness with which Macchiavelli

carried out his theory of the acquisition and preservation of princely

power, and with which he treated politics solely from the point of

view of the warfare of interests.

The relation of church and state, moreover, excited an especial

interest in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, because it played

a part that was always important and often decisive in the conflicts

and shiftings of confessional oppositions. Here an interesting

exchange of conceptions came about. The Protestant view of the

world, which in accordance with its first principle changed the

mediaeval distinction in value between the spiritual and the secular,

and removed the ban of the " profane " from the secular spheres

of life, saw in the state also a divine order; and the Reformation

Philosophy of Right, under the lead of Melancthon, limited the right

of the state more by the right of the invisible, than by the claims

of the visible Church ; indeed, the divine mission of the magistrates

afforded a valuable support for the Protestant State-church. Much

less could the Catholic Church feel itself under obligation to the

modern state; and although it thereby departed from Thomism, it

allowed itself to be pleased by such theories as those of Bellarmin

and Mariana, in which the state was conceived of as a work of

human composition or as a compact. For with this theory the state

lost its higher authority, and to a certain extent its metaphysical

root ; it appeared capable of abolition ; the human will which had

created it might dissolve it again, and even its supreme head was

deprived of his absolute inviolability. While the Protestants re-

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garded the state as an immediate divine order, for the Catholics, as

being a human arrangement, it needed the sanction of the Church

and ought not to be regarded as valid where this was lacking ; but

it should retain this sanction only when it placed itself at the service

of the Church. So Campanella taught that the Spanish Empire

(monarchia) had as its task to place the treasures of foreign parts

of the world at the disposal of the Church for her contest with the

heretics.

2. But in time these oppositions in the philosophy of rights

yielded to confessional indifferentism, which had attained the mas

tery in theoretical science also, and since the state was regarded as

essentially an order of earthly things, the relation of man to God

fell outside its sphere of action. Philosophy demanded for the

citizen the right which she claimed for herself, the right of a free,

individual attitude toward the religious authorities of the time, and

became thereby the champion of toleration. The state has not to

trouble itself about the religious opinion of individuals, the right of

the citizen is independent of his adherence to this or that confes

sion : this demand was the necessary result of the confessional

controversies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which had

heaved and tossed so passionately to and fro. In this view unbe

lieving indifference, and positive conviction which had to defend

itself against political authority of the opposite creed, came to an

agreement.

In this spirit Macehiavelli had already written against the sole

authority of the Roman Church ; but it was by Thomas More that

the principle of toleration was first proclaimed in its completeness.

The inhabitants of his happy island belong to the most varied con

fessions, which all live peacefully side by side without any polit

ical importance being attributed to the variety of their religious

views. They have even united upon a common worship, which each

party interprets in its own sense, and supplements by special forms

of worship. So, too, Jean Bodin, in his Heptaplomeres, makes

highly educated typical representatives, not only of the Christian

confessions, but also of Judaism, Mohammedanism, and Heathen

dom, find a form of worshipping God, which is equally satisfactory

to all. Finally, in a more abstract manner, Hugo Grotius com

pletely separated divine and human right in the sharp distinctness

with which he presented the principles of the philosophical science

of rights, basing divine right upon revelation and human right upon

reason ; demanding at the same time, however, an equally sharp

and thoroughgoing separation of the spheres of life to which they

apply.

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But the classical "Doomsday Book " for the toleration movement

was Spinoza s Theologico-political Tractate, which went to the root of

the much-treated matter. Utilising many thoughts and examples

from the older Jewish literature influenced by Averroism, this work

demonstrated that religion, and especially the religious documents,

have neither the province nor the design of teaching theoretical

truths, and that the essence of religion consists not in the recogni

tion of particular dogmas, but in the disposition and the will and

action determined by it. From this it follows iucontestably that

the state has still less ground or right to trouble itself about the

assent of its citizens to particular dogmas, and that it should rather

by virtue of its real authority restrain every attempt toward a con

straining of the conscience, which may proceed from any of the

ecclesiastically organised forms of religious life. The mystically

profound religious nature of Spinoza alienated him from the dog

matic government of the churches and from belief in the literal

statements of their historical documents. He asserted the principle

that religious books, like all other phenomena of literature, must be

historically explained as to their theoretical import, that is, must be

understood from the point of view of the intellectual condition of

their authors, and that this historical criticism takes away from

those former theoretical views their binding and normative signifi

cance for a later time.

3. With the political and churchly political interests became

associated the social. No one gave them a more eloquent expression

than Thomas More. After a thrilling portrayal of the misery of

the masses the first book of the Utopia comes to the conclusion that

society would do better if instead of the Draconian justice with which

she punishes the violation of her laws, she should stop the sources of

crime. The author maintains that the greater part of the guilt for

the wrong-doing of the individual is due to the perverted arrange

ment of the whole. This latter consists in the inequality of property

brought about by the use of money, for this inequality gives occasion

to all the aberrations of passion, of envy, and of hatred. The ideal

picture of the perfect state of society upon the island of Utopia,

which More sketches in contrast to the present condition, is in its

main features an imitation of the ideal state of Plato. This human

istic revival is, however, distinguished from its prototype in a

manner characteristic for modern socialism, by its abolition of class-

distinctions, which seemed necessary to the ancient thinker in conse

quence of his reflection upon the actually given difference in the

intellectual and moral status of individuals. In an abstraction

that was a prototype for the succeeding development More proceeded

CHAP. 2, 32.] Natural Right : Spinoza, More, Bacon. 429

from the thought of the equality of all citizens before the law, and

changed into an equality of claim or title for all citizens those forms

of community which Plato had demanded of the ruling classes as a

renunciation of the natural impulses toward an individual sphere of

interests. With Plato the preferred classes were to renounce all

private property in order to devote themselves entirely to the gen

eral weal : with More the abolition of private property is demanded

as the surest means for doing away with crime, and is based upon

the equality of title which all have to the common possession. But

at the same time the English Chancellor still holds fast to the ideal

model of the ancient philosopher, in so far as to treat this entire

equality in the division of material interests, as the indispensable

basis for making it possible to all citizens to enjoy in like measure

the ideal goods of society, science, and art. A normal working day

of six hours for all members of society will be enough, he thinks, to

satisfy all external needs of the community : the remaining time

should remain free for every one for nobler employment. With these

characteristics the programme for all the higher forms of modern

socialism grows in the thought of More out of the Platonic project.

But the spirit of the Eenaissance was animated by much more

worldly interests. Stimulated by the magic of discoveries, dazzled

by the glitter of inventions, it set itself the task of transforming by

its new insights the whole outer condition of human society as

related to the natural conditions of life, and saw before itself an

ideal of comfort for human life, which should develop from a com

plete and systematic use of the knowledge and control of Nature

made possible by science. All social injuries will be healed by

raising human society, by means of the scientific advancement of

external civilisation, beyond all the cares and all the need which

now vex it. A few inventions like the compass, the art of printing,

and gunpowder, says Bacon, have sufficed to give human life new

motion, greater dimensions, mightier development. What trans

formations stand before us when invention once becomes an intel

ligently exercised art ! The social problem is thus transferred to

an improvement of the material condition of society.

In Bacon s New Atlantis l a happy island-people in carefully

guarded seclusion is brought before us, which by skilful regula

tions receives information of the progress in civilisation made by

all other peoples, and at the same time, by the systematic prosecu

tion of research, discovery, and invention, raises to the highest

1 The title of this Utopia and much else in it is a reminiscence of Plato s

fragment, Critias (113 f.).

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point the control of Nature for the practical interests of human life.

All kinds of possible and impossible inventions are related in fan

tastic prophecy/ and the whole activity of the " House of Solomon "

is directed toward improving the material state of society, while the

portrayal of the political relations is only superficial and unim

portant.

In Campanella s State of the Sun, on the other hand, in which the

after-effects of More s Utopia, are very noticeable, we come to a com

plete project of the socialistic future state, which is even pedanti

cally ordered down to all of its minor relations. This state does not

shrink in any direction from the most extreme violence to the free

dom of the individual s life. From the mathematically delineated

plan of the imperial city to the division of hours for daily work

and enjoyment, the determination of professions, the pairing of the

men and women, the astrologically predetermined hour for sexual

unions, all takes place here from an arrangement by the state for

the welfare of the whole, and an extended, carefully worked out

system of bureaucracy (in which there is an admixture of metaphys

ical motives) 2 is built up upon the graded knowledge of the citizens.

The more any one knows, the more power he ought to have in the

state, in order to rule and improve by his knowledge the course of

Nature. The points of view in this improvement look essentially

toward external civilisation in Campanella s system also. With

him, indeed, four hours of daily labour should suffice on the average

to assure the good cheer of society, and upon this prosperity all

should have a like claim.

4. In spite of all that is fantastic and whimsical, 3 the thought

nevertheless asserts itself in Campanella s State of the Sun, still

more than in More s Utopia, that the state should be an artificial

product of human insight for the removal of social injuries. Neither

writer desired to set up a mere creation of fancy, any more than did

Plato ; they believe in the possibility of realising " the best political

constitution " by rational reflection upon an order of social relations

1 In addition to the microscope and the telescope, the microphone and tele

phone are not wanting ; there are giant explosive materials, flying-machines,

all sorts of engines with air and water power, and even "some kinds" of

perpetual motion ! But the author lays special value upon the fact that by

better culture of plants and animals, by unsuspected chemical discoveries, by

baths and air-cures, diseases are to be banished and life prolonged ; experiments

on animals are also introduced in the interest of medicine.

2 Beneatli the supreme ruler, Sol or Metaphysicus, who must embody all

knowledge within himself, stand first of all three princes, whose spheres of

activity correspond to the three " primalities " of Being, Power, Wisdom and

Love (cf. 29, 3), etc.

3 Fantastic is especially the strong element of astrological and magical super

stition ; whimsical, his monkish rude treatment of the sexual relations.

CHAP. 2, 32.] Natural Right : Campanella, Grrotius. 431

that shall be in accordance with Nature. In this, to be sure, they

encountered much opposition. Cardanus combated Utopias on

principle, and in their stead commended to science the task of

comprehending the necessity with which the actual states of history

develop in their special definite nature, out of the character, the

relations of life, and the experiences of peoples ; he would have

them regarded as natural products like organisms, and would apply

to their conditions the medical categories of health and disease.

In a larger way, and free from the Pythagorean astrology in which

the mathematician Cardanus indulged, but with a strongly con

structive fancy, the practical statesman Bodin attempted to under

stand the manifold character of historical reality as manifested in

political life.

But the tendency of the time was much more toward seeking a right

founded in Nature for all times and relations alike, and to be recog

nised by reason alone : although a man like Albericus Gentilis desired

to reduce the principles of private right to physical laws by analogies

of childlike crudeness. A firmer and more fruitful ground was

gained when human nature, instead of general " Nature," was taken

as a starting-point. This was done by Hugo Grotius. Like Thomas

Aquinas, he found the fundamental principle of natural right in the

social need, and found the method for its development in logical

deduction. That which reason recognises as agreeing with man s

social nature and following therefrom in this consists the jus

naturale\* that cannot be changed by any historical mutation.

The thought of such an absolute right, which exists only by its

foundation in reason, and which exists independently of the politi

cal power and rather as the ultimate ground of this power, was

brought home to Grotius by the analogy of international law with

which his investigation was primarily concerned. On the other

hand, however, by virtue of this material principle, private right be

came the authoritative presupposition for political right also. The

satisfaction of individual interests, protection of life and property,

appeared as the essential end to be subserved by the ordering of

rights. Formally and methodically, on the contrary, this philo

sophical system of rights was entirely deductive ; it aimed only to

draw the logical consequences of the principle of society. In like

manner Hobbes also regarded the corpus politicum as a machine

capable of b eing deduced from the conception of its end by pure

intellectual activity, and the philosophical doctrine of rights as a

perfect demonstrable science. At the same time this field seemed

1 De Jure Bell, et Pac. I. 1, 10.

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adapted in a pre-eminent degree to the application of the geometri

cal method, and Puffendorf introduced the whole apparatus of this

method by combining Grotius and Hobbes, and developing the whole

system synthetically from the thought that the individual s instinct

toward self-preservation could be rationally and successfully fulfilled

only by satisfying his social need. In this form natural right per

sisted as the ideal of a "geometrical" science until far on into

the eighteenth century (Thomasius, Wolff, indeed, even to Fichte

and Schelling), and survived the general decline of the Cartesian

principle.

5. Looking now at the contents rather than at the form, we find

that the ultimate ground of public life and of social coherence was

placed in the interests of individuals : the mechanics of the state

found in the character of the impulses of the individual man that

self-intelligible and simple element, 1 out of which the complex

structures of life viewed as a subject of law and rights (Rechtslebens)

might be explained in accordance with the Galilean principle. With

this the doctrine of the state also went back to the Epicurean theory of

social atomism 2 (cf. pp. 174 f.), and the synthetic principle by which

the origin of the state was to be understood was the contract. From

Occam and Marsilius down to Bousseau, Kant, and Fichte, this con

tract theory was dominant in political philosophy. Grotius and

Hobbes devoted themselves to carrying it out in the most careful

manner. To the political contract by which the individuals unite

themselves to a community of interests, is attached the contract of

sovereignty or subjection, by means of which the individuals hand

over their rights and authority to the magistracy. This proved to

be a general frame in which the most varied political theories fitted.

While Grotius, and likewise Spinoza, found the interests of the

citizens to be best guaranteed by an aristocratic republican constitu

tion, Hobbes could deduce from the same presupposition his theory

of a purely secular absolutism, according to which the political power

should be inviolably united in one personality, the universal will in

the individual will of the sovereign.

In closest connection with the contract theory appears the devel

opment of the conception of sovereignty. The source of all power,

according to this theory, is the popular will, from which the politi

cal contract and the contract of submission have proceeded; the

proper bearer of the sovereignty is the people. Meanwhile the con-

1 The term "conatas" applies in this sense to both domains, the physical

and the psychical, with Hobbes and Spinoza.

a As in the theoretical domain, so also in the practical, the principle of

Deinocritus and Epicurus obtains with great efforts a late victory.

CHAP. 2, 32.] Natural Riyht : Contract Theory. 433

tract and the transfer of right and power completed thereby, are

regarded by some writers as irrevocable, and by others as capable

of recall. So Bodin, in spite of his doctrine of popular sovereignty,

maintains the unlimited character and unconditional authority of

the royal power, the inviolability of the ruler and the uiijustifia-

bility of all opposition against him ; with Hobbes the sovereignty

of the people is still more completely absorbed into that of the

monarch, whose will here stands quite in the sense of the Vetat c est

raoi as the sole source of rights in the positive political life. In oppo

sition to this view, and decidedly more consistent in view of their

presupposition, the " monarchomachischen [opposed to an absolute

monarchy] theories," whose chief representative besides Buchanan

(1506-1582) and Languet (1518-1581) was Althus of Lower Sax

ony, maintained that the governmental contract becomes liable to

dissolution as soon as the sovereign ceases to rule rightly, i.e. in the

interest and according to the will of the people. If the contract is

broken on one side, it is no longer binding for the other party ;

in this situation the sovereignty returns again to its original bearers.

If man has made the state with a purpose and under reflection, then

he abolishes it again when it becomes evident that it has failed to

fulfil its purpose. Thus the Renaissance is already providing in

advance the theory of revolution. 1

All these theories, however, received their especial colouring from

motives growing out of the particular relations of church and state,

a colouring which depended upon the question whether the unre

stricted power of the ruler was felt as dangerous or as beneficial in

consequence of his relation to the Confessions. The most radical

standpoint in real politics was taken by Hobbes by virtue of his

religious indifferentism : religion is a private opinion, and only that

opinion which the sovereign professes has political standing or value.

No other religion or Confession can be tolerated in public life.

Hobbes gave the philosophical theory for the historical cujus regio

illius religio. And Spinoza attached himself to him in this. He

stood for freedom of thought and against all compulsion of con

science, but for him religion was only a matter of knowledge and

disposition; for the public manifestation of religious feeling in the

church and in public worship, it was in the interest of order and

peace that only the form fixed by the magistracy should obtain. In

a more positive sense the Protestant Philosophy of Right declared for

1 These principles were defended with special application to the English con

ditions of the seventeenth century, and to the right of the "Revolution" of

that time by the poet John Milton (Defensio pro Populo Anglicano, 1051), and

by Algernon Sidney (Discourses of Government, 1683).

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the sovereignty in church and state of the kingdom existing by the

grace of God ; while in this school, also, as for example in the case

of Althus, the sovereignty of the people was defended as over

against a magistracy holding another creed. The same motive was

decisive where the Jesuits maintained that the magistracy might be

removed and that the assassination of the prince was excusable

(cf. above).

G. In the case of Hobbes the rationale of the contract theory

rested on more general motives. If the social and political life was 1

to be comprehended from the point of view of " human nature," the

English philosopher found the fundamental, all-determining charac

teristic of human nature in the impulse toivard self-preservation or

egoism, th e simple, self-evident principle for explaining the entire

volitional life. Here his materialistic metaphysics and sensualistic

psychology (cf. 31) made it appear that this instinct toward self-

preservation, in its original essence, was directed only toward the

preservation and furtherance of the sensuous existence of the indi

vidual. All other objects of the will could serve only as means to

bring about that supreme end. Agreeably to this principle, also,

there was no other norm of judgment for man as a natural being

than that of furtherance or hindrance, of profit or of harm : the

distinction of good and evil, of right and wrong, is not possible

upon the standpoint of the individual, but only upon the social

standpoint, where the common interest instead of the individual s

interest forms the standard. So egoism became the principle of all

practical philosophy; for if the individual s instinct toward self-

preservation was to be restricted and corrected by the command of

the state, yet this state itself was regarded as the most ingenious

and perfect of all the contrivances which egoism had hit upon to

attain and secure its satisfaction. The state of nature, in which the

egoism of each stands originally opposed to the egoism of every

other, is a war of all against all: to escape this the state was

founded as a contract for the mutual warrant of self-preservation.

The social need is not original : it only results necessarily as the

most efficient and certain means for the satisfaction of egoism.

Spinoza adopted this doctrine, but gave it a more ideal signifi

cance by introducing it into his metaphysics. " Suum esse con-

servare " is for him also the quintessence and fundamental motive

or all willing. But since every finite mode belongs equally to both

attributes, its impulse toward self-preservation is directed as well

toward its conscious activity, i.e. its knowledge, as toward its main

tenance in the corporeal world, i.e. its power. This individual

striving, interpreted along the lines of the Baconian identity of

CHAP. 2, 32.] Natural Right : ffobbes, Cambridge Men. 435

knowledge and power, forms for ^Spinoza the ground of explanation

for the empirical life of the state, in accordance with the principle

that each one s right extends as far as his power. In this process

of explanation Spinoza moves mainly in the lines of Hobbes, and

deviates from him only, as noticed above, in his view as to the best

form of constitution. This same complication of conceptions, how

ever, presents itself to Spinoza as affording also a starting-point for

his mystico-religious ethics. For since the true "esse" of every

finite thing is the deity, the only perfect satisfaction of the impulse

toward self-preservation is to be found in "love to God." That

Malebranche, who spoke so vehemently of the "atheistical Jew,"

taught the same in slightly different words "mit ein bischen

anderen Worten" has already been mentioned ( 31, 4).

7. Hobbes theory of egoism the "selfish system," as it was

later termed for the most part found vigorous opposition among

his countrymen. 1 The reduction of all activities of the will, without

any exception, to the impulse toward self-preservation excited both

ethical revolt and the theoretical contradiction of psychological expe

rience. The warfare against Hobbes was undertaken primarily by

the Neo-Platonist school of Cambridge, whose chief literary repre

sentatives were Ralph Cudivorth and Henry More. In this contro

versy the antithesis of &lt;ucns and 0rts developed after the ancient

prototype. For Hobbes, right and moral order arose from social

institution; for his opponents they were original and immediately

certain demands of Nature. Both parties opposed the lex naturalis

to the theological dogmatic grounding of practical philosophy : but

for Hobbes natural law was the demonstrable consequence of intel

ligent egoism ; for the " Platouists " it was an immediate certainty,

innate in the human mind.

Cumberland proceeded against Hobbes in the same line. He

would have man s social nature regarded as being as original as his

egoism : the " benevolent " altruistic inclinations, whose actual ex

istence is not to be doubted, are objects of direct self-perception

which have an original independence of their own ; the social need

is not the refined product of a shrewd self-seeking, but as Hugo

Grotius had conceived of it a primary, constitutive characteristic

of human nature. While egoism is directed toward one s own

private weal, the altruistic motives are directed toward the uni

versal weal, without which private weal is not possible. This

connection between the welfare of the individual and that of the

1 Cf. J. Tulloch, national Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in

the 17th Cent. (Lond. 1872).

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public, which in Hobbes appeared as due to the shrewd insight

of man, is regarded by Cumberland as a provision of God, whose

commandment is hence considered to be the authoritative principle

for obeying those demands which express themselves in the benevo

lent inclinations.

To the side of this natural morality of reason, which was thus

defended against orthodoxy on the one hand and sensualism on the

other, came the natural religion of reason, which had been set up

by Herbert of Cherbury in opposition to these same two positions.

Keligion also shall be based neither upon historical revelation nor

upon human institution ; it belongs to the inborn possession of the

human mind. The consensus gentium so argues Herbert in the

manner of the ancient Stoics proves that belief in the deity is

a necessary constituent of the human world of ideas, a demand

of reason ; but on this account that only which corresponds to those

demands of the reason can stand as true content of religion, as

contrasted with the dogmas of religions.

Thus the questions of practical philosophy which appear in

English literature in the very lively discussion excited by Hobbes,

gradually became transferred to the psychological realm. What is

the origin of right, morals, and religion in the human mind ? so

runs the problem. With this, however, the movements of the

philosophy of the Enlightenment are introduced.

# PART V. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT.

In addition to the literature cited on p. 348, cf .

Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the 18th Cent. Lond. 1876.

J. Mackintosh, On the Progress of Ethical Philosophy during the 17th and

18th Centuries. Edin. 1872.

Ph. Damiron, Memoires pour servir a I Histoire de la Philosophic au 18 me Siecle.

3 vols., Paris 1858-64.

E. Zeller, Geschichte der deutschen Philosophic seit Leibniz. Miinchen, 1873.

Also H. Hettner, Litteraturgeschichte des 18. Jahr. 3 parts.

THE natural rhythm of intellectual life brought with it the result

that in the modern as in the Greek philosophy a first cosmologico-

metaphysical period was followed by a period of an essentially

anthropological character, and that thus once more the newly

awakened, purely theoretical efforts of philosophy must yield to a

practical conception of philosophy as " world-ivisdom." In fact, all

features of the Greek sophistic movement are found again with

ripened fulness of thought, with broadened variety, with deepened

content, and, therefore, also, with added energy in their antitheses

in the Philosophy of the Enlightenment, which coincides approxi

mately in time with the eighteenth century. In the place of Athens

now appears the whole breadth of the intellectual movement among

European civilised peoples, and scientific tradition counts now as

many thousands of years as it then counted centuries ; but the

tendency as a whole and the objects of thought, the points of view

and the results of the philosophising, show an instructive similarity

and kinship in these two periods so widely separated in time and

so different in the civilisations which formed their background.

There prevails in both the same turning of thought toward the

subject s inner nature, the same turning away from metaphysical

subtlety with doubt and disgust, the same preference for an em

pirical genetic consideration of the human psychical life, the same

inquiry as to the possibility and the limits of scientific knowledge,

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and the same passionate interest in the discussion of the prob

lems of life and society. No less characteristic, lastly, for both

periods is the penetration of philosophy into the broad circles of

general culture and the fusion of the scientific with the literary

movement.

But the basis for the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century

was given in the general features of a secular view of life, as they

had been worked out during the Renaissance by the fresh move

ments in art, religion, politics, and natural research. While these

had found their metaphysical formulation in the seventeenth cen

tury, the question now came again into the foreground, how man

should conceive, in the setting of the new Weltanschauung, his own

nature and his own position : and in the presence of the value set

upon this question, the interest in the various metaphysical concep

tions in which the new Weltanschauung had been embodied, retreated

more and more decidedly into the background. Men contented

themselves with the general outlines of metaphysical theories, in

order to employ themselves the more thoroughly with the questions

of human life ; and all the doctrines of the Enlightenment which

offer such a vehement polemic against speculation are, in truth,

working from the beginning with a metaphysics of the " sound com

mon sense " which at last raised its voice so high, and which ulti

mately only assumed as self-evident truth that which had fallen to

it from the achievements of the labour of preceding centuries.

The beginnings of the philosophy of the Enlightenment are to be

sought in England, where, in connection with the well-ordered con

ditions which followed the close of the period of the revolution, a

powerful upward movement of literary life claimed philosophy also

in the interests of general culture. From England this literature

was transplanted to France. Here, however, the opposition of the

ideals which it brought with it to the social and political status,

worked in such a way that not only was the presentation of the

thoughts more excited and vehement from the outset, but the

thoughts themselves also take on a sharper point, and turn their

negative energy more powerfully against the existing conditions in

Church and state. At first from France, and then from the direct

influence of England, 1 also, Germany received the ideas of the

Enlightenment, for which it had already received an independent

preparation in a more theoretical manner: and here these ideas

found their last deepening, and a purification and ennobling as well,

1 Cf. G. Zart, Der Einfluss der englischen Philosophen auf die deutsche Philos.

des 18. Jahrh. (Berlin, 1881).

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as they came to an end in the German poetry with which the

Renaissance of classical Humanism was completed.

John Locke became the leader of the English Enlightenment by

finding a popular form of empirico-psychological exposition for the

general outlines of the Cartesian conception of the world. While

the metaphysical tendency of the system brought forth an idealistic

after-shoot in Berkeley, the anthropologico-genetic mode of con

sideration extended quickly and victoriously to all problems of

philosophy. Here the opposition between the sensualistic associa-

tional psychology and the nativistic theories of various origin con

tinued to have a decisive influence upon the course of development.

It controlled the vigorous movement in moral philosophy, and the

development of deism and natural religion, which was connected

with it ; and it found its sharpest formulation^ in the epistemological

field, where the most consistent and deepest of English thinkers,

David Hume, developed empiricism to positivism, and thereby called

forth the opposition of the Scottish school.

The pioneer of the French Enlightenment was Pierre Bayle, whose

Dictionnaire turned the views of the cultivated world completely in

the direction of religious scepticism ; and it was along this line

chiefly that the English literature was then taken up in Paris.

Voltaire was the great writer, who not only gave this movement its

most eloquent expression, but also presented the positive elements

of the Enlightenment in the most emphatic manner. But the

development pressed with much greater weight toward the negative

side. In the common thinking of the Encyclopvedists became com

pleted step by step the change from empiricism to sensualism, from

naturalism to materialism, from deism to atheism, from enthusiastic

to egoistic morals. In opposition to such an Enlightenment of the

intellect, whose lines all converge in the positivism of Co)idillac,

there appeared in Rousseau a feeling-philosophy of elemental power,

leading to the intellectual shaping of the Revolution.

Germany was won for the Enlightenment movement by the

Leibnizian philosophy and the great success which Wolff achieved,

in his activity as a teacher, in developing and transforming it, but

here, in consequence of the lack of a unifying public interest, the

tendency toward individual culture was predominant. For the ends

of this individual culture, the ideas of the " philosophical century "

were elaborated in psychological and epistemological as well as in

the moral, political, and religious fields with great multiplicity, but

without any new creation of principles until fresh life and higher

points of view were brought by the poetical movement and the great

personalities of its bearers, Lessing and Herder, to the dry intelli-

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gence with which a boastful popular philosophy had extended itself,

especially in connection with the Berlin Academy. 1 This circum

stance kept the German philosophy of the eighteenth century from

losing itself in theoretico-sceptical self-disintegration like the Eng

lish, or from being shattered in practical politics like the French: by

contact with a great literature teeming with ideas a new great

epoch of philosophy was here prepared.

John Locke, born 1632, at Wrington near Bristol, was educated at Oxford,

and became involved in the changeful fortunes of the statesman Lord Shaftes-

bury. He returned home from exile in Holland with William of Orange in

1688, filled several high political offices under the new government which he

also often publicly defended, and died while living in the country at leisure, in

1704. His philosophical work bears the title An Essay concerning Human

Understanding (1690) ; besides this are to be mentioned Some Thoughts on

Education (1693), The, Reasonableness of Christianity (1695), and, among his

posthumous works, Of the Conduct of the, Understanding. Cf. Fox Bourne,

The Life of J. L. (Lond. and N.Y. 1876); Th. Fowler, J. L. (Lond. 1880);

\\_Locke, by A. C. Fraser, Blackwood series, Edin. and Phila. 1890, and article

Locke in Enc. Brit.; T. 11. Green in his Int. to Hume; J. Devvey, Leibniz" 1 s

New Essays, Chicago, 1888 ; Edition of his works by Low, 1771, also ed. Lond.

1853 ; Phi los. wks. in Bohn Lib. Crit. ed. of the Essay by Fraser, 1894].

George Berkeley was born in Killerin, Ireland, in 1685, took part as a clergy

man in missionary and colonisation attempts in America, became Bishop of

Cloyne 1734, and died 1753. His Theory of Vision (1709) was a preparation

for his Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710). This main

work was later followed by the Three Dialogues between Hi/las and Philonous,

and by Alciphron or the Minute Philosopher. Edition of his works by Fraser,

4 vols., Lond. 1871 ; the same writer has also given a good exposition of his

thought as a whole (Blackwood series, Edin. and Lond. 1881). Cf. Collyns

Simon, Universal Immaterialism, Lond. 1862.

The Associational Psychology found its chief supporters in Peter Brown

(died 1735 Bishop of Cork; The Procedure, Extent, and Limits of Human Un

derstanding, 1719), David Hartley (1704-1757 ; De Motus Sensns et Idearum

Generatione, 1746 ; Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty, and his Expec

tations, 1749), Edward Search, pseudonym for Abraham Tucker (1705-1774 ;

Light of Nature, 7 vols., Lond. 1768-1777), Joseph Priestley (1733-1804 ; Hart

ley s Theory of the Human Mind on the Principle of the Association of Ideas,

1775; Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit, 1777), John Home Tooke

(1736-1812; Eirea wrepbevTa or The Dirersions of Parley, 1798; cf. Stephen,

Memoirs of J. II. T., Lond. 1813), Krasmus Darwin (1731-1802 ; Zoon omia or

the Laws of Organic Life, 1794-1796), finally, Thomas Brown (1778-1820;

Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect, 1804 ; posthumously, the Lectures

on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, l820, delivered in Edinburg). Cf. Br.

ISchoenlank, Hartley u. Priestley alsBegriinder desAssociationismus(Ha,\\e,\882);

L. Ferri, Sulla Doitrina Psichologica deir Associazione, Saggio Storico e Critico

(Home, 1878) [Fr. tr. Paris, 1883. Cf. also Hartley and James Mill by G.

S. Bower, Lond. 1881. For bibliography for the writers mentioned in this and

the following paragraphs consult Porter s appendix to Eng. tr. Ueberweg s

Hist. P/7.].

Of the opponents to this movement who Platonise in the older manner,

Richard Price (1723-1791) became known especially by his controversy with

Priestley :

Priestley, The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity (1777); Price, Letters on

Materialism and Philosophical Necessity; Priestley, Free Discussions of the

Doctrines of Materialism (1778).

1 Cf. Ch. Bartholmess, Histoire Philosophique de V Academic de Prusse,

Paris, 1859.

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Among the English moral philosophers, Shaftesbury (Anthony Ashley

Cooper, 1071-1713) takes a most important place. His writings were collected

under the title, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions and Times (1711).

Cf. G. v. Gizycki, Die Philosophic ShSs (Leips. and Heidelberg, 1876). After

him various groups diverge. The intellectualistic tendency is represented by

Samuel Clarke (1075-1729; A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of

God, 1705; Philosophical Inquiry concerning Human Liberty, 1715; cf. his

correspondence with Leibniz) and William Wollaston (1059-1724 ; The Relig-

ion of Nature Delineated, 1722). The morality based on feeling was repre

sented by Francis Hutcheson (1094-1747 ; Inquiry into the Original of our

Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, 1725 ; A System of Moral Philosophy, 1755 ; cf.

Th. Fowler, Shaftesburt/ and Hutcheson, Lond. 1882) ; Henry Home, pseud,

for Lord Kames (1090-1782 ; Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural

Religion, 1751; Elements of Criticism, 1762); Edmund Burke (1730-1797;

Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beauti

ful, 1750) ; Adam Ferguson (1724-1810 ; Institutions of Moral Philosophy,

1709), and in a certain sense also, Adam Smith (1723-1790 ; Theory of Moral

Sentiments, 1759) ; the principle of authority was defended by Joseph Butler

(1092-1752; Sermons upon Human Nature, 1720) [Butler, in Blackwood series

by W. L. Collins, 1881], and William Paley (1743-1805; Principles of Moral

and Political Philosophy, 1785). The ethics of the associonational psychology

was developed chiefly by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832 ; Introduction to the

Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1789; Traite de Legislation Civile et

Penale, brought together by E. Dumont, 1801 ; Deontology, ed. by J. Bowring,

1834 ; works in 11 vols., Edin. 1843). In a peculiar isolated position appears

Beruhard de Mandeville (1(570-1733 ; The Fable of the Bees, or Private Vices

made Public Benefits, 1700, later with illustrative dialogues, 1728 ; Inquiry into

the Origin of Moral Virtue, 1732 ; Free 1 houghts on Religion, Church, Govern

ment. 1720). On him cf. P. Sakmann (Freiburg, 1898).

The literature of Deism coincides, for the most part, with the above-named

literature of moral philosophy ; but in addition to those named the following

writers are also prominent : John Toland (1070-1722 ; Christianity not Myste

rious, 1096 ; Letters to Serena, 1704 ; Adeisida-mon, 1709 ; Pantheisticon, 1710) ;

Anthony Collins (1070-1729 ; A Discourse of Free Thinking, 1713) ; Matthew

Tindal (1050-1733 ; Christianity as Old as the Creation, 1730) ; Thomas Chubb

(1079-1747 ; A Discourse concerning Reason icith Regard to Religion, 1730) ;

Thomas Morgan (died 1743 ; The Moral Philosopher, 3 parts, 1737 ff.) ; finally,

Lord Bolingbroke (1072-1751); works ed. by Mollet in 5 vols., 1753 f. ; cf.

F. v. Kaumer, Abhandl. drr Berl. Akad. 1840). Cf. V. Lechler, Geschichte des

englischen Deismus (Stuttgart and Tub. 1841).

England s greatest philosopher is David Hume, born, 1711, in Edinburg, and

educated there. After he had spent some time as merchant, he lived for several

years in France, occupied in study, and composed his work of genius, the

Treatise on Human Nature (printed 1739 f.). The failure of this book induced

him to work it over and publish it under the title Inquiry concerning Human

Understanding, as a second volume of his more successful Essays, Moral, Politi

cal and Literary (1748), and to add An Inquiry concerning the Principles of

Morals (1751), and also The Natural History of Religion (1755). As libraria n

of the Advocates Library in Ediuburg he found opportunity to write his History

of England. After a stay in Paris, where he received great honour and came

into connection with Rousseau among others, he was for some time Under

secretary of State in the Foreign Office, but finally returned to Edinburg, where

he died, 1776. The Dialogues concerning Natural Religion and some smaller

treatises appeared posthumously. Ed. of his works by Green and Grose in

4 vols. (Lond. 1875). His autobiography was published by his friend, Adam

Smith (1777). Cf. J. H. Burton. Life and Correspondence of D. H. (Edin.

1840-50) ; E. Feuerlein in the Zeitschr. " Der Gedanke" (Berlin, 1803 f.) ;

E. 1 fleiderer, Empirismus und Skepsis in D. H. s Philosophie (Berlin. 1874) ;

T. Huxley, D. H. (Lond. 1879) ; Fr. Jodl, I.cbcu n. Pi,ilnsn,,hie D. //. s (Halle,

1872) ; A. Meinong, Hume-Stitdien (Vienna, 1877, 1882) ; G. v. Gizycki, Die

Ethik D. //. s (Breslau, 1878). fW. Knight, Blackwood series, 1880; esp.

Int. by T. H. Green in his ed. of the works. Selby-Bigge eds. of the Treatise

(1888) and the Enquiry (with Introd. 1894), Clav. Press, are excellent.

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The Scottish School was founded by Thomas Reid (1710-1796, Professor

at Glasgow ; Inquiry into the Human Mind on the. Principles of Common Sense,

1764; Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Alan, 1785; Essays on the Active

Powers of Man, 1788, complete ed. by W. Hamilton, Edin. 1827). [Selections

ed. by E. H. Sneath, N.Y. 1892, contains bibliog. Cf. A. Seth, Scottish Philoso

phy, Edin. and Lond. 1886, and art. Eeid in Enc. Brit. ] Besides James

Oswald (died 1793, Appeal to Common Sense, in Behalf of Religion, 1766)

and James Beattie (died 1805, Es\*ay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth,

1770), the school had its chief academical and literary representative in Dugald

Stewart (1753-1828, Professor in Edinburg ; Elements of the Philosophy of the

Human Mind, 3 parts, 1792-1827 ; ed. of his works by W. Hamilton, 10 vols.,

Edin. 185411).

Pierre Bayle, the type of sceptical polyhistory, born 1647 at Carlat, led

a life disquieted by twice changing his Confession, was finally a professor in

Sedan and Rotterdam, an 1 died 1706. His influential life work is embodied in

his Dictionnaire Historiq-ie &lt;&gt;t Critique, (1695 and 16D7). Cf. L. Feuerbach, P.

Bayle nach seine n fur die Gexchichte der Philosophic und Menschhe.it interessan-

testen Momenten, Ansbach, 1833.

Of the works of Voltaire (Francois Arouet le Jeune, 1694-1778 ; the main

events of his literary life are his flight to London, his stay with the Marquise

du Chatelet in Cirey, his visit with Frederick the Great in Potsdam, and his

rest in old age at the country seat Ferney, near Geneva), the following are

principally to be considered here : Lettres sur les Anglais (1784), Metaphysiqne

de Newton (1740), Elements de la Philosophic de Newton mis a la Portee de

tout le Monde (1741), Examen important de Mi/lord Jiolingbroke (1736), Can-

dide ou sur V Optimisme (\lol), Dictionnaire Philosophique (1764), Le, Philosophe

Ignorant (1767), Reponse au Systeme de la Nature (1777), the poem Les

Systemes, etc. Cf. E. Bersot, La Philosophic de V. (Paris, 1848); D. F. Strauss,

V. (Leips. 1870); J. Morley, V. (Lond. and N.Y. 1872).

More sceptical in metaphysical aspects appear natural scientists and mathe

maticians such as Maupertuis (1698-1759; active in connection with the

Berlin Academy ; Essai de Philosophic Morale, 1750 ; Essai de Cosmologie,

1751 ; controversial writings between him and the Wolffian, S. Konig, collected

Leips. 1758), or d Alembert (Melanges de Litterature, d 1 Histoire et de Philoso

phic, 1752); others proceed more naturalistically, such as Button (1708-1788;

Histoire Naturelle Generale et Particuliere, 1749 ff.) and Jean Battiste Robinet

(173-3-1820; De la Nature, 1761; Considerations Philosophiques de la Grada

tion Naturelle des Formes d Etre 1767).

Sensualism appears in connection with materialism in Julien Offrai de

Lamettrie (1709-1751 ; Histoire Naturelle de VAme, 1745; V Homme Machine,

1748 ; UArtde, Jouir, 1751 ; (Euvres, Berlin, 1751 ; on him F. A. Lange, Gesch.

des Mater., I. 326 ff. [Eng. tr. Hist, of Mater., Vol. II. 49 ff.] ; Neree Quepat,

Paris, 1873) ; it appears solely as psychological theory with Charles Bonnet

(1720-1793; Essai de Psychologic, 1755; Essai Analytique sur les Faculte.s de

r Ame, 1759; Considerations sur les Corps Organises, 1762; Contemplation de

la Nature, 1764 ; Palingenesies Philosophiques, 1769), and with a positivistic

pointing in Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715-1780 ; Essai sur V Origine, de la

Connaissance Humaine, 1746; Traite des Systemes, 1749; Traite des Sensa

tions, 1754 ; Logique, 1780 ; Langue des Calculs in the complete edition, Taris,

1798 ; cf. F. Uethorfi, C. ou I Empirisme et le Rationalisme, Paris, 1864). The

last representatives of these theories are, on the one hand, Pierre Jean George

Cabanis (1757-1808 ; Les Rapports du Physique et du Moral de V Homme, 1802 ;

(Euvres, Paris, 1821-25), on the other side, Antoine Louis Claude Destutt de

Tracy (1754-1836; Elements d Ideologic, in 4 parts, 1801-15, together 1826).

Cf. Fr. Picavet, Les Ideologues (Paris, 1891).

The literary concentration of the Enlightenment movement in France was the

Encyclopaedia (Encyclopedic ou Dictionnaire Raisonnedes Sciences, des Arts et

des Metiers, 28 vols., 1752-1772, supplement and index, 7 vols., extending to 1780).

Besides d Alembert, who wrote the introduction, the editor and intellectual

head of the circle from which it proceeded was Denis Diderot (1713-1784;

Pensees Philosophiques, 1746 ; Pensees sur V Interpretation de la Nature, 1754 ;

of the posthumous publications the Promenade d wn Sceptique, the Entretien

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d Alembert et de Diderot, and the Eeve (V Alcmbert are to be emphasised;

worthy of mention also is the Essdi de Print nre ; (Euvres Completes, Paris,

187o, 20 vols. ; of. K. Itosenkranz, D., sein Lebm und seine Werke, Leips. 186(5;

J. Morley, U. and the Encyclopaedists, Loud. 1878). Further collaborators upon

the Encyclopaedia (aside from Voltaire and Rousseau, who became separated

from the work at an early date) were Turgot (article Existence), Daubenton,

Jaucourt, Duclos, Grimm, llolbach, etc. From the same circle ( Les Philo-

sophes ") proceeded later the Systeme de la Nature (pseud, author, Mirabeau,

1770), which is in the main to be attributed to Dietrich von Holbach (1728-1789,

from the Palatinate ; Le, bon Sens ou Idees Naturelle.s opposees aux Idees Sur-

nnturelles, 1772 ; Elements de la Morale Universelle, 1776, etc.). [On the

Systems de la Nature cf. Lange, Hist, of Mat., II. 92 ff.] With him co-oper

ated Grimm (1728-1807 ; Correspondance Litteraire, 1812), the mathematician

Lagrange, the Abbe Galiani, Naigeon, and others ; the concluding chapter,

"Abrfige du Code de la Nature." is perhaps from Diderot s pen; Helve"tius

wrote a very popular exposition, " Vrai Sens du Systeme de la Nature," 1771.

The same writer (Claude Adrien Helvetius, 1715-1771) gave the sharpest expres

sion to the morals of the sensualistic associational psychology in his much read

book, De V Esprit (1758 ; cf. also his posthumous work, De V Homme de ses

Facnltes et de son Education, 1772).

The theory of English constitutionalism was adopted in France by Montes

quieu (1689-1755 ; Lettres Persanes, 1721 ; De V Esprit des Lois, 1748). Social

problems were treated on the one side by the so-called Physiocrats such as

Quesnay ( Tableaux Economiques, 1758; ; Turgot (Ileflerions snr la Forma

tion et la Distribution des Eichesses, 1774, opposed by (ialiani, Dialogues sur le.

Commerce des Bles} and others, on the other side by the Communists such as

Morelly (Code de la Nature, 1755), and Mably, the brother of Condillac (De

la Legislation ou Principes des Lois, 1776.

The most notable figure of the French Enlightenment was Jean Jacques

Rousseau (born, 1712, in Geneva, died, 1778, in Ermenonville after an adven

turous life, which toward the end was troubled by melancholy and hallucinations

of persecution). His main writings aside from the autobiographical Confes

sions [tr., Lond. 1876] are Disc. ours sur les Sciences et les Arts (1750), Dis-

cours sur V Origine et les Fondemens de V Inegalite parmi les Hommes (1773),

La Nouvelle Heloise (1761), Emile ou sur V Education (1762) [abr. tr., Boston,

1885], Du Contrat Social (1762). Cf. F. Brockerhoff, 7?., sein Leben und seine

Werke (Leips. 1863 and 1874) ; E. Feuerlein in " De r Gedanke. " (Berlin, 1866) ;

L. Moreau, J. J. E. et le Siecle Philosophique (Paris, 1870) ; J. Morley, J. J. E.

(Lond. 1873) ; K. Fester, E. und die, deutsche Geschichtsphilosophie (Stuttgart,

The philosophical theory of the Revolution was developed chiefly by

1890) ; [E. Caird, Jt. in Essays, Vol. I.].

Re

Charles Francois de St. -Lambert (1716-1803 ; Principes des Mce.urs chez toutes

les Nations ou Catechisme Universel, 1798), Const. Fr. Chassebceuf Comte de

Volney (1757-1820; Les Euines, 1791; La Loi Naturelle ou Principes Phy

siques de la Morale, deduits de V Organisation de V Homme et de V Univers ou

Catechisme du Citoyen Fran^ais, 1793), Marie Jean Ant. Nic. de Condorcet

(1743-1794 ; Esquisse d un Tableau Historique du Progres de V Esprit llumain,

1795), Dominique Garat (1749-1833; cf. Conte Ee.ndu des Seances des Ecoles

Normales, II. 1-40). Cf. L. Ferraz, La Philosophic de la devolution (Paris,

1890).

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, the many-sided founder of German philosophy,

was born, 1646, in Leipsic, studied there and at Jena, received his degree in

Altorf, and was then, through his acquaintance with Boyneburg, drawn into the

diplomatic service of the Elector of Mayence. In this service, pursuing political

and scientific plans of his own, he travelled as a member of an embassy to Paris

and London, with an incidental visit to Spinoza in The Hague, and then entered

the service of the court of Hanover and Brunswick as librarian and court his

torian. In all these positions he was active in his public and diplomatic capacity

in the interests of the German national spirit and of peace between the Confes

sions. Later he lived at the court of the first Prussian Queen Sophie Charlotte,

a Hanoverian princess, in Charlottenberg and Berlin, where the Academy was

founded under his direction ; afterwards he lived for some time in Vienna, to

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consult archives. Here he gave the stimulus for the foundation of an academy,

a project which was later carried out, and the St. Petersburg Academy was also

due to his influence. He died, 1716, at Hanover. The manifold nature of his

activity, and the way in which his life was split up, is shown also in the fact that

his scientific views are, for the most part, deposited only in fragmentary essays,

and in an incredibly extensive correspondence. The best edition of his philo

sophical writings is the most recent by C. J. Gerhardt, 7 vols. (Berlin, 1875-1\*0).

The metaphysical treatises have been cited above (p. 382). For his influence

upon the philosophy of the Enlightenment, the following come chiefly into con

sideration, aside from the correspondence with Bayle and Clarke : Essais de

Theodicce sur la Bonte de Dieu, la Liberte de V Homme ft V Oriyine du Mai

(Amsterdam, 1710), and the Nouveaux Essais sur VEntendement Humain, first

published in 1765, by Raspe. Cf. G. E. Guhrauer, G. [V. Frhr. v. L. (Breslau,

1842) ; E. Pfleiderer, L. als Patriot, Staatsmann und Bildungstrager (Leips.

1870); art. L. in Ersch und Gruber s Enc., by W. Windelb and ; L. Feuer-

bach, Darstellung, Entwicklung und Kritik der LSschen Phil. (Ansbach, 1844) ;

E. Nourisson, La Philosophic d&lt;&gt; L. (Paris, 1860) ; L. Grote, L. und seine Zeit

(Hanover, 1869) ; O. Caspar!, L s Philosophic (Leips. 1870) ; J. T. Merz, L.

(Lond. 1884); [J. Dewey, Leibniz s New Exsays, Chicago, 1888; art. Leibniz

in Enc. Brit., by Sorley ; P:ng. tr. of Imp. Phil. Works, by G. M. Duncan, New

Haven, 1890 ; of the New Essays, by A. G. Langley, Lond. and N.Y. 1893].

Among the most influential " Enlighteners" in Germany was Leibniz s con

temporary and fellow-countryman, Christian Thomasius (1655-1728; Einlei-

tung zur Vernunftlehre, Ausf nhrung der Vernunftlehre, both in 1691 ; Einl. zur

Sittenlehre, 1692 ; Ausfuhrung d. Sittenlehre, 1696 ; Fundamenta Juris Naturae

et Gentium ex Sensu Communi Deducta, 1705 ; cf. A. Luden,&lt;7. Th., Berlin, 1805).

The centre of scientific life in Germany during the eighteenth century was

formed by the teaching and school of Christian Wolff. He was born, 1679,

in Breslau, studied at Jena, was Privat-docent at Leipsic, and taught in Halle

until he was driven away in 1723 at the instigation of his orthodox opponents ;

he then became Professor at Marburg. In 1740 Frederick the Great called him

back to Halle with great honour, and he was active there until his death in

1754. He treated the entire compass of philosophy in Latin and German text

books ; the latter all bear the title Vernunftige Gedanken [" Rational Thoughts,"

treating psychology, metaphysics, physics, physiology, botany, astronomy,

ethics, politics, etc.] ; in detail: von den Kraften des menschlichen Verstandes,

1712 ; von Gott, der Welt und der tfeele des Menschen, auch alien Dingen uber-

haupt, 1719; von der Menschen Thun und Lassen, 1720; vom geseUschaftlichen

Lcben der Menschen, 1721; von den Wirkungen der Natur, 1723; von den

Absichten der nat iirlichen Dinye, 1724; von den Theilen der Menschen, Thiere,

und Pflanzen, 1725. The Latin works, Philosophia Rationales sive Logica,

1718; Philosophia Prima SIVP Ontologia, 1728; Cosmologin, 1731; Psycholo-

gia Empirica, 1732; Eatioualis, 1734; The.ologia Naturalis, 1736; Philosophia

Practica Universalis, 1738 ; Jus Natures, 1740 ff. ; Jus Gentium, 1749 ; Philo

sophia Moralis, posthumously pub., 1756. Cf. K. G. Ludovici, Ausfdhrlicher

Entwurfeiner volUtandigen Historic der Wolfschen Philosophic (Leips. 1736 ff.).

Also VV. L. G. v. Eberstein, Versuch finer Geschichte der Log ik und Metaphysik

bei den Deutschen von Leibniz an (Halle, 1799).

Among the Wolffians may be named, perhaps, G. B. Bilfinger (1693-1750,

Dilucidationes Philosophical de Deo, Anima Humana, Mundo, etc., 1725) ;

M. Knutzen (died 1751; Ryxtema Causarum Kfficientium, 1746; cf. B. Erd-

mann, M. Kn. und seine. Zeit. Leips. 1876) ; J. Chr. Gottsched (1700-1766;

Erste Grande der gesammten WcHitiKisshe.it, 1734) ; Alex. Baumgarten (1714-

1762; Metaphysira, 1739; ^Esthetica, 1750-58).

As representatives of the geometrical method appear M. G. Hansch (1683-

1752; Ars Inveniendi, 1727) and G. Ploucquet (1716-1790; cf. A. F. Bock,

Sammlung von Schriftrn, welche dem logischen Calciil des Hernn P. betreffen,

Frankfort and Leips/ 1766) ; as opponents of the same, Pierre Crousaz (J663-

1/48; Logik, 1712 and 1724; Lehrc vom Schonen, 1712), Andreas Rudiger

(1671-1731 ; De Sensu Veri et Falsi, 1709; Philosophia Synthetica, 1707) and

Chr. A. Crusius (1712-1775 ; Entwurf der nothwendigen Vernunfticahrheiten,

1745 ; Weg zur Geicissheit und Zuverliissigkeit der menschlichcn Erkenntniss,

1747.) An eclectic intermediate position is taken by J. Fr. Budde (1667-1729 ;

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Institutional Philosophic Eclectics, 1705) and by the historians of philosophy,,!. J.

Brucker and I). Tiedmann, and also by Joh. Lossius (Die physichen Ursachen

des Wahren, 1775) and A. Platner (1744-1818 ; PhiloHOpMtche Aphorismen,

1776 and 1782).

Of more independent importance are J. H. Lambert (born, 1728, at Mtil-

hausen, died, 1777, in Berlin ; Kosmoloyische Briefe, 1761 ; Neues Organon,

1764; Architektonik, 1771) and Nic. Tetens (1730-1805; Philosophised e Ver-

suche uber die Menschliche Natur und Hire Entwickluny, 1776 f. ; cf. Fr. Harms,

Ueber die Psycholoyie des N. T., Berlin, 1887). Both stand in literary connec

tion with Kant (cf. Tart VI. ch. 1), whose pre-critical writings belong like

wise in this setting; these are principally Allgemeine Naturyeschichte. und

Theorie des Himmels, 1755 ; Principiorum Primorum Coynitionis Metaphysical

Nova Dilucidatio, 1755; Monadologia Physica, 1756; Die falsche Spitzfindig-

ke.it der vier syllogistischen Fiyuren, 1762 ; Der einzig moyliche Beweisyrund

zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes, 1763 ; Versuch. den Beyriff der nega-

tiven Grossen in die Weltwcisheit einzuftihren, 1763 ; Ueber die Deutlichkrit der

Grundsatze der natiirlichen Theologie und Moral, 1764 ; Beobachtunyen ilber

das Gefnhl des Schonen und Erhabenen, 1764 ; Traume eines Geistersehers,

erluutert durch Traume der Metaphysik, 1766 ; De Mundi Sensibilis atque

Intelliyibilis Forma et Principiis, 1770. Cf. li. Zimmerman, Lambert der Vor-

giinyer KanCs, 1879. [On Lambert and Tetens, cf. A. liiehl, Der philoso-

phische Kriticismus, Leips. 1876. For the pre-critical writings of Kant, E.

Caird, The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant, Glasgow, Lond., and N.Y.

1889, Fischer s Kant; Cohen, Die systematischen Beyriffe in Kant s vorkrit-

ischen tichriften, and the works cited in first par., p. 536.]

Deism found a vigorous and instructive support in Germany among numer

ous Wolfh ans, though nothing new in principle was added. Characteristic of

this was the translation of the Bible by Lorens Schmidt. The standpoint of

historical criticism of the biblical writings was maintained by Salomon Semler

(1725-1791). The sharpest consequences of the deistic criticism were drawn

by Samuel Reimarus (1699-1768; Abhandlunyen von den vornehmsten Wahr-

heiten der nat tirlirhen Religion, 1754 ; Betrachtung uber die Triebe der Thiere,

1760, especially his Schuizsrhrift fur die vernunftiyen Verehrer Gottes, 1767

[not pub.], from which Leasing edited the " Woli enbiittler Fragmeiite," and,

in more recent time, Dav. Fr. Strauss edited an extract, Leips. 1862). Joh.

Chr. Edelmann was a Spinozistic free-thinker (1698-1767). Cf. K. Monckeberg,

Iteimarus itnd Edelmann (Hamburg, 1867).

The movement of the so-called Pietism, allied to Mysticism, which was

begun by Spener (1635-1705), and carried forward with organising energy

by Aug. Herm. Francke (1663-1727), had only an indirect influence upon phil

osophy during this period ; at a still farther distance stand the more isolated

members of mystic sects such as Gottfried Arnold (16H6-1714) and Conrad

Dippel (1673-1734).

Empirical psychology was represented among the Germans in the eigh

teenth century by numerous names, comprehensive collections, text-books, and

special investigations. There are Casimir von Creuz (1724-1770), Joh. Gottl.

Krtiger (Versnch einer experimentalen Seelenlehre, 1756), J. J. Hentsch (] er-

such i (ber die Folge der Veranderung der Seele, 1726), J. Fr. Weiss (De. \atura

Animi et Potissimum Cordis Humcmi, 1761), Fr. v. Irwing (Erfahrungen

und U nter suchuny en uber den Menschen, 1777 ff. ) et al. The Magazin zur

Erfahrnngsseelenli-hre," edited by Moritz (1785-1793), formed a place for col

lecting contributions to this favourite science. Further literature in K. Fortlage,

System der Psycholoyie, I. 42 f .

A theory of art upon the basis of empirical psychology is found in Baum-

garten s pupil, G. Fr. Meier (1718-1777), and especially in Joh. Georg Sul-

zer (1720-1779 ; Theorie der angenehmen Empjindungen, 1762 ; Vermischte

Schriften, 1773 ff. ; Allgemeine Theorie der schonen Kunste, 1771-1774, a

lexicon of esthetics).

Of the Popular Philosophers may be mentioned Moses Mendelssohn

(1729-1786 ; Briefe uber die Empfindunyen, 1755 ; Ueber die Evidenz in den

Mftuphysischen Wissenschaften, 1764; Phcedon, 1767; Mnryenstunden, 1785;

Ff r\*e,ed. by Brasch, Leips. 1881), the book-dealt- Fr. Nicolai (1733-1811),

who published successively the Bibliothek der schonen Wissenschaften, the

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Briefe die neueste deutsche Literatur betreffend, the Allgemeine deutschc Biblio-

tkek;, and the Neue Allgemeine deutsche, Bibliothek ; further.!. Aug. Eberhard

(1738-1809), Joh. Bernh. Basedow (1723-1790), Thomas Abbt (1738-170(5),

Joh. Jac. Engel (1741-1802; editor of the Philosoph fur die Welt}, J. J. H.

Feder (1740-1821), Chr. Meiners (1747-1810), Chr. Garve (1742-1798).

A highly interesting position personally is occupied by Frederick the Great,

the Philosopher of Sanssouci. On him, cf . Ed. Zeller, Fr. d. Gr. als. Philosoph

(Berlin, 1886).

Of Leasing s writings those of chief importance for the history of philosophy

are the Hamburger Dramaturgic, the Erziehung des menschen Geschlechtx,

the Wolfenbuttler Fragmente, and the theological controversial writings. Cf.

Rob. Zimmerman, Leibniz und Lessing (titudien uud Kritiken, I. 126 ff.) ;

E. Zirngiebl, Der Jacobi-Mendelssohn l sche Streit iiber Lessing s Spinozismus

(Munich, 1861) ; C. Hebler, Lessing- Studien (Bern, 1862) ; W. Dilthey (Preuss.

Jahrb. 1879). [Kng. tr. of the Ham. Dram, and Education of Human Race

in Bohn Lib.; of Laoccoon, by Phillimore, Lond. 1875 ; cf. Sime, Lessing, Loud.

1873, 1879.]

Among Herder s writings belong in this period, Ueber den Ursprung der

Sprache, 1772; Auch eine Philosophic der Geschichte der Menschheit, 1774;

Vom Erkennen und Empfinden der menschlichen Seele, 1778 ; Ideen zur

Philosophic der Geschichte der Menschheit, 1784 ff. [Eng. tr., Lond. 1800];

Gott, Gesprache uber Spinoza s System, 1787 ; Briefe zur Beforderung der

Humanitat, 1793 ff. (on his later philosophical literary activity, cf. below, Part

VI. ch. 2). Cf. R. Haym, H. nach seinem Leben und seinen Werken (Berlin,

1877-85) ; E. Melzer, H. als Geschichtsphilosoph (Neisse, 1872) ; M. Kronen-

berg, H. s Philosophic (Heidi. 1889) [art. Herder in Enc. Brit, by J. Sully].

Cf. also J. Witte, Die Philosophie unserer Dichterheroen (Bonn, 1880).

## CHAPTER I. THE THEORETICAL QUESTIONS.

"THE proper study of mankind is man." This word of Pope s

is characteristic of the whole philosophy of the Enlightenment, not

only in the practical sense that this philosophy finds the ultimate

end of all scientific investigation to be always man s " happiness,"

but also, in the theoretical point of view, in so far as this philosophy,

as a whole, aims to base all knowledge upon the observation of the

actual processes of the psychical life. After Locke had set up the

principle, 1 that prior to all metaphysical considerations and contro

versies the general question must be decided of how far human

insight reaches, and that this in turn is possible only by exact exhi

bition of the sources from which knowledge derives, and of the

course of development by which it is brought about, from that

time epistemology, the theory of knowledge, was brought into the

front rank of philosophical interests, and at the same time empirical

psychology was recognised as the authoritative and decisive court of

last resort for epistemology. The legitimate reach of human ideas

should be judged by the way in which they arise. Thus experiential

psychology with all the tacit assumptions which are customary in

it becomes at once the basis of the whole philosophical view of the

world, and the favourite science of the age, and is at the same time

the instrument of mediation between science and general literature.

As in this latter field, the predominant characteristic among both

Englishmen and Germans was that of depicting minds and reflect

ing or viewing one s self in the literary looking-glass, so philosophy

should draw only the image of man and of the activities of his con

sciousness. Societies for the "observation of man" were founded,

all sorts of dilettante accounts of remarkable experiences were gar

nered in large " magazines," and the government of the French

Republic in its official system of instruction, 2 replaced "philoso

phy " by the sounding title, "Analyse de 1 entendement humain."

1 Introduction to the Essay. Cf. M. Drobisch, Locke, Der Vorldufer Kant s

(Zeitxchr. f. exacte Philosophic, 18(il).

2 Cf. the highly amusing Seances des ficoles Normal, first year.

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While accordingly among the theoretical questions of the Enlight

enment philosophy, those as to the origin, development, and know

ing power of human ideas stood uppermost, these were from the

beginning placed beneath the presupposition of popular metaphysics,

viz. that of naive realism. There, " without," is a world of things,

of bodies or of who knows what else, and here is a mind which is

to know them. How do the ideas, which reproduce within the mind

that world of things, get into it ? This way of stating the problem

of knowledge, which is like that of the ancient Greeks, controls the

theoretical philosophy of the eighteenth century completely, and

attains in it both most perfect formulation and decisive disintegra

tion. Just in this respect the Cartesian metaphysics with its dualism

of conscious and corporeal substances takes a controlling position

through the entire age of the Enlightenment, and the popular

empirical mode of expression in which it was presented by Locke,

made this author the leader of the new movement. The methodical

and metaphysical considerations which had reached a great develop

ment, and one full of character in Descartes important disciples,

were now translated into the language of empirical psychology, and

so arranged for the comprehension of the ordinary mind.

In connection with this, however, the terminism which was in

herent in all modern philosophy, and which had been fostered

especially in England (Hobbes), forced its way victoriously to the

surface ; the qualitative separation of the content and forms of

consciousness from the " outer world," to which alone they were

nevertheless held to relate, was carried farther and deeper, step by

step, until it at last reached its extreme consequence in Hume s

positivism. To the scientific dissolution which metaphysics thus

experienced, corresponded in turn a popularly practical and preten

tiously modest turning away from all speculation of more than

ordinary refinement, or an all the more express profession of

adherence to the truths of sound common sense.

Whatever metaphysical interest remained vigorous in the En

lightenment literature attached itself to the religious consciousness

and to those endeavours which hoped to attain out of the strife of

religious Confessions to a universal and rational conviction. In the

deism which extended over Europe from the English free-thinking

movement, the positive views of the world and of life of the En

lightenment period became concentrated, and while these convic

tions at the outset developed out of the connection with the natural

science metaphysics of the preceding century, and in consequence

of this devoted an especially lively interest to the problems of

teleology, they became shifted with time more and more from the

CHAP. 1, 33.] Innate Ideas : Cambridge Platonists. 449

metaphysical to the moral, from the theoretical to the practical

domain.

### 33. Innate Ideas.

With regard to the question as to the origin of ideas the philoso

phy of the Enlightenment found already in the field the sharply

pronounced antithesis of Sensualism and Rationalism.

1. The first of these had been defended by Hobbes on the theo

retical as also upon the practical domain, inasmuch as he held man,

in so far as he is an object of scientific knowledge, to be an entirely

sensuous being, bound to the sensations and impulses of the body.

All ideas, in his view, have their origin in the activity of the senses,

and the mechanism of association was held to explain the arising of

all other psychical structures from these beginnings. Such doctrines

seemed to bring in question the super-sensuous dignity of man, and

that not only in the eyes of the orthodox opponents of Hobbes ; the

same motive determined the Neo-Platonists also to lively opposi

tion. Cudworth especially had distinguished himself in this respect ;

in his combating of atheism 1 he had Hobbes in mind as one of his

main opponents, and in opposition to the doctrine that all human

ideas arise from the operation of the outer world upon the mind,

he appeals especially to mathematical conceptions. The corporeal

phenomena never completely correspond to these ; the most we can

sav is that they resemble them. 2 In treating the conception of God,

on the other hand, he lays claim to the argument of the consensus

gentium, and carries it out 3 in most extensive manner to show that

this idea is innate. In like manner, Herbert of Cherbury had already

grounded all the main doctrines of natural religion and morals by

the aid of the Stoic and Ciceronian doctrine of the communes notitice.

The doctrine of innate ideas was conceived in a somewhat differ

ent sense by Descartes 4 and his disciples. Here the psychological

question as to the origin of ideas was less in mind, although this

question, too, at a decisive passage in the Meditations (Med. III.)

received the answer that the innateness of the idea of God was

to be conceived of as a sign which the creator had imprinted upon

his creature ; but on the whole the great metaphysician had laid

more weight upon the point that the criterion of innateness consists

in immediate evidence or certainty. Hence he had finally extended

the designation (almost stripped of the psychological meaning be-

1 In the Systema fnti Hi &lt;-fn&lt;tlt . especially at the close, V. f&gt;, 28 ff.

2 Ih. V. 1, 108 ff. (p. .tor, ff. Mosh. ).

8 The whole fourth chapter is devoted to this task.

4 Cf. E. Grimm, l)i x&lt;-nri&lt;&gt;.S /./Vuv r,m &lt;/i ii ni/i/i /ntrenen Ideen, Jena, 1873.

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longing to it at the outset) of the Latin idece innatce to all that

lumine naturali dare et distincte percipitur. Direct assent had been

adduced by Herbert of Cherbury also as the characteristic mark of

innate ideas. 1

2. Locke s polemical attitude toward the maintenance of innate

ideas has, indeed, an epistemological purpose, but is really deter

mined only by the psycho-genetic point of view. He asks primarily

only whether the soul at its birth brings complete knowledge into

the world with it, and finds this question deserving of a negative

answer. 2 In consequence of this the development of the thesis

"No innate principles in the mind" in the first book of Locke s

Essay is directed less against Descartes than against the English

Neo-Platonists. 3 It combats first of all the consensus gentium, by an

appeal to the experience of the nursery and of ethnology ; it finds

that neither theoretical nor practical principles are universally

known or acknowledged. Nor does it except from this demonstra

tion (with an express turn against Herbert) even the idea of God,

since this is not only very different among different men, but is even

entirely lacking with some. Nor does Locke allow the evasion

suggested by Henry More,\* that innate ideas might be contained in

the soul not actually, but implicitly : this could only mean, accord

ing to Locke, that the soul is capable of forming and approving

them, a mark which would then hold for all ideas. The imme

diate assent, finally, which was held to characterise that which is

innate, does not apply in the case of the most general abstract

truths, just where it is wanted ; and where this immediate assent

is found it rests upon the fact that the meaning of the words and of

their connection has been already apprehended at an earlier time. 5

Thus the soul is again stripped of all its original possessions : at

birth it is like an unwritten sheet (cf. p. 203), white paper void

of all characters. 6 In order to prove this positively, Locke then

pledges himself to show that all our "ideas" 7 arise from experience.

Here he distinguishes simple and complex ideas in the assumption

that the latter arise out of the former : for the simple ideas, how-

1 De Ventate (1656), p. 76.

2 In which, moreover, Descartes completely agreed with him, for it was Des

cartes opinion also that it was not to be assumed that the mind of the child

pursues metaphysics in its mother s womb. Op. (C.) VIII. 269.

8 Cf. (and also for the following) G. Geil, Die Abhangigkeit Locke s von

Descartes (Strassburg, 1887).

\* H. More, Antidot. adv. Ath. I. 3 and 7, and Locke, I. 2, 22. Cf. Geil, op.

cit., p. 49.

5 Locke, I. 2, 23 f. 6 Ib . n. j f 2 .

7 The term " idea" had lost its Platonic sense already in later Scholasticism

and taken on the more general meaning of any mental modification whatever

( Vorstellung) .

CHAP. 1, 33.] Innate Ideas : Locke. 451

ever, he announces two different sources : sensation and reflection,

outer and inner perception. Under sensation he understands the

ideas of the corporeal world, brought about by the medium of the

bodily senses ; under reflection, on the other hand, the knowledge

of the activities of the soul itself called out by the above process.

Psycho-genetically, therefore, these two kinds of perception are so

related that sensation is the occasion and the presupposition for

reflection, as regards their matter or content the relation is, that

all content of ideas arises from sensation, while reflection, on the

contrary, contains the consciousness of the functions performed in

connection with this content.

3. To these functions, however, belonged also all those by means

of which the combination of the elements of consciousness into

complex ideas takes place, i.e. all processes of thought. And here

Locke left the relation of the intellectual activities to their original

sensuous contents in a popular indefiniteness which gave occasion

to the most various re-shapings of his teaching soon after. For, on

the one hand, those activities appear as the "faculties " of the mind,

which in reflection becomes conscious of these its own modes of

functioning (as for example, the capacity of having ideas itself, 1

" perception," is treated as the most original fact of reflection, to

understand which every one is sent to his own experience) ; on the

other hand, the mind, even in these relating activities, such as

recollecting, distinguishing, comparing, connecting, etc., is regarded

throughout as passive and bound to the content of the sensation.

Hence it was possible for the most various views to develop out of

Locke s doctrine, according to the varying degree of self-activity

which was ascribed to the mind in its process of connecting its

ideas.

Of particular interest in this connection, by reason of the problems

of epistemology and metaphysics derived from the Middle Ages, was

the development of the abstract ideas out of the data; "of sensation.

Like the greater part of English philosophers, Locke was an ad

herent of Nominalism, which professed to see in general concepts

nothing but internal, intellectual structures. In explaining these

general ideas, however, Locke made more account of the co-opera

tion of "signs," and in particular of language. Signs or words,

when attached more or less arbitrarily to particular parts of ideas,

make it possible to lay special stress upon these parts and bring

them out from their original complexes, and thereby render possible

the farther functions by which such isolated and fixed contents of

1 Essay, II. 9, 1 f.

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consciousness are put into logical relations to one another. 1 Hence

for Locke, as formerly for the Epicureans, and then for the Ter-

minists, logic was coincident with the science of signs, semiotics. 11

By this means room was gained for a demonstrative science of con

ceptions and for all abstract operations of the knowing mind, quite

in the spirit of Occam, in spite of the sensualistic basis upon which

all content of ideas was held to rest. None of these determinations

were philosophically new, lior has their exposition in Locke any

originality or independent power of thought : it is, however, smooth

and simple, of agreeable transparency and easy to understand; it

despises all scholastic form and learned terminology, glides skilfully

over and away from all deeper problems, and thus made its author

one of the most extensively read and influential writers in the history

of philosophy.

4. Strongly as Locke had emphasised the independent existence

of inner experience by the side of the outer (as followed from his

metaphysical attachment to Descartes, on which see below, 34, 1),

he yet made the dependence of reflection upon sensation, as regards

origin and content, so strong that it proved the decisive factor in

the development of his doctrine. This transformation to complete

sensualism proceeded along different paths.

In the epistemological and metaphysical development of Nomi

nalism this transformation led with Locke s English successors to

extreme consequences. Berkeley 3 not only declared the doctrine of

the Reality of abstract conceptions to be the most extraordinary of

all errors in metaphysics, but also like the extreme Nominalists

of the Middle Ages denied the existence of abstract ideas within

the mind itself. The illusory appearance of such ideas arises from

the use of words as general terms ; but in truth, even in connection

with such a word, we always think merely the sensuous idea, or the

group of sensuous ideas, which at the beginning gave rise to that

term. Every attempt to think the abstract alone shatters upon the

sensuous idea, which always remains as the sole content of intellectual

activity. For even the remembered ideas and partial ideas which

can be separated out, have no other content than the original sense-

1 The development of these logical relations between the ideational contents

which have been singled out and fixed by means of the verbal signs, appears

with Locke, under the name of the lumen naturale. Descartes had understood

by this as well intuitive as also demonstrative knowledge, and had set all this

natural knowing activity over against revelation ; Locke, who treats the intuitive

with terministic reserve (cf. 34, 1), restricts the signification of the " light of

nature " to the logical operations and to the consciousness of the principles

which obtain in these, according to the nature of the thinking faculty.

2 Essay, IV. 21, 4.

8 Princ. of Human Knowledge, 5 ff.

CHAP. 1, 33.] Innate Ideas : Berkeley, Hume. 453

impressions, because an idea can never copy anything else than

another idea. Abstract ideas, therefore, are a fiction of the schools ;

in the actual activity of thought none but sensuous particular ideas

exist, and some of these can stand for or represent others similar to

them, on account of being designated by the same term.

Daviil Hume adopted this doctrine in its full extent, and on the

ground of this substituted for Locke s distinction of outer and inner

perception another antithesis with altered terminology, viz. that

of the original and the copied. A content of consciousness is either

original or the copy of an original, either an " impression" or an

" idea" All ideas, therefore, are copies of impressions, and there

is 110 idea that has come into existence otherwise than by being a

copy of an impression, or that has any other content than that

which it has received from its corresponding impression. It ap

peared, therefore, to be the task of philosophy to seek out the orig

inal for even the apparently most abstract conceptions in some

impression, and thereby to estimate the value for knowledge which

the abstract conception has. To be sure, Hume understood by im

pressions by no means merely the elements of outer experience;

he meant also those of inner experience. It was, therefore, accord

ing to Locke s mode of expression, the simple ideas of sensation

and reflection which he declared to be impressions, and the wide

vision of a great thinker prevented him from falling into a short

sighted sensualism.

5. A development of another sort, which yet led to a related goal,

took place in connection with the aid of physiological psychology.

Locke had only thought of sensation as dependent upon the activity

of the bodily senses, but had regarded the elaboration of sensation

in the functions underlying reflection as a work of the mind ; and

though he avoided the question as to immaterial substance, he had

throughout treated the intellectual activities in the narrower sense

as something incorporeal and independent of the body. That this

should be otherwise regarded, that thinkers should begin to consider

the physical organism as the bearer or agent not only of the simple

ideas, but also of their combination, was easily possible in view of

the indecisive ambiguity of the Lockian doctrines, but was still

more called out by one-sided conclusions drawn from Cartesian and

Spinosittic theories.

Descartes, namely, had treated the whole psychical life of the

animal as a mechanical process of the nervous system, while he had

ascribed the human psychical life -to the immaterial substance, the

res cogitans. The more evident the completely sensuous nature of

human ideation now seemed in consequence of Locke s investigation,

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the nearer lay the question whether it was possible to maintain the

position, that the same processes which in the animal seemed capa

ble of being understood as nervous processes, should be traced back

in the case of man to the activity of an immaterial psychical sub

stance. From another side, Spinoza s parallelism of the attributes

worked in the same direction (cf. above, 31, 9). According to

this view a process in the bodily life corresponds to every process of

the psychical life, without either process being the cause of the

other, or one process being the original and the other the derived.

(Such, at least, was the thought of the philosopher himself.) This

had now been conceived of at first by its opponents as materialism,

as if Spinoza meant that the fundamental process was the bodily,

and the psychical process only its accompanying phenomenon. But

among its adherents also, both physicians and natural scientists,

such as the influential Boerhave of Leyden, a mode of thought in

clining strongly toward materialism soon substituted itself for the

master s doctrine. This took place in connection with the expe

riences of experimental physiology which, following Descartes

stimulus, employed itself largely with a study of reflex movements.

It is interesting that the consequences of these combinations of

thought appeared in literary form first in Germany. Here as early

as 1697 a physician named Pancratius Wolff taught in his Cogita-

tiones Medico-leg ales that thoughts are mechanical activities of the

human body, especially of the brain, and in the year 1713 appeared

the anonymous Correspondence concerning the Nature of the Soul

(Briefwechsel vom Wesen der /Seele), 1 in which, screened by .pious

refutations, the doctrines of Bacon, Descartes, and Hobbes are car

ried out to an anthropological materialism. A distinction of degree

only is recognised between the psychical life of the animal and that

of man ; ideas and activities of the will are without exception re

garded as functions of excited nerve-fibres, and practice and educa

tion are given as the means by which the higher position of man

is reached and maintained.

In England the procedure was more cautious. In a way similar

to that in which Locke had carried out the Baconian programme, men

now studied primarily the internal mechanism of the psychical activ

ities, and the development of the higher out of the elementary states

according to purely psychological laws : such was the work of Peter

Brown in the epistemological field, and that of others upon the

domain of the activities of the will. In the same manner proceeded

1 Of which Lange gives an account, Gesch. des Mat., I. 319 ff. (2d ed. [Eng.

tr., History of Materialism, II. 37 ff.] ).

CHAP. 1, 33.] Innate Ideas : Hartley, Lamettrie. 455

David Hartley also, who brought into common use the expression

association 1 (which had already been used before this) for the com

binations and relations which arise between the elements. He wished

to conceive these relations, which he analysed with all the care of a

natural scientist, solely as psychical processes, and held fast to their

complete incomparableness with material processes, even with the

most delicate forms of corporeal motion. But he was also a physi

cian, and the connection of the mental life with the states of the

body was so clear to him that he made the constant correspondence

of the two and the mutual relationship of ;the psychical functions

and the nervous excitations, which, at that time, were termed " vibra

tions," 2 the main subject-matter of his psychology of association.

In this work he held fast to the qualitative difference between the

two parallel series of phenomena and left the metaphysical question,

as to the substance lying at their basis, undecided: but with refer

ence to causality he fell insensibly into materialism, in that he con

ceived of the mechanism of the nervous states as ultimately the

primary event, and that of the psychical activities as only the phe

nomenon accompanying this event. To simple nervous excitations

correspond simple sensations or desires ; to complex, complex. This

scientific theory, to be sure, involved him in serious contradictions

with his pious faith, and the "Observations" show how earnestly

and fruitlessly he struggled between the two. Quite the same is

true of Priestley, who even made the farther concession to material

ism of letting fall the heterogeneity between the psychical and

bodily processes, and desiring to replace psychology completely by

nerve physiology. On this account he also abandoned entirely the

standpoint of inner experience defended by the Scots, but at the

same time desired to unite with his system the warmly supported

conviction of a teleological deism.

Anthropological materialism was worked out in its baldest form

by the Frenchman, Lamettrie. Convinced by medical observations

upon himself and others of the complete dependence of the mind

upon the body, he studied the mechanism of life in animals and men,

following Boerhave s suggestions, and Descartes conception of the

former seemed to him completely applicable to the latter also. The

distinction between the two, which is only one of degree, permits

for human psychical activities also no other explanation than that

they are mechanical functions of the brain. On this account it is

1 In the later, especially the Scottish literature, and in particular with Thomas

Brown, the expression "association" is often replaced by suggestion.

2 Instead of this term Erasmus Darwin introduced the expression, " motions

of the sensorium."

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an encroachment of metaphysics to ascribe to the "mind" a sub

stantiality of its own in addition to that of matter. The conception

of matter as that of a body which is in itself dead and needs mind

or spirit as its moving principle, is an arbitrary and false abstrac

tion : experience shows that matter moves itself and lives. It is

just Descartes mechanics which has proved this, says Lamettrie,

and therefore the inevitable consequence of this mechanics is mate

rialism. And that all psychical life is only one of the functions of

the body, is evident from the fact that not a single content is found

in the mental life which is not due to the excitation of some one of

the senses. If we think of a man as the Church Father Arnobius

proposed, so writes Lamettrie, 1 to establish his sensualism which

had developed from Locke, who from his birth on had been excluded

from all connection with his kind, and restricted to the experience

of a few senses, we should find in him no other ideational contents

than those brought to him through just these senses.

6. Less important in principle, but all the more widely extended

in the literary world, were the other re-shapings which Locke s

doctrine experienced in France. Voltaire, who domesticated it

among his countrymen by his Lettres sur les Anglais, gave it a com

pletely sensualistic stamp, and even showed himself though with

sceptical reserve not disinclined to entrust to the Creator the

power of providing the I, which is a corporeal body, with the

capacity of thinking also. This sceptical sensualism became

the fundamental note of the French Enlightenment. 2 Condillac,

who at the beginning had only expounded Locke s doctrine and

defended it against other systems, professed his adherence to this

sceptical sensualism in his influential Traite des Sensations.

Whatever the mind may be, the content of its conscious activities

is derived solely from sense-perception. Condillac develops the

theory of associational psychology in connection with the fiction

of a statue, which, equipped only with capacity of sensation, receives

one after another the excitations of the different senses which are

added to it, and by this means gradually unfolds an intellectual

life like that of man. Here the fundamental idea is that the mere

co-existence of different sensations in the same consciousness brings

with it of itself the sensation of their relation to each other and to the

1 At the close of the Histoire Naturelle de VAme. Cf. also above, p. 225,

note 1.

2 The same mode of thought asserts itself also in the beginnings of aesthetic

criticism in the form of the principle that the essence of all art consists in the

"imitation of beautiful Nature." The type of this conception was E. Batteux

(171:5-1780) with his treatise, Les Beaux Arts rcduits a un meme Principe

(1740).

CHAP. 1, 33.] Innate Ideas : Condillac, Diderot. 457

object or the self. In accordance with this principle the process is

depicted by which all the manifold psychical activities become

unfolded out of perception : in the theoretical series, by virtue of the

differences in intensity and in repetition of sensations, there grow

successively attention, recognising recollection, distinction, com

parison, judgment, inference, imagination, and expectation of the

future ; and finally with the help of signs, especially those of

language, arise abstraction and the grasping of general principles.

But in addition to sensation, perception has also the feeling-element

of pleasure and pain, and out of this, in connection with the move

ment of ideas, develop desire, love and hate, hope, fear, 1 and as

the result of all such changes of the practical consciousness

finally, the moral will. So knowledge and morality grow upon the

soil of the sensibility.

This systematic construction had great success. The systematic

impulse, which was repressed in the metaphysical field (cf. 34, 7),

threw itself with all the greater energy upon this "analysis of the

human mind " as a substitute ; and as Condillac himself had already

woven many acute observations into his exposition of the develop

ment process, so a whole throng of adherents found opportunity to

take part in the completion of this structure by slight changes and

shiftings of the phases, by innovations in nomenclature and by

more or less valuable deductions. The Government of the Revolu

tion recognised as philosophy only this study of the empirical

development of intelligence, and Destutt de Tracy gave it later the

name "Ideology." 2 So it came about that at the beginning of our

century philosophers were in France usually called ideologists.

7. With reference to the nature of the mind in which these trans

formations of sensation (sentir) were held to take place, a great part

of the ideologists remained by Condillac s positivistic reserve ; others

went on from Voltaire s problematical to Lamettrie s assertive mate

rialism, at first, in Hartley s fashion emphasising the thorough

going dependence of combinations of ideas upon nervous processes,

then with express maintenance of the materiality of the psychical

activities. This development is most clearly to be seen in the case

of Diderot. He set out from the position of Shaftesbury and Locke,

but the sensualistic literature became more potent from step to step

1 In the development of the practical series of conscious acts, the influence of

I)psc;irt. s and Spinoza s theory of the emotions and passions asserted itself

with Condillac and his disciples, as also in part among the English associa-

tional psychologists.

2 It is not impossible that this nomenclature in case of de Tracy was intended

to be the counterpart to Fichte s " VVissenschaftslehre," Science of Knowl

edge (cf. below, Tart VI. ch. 2).

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in the Editor of the Encyclopaedia ; he followed up the hypotheses

of hylozoism 1 (cf. below, 34, 9), and finally took part in the com

position of the Systeme de la Nature. This work set forth the

human psychical activities within the framework of its metaphysics

as the fine invisible motions of the nerves, and treated their genetic

process just as Lamettrie had done. Among the later ideologists

Cabanis is prominent in this respect by the newness of his physio

logical point of view ; he takes account of the progress of natural

science in so far as to seek the conditions of the nerves, to which

man s psychical states (le moral) must be referred, no longer merely

in mechanical motions, but in chemical changes. Ideation is the

secretion of the brain, just as other secretions are produced by other

organs.

In opposition to this, another line of ideology held fast to Locke s

principle that all content of ideas may indeed be due to the senses,

but that in the functions directed toward combining such content

the peculiar character of the mind s nature shows itself. The leader

of this line of thought was Bonnet. He, too, in a manner similar to

that of Condillac, adopts the mode of consideration commended by

Lamettrie, adverting to Arnobius, but he is much too well-schooled

as an investigator of Nature to fail to see that sensation can never

be resolved into elements of motion, that its relation to physical

states is synthetic, but not analytic. Hence he sees in the mechanism

of the nervous system only the causa occasionalis for the spontaneous

reaction of the mind, and the substantiality of the mind seems to him

to be proved by the unity of consciousness. He connects with this

theory all sorts of fantastic hypotheses. 2 Keligious ideas speak in

his assumption of the immaterial mind-substance, but sensualism

admits an activity of this substance only in connection with the

body ; for this reason, in order to explain immortality and the un

interrupted activity of the mind, Bonnet helps himself by the

hypothesis of an sethereal body which is joined essentially with the

soul and takes on a coarser material external organism, according to

its dwelling-place in each particular case.

This union of sensualism with the maintenance of self-subsistent

substantiality and capacity of reaction on the part of the mind

passed over to Bonnet s countryman, Rousseau, who combated with

its aid the psychological theories of the Encyclopaedists. He found

that this characteristic quality of the mind, the unity of its function,

evinces itself in feeling (sentiment), and opposed this original natu-

1 The decisive transition-writing is d Alemberf s Dream.

2 In the Palingenesies Philosophiques.

CHAP. 1, 33.] Innate Ideas : Bonnet, Rousseau, Reid. 459

ralness of its essence to the cold and indifferent mechanism of ideas,

which would debase the mind to an unconditional dependence upon

the outer world. The feeling of individuality rebelled with him

against a doctrine according to which there is nothing in man s

consciousness but the play, as if upon an indifferent stage, of a mass

of foreign contents accidentally coming together, which unite and

then separate again. He wished to bring out the thought that it is

not the case that the mental life merely takes place within us, but

that it is rather true that we are ourselves present as actively deter

mining personalities. This conviction dictated Rousseau s opposi

tion to the intellectualistic Enlightenment, which in the sensualism

of Condillac and of the Encyclopaedists wished to regard man s inner

life as only a mechanical product of sensational elements excited

from without : to psychological atomism Rousseau opposes the

principle of the Monadology.

In the same manner, and perhaps not without influence from

Rousseau in his arguments, St. Martin raised his voice against the

prevailing system of Condillac ; he even came out of his mystical

retreat to protest in the sessions of the Ecoles Normales 1 against

the superficiality of sensualism. The ideologists, he says, talk a

great deal about human nature ; but instead of observing it they

devote their energies to put it together (composer).

8. The Scottish philosophers are the psychological opponents of

sensualism in all its forms. The common ground on which this

contrast developed is that of psychology regarded as philosophy.

For Reid, also, and his disciples seek the task of philosophy in the

investigation of man and his mental capacities ; indeed, they fixed

still more energetically and one-sidedly than the various schools of

their opponents the methodical point of view that all philosophy

must be empirical psychology. But this view of the human physi

cal activity and its development is diametrically opposed to that

of the sensualists. The latter hold the simple, the former the com

plex, the latter the individual ideas, the former the judgments, the

latter the sensuous, the former the internal, the latter the particular,

the former the general, to be the original content of the mind s

activity. Reid acknowledges that Berkeley s idealism and Hume s

scepticism are as correct consequences from Locke s principle as is

Hartley s materialism ; but just the absurdity of these consequences

refutes the principle.

In opposition to this, Reid will now apply the Baconian method

of induction to the facts of inner perception in order to attain by an

\* Seances des tic. Norm., III. 61 ff.

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analysis of these to the original truths, which are given from the

beginning in connection with the nature of the human mind, and

which assert themselves in the development of its activities as

determining principles. Thus, putting aside all help of physiology,

the fundamental science psychology shall be perfected as a kind of

natural science of inner observation. In the solution of this task,

Reid himself, and after him especially Dugald Stewart, develop a

considerable breadth and comprehensiveness of vision in the appre

hension of the inner processes and a great acuteness in the analysis

of their essential content : a multitude of valuable observations on

the genetic processes of the mental life is contained in their exten

sive investigations. And yet these investigations lack in fruitful-

ness of ideas as well as in energetically comprehensive cogency.

For they everywhere confuse the demonstration of that which can

be discovered as universally valid content in the psychical func

tions, with the assumption that this is also genetically the original

and determining : and since this philosophy has no other principle

than that of psychological fact, it regards without criticism all that

can in this manner be demonstrated to be actual content of mental

activity, as self-evident truth. The sum-total of these principles is

designated as common sense, and as such is held to form the supreme

rule for all philosophical knowledge.

9. In the philosophy of the German Enlightenment all these

tendencies mingle with the after- workings of the Cartesian and

Leibnizian rationalism. The twofold tendency in the method of

this latter system had taken on a fixed systematic form through

the agency of Christian Wolff". According to him, all subjects

should be regarded both from the point of view of the eternal

truths and from that of the contingent truths : for every province

of reality there is a knowledge through conceptions and another

through facts, an a priori science proceeding from the intellect and

an a posteriori science arising from perception. These two sciences

were to combine in the result in such a way that, for example, em

pirical psychology must show the actual existence in fact of all

those activities which, in rational psychology, were deduced from

the metaphysical conception of the soul, and from the " faculties "

resulting from this conception. On the other hand, following Leib

niz s precedent, the distinction in value of the two modes of knowl

edge was so far retained as to regard only the intellectual knowledge

as clear and distinct insight, while empirical (or, as they said at

that time, historical) knowledge was regarded as a more or less

obscure and confused idea of things.

Psychologically, the two kinds of knowledge were divided, in

CHAP. 1, 33.] Innate Ideas: Wolff, Lambert. 461

accordance with the Cartesian model, into the idem innatce and the

idece adventitice. Yet Wolff himself, agreeably to the metaphysical

direction of his thought, laid less weight upon the genetic element.

But the opposite was the case with his adherents and opponents,

who were already standing under the influence of the French and

English theories. The general course of the development was that

the importance which Leibniz and Wolff had conceded to empiricism

was increased more and more by the penetration of the Lockian

principles. The psychological method gained the preponderance

over the metaphysico-ontological step by step, and within the psy

chological method increasing concessions were made to sensualism,

of such a nature that ultimately not only earnest men of science

like liiidiger and Lossius, but especially a great part of the "popu

lar philosophers " supported completely the doctrine that all human

ideas arise from sense-perception. The motley and irregular series

of stages in which this process completed itself has only a literary-

historical interest, 1 because no new arguments came to light in con

nection with it.

Only one of these men used the psychologico-epistemological

dualism which prevailed in the German philosophy of the Enlight

enment, to make an original and fruitful turn. Heinrich Lambert,

who was fully abreast of the natural science of his time, had

grown into intelligent sympathy with the mathematico-logical

method as completely as he had into an insight into the worth of

experience : and in the phenomenology of his New Organon, in

attempting to fix the limits for the psychological significance of

these two elements of knowledge, he disposed the mixture of the

a priori and a posteriori constituents requisite for knowing reality,

in a way that led to the distinction of form and content in ideas. The

content-elements of thought, he taught, can be given only by per

ception : but their mode of connection, the form of relation which

is thought between them, is not given from without, but is a proper

activity of the mind. This distinction could be read out of Locke s

ambiguous exposition : - but no one had conceived it so sharply and

precisely from this point of view as Lambert. And this point of

view was of great importance for the genetic consideration of the

ideas of the human mind. It followed from it, that it was neither

possible to derive the content from the mere form, nor the form of

knowledge from the content. The first refuted the logical rational-

1 Cf. W. Windelband, Gesch. d. neueren 1 hiloxophie, I. 53-55.

2 Cf. the demonstration in G. Hartenstein, Locke s Lehre von der mensch-

lichen Erkenntniss in Ve.rgle.ic.hung mit Leibniz 1 Krttik derselben (Leips.

1861, Abhandl. d. sticks. Ges. d. Wissensch.).

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ism with which Wolff would spin all ontology and metaphysics out

from the most general principles of logic, and ultimately from the

one principle- of contradiction ; the other took the basis away from

sensualism, which thought that with the contents of perception the

knowledge also of their relations was immediately given. Out of

this grew for the " improvement of metaphysics " the task of dis

solving out these relating forms from the total mass of experience,

and of making clear their relation to content. But Lambert sought

in vain for a single unifying principle for this purpose, 1 and his

" Architektonik " finally contented itself with making a collection

of them not based on any internal principle.

10. While all these theories as to the origin of human ideas were

flying about in the literary market, the reconciling word upon the

problem of innate ideas had been long spoken, but was waiting in a

manuscript in the Hanoverian library for the powerful effect which

its publication was to produce. Leibniz, in his Nouveaux Essais,

had provided the Lockian ideology with a critical commentary in

detail, and had embodied within it the deepest thoughts of his phi

losophy and the finest conclusions of his Monadology.

Among the arguments with which Locke combated the doctrine

that ideas were innate, had been that with which he maintained

that there could be nothing in the mind of which the mind knew

nothing. This principle had also been pronounced by him 2 in the

form that the soul thinks not always. By this principle the Car

tesian definition of the soul as a res cogitans was brought into ques

tion : for the essential characteristic of a substance cannot be denied

it at any moment. In this sense the question had been often dis

cussed between the schools. Leibniz, however, was pointed by his

Monadology to a peculiar intermediate position. Since, in his view,

the soul, like every monad, is a " representing " power, it must have

perceptions at every moment : but since all monads, even those

which constitute matter, are souls, these perceptions cannot pos

sibly all be clear and distinct. The solution of the problem lies,

therefore, again in the conception of unconscious representations or

petites perceptions (cf. above, 31). The soul (as every monad)

always has ideas or representations, but not always conscious, not

always clear and distinct ideas ; its life consists in the development

of the unconscious to conscious, of the obscure and confused to clear

and distinct ideas or representations.

In this aspect Leibniz now introduced an extremely significant

1 This is best seen in his interesting correspondence with Kant, printed in

the works of the latter.

2 Essay II. 1, 10 f.

CHAP. 1, 33.] Innate Ideas : Leibniz. 463

conception into psychology and epistemology. He distinguished

between the states in which the soul merely has ideas, and those in

which it is conscious of them. The former he designated as percep

tion, the latter as apperception. 1 He understood, therefore, by

apperception the process by which unconscious, obscure, and con

fused representations are raised into clear and distinct consciousness,

and thereby recognised by the soul as its own and appropriated by

self-consciousness. The genetic process of the psychical life consists

in the changing of unconscious into conscious representations or ideas,

in taking up perceptions into the clearness and distinctness of self-

consciousness. In the light of the Monadology Leibniz s methodo

logical view of the empirical or contingent truths (cf. 30, 7) took

on a peculiar colouring. The fact that the monads have no windows

makes it impossible to conceive of perception metaphysically as a

working of things upon the soul : 2 the ideas of sense, or sense-pres

entations, must rather be thought as activities which the soul, by

virtue of the pre-established harmony, develops in an obscure and

confused manner (as petites perceptions ), and the transformation

which takes place in them can be regarded only as a process of

making them distinct and of clearing them up, as a taking up into

self-consciousness, as apperception.

Sensibility and understanding, the distinction between which with

Leibniz coincides with that of different degrees of clearness and

distinctness, have, therefore, in his view, the same content, only

that the former has in obscure and confused representation

what the latter possesses as clear and distinct. Nothing comes

into the soul from without; that which it consciously represents

has been already unconsciously contained within it : and on the

other hand, the soul cannot bring forth anything in its conscious

ideas which has not been within it from the beginning. Hence

Leibniz must decide that in a certain sense, that is, unconsciously,

all ideas are innate ; and that in another sense, that is, consciously, no

idea is innate in the human soul. He designates this relation, which

had been previously sketched in the principles of the Monadology,

by the name virtual innnteness of ideas.

This thought, which is at once treated as the controlling point of

view at the opening of the New Essays, is carried out especially

with reference to the universal or eternal truths. This was indeed

the burning question : here the one party (the Neo-Platonists, and

in part the Cartesians) maintained that these were innate "actu-

1 Princ. de la Nat. et de la Grace, 4, where the relationship with the Lockian

reflection comes out strongly : ^o?^. Ess. II. 9, 4.

2 N. E. IV. 4, 5.

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ally," as fully formed (fertige) truths ; the others (Hobbes, and

in part Locke) would explain them from the co-operation of sensa

tional elements. Leibniz, however, carries out the thought that

such principles are contained already in perception, as petites percep

tions, that is, as the involuntary forms of relating thought, but that

after this unconscious employment of them they are apperceived,

that is, raised to clear and distinct consciousness and so recognised

in connection with experience. The form of the soul s activity

which is afterwards brought to clearness and distinctness of intel

lectual apprehension as a universal principle, an eternal truth,

inheres already in the sensuous representation, though unclear and

confused. Hence while Locke had appropriated for his own use the

scholastic principle niliil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu,

Leibniz adds thereto nisi intellectus ipse. 1

11. When the Nouveaux Essais were printed in 1765, they excited

great attention. Lessing was translating them. That the life of

the soul transcends all that is clear and distinctly conscious, and is

rooted in obscurely presaged depths, was an insight of the highest

value for the literature which was just struggling out of the intel

lectual dryness of the Enlightenment, and out of insipid correctness

to an unfolding full of genius, and an insight all the more valua

ble as coming from the same thinker that Germany honoured as the

father and hero of its Enlightenment. In this direction Leibniz

worked especially upon Herder : we see it not only in his aesthetic

views, 2 but still more in his prize essay "On the Knowing and Feel

ing of the Human Soul."

Under the preponderance of the methodological point of view, the

Leibnizo-Wolffian school had strained the opposition between rational

and empirical knowledge as far as possible, and had treated under

standing and sensibility as two separate faculties. The Berlin

Academy had wished to see the mutual relation of these two sepa

rated powers, and the share which each has in human knowledge,

investigated : Herder played the true Leibniz as the latter had

developed himself in the Nouveaux Essais against the prevailing

system of the schools when he emphasised in his treatise the living

unity of man s psychical life, and showed that sensibility and under

standing are not two different sources of knowledge, but only the

different stages of one and the same living activity with which the

monad comprehends the universe within itself. All the ideas with

which the soul raises itself in its development, step by step, from the

consciousness of its immediate environment to the knowledge of

1 Nouv. Ess. II. 1, 2. 2 Cf. principally the fourth Kritische Wdldclien.

CHAP. 1, 33.] Innate Ideas : Herder, Kant. 465

the harmony of the universe, are innate within the soul as internal

powers. This deeper unity of sensibility and understanding, Herder

called feeling ; and in this also in his inquiry as to the "Origin of

Language," he found the function which embraces all senses like a

unity, and by means of which the psycho-physical mechanism of

producing and hearing sounds (Tonens and Horens) is raised to

become the expression of thought.

12. More important still was another effect of the work of Leib

niz. It was no less a thinker than Kant who undertook to build up

the doctrine of the Nouveaux Essais into a system of epistemology

(of. 34, 12). The Konigsberg philosopher was stimulated by that

work to one of the most important turns in his development, and

completed it in his Inaugural Dissertation. 1 He had already grown

out of the Wolffian school-metaphysics and had been long employed

with the examination of the empirical theories, and yet could not

satisfy himself with them. 2 On the contrary, he was proceeding in

the direction of establishing metaphysics upon a new basis, and was

following Lambert s attempts to make a beginning at the work in

connection with the distinction of form and content in knowledge.

Now Leibniz showed with reference to the " eternal truths " that

they inhered already as involuntary relating forms within sense

experience itself, to be raised and brought to clear and distinct con

sciousness by the reflection of the understanding. This principle of

virtual innateness is the nerve of Kant s Inaugural Dissertation : the

metaphysical truths lie in the soul as laws of its activity, 3 to enter

into active function on occasion of experience, and then to become

object and content of the knowledge of the understanding.

Kant now applies this point of view in a new and fruitful manner

to sensuous knowledge. From methodical reasons he opposed this to

intellectual knowledge much more sharply even than the Wolffians :

but on this account the question for him was, whether there are

perhaps in the world of the senses just such original form-relations

as had been pointed out in the intellectual world by Leibniz and

recognised by Kant himself (cf. 8, and the whole Sectio IV. of the

treatise De mundi sensibilis et intelligibilis forma et principiis) : and

thus he discovered the " pure Forms of the sensibility " space and

time. They are not innate in the ordinary sense, but acquired, yet

not abstracted from the data of sensibility, but ab ipsa mentis

1 The dependence of this essay upon the Nouveaux Essais has been shown by

W. Windelband, Vierteljakrschr. f. wissensch. Philos., I., 1876, pp. 234 ff.

- This is best proved by the essay which apparently stands farthest removed

from metaphysics, The Dreams of a Ghost Seer. Cf. also Part VI. ch. 1.

8 De Mundi Sens, et Int., 6: dantur per ipsam naturam intellectus. Cf.

8, also the corollary to 3.

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action? secundum perpetuas leges sensa sua coordinante [from the

very action of the mind co-ordinating its sensations according to

perpetual laws], and like the intellectual Forms they are recognised

by attending to the mind s activity on occasion of experience, the

business of mathematics.

Another formulation was given to the principle of virtual innate-

ness by Teteits. He wrote his essays on human nature and its

development under the impression received from Kant s Inaugural

Dissertation. He, too, declares that the " acts of thought " are the

first original relation-thoughts ( Verhdltnissgedanken) : we learn

them by applying them when we think; and thus they prove

themselves to be the natural laws of thought. The universal prin

ciples which lie at the basis of all philosophical knowledge are,

accordingly, " subjective necessities " in which the essential nature

of the thinking soul itself comes to consciousness.

### 34. Knowledge of the Outer World.

The background of all these theories is their epistemological pur

pose. This, however, assumes from the beginning a somewhat

narrower place under the presupposition of the nai ve realism which

became attached to the Cartesian metaphysics. The principle of

the cogito ergo sum made the self-knowledge of the mind s nature

appear as the original certainty, as that which was self-evident and

immediately free from doubt ; but the greater the difference in kind

which was conceived to exist between the world of consciousness

and that of space and bodies, the greater the difficulties that pre

sented themselves with reference to the possibility of knowing this

latter world. This fact was taught at once by the metaphysical

development immediately after Descartes (cf. 31), and the same

was now repeated in the most various forms in connection with the

translation of these same thoughts into the language of empirical

psychology and sensualism.

There is thus in the epistemology of modern philosophy from its

beginning a superiority attributed to inner experience, by virtue of

which knowledge of the outer world becomes problematical. In this an

after-working of the Termiuism, with which the Middle Ages had

ended, asserts itself throughout the whole extent of modern thought

as a determining mode of view : the heterogeneity of the outer

and inner worlds gives the mind a proud feeling of a substantial

quality peculiar to itself as contrasted with things, but at the same

time a certain degree of uncertainty and doubtfulness in orienting

itself in this world which is to it strange and foreign. In this way

CHAP. 1, 34.] Knowledge of the Outer World : Locke. 467

the very statement of the fundamental problem in the philosophy of

the Enlightenment shows itself to be an echo of that deepening

of the mind within itself, that placing of consciousness upon an inde

pendent basis over against the outer world, with which the ancient

philosophy ended its course. In this was rooted the power of the

Augustinian spirit over modern philosophy.

1. The preponderance of the inner experience asserts itself very

strongly also with Locke, although in principle he placed sensation

and reflection upon an equality psychologically, and in his genetic

theory even made the latter dependent upon the former. But in

assigning the epistemological values this relation is at once reversed

in the spirit of the Cartesian principles. For the dualism of finite

substances which the great French metaphysician had propounded is

quietly introduced by Locke in conjunction with the dualism of the

sources of experience : sensation is designed to furnish knowledge of

the corporeal outer world, reflection to give knowledge of the activities

of the mind itself: and in this consideration it is naturally found

that the latter is much more suited to its task than the former.

Our knowledge of our own states is intuitive and the most certain of

all; and with a knowledge of our states we are at the same time

perfectly and undoubtedly sure of our own existence also. Locke

presents this doctrine of the certainty of knowledge of self with

an almost verbal adherence to Descartes. 1 With reference to our

knowledge of the corporeal world, on the other hand, his attitude

is much more reserved. Such a knowledge is possible only through

sensation ; and although it still deserves the name knowledge, it yet

lacks complete certainty and adequacy. Primarily, it is only the

presence of the idea in the mind that is intuitively certain ; that a -

thing corresponds to the idea is not intuitively certain, and demon

stration can at most teach that there is a thing there, but can

predicate nothing concerning this thing.

To be sure, Locke is not at all in agreement with himself on this

point. In connection with his theory of the ideas of sensation, he

adopts the doctrine of the intellectual nature of the sense qualities

quite in the form worked out by Descartes (cf. 31, 2), designates

them happily by the distinction of primary and secondary qualities,

adds, as tertiary qualities, such powers as express the relation of one

body to another, declares primary qualities to be those which really

belong to bodies in themselves, and reckons, also, impenetrability

in this class, in addition to those assigned to it by Descartes. As

compared with the doctrine of Hobbes, this is in its essence a

i Essay IV. 0, 3.

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decided relapse into the mode of thought of Democritus and Epicurus,

as is shown, also, in the fact that Locke follows the theory of

images in tracing stimulations to the affection of the nerves by

minute particles streaming out from objects. 1 On the whole, there

fore, the fundamental Cartesian basis of mathematical knowledge

of Nature is here reaffirmed and even more widely extended.

But Locke s decision in connection with his analysis of the idea

of substance has an entirely different purport. Like Occam, he

distinguishes from intuitive knowledge and knowledge given by

sensation, demonstrative knowledge : this has to do, not with the

relation of ideas to the outer world, but with the relation of ideas

to one another. In its value as knowledge it stands after the intui

tive, but superior to the sensitive. 2 Demonstrative thinking is then

conceived of entirely terministically, something as in the case of

Hobbes, as a reckoning with concept signs. The necessity attach

ing to the demonstration holds only within the world of ideas ; it

concerns, as one class, general or abstract ideas to which no proper

reality corresponds in natura rerum. If ideas are once present,

judgments may be formed concerning the relations which exist

between them, quite apart from any reference to the things them

selves ; and it is with such judgments alone that demonstrative

knowledge has to do. Such "complex" ideas are thought-things,

which, after they have been fixed by definition, can enter into the

union with others determined in each case by the respective con

tents, without thereby acquiring any relation to the outside world.

Among these modes of union, that which is expressed by the idea

of substance (the category of inherence) is conspicuous in an especial

manner. For all other contents and relations can be thought only

as belonging to some substance. This relation, therefore, has Keality,

the idea of substance is, according to Locke s expression, ectypal,

but only in the sense that we are forced to assume a real substrate

for the modes given in particular ideas, without being able to make

any assertion as to what this substrate itself is. Substance is the

supporter, itself unknown, of known qualities, which we have occa

sion to assume belong together.

This view that substances are unknowable does not, indeed,

hinder Locke from taking in hand at another passage, 3 in an entirely

Cartesian fashion, a division of all substances into "cogitative and

incogitative." On the other hand, he applies the view to his treat-

1 Essay, II. 8, 7 ff. Cf. also B. Ruttenauer, Zur VorgeschicMe des Idealismus

und Kriticismus (Freiburg, 1882), and Geil, op. cit., pp. 66 ff.

\* Ib. IV. 2.

3 Ib. II. 23, 29 ; IV. 10, 9.

CHAP. 1, 34.] Knowledge of the Outer World : Berkeley. 469

ment of the cogito ergo sum. This principle he carries over entirely

from the metaphysical realm into that of empirical psychology.

Self-certainty is for him that of the " internal sense " ; intuition in

this case refers only to our states and activities, not to our essence ;

it shows us, indeed, immediately and without doubt, that we are,

but not what we are. The question as to the substance of the soul

(and accordingly the question also as to its relation to the body) is

as incapable of an answer as the question as to the "what" of any

substance whatever.

Nevertheless, Locke holds it to be possible to gain a demonstrative

certainty of the existence of God. For this purpose he adopts the

first of the Cartesian proofs (cf. 30, 5) in a somewhat modified

form, and adds the ordinary cosmological argument. An infinite,

eternal, and perfect being must be thought, an ultimate cause of

finite substances of which man intuitively knows himself to be one.

So manifold and full of contradictions are the motifs which cross

in Locke s doctrine of knowledge. The exposition, apparently so

easy and transparent, to which he diluted Cartesianism, glides over

and away from the eddies which come up out of the dark depths of

its historical presuppositions. But as the ambiguous, indeterminate

nature of his psychology unfolded itself in the antithesis in the fol

lowing developments, so, too, this epistemological metaphysics offered

points of departure for the most varied transformations.

2. The very first of these shows an audacious energy of one-sided-

ness in contrast with the indecisiveness of Locke. Berkeley brought

the ascendency of inner experience to complete dominance by putting

an end to the wavering position which Locke had taken upon the

question as to the knowledge of bodies. This he did with the aid

of his extreme Nominalism and with a return to the doctrines of

Hobbes. He demolished the conception of corporeal substance. Ac

cording to the distinction of primary and secondary qualities, it was

held that a part of that complex of ideas which perception presents

us as a body should be separated out, and another part retained as

alone real ; but this distinction, as Hobbes had already taught

(cf. 31, 2), is in the nature of the case erroneous. The "mathe

matical " qualities of bodies are as truly ideas within us as the

sense qualities, and Berkeley had demonstrated exactly this point

with analogous arguments in his Theory of Vision. He attacks the

warrant of the distinction of Descartes (and of Democritus). But

while, according to this view, all qualities of bodies without excep

tion are ideas in us, Locke has retained as their real supporter a

superfluous unknowable "substance" ; in a similar way others speak

of matter as the substrate of sensible qualities.

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But in all these cases, says Berkeley, it is demanded of us to

regard an abstraction as the only actual reality. Abstract ideas,

however, do not exist, they do not exist even in the mind, to say

nothing of existing in natura rerum. Locke was then quite right in

saying that no one could know this substance ": no one can even

think it; it is a fiction of the schools. For the nai ve consciousness,

for "common sense," whose cause Berkeley professes to maintain

against the artificial subtlety of philosophers, bodies are just exactly

what is perceived, no more and no less ; it is only the philosophers

who seek for something else behind what is perceived, something

mysterious, abstract, of which they themselves cannot say what it

is. For the unperverted mind, body is what one sees, touches,

tastes, smells, and hears : its esse is percipi.

Body is then nothing but a complex of ideas. If we abstract from

a cherry all the qualities which can be perceived through any of the

senses, what is left ? Nothing. The idealism which sees in a body

nothing farther than a bundle of ideas is the view of the common

man ; it should be that of philosophers also. Bodies possess no

other reality than that of being perceived. It is false to suppose

that there is in addition to this a substance inherent within them,

which "appears" in their qualities. They are nothing but the sum

of these qualities.

In reply to the question that lies close at hand, in what the differ

ence consists between the "real" or actual body and that which is

only imagined or dreamed of, if all bodies are only perceived,

Berkeley answers with a spiritualistic metaphysics. The ideas

which constitute the existence of the outer world are activities of

spirits. Of the two Cartesian worlds only one has substantial

existence ; only the res cogitantes are real substances, the res extensce

are their ideas. But to finite spirits the ideas are given, and the

origin of all ideas is to be sought only in the infinite Spirit, in God.

The reality of bodies consists, therefore, in this, that their ideas are

communicated by God to finite spirits, and the order of succession

in which God habitually does this we call laws of Nature. Hence

Bishop Berkeley finds no metaphysical difficulty in supposing that

God under certain circumstances departs from the usual order for

some especial end, and in this case man speaks of miracles. On the

other hand, a body is unreal which is presented only in the indi

vidual mind according to the mechanism of memory or imagination,

and without being at the same time communicated to the mind by

God. And finally, since the actual corporeal world is thus changed

into a system of ideas willed by God, the purposiveness which its

arrangement and the order of its changes exhibit gives rise to no

further problem.

CHAP. 1, 34.] Knowledge of the Outer World : Collier. 471

The parallelism between this inference from Locke and that

which Malebranche had drawn from Descartes is unmistakable ; and

Malebranche and Berkeley are also at one in holding that God alone

is the active force in the world, and that no individual thing is

efficiently operative (cf. 31, 8). It is extremely interesting to see

how the extreme Realism of the Frenchman and the extreme

Nominalism of the Englishman amount to the same thing. The

grounds on which the views are based could not be more different :

the result is the same. For what still separated the two could be

easily removed out of the way. This was proved by a contemporary

and countryman of Berkeley s, Arthur Collier (1680-1732) in his

interesting treatise Clavis Universalis. 1 Malebranche, 2 indeed, as a

Cartesian, had not directly demurred to the reality of the corporeal

world, but had held that we could understand the knowledge of this

world by man, only on the hypothesis that the ideas of bodies in

God are the common original, in accordance with which God pro

duces, on the one hand, the actual bodies, and, on the other, the

ideas of these bodies in finite minds. Collier showed now that in

this theory the reality of the corporeal world played a completely

superfluous role: since no actual relation between the corporeal

world and human ideas is assumed, the value of human ideas for

knowledge remains quite the same if we posit only an ideal cor

poreal world in God, and regard this as the real object of human

knowledge.

The idealism, which proceeded in this way from the cogito ergo

sum along several paths, was attended by still another paradox as

a by-product, which is occasionally mentioned in the literature of

the eighteenth century without any definite name or form. Each

individual mind has certain, intuitive knowledge only of itself and

of its states, nor does it know anything of other minds except

through ideas, which refer primarily to bodies and by an argument

from analogy are interpreted to indicate minds. If, however, the

whole corporeal world is only an idea in the mind, every individual

is ultimately certain only of his own existence ; the reality of all

else, all other minds not excluded, is problematical and cannot be

demonstrated. This doctrine was at that time designated as

Egoism, now it is usually called Solipsism. It is a metaphysical

1 The alternative title of the book reads, A New Inquiry after Truth, being

a Demonstration of the. Non-Existence or Impossibility of an External World

(Lond. 112:5). It was edited together with Berkeley s treatise in the German

" Collection of the Principal Writin&lt;/x n /&gt;i&lt;-}, deny the Reality of their own

Body ( !!) &gt;nl of the whole Corporeal World," by Eschenbach (Rostock, 1750).

2 Whose doctrine had become known in England by the agency especially of

John Norris (Essai d un Theorie du Monde Ideal, Loud. 1704).

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sport which must be left to the taste of the individual; for the

solipsist refutes himself by beginning to prove his doctrine to

others.

Thus, following in the train of the Meditations, in which Descartes

recognised self-consciousness as the rescuing rock in the sea of

doubt, the result was finally reached which Kant later characterised

as a scandal to philosophy ; namely, that a proof was demanded for

the reality of the outer world, and none adequate could be found.

The French materialists declared that Berkeley s doctrine was an

insane delusion, but was irrefutable.

3. The transformation of Locke s doctrine by Berkeley leads

farther in a direct line to Hume s theory of knowledge. To the

nominalistic denial of abstract ideas the penetrative and profound

Scot attached his distinction of all intellectual functions into im

pressions, and ideas which are copies of impressions; and coincident

with his distinction is that of intuitive and demonstrative knowl

edge. Each kind of knowledge has its own kind of certainty.

Intuitive knowledge consists simply in the affirmation of actually

present impressions. What impressions I have, I can declare with

absolute certainty. I can make no mistake in this, in so far as I

keep within the bounds of simply stating that I have a perception

possessing this or that simple or complex content, without adding

any conceptions which would put any interpretation upon this

content.

As among the most important of these impressions which have

immediate intuitive certainty Hume reckons the relations in space

and time of the contents of sensation, the fixing of the co-exist

ence or succession of elementary impressions. The spatial order in

which the contents of perception present themselves is undoubtedly

given immediately with the contents themselves, and we likewise

possess a sure impression as to whether the different contents are

perceived at the same time or in succession. Contiguity in space

and time is therefore intuitively given together with the impres

sions, and of these facts the human mind possesses a knowledge

which is perfectly certain and in nowise to be questioned. Only,

in characterising Hume s doctrine, it must not be forgotten that

this absolutely certain matter-of-fact quality, which belongs to

impressions, is solely that of their presence as mental states. In

this meaning and restriction intuitive knowledge embraces not only

the facts of inner experience, but also those of outer experience, but

at the price of recognising that the latter are properly only species

of the former, a knowledge, that is, of mental states.

Contiguity in space and time is, however, but the most elementary

CHAI&gt;. 1, 34.] Knowledge of the Outer World : Hume. 473

form of association between perceptions ; besides this Hume reckons

two other laws, those of resemblance (or contrast, respectively) and

causality. As regards the former of these two forms of relation,

we have a clear and distinct impression of the likeness or unlike-

ness of sensations, and of the different degrees of these ; it consists

in the knowledge of the degree of resemblance in our own (sensi

tive) action, and belongs therefore to the impressions of the inner

sense, which Locke called reflection. On this is based, consequently,

a demonstrative knowledge of complete certainty; it concerns the

forms of that comparison between magnitudes which we perform

upon the given contents of our ideas, and is nothing but an analysis

of the regularity with which this takes place. This demonstrative

science is mathematics ; it develops the laws of equality and propor

tion with reference to numbers and space, and Hume is inclined to

concede a still higher epistemological value to arithmetic than to

geometry. 1

4. But mathematics is also the sole demonstrative science; and is

that just because it relates to nothing else than the possible rela

tions between contents of ideas, and asserts nothing whatever as to

any relation of these to a real world. In this way the terministic

principle of Hobbes (cf. 30, 3) is in complete control with Hume,

but the latter proceeds still more consistently with his limitation of

this theory to pure mathematics. For Hume declares that no asser

tion respecting the external world is capable of demonstration ; all

our knowledge is limited to the ascertaining and verifying of

impressions, and to the relations of these mental states to each

other.

Hence it seems to Hume an unauthorised trenching of thought

beyond its own territory, when the resemblance between ideas is .

interpreted as meaning metaphysical identity ; this is the case in

every employment of the conception of substajice. Whence is this

conception ? It is not perceived, it is not found as a content either

in particular sensations or in their relations ; substance is the

unknown, indescribable support of the known contents of ideas.

Whence this idea for which no impression is to be found in the

whole circuit of sensations as its necessary original ? Its origin is

to be sought in reflection. It is the copy of . a f requer tly repeated

conjunction of ideas. By the repeated being together of impres

sions, by the custom of the like ideational process there arises by

virtue of the law of association of ideas the necessity of the idea of

their co-existence, and the feeling of this associative necessity of the

i Treat. I. 2, 1 ; I. 3, 1.

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ideational process is thought as a real belonging together of the

elements of association, i.e. as substance.

The thought-form of inherence is thus psychologically explained,

and at the same time epistemologically rejected ; nothing corre

sponds to it further than the feeling of a likeness in the ideational

conjunction ; and since we can never know anything of existence

except by immediate sense-perception, the Reality of the idea of

substance is incapable of proof. It is clear that Hume thus makes

Berkeley s doctrine his own, so far as it concerns corporeal things.

But Berkeley had but half done his work upon the idea of substance.

He found that bodies are only complexes of sensations ; that their

being is identical with their being perceived ; that there is no sense

or meaning in hypostatising their belonging together, as an unknown

substance : but he let the psychical substances, spirits, the res cogi-

tantes, stand ; he regarded them as the supports or agents in which

all these ideational activities inhere. Hume s argument applies to

this latter class also. What Berkeley showed of the cherry is true

also of the " self." Inner perception, also (such was the form which

it had actually taken on already with Locke; cf. above, No. 1),

shows only activities, states, qualities. Take these away, and noth

ing remains of Descartes res cog Mans either : only the " custom " of

constant conjunction of ideas in imagination is at the basis of the

conception of a "mind"; the self is only a " bundle of perceptions." 1

The same consideration holds also, mutatis mutandis, for causality,

that form under which the necessary conn &gt;ction between contents

of ideas is usually thought : but this is neither intuitively nor de

monstratively certain. The relation of cause and effect is not per

ceived ; all that we can perceive by the senses is the relation in

time, according to which one regularly follows the other. If, now,

thought interprets this sequence into a consequence, this post hoc

into a propter hoc, 2 this too has no basis in the content of the ideas

causally related to each other. From a " cause " it is not possible

to deduce logically its " effect " ; the idea of an effect does not con

tain within it that of its cause. It is not possible to understand

the causal relation analytically. 3 Its explanation is, according to

1 Treat. I., Part IV. The objectionable consequences which resulted from

this for religious metaphysics perhaps occasioned Hume, when working over

his Treatise into the Essays, to let drop this which cut most deeply of all his

investigations.

2 In this respect Hume had a forerunner in his countryman Joseph Glanvil

(1(530-1080), who combated the mechanical natural philosophy from the stand

point of orthodox scepticism in his Scepsis Scientific^, 1005.

3 The same thought lay already at the basis of the Occasionalistic meta

physics (cf. 31, 7); for the essential reason for its taking refuge in mediation

by the will of God was the logical incomprehensibility of the causal relation.

CHAP. 1, 34.] Knowledge of the Outer World : Hume. 475

Hume, to be gained by means of association of ideas. Through the

repetition of the same succession of ideas, and the custom of finding

them follow each other, an inner necessity or compulsion arises of

imagining and expecting the second after the first ; and the feeling

of this inner necessity with which one idea calls up another is inter

preted as a real objective necessity, as if the object corresponding

to the first idea forced that corresponding to the other to a real

existence in nalura rerum. The impression in this case [of which

the idea of cause and effect is a copy] is the necessary relation

between the ideational activities [activities of the " imagination"],

and from this arises, in the idea of causality, the idea of a neces

sary relation between the ideational contents [i.e. that A. causes B ;

whereas the case really is that the idea of A causes the idea of B,

i.e. recalls it by the law of association].

[In view of the extreme condensation of the above statement, a fuller outline

of Hume s discussion of causality may be useful. As found in the Treatise it

is briefly as follows: All knowledge as to matters of fact ("probability"), if

it goes beyond the bare present sensation, depends on causation. This contains

three essential elements, contiguity, succession, and necessary connection. We

can explain the first two .(i.e. can find the impression from which they come),

but no impression of sensation can be found for the third and most impor

tant. To aid in the search for its origin we examine the principle both in its

general form and in its particular application, asking (1), why we say that

whatever begins to exist must have a cause, and (2), why we conclude that

a particular cause must necessarily have a particular effect.

(1) Examination of the first gives the negative result that the principle is not

intuitively or demonstratively certain (the opposite is not inconceivable), hence

it is not derived purely a priori, i.e. by analysing relations between ideas ;

therefore it must be from experience. (2) But hoio from experience? Taking

for convenience the second question stated above, the particular instead of the

general, it is evident (a) that the senses cannot tell that a particular effect will

follow a given cause ; they are limited to the present. Nor (b) can such knowl

edge as to future events be gained by reasoning on experience, as this would

involve knowing that instances of which we have had no experience must

resemble those of which we had experience (would assume the uniformity of

Nature), (c) Therefore the principle apparently must come from the only

remaining faculty, imagination. This seems at first impossible, in view of the

strong belief which attaches to these ideas (e.g. that fire will burn), in contra

distinction from ordinary ideas of fancy. The question as thus shifted now

becomes: (3) How explain the fact that we believe that a particular effect will

follow a given cause ? The only difference between the ideas of the senses and

memory (in which we believe) and those of fancy (in which we do not) is that

of the feeling joined with them. The ideas of memory are more strong and

The same was also recognised by Kant in his Attempt to introduce the Concep

tion of Negative Quantities into Philosophy " (cf. the general remark at the close)

in a manner essentially in agreement with Hume. And finally, Thomas Brown

(On Cause and Effect), who also is not disinclined to Occasionalism (cf. op. cit.,

pp. 108 ff.), in a very interesting way deduces psychologically, and at the same

time rejects epistemologically (ib. 184 ff.), the demand for an "explaining" or

"understanding" of the actual succession of facts in time. Perception shows

causes and effects roughly. The explanation of the process consists, then, in its

analysis into particular, simple and elementary causal relations. By this means

the illusion arises as if these latter must be yet again made analytically com

prehensible.

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lively. Hence the problem is, What makes the idea (e.g. that fire will burn) so

"lively" that I believe in it? and the solution is, that as I find this belief

arising not from a single instance, but only from the constant conjunction of

the two impressions, the liveliness must be due to custom, i.e. to the habitual

association of the ideas. " All probable reasoning is nothing but a species of

sensation.""

This same doctrine explains the origin of the idea of necessary connection.

For this does not arise from one instance, but from several. Repetition dis

covers nothing new, nor does it produce anything new in the objects, but it does

produce something in the mind, viz. a determination to pass from one object to

its usual attendant. The idea of necessity must arise from some impression.

There is no external impression that can give rise to it, hence it must be an im

pression of reflection, and the only one available is that propensity which custom

produces to pass from an object to the idea of its usual attendant. Necessity is

something that exists in the mind, not in objects. This is confirmed by compar

ative psychology (animals infer from experience through custom), by the theory

of probabilities, and (in the Inquiry) by the freedom of the will, since belief

may be reached in all these without necessarily holding to any objective neces

sary connection. TV.]

In this way, Hume s theory of knowledge disintegrates the two

fundamental conceptions about which the metaphysical movement

of the seventeenth century had revolved. Substance and causality

are relations between ideas, and cannot be proved or substantiated

either by experience or by logical thought : they rest upon the

fictitious substitution of impressions derived from reflection, for

those of sensation. But with this, the ground is completely taken

from under the feet of the ordinary metaphysics, and in its place

appears only epistemology. The metaphysics of things gives place

to a metaphysics of knowledge.

6. Hume s contemporaries characterised this result of his investi

gations especially out of regard for its consequences with respect

to religious metaphysics (cf. 35, 6) as Scepticism : yet it is

essentially different from those doctrines to which this name his

torically belongs. The settling of facts by sense-experience is, for

Hume, intuitive certainty ; mathematical relations pass for demon

strative certainty : but, as for all alleged assertions by means of

conceptions ["by abstract reasoning"] with reference to a reality

other than that belonging to ideas [" concerning matter of fact and

existence"], Hume cries, "Into the fire with it!" There is no

knowledge of what things are and how they work : we can say only

what we perceive by sensation, what arrangement in space and time

and what relations of resemblance we experience between them.

This doctrine is absolutely consistent and honest empiricism : it

demands that if the only source of knowledge is perception, nothing

further shall be mingled with this than what it actually contains.

With this, all theory, all examination of cause, all doctrine of the

" true Being" behind "phenomena" is excluded. 1 If we characterise

1 Berkeley is, therefore, correctly understood only from the point of view of

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this standpoint as Positivism, in accordance with the terminology of

our century, we may say that its systematic basis was established

by Hume.

But England s deepest thinker gave to this radical theory of

knowledge a characteristic supplement. The associations of ideas

which lie at the basis of the conceptions of substance and causality

are, indeed, attended by neither intuitive nor demonstrative certainty;

instead of this, however, they are accompanied by a conviction which

has its roots in feeling, a natural belief, which, unperverted by any

theoretical reflections, asserts itself victoriously in man s practical

procedures, and is completely adequate for the attainable ends of

life and for the knowledge relating to these. On this rests the

experience of daily life. To question this never came into Hume s

mind : he only wishes to prevent this from playing the role of an

experimental science, for which it is inadequate. With the entire

earnestness of philosophical depth he unites an open vision for the

needs of practical life.

7. For the reception of this positivism the intellectual temper

was less favourable in England than in France. Here the renuncia

tion of any attempt at a metaphysics of things lay already prepared

in the fundamental sceptical tendency which had made its appear

ance so repeatedly from the Cartesian philosophy ; and the preva

lence of this temper had been especially furthered by Bayle, whose

criticism was, indeed, in principle directed chiefly against the rational

grounding of religious truths ; but at the same time applied to all

knowledge reaching beyond the sensuous, and therefore to all meta

physics. Besides this, there was in the French literature a freer

tendency that belongs to men of the world, which had likewise been

furthered by Bayle, and at the same time by the influence of Eng

lishmen, a tendency which would strip off the fetters of the system

of the schools, and demanded the immediate reality of life instead of

abstract conceptions. Thus Bacon s doctrine, with its limitation

of science to physical and anthropological experience, became more

efficacious in France than in his own home. The " point de systeme "

meets us here at every step ; no one any longer wishes to know

anything of the " causes premieres," and this Baconian platform

with all its encyclopaedic and programmatic extension was laid down

by d Alembert as the philosophical basis of the Encyclopedia. 1

Hume : his idealism is half positivism. He lays especial weight upon the point

that behind the ideas of bodies we are not still to seek for something abstract,

something existent in itself. If this principle be extended to minds, we have

Hume s doctrine ; for with the fall of Berkeley s spiritualistic metaphysics, the

order of phenomena willed by God, to which he had reduced causality, falls also.

1 In the *Discourse Préliminaire*

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In Germany the Wolffian system was opposed with the "point de

systeme " by men like Crousaz and Maupertuis on grounds of taste,

and, in fact, the pedantry of this text-book philosophy offered many

points of attack. In contrast with this the German Popular Philos

ophy prided itself upon its absence of system ; as developed by

Mendelssohn it would refrain from all subtleties as to that which

cannot be experienced, and employ itself the more with that which

is useful for men. And, lastly, we find a fine example of harmony

with this temper in Kant s Dreams of a Ghost-Seer, where he lashes

the architects of various artificial worlds of thought with sharp

irony, and pours out copious scorn upon metaphysical endeavour

with a gallows-humour which touches his own inclination in a

most sensitive point. Among the German poets Wieland is in this

same spirit the witty anti-metaphysician.

8. A very peculiar turn was taken by positivism, finally, in the

later doctrine of Condillac. In him converge the lines of the French

and the English Enlightenment, and he finds a positivistic synthesis

of sensualism and rationalism, which may be regarded as the most

perfect expression of modern terminism. His Logic 1 and his post

humous Langue des Calculs developed this doctrine. It is built up

essentially upon a theory of "signs" (signes). 2 Human ideas are all

of them sensations, or transformations of such, and for these no

especial powers of the soul are needed. 3 All knowledge consists in

the consciousness of the relations of ideas, and the fundamental

relation is that of equality. The business of thinking is only to

bring out the relations of equality between ideas. 4 This is done by

analysing the complexes of ideas into their constituent elements

and then putting them together again : decomposition des pheno-

menes and composition des idees. The isolation of the constituent

elements which is requisite for this can, however, be effected only

with the aid of signs or language. All language is a method for

the analysis of phenomena, and every such method is a "language."

The different kinds of signs give different " dialects " of the human

language: as such Condillac distinguishes five, the fingers (ges

tures), sound-language, numbers, letters, and the signs of the infini

tesimal calculus. Logic, as the universal grammar of all these

1 A text-book for " Polish professors."

2 After the Langue des Calculs became known, the Institute of Paris and the

Berlin Academy gave out, almost at the same time, the theory of signs as the

subject for their prizes. At both places a great number of elaborations were

presented, mostly of very inferior value.

3 This Condillac maintains against Locke, and indeed already in his Traite

des Sensations, and his school do the same against the Scots.

4 In these determinations lie suggestions from Hobbes as well as from Hume.

CHAP. 1, 34.] Knowledge of the Outer World : Condillac. 479

languages, determines, therefore, mathematics also, and indeed the

higher as well as the elementary, as special cases.

All science thus contains only transformations. The thing to be

done is always to make out that the unknown, which one is seeking,

is really something already known; that is, to find the equation

which shall put the unknown x equal to a composition of ideas : it

is just for this end that the structures of perception must be

previously decomposed. It is evident that this is but a new

generalising mode of expression for Galileo s doctrine of the method

of resolution and composition; but it rises here upon a purely

sensualistic basis ; it denies the constructive element which Hobbes

had so sharply emphasised and makes of thinking a reckoning with

only given quantities. In doing this it rejects all thought of a

relation of these data to metaphysical reality, and sees in scientific

knowledge only a structure built up of equations between contents

of ideas in accordance with the principle le meme est le mme. The

human world of ideas is completely isolated within itself, and truth

consists only in the equations that can be expressed within this

world by " signs."

9. Indifferent as this Ideology professed to be metaphysically, its

sensualistic basis, nevertheless, involved a materialistic metaphysics.

Even though nothing was to be said as to the reality corresponding

to sensations, there still remained in the background the popular

idea that sensations are produced by bodies. On this account the

cautious restraint that belonged to these positivistic consequences

of sensualism needed only to be neglected to convert the anthropo

logical materialism, which had developed in the psychological

theories, into a metaphysical and dogmatic materialism. And so

Lamettrie spoke out with coquettish recklessness what many others

did not dare to confess to themselves, to say nothing of confessing

or defending it openly.

But other lines of thought in natural science, independently of

ideology, were also driving toward materialism. Lamettrie had

very rightly seen that the principle of the mechanical explanation

of Nature would ultimately tolerate nothing in addition to matter

moved by its own forces : long before Laplace gave the well-known

answer that he did not need the " hypothesis of the deity " French

natural philosophy had attained this standpoint. That the world

of gravitation lives in itself was Newton s opinion also; but he

believed that the first impulse for its motions must be sought in an

action of God. Kant went a step farther when he cried in his

Natural History of the Heavens. " Give me matter, and I will build

you a world." He pledged himself to explain the whole universe

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of the fixed stars after the analogy of the planetary system, 1 and

traced the origination of the individual heavenly bodies out of a

fiery-fluid primitive condition solely to the opposed working of the

two fundamental forces of matter, attraction and repulsion. But

Kant was convinced that the explanation which is sufficient for solar

systems shatters when applied to the blade of grass and the

caterpillar; the organism seems to him to be a miracle ( Wunder) in

the world of mechanics.

The French philosophy of Nature sought to overcome this obstacle

also, and to put the problem of organisation out of the world. Among

the countless atom-complexes, it taught, there are also those which

possess the capacity of preserving and propagating themselves.

Buffon, who pronounced and carried through with full energy this

frequently expressed thought, gave to such atom-complexes the name

organic molecules, and by assuming this conception all organic life

might be regarded in principle as an activity of such molecules, which

develops according to mechanical laws, in contact with the external

world. 2 This had been already done by Spinoza, of whose theory of

Nature Buffon frequently reminds us ; the latter, also, speaks of God

and " Nature " as synonyms. This naturalism found in mechanics,

accordingly, the common principle for all corporeal occurrence.

But if now ideology taught that ideas and their transformations

should be regarded as functions of organisms, if it no longer was

regarded as impossible, but more and more seemed probable, that

the thing which thinks is the same that is extended and moves,

if Hartley and Priestley in England and Lamettrie in France

showed that a change in consciousness is a function of the nervous

system, it was but a step from this to teach that ideas with all

their transformations form only a special case of the mechanical

activity of matter, only a particular kind of its forms of motion.

While Voltaire had expressed the opinion that motion and sensation

might perhaps be attributes of the same unknown substance, this

hylozoism changed suddenly into decided materialism as soon as

the dependence of the psychical upon the physical was given the

new interpretation of a likeness in kind between the two, and it is

often only by soft and fine shades of expression that the one is

1 The suggestion for this brilliant astro-physical hypothesis, to which Lam

bert also came very near in his Kosmologischen Briefen, and which was devel

oped later in a similar manner by Laplace, was due perhaps to a remark by

Buffon. Cf. O. Liebmann, Zur Analysis der Wirklichke.it, 2d ed., p. 376.

2 This principle of Buffon was further developed later by Lamarck (Philoso

phic Zoologique, Paris, 1809), who attempted to explain the transformation

of organisms from the lower to the higher forms by a mechanical influence of

the outer world, by adaptation to the environment.

CHAP. 1, 34.] Knowledge of the Outer World : Materialism. 481

converted into the other. This transition is presented in the

writings of Hobinet. He gives a metaphysical flight to the philos

ophy of Nature. Finding support in the development system of the

Leibnizian Monadology, he regards the graded scale of things as an

infinite multiplicity of forms of existence, in which the two factors

of corporeality and psychical function are mixed in all the different

relations possible, so that the more the nature of a particular thing

unfolds in the one direction, the less is its activity in the other.

This holds true, also, according to Robinet, in the case of the vital

movements of individual creatures ; the force which they use men

tally is lost physically, and conversely. Regarded as a whole,

however, the psychical life appears as a special form which the

fundamental material activity of things is able to assume, to be later

translated back again into its original form. Robinet thus regards

ideas and activities of the will as mechanical transformations of the

nervous activity which can be changed back again into that. Noth

ing takes place psychically which was not predisposed in the physi

cal form ; and the body, accordingly, receives in psychical impulses

only the reaction of its own motion.

In the Systeme de la Nature materialism appears at last undis

guised as a purely dogmatic metaphysics. It introduces itself with

the Epicurean motive of wishing to free man from fear of the super-

sensuous. It shall be shown that the supersensuous is only the

invisible form of activity of the sensuous. No one has ever been

able to think out anything of a supersensuous character that was

not a faded after-image of the material. He who talks of idea and

will, of soul and God, thinks of nervous activity, of his body and

the world over again in an abstract form. For the rest, this "Bible

of Materialism" presents no new doctrines or arguments in its pain

fully instructive and systematically tedious exposition : yet a certain

weight in its conception taken as a whole, a greatness of stroke in

drawing the lines of its Weltanschauung, a harsh earnestness of pre

sentation, is not to be mistaken. This is no longer a piquant play

of thoughts, but a heavy armed attack upon all belief in the imma

terial world.

10. In spite of psycho-genetic opposition, the problem of knowl

edge as conceived by the supporters of " innate ideas " was not all

too unlike the view which obtained with the sensualists. The dual-

istic presupposition assumed by both classes made it difficult for

the latter to understand the conformity which the ideas called out

in the mind by bodies bear to the bodies themselves. But it seemed

almost more difficult still to understand that the mind should cog

nise a world independent of it, by means of the development of the

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thought-forms which are grounded in its own nature. And yet

exactly this is an assumption so deeply rooted in human thought,

that it passes for the most part as self-evident and a matter of

course, not only for the na ive consciousness, but also for philo

sophical reflection. It was the mission of the Terminism, whose

after-workings were active in modern philosophy, to shake this fun

damental dogmatic conviction, and push forward for consideration

the question as to the ground of that conformity between necessity

of thought, on the one hand, and reality on the other. Even Des

cartes had found it necessary to support the knowing power of the

lumen naturale by the veracitas dei, and thereby had shown the only

way which the metaphysical solution of the problem could take.

To be sure, where that philosophical impulse was lacking which

directs its dav^a^uv its wonder upon just that which is appar

ently self-evident and a matter of course, the difficulty just men

tioned weighed less heavily. This was the case with Wolff, in spite

of all his power of logical clearness and systematic care, and with

the Scots, in spite of all their fineness of psychological analysis.

The former proceeds to deduce, more yeometrico, an extensive ontol

ogy, and a metaphysics with its parts relating to God, to the world,

and to the soul, all from the most general formal laws of logic,

from the principle of contradiction and that of sufficient reason (and

this second principle is even to be reduced to the first). Wolff,

indeed, stands so completely within the bounds of this logical

schematism that the question never seems to occur to him at all,

whether his whole undertaking namely, that of spinning "a sci

ence of all that is possible, in so far as it is possible " out of logical

propositions is authorised in the nature of the case. This problem

was concealed for him the more as he confirmed every rational

science by an empirical science [e.g. Rational by Empirical Psychol

ogy, etc.], an agreement, indeed, which was possible only because

his a priori construction of metaphysical disciplines borrowed from

experience step by step, though the loan was unnoticed. Neverthe

less, this system, which was blessed with so many disciples, had the

great didactic value of setting up and naturalising strictness in

thought, clearness of conceptions, and thoroughness in proof, as the

supreme rules for science, and the pedantry which unavoidably stole

in with these found a sufficient counterpoise in other intellectual

forces.

The Scottish philosophy contented itself with seeking out the

principles of sound common sense. Every sensation is the sign

Reid too, thinks as terministically as this of the presence of an

object; thinking guarantees the reality of the subject; whatever

CHAP. 1, 34.] Knoivledge of the Outer World: Leibniz. 483

actually comes into being must have a cause, etc. Such principles

are absolutely certain ; to deny them or even to doubt them is

absurd. This is especially true, also, of the principle that what the

understanding recognises clearly and distinctly is necessarily so.

In this is formulated the general principle of a philosophical atti

tude which is called dogmatism (after Kant), unconditional confi

dence in the agreement of thought with reality. The above examples

of the particular principles show how eclectically this common sense

sought to gather its fundamental truths from the different systems

of philosophy. In this respect the " gesunde Menschenverstand "

[sound common sense] of the German popular philosophers was

entirely in accord with it. Mendelssohn, like Reid, was of the

opinion that all extremes in philosophy were errors, and that the

truth lay in the mean position : every radical view has a germ of

truth which has been forced artificially to a one-sided and diseased

development. A sound, healthy thinking (Nicolai, especially, lays

weight on this predicate) does justice to all the different motives

and so finds as its philosophy the opinion of the average man.

11. In the mind of Leibniz the problem was solved by the

hypothesis of the pre-established harmony. The monad knows the

world because it is the world : the content which it represents is

from the beginning the universe, and the law of the monad s activity

is the law of the world. On account of its " having no windows "

it has no experience at all in the proper sense : nevertheless the

possibility of knowing the world is so established in its very essence

that all its states must be regarded as just such a knowledge. There

is, accordingly, no difference between intellect and sensibility, either

as regards the objects to which they refer, or as regards the way in

which consciousness relates itself to these objects : the only differ

ence is that sensibility cognises the indistinct phenomenal form,

while intellect cognises the true essence of things. From a scientific

point of view, therefore, knowledge by the senses was treated partly

as the imperfect, preliminary stage, partly as the indistinct anti-type

for the intellect s insight : the " historical " sciences were regarded

either as preparations for the philosophical, or as lower appendages.

From this relation a peculiar consequence resulted. The sensuous

mode of representation, too, has a certain peculiar perfection of its

own, which differs from the clearness and distinctness of intellectual

knowledge in apprehending the phenomenal form of its object with

out any consciousness of grounds or reasons : and in this perfection,

characteristic of sensuous knowledge, Leibniz 1 had set the feeling oj

1 Cf. esp. Princ. de la Nat. et de Ic Grace, 17.

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the beautiful. When, now, one of Wolff s disciples, Alexander Baum-

garten, in whom the architectonic impulse toward systematisation

was developed to a particularly high degree, wished to place by the

side of logic as the science of the perfect use of the intellect, a corre

sponding science of the perfection of sensation, an (Esthetics, this dis

cipline took on the form of a science of the beautiful. 1 Thus aesthetics, 2

as a branch of philosophical knowledge, grew up, not out of interest

in its subject-matter, but with a decided depreciation of it ; and as a

" step-sister " [lit. posthumous : nachgeborene Schivester ] of logic she

was treated by the latter with very little understanding for her own

peculiar nature, and with a cool intellectual pedantry. Moreover,

this last-named rationalist, who followed Leibniz in regarding the

actual world as the best, and therefore, as the most beautiful among

all possible worlds, could set up no other principle for the theory of

art than the sensualistic one of imitating Nature, and developed

this principle essentially into a tedious poetics. But in spite of this,

it remains Baumgarten s great service to have treated the beautiful

again, and for the first time in modern philosophy, in a systematic

way from the general conceptions of philosophy, and by so doing to

have founded a discipline that was destined to play so important a

part in the further development of philosophy, especially in that of

Germany.

12. The Leibnizo-Wolffian conception of the relation between

sense and understanding, and especially the geometrical method

introduced for rational knowledge, encountered numerous opponents

in the German philosophy of the eighteenth century, whose opposi

tion proceeded not only from the incitements of English and French

sensualism and empiricism, but from independent investigations as to

the methodical and epistemological relation between mathematics and

philosophy.

In this latter line Itudiger, and, stimulated by him, Crusius, con

tended most successfully against the Wolffian doctrine. In opposi

tion to Wolff s definition of philosophy as the science of the possible,

Rudiger asserted that its task is to know the actual. Mathematics,

and, therefore, also a philosophy which imitates the methods of

mathematics, have to do only with the possible, with the contradic-

tionless agreement of ideas with one another ; a true philosophy

needs the real relation of its conceptions to the actual, and such a

1 Cf. H. Lotze, Gesch. der Aesthetik in DeutKchland (Munich, 1888).

2 The name "aesthetics" was then adopted at a later time by Kant, after

some resistance at first, for the designation of the philosophical doctrine of the

beautiful and of art, and from him passed over to Schiller, and through the

latter s writings into general use.

CHAP. 1, 34.] Knowledge of the Outer World: Kant. 485

relation is to be gained only by perception. Crusius made this

point of view his own ; and although he thought in a less sensual-

istic manner than his predecessor, he yet criticised in a quite similar

manner from that point of view the effort of the geometrical method

to know reality by employing only logical forms. He rejected the

ontological proof for the existence of God, since out of conceptions

alone existence can never be inferred ; existence (as Kant expressed

it) cannot be dug out of ideas. In the same line, also, was the

exact distinguishing between the real relation of causes and effects

and the logical relation of ground and consequent, which Crusius

urged iu his treatment of the principle of ground or reason. For

his own part he used this difference between real and ideal grounds

to oppose the Leibnizo-Wolffian determinism, and especially to set

up the Scotist conception of the unrestricted free will of the

Creator, in opposition to the Thomist conception of the relation

between the divine will and the divine intellect, which the rational

ists maintained. The turning away from natural religion, which

lay in all these inferences, made the stricter Protestant orthodoxy

favourably disposed toward the doctrine of Crusius.

The investigation as to the fundamental difference in method

between philosophy and mathematics, that cut deepest and was

most important in results, was that undertaken by Kant, whose

writings very early refer to Crusius. But in his prize treatise On

the Clearness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals he

brings a decisive statement. The two sciences are related as oppo

site in every respect. Philosophy is an analytic science of concep

tions, mathematics a synthetic science of magnitudes: the former

receives its conceptions, the latter constructs its magnitudes ; the

former seeks definitions, the latter sets out from definitions ; the

former needs experience, the latter does not ; the former rests upon

the activity of the understanding, the latter upon that of the sensibil

ity. Philosophy, therefore, in order to know the real, must proceed

zetetically: it must not try to imitate the constructive method of

mathematics.

With this fundamental insight into the sensuous character of the

cognitive foundations of mathematics, Kant exploded the system of

the geometrical method. For, according to his view, sensibility and

understanding can no longer be distinguished as lower and higher

grades of clearness and distinctness in knowledge. Mathematics

proves that sensuous knowledge can be very clear and distinct, and

many a system of metaphysics proves that intellectual knowledge

may be very obscure and confused. The old distinction must there

fore be exchanged for another, and Kant attempts a substitute by

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defining sensibility as the faculty of receptivity, understanding as

that of spontaneity. He does this in his Inaugural Dissertation, and

upon this builds a new system of epistemology, 1 leaning upon the

psychological principle of virtual innateness (of. 33, 12).

The main outlines of the system are the following : the Forms of

the sensibility are space and time ; those of the understanding are

the most general conceptions. Out of reflection upon the one class

arises mathematics ; upon the other class, metaphysics ; both a priori

sciences of unconditional certainty. But Forms of (receptive) sen

sibility give only the necessary knowledge of the appearance of

things in the human mind (mundus sensibilis phenomenon) ; the

Forms of the understanding, on the contrary, give adequate knowl

edge of the true essential nature of things (mundus intelligibilis nou-

menon). That these Forms of the understanding are able to do this

is due to the fact, that the understanding, as well as things them

selves, has its origin in the divine mind ; that we, therefore, by

means of it, see things to a certain extent " in God." 2

### 35. Natural Religion.

The epistemological motives which ruled the eighteenth century

were not in general favourable to metaphysics : if, in spite of this,

they brought their sceptical and positivistic tendency to complete

expression in but few instances, this was due to the religious inter

est which expected from philosophy a decision as to its problems.

The religious unrest and wars from which Germany, France, and

England had suffered, and the quarreling over dogmas which had

been connected with them, had been followed already in the seven

teenth century by a feeling of surfeit and disgust for the distinc

tions in creeds : the " wretched century of strife," as Herder called

it, longed for peace. In England the temper of the Latitudinarians

extended itself, and on the continent efforts toward union were taken

up again and again in spite of frequent failure. Bossuet and Spinola

on one side, and Leibniz on the other, worked long in this direction :

the latter projected a sy sterna theologicum, which should contain the

fundamental doctrines of Christianity common to all three Confes

sions, and when the negotiations with the Catholics no longer

1 The system of the Inaugural Dissertation is only one stage in Kant s

development ; he gave it up again forthwith ; hence it belongs in his pre-critical

time and in this period.

2 This doctrine, presented with an appeal to Malebranche (Sectio IV.), is

accordingly just the system of the pre-established harmony between knowledge

and reality which Kant later rejected so energetically (Letter to M. Herz,

Feb. 21, 1772).

CHAP. 1, 35.] Natural Religion : Locke, Deism. 487

offered any hope, he attempted, at least, to employ his relations to

the courts of Hanover and Berlin to bring about a union between

the Lutherans and the Reformed body, this, too, indeed without

any immediate result.

Locke, on the other hand, in his three Letters concerning Tolera

tion, brought together the thoughts of the toleration movement into

the theory of the " free church in the free state," into the demand

that the modern state, raised above all Church tutelage, should tol

erate and protect every religious belief as personal opinion, and

every religious society as a free association, in so far as it does not

threaten to disturb political order.

But the more the union was thwarted by the resistance of theo

logians, the more nourishment came to the life of the Mystic sects,

whose supra-confessional tendencies were in harmony with the efforts

toward union, and which spread in the eighteenth century with a

multitude of interesting manifestations. The Pietism founded by

Spener and Francke kept nearest to the Church life, and was there

fore most successful. This, nevertheless, allows a certain indif

ference toward dogmatic faith to appear, but in compensation lays

all the more weight upon the increase of personal piety and upon

the purity and religious colouring of conduct.

1. In connection with all these movements stands the tendency

of the Enlightenment philosophy toward establishing the universal,

" true " Christianity by means of philosophy. True Christianity is in

this sense identified with the religion of reason, or natural religion,

and is to be dissolved out from the different forms of positive,

historical Christianity. At first, such a universal Christianity was

still allowed the character of a revealed religion, but the complete

agreement of this revelation with reason was maintained. This

was the position taken by Locke and Leibniz, and also by the

latter s disciple, Wolff. They conceive the relation between natural

and revealed religion quite in accordance with the example of

Albert and Thomas (cf. p. 321) : revelation is above reason, but in

harmony with reason ; it is the necessary supplement to natural

knowledge. That is revealed which the reason cannot find out of

itself, but can understand as in harmony with itself after the revela

tion has taken place.

Proceeding from this idea, the Socinians had already taken a step

further. They, too, recognised very vigorously the necessity of

revelation; but they emphasised, on the other hand, that nothing

can be revealed that does not prove accessible to rational knowledge.

Hence only what is rational in the religious documents is to be

regarded as revealed truth ; i.e. reason decides what shall be held to

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be revelation. From this standpoint the Sociriians separated the

Trinity and the Incarnation from the content of revelation, and

in general transferred revelation from the realm of theoretical

truths to an entirely different field. They comprehend religion

under the characteristic of law, and this constitutes their peculiar

position. What God reveals to man is not a metaphysics, but a law.

This he did in Moses, and so in Christ he gave a new law. But if

religion objectively is law-giving, subjectively it is fulfilling the

law, not an acceptance of theoretical doctrines, nor even merely a

moral disposition, but subjection to the law revealed by God and

a keeping of all its prescriptions. This alone has been made by

God the condition of eternal blessedness a juridical conception of

religion, which, with its resort to the principle of the boundless

authority of what is determined by divine power, seems to contain

strongly Scotist elements.

2. If, however, the criterion of revelation is ultimately to lie

solely in the rationality of the same, the completely consistent

result of this theory is, that historical revelation should be set aside

as superfluous, and natural religion alone retained. This was done

by the English Deists; and Toland is their leader in so far as he

first undertook to strip Christianity, i.e. the universal religion of

reason, of all mysteries, and reduce it, as regards the knowledge

which it contains, to the truths of the "natural light," i.e. to a

philosophical theory of the world. But the content which the

Enlightenment philosophy sought to give to this, its religion of

Nature, had two sources, theoretical and practical reason. As

regards the first, Deism contains a metaphysics based upon natural

philosophy ; in the second aspect it involves a theory of the world

from the point of view of moral philosophy. In this way the natural

religion of the Enlightenment was involved in the movement of

theoretical, and also in that of practical problems : these its two

elements stood in close connection, but found each a particular

development, so that they could diverge and become mutually

isolated. The relation between these two constituents was as

determining in its influence for the history of natural religion as

was the common relation which they sustained to the positive

religions.

The complete union of the two elements is found in the most

important thinker of this movement, Shaftesbury. The centre of

his doctrine and of his own nature is formed by what he himself

called enthusiasm, enthusiasm for all that is true, good, and beau

tiful, the elevation of the soul above itself to more universal values,

the living out of the whole peculiar power of the individual by the

CHAP. 1, 35.] Natural Religion : Toland, Shaftesbury. 489

devotion to something higher. Nor is religion anything else : a

life of increased and enhanced personality, a knowing one s self to

be one with the great connected all of reality. But this noble pas

sion, like every other, grows from admiration and strong emotion to

love. The source of religion is, therefore, objectively as well as

subjectively, the harmony and beauty and perfection of the universe ;

the unavoidable impression received from this perfection awakens

enthusiasm. With a warm heart Shaftsbury portrays the order of

things, the purposiveness of their inter-play, the beauty of their

formation, the harmony of their life, and shows that there is noth

ing in itself evil nothing which entirely misses its mark. What

ever appears an evil in one system of individuals, proves itself in

another, or in a higher connection, to be still a good, as a necessary

member in the purposeful structure of the whole. All imperfection

of the particular vanishes in the perfection of the universe ; every

discord is lost in the harmony of the world.

This universal optimism, whose theodicy is in its conceptions com

pletely Neo-Platonic in character, knows therefore but one proof

for the existence of God, the physico-theological. Nature bears

everywhere the marks of the artist, who has unfolded the loveli

ness of his own nature in the charm of phenomena with the highest

intelligence and sensitiveness. Beauty is the fundamental concep

tion of this Weltanschauung. Its admiration of the universe is

essentially aesthetic, and the taste of the cultivated man is, for

Shaftsbury, the basis of both religious and moral feeling. For

this reason his teleology also is the tasteful one of artistic apprehen

sion ; like Giordano Bruno he seeks the purposiveness of the uni

verse in the harmonious beauty of each of its individual structures.

All that is petty and utilitarian in teleological thought is here

stripped off, and a wave of poetic world-glorification that carries all

before it goes through Shaftesbury s writings. It was on this

account that they worked so powerfully upon the German poets,

upon Herder, 1 and upon Schiller. 2

3. Few, indeed, of the philosophers of the Enlightenment stand

upon this height. Voltaire and Diderot 3 allowed themselves at

first to be swept along to such an enthusiastic view of the world.

Maupertuis and Robinet had also something of the universalistic

tendency ; in Germany, Reimarus in his reflections concerning the

mechanical instincts of animals, shows at least a sensibility for the

artistically delicate detailed work of Nature and for the internal

1 Herder, Vom Erkennen rind Empfinden.

2 Schiller, Philisophische Briefe (Julius).

3 Particularly in the Pensees Philosophiqites.

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end which she realises in her organic structures. But the great

mass of the philosophical writers of the eighteenth century is so

controlled by the anthropological interest and the practical aims of

philosophy that it investigates rather the uses which the arrangement

of the universe and the activities of its parts yield for the wants of

man; and if those of higher temper have in view principally the

furthering and perfecting of the moral nature, they still do not

despise the point of view of usefulness and every-day " happiness."

Thus aesthetic teleology is cut off by the Stoic doctrine of utility,

and the technical analogy, with which men like Leibniz, Newton,

and Clarke had thought of the subordination of mechanism to teleol

ogy, could not but be favourable to this utilitarian conception. For

the purposiveness of machines consists just in yielding an advan

tage, just in the fact that their product is something else, something

in addition to their own working. And this analogy was quite

welcome also to the " Enlighteners," who frequently praised the

harmony of their philosophy with natural science ; they employed

this mode of view as against the conception of miracle found in

positive religion. Reimarus, too, held that only bunglers need to

assist their machines afterwards, and that it is unworthy of perfect

intelligence to come into such a position. But if it was asked what

the end of the world-machine is, the answer of the Enlightenment

was, the happiness of man, or perhaps at most, that of created beings

in general. This trade in the small wares of usefulness (Nutzlich-

keitskramerei) was carried out in the most tasteless manner in the

German Enlightenment. Wolff s empirical teleology (Designs of

Natural Things) excites one s mirth by the petty points of view

which he assigns to the creative intelligence, and the Popular Phil

osophers vied with each other in portraying in broad and pleasing

pictures the neat and comfortable way in which this universe is

fitted up for the homo sapiens, and how well one may live in it if

he bears himself well.

A nobler thought, even at that time, was that of Kant, when in

his Natural History of the Heavens he adopted the Leibnizo-New-

tonian conception, but left behind all that talk about the use of the

world for man, and directed his look toward the perfection which

displays itself in the infinite multiplicity of the heavenly bodies,

and in the harmony of their systematic constitution; and with him,

by the side of the happiness of creatures, appears always their

ethical perfecting and elevation. But he, too, esteems the physico-

theological \* proof for the existence of God as that which is the most

1 This term points back into the seventeenth century, and seems to have

CHAP. 1, 35. J Natural Religion : Kant, Leibniz. 491

impressive for man, though he grants strict cogency as little to this

as to the cosmological and ontological. The popular philosophy, on

the contrary, had its favourite just in this proof, and it forms a gen

eral characteristic of natural religion.

4. The presupposition of this course of thought was the convic

tion that the world is really so perfect and purposive as to support

the proof in question. Believing souls brought this conviction with

them, and the literature of the eighteenth century proves that it was

assumed without question in wide circles as a valid premise of the

argument; sceptical minds demanded that this also should be dem

onstrated, and so roused the problems of theodicy. In most cases

the Enlightenment philosophy resorted here to the same (ancient)

arguments which Shaftesbury brought into the field, but the scep

tical-orthodox method, of pointing to the limited nature of human

knowledge and to the darkness in the ways of Providence, was not

despised.

A new turn was given to theodicy by Leibniz. He had been

brought by Bayle s incisive criticism to the necessity of adding

experimental proof to his system of Monadology by showing the

perfection of the universe. Setting in motion to this end the high

est conceptions of his metaphysics, he attempted to show that the

actual presence of evil in the world does not make out a case against

its having originated from an all-good and all-powerful creative

activity. Physical evil, he maintains, is a necessary consequence

of moral evil in the ethical world order ; it is the natural punish

ment of sin. Moral evil, however, has its ground in the finiteness

and limitation of creatures, and this latter is metaphysical evil. As

a finite thing the monad has obscure and confused sensuous repre

sentations or ideas, and from these follow necessarily the obscure

and confused sensuous impulses, which are the motives to sin. The

problem of theodicy is thus reduced to the question, Why did God

create or permit metaphysical evil ?

The answer to this question is very simple. Finiteness belongs

to the conception of a created being; limitation is the essential

nature of all creatures. It is a logical necessity that a world can

exist only out of finite beings which reciprocally limit each other

and are determined by their creator himself. But finite beings are

imperfect. A world that should consist of nothing but perfect

beings is a contradiction in terms. And since it is also an " eter

nal," that is, a conceptional or rational truth, that out of metaphysi-

aris.-n from the Neo-Platonic circles in England. Samuel Parker published in

Kit! .) Tentamina Physico-theologica de Deo, and William Derham, in 1713, a

Physico-theology.

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cal evil follows first moral and further physical evil, that out of

iiniteness follows sin, and out of sin sorrow, it is then a logical

necessity that a world without evil is unthinkable. However much,

therefore, the goodness of God might desire to avoid evil, the

divine wisdom, the " region des verites eternelles" makes a world

without evil an impossibility. Metaphysical truths are independ

ent of the divine will; the latter in its creative activity is bound

to them.

But, on the other hand, the goodness, which belongs to the con

ception of God as truly as does his wisdom, is a guarantee that the

evils are as few as possible. The world is contingent, i.e. it may be

thought as being other than it is. There is an infinite number of

possible worlds, none of them entirely without evil, but some

affected with much more numerous and heavy evils than others.

If now from among all these possible worlds, which God s wisdom

spread out before him, he created this actual world, it can only have

been the choice of the best that guided him iu so doing; he has

made real the one which contains the least and the fewest evils.

The contingency of the world consists in the fact that it exists, not

with metaphysical necessity, but through a choice exercised among

many possibilities ; and since this choice proceeds from the all-good

will of God, it is unthinkable that the world is any other than the

best. Theodicy cannot proceed to deny the evil in the world, for

evil belongs to the very idea of the world ; but it can prove that this

world contains as little evil as is in any way possible in accordance

with metaphysical law. God s goodness would gladly have pro

duced a world without evil, but his wisdom permitted him only the

best among possible worlds.

Hence arises the common expression, optimism. Whether this

experimental proof of the physico-theological view of the world

succeeds, may be left undecided. The eighteenth century con

ceived of the matter as though it was the essential aim of Leibniz

to prove that the world is the most perfect that can be thought;

that he did this only under the presupposition of the metaphysical

necessity of evil, was, in characteristic fashion, scarcely noted in

the literature of that time, which itself was through and through

" optimistic " in its thought. In a historical aspect the most note

worthy thing in this theodicy is the peculiar mixture of Thomist

and Scotist metaphysics. The world is such as it is only because

God has so willed it ; by virtue of his omnipotence he might have

chosen another ; but in the choice of the possibilities before him

the divine will is bound to the divine intellect as the "eternal

truths." Above all reality hovers the fate prescribed by logic.

CHAP. 1, ;$-&gt;.] Natural Religion: Voltaire, Diderot. 493

5. In the forms hitherto developed the teachers of natural religion

believed that they could attain along the physico-theological path to

the conception of the deity as creative intelligence, and for this

phase of the development the name Deism is customarily employed.

The conception of God as personality, which survived in this pro

cedure as the last remnant from positive religion, offered a hold for

the moral side also of natural religion, and in turn found in that its

support. But where only the theoretical element was pursued, nat

ural religion found itself involved in the course of development

taken by naturalistic metaphysics, and found in this finally its

downfall. Toland already gave a completely pantheistic turn to the

admiration of Nature, which for him constituted the essential con

tent of religious feeling, and with the hylozoism which developed

among the French natural scientists (of. 34, 9) the transcendence

of God, as well as his personality, was at an end ; and when then

the complete dominance of the mechanical explanation of Nature

was proclaimed, when the organic world also was recognised as in

principle the product of the universal mechanism of Nature, the

physico-theological proof lost its power over the mind. In addition

to this the premises of the argument were questioned. The Lisbon

earthquake (1755) which shocked all Europe made many waver in

their ideas of the perfection and adaptedness of the world s ar

rangement ; the indifference with which Nature destroys human life

and all its content of ends and worth seemed to speak much more

for a blind necessity in all that takes place than for a teleological

disposition of the world-process. Voltaire, in whom this revolution

in point of view became complete, began in Candide to make sport

of the " best of possible worlds," and the element of natural philos

ophy in natural religion crumbled to pieces.

The Sy steme de la Nature drew the last consequences with its

atheism and materialism. All adaptation, all order of Nature, is only

a phenomenon in the human mind. Nature itself knows only the

necessity of atomic motion, and in it there are no icorth-determina-

tions, which are dependent upon ends or norms of value. Nature s

conformity to law is active with the same rigour in those things

which appear to us aimless or unpurposive, irregular or anomalous,

as in the things which we judge with reference to their agreement

with our designs or customs, and approve as purposeful. The wise

man should make this indifference of Nature his own ; he should see

through the relativity of all conceptions of ends; there is no real

norm or order. This principle was applied by Diderot to aesthetics.

The correctness of Nature is accordingly the only thing that art

should display, the only thing that it should grasp and give back ;

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beauty is one of those valuations which have no objective validity.

Materialism knows only an art void of ideals, only the indifferent

copy of any reality whatever.

6. While the foundations of Deism based on natural philosophy

were thus crumbling from within, its epistemological basis began

also to waver ; for all attacks upon the possibility of a metaphysics

struck also at that of a natural religion, which indeed in its contents

exhibited but a survival of religious metaphysics. In this respect

the Baconian system was the most dangerous foe of the deistic doc

trine. It allowed religion to stand only as revelation and combated

the possibility of knowing its doctrines by the aid of reason, or even

of merely bringing them into accord with reason. No one supported

this standpoint more energetically than Pierre Bayle. He worked

systematically to show that all dogmatic doctrines were contrary to

reason ; he laid bare their contradictions with penetrating keenness ;

he sought to .prove that they were absurd for the natural reason.

But he uncovered, also, the weak points in Deism ; he denied the

cogency of the philosophical arguments for the existence of God and

the immortality of the soul, and took special occasion in connection

with the problems of theodicy to prove the inadequacy of the "nat

ural light " : even in controversy with Leibniz he was not worsted.

Religion is, therefore, possible for him only as positive revelation

in contradiction with philosophical knowledge. He defends with

all keenness the twofold truth. And therefore, although perhaps

for himself he might have credit for a faith contrary to reason,

his writings and especially the articles of his much read Dictionnaire

were not less dangerous to the theoretical doctrines of positive relig

ion than to those of Deism.

Finally Hume, also, on epistemological grounds dissolved the

union which the other English empiricists and nominalists, and

indeed, even the materialists, like Hartley and Priestley, sought to

maintain with natural religion. If there is no metaphysics of things

at all, philosophical religion falls also. Hume, indeed (as Cleanthes

in the dialogue), acknowledges in the spirit of his practical prob-

abilism that the world on the whole makes the incontestable impres

sion of purposiveness and rational order, and finds, therefore, that

that belief, on which all our experience rests, is applicable also to

the (physico-theological) assumption of a unity in creation and in

the direction of the whole. But from the standpoint of science

(as Philo) he cannot regard this belief as capable of being estab

lished by reason. In particular he asserts, in accordance with the

principles of the theory of probability, that it is quite explicable,

even on the hypothesis of a purely mechanical theory, that amid

CHAP. 1, 35.] Natural Religion : Bayle, Hume. 495

the countless combinations of atoms, one which was durable, pur-

posive, and well ordered should at last come about and become fixed.

So the case remains with a problematical decision. Natural religion

is a reasonable mode of view for the practical man, but it should

not profess to be a scientific doctrine.

7. The more the metaphysical factor in Deism retreated for these

or other reasons, the more the " true Christianity," which Deism

professed to be, became restricted to a moral conviction. This had

been already prepared by Herbert of Cherbury, who stood farther

removed from natural philosophy, and had been quite definitely

expressed by Spinoza. According to this view the essence of

religion consists in moral action, and the religious life has for its

true content, deliberation upon duty, and the seriousness of a con

duct of life determined by this. This in itself alone gave but very

pale and vanishing lines for a Weltanschauung. There remained an

indefinite idea of an all-good God, who created man for happiness,

who should be worshipped by a virtuous life, and who will exercise

an equalising justice in an eternal life, so that such virtue will

receive the reward which is lacking to it here. No one will fail to

notice the pure, noble thought which lived in this moralising Deism,

or the high value which belongs to it historically, because in opposi

tion to the one-sidedness and strife of confessional zeal it brought

the ideals of toleration and philanthropy, respect for the purely

human appreciation of the ethical disposition, and modesty in per

sonal opinion, to a position of honour in literature and social life.

But, on the other hand, it is also true that there has never been a

more meagre form of religious life than this. Its religion has no

taste of earth, and with the mysteries which the Enlightenment

would not tolerate, understanding for the depths of religious life

was lost also. There is nothing more of anxiety for the soul s salva

tion, of the struggle for redemption, of the ardent feeling of deliver

ance. Deism, therefore, failed in vital religious power; it was an

artificial product of cultured society, and when the German En-

lighteners wrote books to preach the deistic morals to children,

they only proved how little they understood of real religion.

Among the great mass of the supporters of this standpoint in

the "popidar philosophy " all possible degrees of uncertainty prevail

as to how far those moral remnants of the religious view of the

world are still capable of a theoretical grounding, and how far they

are to be regarded as merely constituents of the ethical conscious

ness. Full clearness on this point rules in Voltaire s later thought.

Here he has been so far seized upon by Bayle s scepticism as to

acknowledge no longer any metaphysical authorisation : the deity

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and immortality are now for him only valid as postulates of the

moral feeling ; i aith in them is regarded as only the condition for

moral action. If this belief should perish, the motives for honest

conduct, and thus the foundations of social order, would, he thinks,

perish with it: si Dieu n exista.it pas, il faudrait I inventer.

8. Different as are these individual forms in which natural relig

ion developed, they all agree on one point, in their depreciatory

criticism of positive religions. Only that is regarded as true in

these religions, in which they all agree with each other and with

natural religion ; all that is taught beyond this, with an appeal to a

special revelation, the deists turn from the door, and it was pre

cisely in this respect that they called themselves /ree thinkers. The

claims made by the revelational doctrine encountered, therefore, an

especially vigorous contradiction. Collins refuted the proof from

prophecy, Woolston the proof from miracles, both by seeking to

give for the corresponding accounts in the religious documents a

natural explanation so far as possible. This attempt, which aimed

not to involve in doubt the credibility of the biblical narratives, but

to explain them by purely natural causes, frequently in a very fan

tastic fashion and excluding all that is mysterious and supernatural,

has been characterised and employed in Germany especially as

rationalistic interpretation. It was here, too, that Reimarus, in his

Schutzschrift, proceeded in the sharpest manner against the possi

bility of revelation, which he declared to be superfluous, unthinkable,

and untrue. Others directed their criticism against individual doc

trines of dogmatics. Diderot attacked the moral attributes in the

Christian conception of God, and Voltaire exercised his wit in un

sparing derision of the dogmas and ceremonies of all religions and

Confessions.

But in his case also there was at bottom the earnest thought,

that all these additions of the positive religions were so many

obscurations and corruptions of the true religion, for which, like

the other deists, he felt called to contend. They were filled with

the conviction that natural religion is an inheritance of all men, a

conviction set within the nature of man himself, and that it was,

therefore, the original state of the religious life. From this point

of view all positive religions appear as depraved forms which have

entered in the course of history, and a progress in the history of

religion consists, therefore, in every case in nothing but a return

to the primitive, pure, and uncorrupted religion. Hence according

to Tindal the true Christianity, which coincides with Deism, is as

old as creation. Jesus did not bring a revelation, he only rehabili

tated the true worship of God in the face of the decay of the

CHAP. 1, 35.] Natural Religion : Deists, Hume. 497

ancient religions ; but the Christian churches have again corrupted

his work, and free-thinking desires to return to him. So, too, Lessing

distinguished between Christianity and the religion of Christ.

If now it was asked, what were the causes that brought about

this distortion of true religion, the Enlighteners were entirely

devoid of any historical comprehension for these : what they held

to be false seemed to them possible only through voluntary inven

tion. They were so strongly convinced of the evidence that their

Deism was the only true system, that all other teachings seemed to

them explicable only by lying and deceit, and that the proclaimed

of these seemed to have acted only in their own interests. It is

then the general doctrine of the deists that the historical basis of

positive religions is invention and deceit. Even Shaftesbury knew

no other way of explaining how enthusiasm, which constitutes true

religion, could be distorted to the fanaticism of superstition. The

hatred of priests felt by the Enlighteners was most sharply ex

pressed on this point also in the Schutzschrift of Reimarus.

9. Such incapacity to do justice to the historical nature of posi

tive religions agreed well with the universal lack in historical sense

and understanding which was peculiar to the whole philosophy of

the Enlightenment. This had its ground in the fact that modern

thought had made its growth, hand in hand with natural science,

in investigating that which is either tunelessly or always valid.

Only in a few instances was this ban broken through.

This was done first and with clearest consciousness by David

Hume. While he found that religion cannot be based upon demon

strative rational knowledge, he showed also that the question as

to the origin of religion in the human mind must be completely

separated from the speculative investigation. This new question

he treated solely in accordance with psychological principles, as a

"Natural History of Religion." He shows how in the primitive

apprehension of Nature and in the feelings of fear and hope, of

terror and of blessing, which are associated with it, and in the com

parison of the course of Nature with the vicissitudes of human life,

there lay the incitements to the formation of ideas of higher beings,

and to worship designed to appease or to flatter. The natural,

primitive form of religion is, therefore, polytheism, which thinks

and treats these higher powers in a completely anthropomorphic

manner. But the manifold forms assumed by myth fuse in accord

ance with the laws of the association of ideas ; myths pass over into

each other, and ultimately the whole body of religious ideas becomes

condensed into the belief in a single divine being, to whom the pur

poseful order of the universe is due, a faith, to be sure, which

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cannot preserve itself in a pure form, but is associated in various

ways with its original presuppositions. The history of religion is

the gradual transformation of polytheism into monotheism, and its

result coincides with that teleological view of the world which

Hume had developed as the view of the intelligent man, not, indeed,

capable of scientific proof, but bound up with the natural feeling of

belief.

This mode of apprehending the subject from the point of view of

psychology and the history of civilisation was reinforced by that

from the point of view of philology and the history of literature,

which found expression in the historical biblical criticism founded by

Salomon Semler. This began to carry out the thought formulated

by Spinoza, 1 that the biblical books must be treated just as other

writings as regards their theoretical contents, their origin, and their

history ; that they must be understood from the point of view of

their time and the character of their authors. Semler directed par

ticular attention to the point that the different parties of the early

Christians find expression in the books of the New Testament.

While it may be that the hypotheses to which he came in this

respect have been left behind by later science, it is nevertheless true

that a scientific way out of the radicalism into which the deistic

movement had run was here shown, and Semler therefore raised his

voice against the spokesmen of the Enlightenment.

Lessing took part in these questions from still another side. He

was certainly not the man to make his conviction bend to a tenet;

he saw through and rejected, as few others, the limitation which

will find its sole truth in that which has been transmitted histori

cally ; but he guarded himself well from playing the judge, who

now, after thousands of years, shall decide as to the genuine

ness of the three rings. But it is not merely this that separates

him from the great mass of the Enlighteners ; he is himself a deep,

religious nature, and, like Herder, 2 sees in religion a living relation

of man to God, and God to man. Hence religion is not possible with

out revelation, and the history of religions is the series of the revela

tions of God, is the education of the human race by God. Lessing

assumes the well-planned succession of these revelations to be such,

1 In what degree Spinoza s writings were known to the religious Enlighteners

in Germany appears, among other tilings, from the interesting fact that Lorenz

Schmidt, the leader of the Wertheim translation of the Bible, is the anonymous

editor of a book in which, under the mask of a "Refutation of the Doctrine of

Spinoza by the Famous Philosopher Christian Wolff," an excellent translation

of Spinoza s Ethics is offered, and finally only a few paragraphs from Wolff s

German writings are appended (printed Frankfort and Leips. 1744).

2 Cf. Herder s treatise on the Adteste Urkunde de.s MenschengescMechts.

CHAP. 1, 35.] Natural Religion : Lessiwj, Herder. 499

that the deeper meaning of each is unfolded more clearly and dis

tinctly in that which follows. So even the New Testament, the

second elementary book, over which the more advanced scholar now

" stamps and glows," gives us a premonition of an eternal gospel.

In carrying out this thought of Origen s, 1 Lessing indicates in but

a tentative manner indefinite lines which lie in the direction of a

mystico-speculative interpretation of dogmas.

1 Education of the Human Bace, 72 ff.

## CHAPTER II. PRACTICAL QUESTIONS.

THE natural religion of the eighteenth century sought in morals

the support which a metaphysics of the natural-science sort could

not permanently afford it. This was possible by reason of the fact,

that in the meantime this branch also of philosophical investigation

had won its complete independence of positive religion. And in

fact, this freeing process, which had already begun in the train of

the religiously indifferent metaphysics of the seventeenth century,

had completed itself in a relatively speedy and simple manner. But

the peculiar character of the new age asserted itself here also, in the

very early transfer of the point of interest in these investigations to

the psychological domain ; and here philosophy encountered the lit

erary inclination of the age, which was directed toward a profounder

employment of man with himself, toward an overhauling of his feel

ings and an analysing of his motives, and toward the "sentimental"

fostering of personal relations. The individual revelling in his own

inner life, the monad enjoying self, is the characteristic phenomenon

of the age of the Enlightenment. The individualism of the Renais

sance, which in the seventeenth century had been repressed by exter

nal forces, now broke forth again with a more inward power from

the stiff dignity of ceremonious, formal life : bounds were to be

broken through, externalities cast away, and the pure, natural life

of man brought out.

But the more important the individual thus became to himself, and

the more many-sided his view in weighing questions regarding the

import of his true happiness, the more morality, society, and the

state became to him a problem. How comes the individual so

runs the fundamental practical question of the Enlightenment phil

osophy to a life connected with others, which extends in influence

and authority beyond the individual himself ? Through all the ani

mated discussions of these problems goes, as a tacit assumption, the

view that the individual in his natural (as it was always conceived)

determinate character is the original datum, is that which is self-

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intelligible, and that all the relations which go beyond the individual

are to be explained from him as a starting-point. In so far the natu

ralistic metaphysics of the seventeenth century thought here more

after the analogy of atomism, there more after that of the Monad-

ology forms the background for the morals of the eighteenth.

The constantly progressing process in which these presuppositions

became more clear and distinct brought with it the result, that the

principles of ethics found a valuable clearing up in the discussions

of this period. For inasmuch as the ethical life was regarded

as something added to the natural essence of the individual, as some

thing that must first be explained, it was necessary, on the one hand,

to establish by an exact discrimination what the thing to be ex

plained really is, and on the other hand, to investigate on what the

worth and validity of the ethical life rests : and the more morality

appeared to be something foreign to the natural essence of the indi

vidual, the more the question as to the motives which induce man

to follow ethical commands asserted itself, side by side with the

question as to the ground of the validity of those commands. And

so three main questions appeared, at the beginning much involved,

and then becoming complicated anew : what is the content of

morality ? on what rests the validity of the moral laws ? what

brings man to moral action ? The principles of morals are set forth

according to the three points of view of the criterion, the sanction,

and the motive. This analysis and explanation, however, showed

that the various answers to these separate questions were capable of

being combined with each other in the most various ways : so the

clearing and separating process above named results precisely from

the motley variety and changing hues exhibited by the doctrines of

moral philosophy in the eighteenth century. Shaflesbury stands in

the centre of the movement as the mind that stimulates in all direc

tions and controls in many lines ; while, on the other hand, the move

ment reaches no definite conclusion in this period, on account of the

differences in the statements of the question (cf. 39) .

A typical feature of the fundamental individualistic tendency of

this ethics was the repeatedly renewed consideration of the relation

of virtue and happiness : the final outcome, expressed more or less

sharply, was that the satisfaction of the individual s impulses was

raised to be the standard of value for the ethical functions. The

system of practical philosophy built up upon this principle is

Utilitarianism, the varied development of which forms the centre in

the complicated courses of these reflections.

But out of this arose the much more burning question, as regards

the political and social order, the question, namely, as to the value

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for happiness of the social union, of public institutions and their

historical development. That which exists and has come into being

historically has lost once more its immediate validity and naive

valuation : it should justify itself before the critical consciousness,

and prove its right to existence by the advantages which it yields

for the happiness of individuals. From this point of view was

developed the political and social philosophy of the eighteenth cen

tury ; upon this standpoint this philosophy assumed its critical

attitude toward historical reality, and in accordance with this

standard, finally, it examined the results of the historical progress of

human civilisation. The worth of civilisation itself and the relation

of Nature and history became thus a problem which received its most

impressive formulation from Rousseau, and which, in opposition to

the movements excited by him, and in conjunction with the con

vulsions of the Revolution, gave form to the beginnings of the

Philosophy of History.

### 36. The Principles of Morals.

Fr. Schleiermacher, Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre (1803),

W. W. III. Vol. 1.

H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (4th ed., Lond. and N.Y. 1890).

[J. Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, Vol. II.]

[W. L. Courtney, Constructive Ethics (Lond. 1886).]

THE most fruitful incitements to the discussion of ethical prob

lems proceeded in both positive and negative directions from Hobbes.

The "selfish system" propounded by him extended its influence

throughout the entire eighteenth century. It was carried out into

all of its consequences, and was an ever-powerful stimulus to draw

out opposing theories, which just for this reason were also dependent

upon it. In a certain sense this is true of Cumberland, who indeed

defended the validity of ethical laws as eternal truths in opposition

to psychological relativity, and yet at the same time would have the

universal welfare regarded as their essential and determining con

tent.

1. The position of Locke with reference to these questions is still

less definitely formulated than his attitude with regard to theoreti

cal questions. No doubt the treatment of practical principles

occupies almost the larger space in his attack upon "innate ideas,"

as is natural from the fact that his opposition is there directed

against the Platonism of the Cambridge school. But the positive

indications upon ethical subjects (and indeed there is nothing that

goes beyond indications), which are found scattered through his

CHAP. 2, 36.] Principles of Morals : Locke. 503

writings, do not in any important degree transcend mere psycholo-

gism. Locke regards the moral judgment as demonstrative knowl

edge, because it has for its object a relation, namely, the agreement

or non-agreement of a man s action with a law [" conformity or

disagreement men s voluntary actions have to a rule, to which they

are referred, and by which they are judged of"]. 1 Accordingly the

imperative character seems essential for ethics. The existence of

such norms, however, presupposes not only a law-giver, but also his

power to visit obedience to his laws with a reward, and disregard of

them with punishment ; for only through the expectation of these

consequences, Locke holds, can a law work upon the will.

If the philosopher was certain of not deviating from the "com

mon sense " of the average man with such principles, he was equally

secure in the three instances which he adduces of the law-giving

authority, public opinion, the state, and God. And in the high

est of these instances he found again the point of attachment for

the remnant of Cartesian metaphysics which his empiricism had

preserved. For identically the same will of God is known by reve

lation and by the " natural light " (according to Locke s philosophy

of religion; cf. 35, 1). The law of God is the law of Nature. But

its content is, that the order of Nature fixed by God attaches inju

rious consequences to certain actions, and useful consequences to

others, and that therefore the former are forbidden, the latter com

manded. Thus the moral law gains a metaphysical root without

losing its utilitarian content.

2. The need of a metaphysical basis of morals asserted itself also

in other forms, and in part in a still stronger degree, though it was

common to the whole Cartesian school to regard right will as the

necessary and inevitable consequences of right insight. In this

respect Cartesianism was seconded by the whole throng of Platonists,

who were so hostile to it in natural philosophy at first, Henry

More 2 and Cudworth, 3 later, especially, Richard Price. 4 They all

proceeded from the thought that the moral law is given with the

inmost nature of reality which has proceeded forth from God, and

that it is therefore written with eternal and unchangeable letters in

every reasonable being. With much enthusiasm but with few new

arguments, they defended the Stoic-Platonic doctrine in its Christian-

theistic transformation.

1 Cf. Essay cone. Hum. Un., II. 28, 4 ff.

2 Encheiri dion Ethicum (16t&gt;7).

3 Whose Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality was first pub

lished by Chandler, in 1731.

4 Questions and Difficulties in Morals (Lond. 1758).

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This intellectualism, in connection with rationalistic metaphysics,

took a direction that was widely removed from the Scotist recourse

to the divine will which had been revived by Descartes and still

more by Locke, and instead of this proceeded to determine the

content of the moral law solely by metaphysical relations, and,

accordingly, in the last instance, by logical criteria. Just in this

appeared its contrast to all the psychologically influenced theories,

which, in some form or other, always returned to feelings of pleas

ure and pain as the central nerve of ethical determinations. This

is clearest in the case of Clarke, who professed to find the objective

principle of morals in the " fitness " of an action to its determining

relations, and who claimed for the knowledge of this fitness a self-

evidence analogous to the knowledge of mathematical truth, and in

the Cartesian spirit was convinced that the feeling of obligation,

by which the will is determined to the appropriate action, develops

inevitably from such an insight into the fitness of things./ Ethical

inferiority, accordingly, appeared quite in the ancient fashion (cf.

7, 6) to be the result of ignorance or of erroneous opinion. Wol-

laston, stimulated by Clarke, gave to the same thought the turn,

that since every action involves a (theoretical) judgment as to its

underlying relations, the decision as to whether the act is right or

wrong in the ethical sense depends upon the Tightness (correctness)

or wrongness of this judgment.

3. Pierre Bayle takes a peculiar position with reference to these

questions : he supports a rationalism without any metaphysical back

ground. In his case the interest of fixing morals upon a firm basis,

as opposed to all dependence upon dogmatic doctrines, was active in

the strongest and most radical manner. While in declaring meta

physical knowledge in general to be impossible he opposed the

rational grounding of natural religion as well as that of positive

dogma, he yet gave back with full hands to the " reason " in the

practical domain what he had taken from it in the theoretical realm.

Incapable of knowing the essence of things, the human reason is,

according to him, completely furnished with the consciousness of

its duty : powerless without, it is complete master of itself.^ What

it lacks in science it has in conscience : a knowledge of eternal and

unchangeable truth.

The ethical reason, Bayle holds therefore, remains everywhere

the same, however different men, peoples, and times may be in their

theoretical insight. He teaches for the first time with clear con

sciousness the practical reason s complete independence of the theo

retical; but this, too, he is glad to bring to its sharpest point with

reference to theology. Revelation and faith are regarded by him in

CHAP. 2, 36.] Principles of Morals : Clarke, Bayle. 505

the Catholic manner as essentially theoretical illumination, and just

on this account they seem to him to be indifferent for morality. He

admired the ethical excellence of ancient heathenism, and believed

in the possibility of a morally well-ordered community of atheists.

While, therefore, his theoretical scepticism might seem favourable

to the Church, his moral philosophy was necessarily attacked as her

most dangerous foe.

If the ethical principles were in this discussion proclaimed by

Bayle also as " eternal truths," he did it in the original Cartesian

sense, where interest centered not so much about the psychological

question of innateness, as rather about the epistemological point of

view of immediate evidence not brought about through the medium

of logic. In this sense the virtual innateness of ethical truths was

held of course by Leibniz, and it was in the spirit of both that Vol

taire, who approached Bayle s standpoint the more in proportion as

his attitude toward metaphysics became more sceptical (cf. 35, 5),

said of the ethical principles that they were innate in man just as

his limbs were : he must learn to use both by experience.

4. Bayle very likely had the support of general opinion when he

ascribed to the ethical convictions a worth exalted above all change

and all difference of theoretical opinions; but he was successful,

perhaps, just because he treated those convictions as something

known to all, and did not enter upon the work of bringing their

content into a system, or of expressing them as a unity. Whoever

attempted this seemed hardly able to dispense with a principle

taken either from metaphysics or from psychology.

Such a determination of the conceptions of morality by a principle

was made possible by the metaphysics of Leibniz, though it was only

prepared by him incidentally and by way of indications, and was

first carried out by Wolff in systematic, but also in cruder forms.

The Monadology regards the universe as a system of living beings,

whose restless activity consists in unfolding and realising their

original content. In connection with this Aristotelian conception

the Spinozistic fundamental idea of the " suum esse conservare" (cf.

32, 6) becomes transformed into that of a purposeful vocation

or destiny, which Leibniz and his German disciples designated as

perfection. 1 The "law of Nature," which for this ontology also is

coincident with the moral law, is the striving of all beings toward

perfection. Since now every process of perfecting, as such, is con

nected with pleasure, and every retrogression in life s development

with pain, there follows from this the ancient identification of the

ethically good with well-being or happiness.

1 Leibniz, Monad. 41 ff.

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Natural law, therefore, demands of man that he should do all

that serves his perfection, and forbids all that threatens to bring

him loss in his perfection. From this thought Wolff develops the

whole system of duties, bringing to his aid especially the principle

of mutual furtherance : man needs for his own perfecting other

men, and works toward his own perfection in helping them toward

the fulfilment of their vocation. In particular, however, it followed

from these premises that man must know what truly conduces to

his perfecting ; for not all that is momentarily felt to be a further

ance of life proves truly and permanently a step toward perfection.

Hence morality is throughout in need of ethical knowledge, of

right insight into the nature of man and things. From this point of

view the enlightenment or "clearing up" of the understanding appears

the pre-eminent ethical task. With Leibniz this follows immediately

from the conception of the monad. 1 The monad is the more perfect,

and perfection Leibniz defines in genuine scholastic fashion as

grandeur de la realite positive, the more it shows its activity in

clear and distinct representations ; the natural law of its develop

ment is the clearing up of its original obscure representative content

(cf. 31, 11). Wolff s circumstantial deduction takes rather the

form of pointing out in experience the useful consequences of

knowledge. It remains thus quite within the setting of the homely

aim which the German teacher-philosopher (Kathederphilosoph) set

before his scientific work, viz. to make philosophy usable and prac

tically efficient, by clearness of conceptions and plainness of proofs.

5. This tendency Wolff had adopted from his teacher Thomasius,

the father of the Enlighteners, a man who was indeed wanting in

the pre-eminence that characterised the mind of Leibniz, but was

given all the more an understanding for the wants of his time, a

capacity for agitation, and a spirit for efforts toward the public

good. Intellectual movements of the Renaissance that had been

checked in the seventeenth century revived again at its close.

Thomasius would transplant philosophy from the lecture hall into

real life, put it into the service of the general weal; and since he

understood little of natural science, his interest turned toward

criticism of public institutions. Eeason only should rule in the life

of the whole, as well as in that of the individual : so he fought honour

ably and victoriously against superstition and narrowness, against

torture and witch-trials. Enlightenment in the sense of Thomasius

is hence far from having the metaphysical dignity which Leibniz

gave it. It gains its value for individuals and for society first by

the uses which it yields and which can be expected from it alone.

Cf. Leibniz, Monad. 48 ff.

CHAP. 2, 36.] Principles of Morals : Wolff, Thomasius. 507

Perfection and utility are accordingly the two characteristics which

with Wolff make Enlightenment an ethical principle. The former

conies out more strongly in connection with the general metaphysical

basis ; the latter in the particular building out of the system. And

in the same way this duality of criteria goes through Wolff s school

and the whole popular philosophy, only, the more superficial the

doctrines become, the broader the space taken by utility. Even

Mendelssohn gives as the reason for turning aside from all deeper

and more refined subtilty, that philosophy has to treat only just so

much as is necessary for man s happiness. But because this eudae-

monism of the Enlightenment had from the outset no higher point

of view than that of the education and welfare of the average man,

it fell into another limitation, the most jejune philistinism and sen

sible, prosaic commonplace. This might be in place and most

beneficial in effect in a certain stratum of popular literature, not

high, indeed, but broad; but when such a success on the part of the

Enlighteners "went to their heads," when they applied the same

measuring rod to the great phenomena of society and history, when

this excessive pride of the empirical understanding would allow

nothing to stand except what it had known "clearly and distinctly,"

then the noble features of the Enlightenment became distorted to

that well-intentioned lack of comprehension, as type of which

Friedrich Nicolai, with all his restless concern for the public good,

became a comic figure. 1

6. The great mass of the German Enlighteners did not suspect

how far they were wandering from the living spirit of the great

Leibniz with this dry\* utility of abstract rules. Wolff, indeed, had

already let the pre-established harmony fall metaphysically also,

and so proved that the finest meaning of the Monadology had re

mained hidden from him. Hence he and his successors had no

comprehension for the fact, that Leibniz s principle of perfection

made the unfolding of the content of the individual life and the shap

ing out of its dimly felt originality, the task of the ethical life, in

the same degree as his metaphysics asserted the peculiar nature of

each individual being in the face of all others. This side of the

matter first came into power in Germany, when the period of genius

dawned in literature, and the passionate feeling of strongly indi

vidual minds sought its own theory. The form which it then found

in Herder s treatises, and likewise in Schiller s Philosophical Letters,

was, however, much more strongly determined by another doctrine

1 Cf. Fichte, Fr. Nicolafs Leben und sonderbare Meinungen (1801), W. W.

VIII. 1 ff.

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than it was by Leibniz, by a doctrine which, in spite of the dif

ference in the conceptions in which it was carried out, had in its

ethical temper the closest relationship with that of the German

metaphysician.

Shoftesbury had given to the idea of perfection a form that was

less systematic but all the more impressive and clear to the imagi

nation. The ancient conception of life, in accordance with which

morality coincides with the undisturbed unfolding of man s true and

natural essence, and therefore with his true fortune, was directly

congenial to him and became the living basis of his thought. Hence,

with Shaftesbury, the ethical appears as the truly human, as the

flower of man s life, as the complete development of his natural

endowments. In this is fixed at the outset Shaftesbury s attitude

toward Cumberland and Hobbes. He cannot, like the latter, regard

egoism as the sole fundamental characteristic of the natural man ;

he rather agrees with the former in recognising the altruistic incli

nations as an original inborn endowment. But neither can he see

in these inclinations the sole root of morality ; to him morality is

the completion of the entire man, and therefore he seeks its principle

in symmetrical development and in the harmonious interaction of the

two systems of impulses. This theory of morals does not demand

the suppression of one s own weal in favour of that of others ; such

a suppression appears to it to be necessary only in the lower stages

of development : the fully cultivated man lives as truly for himself

as for the whole, 1 and just by unfolding his own individual charac

ter does he set himself as a perfect member in the system of the

universe. Here Shaftesbury s optimism expresses itself most fully

in his belief, that the conflict between the egoistic and the altruistic

motives, which plays so large a part in the lower strata of humanity,

must be completely adjusted in the ripe, mature man.

But for this reason the ethical ideal of life is with this thinker

an entirely personal one. Morality consists for him, not in the

control of general maxims, not in the subordination of the individ

ual s will to norms or standards, but in the rich and full living out

of an entire individuality. It is the sovereign personality which

asserts its ethical right, and the highest manifestation in the ethical

realm is the virtuosoship, which allows none of the forces and none

of the lines of impulse in the individual s endowment to be stunted,

1 Pope compared this relation with the double motion of the planets about the

sun and their own axes (Essay on Man, III. 314 ff.). Moreover, it was through

tlie same poet that Shaftesbury s theory of life worked on Voltaire, while

Diderot (in his work upon the Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit) attached

himself directly to Shaftesbury.

CHAP. 2, 36.] Principles of Morals : Shaftesbury, Hutcheson. 509

but brings all the manifold relations into harmony in a perfect con

duct of life, and thus brings about both the individual s happiness

and his most efficient working for the welfare of the whole. Thus

the Greek ideal of the kalokagathia finds a new expression in the

Weltanschauung of the Monadology (cf. 7, 5).

7. While the moral principle has thus with Shaftesbury already

received an aesthetical colouring in its contents, this colouring ap

pears consistently in a yet stronger degree when he deals with the

question as to the source of knowledge for ethical tasks. This source,

by metaphysicians and sensualists alike, was found in rational knowl

edge either of the nature of things or of the empirically useful : in

both cases principles resulted that were capable of demonstration

and universally valid. The morals of virtuosoship, on the contrary,

must take its individual life-ideal from the depths of the individual

nature ; for it morality was grounded upon feeling. The ethical

judgments by which man approves those impulses which Nature has

implanted within him to further his own and others weal, or, on the

other hand, disapproves the "unnatural " impulses that work against

those ends, these judgments rest on man s ability to make his

own functions the object of study, i.e. upon "reflection" (Locke);

they are not merely, however, a knowledge of one s own states, but

are emotions of reflection, and as such they form within the " inner

sense " the moral sense.

Thus the psychological root of the ethical was transplanted from

the field of intellectual cognition to the feeling-side of the soul, and

set in the immediate vicinity of the aesthetic. The good appeared

as the beautiful in the world of will and action : it consists, like the

beautiful, in a harmonious unity of the manifold, in a perfect devel

opment of the natural endowments ; it satisfies and blesses as does

the beautiful ; it is, like the beautiful, the object of an original

approval fixed in man s deepest nature. This parallel ruled the

literature of the eighteenth century from Shaftesbury on : " taste "

is the fundamental faculty ethically as aesthetically. This was

perhaps most distinctly expressed by Hutcheson, but with a turn

which to some degree led away again from Shaftesbury s individual

ism. For he understood by the "moral sense" in the purely

psychological meaning of "innateness" an original faculty, essen

tially alike in all men, and with the function of judging what

is ethically to be approved. The metaphysical accessories of the

Platonists and Cartesians were gladly thrown overboard, and in

their stead he held fast the more eagerly especially in opposition

to the "selfish system" to the principle that man possesses a

natural feeling for the good as for the beautiful, and declared the

analysis of this feeling to be the business of philosophy.

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The carrying over of this principle into the theoretical domain

led in the Scottish School (cf . 33, 8) to making the True parallel with

the Good and the Beautiful, as the object of original approval, and

thus assuming in " common sense " a kind of " logical sense." But

the principle of feeling as source of knowledge was proclaimed in a far

more pronounced manner by Rousseau, who based his deism upon

the uncorrupted, natural feeling l of man, in opposition to the cool

intellectual analysis with which the purely theoretical Enlighten

ment treated the religious life. This feeling-philosophy was carried

out in a very indefinitely eclectic manner by the Dutch philosopher,

Franz Hemsterhuys (of Groeningen, 1720-1790), and with quaint

singularity by the talented enthusiast, Hamann, the " Wizard of the

North." 2

8. It was, however, in the fusion of ethical and cesthetic investiga

tions that the above theory of the feelings, prepared by Shaftesbury

and Hutcheson, made its influence most felt. The more the eudae-

monistic morals was treated in a manner intelligible to the common

mind, the more convenient it was for it to be able to invest the

moral commands, as the object of a natural pleasure, with the garb

of grace and attractiveness, and to be permitted to commend the

good to the taste as something akin to the beautiful. The Scottish

School, also, was not far from this mode of view, and Ferguson

developed Shaftesbury s ideas in this manner with especial reference

to the Leibnizian fundamental conception of perfection. The effect

of this complication of thought for aesthetics, however, was that the

beginnings toward a metaphysical treatment, which Shaftesbury

had brought to the problems of the beautiful from the system of

Plotinus, became completely overshadowed by the psychological

method. The question asked was not, what the beautiful is, but

how the feeling of the beautiful arises ; and in the solution of this

question the explanation of the aesthetic was brought into more or

less close connection with ethical relations. This shows itself, too,

in the case of those writers upon aesthetics who stood closer to

the sensualistic psychology than did the Scots. Thus Henry Home

conceives of the enjoyment of the beautiful as a transition from the

purely sensuous pacification of desires to the moral and intellectual

joys, and holds that the arts have been " invented " for that refine

ment of man s sensuous disposition which is requisite for his higher

1 Cf. the creed of the Savoyard Vicar in tfmile, IV. 201 ff.

2 Johann Georg Hamann (of Konigsberg, 1780-1788 ; collected writings ed.

by Gildemeister, Gotha, 1857-73) combines this line of thought with a pietism

not far removed from orthodoxy in his thoughtful, but illogical and unclear

form of expression.

CHAP. 2, 36.] Principles of Morals : Home, Burke. 511

destiny. He seeks, therefore, the realm of the beautiful in the

higher senses, hearing and especially sight, and finds as the basis,

a taste common to all men for order, regularity, and combination of

the manifold into a unity. When he then further distinguishes

between the "intrinsic" beauty which is immediately an "object

of sense," and the beauty of " relation," these relations look essen

tially toward what is for the common good ethically, in the ser

vice of which beauty is thus placed. 1 Even Edmund Burke, in his

effort to derive the aesthetic from elementary states of sensation

in accordance with the method of associational psychology, is very

strongly dependent upon the form given to the problems by contem

porary moral philosophy. His attempt to determine the relation

of the beautiful to the sublime a task at which Home, also, had

laboured, though with very little success 2 proceeds from the

antithesis of the selfish and the social impulses. That is held to

be sublime which fills us with terror in an agreeable shudder, "a

sort of delightful horror," while we are ourselves so far away that

we feel removed from the danger of immediate pain : that is beau

tiful, on the contrary, which is adapted to call forth in an agreeable

manner the feelings either of sexual love or of human love in

general.

In a manner similar to that of Home, Sulzer placed the feeling of

the beautiful midway between that of the sensuously agreeable and

that of the good, forming thus a transition from the one to the other.

The possibility of this transfer he found in the intellectual factor

which co-operates in our apprehension of the beautiful : it appeared

to him following the view of Leibniz (cf. 34, 11) as the

feeling of harmonious unity in the manifold perceived by the senses.

But just by reason of these presuppositions, the beautiful was for

him valuable and perfect only when it was able to further the

moral sense. Art, also, is thus drawn into the service of the morals

of the Enlightenment, and the writer on aesthetics, who was so long

celebrated in Germany, shows himself but a mechanical handicrafts

man of Philistine moralising in his conception of art and its task.

How infinitely freer and richer in esprit are the " Observations "

which Kant instituted "concerning the Feeling of the Beautiful and

the Sublime," at the time when he, too, pursued, from the psycho

logical standpoint, and with admirable knowledge of the world, the

1 For more detailed treatment, see the art. Home (Kames) by W. Windel-

band in Ersch und Gruber" 1 \* Enc., Vol. II. 32, 213 f.

2 According to Home the beautiful is sublime if it is great. The antithesis

between the qualitatively and the quantitatively pleasing seems to lie at the

basis of his unclear and wavering characterisations.

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fine ramifications of the ethical and aesthetic life in individuals,

families, and peoples !

Finally these thoughts gave occasion in Germany to a change in

psychological theory that was rich in results. Before this it had

been the custom to divide the psychical activities according to the

Aristotelian example into theoretical and practical. But now the

feelings, which became thus recognised in their various significance,

seemed incapable of being brought either into the group of knowing,

or into that of willing, without disadvantage ; it seemed rather that

the feelings, as a peculiar mode of expression, in part lay at the

basis, and in part followed, both of the above functions of the soul.

Here, too, the suggestion came from the Leibnizian Monadology.

Sulzer, in his Berlin lectures, 1 seems first to have pointed out that

the obscure, primitive states of the monad should be separated from

the developed forms of life seen in completely conscious knowing

and willing, and he already found the distinguishing characteristic

of these obscure states to be the conditions of pleasure and pain given

with them. This was done also, in a similar way, from Leibnizian

presuppositions by Jacob Friedrich Weiss. 2 Mendelssohn (1755)

first named these states Empfindungen\* [sensations], and later the

same author designated the psychical power, which lies at their

common basis, as the faculty of approval (Billigungsvermogen}. 4 But

the decisive influence on terminology was exercised by Tetens and

Kant. The former substituted for sensations (Empfindungen) the

expression feelings (Fuhlungen or Gefuhle), 5 and Kant used the latter

almost exclusively. It was he, too, who later made the triple divis

ion of the psychical functions into ideation, feeling, and willing ( Vor-

stellen, Fiihlen, und Wollen) the systematic basis of his philosophy, 6

and since then this has remained authoritative, especially for

psychology.

9. The counter-current, which proceeded from Ifobbes and declared

the profit or injury of the individual to be the sole possible content

of the human will, maintained itself in the face of all these develop

ments. In this theory, the criterion of ethical action was sought in

a purely psychological manner in the consequences of such action

1 1751 f. Printed in the Vermischten Schriften (Berlin, 1773).

2 J. F. Weiss, De Natura Animi et potiss imum Cordis Humani (Stuttgart,

1761).

3 In this Mendelssohn, with his Letters concerning the Sensations, refers

directly to Shaftesbury.

\* Cf. Mendelssohn, Morgenstunden, 1785, ch. 7 (W. I. 352).

5 Cf. Tetens, Versuche, X. pp. 625 ff.

6 In the article written between 1780 and 1790 designed at first as an intro

duction to the Critique of Judgment which has passed over into his writings

under the title Ueber Philosophie iiberhaiipt. Cf. Pt. VI. ch. 1.

CHAP. 2, 36.] Principles of Morals : Utilitarianism. 513

for the advantage of our fellow-men. Morality exists only within

the social body. The individual, if by himself and alone, knows

only his own weal and woe ; but in society his actions are judged

from the point of view of whether they profit or injure others, and

this alone is regarded as the standpoint of ethical judgment. This

conception of the ethical criterion corresponded not only to the

common view, but also to the felt need of finding for ethics a basis

that should be destitute of metaphysics, and rest purely on empiri

cal psychology. Cumberland and Locke even acceded to it in the

last resort, and not only the theological moralists like Butler and

Paley, but also the associational psychologists like Priestley and

Hartley, attached themselves to it. The classical formula of this

tendency was gradually worked out. An action is ethically the

more pleasing in proportion as it produces more happiness, and in

proportion as the number of men who can share this happiness

becomes greater : the ethical ideal is the greatest happiness of the

greatest number. This became the watch-word of Utilitarianism.

This formula, however, suggested the thought of determining

quantitatively the ethical values for individual cases and relations.

The thought of Hobbes and Locke, of grounding a knowledge of a

strictly demonstrative ethics upon the utilitarian principle, seemed

thereby to have found a definite form, welcome to the natural-science

mode of thinking. This enticement was pursued by Bentham, and

in this consists the peculiar element of utilitarian thought as carried

out by him, a work which he performed with a warm feeling for

the public good, and which was later much referred to. The point

is to find exact, definite points of view, according to which the value

of every mode of action for the weal of the actor himself and of the

community to which he belongs, can be determined, partly in itself,

partly in its relation to other modes of conduct; and Bentham in

this table of values and their opposites, with an extensive consid

eration of both individual and social relations and needs, sketches a

scheme of a pleasure and pain balance for reckoning the useful and

injurious consequences of human activities and institutions. As

with Hume (cf. below, No. 12), the reckoning of the ethically val

uable falls to the province of the measuring intellect ; but the factors

with which it operates in this process are solely the feelings of

pleasure and pain.

10. The close connexion in which this utilitarianism stood his

torically after Hobbes VitlTthe selfish system that i% ^ith the

assumption of the essentially egoistic character of human nature

led necessarily to the separation of the question as to the criterion

of morality and the kind of knowledge by which it is apprehended,

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from that as to the sanction of the moral commands and the motives

for obeying them. For the metaphysical theories, the sanction of

the ethical commands lay in the eternal truths of the law of Nature :

and psychologically, also, there seemed to be no further and especial

motive needed for the effort toward perfection, for the living out of

the personality, for the following of innate ethical inclinations ;

morality was self-explaining under such presuppositions. But he

who thought more pessimistically of man, he who held him to be a

being determined originally and in his own nature solely by regard

to his own weal or woe, he must ask with what right an altruistic

way of acting is required of such a being, and by what means such

a being can be determined to obedience to this requirement. If

morality was not of itself inherent in man s nature, it must be

declared how it comes into him from without.

Here, now, the principle of authority, already adduced by Hobbes

and Locke, performed its service. Its most palpable form was the

theological; it was carried out with more finely wrought conceptions

by Butler, and in a crude manner, intelligible to the common mind,

by Paley. Utility is for both the criterion of ethical action, and the

divine command is for both the ground of the ethical requirements.

But while Butler still seeks the knowledge of this divine will in the

natural conscience his re-interpretation of Shaftesbury s emotions

of reflection, for which he himself uses also the term " reflection "

for Paley, it is rather the positive revelation of the divine will that

is authoritative ; and obedience to this command seems to him explic

able only because the authoritative power has connected its com

mandment with promises of reward and threatenings of punishment.

This is the sharpest separation of ethical principles, and that perhaps

which corresponds most to the " common sense " of the Christian

world. The criterion of the moral is the weal of one s neighbour;

the ground of our knowledge of the moral is the revealed will of

God ; the real ground which supplies the sanction is the will of the

Supreme Being ; and the ethical motive in man is the hope of the

reward, and the fear of the punishment, which God has fixed for

obedience and disobedience.

11. Paley thus explained the fact of ethical action by the hypoth

esis that man, in himself egoistic, is brought at last by the agency

of the equally egoistic motives of hope and fear, and by the round

about way of a theological motivation, to the altruistic mode of

action commanded by God. The sensiialistic psychology substituted

for the theological agency the authority of the state and the con

straining forces of social life. If the will of man is in the last

resort always determinable only by his own weal and woe, his altru-

CHAP. 2, 30.] Principles of Morals : Sutler, Paley. 515

istic action is comprehensible only on the supposition that he sees

in it the surest, simplest, and most intelligent means under the

given relations for bringing about his own happiness. While, there

fore, the theological utilitarians held that the natural egoism should

be tamed by the rewards of heaven and punishments of hell, it

seemed to the empiricists that the order of life arranged by the

state and society was sufficient for this purpose. Man finds himself

in such relations that when he rightly reflects he sees that he will

find his own advantage best by subordination to existing morals

and laws. The sanction of ethical demands lies, accordingly, in the

legislation of the state and of public morality which is dictated by

the principle of utility, and the motive of obedience consists in

the fact that each one thus finds his own advantage. Thus Man-

deville, Lamettrie, and Helcetius developed the " selfish system " ; La-

mettrie, especially, with tasteless cynicism that savoured of a

desire for admiration, seeking to exhibit " hunger and love " in

their lowest sensuous meaning as the fundamental motives of all

human life a wretched, because artificial, imitation of ancient

Hedonism.

Morality, accordingly, appears to be only eudsemonistic shrewd

ness, the polished egoism of society, the refined cunning of the man

who is familiar with life, and has seen that to be happy he can

pursue no better path than to act morally, even if not to be moral.

This view frequently finds expression in the Enlightenment philos

ophy as the governing principle of " the world " of that day :

whether it be as the naive, cynical confession of a writer s own dis

position, as in Lord Chesterfield s well-known letters to his son,

or in the form of moralising reflections, as in Labruyere s " Charac-

teres" (1680), and in La Rochefoucauld s "Reflections" (1690),

where the mask is unsparingly torn off from man s ethical behaviour,

and naked egoism is disclosed as the sole impelling motor every

where, or finally as bitter satire, as with Swift, where the true

nature of the human beast is finally discovered by Gulliver among

the Yahoos.

Hand in hand with this gloomy conception of the natural mean

ness of man the view goes through the age of the Enlightenment

that man s education to ethical action has to appeal to just this low

system of impulses, working through pOAver and authority, with the

aid of fear and hope. This shows itself characteristically even with

those who claim for the mature and fully developed man, a pure

morality raised above all egoism. So, for example, Shaftesbury

finds positive religion with its preaching of rewards and punish

ments quite good enough for the education of the great mass. So,

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too, Prussia s philosophical king Frederick the Great, 1 who for him

self had a consciousness of duty so strict and pure and free from all

selfish considerations, and declared such to be the highest ethical

good, yet thought that in the case of the education which the state

gives to men it should start with their closest interests, however

low these might be ; for he granted to the Encyclopaedists that man

as a genus is never to be determined by anything else than by his

own personal interests. In this respect the French Enlighteners,

especially, sought to analyse the motives, by awakening which the

state can win the citizens to care for the interests of the whole.

Montesquieu showed with fine psychology how different the forms

are which this relation takes under different forms of constitution.

Lamettrie pointed, as Mandeville had already done, to the sense of

honour or repute as the most powerful factor in the social sentiment

among civilised peoples, and Helvetius carried out this thought

farther.

But if the sensualistic psychology thus looked for man s ethical

education from the state alone, the degree of success with which

this was accomplished must serve as a standard for estimating the

value of public institutions. This consequence was drawn by

Holbach, and the most winning feature of this dry book is perhaps

the honourableness and energy with which it tries to show how little

the rotten conditions of the public life of that time were adapted to

raise the citizen above the meanness of selfish endeavours.

12. Hume s moral philosophy may be regarded as the most com

plete embodiment of this movement, and as the most refined consid

eration of the motives that contend within it. It, too, stands

completely upon the basis of the psychological method : man s

ethical life is to be understood by a genetic investigation of his

passions, feelings, and volitions. The most significant element in

Hume s teaching is the separation of utilitarianism from the selfish

system. The criterion of ethical approval and disapproval is, for

him, too, the effect which the quality or action to be judged is

adapted to produce in the form of feelings of pleasure and pain,

and, like the ancients and Shaftesbury, he interprets this in the

widest sense, inasmuch as he regards as objects of ethical pleasure,

not only the "social virtues," such as justice, benevolence, etc., but

also the "natural abilities," 2 such as prudence or sagacity, fortitude,

energy, etc. But we feel this approval, even when these qualities

1 Cf. especially what is adduced by E. Zeller, F. d. G. als Philosoph, pp.

67 ff., 105 ff., and also especially Frederick s "Antimacchiave.lli.

2 Here, too, the old ambiguity of virtus (virtue) = moral virtue, and also

ability or excellence, plays a part.

CHAP. 2, 36.] Principles of Morals : Hume, Smith. 517

are completely indifferent to our own welfare, or indeed even inju

rious to the same ; and this cannot possibly be traced back to

egoism through the medium of mere psychological association. On

the other hand, the relation which these judgments sustain to the

complicated relations of experience forbids the assumption of their

innateness. They must rather be reduced to a simple, elementary

form, and this is sympathy? i.e. primarily our capacity to feel

with another his weal or woe as our own, at least in a weakened

form. Such sympathetic feelings, however, are not only the

impulsive grounds of moral judgments, but also the original motives

of moral action, for the feelings are the causes of the decisions of

the will. Still, these original impulses alone are not adequate to

explain ethical judgment and action. For the more complicated

relations of life, there is need of a clarification, ordering, and com

parative valuation of the factors of feeling, and this is the business

of reason. From the reflection of reason arise, therefore, in addition

to the natural and original values, derivative " artificial " virtues, as

the type of which Hume treats justice and the whole system of

standards of rights and law in this, evidently, still dependent

upon Hobbes. But in the last resort these principles, also, owe

their ability to influence judgment and volition, not to rational

reflection as such, but to the feelings of sympathy to which this

appeals.

Thus the crude conception of a " moral sense " is refined by

Hume s investigation to a finely articulated system of moral psy

chology with its carefully differentiated conceptions, as the centre

of which we find the principle of sympathy. A farther step in

carrying out this same theory was taken in the ethical work of

Adam Smith. As against the externality with which ordinary

utilitarianism had placed the criterion of ethical judgment in the

pleasurable or painful consequences of the act, Hume had energet

ically directed attention to the fact, that ethical approval or disap

proval concerns rather the disposition manifesting itself in the

action, in so far as this aims at the consequences in question.

Hence Smith found the essence of sympathy, not only in the

capacity of feeling these consequences with the one who experiences

them, but also in the ability to transfer one s self into the disposi

tion or sentiment of him who acts, and to feel his motives with him.

And extending farther and farther the thought of transfer through

sympathy, the judgment which the individual pronounces upon him

self in the conscience is then conceived as a reflex, mediated through

1 Cf. Treatise, II. 1, 11, and II. 2, 5.

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feelings of sympathy, of the judgment which he receives from

others and exercises upon others.

All phenomena of the ethical life are thus rooted, according to

Hume and Smith, in the social life, whose psychological basis is

sympathy, and the founder of political economy, with his great

philosophical friend, sees in the mechanism of sympathetic transfers

of feeling an adjustment of individual interests similar to that which

he believed himself to have discovered in the realm of the exchange

of external goods, which is conducted with reference to the strait-

ness of the conditions of life, in the mechanism of supply and

demand in connection with the competition of labour. 1 But with

these insights into the thoroughgoing dependence of the individual

upon a social body, which he does n\*/t (Create, but in which he finds

himself actually placed, the philosophy of the Enlightenment is

already pointing beyond itself.

### 37. The Problem of Civilisation.

The fundamental thought, which the philosophy of the Enlight

enment would hold as to the great institutions of human society and

its historical movement, was prescribed for it in advance, partly by

its dependence upon natural-science metaphysics, and partly by its

own psychological tendency. This was to see in these institutions

the products of the activities of individuals ; and from this followed

the tendency to single out those interests whose satisfaction the

individual may expect from such general social connections when

once these exist, and to treat them in a genetic mode of explanation

as the motives and sufficient causes for the origin of the institutions

in question, while at the same time regarding them from a critical

point of view, as the standard for estimating the value of the same.

Whatever was regarded as having been intentionally created by

men should show also whether it was then really fulfilling their

purposes.

1. This conception was guided into the political and juristic track

primarily by Hobbes. The state appeared as the work of individuals,

constructed by them under the stress of need, when in a condition

of war with each other and in fear for life and goods. With its whole

system of rights, it was regarded as resting upon the compact which

the citizens entered into with each other from the above motives.

The same Epicurean compact-theory, which had revived in the later

Middle Ages, passed over with Nominalism into modern philosophy

1 Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Lond. 1776).

CHAP. 2, 37.] Problem of Civilisation : Compact-Theory. 519

and extended its influence over the whole eighteenth century. But

the artificial construction of absolutism, which Hobbes had erected

upon it, gave place more and more in consequence of political events

to the doctrines of popular sovereignty. This lay at the basis of the

English Constitution of 1688, as well as at that of the theoretical shap

ing which Locke gave the same in his doctrine of the separation and

equilibrium of the three departments of the state, the legislative,

executive, and federative. It controlled, also, as an ideal require

ment, the writings of Montesquieu, who, in considering the rotten

administration of law at his time, would have complete independ

ence given to the judicial power, while he thought of the executive

and federative departments (as administration within and without,

respectively) as united in the one monarchical head. It was finally

carried out to a complete system of democracy in Rousseau s Con-

trat Social, in which the principle of transfer and representation

was to be limited as much as possible, and the exercise of the sov

ereignty also to be assigned directly to the whole body of the peo

ple. In all these transformations of the doctrine of Hobbes, the

influence of the realities of historical politics is obvious, but the

antithesis between Hobbes and Rousseau has also its theoretical

background. If man is regarded as by nature essentially egoistic,

he must be compelled to keep the social compact by the strong arm

of the state : if he is regarded as originally good and social in his

feelings, as by Kousseau, it is to be expected of him that he will of

himself always take part in carrying out, in the interest of the

whole, the life prescribed by the compact.

It is interesting now to see that the compact-theory in the

eighteenth century communicated itself also to those theories of

the philosophy of right which did not have a merely psychological

basis. The " natural right " of this time proceeds also from the

right of the individual, and seeks to derive from this the rights of

individuals in their relation to each other. Yet in carrying out this

principle two different tendencies show themselves in German phil

osophy, leading to results that were extremely characteristic in

their differences. Leibniz had derived the conceptions of right (or

law) from the most general principles of practical philosophy, fol

lowing the example of the ancients. 1 Wolff followed him in this

respect also, but made it on this account the end of the political

compact to secure the mutual furtherance of individuals in behalf

of their mutual perfecting, enlightening, and happiness ; according

1 Cf. his introduction to the Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus (1693),

Works (Erd.), 118 ff.

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to him, therefore, the state has to care, not merely for external

safety, but also for the general welfare in the broadest extent.

The consequence of this is that Wolff assigns to the state the right

and duty of a thorough tutelage of the great mass of unenlightened

men who are controlled by error and passion, and of intermeddling

even in their private relations in the way of education. Thus Wolff

gave the theory for that " paternal " despotism of the benevolent

police-state under which the Germans of his time lived with very

mixed feelings.

The exactly opposite result attached itself theoretically to the

separation of the philosophy of right from morals, for which the

way had already been prepared by Thomasius, with his sharp parting

of the justum and the honestum. In this line the disciple of Tho-

masius, Gundling (16711729), maintained that right or law was to be

treated solely as the ordering of the external relations of individuals,

that it has for its end the preservation of peace without, and there

fore its decrees can be enforced only as to outward relations. This

limitation of the state s activity to the external protection of law

evidently corresponded most fully to the dualistic spirit of the

Enlightenment. If the individual has conformed to the political

compact only from need and want, he will evidently be inclined to

make as few concessions to the state as possible, and will be willing

to sacrifice to it of his original " rights " only so much as is uncondi-

ditionally requisite for the end which it is to fulfil. This was not

merely the thought of the Philistine citizen, who is indeed ready to

call for the police at once when anything is the matter, but privately

regards the order of the laws as an enemy that must be kept from

his throat as much as possible ; it was also the feeling of the En-

lightener of high intellectual development, who had for his rich

inner life only the interest of being able to devote himself unmo

lested to the enjoyments of art and science. In fact, the petty

spirit of the small German states, with its lack of ideals, must

necessarily produce the indifference toward public life which thus

found its theoretical expression. The lowest stage which the de

preciation of the state reached in this respect among the cultured

classes is perhaps best characterised by William von HumboldCs

" Ideas toward an Attempt to determine the Bounds of the Operation

of the State." 1 Here every higher interest of man is carefully ex

cluded from the province of the state s authority, and the task of

public government is restricted to the lower service of protecting

the life and property of the citizen.

i Written 1792, published 1851 by E. Cauer.

CHAP. 2, 37.] Problem of Civilisation : Voltaire. 521

2. If in this respect German philosophy remained quite indif

ferent toward the actual political condition, on the other hand

there appeared in it also the general tendency of the Enlightenment

to order the life of society, as that of the individual, according to

the principles of philosophy. If it is glory enough for this period

to have successfully cleared away much historical lumber that had

accumulated in the house-keeping of European peoples, Thomasius

and Wolff, Mendelssohn and Nicolai, certainly deserve credit for

their share in the work (cf. 30, 5). But this side of the matter

came forward in an incomparably more powerful and efficient

degree with the French Enlighteners. It is enough here to recall

Voltaire, who appeared as a literary power of the first rank, work

ing unweariedly and victoriously for reason and justice. But the

contest which he carried on to a certain extent before the bar of

public opinion of all Europe was taken up in detail by his fellow-

countrymen, in a criticism of social institutions and by proposals

for their improvement : in a broad and often passionate discussion

philosophical reflection proceeds to the task of reforming the state.

And here the weakness of the Enlightenment at once appears side

by side with its strength. As always, it takes the standards of its

criticism for existing institutions, and of its proposals for their

change, from the universal, eternal nature of man or of things;

thus it loses from sight the authorisation and vital force of histori

cal reality, and believes that it is only needed to make a tabula rasa

of the existing conditions wherever they show themselves contrary

to reason, in order to be able to build up society entire in accordance

with the principles of philosophy. In this spirit the literature of

the Enlightenment, especially in France, prepared for the actual

break with history, the Revolution. Typical in this was the pro

cedure of Deism which, because none of the positive religions with

stood its " rational " criticism, would abolish them all and put in

their place the. religion of Nature.

So then the French Revolution, too, attempted to decree the

abstract natural state of "liberty, equality, and fraternity," the

realisation of " human rights " according to Rousseau s Social

Contract. And numerous pens of very moderate quality hastened

to justify and glorify the procedure. 1 It is for the most part a

superficial Epicureanism standing upon the basis of Condillac s

positivism that acts as spokesman. Thus Volney seeks, with the

de la Nature, the source of all the evils of society in the

1 The preference for the catechism, a form designed for education in the

Church, is characteristic of this literature.

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ignorance and covetousness of man, whose capacity for perfection

has hitherto been restrained by religions. When all "illusions"

shall be frightened away with these religions, then the newly

organised society will have as its supreme rule of conduct, that

"good" is only what furthers the interests of man, and the cate

chism for the citizen is comprehended in the rule "Conserve toi

instruis toi modere toi vis pour tes semblables, afin qu ils vivent

pour toi." 1 Still more materialistic is the form in which the theory

of the Revolution appears with .St. Lambert, from whom the defini

tion that was much discussed in later literature comes : " L homme

est une masse organisee et sensible ; il re^oit 1 intelligence de ce qui

1 environne et de ses besoins." 2 With the most superficial con

sideration of history, he celebrates in the Revolution the final

victory of reason in history, and at the same time this Epicurean

deduces that the democratic beginnings of this great event will be

completed in Caesardom ! The extreme pitch of self-complacent

boasting in this aspect of parliamentary dilettantism was reached

by Garat and Lancelin. 3

In contrast with these glittering generalities and declamations

over the welfare of the people and the reign of reason, the earnest

reality with which Bentham sought to make the utilitarian principle

useful for legislation, appears in an extremely favourable light.

This work he sought to accomplish by teaching the application of

the quantitative determination of pleasure and pain values (of.

36, 9) to the consideration of the ends of particular statutes, with

a careful regard to the existing conditions in every case. 4 Just in

this he showed his insight into the fact that in the political move

ment the question at issue is not merely that of political rights, but

above all that of social interest, and along just this line an enthu

siastic and successful champion of the Revolution arose in Godwin, 5

who was not uninfluenced by Bentham. But along other lines, too,

1 Volney, at the close of the Catechisme, CEuvr., I. 310.

2 St. Lambert, Catech. Introd., CEuvr., I. 53. For the characterisation of

this literature it should not remain unmentioned that in St. Lambert s cate

chism the Analyse de Vhomme is followed in a second book by an Analyse de

la femme.

3 The organ of this movement most worthy of esteem was the Decade Philo-

sophique, which saw and defended in the Revolution the triumph of the philoso

phy of the eighteenth century. Cf. Picavet, Ideologues, 86 ff .

4 It is the more to be lamented that Bentham later in his Deontology at

tempted to give a kind of popular catechism of the utilitarian morals, which,

in radical one-sidedness, in rancour and lack of understanding for other moral

systems, equals the worst products of the time of the Revolution.

6 William Godwin (1756-1836) published his Inquiry concerning Political

Justice and its Influence on General Virtue and Happiness in 1793. Cf. C.

Kegan Paul, W. Godwin, his Friends and Contemporaries, Lond. 1876, and L.

Stephen, English Thought, II. 264 ff.

CHAP. 2, 37.] Problem of Civilisation : France. 523

the social storm is heard in the literature of the Revolution, as dull

thunder still dying away in the distance. The investigations con

cerning the problems of political economy, which in France especially

were chiefly promoted by the physiocratic school, became more and

more comprehensive, and were grounded with increasing indepen

dence upon empirical principles. But while the theory of the

state demanded, above all, security of possessions, there rose, from

the depth of society, the question as to the right of personal property ;

and while the philosophers considered with more and more dissen

sion the problem, how the interests of the community could be

reconciled with those of the individual (of. below), the thought

forced its way to the surface that the ground of all evil with the

human race lies in the striving after individual possessions, and

that a social morality and a moral society will begin with the denun

ciation of this original sin, and not till then. Such communistic

ideas were thrown to the world by Mably and Morelly, and a Babeuf

made the first abortive conspiracy to carry out these ideas, under

the Directory.

3. But the social question had already before this cast up its

waves from its lowest depth. The contrast between the classes

representing luxurious wealth and most wretched poverty, which

had so great importance among the causes of the Revolution, might

indeed at first be more palpable and effective; but it first acquired

its full sharpness by virtue of the antithesis between culture and

non-culture, which was linked with it by the whole development of

European life, and this separating chasm was deepest and baldest

in the age of the Enlightenment. The more the age plumed itself

upon its "culture," the more evident it became that this was in the

main a privilege of the property-owning class. In this point, too,

English Deism had led the way with typical frankness. The

religion of reason should be reserved for the cultivated man, just

as the free, beautiful morality should be : for the ordinary man, on

the other hand, Shaftesbury held, the promises and threatenings of

positive religion must remain standing as a wheel and gallows.

Toland, too, had presented his cosmopolitan natural worship as an

"esoteric" doctrine, and when the later Deists began to carry these

ideas among the people in popular writings, Lord Bolingbroke, him

self a free-thinker of the most pronounced kind, declared them to

be a pest of society, against which the sharpest means were the best.

Among the German Deists, also, men like Semler would have a very

careful separation made between religion as a private matter and

religion as a public order.

The French Enlightenment, as the relation of Voltaire to Boling-

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broke shows, was from the beginning decidedly more democratic.

Indeed, it had the agitative tendency to play off the enlighten

ment of the masses against the exclusive self-seeking of the upper

ten thousand. But with this was completed a revolution, by virtue

of which the Enlightenment necessarily turned against itself. For

if in those strata in which it first took hold " culture " or civilisa

tion had such consequences as appeared in the luxury of the "higher"

classes, if it had been able to do so little in the way of yielding

fruits that could be used for the needs of the masses also, its value

must appear all the more doubtful the more philosophy regarded

the "greatest happiness of the greatest number" as the proper

standard for the estimation of things and actions.

In this connection the problem of civilisation shaped itself out for

modern philosophy : the question whether and how far civilisation,

i.e. intellectual improvement (which is a historical fact), and the

change in human impulses and in the relations of human life, which

has been connected with it whether and in how far this civilisa

tion has served to further the moral order and man s true happiness.

The more proudly and self-complacently the average Enlightener

praised the progress of the human mind, which had reached in him

its summit of a clear and distinct rational life in theory and prac

tice, the more burning and uncomfortable this question became.

It is raised first, though not in a direct and square statement, by

Mandeville. In his psychology an extreme adherent of the selfish

system, he sought to show, as against Shaftesbury, that the whole

life and charm of the social system rests solely upon the struggle

which self-seeking individuals carry on in their own interests a

principle which worked also upon Adam Smith in his doctrine of

supply and demand. 1 If we should think of man as stripped bare

of all egoistic impiilses (this is the meaning of the Fable of the Bees),

and provided only with the "moral" qualities of altruism, the social

mechanism would stand still from pure absence of regard for self.

The motive power in civilisation is solely egoism, and, therefore,

we must not be surprised if civilisation displays its activity, not

by heightening the moral qualities, but only by refining and dis

guising egoism. And the individual s happiness is as little enhanced

by civilisation as his morality. If it were increased, the egoism,

on which the progress of civilisation rests, would be thereby weak

ened. In truth, it appears, rather, that every improvement of the

material condition, brought about by intellectual advance, calls forth

new and stronger wants in the individual, in consequence of which

i Cf. Lange, Cesch. d. Mater., I. 285 [Eng. tr. I. 205J.

CHAP. 2, 37.] Problem of Civilisation : Mandevilh, Rousseau. 525

he becomes more and more discontented ; and so it turns out that

the apparently so brilliant development of the whole is accomplished

only at the cost of the morality and happiness of the individual.

4. In Mandeville these thoughts appear in a mild suggestion, and

at the same time, in the repelling form of a cynical commendation

of the egoism, whose " private vices " are " public benefits." They

attained an importance for world-literature through the brilliant

turn given them by Rousseau. With him the question concerned

nothing more and nothing less than the worth of all human

history its worth for the morality and happiness of individuals.

And he cast into the face of the Enlightenment the reproach that

all growth in knowledge, and all refinement of life, had but made

man more and more untrue to his true vocation and his true nature.

History with its artificial structure of civilised society has deterio

rated man : J he came forth from the hand of Nature good and pure,

but his development has separated him from Nature step by step.

The beginning of this " degeneration " Rousseau, in his second Dis

course, found in the creation of property, which had for its result the

division of labour, and with this the separation of the classes and, ulti

mately, the awakening of all evil passions : this it was that enlisted

the work of the intellect permanently in the service of self-seeking.

In comparison with this unnatural condition of civilised barbarism

the state of Nature appears at first as the lost paradise, and in this

sense the sentimental yearning of a time intellectually and morally

blase found its nourishment in Rousseau s writings, above all in the

New Hdoise. The ladies of the salon were carried away with enthu

siasm for the Gessnerian pastoral idyl; but on this account they

mis-heard the admonition of the great Genevan.

For he did not wish to lead back to that state of Nature which

had no society. He was convinced that man is provided by his

creator with a capacity for being perfected (perfectibilite) which

makes the development of his natural endowment both a duty and

a natural necessity. If this development has been guided into

wrong paths by the historical process Avhich has hitherto prevailed,

and, therefore, has led to demoralisation and wretchedness, history

must be begun anew ; in order to find the right way toward his devel

opment man must return from the unnatural condition of intellectual

pride to the simple natural state of feeling, from the narrowness

and falsehood of relations of society to his pure unstunted self.

For this end, according to Rousseau, humanity as a whole needs a

1 The English Deists conception of the history of religion (cf. 35, 8) is

extended by Rousseau to all history.

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political constitution, which affords the individual full freedom of

personal activity in connection with the life of the whole body, and

in accordance with the principle of equality of rights ; and as indi

viduals, humanity needs an education, 1 which allows the natural

endowments of the individual to unfold from his own vitality

without constraint. The optimism, which Rousseau finds in the

constitution of the natural God-descended nature of man, makes

him hope that our condition will be better, the more freely and

naturally we can develop.

5. While we thus find Rousseau in lively opposition to the his

torical development, and in the zealous endeavour to put in its stead

a new development " according to Nature," the last reconciling

synthesis of the ideas of the Enlightenment is the endeavour to

understand the previous course of human history itself as the

natural development of human nature ; in this thought the phil

osophy of the eighteenth century strips off all its one-sided-

ness and reaches its highest consummation. The first stirring of

this is found in an isolated appearance of Italian literature, with

Vico. 2 Influenced by the Neo-Platonic metaphysics of the Renais

sance, especially by Campanella, and educated by Bodin and Grotius,

he had grasped the idea of a general natural law of the development

of life, which manifests itself in the history of peoples as well as in

that of individuals, and with great learning had sought to prove

this principle of the identity of all natural development. But if in

such a conception of the naturally necessary correspondences between

the different historical systems and the fundamental biological

scheme, the thought of a purposeful inter-relation of the destinies

of nations had remained foreign to him, this had previously found

1 In its details Rousseau s fimile frequently uses the "Thoughts," which

Locke had advanced with a much more limited purpose for the education of a

young man of higher station in society : there, too, the complete development

of the individuality was the main thing, from which the turning away from

learned one-sidedness, the direction of attention to the real and practical, the

appeal to perception and the use of individual instead of general truths in

instruction and education, followed as a matter of course. These principles,

thought out for the Englishman of superior rank, Rousseau adopts as elements

in an education which sought to develop in man, not the member of a definite

class or of a future profession, but only "the man." In this spirit his peda

gogical doctrines passed over to the school of German philanthropy, which, under

the lead of Basedow (1723-179D), combined the principle of natural develop

ment with that of utility, and thought out the appropriate forms of an education

for a community by which the individual should be trained to become by the

natural way a useful member of human society.

2 Giov. Battista Vico (1&lt;&gt;68-1744) became influential chiefly through his

Principj cV una scienza nuova (V intorno alia commune natura delle nazioni

(1725). Cf. K. Werner, (riambattista V. als Fhiloxopli uud fjdchrter Forscher

(Vienna, 1879) ; R. Flint, Vic.o (Kdin. and Lond. 1884); and likewise for the

following, Flint, The Philosophy of History in Europe, Vol. I., new ed., 1893. ,

CHAP. 2, 37.] Problem of Civilisation: Vico, Herder. 527

all the more forcible support in Bossuet. 1 The French prelate con

tinues the patristic philosophy of history , which had pushed the

Redemption into the centre of the world s events. He would have

the christianising of modern nations through the empire of Charles

the Great, regarded as the concluding and decisive epoch of uni-

Versal history, the whole course of which is the work of divine

providence, and the goal of which is the dominance of the one

Catholic Church. Such a theological view of the world and of

history had now, indeed, been energetically put aside by modern

philosophy, but the meagreness of the results yielded for the con

sideration of history by the treatment of human society from the

point of view of individual psychology is seen in the trivial lucu

brations of Iselin, 2 in spite of his leaning upon Rousseau.

It was in a mind of Herder s universal receptiveness and fineness

of feeling that Rousseau s ideas first found in this respect, also, a

fruitful soil. But his optimism, which had matured in the atmos

phere of Leibniz and Shaftesbury, did not allow him to believe in

the possibility of that aberration which the Genevan would regard

as the nature of previous history. He was rather convinced that the

natural development of man is just that which has taken place in

history. While Rousseau s conception of man s perfectibility was

treated by the Genevan s French adherents, such as St. Lambert,

and especially Condorcet, as the voucher for a better future, and as

an infinite perspective toward the perfecting of the race, Herder

used it against Rousseau as a principle of explanation for the

past, also, of the human family. History is nothing but the unin

terrupted progress of natural development.

This concerned, above all, the beyinniiiy of history. The begin

ning of the life of society is to be understood, not as an arbitrary

act, whether of human reflection or of divine determination, but as a

gradually formed result of the natural connection. It has neither

been invented nor commanded, but has become. Characteristically

enough, these opposing views as to the origin of history, asserted

themselves earliest in theories of language. The individualism of

associational psychology saw in language, as is manifest particularly

in the case of Condillac, 3 an invention of man, supra-naturalism,

defended in Germany by Silssmikh 4 saw a divine inspiration; here

1 Jacques Beniirnr Iinxn(-t (1027-1704), the celebrated eloquent divine, wrote

the Discours s\ir V Histoire Universelle (Paris, 1681) originally for the instruc

tion of the Dauphin.

a Isaak Iselin of Basle (1728-1782) published in 1764 his Philustophischen

Muthmassunyen u!&gt;er die d eschichte des Menschheit, 2 vols.

;i I.oijique and Lanrjuc des Calculs.

4 Reweis, dass der Ursprung der menschlichen Sprache gottlich sei (Berlin,

1766).

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.Rousseau had already spoken the word of solution when he saw in

language a natural, involuntary unfolding of man s essential nature. 1

Herder not only made this conception his own (cf. above, 33,

11), but he extended it also consistently to all man s activities in

civilisation. He proceeds, therefore, in his philosophy of history

from the point of view of man s position in Nature, from that of

the conditions of life which the planet affords him, and from that

of his peculiar constitution, to understand from these sources the

beginnings and the direction of his historical development: and in

the progress of his exposition of universal history he makes, like

wise, the peculiar character of each people and of its historical sig

nificance proceed from its natural endowments and relations. But

at the same time the developments of the various nations do not

fall apart in his treatment, as was still the case with Vico: on the con

trary, they are all arranged organically as a great chain of ascend

ing perfection. And they all form in this connected whole the

ever-maturer realisation of the general constitution of human nature.

As man himself is the crown of creation, so his history is the

unfolding of human nature. The Idea of Humanity explains the

complicated movement of national destinies.

In this consideration, the unhistorical mode of thinking which

had characterised the Enlightenment was overcome : every form in

this great course of development was valued as the natural product

of its conditions, and the " voices of the peoples " united to form

the harmony of the world s history, of which humanity is the theme.

And out of this sprang also the task of the future, to bring to

ever richer and fuller development all the stirrings of human

nature, and to realise in living unity the ripe fruits of the historical

development. In the consciousness of this task of the " world-

literature," far from all the pride of the meaner Enlightenment,

full of the presage and anticipation of a new epoch, Schiller could

call out, in valedictory to the " philosophical century," the joyful

words :

" Wie schon, o Mensch, mit deinem Palmenzweige

Stehst du an des Jahrhunderts Neige

In edler, stolzer Mannlichkeit ! " 2

1 With his arguments, though in part of another opinion, St. Martin the

Mystic attacked the crude presentation of Condillac s doctrine by Garat ; cf.

Stances de.s coles Normales, III. 61 ff.

2 In rude paraphrase :

How fair, man, with victory s palm,

Thou standest at the century s wane

In noble pride of manliness.

# PART VI. THE GERMAN PHILOSOPHY.

To the literature cited on pp. 348 and 437, we add :

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A fortunate union of various intellectual movements produced

in Germany, during the close of the preceding and at the beginning

of the present century, a bloom of philosophy, which in the history

of European thought can be compared only with the great develop

ment of Greek philosophy from Socrates to Aristotle. In a devel

opment, powerful alike in its intensity and extent, the German

mind during the short span of four decades (1780-1820) produced a

wealth of systems of philosophical Weltanschauung, grandly pro

jected on all sides, such as has at no other time been compressed

within so narrow a space ; and in all of these the thoughts of pre

ceding philosophy combine to form characteristic and impressive

structures. They appear in their totality as the ripe fruit of a long

growth, out of which germs of a new development, as yet scarcely

recognisable, are to spring.

This brilliant phenomenon had its general cause in the incompar

able vigour and spirit with which the German nation at that time

took up again with new strength, and carried to its completion, the

movement of civilisation which began in the Renaissance and had

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been interrupted by external force. Germany attained the summit

of its inner development at the same time that its outer history

reached its lowest condition, a process that has no equal in history.

When it lay politically powerless, it created its world-conquering

thinkers and poets. Its victorious power, however, lay just in the

league between philosophy and poetry. The contemperaneousness of

Kant and Goethe, and the combination of their ideas by Schiller,

these are the decisive characteristics of the time.

The history of philosophy at this point is most intimately inter

woven .with that of general literature, and the lines of mutual rela

tion and stimulus run continuously back and forth. This appears

characteristically in the heightened and finally decisive significance

which fell in this connection to the problems and conceptions of

aesthetics. Philosophy found thus opened before her a new world,

into which she had hitherto had but occasional glimpses, and of

which she now took possession as of the Promised Land. In their

matter as well as their form, aesthetic principles gained the mastery,

and the motives of scientific thought became interwoven with those

of artistic vision to produce grand poetical creations in the sphere

of abstract thought.

The ensnaring magic which literature thus exercised upon philos

ophy rested mainly upon its historical universality. With Herder

and Goethe begins what we call, after them, world-literature ; the

conscious working out of true culture from the appropriation

of all the great thought-creations of all human history. The Ro

mantic School appears in Germany as the representative of this

work. And, in analogy to this, philosophy also developed out of a

wealth of historical suggestions ; it resorted with conscious deep

ening of thought to the ideas of antiquity and of the Renaissance,

it plunged intelligently into what the Enlightenment had shown,

and ended in Hegel by understanding itself as the systematically

penetrating and formative comprehension of all that the human

mind had hitherto thought.

But for this mighty work it needed a new conceptional basis,

without which all those suggestions from general literature would

have remained without effect. This philosophical power to master

the ideal material of history dwelt within the doctrine of Kant, and

this is its incomparably high historical importance. Kant, by the

newness and the greatness of his points of view, prescribed to the

succeeding philosophy not only its problems, but also the means for

their solution. His is the mind that determines and controls on all

sides. The work of his immediate successors, in which his new

principle unfolded itself in all directions and finished its life histor-

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ically with an assimilation of earlier systems, is best comprehended

in accordance with its most important characteristic, under the name

of Idealism.

Hence we treat the history of the German Philosophy in two

chapters, of which the first embraces Kant, and the second the de

velopment of idealism. In the thought symphony of those forty

years the Kantian doctrine forms the theme, and idealism its

development.

## CHAPTER I. THE CRITIQUE OF REASON.

C. L. Reinhold, Brief e uber die Kantische Philosophic (Deutsch. Merkur,

1786 f.). Leips. 1790 ff.

V. Cousin, Lemons sur la Philosophic de Kant. Paris, 1842.

M. Desdouits, La Philosophic de Kant, d apres les Trots Critiques. Paris, 1876.

E. Caird, The Philosophy of Kant. Lond. 1876.

[E. Caird, The Critical Philosophy of I. Kant, Glasgow, Lond., and N.Y.,

2 vols., 1889.]

C. Cantoni, Em. Kant (3 vols.). Milan, 1879-1884.

W. Wallace, Kant. Oxford, Edin., and Lond. 1882.

J. B. Meyer, Kant s Psychologic. Berlin, 1870.

THE pre-eminent position of the Konigsberg philosopher rests

upon the fact that he took up into himself the various motives of

thought in the literature of the Enlightenment, and by their recipro

cal supplementation matured a completely new conception of the

problem and procedure of philosophy. He passed through the

school of the Wolffian metaphysics and through an acquaintance

with the German popular philosophers; he plunged into Hume s

profound statement of problems, and was enthusiastic for Rousseau s

gospel of Nature ; the mathematical rigour of the Newtonian natural

philosophy, the fineness of the psychological analysis of the origin

of human ideas and volitions found in English literature, Deism

from Toland and Shaftesbury to Voltaire, the honourable spirit of

freedom with which the French Enlightenment urged the improve

ment of political and social conditions, all these had found in the

young Kant a true co-worker, full of conviction, who with a rich

knowledge of the world and admirable sagacity, and also, where it

was in place, with taste and wit, though far from all self-compla

cency and boasting, united typically within himself the best features

of the Enlightenment.

But it was in connection with the difficulties of the problem of

knowledge that he wrought out from all these foundation elements

the work which gave him his peculiar significance. The more he

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had originally prized metaphysics just because it claimed to give scien

tific certainty to moral and religious convictions, the more lasting

was its working upon him when he was forced to become convinced

by his own progressive criticism in his constant search for truth,

how little the rationalistic school system satisfied that claim which

it made. But the more, also, was his vision sharpened for the

limitations of that philosophy which empiricism developed by the

aid of psychological method. In studying David Hume this came

to his consciousness in such a degree that he grasped eagerly for the

aid which the Nouveaux Essais of Leibniz seemed to offer toward

making a metaphysical science possible. But the epistemological

system, which he erected upon the principle of virtual innateness

extended to mathematics (cf. pp. 465 f. and 485 f.), very soon proved

its untenability, and this led him to the tedious investigations

which occupied him in the period from 1770 to 1780, and which

found their conclusion in the Critique of Pure Reason.

The essentially new and decisive in this was that Kant recog

nised the inadequacy of the psychological method for the solution of

philosophical problems, 1 and completely separated the questions

which surround the origin and the actual development of man s

rational activities, from those which relate to their value. He shared

permanently with the Enlightenment the tendency to take the

starting-point of his investigations, not in our apprehension of

things, which is influenced by most various presuppositions, but

in considering the reason itself; but he found in this latter

point of view universal judgments which extend beyond all expe

rience, whose validity can neither be made dependent upon the

exhibition of their actual formation in consciousness, nor grounded

upon any form of innateness. It is his task to fix upon these judg

ments throughout the entire circuit of human rational activity, in

order from their content itself and from their relations to the

system of the rational life determined by them, to understand their

authority or the limits of their claims.

This task Kant designated as the Critique of Reason, and this

method as the critical or transcendental method; the subject-matter

to which this method was to be applied he considered to be the

investigation as to the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori?

1 Cf. the beginning of the transcendental deduction of the pure conceptions

of the understanding in the Critique of I nre, Reason, II. 118 ff.

2 This expression took form gradually in connection with the origination of

the Kr. d. r. V. through the importance which the conception of synthesis

acquired. Cf. 38. Kant develops the above general formula in his introduc

tion to the Critique in the following way : judgments are analytical when the

relation of the predicate to the subject, which is therein asserted, has its ground

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This rests upon the fundamental insight that the validity of the

principles of reason is entirely independent of how they rise in the

empirical consciousness (whether of the individual or of the race).

All philosophy is dogmatic, which seeks to prove or even merely to

judge of this validity by showing the genesis of those principles

out of elements of sensation, or by their innateness, whatever the

metaphysical assumptions in the case may be. The critical method,

or transcendental philosophy, examines the form in which these

principles actually make their appearance, in connection with the

capacity which they possess of being employed universally and

necessarily in experience.

From this there followed for Kant the task of a systematic inves

tigation of reason s functions in order to fix upon their principles,

and to examine the validity of these ; for the critical method, which

was first gained in epistemology, extended its significance of itself

to the other spheres of the reason s activity. But here the newly

acquired scheme of psychological division (cf. p. 512, note 6) proved

authoritative for his analysis and treatment of philosophical problems.

As thinking, feeling, and tv tiling were distinguished as the funda

mental forms in which reason expresses itself, so the criticism of

reason must keep to the division thus given ; it examined separately

the principles of knowledge, of morality, and of the working of things

upon the reason through the medium of feeling, a province inde

pendent of the other two.

Kant s doctrine is accordingly divided into a theoretical, a practi

cal, and an cesthetical part, and his main works are the three Critiques,

of the Pure Reason, of the Practical Reason, and of the Judgment.

Immanuel Kant, born April 22, 1724, at Konigsberg, Prussia, the son of

a saddler, was educated at the Pietistic Collegium Fridericianum, and attended

in 1740 the University of his native city to study theology ; but subjects of

natural science and philosophy gradually attracted him. After concluding his

studies, he was a private teacher in various families in the vicinity of Konigs

berg from 1746 to 1755, habilitated in the autumn of 1755 as Privatdocent in

in the concept itself which forms the subject ("explicative judgments");

synthetical, when this is not the case, so that the addition of the predicate to

the subject must have its ground in something else which is logically different

from both ("ampliative judgments"). This ground is, in the case of syn

thetical judgments a posteriori ("judgments of perception," cf. Prolegom

ena, 18, III. 215 f.), the act of perception itself; in the case of synthetical

judgments a priori, on the contrary, i.e. of the universal principles employed

for the interpretation of experience, it is something else ; what it is is just that

which is to be sought. A priori is, with Kant, not a psychological, but a purely

epistemological mark ; it means not a chronological priority to experience, but

a universality and necessity of validity in principles of reason which really tran

scends all experience, and is not capable of being proved by any experience \i.e.

a logical, not a chronological priority]. No one who does not make this clear

to himself has any hope of understanding Kant.

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the philosophical faculty of Konigsberg University, and was made full Professor

there in 1770. The cheerful, brilliant animation and versatility of his middle

years gave place with time to an earnest, rigorous conception of life and to the

control of a strict consciousness of duty, which manifested itself in his unremit

ting labour upon his great philosophical task, in his masterful fulfilment of the

duties of his academic profession, and in the inflexible rectitude of his life, which

was not without a shade of the pedantic. The uniform course of his solitary and

modest scholar s life was not disturbed by the brilliancy of the fame that fell upon

his life s evening, and only transiently by the dark shadow, that the hatred of

orthodoxy, which had obtained control under Frederick William II., threatened

to cast upon his path by a prohibition upon his philosophy. He died from

weakness of old age on the 12th of February, 1804.

Kant s life and personality after his earlier works has been drawn most

completely by Kuno Fischer ((tench, d. neueren Philos., III. and IV., 4th ed.

Heidelb. 18i)9) ; E. Arnoldt has treated of his youth and the first part of his

activity as a teacher (Konigsberg, 1882); [J. II. W. Stuckenberg, Life of Kant,

Lond. 1882].

The change which was taking place in the philosopher toward the end of the

seventh decade of the eighteenth century appears especially in his activity as

a writer. His earlier " pre-critical " works (of which those most important

philosophically have been already cied, p. 445) are distinguished by easy-

flowing, graceful presentation, and present themselves as admirable occasional

writings of a man of fine thought who is well versed in the world. His later

works show the laboriousness of his thought and the pressure of the contending

motifs, both in the form of the investigation with its circumstantial heaviness

and artificial architectonic structure, and in the formation of his si ntt nces,

which are highly involved, and frequently interrupted by restriction. Minerva

frightened away the graces ; but instead, the devout tone of a deep thought and

an earnest conviction which here and there rises to powerful pathos and weighty

expression hovers over his later writings.

For Kant s theoretical development, the antithesis between the Leibnizo-

Wolffian metaphysics and the Newtonian natural philosophy was at the begin

ning of decisive importance. The former had been brought to his attention at

the University by Knutzen (cf. p. 444), the latter by Teske, and in his growing

alienation from the philosophical school-system, his interest for natural science,

to which for the time he seemed to desire to devote himself entirely, co-operated

strongly. His first treatise, 1747, was entitled Thoughts upon the True Estima

tion of the Vis Viva, a controverted question between Cartesian and Leibnizian

physicists ; his great work upon the General Natural History and Theory of

the Heavens was a natural science production of the first rank, and besides

small articles, his promotion treatise, De Jgne (1755), which propoundid a

hypothesis as to imponderables, belongs here. His activity as a teacher also

showed, even on into his later period, a preference for the subjects of natural

sciences, especially for physical geography and anthropology.

In theoretical philosophy Kant passed through many reversals (mancherlei

Umkippunt/en) of his standpoint (cf. 33 and 34). At the beginning (in the

Physical Monadology} he had sought to adjust the opposition between Leibniz

and Newton, in their doctrine of space, by the ordinary distinction of things-in-

themselves (which are to be known metaphysically), and phenomena, or things

as they appear (which are to be investigated physically) ; he then (in the writ

ings after 1760) attained to the insight that a metaphysics in the sense of

rationalism is impossible, that philosophy and mathematics must have diametri

cally opposed methods, and that philosophy as the empirical knowledge of the

given cannot step beyond the circle of experience. But while he allowed him-

self to be comforted by Voltaire and Rousseau for this falling away of meta

physical insight, through the instrumentality of the "natural feeling" for the

right and holy, he was still working with Lambert at an improvement of the

method of metaphysics, and when he found this, as he hoped, by the aid of

Leibniz s Nouveaux Essais, he constructed in bold lines the mystico-dogmatic

system of his Inaugural Dissertation.

The progress from there on to the System of Criticism is obscure and contro

verted. Cf. concerning this development, in which the time in which he was

influenced by Hume and the direction which that influence took are especially

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in question, the following: Fr. Michelis, Kant vor rind nach 1770 (Braunsberg,

1871) ; Fr. Paulsen, Versuch einer Entwicklungsgeschichte der kantischen

Erkenntnisstheorie (Leips. 1875) ; A. Riehl, Geschichte und Methode des phi-

losophischen Kritic.ismus (Leips. 1876) ; B. Erdmann, Kant s Kriticismus

(Leips. 1878) ; W. Windelband, Die verschiedenen Phasen der kantischen

Lehre vom Ding-an-sich ( Vierteljahrschr. f. wissensch. Philos., 1876). Cf. also

the writings by K. Dieterich on Kant s relation to Newton and Rousseau under

the title Die kantische Philosophic in ihrer inneren Entwicklungsgeschichte,

Freiburg i. B. 1885.

From the adjustment of the various tendencies of Kant s thought proceeded

the "Doomsday-book" of German philosophy, the Critique of Pure Reason

(Riga, 1781). It received a series of changes in the second edition (1787), and

these became the object of very vigorous controversies after attention had been

called to them by Schelling ( W., V. 196) and Jacobi (W., II. 291). Cf. concern

ing this, the writings cited above. H. Vaihinger, Commentar zu K. K. d. r. V,

(Vol. I., Stuttgart, 1887 [Vol. II., 1892]), has diligently collected the literature.

Separate editions of the Kritik, by K. Kehrbach, upon the basis of the first edi

tion, and by B. Krdmann [and E. Adickes] upon the basis of the second

edition. [Eng. tr. of the Critique (2d ed.), by Meiklejohn, in the Bohn Library,

and by Max Miiller (text of 1st ed. with supplements giving changes of 2d ed.),

Lond. 1881 ; Paraphrase and Commentary by Mahaffy and Bernard, 2d ed.,

Loud, and N.Y. 1889 ; partial translations in J. II. Stirling s Text-book to Kant,

and in Watson s Selections, Lond. and N.Y. 1888. This last contains also ex

tracts from the ethical writings and from the Critique of Judgment. ,]

The additional main writings of Kant in his critical period are : Prolegomena

zu einer jrden kiinftigen Metapbysik, 1783 ; Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der

Bitten, 1785; Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Naturwissenschaft, 1785;

Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 1788 ; Kritik der Urtheilskraft, 1790 ; Die

Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, 1793 ; Zum ewigen Frie-

den, 1795 ; Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Rechts- und Tugendlehre, 1797 ;

Der Streit der Fakultiiten, 1798 ; [Eng. tr. of the Prolegomena, by Mahaffy and

Bernard, Lond. and N.Y. 1889; of the Prolegomena and Metaphysical Founda

tions of Natural Science, by Bax, Bohn Library ; of the ethical writings, includ

ing the first part of the Religion within the Bounds of Pure Reason, by T. K.

Abbott, 4th ed., Lond. 1889 ; of the Critique of Judgment, by J. H. Bernard,

Lond. and N.Y. 1892; of the Philosophy of Law, by W. Hastie, Edin. 1887;

Principles of Politics, including the essay on Perpetual Peace, by W. Hastie,

Edin. 1891. The contents of Kant s Essays and Treatises, 2 vols., Lond. 1798,

is given in Ueberweg, II. 138 (Eng. tr.)].

Complete editions of his works have been prepared by K. Rosenkranz and

F. W. Schubert (12 vols., Leips. 1833 ff.), G. Hartenstein (10 vols., Leips.

1838 f., and recently 8 vols., Leips. 1867 ff.), and J. v. Kirchmann (in the

Philos. Biblioth.}. 1 They contain, besides his smaller articles, etc., his lectures

upon logic, pedagogy, etc., and his letters. A survey of all that has been

written by Kant (including also the manuscript of the Transition from Meta

physics to Physics, which is without value for the interpretation of his critical

system) is found in Ueberweg- Heinze, III. 24 ; there, too, the voluminous

literature is cited with great completeness. Of this we can give here only a

choice of the best and most instructive ; a survey of the more valuable literature,

arranged according to its material, is offered by the article Kant, by W. Windel

band in Ersch und Gruber s Enc. [The Journal of Speculative Philosophy

contains numerous articles upon Kant. We may mention also Adamson, The

Philosophy of Kant, Edin. 1879 ; art. Kant, in Enc. Brit., by the same author ;

arts, in Mind, Vol. VI., by J. Watson, and in Philos. Review, 1893, by J. G.

Schurmann. E. Adickes has begun an exhaustive bibliography of the German

literature in the Philos. Review, 1893.]

1 The citations refer to the older Hartenstein edition In the case of many

works the convenient editions by K. Kehrbach (Reclam. Bib. ) make easy the

transfer of the citations to the other editions.

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### 38. The Object of Knowledge.

Erh. Schmid, Kritik der reinen Vernunft im Grtuidris.se. Jena, 1786.

H. Cohen, Kant s Theorie der Erfahrung. Berlin, 1871.

A. Holder, Darstellung der kantischen Erkenntnisstheorie. Tlibingen, 1873.

A. Stadler, Die, Grundsiitze der reinen Erkenntnisstheorie in der kantischen

Philosophic. Leips. 187(5.

Job. Volkelt, /. Kant s Erkenntnisstheorie nach ihren Grundprincipien analysirt. Leips. 1879.

E. Pfleiderer, Kantischer Kriticismus und englische Philosophic. Tiibingen,

1881.

J. Hutchinson Stirling, Text-Book to Kant. Edin. and Lond. 1881.

Seb. Turbiglio, Analisi, Storia, Critica della llagione Pura. Rome, 1881.

G. S. Morris, Kant s Critique of Pure Reason, Chicago, 1882.

Fr. Staudinger, Jt oumena. Darmstadt, 1884.

[K. Fischer s Criticism of Kant, trans, by Hough. Lond. 1888.]

[J. Watson, Kant and his English Critics. Lond. 1880.]

[H. Vaihinger, Commentar zu Kant s Kritik d. r. Vernunft, II. (on the

Esthetic). Stuttgart, 1892.]

Kant s theory of knowledge followed with tenacious consistency

from the statement which modern Terminism had given to problems

of knowledge (cf. pp. 466 and 482). The philosopher had grown up

in the nai ve realism of the Wolffian school, which without close

scrutiny regarded logical necessity and reality as identical ; and his

liberation from the ban of this school consisted in his seeing the

impossibility of determining out of "pure reason," i.e. through mere

logical operations with conceptions, anything whatever as to the j

existence l or the causal relation 2 of real things. The metaphysi

cians are the architects of many a world of thought in the air; 3 but

their structures have no relation to reality. Kant now sought this

relation first in the conceptions given through experience, since the

genetic connection of these with the reality to be known by science

seemed immediately evident, but he was shaken from this "dog

matic slumber" by Hume, 4 who demonstrated that precisely the

constitutive Forms of the conceptional knowledge of reality, espec

ially the Form of causality, are not given in perception, but are

1 Cf. Kant s Sole Possible Proof for the Existence of God.

2 Cf. the Essay on Negative Magnitudes, especially the conclusion (W., I.

59 ff.).

8 Dreams of a Ghost Seer, I. 3 ; W., III. 75.

4 In connection with this frequently mentioned confession of Kant, it is for

the most part disregarded that he characterised as "dogmatic" not only

rationalism, but also the empiricism of the earlier theory of knowledge, and

that the classical passage at which he uses this expression (in the preface to

the Prolegomena, W.. III. 170 f.) does not contrast Hume with Wolff, but with

Locke, Reid, and Beattie only. The dogmatism from which, therefore,

Kant declared that he had been freed through Hume icas that of cin/iiricism.

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products of the mechanism of association without any demonstrable

relation to the real. Reality was not to be known from the "given"

conceptions, either. And then Kant, prompted by Leibniz, deliber

ated once more whether the purified conception of virtual innate-

ness, with the aid of the " pre-established harmony " grounded in

God between the monad which knows and the monad which is to be

known, might not solve the mystery of the relation of thought and

Being, and in his Inaugural Dissertation he had convinced himself

that this was the solution of the problem. But cool reflection

soon showed that this pre-established harmony was a metaphysical

assumption, incapable of proof and unable to support a scientific

system of philosophy. So it appeared that neither empiricism nor

rationalism had solved the cardinal question, the relation of knowl

edge to its object, in what does it consist and on what does it rest ? ]

1. Kant s own, long-weighed answer to this question is the Critique

of Pure Reason. In its final systematic form, which found an ana

lytical explication in the Prolegomena, his criticism proceeds from

the/ocf of the actual presence of synthetic judgments a priori in three

theoretical sciences; viz. iu mathematics, in pure natural science, and

in metaphysics; and the design is to examine their claims to universal

and necessary validity.

In this formulation of the problem the insight into the nature of

reason s activity, which Kant had gained in the course of his critical

development, came into play. This activity is synthesis, i.e. the

uniting or unifying of a manifold. 2 This conception of synthesis\* is

a new element which separates the Critique from the Inaugural Dis

sertation; in it Kant found the common element between the Forms

of the sensibility and those of the understanding, which in his

exposition of 1770 were regarded as entirely separate, in accordance

with their characteristic attributes of receptivity and spontaneity

respectively. 4 It now appeared -that the synthesis of the tfteoretical

1 Kant s letter to Marcus Herz, Feb. 21, 1772.

" This frequently repeated definition makes the fundamental conception of

of the critical doctriue of knowledge appear in closest proximity to the funda

mental metaphysical conception of the Monadology. Cf. 31, 11.

8 Which is introduced in the Transcendental Analytic in connection with the

doctrine of the iUfgffriff Sections 10 and 15 (of the first edition of the

Critique).

4 Hence the cocftk of synthesis in the present form of the CHfffM of

Pure Beaton comes in \nWMnm with the psychological presuppositions which

passed over to the Critique out of the German working-over of the Inaugural

Dinertition. which forms the Transcendental ^Efttietic and the beginning of the

Transcendental Lnyic this was originally to have appeared immediately after

1770 under the title Limit\* &lt; &lt; &lt;\*\* and of the Understanding). In

--:-. resuppositions became obliterated.

Earlier, sensibility and und\*-- over against each ot;

receptivity and spontaneity ; but space and time, the pure Forms of the sensi-

CHAP. 1, 38.] Object of Knowledge : Synthesis. 539

reason completes itself in three stages : the combination of sensa

tions into perceptions takes place in the Forms of space and time ;

the combination of the perceptions into experience of the natural

world of reality takes place by means of concepts of the understand

ing; the combination of judgments of experience into metaphysical

knowledge takes place by means of general principles, which Kant

calls Ideas. These three stages of the knowing activity develop,

therefore, as different Forms of synthesis, of which each higher

stage has the lower for its content. The critique of reason has to

investigate what the especial Forms of this synthesis are in each

stage, and in what their universal and necessary validity consists.

2. As regards mathematics, the conception of the Inaugural Dis

sertation fits aptly, in the main, into the critique of reason. Mathe

matical propositions are synthetic ; they rest in the last resort upon

construction in pure perception, not upon the development of con

ceptions. Their necessity and universal validity, which cannot be

established by any experience, is, therefore, to be explained only if

an a priori principle of perception lies at their basis. Kant, there

fore, shows that the general ideas of space and time, to which all

insights of geometry and arithmetic relate, are " pure Forms of per

ception " or perceptions a priori. The ideas of the one infinite

space and of the one infinite time do not rest upon the combination

of empirical perceptions of finite spaces and times; but with the

very attributes of limit in the " beside-of-one-another " and \* after-

one-another " (co-existence and succession), the whole of space and

the whole of time respectively are already involved in the empirical

perception of particular space and time magnitudes, which can accord

ingly be presented to the mind only as parts of space in general

and of time in general. Space and time cannot be "concepts,"

since they relate to an object which is only a single, unique object,

and which is not thought as complete, but is involved in an infinite

synthesis ; and further, they are related to the ideas of finite magni

tudes, not as class -concepts are to their particular examples, but as

the whole to the part. If they are, accordingly, pure perceptions

(Anschauungen), i.e. perceptions not founded upon empirical percep

tions ( Wahrnehj&ungen), but lying at the basis of all empirical per

ceptions, 1 then they are, as such, necessary ; for we can indeed think

bility, were indeed the principles of the synthetical ordering of the

and thus belonged under the general conception of synthesis, i.e. spontaneous

unity of the manifold. Thus the conception of synthesis burst the psychological

schema of the Inaugural Dissertation.

1 Here once more it must be recalled that it is but a perverted and completely

err. iu-.nis conception of Kant to conceive of this lying at the basis of" or

pn ceding," as referring to time. The natirism. which holds space and time

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everything away from them, but cannot think them away. They

are the given Forms of pure perception from which we cannot escape,

the laws of relations, in which alone we can mentally represent with

synthetic unity the manifold of sensations. And further, space is

the form of the outer sense, time that of the inner sense ; all objects

of the particular senses are perceived as spatial, all objects of self-

perception as in time.

If, then, space and time are the " unchangeable Form of our sensu

ous receptivity," cognitions determined by these two kinds of per

ception without any regard to the particular empirical content,

possess universal and necessary validity for the entire compass of

all that we can perceive and experience. In the realm of the sensi

bility, so the " Transcendental .-Esthetic " teaches, the only

object of a priori knowledge is the Form of the synthesis of the man

ifold given through sensation, the law of arrangement in space and

time. But the universality and necessity of this knowledge is intel

ligible only if space and time are nothing but the necessary Forms of

man s sensuous perception. If they possessed a reality independent

of the functions of perception, the a priori character of mathematical

knowledge would be impossible. Were space and time themselves

things or real properties and relations of things, then we could know

of them only through experience, and, therefore, never in a univer

sal and necessary way. This last mode of knowledge is possible

only if they are nothing but the Form under which all things in our

perception must appear. 1 According to this principle the a priori

and the phenomenal become for Kant interchangeable conceptions.

The only universal and necessary element in man s knowledge is the

Form under which things appear in it. Rationalism limits itself to

the Form, and holds good even for this only at the price of the

" subjectivity " of the same.

3. While Kant would thus have the spatial and chronological re

lations of objects of perception regarded as wholly a mode of mental

representation, which does not coincide with the reality of things

themselves, he distinguished this conception of their ideality very

exactly from that " subjectivity of the qualities of sense " which was

held by him, as by all philosophy after Descartes and Locke, to be

self-evident. 2 And the point at issue here again is solely the ground

of the phenomenality. As regards colour, taste, etc., the phenome-

nality had been based, since the time of Protagoras and Democritus,

to be inborn ideas, is un-Kantian throughout, and stands in contradiction tc

express declarations of the philosopher (cf., e.g., above, p. 465 f.).

1 This thought is developed with especial clearness in the Prolegomena, 9.

2 Cf. Critique, 3, b. W., II. 68.

CHAP. 1, 38.] Object of Knowledge : Space and Time. 541

upon the difference and relativity of impressions ; for the Forms of

space and time, Kant deduces their phenomenality precisely from

their invariability. For him, therefore, the qualities of sense

offered only an individual and contingent mode of representation ;

while the Forms of space and time, on the other hand, present

a universal and necessary mode in which things appear. All that

perception contains, is, indeed, not the true essence of things, but

an appearance or phenomenon ; but the contents of sensation are

" phenomena " in quite another sense than that in which the Forms

of space and time are such ; the former have worth only as the

states of the individual subject, the latter as "objective" Forms of

perception for all. Even on this ground, therefore, Kant, too, sees

the task of natural science to lie in the reduction of the qualitative

to the quantitative, in which alone necessity and universal validity

can be found upon a mathematical basis, agreeing in this with

Democritus and Galileo ; but he differed from his predecessors in

holding that, philosophically considered, even the mathematical mode

of representing Nature can be regarded only as an appearance and

phenomenon, though in the deeper sense of the word. Sensation

gives an individual idea, mathematical theory gives a necessary,

universally valid perception of the actual world ; but both are

merely different stages of the phenomenal appearance, behind which

the true thing-in-itself remains unknown. Space and time hold

without exception for all objects of perception, but for nothing

beyond ; they have " empirical reality " and " transcendental ideality."

4. The main advance of the Critique of Reason beyond the Inau

gural Dissertation consists in the fact that these same principles are

extended in a completely parallel investigation to the question as

to the epistemological value which belongs to the synthetic Forms

of the activity of the understanding. 1

Natural science needs besides its mathematical basis a number of

general principles as to the connection of things. These principles,

such as that every change must have its cause, are of a synthetic

nature, but, at the same time, are not capable of being established

by experience, though they come to consciousness through experi

ence, are applied to experience, and find there their confirmation.

Of such principles a few have indeed been incidentally propounded

and treated hitherto, and it remains for the Critique itself to dis

cover the "system of principles," but it is clear that without this

basis the knowledge of Nature would be deprived of its necessary

1 This parallelism is seen most plainly by comparing 9 and 14 of the

Prolegomena.

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and universal validity. For "Nature" is not merely an aggregate

of spatial and temporal Forms, of corporeal shapes and motions,

but a connected system, which we perceive through our senses, but

think at the same time through conceptions. Kant calls the faculty

of thinking the manifold of perception in synthetic unity, the

Understanding ; and the, categories or pure conceptions of Understand

ing are the Forms of the synthesis of the Understanding, just as space

and time are the Forms of the synthesis of perception.

If now Nature, as object of our knowledge, were a real connected

system of things, independent of the functions of our reason, we

could know of it only through experience and never a priori; a uni

versal and necessary knowledge of Nature is possible only if our

conceptional Forms of synthesis determine Nature itself. If Nature

prescribed laws to our understanding, we should have only an

empirical, inadequate knowledge ; an a priori knowledge of Nature

is therefore possible only if the case be reversed and our understanding

prescribes laws to Nature. But our understanding cannot determine

Nature in so far as it exists as a thing-in-itself, or as a system of

things-in-themselves, but only in so far as it appears in our thought.

A. priori knowledge of Nature is therefore possible only if the con

nection which we think between perceptions is also nothing but our mode

of ideation; the conceptional relations also, in which Nature is an

object of our knowledge, must be only "phenomenon."

5. In order to attain this result, the Critique of Reason proceeds

first to assure itself of these synthetic Forms of the understanding

in systematic completeness. Here it is clear from the outset that

we have not to do with those analytic relations which are treated in

formal logic, and grounded upon the principle of contradiction. For

these contain only the rules for establishing relations between con

ceptions according to the contents already given within them. But

such modes of combination as are present when we affirm the rela

tion of cause and effect, or of substance and accident, are not con

tained in those analytical Forms just this had been shown by

Hume. Kant discovers here the completely new task of transcendental

logic. 1 Side by side with the (analytic) Forms of the understanding,

in accordance with which the relations of conceptions which are

given as to their contents are established, appear the synthetic Forms

of understanding, through which perceptions are made objects of

conceptional knowledge. Images of sensation, co-ordinate in space

and changing in time, become " objective " only by being thought as

6 Cf. M. Steckelmacher, Die formale Logik Kant s in ihren Beziehungen zur

transscendentalcn (Breslau, 1878).

CHAP. 1, 38.] Object of Knowledge : Categories. 543

things with abiding qualities and changing states ; but this relation

expressed by means of the category inheres analytically neither in the

perceptions nor in their perceptional relations as such. In the ana

lytic relations of formal logic thinking is dependent upon its objects,

and appears ultimately with right as only a reckoning with given

magnitudes. The synthetic Forms of transcendental logic, on the

contrary, let us recognise the understanding in its creative function

of producing out of perceptions the objects of thought itself.

At this point, in the distinction between formal and transcen

dental logic, appears for the first time the fundamental antithesis

between Kant and the conceptions of the Greek theory of knowl

edge which had prevailed up to his time. The Greek theory

assumed "the objects" as "given" independently of thought, and

regarded the intellectual processes as entirely dependent upon the

objects; at the most it was the mission of the intellectual processes

to reproduce these objects by way of copy, or allow themselves to

be guided by them. Kant discovered that the objects of thought

are none other than the products of thought itself. This spontaneity

of reason forms the deepest kernel of his transcendental idealism.

But while he thus with completely clear consciousness set a new

epistemological logic of synthesis by the side of the analytical logic

of Aristotle, which had as its essential content the relations involved

in subsuming ready-made conceptions under each other (cf. 12),

he yet held that both had a common element, viz: the science of

judgment. In the judgment the relation thought between subject

and predicate is asserted as holding objectively ; all objective think

ing is judging. Hence if the categories or radical conceptions of the

understanding are to be regarded as the relating forms of the

synthesis by which objects arise, there must be as many categories

as there are kinds of judgments, and every category is the mode of

connecting subject and predicate which is operative in its own kind

of judgment.

Kant accordingly thought that he could deduce the table of the

categories from that of the judgments. He distinguished from the

four points of view of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality,

three kinds of judgments for each: Universal, Particular, Singular,

Affirmative, Negative, Infinite, Categorical, Hypothetical, Dis

junctive, Problematic, Assertoric, Apodictic; and to these were

to correspond the twelve categories : Unity, Plurality, Totality,

Reality, Negation, Limitation, Inherence and Subsistence, Caus

ality and Dependence, Community or Reciprocity, Possibility and

Impossibility, Existence and Non-existence, Necessity and Con

tingency. The artificiality of this construction, the looseness of

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the relations between Forms of judgment and categories, the un

equal value of the categories, all this is evident, but Kant

unfortunately had so much confidence in this system that he treated

it as the architectonic frame for a great number of his later

investigations.

6. The most difficult part of the task, however, was to demon

strate in the "Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Conceptions

of the Understanding" how the categories "make the objects of

experience." The obscurity into which the profound investigation

of the philosopher necessarily came here is best brightened up by

a fortunate idea of the Prolegomena. Kant here distinguishes judg

ments of perception, i.e. those in which only the relation of sensations

in space and time for the individual consciousness is expressed, and

judgments of experience, i.e. those in which such a relation is

asserted as objectively valid, as given in the object; and he finds

the difference in epistemological value between them to be, that

in the judgment of experience the spatial or temporal relation is

regulated and grounded by a category, a conceptional connection,

whereas in the mere judgment of perception this is lacking. Thus,

for example, the succession of two sensations becomes objective and

universally valid when it is thought as having its ground in the

fact that one phenomenon is the cause of the other. All particular

constructions of the spatial and temporal synthesis of sensations

become objects only by being combined according to a rule of the

understanding. In contrast with the individual mechanism of

ideation, in which individual sensations may order themselves,

separate and unite in any way whatever, stands objective think

ing, which is equally valid for all, and is bound to fixed, co

herent, ordered wholes, in which the connections are governed by

conceptions.

This is especially true in the case of relations in time. For since

phenomena of outer sense belong to the inner sense as "determina

tions of our mind," all phenomena without exception stand under

the Form of the inner sense, i.e. of time. Kant, therefore, sought

to show that between the categories and the particular Form of

perception in time a " schematism " obtains, which first makes it

possible at all to apply the Forms of the understanding to the

images of perception, and which consists in the possession by every

individual category of a schematic similarity with a particular form of

the time relation. In empirical knowledge we use this schematism

to interpret the empirically perceived time relation by the correspond

ing category [e.g. to apprehend regular succession as causality] ;

transcendental philosophy, conversely, has to seek the justification

CHAP. 1, 38.] Object of Knowledge : Experience. 546

of this procedure in the fact that the category, as a rule of the

understanding, gives the corresponding time relations a rational

basis as object of experience.

In fact, the individual consciousness finds in itself the contrast

between a movement of ideas (say of the fancy), for which it claims

no validity beyond its own sphere, and, on the other hand, an activ

ity of experience, in the case of which it knows itself to be bound

in a way that is likewise valid for all others. Only in this depend

ence consists the reference of thought to an object. But if it was

now recognised that the ground of the objective validity of the

time (and space) relation can rest only in its determination by a

rule of the understanding, it is on the other hand a fact that

the consciousness of the individual knows nothing of this co-opera

tion of the categories in experience, and that he rather accepts the

result of this co-operation as the objective necessity of his appre

hension of the synthesis of sensations in space and time.

The production of the object, therefore, does not go on in the

individual consciousness, but lies already at the basis of this con

sciousness ; for this production, a higher common consciousness must

therefore be assumed, which comes into the empirical consciousness

of the individual, not with its functions, but only with their result.

This Kant termed in the Prolegomena, consciousness in general; in

the Critique, transcendental apperception, or the "/" [or "self,"

or " ego "].

Experience is accordingly the system of phenomena in which the

spatial and temporal synthesis of sensation is determined by the rules

of the understanding. Thus " Nature as phenomenon " is the object

of an a priori knowledge ; for the categories hold for all experience,

because experience is grounded only through them.

7. The universal and necessary force and validity of the cate

gories find expression in the Principles of the Pure Understanding,

in which the conceptional Forms unfold themselves through the

medium of the schematism. But here it is at once evident that the

main weight of the Kantian doctrine of the categories falls upon

the third group, and thus upon those problems in which he hoped

"to solve Hume s doubt." From the categories of Quantity and

Quality result only the " Axiom of Perception," that all phenomena

are extensive magnitudes, and the " Anticipations of Empirical

Perception " according to which the object of sensation is an inten

sive magnitude ; in the case of Modality there result only definitions

of the possible, actual, and necessary, under the name of the " Postu

lates of Empirical Thought." On the other hand, the Analogies of

Experience prove that in Nature substance is permanent, and that

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its quantum can be neither increased nor diminished, that all

changes take place according to the law of cause and effect, and that

all substances are in thorough-going reciprocity or inter-action.

These, therefore, are the universally and necessarily valid prin

ciples and highest premises of all natural science, which are uni-

\ versally and necessarily valid without any empirical proof; they

^ contain what Kant calls the metapkysics of Nature. In order that

they may be employed, however, upon the Nature given through

our senses, they must pass through a mathematical formulation,

because Nature is the system of sensations perceived in the Forms

of space and time and ordered according to the categories. This

transition is effected through the empirical conception of motion, to

which all occurrence and change in Nature is theoretically to be

reduced. At least, science of Nature, in the proper sense, reaches

only so far as we can employ mathematics : hence Kant excluded

psychology and chemistry from natural science as being merely

descriptive disciplines. The "Metaphysical Elements of Natural

Science " contain, accordingly, all that can be inferred universally

and necessarily concerning the laws of motion, on the ground of the

categories and of mathematics. The most important point in Kant s

philosophy of Nature, as thus built up, is his dynamic theory of mat

ter, in which he now deduces from the general principles of the

Critique the doctrine already laid down in the " Natural History of

tlie Heavens," that the substance of that which is movable in space

is the product of two forces which maintain an equilibrium in a

varying degree, those of attraction and repulsion.

8. But in accordance with Kant s presuppositions, the above

i metaphysics of Nature can be only a metaphysics of phenomena :

and no other is possible, for the categories are Forms for relating,

. and as such are in themselves empty ; they can refer to an object

only through the medium of perceptions, which present a manifold

content to be combined. This perception, however, is, in the case

of us men, only the sensuous perception in the forms of space and

time, and as a content for their synthetic function we have only

tli at given in sensations. Accordingly, the only object of human

knowledge is experience, i.e. phenomenal appearance ; and the divis

ion of objects of knowledge into phenomena and rioumena, which

has been usual since Plato, has no sense. A knowledge of things-in-

themselves through " sheer reason," and extending beyond experi

ence, is a nonentity, a chimera.

But has, then, the conception of the thing-in-itself any rational

meaning at all ? and is not, together with this, the designation of

all objects of our knowledge as " phenomena," also without meaning ?

CHAP. 1, 38.] Object of Knowledge ; Thiny-in^Itself. 547

This question was the turning-point of Kant s reflections. Hitherto

all that the nai ve conception of the world regards as " object " has

been resolved partly into sensations, partly into synthetic Forms of

perception and of the understanding ; nothing seems to remain

besides the individual consciousness as truly existing, except the

"consciousness in general, the transcendental apperception. But

where, then, are the " things," of which Kant declared that it had

never come into his mind to deny their reality ?

The conception of the tldng-in-itself can, to be sure, no longer have

a positive content in the Critique of Reason, as it had with Leibniz,

or in Kant s Inaugural Dissertation; it can no longer be the object

of purely rational knowledge, it can no longer be an " object " at all.

But it is at least no contradiction, merely to think it. Primarily,

purely hypothetically, and as something the reality of which is

neither to be affirmed nor to be denied, a mere " problem."

Human knowledge is limited to objects of experience, because the

perception required for the use of the categories is in our case only

the receptive sensuous perception in space and time. If we suppose

that there is another kind of perception, there would be for this

other objects, likewise, with the help of the categories. Such objects

of a non-human perception, l:o\vcver. remain still only phenomena,

though this perception again might be assumed as one which

arranges the given contents of sensation in any manner whatever.

Nevertheless, if one should think of a perception of a non-receptive

kind, a perception which synthetically produced not only its Forms,

but also its contents, a truly " productive imagination," its

objects would necessarily be no longer phenomena, but things-in-

themselves. Such a faculty would deserve the name of an intellect

ual perception (or intuition), or intuitive intellect; it would be the

unity of the two knowing faculties of sensibility and understand

ing, which in man appear separated, although by their constant

reference to each other they indicate a hidden common root. The

possibility of such a faculty is as little to be denied as its reality

is to be affirmed ; yet Kant here indicates that we should have to

think a supreme spiritual Being in this way. Noumena, or tliings-

in-themselves, are therefore thinkable in the negative sense as objects of

a non-sensuous perception, of which, to be sure, our knowledge can

predicate absolutely nothing, they are thinkable as limiting con

ceptions of experience.

And ultimately they do not remain so completely problematical

as would at first appear. For if we should deny the reality of

things-in-themselves, " all would be immediately resolved into

phenomena\*- and we should thus be venturing the assertion that

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nothing is real except what appears to man, or to other sensuously

receptive beings. But this assertion would be a presumption com

pletely incapable of proof. Transcendental idealism must, therefore,

not deny the reality of noumena ; it must only remain conscious

that they cannot in any wise become objects of human knowledge.

Things-in-themselves must be thought, but are not knowable. In

this way Kant won back the right to designate the objects of human

knowledge as "only phenomena."

9. With this the way was marked out for the third part of the

critique of the reason, the Transcendental Dialectic. 1 A metaphysics

of that which cannot be experienced, or, as Kant prefers to say, of

the supersensuous, is impossible. This must be shown by a criticism

of the historical attempts which have been made with this in view,

and Kant chose, as his actual example for this, the Leibnizo-Wolffian

school-metaphysics, with its treatment of rational psychology, cos

mology, and theology. But at the same time, it must be shown that

that which is incapable of being experienced, which cannot be

known, must yet necessarily be thought ; and the transcendental

illusion must be discovered, by which even the great thinkers have

at all times been seduced into regarding this, which must necessarily

be thought, as an object of possible knowledge.

To attain this end Kant proceeds from the antithesis between the

activity of the understanding and the sensuous perception by the

aid of which alone the former produces objective knowledge.

The thinking, which is determined by the categories, puts the data

of the sensibility into relation with one another in such a way, that

every phenomenon is conditioned by other phenomena : but in this

process the understanding, in order to v think the individual phenom

enon completely, must needs grasp the totality of the conditions by

which this particular phenomenon is determined in its connections

with the whole experience. But, in view of the endlessness of the

world of phenomena in its relation to space and time, this demand

cannot be fulfilled. For the categories are principles of relation

between phenomena ; they cognise the conditionality or conditional

character of each phenomenon only by means of other phenomena,

and demand for these again insight into their conditional nature as

determined by others, and so on to infinity. 2 Out of this relation

1 As regards the subject matter, the Transcendental Esthetic, Analytic, and

Dialetic, as the Introduction shows, form the three main co-ordinate parts of

the Critique ; the formal schematism of the division which Kant imitated from

the arrangement of logical text-books usual at that time, is, on the contrary,

entirely irrelevant. The "Doctrine of Method" is in fact only a supplement

extremely rich in fine observations.

2 Cf. the similar thoughts in Nicolaus disarms and Spinoza, though there

metaphysically applied ; above, pp. 347 and 419.

CHAP. 1, 38.] Object of Knowledge : Ideas. 549

between understanding and sensibility result for human knowledge

necessary and yet insoluble problems; these Kant calls Ideas, and

the faculty requisite for this highest synthesis of the cognitions

of the understanding he designates as Reason in the narrower

sense.

If now the reason will represent to itself as solved, a problem

thus set, the sought totality of conditions must be thought as some

thing unconditioned, which, indeed, contains in itself the conditions

for the infinite series of phenomena, but which is itself no longer

conditioned. This conclusion of an infinite series, which for the

knowledge of the understanding is in itself a contradiction, must

nevertheless be thought, if the task of the understanding, which

aims at totality in connection with the infinite material of the data

of the senses, is to be regarded as performed. The Ideas are hence

ideas or mental representations of the unconditioned, which must

necessarily be thought without ever becoming object of knowledge,

and the transcendental illusion into which metaphysics falls con

sists in regarding them as given, whereas they are only imposed or

set as a task (aufgegebeii). In truth they are not constitutive prin

ciples through which, as through the categories, objects of knowl

edge are produced, but only regulative principles, by which the

understanding is constrained to seek for farther and farther con

necting links in the realm of the conditioned of experience.

Of such Ideas Kant finds three ; the unconditioned for the totality

of all phenomena of the inner sense, of all data of the outer sense,

of all the conditioned in general, is thought respectively as the soul,

the world, and God.

10. The criticism of rational psychology in the "Paralogisms of

Pure Reason" takes the form of pointing out in the usual proofs

for the substantiality of the soul, the quaternio terminorum of a

confusion of the logical subject with the real substrate ; it shows

that the scientific conception of substance is bound to our perception

of that which persists in space, and that it is therefore applicable

only in the field of the external sense, and maintains that the Idea

of the soul as an unconditioned real unity of all phenomena of the

inner sense, is indeed as little capable of proof as it is of refutation,

but is at the same time the heuristic principle for investigating the

inter-connections of the psychical life.

In a similar way, the section on the " Ideal of the Reason " treats

the Idea of God. Carrying out with greater precision his earlier

treatise on the same subject, Kant destroys the cogency of the

arguments brought forward for the existence of God. He combats

the right of the ontological proof to infer existence from the concep-

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tion alone ; he shows that the cosmological proof involves a petitio

principii when it seeks the "first cause" of all that is "contingent"

in an "absolutely necessary" being; he proves that the teleological

or physico-theological argument at the best granted the beauty,

harmony, and purposiveness or adaptation of the universe leads

to the ancient conception of a wise and good " Architect of the

world." But he emphasises that the denial of God s existence is a

claim which steps beyond the bounds of our experiential knowledge,

and is as incapable of proof as the opposite, and that rather the

belief in a living, Real unity of all reality constitutes the only

powerful motive for empirical investigation of individual groups of

phenomena.

Most characteristic by far, however, is Kant s treatment of the

Idea of the world in the Antinomies of Pure Reason. These

antinomies express the fundamental thought of the transcendental

dialectic in the sharpest manner, by showing that when the universe

is treated as the object of knowledge, propositions which are

mutually contradictory can be maintained with equal right, in so

far as we follow, on the one hand, the demand of the understanding

for a completion of the series of phenomena, and on the other, the

demand of the sensuous perception for an endless continuance of

the same. Kant proves hence, in the "thesis," that the world must

have a beginning and end in space and time, that as regards its

substance it presents a limit to its divisibility, that events in it

must have free, i.e. no longer causally conditioned, beginnings, and

that to it must belong an absolutely necessary being, God; and in

the antithesis he proves the contradictory opposite for all four cases.

At the same time the complication is increased by the fact that the

proofs (with one exception) are indirect, so that the thesis is proved

by a refutation of the antithesis, the antithesis by refutation of the

thesis ; each assertion is therefore both proved and refuted. The

solution of the antinomies in the case of the first two, the " mathe

matical," takes the form of showing that the principle of excluded

third loses its validity where something is made the object of knowl

edge, which can never become such, as is the case with the universe.

In the case of the third and fourth antinomies, the " dynamical,"

which concern freedom and God, Kant seeks to show (what, to be

sure, is impossible in a purely theoretical way), that it is perhaps

thinkable that the antitheses hold true for phenomena, and the

theses, on the other hand, for the unknowable world of things-in-

themselves. For this latter world, it is at least not a contradiction

to think freedom and God, whereas neither is to be met with, it is

certain, in our knowledge of phenomena.

CHAP. 1, 39.] The Categorical Imperative. 551

### 39. The Categorical Imperative.

H. Cohen, Kant s Begrundung der Ethik. Brlin, 1877.

E. Arnoldt, Kant s Idee vom hochsten Gut. Konigsberg, 1874.

B. 1 iinjer, Die Religionsphilosophie Kant s. Jena, 1874.

[N. Porter, Kant s Ethics. Chicago, 188f&gt;.]

[J. G. Schurniann, Kantian Ethics and the. Ethics of Evolution. Lond. 1882.]

The synthetic function in the theoretical reason is the combina

tion of mental presentations into perceptions, judgments, and Ideas.

The practical synthesis is the relating of the will to a presented con

tent, by which this latter becomes an end. This relating Form Kant

carefully excluded from the primary conceptions of the knowing

understanding; it is instead the fundamental category of the practical

use of the reason. It gives no objects of knowledge, but instead,

objects of will.

1. For the critique of the reason there rises from this the prob

lem, whether there is a practical synthesis a priori, that is, whether

there are necessary and universally valid objects of willing ; or whether

anything is to be found which the reason makes its end or demands

a priori, without any regard to empirical motives. This universal and

necessary object of the practical reason we call the moral laiv.

For it is clear for Kant from the outset, that the activity of pure

reason in proposing ends to itself, if there is any such activity, must

appear as a command, in the form of the imperative, as over against

the empirical motives of will and action. The will directed toward

the particular objects and relations of experience is determined by

these and dependent upon them ; the pure rational will, on the con

trary, can be determined only through itself. It is hence necessarily

directed toward something else than the natural impulses, and this

something else, which the moral law requires as over against our

inclinations, is called duty.

Hence the predicates of ethical judgment concern only this kind

of determination of the will; they refer to the disposition, not to

the act or to its external consequences. Nothing in the world, says

Kant, 1 can be called good without qualification except a Good Will ;

and this remains good even though its execution is completely

restrained by external causes. Morality as a quality of man is a

disposition conformable to duty.

2. But it becomes all the more necessary to investigate as to

1 Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, I. (W., IV. 10 ff.) ; Abbott, p. 9.

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whether there is such an a priori command of duty, and in what

consists a law, to which obedience is required by the reason quite

independently of all empirical ends. To answer this question Kant

proceeds from the teleological connections of the actual volitional

life. Experience of natural causal connections brings with it the

consequence, that we are forced to will according to the synthetic

relation of end and means, one thing for the sake of another. From

practical reflection on such relations arise (technical) rules of dex

terity and (" practical ") counsels of prudence. They all assert,

" If you will this or that, then you must proceed thus or so." They

are on this account hypothetical imperatives. They presuppose a

volition as actually present already, and demand on the ground of

this the further act of will which is required to satisfy the first.

But the moral law cannot be dependent upon any object of will

already existing in experience, and moral action must not appear as

means in service of other ends. The requirement of the moral

command must be propounded and fulfilled solely for its own sake.

It does not appeal to what the man already wishes on other grounds,

but demands an act of will which has its worth in itself only, and

the only truly moral action is one in which such a command is

fulfilled without regard to any other consequences. The moral law

is a command absolute, a categorical imperative. It holds uncondition

ally and absolutely, while the hypothetical imperatives are only

relative.

If now it is asked, what is the content of the categorical impera

tive, it is clear that it can contain no empirical element : the demand

of the moral law does not stand in relation to the " matter of the

act of will." For this reason happiness is not adapted to be the

principle of morals, for the striving after happiness is already

present empirically, it is not a demand of reason. Eudsemonistic

morals leads, therefore, to merely hypothetical imperatives ; for it,

the ethical laws are only " counsels of prudence or sagacity " advis

ing the best method of going to work to satisfy the natural will.

But the demand of the moral law is just for a will other than the

natural will ; the moral law exists for a higher purpose than to

make us happy. If Nature had wished to place our destiny and

vocation in happiness, it would have done better to equip us with

infallible instincts than with the practical reason of conscience,

which is continually in conflict with our impulses. 1 The "happiness

morals " is even, for Kant, the type of false morals, for in this the

law always is that I should do something because I desire something

1 Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, IV. 12 f . ; Abbott, p. 11.

CHAP. 1, 39.] Categorical Imperative : Autonomy. 553

else. Every such system of morals is heteronomous ; it makes the

practical reason dependent upon some thing given outside of itself,

and this reproach applies to all attempts to seek the principle of

morality in metaphysical conceptions, such as that of perfection.

The theological morals is completely rejected by Kant with the

greatest energy, for it combines all kinds of heteronomy when it

sees the sanction in the divine will, the criterion in utility, and the

motive in the expectation of reward and punishment.

3. The categorical imperative must be the expression of the

autonomy of the practical reason, i.e. of the pure self-determination

of the rational will. It concerns, therefore, solely the Form of

willing, and requires that this should be a universally valid law.

The will is heteronomous if it follows an empirically given impulse ;

it is autonomous only where it carries out a law given it by itself.

The categorical imperative demands, therefore, that instead of act

ing according to impulses we should rather act according to maxims,

and according to such as are adapted for a universal legislation for

all beings who will rationally. "Act as if the maxim from ^lhich

you act were to become through your will a universal law of

nature."

This purely formal principle of conformity to law gains a mate

rial import by reflection upon the various kinds of worths. In the

kingdom of ends that which is serviceable for some end, and can

therefore be replaced by something else, has a price, but that only

has worth or dignity, which is absolutely valuable in itself, and is

the condition for the sake of which other things may become valu

able. This worth belongs in the highest degree to the moral law

itself, and, therefore, the motive which stimulates man to obey this

law must be nothing but reverence for the law itself. It would be

dishonoured if it were fulfilled for the sake of any external advan

tage. The worth or dignity of the moral law, moreover, passes over

to the man who is determined by this alone in the whole extent of

his experience, and is able to determine himself by the law itself,

to be its agent, and to identify himself with it. Hence reverence for

the worth of man is for Kant the material principle of moral science.

Man should do his duty not for the sake of advantage, but out of

reverence for himself, and in his intercourse with his fellow-man he

should make it his supreme maxim, never to treat him as a mere

means for the attainment of his own ends, but always to honour in

him the worth of personality.

From this Kant deduces a proud and strict system of morals 1 in

1 Metaphysische Anfangsyriinde der Tugendlehre, W., V. 221 ff.

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which, as set forth in his old age, we cannot fail to discern the

features of rigourism and of a certain pedantic stiffness. But the

fundamental characteristic of the contrast between duty and inclina

tion lies deeply rooted in his system. The principle of autonomy

recognises as moral, only acts of will done in conformity to duty,

and wholly out of regard for maxims ; it sees in all motivation of

moral action by natural impulses a falsification of pure morality.

Only that which is done solely from duty is moral. The empirical

impulses of human nature are, therefore, in themselves, ethically

indifferent ; but they become bad as soon as they oppose the demand

of the moral law, and the moral life of man consists in realising the

command of duty in the warfare against his inclinations.

4. The self-determination of the rational will is, therefore, the

supreme requirement and condition of all morality. But it is impos

sible in the realm of the experience which is thought and known

through the categories : for this experience knows only the deter

mination of each individual phenomenon by others ; self-determina

tion, as the power to begin a series of the conditioned, is impossible

according to the principles of cognition. This power with reference

to the will we call freedom, as being an action which is not conditioned

by others according to the schema of causality, but which is deter

mined only through itself, and is on its part the cause of an endless

series of natural processes. Hence if the theoretical reason, whose

knowledge is limited to experience, had to decide as to the reality

of freedom, it would necessarily deny it, but would thereby reject

also the possibility of the moral life. But the Critique of Pure

Reason has shown that the theoretical reason cannot assert any

thing whatever as to things-in-themselves, and that, accordingly,

there is no contradiction in thinking the possibility of freedom for

the supersensuous. But as it is evident that freedom must necessa

rily be real if morality is to be possible, the reality of things-in-them

selves and of the supersensuous, which for the theoretical reason must

remain always merely problematical, is herewith guaranteed.

This guarantee is, to be sure, not that of a proof, but that of a

postulate. It rests upon the consciousness; thoti canst, for thou

oughtest. Just so truly as thou feelest the moral law within thee,

so truly as thou believest in the possibility of following it, so truly

must thou also believe in the conditions for this, viz. autonomy and

freedom. Freedom is not an object of knowledge, but an object of

faith, but of a faith which holds as universally and necessarily in

the realm of the supersensuous, as the principles of the understand

ing hold in the realm of experience, an a priori faith.

Thus the practical reason becomes completely independent of the

CHAP. 1, 39.] Categorical Imperative : Freedom. 555

theoretical. In previous philosophy " the primacy " of the theoreti

cal over the practical reason had prevailed ; knowledge had been

assigned the work of determining whether and how there is freedom,

and accordingly of deciding as to the reality of morality. Accord

ing to Kant, the reality of morality is the fact of the practical reason,

and, therefore, we must believe in freedom as the condition of its

possibility. From this relation results, for Kant, the primacy of the

practical over the theoretical reason; for the former is not only capa

ble of guaranteeing that which the latter must decline to vouch for,

but it appears also that the theoretical reason in those Ideas of the

unconditioned in which it points beyond itself ( 38, 9) is deter

mined by the needs of the practical reason.

Thus there appears with Kant, in a new and completely original

form, the Platonic doctrine of the two tvorlds of the sensuous and the

supersensuous, of phenomena and things-in-themselves. Knowledge

controls the former, faith the latter; the former is the realm of

necessity, the latter the realm of freedom. The relation of antithesis

and yet of mutual reference, which exists between these two worlds,

shows itself best in the nature of man, who alone belongs in like

measure to both. So far as man is a member of the order of Nature

he appears as empirical character i.e. in his abiding qualities as well

as in his individual decisions as a necessary product in the causal

connection of phenomena ; but as a member of the supersensuous

world he is intelligible character, i.e. a being whose nature is decided

by free self-determination within itself. The empirical character is

only the manifestation, which for the theoretical consciousness is

bound to the rule of causality, of the intelligible character, whose

freedom is the only explanation of the feeling of responsibility as it

appears in the conscience.

5. But freedom is not the only postulate of a priori faith. The

relations between the sensuous and the moral world demand yet

a more general bond of connection, which Kant finds in the concep

tion of the highest good. 1 The goal of the sensuous will is happiness;

the goal of the ethical will is virtue ; these two cannot sustain to

each other the relation of means to end. The striving after happi

ness does not make an act virtuous ; and virtue is neither permitted

to aim at making man happy, nor does it actually do so. Between

the two no causal relation exists empirically, and ethically no teleo-

logical connection can be permitted to enter. But since man belongs

as well to the sensuous as to the ethical world, the " highest good "

must consist for him in the union of virtue and happiness. This

1 Critique of Prac. Reason, Dialectic, W., IX. 225 ff.; [Abbott, 202 ff.J.

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last synthesis of practical conception, however, can be morally

thought only in the form that virtue alone is worthy of happiness.

The demand of the moral consciousness, here expressed, is never

theless not satisfied by the causal necessity of experience. Natural

law is ethically indifferent, and affords no guarantee that virtue

will necessarily lead to happiness ; on the contrary, experience

teaches rather that virtue requires renunciation of empirical happi

ness, and that want of virtue is capable of being united with tem

poral happiness. If, therefore, the ethical consciousness requires

the reality of the highest good, faith must reach beyond the empirical

life of man, and beyond the order of Nature, on into the super-

sensuous. It postulates a reality of personality which extends

beyond the temporal existence the immortal life and a moral

order of the universe, which is grounded in a Supreme Reason in

God.

Kant s moral proof for freedom, immortality, and God is, there

fore, not a proof of knowledge, but of faith. Its postulates are the

conditions of the moral life, and their reality must be believed in

as fully as the reality of the latter. But with all this they remain

knowable theoretically, as little as before.

6. The dualism of Nature and morality appears with Kant in its

baldest form in his Philosophy of Religion, the principles of which,

agreeably to his theory of knowledge, he could seek only in the

practical reason ; universality and necessity in relation to the super-

sensuous are afforded only by the ethical consciousness. Only that

can be a priori in religion, which is based upon morals. Kant s

religion of reason is, therefore, not a natural religion, but " moral

theology." Religion rests upon conceiving moral laws as divine

commands.

This religious form of morality Kant develops once more from

the twofold nature of man. There are in him two systems of im

pulses, the sensuous and the moral ; on account of the unity of the

willing personality neither can be without relation to the other.

Their relation should be, according to the moral demand, that of

the subordination of the sensuous impulses to the moral; but as

a matter of fact, according to Kant, the reverse relation naturally

obtains with man, 1 and since the sensuous impulses are evil as soon

as they even merely resist the moral, there is in man a natural bent

1 The pessimistic conception of man s natural essence doubtless has with

Kant its occasion in his religious education ; but he guards himself expressly

against the identification of his doctrine of the radical evil with the theological

conception of hereditary sin; cf. Rel. innerh. d. Grenze d. r. V., I. 4; W., VI.

201 ff. ; [Abbott, p. 347].

CHAP. 1, 39.] Categorical Imperative : Religion, Law. 557

to evil. This "radical evil" is not necessary; for otherwise there

would be no responsibility for it. It is inexplicable, but it is a fact ;

it is a deed of intelligible freedom. The task which follows from

this for man is the reversal of the moving springs, which is to be

brought about by the warfare between the good and evil principle

within him. But in the above-described perverted condition, the

brazen majesty of the moral law works upon man with a terror that

dashes him down, and he needs, therefore, to support his moral

motives, faith in a divine power, which imposes upon him the moral -

law as its command, but also grants him the help of redeeming love to

enable him to obey it.

From this standpoint Kant interprets the essential portions of

Christian doctrine into a "pure moral religion," viz. the ideal of

the moral perfection of man in the Logos, redemption through

vicarious love, and the mystery of the new birth. He thus restores

to their rightful place, from which they had been displaced by the

rationalism of the Enlightenment, the truly religious motives which

are rooted in the felt need of a redemption, though he does this

in a form which is free from the historical faith of orthodoxy. But

the true Church, for him also, is only the invisible, the moral king

dom of God. the ethical community of the redeemed. The historical

manifestations of the moral community of men are the Churches ;

they need the means of revelation and of "statutory" faith. But

they have the task of putting this means into the service of the

moral life, and if instead of this they lay the main weight upon the

statutory, they fall into service for a reward, and into hypocrisy.

7. It is connected with his restriction of ethical judgment by

making it apply only to the disposition, that in his Philosophy of

Right Kant pursued that direction which treats the same, so far

as possible, independently of morals. Kant distinguished (even

with regard to ethical valuation) between morality of disposition and

legality of action, between voluntary obedience to the moral law

and external conformity of action to what is demanded by posi

tive law. Actions are subject to compulsion, dispositions never.

While morals speaks of the duties of the disposition, law or right

is employed with the external duties of action which can be en

forced, and does not ask as to the disposition with which they are

fulfilled or broken.

And yet Kant makes freedom, which is the central conception of

his whole practical philosophy, the basis also of his science of right.

For right or law is also a demand of the practical reason, and has in

this its a priori, valid principle : it cannot therefore be deduced as

a product of empirical interest, but must be understood from the

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general rational vocation or destiny of man. This latter is the

vocation to freedom. The community of men consists of those

beings that are destined for ethical freedom, but are yet in the

natural state of caprice or arbitrary will, in which they mutually

disturb and check each other in their spheres of activity. Law has

for its task to establish the conditions under which the will of the

one can be united with the will of another according to a universal

law of freedom, and, by enforcing these conditions, to make sure

the freedom of personality.

From this principle follows analytically, according to Kant s

deduction, all private law, public law, and international law. At

the same time, it is interesting to observe how the principles of his

theory of morals are everywhere authoritative in this construction.

Thus, in private law it is a far-reaching principle corresponding

to the categorical imperative that man must never be used as a

thing. So, too, the penal law of the state is grounded not by the

task of maintaining the state of right, but by the ethical necessity

of retribution.

Law in a state of nature is therefore valid only in a provisory

way; it is completely, or, as Kant says, peremptorily, valid, only

when it can be certainly enforced, that is, in the state. The supreme

rule for justice in the state, Kant finds in this, that nothing should

be decreed and carried out which might not have been resolved

upon if the state had come into existence by a contract. The con

tract theory is here not an explanation of the empirical origin of

the state, but a norm for its task. This norm can be fulfilled with

any kind of constitution, provided only law really rules, and not

arbitrary caprice. Its realisation is surest if the three public

functions of legislation, administration and judicial procedure are

independent of each other, and if the legislative power is organised

in the " republican " form of the representative system, a pro

vision which is not excluded by a monarchical executive. It is only

by this means, Kant thinks, that the freedom of the individual will

be secured, so far as this can exist without detriment to the freedom

of others ; and not until all states have adopted this constitution can

the state of Nature in which they now find themselves in their rela

tions to each other, give place to a state of law. Then, too, the law

of nations, which is now only provisory, will become " peremptory."

Upon foundations of philosophy of religion and philosophy of

law is built up, finally, Kant s theory of history. 1 This took form

1 Cf. besides the treatises cited on pp. 417-422. the treatises, Idea of a Uni

versal History from a Cosmopolitical Point of View (1784) [tr. by Hastie in

CHAP. 1, 40.] Natural Purposiveness. 559

in dependence upon the theories of Rousseau and Herder, a depend

ence which follows from the antithesis between those authors.

Kant can see in history neither the aberration from an originally

good condition of the human race, nor the necessary, self-intelligible

development of man s original constitution. If there ever was a

primitive paradisiacal state of humanity, it was the state of inno

cence in which man, living entirely according to his natural impulses,

was as yet entirely unconscious of his ethical task. The beginning

of the work of civilisation, however, was possible only through a break

with the state of Nature, since it was in connection with its trans

gression that the moral law came to consciousness. This (theoret

ically incomprehensible) "Fall" was the beginning of history.

Natural impulse, previously ethically indifferent, now became evil,

and was to be opposed.

Since then the progress of history has consisted not in a growth of

human happiness, but in approximation to ethical perfection, and in

the extension of the rule of ethical freedom. With deep earnestness

Kant takes up the thought that the development of civilisation suc

ceeds only at the cost of individual happiness. He who takes this

latter for his standard must speak only of a retrogression in history.

The more complicated relations become, the more the vital energy

of civilisation grows, by so much the more do individual wants

increase, and the less is the prospect of satisfying them. But just

this refutes the opinion of the Enlighteners, as if happiness were

man s vocation. The ethical development of the whole, the control

of practical reason, grows in an inverse ratio to the empirical satis

faction of the individual. And since history represents the outer

social life of humanity, its goal is the completion of right and law,

the establishing of the best political constitution among all peoples,

perpetual peace a goal whose attainment, as is the case with all

ideals, lies at an infinite distance.

40. Natural Purposiveness.

A. Stadler, Kant s Teleologie. Berlin, 1874.

H. Cohen, Kant s Begriindung der ^Esthetik. Berlin, 1889.

[J. H. Tufts, The Sources and Development of Kant s Teleology. Chicago, 1892.]

By his sharp formulation of the antithesis of Nature and Free

dom, of necessity and purposiveness (or adaptation to ends), the

Principles of Politics] ; Recension von Herder s Tdeen (1785); Muthmasslicher

Anfaxg dtr Weltgeschichte (1786) ; Das Ende aller Dinge (1794). v

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theoretical aud practical reason diverge so widely in Kant s system,

that the unity of the reason seems endangered. The critical phil

osophy needs, therefore, in a manner that prefigures the methodical

development of its system, 1 a third principle that shall afford a defin

itive mediation, and in which the synthesis of the above opposites

shall be effected.

1. Psychologically, the sphere in which this problem is to be

solved can, in accordance with the triple division adopted by Kant

(cf. 36, 8), be only the faculty of feeling or " approval." This, in fact,

takes an intermediate position between ideation and desire. Feeling

or approval presupposes a complete idea of the object, complete

in the theoretical sense, and sustains a synthetic relation to this ;

and this synthesis as a feeling of pleasure or pain, or as approval or

disapproval, always expresses in some way that the object in ques

tion is felt by the subject to be either purposive, i.e. adapted to its

end, or not to the purpose.

The standard of this valuation may have existed beforehand as a

conscious design, forming thus a case of intentional volition, and in

such cases the objects are termed useful or injurious ; but there are

also feelings which, without being referred to any conscious purposes

whatever, characterise their objects immediately as agreeable or dis

agreeable, and in these also a determination with reference to an

end must be somehow authoritative.

The critique of the reason, accordingly, has to ask, Are there

feelings a priori, or approvals that have universal and necessary valid

ity? and it is clear that the decision upon this case is dependent

upon the nature of the ends which determine the feelings and

approvals in question. With regard to the purposes of the will, this

question has been already decided by the Critique of the Practical

Reason; the only end of the conscious will which has a priori

validity is the fulfilling of the categorical imperative, and on this

side, therefore, only the feelings of approval or disapproval in which

we employ the ethical predicates " good " and " bad," can be regarded

as necessary and universally valid. For this reason the new prob

lem restricts itself to the a priori character of those feelings in

which no conscious purpose or design precedes. But these, as may

be seen from the beginning, are the feelings of the Beautiful and the

Sublime.

2. But the problem widens upon another side, when we take into

consideration the logical functions which are concerned in all feel-

1 Cf. note at the close of the Introduction of the Critique of Judgment, W.,

VII. 38 f.

CHAP. 1, 40.] Natural Purposiveness : the Judgment. 561

ings and approvals. The judgments in which these are expressed

are evidently all synthetic. Predicates such as agreeable, useful,

beautiful, and good, are not analytically contained in the subject,

but express the worth of the object with reference to an end ; they

are estimations of adaptation, and contain in all cases the subor

dination of the object to its end. Now in the psychological scheme

which lies at the basis of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant desig

nates the faculty of subsuming the particular under the general by

the name Judgment. And this, too, was regarded as playing among

the theoretical functions, also, the mediating part between Reason

and Understanding, in such a sort that the former gives principles,

the latter objects, while the Judgment performs the task of applying

the principles to the objects.

But in its theoretical use the Judgment is analytical, since it

determines its objects by general conceptions according to rules

of formal logic ; the attainment of a correct conclusion depends only

on finding the appropriate minor for a given major, or vice versa.

In contrast with this determining Judgment, which thus needs no

" Critique," Kant sets the reflecting Judgment, in the case of which

the synthesis consists just in subordination to an end. And accord

ingly the problem of the Critique of the Judgment takes this formu

lation : Is it a priori possible to judge Nature to be adapted to an end f

Evidently this is the highest synthesis of the critical philosophy ;

the application of the category of the ftractical reason to the object of

the theoretical. It is clear from the outset that this application itself

can be neither theoretical nor practical, neither a knowing nor a

willing : it is only a looking at Nature from the point of view of pur-

posiveness or adaptation to ends.

If the reflecting Judgment gives to this contemplation the direc

tion of judging Nature with regard to her adaptation to the contem

plating subject as such, it proceeds cesthetically, i.e. having regard to

our mode of feeling or sensibility ; l if, on the contrary, it regards

Nature as if she were purposive in herself, then it proceeds teleologi-

cally in the narrower sense, and so the Critique of the Judgment is

divided into the investigation of aesthetic and teleological prob

lems.

3. In the first part Kant is primarily concerned to separate the

vesthetic judgment with exactness from the kinds of judgments of

feeling or approval which border upon it on both sides, and to this

end he proceeds from the point of view of the feeling of the beauti-

1 Empfindungsweise ; thus Kant justifies his change in terminology, W., VII.

28 ff. ; cf. II. 60 f. and above, p. 483 f.

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fal. The beautiful shares with the good the a priori character, but

the good is that which agrees with the end presented as a norm in

the moral law, while the beautiful, on the contrary, pleases ivithout

a conception. For this reason, also, it is impossible to set up a

universal criterion which shall contain a content according to which

beauty shall be judged with logical clearness. An aesthetic doctrine

is impossible ; there is only a " Critique of the Taste," that is, an

investigation as to the possibility of the a priori validity of aesthetic

judgments.

On the other hand, the beautiful shares with the agreeable its

conceptionless quality, the absence of a conscious standard of

judgment, and, therefore, the immediacy of the impression. But

the distinction here lies in the fact that the agreeable is something

individually and contingently gratifying, whereas the beautiful

forms the object of universal and necessary pleasure. 1 The princi

ple that there is no disputing over tastes, is true only in the sense

that in matters of taste nothing is to be effected by proofs with con

ceptions, but this does not exclude the possibility of an appeal to

universally valid feelings.

Finally, the beautiful distinguishes itself from both the good and

the agreeable, in that it is the object of a completely disinterested

pleasure. This appears in the circumstance that the empirical reality

of its object is a matter of complete indifference for the aesthetic

judgment. The hedonic feelings all presuppose the material presence

of the phenomena which excite them ; ethical approval or disapproval

concerns just the realisation of the moral end in willing and acting;

the aesthetic feelings, on the contrary, require as their condition a

pure delight in the mere represented image of the object, whether the

same is objectively present for knowledge or not. The aesthetic life

lacks the power of the feelings of personal weal and woe, just as it

lacks the earnestness of a universally worthy work for ethical ends ;

it is the mere play of ideas in the imagination.

Such a delight which relates not to the object, but only to the

image of the object, cannot concern the objective material of the object,

for this always stands in relation to the interests of the subject,

but only the form in which the object is presented to the mind;

and in this, therefore, if anywhere, is to be sought the ground of the

a priori synthesis which belongs to the aesthetic judgments. The

purposiveness of aesthetic objects cannot consist in their adaptation

to some interest or other ; it can be only in their adaptation to the

1 Cf. F. Blencke, Kant s Unterscheidung des Schonen vom Angenehmen

(Strassburg, 1889), where the analogy to the judgments of perception and of

experience is emphasised.

CHAP. 1, 40.] Natural Purposiveness : Beauty. 563

knowing Forms, by the aid of which they are imaged in the mind.

But the faculties which are active in presenting every object are

sensibility arid understanding. The feeling of beauty arises, there

fore, in connection with those objects in the apprehension of which

in the imagination sensibility and understanding co-operate in

harmonious manner. Such objects are purposive with regard to

their working upon our ideational activity, and to this relates the

disinterested delight which manifests itself in the feeling of their

beauty. 1

But this relation to the formal principles of objective ideation

has its ground, not in merely individual activities, but in the

"consciousness in general," in the " supersensuous substrate of

humanity." On this account the feeling of a fitness or purposive-

ness of objects with reference to this consciousness in general is

universally communicable, though not capable of proof by concep

tions, and from this is explained the a priori character of the

aesthetic judgments.

4. While the "undesigned fitness" or appropriateness of the

beautiful is thus set in relation with the working of the object upon

the cognitive functions, Kant conceives the nature of the sublime

from the point of view of an adaptation of the working of the object

to the relation between the sensuous and supersensuous parts of

human nature.

While the beautiful signifies a delightful rest in the play of the

knowing faculties, the impression of the sublime is effected through

the medium of a painful feeling of inadequacy. In the presence of

the immeasurable greatness or overpowering might of objects, we

feel the inability of our sensuous perception to master them, as an

oppression and a casting down; but the supersensuous power of

our reason raises itself above this our sensuous insufficiency. If

here the imagination has to do only with extensive magnitudes,

the mathematically sublime, then the firmly shaping activity of

the theoretical reason gains the victory ; but if, on the contrary, it

has to do with the relations of power, the dynamically sublime,

then the superiority of our moral worth to all the power of Nature

conies to consciousness. In both cases the discomfort over our sen

suous inferiority is richly outweighed and overcome by the triumph

of our higher rational character. And since this is the appropriate

1 [A fragment published by Reicke in his Lose Blatter aus Kant s Nachlass

(B. II. p. 112) shows that Kant at one time connected this adaptation with the

psychological and physiological conception of a general furtherance of life,

whether through the senses or through the play of intellectual faculties. Cf.

J. H. Tufts, op. ctt., p. 35 f.J

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relation of the two sides of our being, these objects have an exalting,

" subliming 1 effect, and produce the feeling of a delight of the reason,

and this feeling, again, because it is based only upon the relation of

our ideational Forms, is universally communicable and of a priori

operation.

5. Kant s aesthetic theory, accordingly, in spite of its "subjec

tive " point of departure, takes essentially the course of an explana

tion of the beautiful and the sublime in Nature; and determines the

same through the relation of the ideational Forms. Hence the

philosopher finds pure beauty only where the aesthetic judgment

relates solely to forms that have no meaning. Where with the

delight there is mingled a regard for the meaning of the forms for

any norm whatever, however indefinite, there we have dependent

beauty. This appears everywhere where the aesthetic judgment is

directed toward objects in which our thought puts a reference to an

end. Such norms of dependent beauty rise necessarily as soon as we

contemplate in the individual phenomenon the relation to the class

which it represents. There is no norm of beauty for landscapes,

arabesques, or flowers, but there may be such perhaps for the higher

types of the organic world. Such norms are aesthetic ideals, and the

true ideal of the aesthetic judgment is man.

The presentation of the ideal is art, the power of aesthetic produc

tion. But while this is a function of man which is performed with

reference to an end, its product will make the impression of the beau

tiful only when it appears as undesigned, disinterested, and free

from the attempt to represent a conception, as is the case with the

beauty of Nature. Technical art produces structures corresponding

to definite ends according to rules and designs, structures which

are adapted to satisfy definite interests. Fine art must work upon

the feeling as does a purposeless product of Nature; it must "be

able to be regarded as Nature."

This, therefore, is the secret of artistic creation, and the character

istic element in it, viz. that the mind which builds with a purpose

works, nevertheless, in the same way as Nature, which builds with

out designs and disinterestedly. The great artist does not create

according to general rules; he creates the rules themselves in his

involuntary work ; he is original and prototypal. Genius is an in

telligence that works like Nature.

In the realm of man s rational activity the desired synthesis of

freedom and nature, of purposiveness and necessity, of practical and

theoretical function, is then represented by genius, which with

undesigning purposiveness or appropriateness creates the work of

fine art.

CHAP. 1, 40.] Natural Purposiveness : Organisms. 565

6. In the Critique of the Teleological Judgment the most promi

nent task is to establish the relations which, from the points of view

of transcendental idealism, exist between the scientific explanation

of Nature and the consideration of the adaptation that dwells within

her. The theory of natural science can in all lines be only mechanical.

"End" (Zweck) is not a category or a constitutive principle of

objective knowledge : all explanation of Nature consists in pointing

out the causal necessity with which one phenomenon produces

another; a phenomenon can never be made intelligible by emphasis

ing its adaptation or fitness. Such " lazy " teleology is the death of

all philosophy of Nature. The apprehension of purposiveness can,

therefore, never profess to be an act of knowledge.

But, on the other hand, the standpoint of the mechanical explana

tion of Nature would give us the right to completely reject teleologi-

cal consideration of Nature, only in case we were in a position to

make intelligible with the aid of scientific conceptions the whole

system of experience, even to the last remnant, in principle at least.

But should points be found where scientific theory is inadequate for

the explanation of the given material, not indeed on account of the

limited nature of the material hitherto available in human experi

ence, but on account of the permanent form of the principle which

determines this material, then in these points the possibility of

supplementing our knowledge by a teleological consideration must

be conceded, if, at the same time, it appears that that which is

mechanically inexplicable makes upon us the inevitable impression

of the purposive. Critical teleology can, therefore, concern only the

limiting conceptions of the mechanical explanation of Nature.

The first of these is Life. A mechanical explanation of the organ

ism has not only not yet succeeded, but it is, according to Kant,

impossible in principle. All life can be explained only through

other life. We are to understand the individual functions of organ

isms through the mechanical connection of their parts with each

other and with the environment ; but we shall always be obliged to

bring into our account the peculiar nature of organised matter and

its capacity of reaction, as a factor incapable of further reduction.

An archaeologist of Nature may trace back the genealogy of life, the

origination of one species from another according to mechanical prin

ciples as far as possible ; \* he will always be obliged to stop with an

original organisation which he cannot explain through the mere

mechanism of inorganic matter.

1 The passages, in which Kant anticipated the latter theory of descent, are

collected in Fr. Schultze, Kant und Darwin (Jena, 1874).

566 G-erman Philosophy : KanCs Critique. [PART VI.

This explanation is impossible because the essential nature of an

organism is, that the whole is determined by the parts just as the

part is determined by the whole, that every member is both cause

and effect of the whole. This reciprocal causality is incomprehen

sible mechanically : the organism is the miracle in the world of

experience. 1 It is just this inter-related play of forms and forces

which in the organism makes the impression of the purposive, or of

adaptation to an end. Therefore the teleological view of organisms

is necessary and universally valid. But it must never profess to be

anything else than a mode of consideration. Thought must never

be satisfied with this in an individual case ; but the insight into this

purposeful -activity must rather serve as a heuristic principle for

seeking out the mechanical connections by which this purposeful

vitality realises itself in each particular case.

7. A second limit of the knowledge of Nature Kant designates

by the name of the Specification of Nature. From pure reason arise

the general Forms of the uniformity of Nature [i.e. causality, etc.],

but only these. The particular laws of Nature do indeed range

themselves beneath those general laws, but do not follow from them.

Their particular content is only empirical, i.e. from the standpoint

of pure reason it is contingent, and has only the force and validity

of an actual matter of fact, 2 [not that of a priori necessity]. It is

never to be understood why there is just this and not some other

content. But at the same time, this particular aspect of Nature

proves completely purposive ; on the one hand, with reference to

our knowledge, since the wealth of the matter of fact in our experi

ence shows itself to be adapted to be ordered under the a priori

Forms of experience, and on the other hand, as purposive in itself,

also, inasmuch as the whole varied multiplicity of the given fits

together to form a concrete world of reality, which is objectively

unitary.

In this lie the reasons a priori for regarding Nature as a whole

from the point of view of purposiveness, and for seeing in the vast

mechanism of her causal connections the realising of a supreme end

of reason. But in accordance with the primacy of the practical

reason, this end can be none other than the moral law, and thus the

teleological consideration issues in the moral faith in the divine

world-order.

Finally, if we consider Nature as purposive, in the sense that in

1 Cf. above, p. 480.

2 Here Kant joins on in an extremely interesting manner to the latest specu

lations of the Leibnizian Monadology ; cf. above, p. 425 [cf. further on this point

Ueber eine Entdeckung, etc., and J. Dewey, Leibniz 1 s New Essays, last, chapter].

CHAP. 1, 40.] Natural Purposiveness. 567

it the universal Forms and the particular contents completely har

monise with each other, then the divine mind, as the reason .which

creates the content at the same time with its Forms, appears as

intellectual perception or intuitive understanding. 1 In this conception

the ideas of the three Critiques run together.

1 Critique, of Judg., 77. Of. G. Thiele, Kant s Intellectuelle Anschauung

( Halle, 1876).

## CHAPTER II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF IDEALISM.

R. Haym, Die romantische Schule. Berlin, 1870.

[A. Seth, From Kant to Hegel. Lond. 1882.]

THE development of the principles won by Kant, to the compre

hensive systems of German philosophy, took place under the co

operation of very different kinds of circumstances. Externally, it

was of primary importance that the doctrine of criticism, after

at first experiencing the fortune of being neglected and misunder

stood, was first raised as a standard by the leading spirits of the

University of Jena, and made the centre of a brilliant teaching

activity. But in this lay the incitement to build out a unified and

impressive system of instruction, the foundations of which Kant had

laid by a careful separation and fine arrangement of philosophical

problems. The systematic impulse ruled philosophical thought at

no period so energetically as at this, and this was due in good part

to the desires of an audience in a state of high and many-sided

excitement, which demanded from the teacher a complete scientific

Weltanschauung.

But in Jena philosophy found itself close by Weimar, the resi

dence of Goethe, and the main literary city of Germany. In constant

personal contact, poetry and philosophy mutually stimulated each

other, and after Schiller had joined the thoughts of the^two, their

interaction became constantly more intimate and deep with their

rapid forward movement.

A third factor was of a purely philosophical nature. A coinci

dence that was rich in results willed that just at the time when the

Critique of Reason of the "all-crushing" Konigsberger began to

break its path, the most firmly articulated and most influential of

all metaphysical systems, the type of "dogmatism," became known

in Germany Spinozism. Through the strife between Jacobi and

Mendelssohn, which related to Lessing s attitude to Spinoza, the

latter s doctrine was brought into the most lively interest, and thus,

CHAP. 2.] The Development of Idealism. 569

/ in spite of the deep opposition which prevails between the two,

Kant and Spinoza became the two poles about which the thought

of the following generation moved.

The predominance of the Kantian influence may be chiefly recog

nised in that the common character of all these systems is idealism; 1

they all develop out of the antagonistic thoughts which were inter

woven in Kant s treatment of the conception thing-in-itself. After

a short time of critical hesitation, Fichte, Schelling, and Ilegd took

the lead in the unresting effort to understand the world as a System

of Reason. Over against the bold energy of metaphysical specula

tion of these thinkers, which was extended by numerous disciples

to a many-coloured variety, there appears in men like Schleiermacher

and Herbart the Kantian reminder of the limits of human knowl

edge ; while, on the other hand, the same motive unfolded in the

construction of a Metaphysics of the Irrational in Schelling s later

doctrine, and with Schopenhauer.

Common to all these systems, however, is the all-sidedness of

philosophical interest, the wealth of creative thoughts, the fineness

of feeling for the needs of modern culture, and the victorious power

of an elaboration from the point of view of a principle, of the his

torical material of ideas.

The Critique of the Pure Reason found little regard at first, and then later

violent opposition. The most important impetus to this was given by Friedrich

Ileinrich Jacob! (1743-1819, finally President of the Munich Academy). His

main treatise bears the title, David Hume iiber den Glaube.n, oder Idealismus

und Realismus (1787) ; in addition to this the treatise Ueber das Untenirhmen

des Kriticismus die Vernunft zu Verstande zu bringen (1802). The treatise

Von den gottlichen Ding en und ihrer Offenbarung (1811) was directed against

Schelling. Cf. also his introduction to his philosophical writings in the second

volume of the complete edition (6 vols., Leips. 1812-1825). His main disciple

was Fr. Koppeii (1775-1858 ; Darstellung des \Vesens der Philosophic, Nurem

berg, 1810 ; cf. on him the art. K. by W. Windelband in Ersch u. Gruber s Enc.).

As further opponents of Kant are to be named Gottlob Ernst Schulze

(1761-1823), the author of the anonymous writing, yEnesidemns oder iiber die

Fundamente der Elementarphilosophie (1792), and of a Kritik der theoretischen

Philosophic (Hamburg, 1801) ; J. G. Hamann (cf. above, p. 510), whose

"review" of the Critique was first printed in 1801 in Reinhold s Beitragen,

1 Let it be remarked here at the outset that not only the main series of the

development from Reinhold to Fichte, Schelling, Krause, Schleiermacher, and

Hegel is idealistic, but also the series which is usually opposed to this, Herbart

and Schopenhauer, in so far, that is, as by "idealism" is understood the

dissolution or resolution (Auflosung) of the world of experience in the process

of consciousness. Herbart and Schopenhauer are "idealists" in the same

degree as Kant ; they posit things-in-themselves, but the world of the senses

is to them also a "phenomenon of consciousness." With Schopenhauer this

is usually noted. With Herbart, on the contrary, the circumstance that he

called the things-in-themselves "Keals" (Eealen\*), in connection with the fact

that for entirely other reasons he opposed the Fichte-Hegel line of thought,

has led to the completely distorted and misleading mode of expression which

has run through all previous text-books of the history of philosophy, of terming

his doctrine " realism," and him in opposition to the " idealists " a " realist."

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and G. Herder in his treatise, Verstand und Vernunft, eine Metakritik zur

Kritik der reinen Vernunfl (1799), also in tlv&gt; Knllifjone. 1800.

Jac. Sig. Beck (1761-1842; Einzig moglicher Standpunkt, aus welchem die

kritische Philosnphie beurtheilt werden muss, Riga, 1790) worked more posi

tively in the development of the Kantian doctrine, as did also Salomon Maimoii

(died 1800 ; Versuch einer Transscendentalphilosophie, 1790 ; Versuch einer

neuen Logik, 1794; Die Kategorien des Aristoteles, 1794; cf. J. Witte, S. M.,

Berlin, 187G).

In .Jena the Kantian philosophy was introduced by Professor Erh. Schmid ;

its main organ was the Allgemeine, Litter at urzeitnng, which appeared there after

1785, edited by Schiitz and Hufeland. The greatest success for extending the

doctrine of Criticism was gained by K. L. Reinhold s Brief e iiber die kantische

Philosophic, which first appeared in Wieland s Deutscher Merkur (1786).

The same author begins also the series of re-shapings and transformations

of the doctrine. Karl Leonh. Heinhold (1758-1828 ; fled from the cloister of

the Barnabites in Vienna; 1788, Professor in Jena; from 1794 Professor in

Kiel) wrote Versuch einer neiten TheoTie des menschlichen Vorstellungxvermo-

gens (Jena, 1789) and Dux Fundament des philosophischen Wissens (1791).

Later, after many changes in his standpoint, he fell into fantasticalness and was

forgotten. His teaching presented in his Jena period gave in crude outlines

a superficially systematic exposition, which soon became the school-system of

I the "Kantians." To tear from forgetfulness the names of these numerous

men is not for this place.

Much finer, richer, and more independent was the work which Fr. Schiller

gave to Kant s ideas. &lt; &gt;f his philosophical writings are here principally to be

named On Grace a)id Dignity, 1793 ; On the Sublime, 1793 ; Letters upon the

jEsthetical Education of Man, 1795 ; On Na ive and Sentimental Poetry, 1796

[Eng. tr. Bohn Library]. In addition to these the philosophical poems such as

Die Kunstler, Ideal und Leben, and the correspondence with Korner, Goethe,

and W. v. Humboldt. Cf. K. Tomaschek, Sch. in seinem Verhaltniss zur

Wissenschaft, Vienna, 1862 ; K. Twesten, Sch. in seinem Verhaltniss zur Win-

senschaft, Berlin, 1863 ; Kuno Fischer, Sch. als Phitosoph, 2d ed., 1891 ; Fr.

Ueberweg, Sch. als Historiker und Philosophy pub. by Brasch, Leips. 1884.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte, born 1762, at Rammenau in Lusatia, educated in

the " Princes School " at Pforta and at the University of Jena, after he had

experienced many changes of fortune as a private teacher and had become

famous by his Kritik aller Offenbarung, which appeared by chance anony

mously, and was universally ascribed to Kant (1792), was called in 1794, while

living in Zurich, to become Heinhold s successor as Professor at Jena. After a

brilliant activity there, he was dismissed in 1799, on account of the "atheism

controversy " (cf. his Appellation an das Publicum and the Gerichtliche Verant-

wortungsschrift), and went to Berlin, where he came into connection with the

Itomanticists. In 1805 he was for a time assigned to the University of Erlangen ;

in 1806 he went to Konigsberg, and then returned to Berlin, where in the winter

of 1807 to 1808 he delivered the Ileden an die deutsche Nation. At the newly

founded Berlin University he acted as Professor and as the first Rector. He

died, 1814, of hospital fever. His main writings are Grundlage dcr gesammten

\Vissenschaftslehre, 1794 ; Grundriss des Eigenthiimlichen der Wissenschafts-

lehre, 1795 [these two, together with other minor works, are translated by

A. E. Kroeger, under the title The Science of Knowledge, Lond. 1889] ; Natur-

recht, 1796 [tr. by A. E. Koeger, The Science of Eights, Lond. 1889] ; the

two Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre, 1797 ; System der Sittenlehre, 1798;

Die Bestimmuny des Menschen, 1800; Der geschlossene Hundelsstaat, 1801;

Ueber das Wesen des Gelehrten, 1805 ; Grundziige des gegenwiirtigen Zeitalters,

1806; Anweisung zum seligen Leben, 1806 [of the last five all but the second

are trans, by W. Smith, Fichte s Popular Works, Lond. 1889. There are also

translations and criticisms in Jour, of Spec. Phil.] ; Works, 8 vols., Berlin,

1845 f. ; Post, works, 3 vols., Bonn, 1834 ; Life and Correspondence, Sulzbach,

1830; Correspondence with Schelling, Leips. 1856; cf. J. II. Lowe, Die Philos.

Fichte s, Stuttgart, 1862; R. Adamson, Fichte, Lond. 1881 ; [also art. in Enc.

Brit. ; C. C. Everett, Fichte s Science of Knowledge, Chicago, 1883].

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Frirdrich Wilhehn Jose])!) Schelling, born, 1775, at Leonberg in Wtirtem-

berg, came to Leipsic in 1700 after his education in Tubingen, was made Pro

fessor in Jena in 1798, and in Wiirzburg in 1803. Called in 180(5 to the Munich

Academy, and for a time (1820-182(5) active at the Erlangen University, he

entered in 1827 the newly founded University of Munich. From here he ac

cepted, in 1840, a call to Berlin, where he soon gave up his activity as a teacher.

He died in 1854 in Uagaz. Cf. Aus Sch. s Leben in Briefen, ed. by Plitt, Leips.

18(59 f. ; Caroline, Briefe, etc., ed. by G. Waitz, Leips. 1871. Schelling s devel

opment as philosopher and author falls into live periods: (1) Philosophy of

Nature, Ideen zu einer Philos. der Natur, 1797 ; Von der Weltseele, 1798 ;

Erxter Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie, 1799; (2) ^Esthetic Ideal

ism, Der transcendentale Idealismus, 1800 ; Vorlesunyen iiber die Philosophic

der Kunst ; (3) Absolute Idealism, Darxte.llnnij meines Systems der Philosophic,

1801 ; Bruno, oder iiber das natiirliche nnd g dttliche Princip der Dinge, 1802 ;

Vorlesungen iiber die Methode des akademischen Stuilinms, 1803; (4) his

Doctrine of Freedom, Philosophic und Religion, 1804 ; Untersuchungen iiber

das \Vesen der menschlichen Freihcit, 1809; Denkmal der Schrift Jacob? s von

den goWichen Dingen, 1812 ; (5) Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation,

Lectures in Part II. of the writings; Collected works, 14 vols., Stuttg. and

Augsb. 185(5-18(51 ; [J. Watson, Spelling s Transcendental Idealism, Chicago,

Griggs series].

Among the thinkers who stood in close relation to Schelling may be noticed,

of the Romantic School, Fr. Schlegel (1772-1829; Characteristics and Criti

cisms in the "Athenaeum," 1799 f. ; Lwinde, 1799; Philosophical Lectures, in

the years 1804-6, ed. by Windischmann, 183(5 f. ; Complete writings, 15 vols.,

Vienna, 184(5 [Eng. tr. of the Philosophy of History and of the Philosophy of

Life and of Language in Bohn Library]) and Novalis (Fr. v. Hardenbenj,

1772-1801)," also K. \V. F. Solger (1780-1,\*&gt;19; Erwin, 1815; Philosophische

Gespmche, 1817 ; Vorlesungen iiber ^Hsthetik, ed. by Heyse, 1829) ; further,

Lor. Oken (1779-1851 ; Lehrbuch der Xaturphilosophie, Jena, 1809 ; cf. A.

Ecker, L. O., Stuttgart, 1880) ; II. Steffens (1773-1845; a Norwegian, Grund-

ziige der philosophischen Naturwissenschaft, 1806), G. H. Schubert (178)-

18IJO; Ahndungen einer allg. Geschichte des Lebens, 1806 f.), Franz Baader

(17(55-1841 ; Fermenta Cognitionis, 1822 ff. ; Speculative Dogmatik, 1827 ff.

Complete writings with a biography ed. by Fr. Hoffmann, Leips. 1851 ff.) ;

and finally, K. Chr. Fr. Krause (1781-1832 ; Entwurf des Systems der Philoso-

phie, 1804; Urbild der Menschheit, 1811 ; Abriss des Systems der Philosophic,

1825 ; Vorlesungen iiber das System der Philosophic, 1828. Some years since an

inexhaustible body of material has appeared from his literary remains, ed. by

P. Hohlfeld and A. Wiinsche. Cf. R. Eucken, Zur Erinnerung an K., Leips.

1881).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Schelling s older friend, was born, 1770,

in Stuttgart, studied in Tubingen, was a private teacher in Berne and Frank

fort, and began, in 1801, his activity as a teacher in Jena, where, in 1805, he

became Professor Extraordinary. After 1806 he became editor of a review

in Bamberg, and in 1808 Gymnasium Director in Nuremberg. In 1816 he went

as Professor to Heidelberg ; in 1818 from there to Berlin, where he worked

until his death in 1831 as the head of a school which extended with greater and

greater brilliancy. Besides the articles published in the Kritische. Journal der

Philosophie, which he edited in connection with Schelling, he published Phdno-

menologie des Geistes (1807) [tr. of chs. 1, 2, and 3 in Jour. Spec. Phil., Vol.

II.; tr. in prep, by J. Royce, Holt & Co., N.Y.]; \Vissenschaft der Logik

(1812 ff.) [tr. of Vol. II. by W. T. Harris, Hegel s Doctrine of Reflection] ;

Encyclopedic der philosophischen Wisscnschaften (1817) [of this the Logic is

trans, with I rti g,n&gt; na by W. Wallace, Clar. Press, 1874, 2d ed., in 2 vols.,

1892] ; Grundlinien der Philosophie des Recht s (1821). After 1827 the Jahr-

biicher fur tfffMeiMCAq/tlicfo Kritik was the organ of his school. His works,

including his lectures edited by his students, were published in 18 vols. (Berlin,

1832 ff.) [trans, of the Philosophy of History, by J. Sibree, Bohn Library ; of the

Introd. tn / /&lt;//. ,&gt;f Art, by B. Bosanquet (Lond. 1886) ; of the Phil, of Art, abr.

by W. Hastie (Edin.), and of the second part of the same in Jour. Spec. Phil.,

.Vols. V.-XIII. ; of the History of Philosophy, by E. S. Haldane, in 3 vols.,

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Vol. I. (Lond. 1892) ; of the Phil, of Religion and of the State, in part in Jour.

Spec. Phil., Vols. XV.-XXI.]. From the very extensive literature we may

name C. Rosenkranz, H. s Leben (Berlin, 1844), and 11. als deutscher National-

philoso/&gt;h (Berlin, 1870) [part, trans. G. S. Hall, St. Louis, 1876]; R. Haym,

//. und Heine Zeit (Berlin, 1857) ; K. Kostlin, H. (Tubingen, 1870) ; J. Klaiber,

Holder! in, Schilling und Heyel in ihren schwiibischen Juyendjahren (Stuttgart,

1877) [The Secret of Heyel, by J. H. Stirling (Lond. 1805), 2 vols. ; Hegel, by

E. Caird (Edin. and Lond. 1888) ; Hegelianism and Personality, by Seth (Edin.

and Lond., 2d ed., 1898) ; Critical Expositions in Griggs series (Chicago) ; of

the Esthetics, by J. S. Kedney (1885) ; of the Philosophy of the State and of

History, by G. S. Morris (1887) ; and of the Logic, by W. T. Harris (1890) ;

numerous articles in the Jour. Spec. Phil, cited in last-named work],

Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher, born, 1768, in Breslau, educated at

the Herrnhuter educational institutions in Niesky and Barby, and at the

University of Halle, after private positions took a vicarship in Landsberg, and

in 179(5 began his duties as preacher at the Berlin CharitS. In 1802 he went

as court preacher to Stolpe ; in 1804 as Professor Extraordinary to Halle ; in

1806 returned to Berlin, where in 1809 he became preacher at the Dreifaltigketts-

kirche ; and in 1810 Professor at the University. He acquitted himself well

in both offices, occupying at the time a successful position in the ecclesiastical

movement (Union) until his death in 1884. His philosophical writings form

the third part of his works collected after his death (Berlin, 1835 ff.). They

contain his lectures on Dialectic, ^Esthetic, etc. ; among his writings are to

be mentioned : Reden ubcr die Religion an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verdchtern

(1799) ; Monologen (1800) ; (Irundlinien einer Kritik der bisheriyen Sittenlehre

(1808). The most important work, the Ethik, is given in the coll. works, in

ttie edition by Al. Schweizer; it is also published in an edition by A. Twesten

(Berlin, 1841). Cf. Aus Sch:s Leben in Briefen, ed. by L. Jonas and W. Dil-

they, 4 vols. (Berlin, 1858-1863) ; W. Dilthey, Leben Schleiermacher s, Vol. I.

(Berlin, 1870) [art. S. in Knc. Brit., J. F. Smith].

Johann Kriedrich Herbart, born, 1776, at Oldenburg, educated there and at

the Jena University, for a time private teacher in Berne and acquainted with

Pestalozzi, became in 1802 Privatdocent in Gottingen, was from 1809 to 1833

Professor in Konigsberg, and then returned to Gottingen as Professor, where

he died, 1841. His main writings are: Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik (1806) ;

Allyeme.ine praktische Philosophie (1808) ; Einleitung in die Philosophie (1813) ;

Lehrbnch zur Psycholoyie (1816) [Kng. tr. by M. K. Smith, N.Y. 1891] ; Psycho

logic als Wissenschaft (1824 f.). Complete edition by G. Hartenstein, 12 vols.

(Leips. 1850 ff.) ; in process of appearance, ed. by K. Kehrbach, since 1882. The

pedagogical writings have been edited by (). Willmann in 2 vols. (Leips. 1873

and 1875). Cf. G. Hartenstein, Die Probleme und Grundlehren der allyemeinen

Metaphysik (Leips. 1836) ; J. Kaftan, Sollen und Sein (Leips. 1872) ; J. Cape-

sius, Die Metaphysik Herbart s (Leips. 1878) [Ward, art. Herbart, in Enc.

Brit.].

Arthur Schopenhauer, b^m 1788 in Danzic, passed over somewhat late to

philosophical life, studied in Gottintren and Berlin, received his degree in 1813

at Jena witli his treatise on the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient

Reason, lived for a time at Weimar and Dresden, habilitated as Privatdocent

in Berlin in 1820, but withdrew after he had won no success in a work as

teacher which was frequently interrupted by journeys, and spent the rest of his

life in private, after 1831, in Frankfort on the Main, where he died in 1860.

His main work is Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, 1819 [7%e World as

Will and as Idea, tr. by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp, Lond. and Boston, 3

vols., 1884-86]. To this were attached Ueber den Willen in der Natur, 1836;

Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik, 1841 ; finally, Parerya und Paralipomena,

18-31. Complete edition in 6 vols. (Leips. 1873 f.), and since then frequently

edited. [Tr. of the Fourfold Root and of On the Will in Nature, by K. Hille-

brand, Bohn Library, 2d ed., 1891 ; of selected essays by Bax, Bohn Library, also

by T. B. Saunders, 5 vols., Lond. and N.Y., 3d ed., 1892.] Cf. W. Gwinner,

SchSs Leben, 2d ed. (Leips. 1878) ; J. Frauenstadt, Briefe iiber die Sch. sche

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Philosophic (Leips. 1854) ; R. Seydel, SchSs System (Leips. 1857) ; A. Hayin,

A. Sch. (Berlin, 1864) ; G. Jellinek, Die Weltanschauung en Leibniz" 1 und

Schopenhauer 1 s (Leips. 1872) [H. Zimmern, Schopenhauer, His Life and Phil.,

Loud. 1870; J. Sully, Pessimism, 2d ed., Lond. 1891 ; Adamson in Mind, 1870].

By the side of the main metaphysical development runs a psychological

side-line, a series of schools which, in an eclectic way, frequently approached

the doctrines of the great systems by the path of the psychological method.

Such is the relation to Kant and Jacobi of J. Fr. Pries (1773-1843 ; Eeinhold,

Fichte und Schelling, 1803 ; Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung, 1805 ; Neue Kritik

der Vernunft, 1807 ; Psychische Anthropologie, 1820 f. Cf. Kuno Fischer, Die

beiden kantischen Schnlen in Jena, Acad. Address, Stuttg. 1802), to Kant and

Fichte of Wilh. Traug. Krug (1770-1842 ; Organon der Philosophie, 1801 ;

HanduKorterbuch der philos. \\ issenschaften, 1827 ff.), to Fichte and Schelling

of Fried. Bouterwek (170(5-1828; Apodiktik, 1799; sKsthetik, 1800), and

finally, to Herbart of Fr. Beneke (1798-1854; Psychologische Skizzen, 1825

and 1827 ; Lehrbuch der Psychologie, als Naturwissenschaft, 1832 ; Metaphysik

und Religionsphilosophie, 1840 ; Die neue Psychologic, 1845).

### 41. The Thing-in-Itself.

The compelling power which Kant s philosophy gained over the

minds and hearts of men was due chiefly to the earnestness and

greatness of its ethical conception of the world ; 1 the progress of

thought, however, attached itself primarily to the new form which

had been given to the principles of the theory of knowledge in the

Critique of the Pure Reason. Kant took the antithesis of phenom

ena and noumena from earlier philosophy ; but by his transcen

dental analytic he widened the realm of phenomena to include the

whole compass of human knowledge, and the thing-in-itself survived

only as a problematical conception, like a rudimentary organ, which

might be indeed characteristic for the historical genesis of this

theory of knowledge, but which performed no living function in it.

1. This was first seen by Jacobi, when he confessed that without

the presupposition of realism one could not enter the Kantian

system, and with the same could not remain in it ; 2 for the concep-

\ tion of the sensibility introduced at the beginning involves the

! causal relation of being affected by things-in-themselves, a rela

tion which, according to the doctrine of the analytic that categories

must not be applied to things-in-themselves, it is forbidden to think.

In this contradiction of professing to think things-in-themselves

and yet of not being permitted to think them, the whole critique of

the reason moves ; and at the same time this contradictory assump-

jtion does not at all help to guarantee to our knowledge of phe-

! nomena even the slightest relation to truth. For, according to

Kant, the mind presents to itself in thought " neither itself nor

1 This is especially to be recognised from Reinhold s Briefen uber die

kant. Ph.

2 Jacobi, W., II. 304.

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other things, but solely and alone that which is neither what the

mind is itself, nor what other things are." 1 The faculty of cogni

tion hovers between a problematical X of the subject and an equally

problematical X of the object. The sensibility has nothing behind

it, and the understanding nothing before it ; " in a twofold en

chanter s smoke, called space and time, rise the ghostly forms of

phenomena or appearances in which nothing appears." 2 If we

assume things, Kant teaches that knowledge has not the least to do

with them. The critical reason is a reason busy about pure noth

ing, i.e. only about itself. If, therefore, criticism will not fall into

nihilism or absolute scepticism, the transcendental idealist must

have the courage to assert the " strongest " idealism ; 3 he must

declare that only phenomena are.

In the claim that what Kant calls the object of knowledge is in

truth " nothing/ inheres as a presupposition the same naive realism,

the destruction of which was the great service of the transcendental

analytic ; and the same realism determines also the epistemology of

Faith, which Jacobi opposes to "the transcendental uncertainty,"

not without being entirely dependent upon it. All truth is knowl

edge of the actual ; but the actual asserts itself in 1 human con

sciousness not through thought, but through feeling; just Kant s

experiment proves that thought alone moves in a circle out of which

there is no access to actuality, in an endless series of the condi

tioned in which no unconditioned is to be found. The fundamental

law of causality may indeed be formulated in exactly this manner,

viz. there is nothing unconditioned. Knowledge, therefore, or thought

that can be demonstrated, is in its very nature, as Jacobi says,

Spinozism, a doctrine of the mechanical necessity of all that is

finite : and it is the interest of science that there be no God,

indeed, a God who could be known would be no God. 4 Even he

who is in his heart a Christian must be in his head a heathen ; he

who will bring into his intellect the light which is in his heart

quenches it. fi But this knowledge is only a mediate knowing ; the

true, immediate knowing is feeling; in this we are truly one with the

object, 6 and possess it as we possess ourselves in the certainty of

a faith that has no proof. 7 This feeling, however, as regards its

objects, is of a twofold kind: the reality of the sensuous reveals

itself to us in perception, that of the supersensuous in the "reason"

i Allwill, XV. ; W., I. 121. 2 W., III. Ill f.

8 W., II. 310. 4 W., III. 384.

6 To Hamann, I. 367. 6 W., II. 175.

7 Hume s conception of belief and his distinction of impressions and ideas

(here called Vorstellungeri) experience in this a noteworthy transformation.

CHAP. 2, 41.] Thing-in-Itself : Fries, Reinhold. 575

For this supra-natural sensualism, therefore, "reason" signifies the

immediate feeling of the reality of the supersensuous, of God, free

dom, morality, and immortality. In this limitation Kant s dualism

of theoretical and practical reason and of the primacy of the latter

return in Jacobi, 1 to be placed in the service of a mystical extrava

gance of feeling, which manifests itself also in the character of

a style which is warm and full of spirit, but rhapsodical and more

given to assertion than to proof.

This same fundamental conception, brought somewhat nearer to

Kant, appears with Fries. In demanding that the knowledge of the

a priori forms to which the critical philosophy aspired must itself

arise a posteriori, through inner experience, and therefore that Kant s

results must be established or set right by an " anthropological "

critique, he rested upon the conviction that the immediate, proper

cognitions of the reason are given originally in an obscure form

through the feeling, 2 and transformed into intellectual knowledge

only by means of reflection. This Leibnizian body ends, however,

in the critical tail, since the perceptional and conceptional Forms of

this reflection are regarded as only an expression of the phenomenal

mode in which the above original truth [as experienced in feeling]

appears ; on the other hand, the body received a Kant-Jacobi head,

when the limitation of knowledge to these phenomenal Forms had

set over against it the immediate relation of moral faith to things-

in-themselves, while at the same time with a decided attachment

to the Critique of Judgment the aesthetic and religious feelings

had ascribed to them the significance of a presage (Ahndung)

that the Being which lies at the basis of phenomena is just that to

which the practical reason relates.

2. The untenability of the Kantian conception of the thing-in-itself,

so keenly recognised by Jacobi, became palpable to a certain extent

when Reinhold in his Elementary Philosophy made the attempt to

present the critical doctrine in a systematic unity. He admired

Kant and adopted entirely his solutions of the individual problems,

but missed in him the formulation of a simple, fundamental princi

ple from which all particular insights might be deduced. Through

the fulfilment of this (Cartesian) demand, 3 opposing private opinions

would be at last replaced by the philosophy, Philosophy without

any surname. He himself believed that he had found this principle

in the principle which he supposed to be quite free from presuppo

sitions, that in consciousness every idea is distinguished by the

i W., III. 351 ff. 2 Fr ies, Neue Kritik, I. 206.

8 Reinhold, Beitrage, I. 91 ff.

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consciousness of subject and object, and is related to both (Principle

of Consciousness). 1 Hence there inheres in every idea something

that belongs to the subject and something that belongs to the

object. From the object comes the manifold of the material, from

the subject the synthetic unity of the Form. From this it follows

that neither the object in itself, nor the subject in itself, is know-

able, but only the world of consciousness which hovers between the

two ; from this results further the opposition of the (sensuous)

material impulse and of the (ethical) Form impulse; in the former

the heteronomy of the dependence of the will upon things may be

recognised ; in the latter the autonomy of the will directed toward

the formal conformity to law.

In this crude form the Kantian School propagated the doctrine of

the master ; all the fineness and profound meaning of the analytic

of the " object" had become lost, and the only substitute was Rein-

hold s effort to find in the " ideational faculty " ( Vorstellungsver-

mogen). or "consciousness, the deeper unity of all the different

cognitive powers which Kant had separated from each other as

Sensibility, Understanding, Judgment, and Reason. In so far the

" fundamental philosophy " opposed with a positive hypothesis the

objections which the sharp separation of the sensibility and the under

standing in the Kantian doctrine encountered with many contempora

ries. This separation presented itself in the exposition determined

by the after-working of the Inaugural Dissertation (of. p. 538, note

4), still more strongly than the spirit of the Critique of Reason

required, and became at the same time still more palpable by the

dualism of the practical philosophy. So the tendency was awak

ened to replace the sensibility again in its rights as against Kant,

and the Leibnizian doctrine of the gradual transition from the func

tions of sense to those of reason proved the source of a powerful

counter-current against Kant s "dissection" of the soul, a dissec

tion more apparent than serious. Hamann in his review, and in

conjunction with him, Herder in his Metakritik, urged this against

the Critique of Pure Reason. Both lay chief emphasis upon lan

guage as the fundamental, unitary, sensuous-intellectual work of

the reason, and seek to show how from the first "splitting apart"

of sensibility and understanding all the other chasms and dualisms

of the critical philosophy necessarily followed. 2

1 Neue Theorie des Vorst., pp. 201 ff.

2 Herder, Metakritik, 14, 111. Works in 40 vols., XXXVII. 333 ff. Moreover,

this thought as Herder presented it in the Metakritik, a silly composition of

personal irritation, was for a long time a positively impelling moment in the

development. Cf. 42.

CHAP. 2, 41.] Thing-in-Itself : Schulze. 577

3. The weak points in Reinhold s system could not escape the

sceptics, but their attacks applied at the same time to Kant himself.

They were united most effectively in Schulze s ^Enesidemus. He

shows that the critical method ensnares itself by setting for itself

a task, the solution of which is according to its own results im

possible. For if the Critique seeks the conditions which lie at the

basis of experience, these conditions are yet not themselves objects

of experience (a conception which certainly corresponded better

with Kant s meaning than did Fries attempt at a psychological

discovery of the a priori) : the critical method demands, therefore,

that philosophical knowledge, at all events a thinking in categories,

shall go beyond experience ; and just this the Analytic declares

impermissible. In fact, the " reason " and each of the knowing

faculties, as sensibility, understanding, etc., is a thing-in-itself, an

imperceptible ground of the empirical activities of the kind of

cognition in question; and of all these things-in-themselves and

their relations to each other and to experience, the critical philoso

phy the metaphysics of knowledge offers a very circumstantial

body of information. To be sure, this information is, if closely

examined, very slight; for such a "faculty" is ultimately thought

only as an unknown common cause of empirical functions, and is

to be characterised only through these its workings.

"^nesidemus" develops this criticism in connection with Rein-

hold s conception of the "ideational faculty"; 1 he shows that we

explain nothing at all, when we postulate over again the content

of that which is to be explained, provided with the problematical

s mark " power " or " faculty." Schulze thus turned against the

I " faculty theory," which was employed by the empirical psycholo-

gists of the Enlightenment in rather a thoughtless manner. It is

only descriptively that there is any sense in comprehending like

phenomena of the psychical life under one generic conception ; but

to hypostatise this conception to a metaphysical power this is

a mythological treatment of psychology. With this watch-word

Herbart " extended the criticism of Schulze to the whole earlier

psychological theory, and Beneke also saw in the bringing into

prominence of this conception the essential progress towards a

natural science of the soul ; i.e. the associational psychology. 3

For Schulze, this is only one of the elements in a proof that the

critical philosophy, while aiming to prove the authority of the

causal conception as against Hume, professes to limit the same

L, p. 98.

t, Lehrb.

8 Beneke, Neue Psych. , pp. 34 ff.

2 Herbart, Lehrb., z. Psych., 3 ; W., V. 8 and elsewhere.

j. 34

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to experience, and yet everywhere makes the assumption of a

causal relation between experience and that which "lies at its

basis." Here, too, belongs of course the contradiction, already

exhibited by Jacobi, in the conception of the thing-in-itself by

which the "sensibility" is said to be affected. Every attempt of

the Critique of Pare Reason to go beyond the circuit of experience,

even merely problematically, is judged in advance by itself. 1

4. The first attempt to transform the conception of the thing-in-

itself, untenable in its Kantian shape, proceeded from Salomon

Maimon. He saw that the assumption of a reality to be placed

outside of consciousness involves a contradiction. What is thought

is in consciousness ; to think of a something outside of consciousness

is as imaginary as it would be mathematics to regard the require

ment V a as a real quantity. The thing-in-itself is an impossible

conception. But what was the inducement to form it ? it lay in

the need of explaining the given in consciousness. 2 It meets us, that

is to say, in our ideas of the antithesis between the Form which we

ourselves create and are conscious of creating, and the material

which we only find present in us, without knowing how we come

by it. Of the Forms we have, therefore, a complete consciousness ; of

the matter, on the contrary, only an incomplete consciousness; it is

something that is in consciousness, without being produced with con

sciousness. But since nothing outside of consciousness is thinkable,

the given can be defined only by the lowest grade of the complete

ness of consciousness. Consciousness can be thought as diminishing

through an infinite number of intermediate stages down to nothing,

and the idea of the limit of this infinite series (comparable to the

V2) is that of the merely-given, the thing-in-itself. Things-in-them-

selves are, therefore, as Maimon says with direct reference to Leibniz

petites perceptions ; cf. p. 424 differentials of consciousness. 3 The

thing-in-itself is the limiting conception for the infinite decreasing

series from complete consciousness down an irrational quantity.

The consequence of this fundamental assumption with Maimon is,

that of the given there can always be only an incomplete knowledge,

as there is only an incomplete consciousness, 4 and that complete

1 The author of the sEnesidemus repeated the thoughts of his polemic in

most concise and comprehensive manner in his Kritik der theorftischen Philoso

phic (II. 549 ff.), a work, moreover, which contains not only an analysis of

the Critique of Pure Reason (I. 172-582), which is one of the best even to the

present day, but also a criticism of the same, supported by deep historical

understanding (found II. 12(5-722). Cf. on the relation to Leibniz, II. 176 ff.

2 Maimon, Transscendentalphilos., pp. 419 f.

Ib. 27 ff.

4 Cf. the contingency of the world with Leibniz and the specification of

Nature with Kant, pp. 398 f., 566.

rv(^ t^ryv^V^^^^\*-^^ 1

CHAP. 2, 41.] Thing-in-Itaelf : Maimon, Fichte. 579

knowledge is limited to the knowledge of the autonomous Forms of

the theoretical consciousness, to mathematics and logic. In his

esteem for these two demonstrative sciences Maimon s critical scep

ticism is in harmony with Hume ; with regard to their theories of

the knowledge of that which is empirically given they diverge

diametrically.

With this, however, it had become clear that the investigations of

the Critique of Pure Reason require a new conception of the relation

of consciousness and Being. Being is to be thought only in conscious

ness, only as a kind of consciousness. Thus the prophecy of Jacobi

begins to be fulfilled; Kant s doctrine urges toward the "strongest

idealism."

This is seen in a disciple who stood in the closest relations to

Kant himself: Sigismund Beck. He found 1 the "Only Possible

Standpoint for Estimating the Critical Philosophy " in this, that

the datum of the individual consciousness, given it as " object," is

made the content of an "original," supra-individual 2 consciousness,

which for this reason is authoritative for the truth of the empirical

knowing process. In the place of the things-in-themselves he set

Kant s " consciousness in general." But he explained to himself in

this way the a priori character of the pure conceptions and catego

ries : the given in the sensuous manifold remained for him also the

unsolved remnant of the Kantian problem.

5. The full idealistic disintegration of the conception of the

thing-in-itself was the work of Fichte. We may best understand

the matter by following the course of thought in his introductions

to his Science of Knowledge, 3 which attaches itself directly, in a

free reproduction, to the most difficult part of the Kantian doctrine,

the transcendental deduction, and illumines with complete clear

ness the culmination of the movement of thought here considered.

The fundamental problem of philosophy or, as Fichte calls it,

just on this account, of the Wissenschaftslehre [lit. "doctrine of

science," where science has the twofold meaning of knowledge as

a mental act, and knowledge as a body of truth = philosophy (of.

p. 94, note 2,)] is given in the fact, that in contrast with the ideas of

individual consciousness, which may come and go in a voluntary

and contingent manner, another set of our ideas maintain them

selves there, and these latter are characterised by a feeling of neces

sity that can be distinguished with entire certainty. To make this

necessity intelligible is the chief task of philosophy or the Science

1 3d vol. of his Erlduterndcr Auszug, from Kant s writing (Leips. 1796).

2 Ib. p. 120 ff. \* Fichte s W., I. 419 ff.

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of Knowledge. We call the system of those ideas which emerge

with the feeling of necessity experience; the problem runs, there

fore, " What is the ground of experience ? " To its solution there

are only two paths. Experience is an activity of consciousness

directed toward objects ; it can therefore be derived only from

things or from the consciousness. In the one case the explanation

is dogmatic, in the other idealistic. Dogmatism regards conscious

ness as a product of things ; it traces the activities of intelligence

also back to mechanical necessity of the causal relations ; if con

sistently thought, therefore, it cannot end otherwise than fatalisti

cally and materialistically. Idealism, on the contrary, sees in

things a product of consciousness, of a free function determined

only by itself ; it is the system of freedom and of deed. These two

modes of explanation, each of which is consistent in itself, are in

such thorough-going contradiction to each other and so irreconcil

able that Fichte regards the attempt of syncretism, to explain expe

rience by dependence both upon things-in-themselves and upon the

reason, as a failure from the outset. If one will not fall a victim to

sceptical despair, he must choose between the two.

This choice, since both present themselves logically as equally

consistent systems, will primarily depend " on what sort of a man

one is" 1 (" was fur ein Menscli man ist"); but while the ethical

interest thus already speaks for idealism, there is still a theoretical

consideration which comes to its aid. The fact of experience, in

the constant reciprocal relation of " being " and " being conscious "

(iSein und Bewusstsein), consists in this, that the "real series" of

objects is perceived in the "ideal" series of mental representations. 2

This " doubleness " dogmatism cannot explain ; for the causality of

things is only a simple series (of "mere being posited"). The

repetition of Being in consciousness (or in the being conscious) is

incomprehensible, if the being is to serve as a ground of explanation

for being conscious. On the contrary, it belongs to the very nature

of intelligence "to see itself." Consciousness, in that it acts or func

tions, knows also that it acts and what it does ; in conjunction with

the real (primary) series of its own functions it produces always at

the same time the ideal (secondary) series of the knowledge of

these functions. If, therefore, consciousness yields the sole ground

of explanation for experience, it does this only in so far as it is the

1 Fichte s W., I. 434.

2 If the antithesis of dogmatism and idealism points back to the Kantian

antithesis of Nature and Freedom, in which connection, moreover, the system

of the necessity of things already appears with a strong Spinozistic character,

the systematic influence of Spinoza s doctrine concerning the two attributes

asserts itself for the first time in this relation of the two series.

CHAP. 2, 41.] Thing-in-Itself : Fichte, Krug. 581

activity which perceives itself and is reflected back into itself, i.e.

as self-consciousness. The science of knowledge has to show that all

consciousness (of experience) which is directed toward something

else toward a Being, toward objects, toward things has its root

in the original relation of consciousness to itself.

The principle of idealism is self-consciousness ; inTs subjective,

methodical aspect, in so far as the science of knowledge aims to

develop all of its insights from the intellectual perception alone, with

which consciousness accompanies its own activities, from rejection

upon that which consciousness knows of its own deed, in objec-

tive, systematic aspect, in so far as in this way those functions of

intelligence are to be pointed out, by means of which that which

in common life is called thing and object, and in the dogmatic

philosophy thing-in-itself, is produced. This last conception, that

of the thing-in-itself, which is through and through contradictory,

is thus resolved to its last remnant ; all Being is comprehensible

only as product of reason, and the subject-matter of philosophical

knowledge is the system of the reason (cf. 42).

For Fichte and his successors, the conception of the thing-in-

itself thus became indifferent, and the old antithesis between Being

and consciousness sank to the secondary significance of an immanent

relation within the activities of the reason. An object exists only

for a subject; and the common ground of both is the reason, the /

which perceives itself and its action. 1

6. While the main development of German metaphysics followed

this Fichtean tendency, the syncretism above mentioned did riot re

main without supporters whom the Wissenschaftslehre had thrust from

the threshold. Its metaphysical type had been stamped out by Rein-

hold ; but it was likewise close at hand for all who took their point

of departure from the individual consciousness with the psychological

method, and believed that they found the individual consciousness

equally dependent upon the Real and upon the universal essence of

the intellect. The " transcendental synthetism," which Krug taught,

may be conceived of as an example of this mode of view. For him,

philosophy is an explanation of self by means of the reflection of

the " I " upon the " facts of consciousness." But in this the primi

tive fact proves to be the transcendental synthesis, that real and

ideal are posited in consciousness as equally original and in relation

to each other. 2 We know Being only in so far as it appears in con

sciousness, and consciousness only in so far as it refers to Being ;

1 Cf. also Schilling s youthful opuscule, Vom Ich als Princip der Philosophic,

W., I. 151 ff.

a Krug, Fundamentalphilosophie, pp. 10(5 ff.

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but both are objects of an immediate knowledge just as is the com

munity existing between them in our world of ideas.

These thoughts found a finer turn given them in Schleiermacher s

dialectic. All knowledge has as its end to establish the identity of

Being and thinking; for the two emerge in human consciousness

separate, as its real and ideal factors, perception and conception,

organic and intellectual functions. Only their complete adjustment

would give knowledge, but they remain always in a state of differ

ence. In consequence of this, science is divided with reference to

its subject matter into physics and ethics, with reference to its

methods into empirical and theoretical disciplines ; natural history

and natural science, history of the world, and science of morals. In

all these particular disciplines one or the other of the two factors

has the predominance, 1 materially or formally, although the oppo-

sites strive toward each other the empirical branches of knowledge

toward rational articulation, the theoretical towards an understand

ing of the facts, physics towards the genesis of the organism and

of consciousness out of the corporeal world, ethics towards the

control and inter-penetration of the sensuous by the will, which acts

according to ends. But the complete adjustment of the real and the

ideal is nowhere attained in actual cognition ; it forms rather the

absolute, unconditioned, infinitely removed goal of the thinking

which desires to become knowledge, but will never completely suc

ceed. 2 Hence philosophy is the science not of knowledge, but of

knowledge in a perpetual state of becoming, dialectic.

But just for this reason it nresupposes the reality of this goal

which is never to be attained in human knowledge ; the identity of

thought and Being. This Schleiermacher, with Spinoza (and Schell-

ing), calls God. It cannot be an object of the theoretical reason,

and just as little can it be such of the practical reason. We do not

know God, and therefore we cannot order our ethical life with refer

ence to him. Religion is more than knowing and right-doing ; it is

the community of life with the highest reality, in which Being and

consciousness are identical. This communion, however, emerges

only in the feeling, in the " pious " (frommen) feeling of an " abso

lute " dependence upon the infinite world-ground which cannot be

exhausted by thought (cf. 42, 6). Spinoza s God and Kant s

thing-in-itself coincide in the infinite, but thus are raised above all

human knowledge and will, and made the objects of a mystical feel

ing whose delicate vibrations harmonise in Schleiermacher (as in

1 This relation in Schleiermacher s Dialectic appears copied after the meta

physical form of Schelling s System of Identity ; cf. 42, 8.

2 Dialektik, W., III. 4 b 68 f.

CHAP. 2, 41.] Thing-in-Itself : Schleiermacher. 583

a somewhat different form in Fries, also) with the inwardness of

the religious life among the Moravians.

Thus the traditions of Mysticism pass through Pietism in

which the orthodox tendency toward a coarser view became more

and more prominent after Spener and Francke, and so called forth

the opposition of the Brothers of the Common Life up to the

summits of the idealistic development ; and indeed the doctrine of

Eckhart and the transcendental philosophy are in close touch in the

spirit which desires to transpose all the outer into the inner ; both

have a genuinely Germanic savour, they seek the world in the

" Gemuth " [the mind as the seat of the feeling and sentiments].

7. In putting aside the possibility of a scientific knowledge of

the world-ground Schleiermacher remained nearer to Kant, but the

intuition of religious feeling which he substituted was all the more

dependent upon Spinoza and upon the influences which the latter

had exercised upon the idealistic metaphysics after Fichte s Science

of Knowledge. This monism of the reason (cf. the development in

42) Herbart combated by an entirely different re-shaping of the

Kantian conception of the thing-in-itself. He desired to oppose

the dissolution of this conception, and found himself forced thereby

to the paradox of a metaphysics of things-in-themselves, which yet

should hold fast to their unknowableness. The contradictions of

the transcendental analytic appear here grotesquely magnified.

This is the more noteworthy as the retrogressive tendency which

has been ascribed to Herbart s doctrine, perhaps in contrast with

the idealistic innovations, developed itself in his attack upon Kant s

transcendental logic (cf. 38, 5). Herbart saw in this with right

the roots of idealism. It teaches, indeed, the Forms with which the

"Understanding" produces the world of objects, and in Fichte s

" I " we only have in a completely developed form that which in

germ was in Kant s " consciousness in general " or "transcendental

apperception." Herbart s inclination toward the earlier philosophy

consists in this, that he denies the creative spontaneity of conscious

ness, and, like the associational psychologists, &gt;finds it determined

and dependent in both Form and content from without. He opposes

also the virtual innateness which had propagated itself from Leibniz

on through the Inaugural Dissertation into the Critique of Pure

Reason: the forms of relation expressed in the categories are for

him, like space and time, products of the ideational mechanism. As

regards the psycho-genetic questions, he stands entirely upon the

platform of the philosophy of the Enlightenment. For this reason

he knows no other logic than the formal logic whose principle is the

principle of contradiction, i.e. the prohibition to commit a contra-

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diction. The supreme principle of all thought is, that which con

tradicts itself cannot be truly real or actual. 1

Now it is evident that the conceptions in which we think experi

ence are full of internal contradictions ; we assume things, which

are to be identical with themselves and yet made equal to a variety

of attributes ; we speak of alterations in which that which is equal

to itself is successively different ; we trace all inner experience back

to an " /" or " self" which as that " which mentally represents

itself " (sick selbst Vorstellende) involves an infinite series in the

subject as well as in the object, we trace all outer experience

back to a matter, in the idea of which the attributes of the discrete

and the continuous are at variance. This experience can be only

phenomenon ; but this phenomenon must have at its basis something

real which is free from contradictions, seeming things must have

absolute "Reals" (Reale), seeming occurrence and change a real

occurrence and change. Whatever seeming there is, there is just so

much indication of Being. To discover this is the task of philoso

phy ; it is a working over of the conceptions of experience which are

given and which must be re-shaped according to the rules of formal

logic, until we know the reality that has no internal contradictions.

The general means to this end is the method of relation. The

fundamental form of contradiction always is, that something simple

is thought as having differences (the synthetic unity of the mani

fold in Kant). This difficulty can be removed only by assuming a

plurality of simple beings, through the relation of which to each

other the "illusion" of the manifold or changeable is produced in

any individual object. Thus the conception of substance can be

maintained only if we suppose that the various qualities and chang

ing states which substance is said to unite, concern not substance

itself, but only the relation in which it successively stands to other

substances. The things-in-themselves must be many ; from a single

thing-in-itself the multiplicity of qualities and states could never be

understood. But each of these metaphysical things must be thought

as entirely simple and unchangeable; they are called by Herbart,

11 Reals" (Realen). All qualities which form the characteristics of

things in experience are relative, and make these characteristics

1 Cf. Einleitung in die Philos., W., I. 72-82. The historical stimulus to this

sharp presentation of the principle of contradiction was no doubt the deprecia

tion which this principle found in the dialectic method (cf. 42, 1) ; logically,

however, Herbart s doctrine (with the exception of his treatment of the "I"

conception) is entirely independent of it. The Eleatic element in the Herbar-

tian philosophy (cf. I. 225) is given with the postulate of Being void of contra

dictions, and to this circumstance the philosopher, who otherwise had little

historical disposition, owed his fineness of feeling for the metaphysical motive

in the Platonic doctrine of Ideas. Cf. I. 237 ff. and XII. 61 ff.

CHAP. 2, 41.] Thing -irtr Itself : Herlart. 585

appear only in relation to other things ; the absolute qualities of the

Reals are, therefore, unknowable.

8. But they must be thought as the ground which determines

the qualities that appear ; and likewise we must assume as ground

of the seeming changes which the mutation of qualities exhibits in

the case of empirical things, an actual process or occurrence, a change

of relations between the Reals. Here, however, this whole artificial

construction of that which lies beyond experience began to waver.

For the Eleatic rigidity of these Reals in nowise permits us to form

an idea of the kind of " actual relations " which are held to obtain

between them. First of all, these cannot be spatial ; 1 space and

time are products of the series formed by ideas, products of the

psychical mechanism, and hence phenomenal for Herbart in almost

a higher degree than for Kant. Only in a transferred sense can the

changing relations of substances be termed a "coming and going in

the intelligible space " ; what they are themselves the Herbartian

doctrine has no term to express. Only, in a negative direction it is

obliged to make a questionable concession. Every Real has only

simple and unchangeable determinations : the relation, therefore,

which exists or arises between two Reals is not essential to either,

and has not its basis in either. A tertium quid, however, which this

relation would postulate, is not to be discovered in this metaphys

ics. 2 Hence the relations which the Reals sustain to each other,

and from which the appearance of things and their relations are

said to follow, are called " contingent views " (zufallige Ansicliten)

of the Reals ; and Herbart s meaning in several passages is scarcely

to be understood otherwise than that consciousness is the intelligible

space in which the above relations between the Reals obtain, that

the real process or occurrence, also, is some thing which itself only

"takes place for the spectator" as "objective seeming." 3 If we

add to this, that the " Being " of the Reals or absolute qualities is

1 Not only in this point do Herbart s Reals distinguish themselves from the

atoms of Democritus, with which they have the common basis of a pluralistic

re-shaping of the Eleatic conception of Being, but also by the difference in

(unknowable) quality, in the place of which atomism allows only quantitive

differences. Just as little are the Reals to be confused with Leibniz s monads,

with which indeed they share their absence of windows, but not the attribute

of being a unity of the manifold. With the Platonic Idi as, they have in com

mon the attributes of the Eleatic Being, but not the character of class-concepts.

2 In this gap of his metaphysics Herbart inserted his philosophy of religion;

for since there is no knowledge of the real ground of the relations between the

Reals, from which the world of phenomena proceeds, the impression of pur-

posiveness which the latter makes permits us to believe, in a manner which is

theoretically unassailable, upon a supreme intelligence as the ground of these

relations, a very pale revival of the old physico-theological proof.

3 Cf. W., IV. 93 ff., 127-132, 233, 240 f., 248 ff. ; see also E. Zeller, Gesch. d.

deutxch. Philos., 844.

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defined by Herbart as " absolute position" i.e. as a " Setzung" l a pos

iting in which Being is at rest, and which is not taken back, we have

opening before us the perspective into an " absolute " idealism.

This was, indeed, carried out by Herbart still less than by Kant ;

here, too, it would have led to absolute contradiction. For the

theory of Reals aims to deduce consciousness also, as a consequence,

emerging in the realm of phenomena, of the " co-existence of the

Reals." The Reals are held to reciprocally "disturb" each other,

and to call forth in each other as reactions against these disturb

ances, inner states which have the significance of self-preserva

tions." 2 Such self-preservations are immediately known to us as

those by the aid of which the unknown Real of our soul maintains

itself against disturbance by other Reals ; they are ideas (Vorstellun-

gen). The soul as a simple substance is naturally unknowable;

psychology is only the science of its self-preservations. These, the

ideas, sustain within the soul, which simply furnishes the indiffer

ent stage for their co-existence, once more the relations of Reals ;

they disturb and inhibit each other, and the whole course of the

psychical life is to be explained from this reciprocal tension of ideas.

By their tension the ideas lose in intensity ; and the consciousness

depends upon the degree of intensity. The lowest degree of

strength, which the ideas can have and still be regarded as actual,

is the threshold of consciousness. If the ideas are pressed by others

below this threshold, they change into impulse. Hence the essential

nature of those psychical states which are called feeling and will is

to be sought in the inhibitory relations of ideas. All these relations

must be developed as a " statics and mechanics of ideas," 3 and since

we have to do here essentially with the determining of differences of

force, this metaphysical psychology must take on the form of a mathe

matical theory of the mechanism of ideas. 4 Herbart lays particular

1 Cf. W., IV. 71 ff.

2 The " sunm esse conservare," with Hobbes and Spinoza the fundamental in

stinct of individuals, appears with Herbart as the metaphysical activity of the

Reals, by virtue of which they produce the world of seeming, i.e. experience.

3 On this metaphysical basis Herbart erected the structure of an immanent

associational psychology. The assumption of a mechanical necessity of the

ideational process, and the view that the volitions follow from this as likewise

necessary relations, proved a fortunate basis for a scientific theory of pedagog

ics, a discipline which Herbart made also dependent upon ethics, since the

latter teaches the goal of education (the formation of ethical character), while

psychology teaches the mechanism through which this is realised. In a similar

way Beneke, who took the standpoint of associational psychology without Iler-

bart s metaphysics, found the path to a systematic pedagogics.

4 In carrying out this thought Herbart assumed that ideas in their reciprocal

inhibitions lose in intensity as much as the weakest of them possesses, and that

this inhibition-sum is divided among the individual ideas in inverse ratio to

their original strength, so that if in the simplest case, a &gt; 6, a is reduced by

CHAP. 2, 41.] Thin&lt;j-in-Itself : Herbart. 587

weight upon the investigation of the process by which newly entering

ideas are "assimilated," ordered, formed, and in part altered, by the

ideas already present ; he employs for this the expression appercep

tion (first coined by Leibniz ; cf. p. 463), and his theory of this takes

the form of an explanation of the " I " or " self " by associational

psychology. The " I " is thought as the moving point in which the

apperceiving and apperceived ideas continually converge.

While the self-preservation of the Real which constitutes the soul,

against disturbance by other Reals thus produces the phenomena

of the ideational life, the reciprocal self-preservation and " partial

inter-penetration " of several Keals produce for the consciousness of

the spectator the "objective seeming or illusion" of matter. The

various physical and chemical phenomena are here tortured out of

the metaphysical presuppositions with an unspeakably toilsome

deduction, 1 an attempt forgotten to-day, which remained as desti

tute of results in natural science as in philosophy.

9. Another Gottingen professor, Bouterwek, attacked the thing-in-

itself with other weapons. He showed in his Apodiktik, that if the

doctrines of the Critique of Pure Reason are to be taken in earnest,

nothing remains for the "object to which the subject necessarily

relates" except a completely inconceivable X. We cannot talk of a

thing-in-itself or of things-in-themselves; for in this are involved

already the categories of Inherence, of Unity and Plurality, 2 and of

Reality, which hold good only for phenomena. The transcendental

philosophy must become " negative Spinozism." 3 It can teach only

that to the "consciousness in general" a "something in general"

corresponds, concerning which nothing whatever is to be affirmed in

absolute knowledge. (Cf. with regard to Spinoza, above, pp. 408 f.).

On the other hand, this absolutely real asserts itself in all relative

knowledge through the consciousness of willing.\* For this shows

everywhere the living force of individuality. We know of the subject

because it wills something, and of the object because it furnishes

the inhibition to 2 + a& - 6 2 and 6 to 6 2 Cf&gt; on thls arbitrarily axiomatic

a + b a + b

assumption and on the mistaken nature of the whole "psychological calculus,"

A. Lange, Die Grundlegung der mathematisrhen Psychologic, Duisburg, 1865.

1 Allgem. Metaphysik, 240 ff ., 331 ff. ; W., IV. 147 ff., 327 ff In Herbart s

metaphysics the branching out of general ontology into the beginnings of psy

chology and natural philosophy is designated by the names Eidology and

Synechology.

2 Cf. esp. Apodiktik, I. 261, 392 ff.

Ib. 385 ff.

4 Following the example of Kant and Fichte, Bouterwek ends his theoretical

Apodiktik in scepticism or in completely abstract-formal, absolute knowledge ;

it is the "practical" apodictic which tirst gains a relation of its content to

reality.

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resistance to this will. The antithesis of force and resistance thus

furnishes a common basis to the knowledge of the reality of our

selves, and to that of the reality of other things, of the I and the

Not-I. 1 This doctrine Bouterwek would have called absolute Virtu-

alism. We know our own reality in that we will, and the reality of

other things in that our will finds in them a resisting force. The

feeling of resistance refutes pure subjectivism or solipsism, but this

relative knowledge of the particular forces of the real is supple

mented by the consciousness of our own willing to form a merely

empirical science. 2

This thought of his Gottingen teacher was developed by Schopen

hauer, under the influence of Fichte, to a metaphysics. With a bold

leap he swings himself up from the position of Virtualism to the

knowledge of the essential nature of all things. We recognise the

will within us as the true reality, and the resistance from which we

know the reality of other things must, therefore, be likewise will.

This is demanded by the " metaphysical need " of a unitary explana

tion for all experience. The world " as idea " can be only phenome

non ; an object is possible only in the subject and determined by

the Forms of the subject. Hence the world in man s idea or mental

representation (as " phenomenon of the brain," as Schopenhauer has

often said with a dangerously contradictory laxity of expression)

appears as a manifold ordered in space and time, a manifold whose

connection can be thought only in accordance with the principle of

causality, the only one of the Kantian categories which Schopen

hauer can admit to an originality of the same rank as that which

belongs to the pure perceptions. Bound to these Forms, conceptional

knowledge can have for its object only the necessity which prevails

between individual phenomena : for causality is a relation of phe

nomena to each other; science knows nothing absolute, nothing

unconditioned; the guiding thread of causality, which leads from

one condition to the other, never breaks off and must not be broken

off arbitrarily. 3 The conceptional work of science can, therefore, in

nowise raise itself above this infinite series of phenomena ; only an

intuitive interpretation of the whole world of ideas, a look of genius

over experience, an immediate apprehension, can penetrate to the

true essence, which appears in our ideas as the world determined in

space and time and by causality. This intuition, however, is that

by which the knowing subject is given immediately through itself as

will. This word solves, therefore, the mystery of the outer world

i Apodiktik II. 62 ff. 2 Ib. II. 67 f.

a In this Schopenhauer is in complete agreement with Jacobi (cf. above,

p. 574).

CHAP. 2, 41.] Thing-in-itself : Schopenhauer. 589

also. For we must apprehend the significance of all that is given to

us immediately in space and time as idea, 1 according to this analogy

of the only thing which is immediately given. The thing-in-itself is

the Will.

The word " will " as here used must indeed be taken in an ex

tended sense. In men and in animals the will appears as motiva

tion determined through ideas, in the instinctive and vegetative life

of the organism as susceptibility to stimulation, in the rest of the

world of experience as mechanical processes. The meaning which

is common to these different internal or external kinds of causality,

should be designated a potiori as will, in accordance with that form

in which alone it is immediately known to us. Accordingly the

philosopher emphasises expressly the point, that the particular

peculiarities with which the will is given in human self-perception,

i.e. its motivation through ideas and conceptions, must be kept quite

apart from our notion of the will as thing-in-itself, a requirement

which it was, indeed, hard enough for Schopenhauer himself to

fulfil.

At the same time, however, the relation between thing-in-itself

and phenomenon must not be thought according to the rule of the

understanding, i.e. causally. The thing-in-itself is not the cause of

phenomena. Even in the case of man the will is not the cause of

his body or of the bodily activities ; but the same reality, which is

given us mediately, through our ideas in space and time perception,

as body, and which in cognition is conceived as something causally

necessary and dependent upon other phenomena, this is im

mediately given as will. Because the thing-in-itself is not subject

to the principle of sufficient reason, we have the paradox, that man

feels himself as will immediately free, and yet in idea knows him

self to be necessarily determined. So Schopenhauer adopts Kant s

doctrine of intelligible and empirical character. In the same way,

however, phenomenal Nature must everywhere be regarded as

obj edification ; that is, as the perceptional and conceptional mode of

representation of the will or the immediately real, and must not

be regarded as the product of the latter. The relation of essence

to phenomenon is not that of cause and effect.

Further, the will as thing-in-itself can be only the one, universal

"world-ivill." All plurality and multiplicity belong to perception

in space and time ; these latter are the principium individuationis.

Hence things are different and separate from each other only as

phenomena in idea and cognition; in their true essence they are

1 Cf. World as Witt, etc., II. 18-23.

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all the same. The will is the ev KO.I TTO.V. Here lies for Schopen

hauer the metaphysical root of morals. It is the deception of the

phenomenal that makes the individual distinguish his own weal

and woe from that of other individuals, and brings the two into

opposition : in the fundamental moral feeling which feels another s

sorrows as one s own in sympathy, the transcendental unity of will

of all reality comes to light.

Finally, the will can have for its object no particular content that

can be empirically presented in consciousness ; for every such

content belongs already to its "objectivity." The world-will has

only itself for its object ; it wills only to will. It wills only to be

actual ; for all that actually is, is itself only a willing. In this

sense Schopenhauer calls it the will to live. It is the thing-in-itself

which ever gives birth to itself in timeless, eternal process, and as

such it is represented in the restless mutation of phenomena.

### 42. The System of Reason.

The direction which the main line of the idealistic development

was to take was prescribed by the principle from which Fichte

made bold to throw overboard the conception of the thing-in-itself.

The relation of Being and consciousness can be explained only out

of consciousness, and by the fact that consciousness "looks at its

own action" and creates thereby at once the real and the ideal

series of experience objects and the knowledge of them. The

problem of the Wissenschaftslehre is, therefore, to comprehend the

world as a necessary connected whole of rational activities, and

the solution can proceed only by reflection on the part of the philos

ophising reason upon its own action and upon that which is requi

site therefor. The necessity, therefore, which prevails in this

system of reason is not causal, but teleological. The dogmatic system

understands the intelligence as a product of things, the idealistic

develops intelligence as an inherently purposeful connection of acts,

some of which serve to produce objects. The progress of philo

sophical thought should not take the form, that because something

is, therefore something else is also, but should rather shape itself

after the guiding principle that in order that something may take

place, something else must take place also. Every act of reason has

a task; to perform this it needs other acts and thus other tasks;

the connected series of all activities for the fulfilment of all tasks,

taken as a purposeful unity, is the system of the reason, the

" history of consciousness." The ground or reason of all Being lies

CHAP. 2, 42.] System of Reason : Dialectic. 591

in the ought ; that is, in the activity of self-consciousness directed

toward an end.

The schema for carrying out this thought is the dialectical method.

If the world is to be comprehended as reason, the system of reason

must be developed from an original task ; all particular acts of

intelligence must be deduced as means to its performance. This

act [lit. " deed-act," Thathandluny^ is self-consciousness. A begin

ning without assumptions, such as philosophy needs, is not to be

found by means of an assertion or proposition, but by means of a

demand, which every one must be able to fulfil : " Think thyself! "

And the whole business of philosophy consists in making clear

what takes place in this act, and what is requisite for it. But this

principle can lead on farther, only so long as it is shown that

between that which should take place and that which does take

place to this end, there is still a contradiction, out of which the new

task results, and so on. The dialectical method is a system in

which every problem or task creates a new one. There is in the

reason itself a resistance to the result it seeks to achieve, and to

overcome this resistance it unfolds a new function. These three

momenta are designated as Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis.

If Kant had maintained the necessity of insoluble problems of

reason for his explanation and criticism of metaphysics, the idealis

tic metaphysics now makes this thought a positive principle. By

this means the reason s world becomes an infinity of self-production,

and the contradiction between the task and the actual doing is

declared to be the real nature of the reason itself. This contradic

tion is necessary and cannot be abolished. It belongs to the essen

tial nature of the reason ; and since only the reason is real, the con

tradiction is thus declared to be real. Thus the dialectical method,

this metaphysical transformation of Kant s transcendental logic,

came into stronger and stronger opposition to formal logic. The

rules of the understanding, which have their general principle in

the principle of contradiction, are adequate, perhaps, for the ordi

nary elaboration of perceptions into conceptions, judgments, and

conclusions ; for the intellectual perception of the philosophising

reason they do not suffice, before the problems of " speculative con

struction " they sink to a relative importance.

This doctrine asserts itself already in the first exposition which

Fichte gave to his Science of Knowledge ; : it was then spoken out

more and more boldly by disciples and associates like Fr. Schlegel,

and, ultimately, the speculative reason affected a superiority to the

1 Grundlage der ges. W.-L., 1 ; W., I. 92 ff. [Kroeger s tr., pp. 63 ff.].

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"reflective philosophy of the understanding" hemmed in within

the principle of contradiction. Schelling 1 appealed to the coinci-

dentia oppositorum of Nicolaus Cusanus and Giordano Bruno, and

Hegel 2 sees in the triumph of the "narrow understanding" over

the reason the hereditary error of all earlier philosophy. 3 Meta

physics, of which Kant has shown that it is not possible for the

understanding, seeks an organ of its own in intellectual perception or

intuition, and a form of its own in the dialectical method. The

productive synthesis of the manifold must keep its unity above the

antitheses into which it divides itself. It is the essential nature

of mind or spirit to disunite itself, and from this state of being rent

apart, to return back to its original unity.

This triplicity rests entirely upon the above (Fichtean) funda

mental characterisation of the mind as that which beholds itself.

The reason is not only "in-itself" as a simple ideal reality, but also

" for-itself " ; it appears to itself as "something other, alien"; it

becomes for itself an object different from the subject, and this

otherness is the principle of negation. The doing away with this

difference, the negation of the negation, is the synthesis of the two

moments above named. These are annulled or sublated [" aufge-

hoben," which has no exact English equivalent ; Bosanquet suggests

" put by " J in the threefold aspect that their one-sided force is

overcome, their relative meaning is preserved, and their original

sense transmuted into a higher truth. Following this scheme of

the "in-itself," "for-itself," and " in-and-for-itself " (An-sich, Fur-

sich, An-und-fur-sich) . Hegel developed his dialectical method with

great virtuosoship by making each conception "turn into its oppo

site," and from the contradiction of the two making the higher con

ception proceed, which then experienced the same fortune of finding

an antithesis which required a still higher synthesis, and so on. The

Master himself, in his employment of this method, particularly in

the Phcenomenology and in the Logic, worked in an astonishing

wealth of knowledge, a quite unique fineness of feeling for concep-

tional connections, and a victorious power of combining thought,

while occasionally his profundity passed over into obscurity and

schematic word-building. In the case of his disciples, a philosophical

jargon grew out of this, which pressed all thought into the triple

scheme, and by the thoughtless externality with which it was used,

1 Sixth Vorl. iiber Meth. d. nk. St., W., V. 207 ff.

2 Cf. esp. his article on Glauben und Wisse.n, W., I. 21 ff.

8 It is from this point of view that we best can understand Herbart s polemic

against absolute idealism. He, too, finds contradictions in the fundamental

conceptions of experience, but just on this account they ought to be worked

over until the contradictionless reality is recognised ; cf. above, 41, 7.

CHAP. 2, 42.] System of Reason : Fichte. 593

and used for a time in widely extended circles, it was all too well

adapted to discredit philosophy as an empty bombast. 1

2. The system of reason with Fichte, in the first period of his

philosophical activity (about 1800), is, in its content also, in full

accord with the above method. The original "act" (Thathandlung)

of self-consciousness, which is determined by nothing except itself,

is that the " /" or self can only be "posited" by being distinguished

from a " Not-I" or "not-self." Since, however, the not-self is posited

only in the self, i.e. historically expressed, the object posited only

in consciousness, the self and the not-self (i.e. subject and object)

must reciprocally determine each other within the " I " or self. From

this results the theoretical or the practical series of self-conscious

ness, according as the Not-I or the " I " is the determining part.

The functions of the theoretical reason are now developed by

Fichte in the following manner : The particular stages result from

the reflection of consciousness upon its own previously determined

action. By virtue of its own activity, which is limited by nothing

external, it presses beyond every bound which the "I" has set for

itself in the Not-I as object. The pure perceptions, space and

time, the categories as rules of the understanding, and the principles

of the reason, are treated as the several forms of this self-determin

ing. In place of the antitheses which Kant had set up between

these particular strata, Fichte set the principle, that in each higher

stage the reason apprehends in purer form what it has accomplished

in the lower stage. Knowing is a process of self-knowledge on the

part of the reason, beginning with sense perception and ascending

to complete knowledge. 2 But this whole series of the theoretical

reason presupposes an original " self-limitation " of the I. If this

is given, the entire series is comprehensible in accordance with the

principle of self-perception ; for every activity has its object and\*

its reason in the preceding. The first self-limitation has its ground

in no preceding act, and therefore, theoretically, no ground what

ever. It is a groundless, free activity, but as such, the ground of all

other activities. This groundless [undetermined] free act is sen

sation. It falls into consciousness, therefore, only in its content,

which is to be taken up into perception ; as act it is, like all that has

1 Cf. the humorous portrayal in G. RUmelin, Eedcn und Aufsntze, pp. 47-50,

Freiburg, 1888.

2 Without any directly visible influence from Leibniz, his conception of the

relation of the different knowing faculties asserts itself here in contrast with

the Kantian separation. Only it is to be noted that this "history of the devel

opment of reason" is, with Leibniz, determined causally, with Fichte teleologi-

cally. What Hamann and Herder (cf. above, p. 576) demanded as a requirement

of the unity of intelligence in the Leibnizian sense, Fichte and Schelling had

meanwhile performed in quite another sense.

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no ground, unconscious. 1 In this consists its " givenness," by virtue

of which it appears as foreign and coining " from without." In

place of the thing-in-itself comes, therefore, the unconscious self-

/ limitation of the I. Fichte calls this activity the productive imagina-

v tion. It is the world-producing activity of the reason.

For sensation there is then no ground which determines it; it

is there with absolute freedom, and determines on its part all

knowledge as regards content. Hence it can be comprehended only

through its end in the practical Wissenschaftslehre, which has

to investigate to what end the self limits itself. This is only to

be understood if we regard the I or self, not as resting Being, but

as in its nature infinite activity or impulse. For since all action is

directed toward an object in connection with which it develops,

so the self, which finds its object not given to it, as is the case

with the empirical will, must, in order to remain impulse and action,

set objects for itself. This takes place in sensation : sensation has

no ground, but only the end of creating for the impulse of the self

a limit beyond which the self passes in order to become object for

itself. The actual world of experience, with all its things, and with

the " Eeality " which it has for the theoretical consciousness, is

only the material for the activity of the practical reason.

The inmost essence of the ego, therefore, is its action, directed

only toward itself, determined only by itself, the autonomy of the

ethical reason. The system of reason culminates in the categorical

imperative. The I is the ethical will, and the world is the material

of duty put into sensuous form. It is there, to the end that we may

be active in it. It is not that Being is the cause of doing, but

Being is brought forth for the sake of the doing. All that is, is

only to be understood or explained from the point of view of that

which it ought to be (soil).

The demand of the Wissenschaftslehre, so paradoxical for the

ordinary .consciousness, 2 amounts, accordingly, to robbing the category

1 The paradox of the "unconscious activities of consciousness" lies in the

expression, not in the thing. German philosophers have frequently been very

unfortunate in their terminology, most unfortunate precisely where they wished

to give German words a new meaning. Fichte not only uses consciousness

and self-consciousness promiscuously, but he understands by consciousness,

on the one hand, the actual idea or mental presentation of the individual or the

empirical ego (hence in this sense " unconscious," bcwusfttlos), and on the

other hand, the functions of the "consciousness in general," of the transcen

dental apperception or the "universal ego or self" (in this sense he speaks of

" history of consciousness "). In these verbal relations rests a good part of the

difficulty of Fichte s exposition and of the misunderstanding which it has

called forth.

2 Tn this spirit Fr. H. Jacobi protested against this knitting, not indeed of the

stocking, but of the.knitting (W., III. 24 ff.). Cf., on the other hand, C. Fort-

lage, Beitrdge zur Psychologic (Leips. 1875), pp. 40 f.

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of substantiality of the fundamental significance which it has in the

nai ve, sensuous view of the world. In this a something that " is,"

a "Being" (" Seiendes ") is always thought as support and cause of^

activities; in Fichte s thought the "doing" or action is conceived

as the original, and Being is regarded as only the means posited for

that end. This antithesis came sharply to light in the atheism

controversy, which had so important consequences for Fichte per

sonally. The Wissenschaftslehre could not allow God to be regarded

as " substance " ; in this case he would necessarily be something

derived ; it could seek the metaphysical conception of God only in.

the "Universal Ego or Self" (allgemeinen 7c/t), in the absolutely

free, world-creating action ; and in clear contrast to the natura

naturans of dogmatism it calls God the Moral World-order, 1 the

ordo ordinans.

Accordingly, the chief philosophical discipline for Fichte is moral ~

science. Projected before Kant s Metaphysics of Morals, Fichte s

system takes from the same the categorical imperative in the

formula " act according to thy conscience," for the starting-point of

a strictly carried out science of duties, which develops the general

and particular tasks of man from the opposition appearing in the

empirical self between the natural impulse and the moral impulse.

At the same time, the Kantian rigour is softened by the fact, that

man s sensibility, also, is permitted to assert its rights as product

of reason. The dualism still survives, but it is already on the way

toward being overcome, and in the thought that the purposeful

connected whole of the reason assigns each of its members a voca

tion prescribed by its natural manifestation, ethical theory is brought

to an elaboration of the " material for the fulfilment of duty," which

is much more penetrating and gives a deeper value to the data of

experience. This shows itself in Fichte s exposition of professional

duties, in his nobler conception of marriage and family life, in the

finer penetration of his ethical investigations into the manifold

relations of human life.

The like is true, also, of Fichte s treatment of the problems of

piiblic life. A youthful energy masters the Kantian fundamental

thoughts here, and gives them a much more impressive formulation

than they could receive from Kant himself, who undertook the

systematic carrying out of these thoughts, only in his old age. The

reciprocal limitation of spheres of freedom in the outer social life of

individuals is, for Fichte also, the principle of Natural Right. As

"primitive rights" he regarded the claims of the individual to

1 Fichte, W., V. 182 ff., 210 ff.

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freedom of his body as the organ for performance of duty, of his

property as being the external sphere of operation to this end, and

finally of his self-preservation as personality. But these primitive

rights become efficient as compulsory rights or laws only through

the authority of (positive) laws in the state. The idea of the com

pact which is at the basis of the state, Fichte analyses into the

citizen, the property, and the defence contract. It is interesting in

this connection to see how these thoughts culminate in his politics

in the principle, that the state has to make provision that every one

may be able to live by his work, the doctrine, named after him, of

the so-called right to work. 1 Work is the duty of the moral person

ality, the condition of existence of the physical ; it must uncondi

tionally be furnished by the state. Hence the regulation of the

relations of labour must not be left to the natural working of supply

and demand (as according to Adam Smith), and the profits of labour

must not be left to the mechanism of society s war of interests, but

the rational law of the state must enter here. From the point of

view of this thought, with a careful consideration of the conditions

given by experience, 2 Fichte projected his ideal of the socialistic state

as "the complete industrial state" (geschlossenen Handelsstaates) ,

which itself takes in hand all production and manufacturing, and all

trade with foreign countries, in order to assign to each citizen his

work and also the full revenue for his work. The powerful idealism

of the philosopher did not shrink from a deep system of compulsion,

if he could hope to assure to every individual thereby a sphere for

the free fulfilment of duty.

3. The problem of conceiving the universe as a system of reason

was solved in the main in the Science of Knowledge by the method

of deducing the external world of the senses as a product, appearing

in the empirical ego, of the " consciousness in general " ; in this

sense Fichte s doctrine, like Kant s, was later characterised as-" sub

jective idealism." Fichte s meaning in this, however, was through

out that " Nature," which it was his intention to have posited as an

organic whole, 3 should possess the full significance of an objective

product of reason, in contrast with the ideas of individuals ; to set

this forth he lacked the penetrating knowledge of his subject which

he possessed in the case of the relations of human life. Thus it was

a supplementing of this work, that was welcome to Fichte also,

1 Naturrecht, 18 ; W., III. 210 ff. ; Geschl. Handelsst., I. 1 ; W., III. 400 ff.

2 Cf. G. Schmoller, Studie iiber J. G. Fichte in Hildebrand s Jahrb. f. Nat.

u. Stat., 1865 ; also W. Windelband, Fichte s Idee des deutschen Staates (Frei

burg, 1890).

3 Fichte, W., IV. 115.

CHAP. 2, 42.] System of Reason : Schelling. 597

when Schelling undertook to solve the other part of the problem and

took up in earnest the thought of constructing or deducing Nature

as the objective system of reason. According to the Science of

Knowledge and Kant s Philosophy of Nature this was possible only

if Nature could be successfully comprehended as a connected whole

of forces, having their ultimate end in a service toward the realisa

tion of the reason s command. The starting-point for this construc

tion was necessarily Kant s dynamic theory, which derived the

existence of matter from the relation of the forces of attraction and

repulsion (cf. 38, 7), and its goal was given by that manifestation

of Nature in which alone the practical reason evinces itself the

human organism. Between the two the whole wealth of Nature s

forms and functions must be spread out as a life in unity, whose

rational meaning was to be sought in the organic growth of the final

goal out of the material beginnings. Nature is the ego, or self, in

process of becoming this is the theme of Schelling s Philosophy

of Nature. This task, which had its basis in philosophical premises,

seemed at the same time set by the condition of natural science,

which had once again reached the point where scattered detail-work

craved a living conception of Nature as a whole. And this craving

asserted itself the more vigorously, as the progress of empirical

science gave little satisfaction to the highly pitched expectations

which had been set upon the principle of the mechanical explanation

of Nature after the seventeenth century. The derivation of the

organic from the inorganic remained, as Kant stated, problematical, to

say the least ; a genetic development of organisms on this basis

was a vexed question; for the theory of medicine, which was then

passing through a great movement, no key had as yet been found by

which it could be fitted into the mechanical conception of the world ;

now came, also, the discoveries of electric and magnetic phenomena,

for which at that time it could not be anticipated that it would be

possible to subsume their peculiar mysterious qualities under the

point of view of the Galilean mechanics. In contrast with this,

Spinoza had made his powerful impression upon the minds of men

just because he thought all Nature, man not excluded, as a con

nected unity, in which the divine Being manifests itself in all

its fulness, and for the development of German thought it became

of decisive importance that Goethe made this conception his own.

The poet, indeed, as we find it best expressed in his splendid apho

risms Die Natur, reinterpreted this view in his own way ; in the

stead of the " mathematical consequence " and its mechanical neces

sity he set the concrete idea of a living unity of Nature, in which the

Weltanschauung of the Renaissance was revived, though without a

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formulation in abstract thought. This poetic Spinozism l became an

essential link in the development of the idealistic systems.

All these motives come into play in Schelling s Philosophy of

Nature : as a result its central conception is life, and it makes the

attempt to consider Nature from the point of view of the organism,

and to understand the connection of its forces from the ultimate

end of the production of organic life. Nature is not to be described

and measured, but the meaning and significance which belong to its

particular phenomena in the purposeful system of the whole are to

be understood. The " categories of Nature " are the forms or shapes

in which the reason sets itself as objective to itself; they form a

system of development in which every particular phenomenon finds

its logically determined place. In carrying out this idea Schelling

was of course dependent upon the condition of the natural science

of his time. Of the connection of forces, of their transformation

into each other, which was the principal point of interest for his

purpose, ideas at that time were still very imperfect, and the

philosopher did not hesitate to fill out the gaps of knowledge by

hypotheses, which he took from the a priori construction of the

teleological system. In many cases these theories proved valuable

heuristic principles (cf. above, p. 566), in others they proved false

paths by which investigation could attain no useful results.

The element in the Philosophy of Nature, which is of historical

significance, is its opposition to the dominance of the Democritic-

Galilean principle of the purely mechanical explanation of Nature.

Quantitative determination is here again regarded as only external

form and appearance, and the causal mechanical connection as only

the mode of representation which conforms to the understanding.

The meaning of the structures of Nature is the significance which

they have in the system of the development of the whole. If, there

fore, Schelling turned his look toward the relationship of forms in

the organic world, if he used the beginnings of comparative mor

phology, in which Goethe played so important a role, in order to ex

hibit the unity of the plan which Nature follows in the succession of

animate beings, yet this connected system was not for him, or for

his disciples such as OJeen, properly a causal genesis in time, but the

expression of a gradually succeeding fulfilment of the end. In the

different orders of animate beings we see in separate forms, accord

ing to Oken, what Nature intends with the organism, and what she

first reaches completely in man. This teleological interpretation

1 It took Herder prisoner also, as is proved by his conversations on Spinoza s

system under the title Gott (1787).

CHAP. 2, 42.] System of Reason : Schelling, Goethe. 599

does not exclude a causal relation in time, but, with Schelling and

Oken at least, it does not include it. It is not their point to ask

whether one species has arisen from another; they only wish to

show that one is the preliminary stage for that which the other

accomplishes. 1

From this we can understand why the mechanical explanation of

Nature, which has again attained the victory in the nineteenth cen

tury, is wont to see in the period of the Philosophy of Nature, only

a fit of teleological excess, now happily overcome, which checked

the quiet work of investigation. But the chronicles of the contro

versy, which since the time of Democritus and Plato has filled the

history of the mode of conceiving Nature, are not yet closed, even

to-day. The reduction of the qualitative to the quantitative, which

presses forward victoriously under the flag of mathematics, has

repeatedly encountered the need which seeks behind motions in

space a reality of rational meaning. This felt need of a living con

tent of Nature Schelling s theory aimed to meet, and for this reason

the great poet, who endeavoured to demonstrate as the true reality

in the charming play of colours not a vibration of atoms, but a some

thing that is originally qualitative, felt drawn toward it. This is

the philosophical meaning of Goethe s " Theory of Colours."

With Schelling the system of Nature is ruled by the- thought that

in it the objective reason struggles upward from its material modes

of manifestation, through the multitude of forms and transforma

tions of forces, up to the organism in which it comes to conscious

ness. 2 Sensitive beings form the termination of the life of Nature ;

with sensation the system of the Science of Knowledge begins.

The devious way which Nature pursues to this goal is frequently

altered in details in the various remodellings which Schelling gave

to his Philosophy of Nature, but in its main outlines it remained

the same. In particular, it was the conception of duality, of the

opposition of forces which negate each other in a higher unity, that

formed the fundamental schema of his " construction of Nature," -

a conception due to the Science of Knowledge, and from this

point of view the polarity in electric and magnetic phenomena which

1 The " interpretation " of phenomena was, to be sure, a dangerous principle

from a scientific point of view ; it opened the gates of the Philosophy of Nature

to poetic fancy and brilliant flashes. These guests forced their way in even

with Schelling, but still more with his disciples, such as Novalis, Steffens, and

Schubert. In the case of Novalis especially we have a magical, dreamy sym

bolism of Nature in a play which is admirable in poetry but questionable in

philosophy.

2 The poetry of this fundamental thought was expressed in most character

istic form by Rebelling himself in the beautiful verses which are printed in

Sch^a Leben in Briefen, I. 28 2 ff.

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busied Schelling s contemporaries as a newly found enigma was

particularly significant for him.

4. When Schelling wished to place beside his Philosophy of

Nature an elaboration of his own of the Science of Knowledge,

under the name of " Transcendental Idealism," an important change

had taken place in the common thought of the Jena idealists, to

which he now gave the first systematic expression. The impetus

to this came from Schiller, and from the development which he had

given to the thoughts of the Critique of Judgment. It had become

plainer step by step that the system of reason must become perfected

for idealism in the aesthetic function, and in place of the ethical

idealism which the Science of Knowledge taught, and the physical

idealism which the Philosophy of Nature presented, appeared now

aesthetic idealism.

The re-shaping, so rich in results, which Kant s thoughts experi

enced through Schiller, by no means concerned merely the aesthetic

questions which lay nearest the poet, but likewise the ethical ques

tions and those pertaining to the history of philosophy, and there

with the whole system of reason. For Schiller s thoughts, even

before his acquaintance with Kant, as is shown among other

things by his poem, Die Kiinstler, had been turned to the prob

lem of the significance of art and the beautiful in the whole con

nected system of man s rational life and its historical development,

and by solving this problem with Kantian conceptions he gave to

the idealism of the Science of Knowledge a decisive turn.

This began with the new Forms which Schiller found for Kant s

conception of beauty. The synthesis of the theoretical and the

practical in the aesthetic reason (cf. 40, 2) could perhaps find no

more fortunate expression than in Schiller s definition of beauty as

freedom in phenomenal appearance. 1 It asserts that aesthetic con

templation apprehends its object without subjecting it to the rules

of the cognising understanding ; it is not subsumed under concep

tions, and we do not ask for the conditions which it has in other

phenomena. It is perceived as if it were free. Schopenhauer after

wards expressed this in the form that the enjoyment of the beautiful

is the contemplation of the object in independence of the principle

of sufficient reason. Schiller later laid still more weight upon the

point that the aesthetic process is as independent of the practical

reason as of the theoretical. The beautiful (in distinction from the

agreeable and the good) is as little an object of the sensuous as it

1 Cf. chiefly the letters to Korner of February, 1793, also the sketch on

"The Beautiful in Art," printed with the letter of the 20th of June of that

same year, all fragments of the dialogue Kallias which was not completed.

CHAP. 2, 42.] System of Reason : Schiller. 601

is of the moral impulse ; it lacks that quality of want or need which

belongs to the life of empirical impulse, just as it lacks the earnest

ness of the practical reason. In the aesthetic life the play impulse

unfolds itself ; \* every stirring of the will is silent in disinterested

contemplation. In this, too, Schiller was followed by Schopenhauer,

when the latter found the happiness of the aesthetic condition in the

overcoming of the unhappy will to live, in the activity of the pure,

willess subject of knowledge. 2

From this Schiller concluded in the first place that wherever we

have to do with educating man, subject to his sensuous nature, to a

condition where he shall will morally, the aesthetic life offers the

most effective means to this end. Kant had designated the " rever

sal of motives " as the ethical task of man (cf. above, 39, 6) ; for

the transition from the sensuous to the ethical determination of the

will he offered man, as an aid, religion; Schiller offered art. 3 Faith

and taste cause man to act legally, at least, when he is not yet ripe

for morality. In intercourse with the beautiful the feelings become

refined, so that natural rudeness vanishes, and man awakes to his

higher vocation. Art is the fostering soil for science and morality.

Such was the teaching of Schiller in the Artists ; his Letters

on the Esthetic Education of the Human Race go deeper. The

aesthetic condition, or state (Staat), because it is the completely

disinterested state, destroys the sensuous will, also, and thus makes

room for the possibility of the moral will ; it is the necessary point

of transition from the physical state, ruled by needs, into the moral

state. In the physical state man endures the power of Nature ; in

the aesthetic state he frees himself from it ; and in the moral state

he controls it.

But already in the Artists the beautiful had been assigned a

second higher task of ultimately giving also the culmination and

completion to moral and intellectual cultivation, and in building this

thought into the critical system the poet passes over from supple

menting to transforming the Kantian doctrine. The two sides of

human nature are not reconciled if the moral impulse is obliged to

overcome the sensuous impulse. In the physical and in the "moral"

state one side of human nature is always suppressed in favour of the

1 The attempt which Schiller makes in his Letters concerning uEthestic

Education (11 f.) to lay a basis for this in transcendental psychology remind

us strongly of the Reinhold-Fichte time when "Jena whirred with the buzz

of Form and Matter."

2 World as Will, etc., I. 36-38. In this connection Schopenhauer no

doubt claims the same value for scientific knowledge. Cf. 43, 4.

8 Cf. the conclusion of the essay, Ueber den moralischen Nutzen asthetischer

Sitten.

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other. We have a complete manhood only where neither of the two

impulses prevails over the other. Man is truly man, only where he

plays, where the war within him is silent, where his sensuous nature

is exalted to so noble a sentiment or sensibility that it is no longer

needful for him to will loftily. The Kantian rigorism holds where-

ever sensuous inclination stands over against duty : but there is the

higher ideal of the " schone Seele " the beautiful \*oul which does

not know this internal conflict because its nature is so ennobled that

it fulfils the moral law from its own inclination. And just this

ennobling is gained by man, only through aesthetic education.

Through it alone is the sensuous-supersensuous discord in human

nature abolished ; in it alone does complete, full manhood come to

realisation.

5. In the ideal of the " schone Seele " the " virtuosoship " of

Shaftesbury overcomes the Kantian dualism. The completion of

man is the aesthetic reconciliation of the two natures which dwell

within him ; culture is to make the life of the individual a work of

art, by ennobling what is given through the senses to full accord

with the ethical vocation. In this direction Schiller gave expres

sion to the ideal view of life characteristic of his time in antithesis

to the rigorism of Kant, and the aesthetic Humanism which he thus

wrested from abstract thought found besides his, a wealth of other

characteristic manifestations. In them all, however, Goethe appeared

as the mighty personality, who presented in living form this ideal

height of humanity in the aesthetic perfection of his conduct of life,

as well as in the great works of his poetic activity.

In this conception of the genius Schiller was first joined by Wil

liam von Humboldt. 1 He sought to understand the nature of great

poems from this point of view; he found the ideal of man s life in

the harmony of the sensuous and the moral nature, and in his treatise

which laid the foundations for the science of language 2 he applied

this principle by teaching that the nature of language is to be under

stood from the organic interaction of the two elements.

An attitude of sharper opposition to the Kantian rigorism had

already been taken, in the Shaftesbury spirit, by Jacobi in his

romance patterned after Goethe s personality, " Allw ill s Briefsamm-

lung." The moral genius also is " exemplary " ; he does not subject

himself to traditional rules and maxims, he lives himself out and

thereby gives himself the laws of his morality. This "ethical

Nature " is the highest that the circuit of humanity affords.

iBorn 1767, died 1835. Works, 7 vols. (Berlin, 1841 if.). Aside from

the correspondence, especially that with Schiller, cf. principally the ^Estheti-

schen Versuche (Brunswick, 1709). Also Kud. Haym, W. v. II. (Berlin, 1856).

2 Ueber die Kawi- Sprache (Berlin, 1836).

CHAP. J, 42.] System of Reason: Romanticists. 603

Among the Romantic School this ethical "geniality" in theory

and practice came to its full pride of luxuriant efflorescence. Here

it developed as an aesthetic aristocracy of culture in opposition to the

democratic utility of the Enlightenment morals. The familiar word

of Schiller s as to the nobility in the moral world was interpreted

to mean, that the Philistine, with his work ruled by general prin

ciples, has to perform his definite action determined by ends, while

the man of genius, free from all external determination by purposes

and rules, merely lives out his own important individuality as a

something valuable in itself, lives it out in the disinterested play

of his stirring inner life, and in the forms shaped out by his own

ever-plastic imagination. In his morals of genius, the sensibility

(Sinnlichlceit) in the narrowest significance of the word is to come

to its full, unstunted right, and by aesthetic enhancement is to become

equal in rank to the finest stirrings of the inner nature, a sublime

thought, which did not prevent its carrying out in Schlegel s Lu-

cinde from running out into sensual though polished vulgarity.

Schleiermachers ethics brought back the Romantic morals to the

purity of Schiller s intention. 1 It is the complete expression of the

life-ideal of that great time. All ethical action seems to it to be

directed toward the unity of Reason and Nature. By this is deter

mined in general the moral law, which can be none other than the

natural law of the reason s life ; by this is also determined in detail

the task of every individual, who is to bring this unity to expression

in a special way, proper only for him. In the systematic carrying-

out of this thought, Schleiermacher distinguishes (according to the

organic and the intellectual factors of intelligence, cf. 41, 6) the

organising and the symbolising activities, according as the unity

of Nature and Reason is procured by striving, or is presupposed,

and thus result in all four fundamental ethical relations, to which

correspond as goods, the state, society, the school, and the Church.

From these the individual has to develop in self-activity to a

harmonious life of his own.

Finally, Hefbart, also, reduced ethical theory to the aesthetic reason

in a completely independent manner; for him, morals is a branch

of general aesthetics. Besides the theoretical reason, which contains

the principles for knowledge of Being, he recognises as original only

the judging or estimation of the existent in accordance with cesthetic

Ideas. This estimation has to do with the will and the needs of

the empirical self as little as has the knowing activity ; "Judgments

of taste " hold necessarily and universally with direct self-evidence,

1 Cf. also Schleiermacher s Vertraute Briefe iiber die Lucinde (1800).

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and always refer to the relations in the existent: these have an

original pleasure or displeasure inherent in them. The application

of these principles to the narrower field of the aesthetic is only

indicated by Herbart : ethics, on the contrary, is regarded by him

as the science of the judgments of taste pronounced upon the rela

tions of human will. It has not to explain anything that is the

business of psychology ; it has only to settle the norms by which

the judgment mentioned above is passed. As such norms, Herbart

finds the five ethical Ideas, Freedom, Affection, Benevolence, Right,

and Equity, and according to these he seeks to arrange the sys

tems of the moral life, while for his genetic investigation he always

emplovs the principles of the associational psychology, and thus

in the statics and mechanics of the state undertakes to set forth

the mechanism of the movements of the will, by which the social

life of man is maintained.

6. From Schiller s aesthetic morals resulted, also, a philosophy of

history, which made the points of view of Rousseau and Kant appear

in a new combination. The poet unfolded this in an entirely char

acteristic manner in his essays on Na ive and Sentimental Poetry,

by gaining the fundamental aesthetic conceptions from bringing

forward historical antitheses, and constructing a general plan of

their movement. The different ages and the different kinds of poetry

are characterised, in his view, by the different relations sustained

by the spirit to the realm of Nature and the realm of Freedom.

As the " Arcadian " state, we have that where man does what is in

accordance with the moral order instinctively, without command

ment, because the antithesis of his two natures has not yet unfolded

in consciousness : as the Elysian goal, we have that full consumma

tion in which his nature has become so ennobled that it has again

taken up the moral law into its will. Between the two lies the

struggle of the two natures, the actual life of history.

Poetry, however, whose proper task it is to portray man, is every

where determined by these fundamental relations. If it makes the

sensuous, natural condition of man appear as still in harmonious

unity with his spiritual nature, then it is natoe; if, on the contrary,

it sets forth the contradiction between the two, if in any way it

makes the inconsistency between the reality and the ideal in man

appear, then it is sentimental, and may be either satirical or elegiac

or, also, in the form of the idyl. The poet who is himself Nature

presents Nature nai vely ; he who possesses her not has the senti

mental interest in her of calling back, as Idea in poetry, the Nature

that has vanished from life. The harmony of Nature and Reason

is given in the former, set as a task in the latter there as reality,

CHAP. 2, 4:2. ] Hyxtem of Reason : Schiller, Svhleyel. 005

here as ideal. This distinction between the poetic modes of feeling

is, according to Schiller, characteristic also for the contrast between

the ancient and the modern. The Greek feels naturally, the modern

man is sensible of Nature as a lost Paradise, as the sick man is

sensible of convalescence. Hence the ancient and nai ve poet gives

Nature as she is, without his own feelings ; the modern and senti

mental only in relation to his own reflection : the former vanishes

behind his object, as the Creator behind his works ; the latter shows

in the shaping of his material the power of his own personality

striving toward the ideal. There realism is dominant ; here ideal

ism ; and the last summit of art would be the union in which the

naive poet should set forth the sentimental material. So Schiller

sketched the form of his great friend, the modern Greek.

These principles were eagerly seized upon by the Romanticists.

Virtuosos of the reviewer s art, such as were the Schleyels, rejoiced

in this philosophical schema for criticism and characterisation, and

introduced it into their comprehensive treatment of the history of

literature. In this Frederick Schlegel gave Schiller s thoughts the

specifically romantic flavour, for which he knew how to use Fichtean

motifs with ready superficiality. While he designated the antithe

sis propounded by Schiller with the new names classic and romantic,

he remodelled it materially, also, by his doctrine of irony. The

classic poet loses himself in his material; the romantic poet hovers

as a sovereign personality above it ; he annuls matter by the form.

In going with his free fancy beyond the material which he posits,

he unfolds, in connection with it, merely the play of his genius,

which he limits in none of its creation. Hence the romantic poet

has a tendency to the infinite, toward the never complete: he him

self is always more than any of his objects, and just in this the

irony evinces itself. For the infinite doing of the ethical will, of

which Fichte taught, the Romanticist substitutes the endless play

of the fancy, which creates without purpose, and again destroys.

The elements in Schiller s doctrine that concern the philosophy

of history found their full development in Fichte, from whom they

borrowed much. As the result of their influence he allowed the

antitheses of his Wissenschaftslehre to become reconciled in the

aesthetic reason. Already in his Jena lectures on the Nature of

the Scholar, and in the treatment which the professional duties

of the teacher and the artist found in the "System of Ethics" we

hear these motifs ; in his Erlangen lectures they have become the

ruling theme. When he proceeded to draw the " Characteristics of

the Present Age, 1 he did it in the pithy lines of a construction of

universal history. As the first (" Arcadian") state of mankind

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appears that of rational instinct or instinctive reason (" Vernunftin-

stinct"), as the representatives of which a normal people is assumed.

In this age the universal consciousness is dominant over and in

individuals with immediate, uncontested certainty of natural neces

sity ; but it is the vocation of the free individual ego to tear himself

loose from this government of custom and tradition, and follow

his own impulse and judgment. With this, however, begins the

age of sinfulness. This sinfulness becomes complete in the intel

lectual and moral crumbling of social life, in the anarchy of opin

ions, in the atomism of private interests. With clear strokes this

" complete sinfulness " is characterised as the theory and practice of

the Enlightenment. The community of mankind has here sunk to

the state based upon needs" ("Nothstaat"), which is limited to

making it externally possible for men to exist together, and

ought to be so limited, since it has nothing to do with any of man s

higher interests, morality, science, art, and religion, and must

leave them to the sphere of the individual s freedom. But for this

reason the individual has no living interest in this "actual" state;

his home is the world, and perhaps also at any moment the state

which stands at the summit of civilisation. 1 This civilisation, how

ever, consists in the subordination of individuals to the known law

of reason. Out of the sinful, arbitrary free-will of individuals must

rise the autonomy of the reason, the self-knowledge and self-legisla

tion of the universally valid, which is now consciously dominant in

the individual. With this the age of the rule of reason will begin,

but it will not be complete until all the powers of the rationally

matured individual are placed at the service of the whole in the

"true state," and so the commandment of the common conscious

ness is again fulfilled without resistance. This ("Elysian") final

state is that of rational art or artistic reason ("Vernunftkunst").

It is the ideal of the " schone Seele " carried over to politics and

history. To bring about this age, and in it to lead the community,

the " kingdom," by reason, is the task of the " teacher," the scholar,

and the artist. 2

The " beginning of the rule of reason " Fichte s vigorous idealism

saw just where sinfulness and need had risen to the highest point.

In his "Addresses to the German Nation" he praised his people

1 The classical passage for the cosmopolitanism of the culture of the eighteenth

century is found in Fichte, W., VII. 212.

2 In the religious turn which Fichte s thought takes at the close, this picture

of the ideal civilised state of the future takes on more and more theocratic

features : the scholar and artist have now become the priest and seer. Cf. W.,

IV. 453 ff., and Nachgel. Werke, III. 417 ff.

CHAP. L&gt;, 42.] System of Reason: Fichte, Schelliny. 607

as the only one that still preserves its originality and is destined

to create the true civilised state. He cries to his people to bethink

itself of this its vocation, on which the fate of Europe is hanging,

to raise itself from within by a completely new education to the

kingdom of reason, and to give back freedom to the world.

7. The point of view of the aesthetic reason attained full mastery

in the whole system of the idealistic philosophy through Schelling.

In his working out of the " Transcendental Idealism " he developed

the Fichtean antithesis of the theoretical and practical Wissen-

schaftslehre by the relation between the conscious and unconscious

activity of the self (of. above, No. 2). If the conscious is de

termined by the unconscious, the self is theoretical ; in the reverse

case it is practical. But the theoretical self, which looks on at the

productiveness of the unconscious reason, manifested in feeling,

perceiving, and thinking, never comes to an end with this, and the

practical self, also, which re-shapes arid transforms the unconscious

reality of the cosmos in the free work of individual morality, of

political community, and of historical progress, has the goal of its

activity in the infinite. In neither series does the whole essential

nature of the reason ever come to its full realisation. This is

possible only through the unconscious-conscious activity of the artistic

genius, in which the above antitheses are abolished. In the un

designed appropriateness of the creative activity, whose product

is freedom in phenomenal appearance, the highest synthesis of all

activities of reason must be sought. Kant had defined genius as

the intelligence that works like Nature; Schiller had characterised

the aesthetic condition of play as the truly human; Schelling

declared the aesthetic reason to be the capstone of the idealistic

system. The work of art is that phenomenon in which the reason

attains purest and fullest development ; art is the true organon of

philosophy. It is in art that the "spectator thought" has to learn

what reason is. Science and philosophy are one-sided and never

completed series of the development of the subjective reason ; only

art is complete in all its works as entirely realised reason.

After he had written the Transcendental Idealism Schelling

delivered in Jena his lectures on the Philosophy of Art, which

carried out this fundamental thought with an intelligent apprecia

tion for artistic character and mode of production, that showed

admirable fineness and acuteness especially in its treatment of

poetry. These lectures, not printed at that time, determined the

whole subsequent development of aesthetics by their influence upon

the Jena circle. As published later they present that form which

Schelling gave them some years after, when delivering them in

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Wiirzburg. In this later form l the change in general point of view,

to which the philosopher had meanwhile advanced, asserts itself

still more.

8. The aesthetic motif was active also, at least formally, in that

a common systematic basis was sought for the Philosophy of Nature

and the Transcendental Philosophy. The former treated the objec

tive, the latter the subjective reason; the two, however, must be

indentical in their ultimate essence; whence this phase of idealism

is called the System of Identity (Identitdt- system). According to

this, a common principle is required for Nature and the self. In

the treatise which Schelling entitled - Exposition of my System

of Philosophy," this common principle is called the "Absolute

Reason" or the "Indifference of Nature and Spirit, of object and

subject"; for the highest principle can be determined neither as

real nor as ideal; in it all antitheses must be obliterated. The

"Absolute" is here as undetermined in its content, 2 with Schelling,

as in the old " negative theology," or as in Spinoza s " substance."

With the latter conception it has in common the property, that its

phenomenal manifestation diverges into two series, the real and the

ideal, Nature and Spirit or Mind. This kinship with Spinoza as

regards his thought, Schelling strengthened by formal relationship,

imitating in his Exposition the schematism of the Ethics.

Nevertheless this idealistic Spinozism is different throughout from

the original in its conception of the world. Both desire to set forth

the eternal transmutation of the Absolute into the universe; but

in this Spinoza regards the two attributes of materiality and con

sciousness as completely separate, and each finite phenomenon as

belonging solely to one of the two spheres. Schelling, however,

requires that "Reality" and "Ideality" must be contained in every

phenomenon, and construes particular phenomena according to the

degree in which the two elements are combined. The dialectical

principle of absolute idealism is the quantitative difference between the

real and the ideal factor -s ; the Absolute itself is just for this reason

complete indifference. 3 The real series is that in which the objective

factor predominates (" iiberwiegt"} ; it leads from matter through

light, electricity, and chemism to the organism the relatively

spiritual manifestation of Nature. In the ideal series the subjective

factor predominates. In it the development proceeds from morality

1 In the coll. works, V. 353 ff., first printed 1859.

2 Schelling s disciple, Oken, expressed this very characteristically when he

placed the Absolute, already called God by him, = 0.

3 Schelling illustrates this schematically by the example of the magnet, in

the different parts of which north and south magnetism are present with vary

ing intensities.

CHAP. 2, 42.] System of Reason : Schelling. 609

and science to the work of art, the relatively most natural appear

ance in the realm of Spirit. And the total manifestation of the

Absolute, the universe, is, therefore, at once the most perfect organ

ism and the most perfect work of art. 1

9. In this system Schelling would comprehend the entire issue of

the investigations which had previously diverged in various direc

tions. The different stages of the self-differentiation of the Absolute

he termed at first, " potencies," but soon introduced another name,

and at the same time another conception of the matter. This was

connected with the religious turn which the thinking of the Roman

ticists took at about the close of the last and the beginning of the

present century. The incitement to this came from Schleiennacher.

He proved to the " Cultured Despisers of Religion," that the system

of reason can become complete only in religion. In this, too, was a

victory for the aesthetic reason. For what Schleiennacher then

preached as religion (cf. 41, 6) was not a theoretical or practical

behaviour of man, but an aesthetic relation to the World-ground, the

feeling of absolute dependence. Therefore, religion, too, was in his

view limited to pious feeling, to the complete permeation of the ,

individual by this inward relation to the universal, and put aside all

theoretical form and practical organisation. For the same reason

religion was held to be an individual matter, and positive religion

was traced back to the "religious genius" of its founder. In view

of this kinship we can understand the influence which Schleier-

macher s " Reden " exercised upon Romanticism : to this is due the

inclination of the latter to expect from religion the unitary solution

of all problems of mankind, to desire to bring in it the separated

spheres of the activity of civilisation into inner and intimate union

again, and, finally, to seek the eternal welfare of all in that rule of

religion over all spheres of life, which obtained in the Middle

Ages. As Schiller created an idealised Greece, so the later Roman

ticists created an idealised Middle Ages.

Schelling followed this line of thought with great acuteness and

fineness of feeling. Like Spinoza, he now named the Absolute " God "

or the " Infinite," and likewise as Spinoza had inserted the attri

butes and the "infinite modes" (cf. p. 409 f.) between "substance " and

the particular finite realities, so the " potencies " are now regarded as

the eternal forms of the phenomenal manifestation of God, while

the empirical particular phenomena are the finite copies of these.

But when in this sense they were also termed by Schelling

Ideas (in his Bruno and in his Method of Academical Study)

1 W., I. 4, 423.

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another influence still comes to light in this. Schleiermacher and

Hegel, the latter of whom had exerted a personal influence upon

Schelling since 1801, both pointed to Plato; but the philosophical

knowledge of that time \* still saw Plato s doctrine through the spec

tacles of Neo-Platonism, which conceived of the Ideas as God s vision

or intuition of himself (Selbstanschauung Gottes). And so Schelling s

doctrine turned back into a Neo-Platonic Idealism, according to

which the "Ideas" formed the intermediate link through which

the Absolute became transformed into the world.

This religious idealism of Schelling s doctrine of Ideas has a

number of parallel and succeeding phenomena. The most interest

ing of these personally is Fichtes later doctrine, in which he paid to

the victory of Spinozism the tribute of making the infinite impulse

of the I proceed forth from an "absolute Being " (Sein) and be di

rected toward the same. For finite things, he held fast to his deduc

tion of them as products of consciousness ; but the infinite activity

of this consciousness he now deduced from the end of "imitating"

an absolute Being, the deity, and hence the vocation and destiny of

man appeared to him no longer the restless activity of categorical

imperative, but the " blessed life " of sinking into a contemplation

of the divine original, a mystical dying note of the mighty

thinker s life, which makes the victory of the aesthetic reason

appear in its full magnitude.

The religious motif was followed still farther by Schelling s dis

ciple Krause. He wished to combine the pantheistic Weltanschauung

of idealism, which Schelling even at that time still defended (in

Spinozistic fashion), with the conception of divine personality. He,

too, regards the world as the development of the divine " essence,"

which is distinctly stamped out in the Ideas ; but these ideas are

the intuition which the supreme personality has of himself. Essence

( Wesen) this is Krause s term for God is not indifferent Rea

son, but the personal, living ground of the world. In his farther

carrying out of the system, which was characterised as "Panen-

theisin," Krause has scarcely any other originality than the very

objectionable one of presenting the thoughts common to the whole

idealistic development in an unintelligible terminology, which he

himself invented, but declared to be pure German. He carries

out, especially, his conception of the entire life of reason from the

point of view of the " Gliedbau" (in German, organism). He not

only, like Schelling, regards the universe as a " Wesengliedbau "

1 On Herbart s independent position, the importance of which becomes clear

just in antithesis to that of Schelling and Hegel, see above, p. 584, note 1.

CHAP. 2, 42.] System of Reason : Krause, HegeL 611

(divine organism), but also regards the structures of society as

continuations of the organic vital movement beyond the individual

man ; every union (Band) is such a " Gliedbau," and inserts itself

again into a higher organism as a member (Glied), and the course

of history is the process of the production of more and more perfect

and comprehensive unions.

For the Romantic cesthetics, finally, Schelling s new doctrine gave

rise to the result that the Neo-Platonic conception of beauty, as

phenomenal manifestation of the Idea in the sensuous, became again

recognised as authoritative. The relation of inadequacy between

the finite appearance and the infinite Idea agreed with Schlegel s

principle of irony, and these thoughts Solyer, especially, made the

basis of his theory of art.

10. The consummation of this whole rich and varied development

is formed by Hegel s logical idealism. He signifies in the main

a return from Schelling to Fichte, a giving up of the thought that

the living wealth of the world can be derived or deduced from the

"Nothing" 1 of absolute indifference, and the attempt to raise this

empty substance again to spirit, 2 to the self-determined subject.

Such knowledge, however, cannot have the form of intuition or

immediate perception (Anschauuny) , which Fichte and Schelling

had claimed for the Ego or the Absolute, but only that of the con

ception or notion (Begrijf}. If all that is real or actual is the mani

festation of spirit or mind, then metaphysics coincides with the

logic 3 which has to develop the creative self-movement of spirit as

a dialectical necessity. The conceptions into which mind or spirit

takes apart and analyses its own content are the categories of reality,

the forms of the cosmic life ; and the task of philosophy is not to

describe this realm of forms as a given manifold, but to comprehend

them as the moments of a single unitary development. The dialec

tical method, therefore, serves, with Hegel, to determine the

essential nature of particular phenomena by the significance which

they have as members or links in the self-unfolding of spirit.

Instead of Spirit (Geist) Hegel also uses Idea or God. It is the

highest task that has ever been set philosophy, to comprehend the

world as a development of those principles or determinations which

form the content of the divine mind.

1 Hegel, Phdnomen. Vorr., W., II. 14.

2 [Geist, as in 20, has the connotation of both "mind" and spirit. "

The former seems more appropriate where logical relations are under considera

tion, though the latter is usually retained for the sake of uniformity.]

8 This metaphysical logic is of course not formal logic, but in its determining

principle is properly Kant s transcendental logic. The only difference is that

tin- " phenomenon " is for Kant a human mode of representation, tor Hegel oil

objective externalising of the Absolute Spirit.

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In this, Hegel sustains not only to the German philosophy, but to

the whole earlier intellectual movement, a relation similar to that

of Proclus to Greek thought : ! in the "schema of trinities " of Posi

tion, Negation, and Sublation or Reconciliation, all conceptions with

which the human mind lias ever thought reality or its particular

groups, are woven together into a unified system. Each retains its

assigned place, in which its necessity, its relative justification, is said

to become manifest : but each proves by this same treatment to be

only a moment or factor which receives its true value only when it

has been put in connection with the rest and introduced into the

whole. It is to be shown that the antitheses and contradictions of

conceptions belong to the nature of mind itself, and thus also to the

essential nature of the reality which unfolds from it, and that their

truth consists just in the systematic connection in which the cate

gories follow from one another. "The phenomenon is the arising

and passing away, which itself does not arise and pass away, but

is in-itself, and constitutes the reality and movement of the life

of truth." 2

Hegel s philosophy is, therefore, essentially historical, a systematic

elaboration of the entire material of history. He possessed both the

necessary erudition and also the combining power and fineness of

feeling for the discovery of those logical relations which were of

importance for him. The interest in his philosophy lies less in the

individual conceptions, which he took from the intellectual labours of

two thousand years, than in the systematic combination which he

brought about between them : and just by this means he knew how

to portray in masterly manner the meaning and significance of indi

vidual details, and to throw a surprising light upon long-standing

structures of thought. He, indeed, displayed in connection with

his data the arbitrariness (Willkiir) of [a priori ] constructive thought,

which presents the actual reality, not as it offers itself empirically, but

as it ought to be in the dialectical movement, and this violation of the

actual matter of fact might be objectionable where the attempt was

made to bring empirical material into a philosophical system, as in

the philosophy of Nature, the history of philosophy, and history in

general. All the more brilliant did the power of the thinking sat

urated by the historical spirit prove in those fields where it is the

express province of philosophical treatment, merely to reflect on

\* Cf. above, 20, 8.

2 This Heracliteanism, which was inherent already in Fichte s doctrine of

action (cf. above, p. 594 f.), found its most vigorous opponent in Herbart s

Eleaticism (cf. 41, 7 f.)- This old antithesis constitutes the essential element

in the relation of the two branches of German idealism (cf. above, p. 584, note).

CHAP. 2, 42.] Syxtem of Reason : Heyel. (&gt;13

undoubted data, but not to give any account of empirical reality.

So Hegel gave as aesthetics a historical structure built up of the

aesthetic ideals of mankind. Following Schiller s method, and attach

ing himself also materially to Schiller s results, he displayed all the

fundamental systematic conceptions of this science in the well-

arranged series of the symbolic, the classic, and the romantic, and

likewise divided the system of the arts into architecture, sculpture,

painting, music, and poetry. So, too, from the fundamental concep

tion of religion as being the relation of the finite to the absolute

Spirit in the form of imaginative representation (Vorstellung) his

philosophy of religion develops the stages of its positive realisation

in the natural religion of magic, fire worship, and animal symbolism,

in the religion of spiritual individuality of the sublime, the beautiful,

and the intellectual, and finally in the absolute religion which repre

sents God as what he is, the triune Spirit. Here, with a deep-going

knowledge of his material, Hegel has everywhere drawn the main

lines in which the empirical treatment of these same subjects later

moved, and set up the philosophical categories for the general con

sideration of historical facts as a whole.

The same is true, also, of his treatment of universal history.

Hegel understood by Objective Spirit the active and influential living

body of individuals, which is not created by these, but rather forms

the source from which they proceed as regards their spiritual life.

The abstract form of this body is called Right; 1 it is the Objective

Spirit " in itself." The subjection of the subjective disposition of

the individual to the commands of the common consciousness the

philosopher calls "morality," while he retains the name of " Sittlich-

keit " [social morality or the moral order] for the realisation of the

common consciousness in the State. In the immanent living activity

of the human reason the state is the highest ; beyond this are only

art, religion, and science, which press forward to the Absolute

Spirit. The state is the realisation of the ethical Idea ; it is the

spirit of the people become visible ; it is in its Idea the living work

of art, in which the inwardness of the human reason comes forth

into outer manifestation. But this Idea, from which the system of

the forms and functions of political life derives, appears in the

actual world only in the individual structures of the states which

arise and pass away. Its only true and full realisation is universal

history, in which the peoples enter successively, to live out their

spirit in the work of state formation, and then retire from the stage.

1 Hence Hegel treats the doctrine of Objective Spirit under the title Philoso

phy of Right (Rechtuphilosophie}.

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So every epoch is characterised by the spiritual predominance of a

definite people, which imprints the sign of its peculiar character

upon all the activities of civilisation. And if it is the task of his

tory as a whole to understand this connected order, then politics, too,

must not suppose that it can construct and decree a political life

from abstract requirements; it must, rather, seek in the quiet

development of the national spirit the motives of its political move

ment. So in Hegel, the "Philosopher of the Restoration," the

historical Weltanschauung turns against the revolutionary doctrinair-

ism of the Enlightenment.

Hegel is less successful in the treatment of questions of natural

philosophy and psychology ; the energy of his thought lies in the

domain of history. The external scheme of his system, as a whole,

is in large the following: the Spirit in itself (Geist an sich), i.e. in

its absolute content, is the realm of the categories ; this is treated

by the Logic as the doctrine of Being, of Essence, and of Concep

tion or Notion. Spirit for itself (Geist fur sich), i.e. in its otherness

and self-estrangement or externalisation, is Nature, the forms of

which are treated in Mechanics, Physics, and Organics. The third

main part treats, as Philosophy of Spirit, the Spirit in and for itself

(an und fur sich), i.e. in its conscious life as returning to itself;

here three stages are distinguished, viz. the Subjective (individual)

Spirit ; the Objective Spirit as Right, Morality, State, and History ;

finally, the Absolute Spirit as pure perception (Anschauung) in

Art, as imaginative representation ( Vorstellung) in Religion, as

conception (Begriff) in the History of Philosophy.

He repeats, in all these parts of his philosophy, not only the

formal dialectic of the construction of his conceptions, but also

the material which constitutes the contents of the successive con

ceptions. So the Logic in its second and third parts develops

already the fundamental categories of the Philosophy of Nature

and of Spirit ; so the development of the aesthetic ideals constantly

points toward that of the religious Vorstellungen ; and so the whole

course of the Logic is parallel to his History of Philosophy. Just

this relation belongs to the essential nature of the system of reason,

which here embraces not only, as with Kant, the Forms, but also

the content, and aims to unfold before its view this content in the

variety of the " forms of the actual world of reality," although this

content is ultimately everywhere the same with itself. The course

of development is always the same, viz. that the " Idea," by dif

ferentiating and becoming at variance with itself, "comes to itself."

Hence the categories progress from the Being which has no content

to the inner Essence, and from there to the Idea which understands

CIIAI-. -J, 43.] Metaphysics of the Irrational. 615

itself ; hence the forms of the empirical world ascend from matter

to the imponderables, then to the organism, consciousness, self-

consciousness, reason, right, morality, and the social morality of the

state, successively, to apprehend the Absolute Spirit in art, religion,

and science; hence the history of philosophy begins with the cate

gories of material existence, and becomes complete after all its

fortunes in the doctrine of the self-comprehending Idea ; hence,

finally, the entrance into this "system of the reason," also, will best

be found by making it clear to one s self how the human mind

begins with the sensuous consciousness, and by the contradictions

of this is driven to an ever higher and deeper apprehension of itself,

until it finds its rest in philosophical knowledge, in the science of

the conception. The inter-relation of all these developments Hegel

has set forth with obscure language and many mysterious and

thoughtful intimations, in his Phenomenology.

In this system of reason every particular has its truth and reality

only in its being a moment in the development of the whole. Only

as such is it real in concreto, and only as such is it comprehended

by philosophy. But if we take it abstractly, if we think it in its

isolation, in which it exists not realiter, but only according to the

subjective apprehension of the understanding, then it loses that

connection with the whole, in which its truth and actual reality

consists : then it appears as accidental and without reason. But

as such, it exists only in the limited thinking of the individual

subject. For philosophical knowledge, the principle holds, that

what is reasonable is real, and what is real is reasonable. 1 The

System of Reason is the sole reality.

### 43. The Metaphysics of the Irrational.

The "dialectic of history" willed it that the System of Reason

should also change into its opposite, and that the insight into the

insurmountability of the barriers which the attempt to deduce all

phenomena from one fundamental principle necessarily encounters,

caused other theories to arise close beside the idealistic doctrines

already treated ; and these other theories found themselves thereby

forced to maintain the unreason of the World-ground. The first to

pass through this process was the many-sided agent of the main

development, the Proteus of idealism, Schelling. The new in this

movement is not the knowledge that the rational consciousness

always has ultimately something for its content, which it simply

1 Vorrede zur Rechtsphilos., W., VIII. 17.

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finds present within itself, without being able to give any account

of it : such limiting conceptions were the transcendental X as thing-

in-itself, with Kant ; as differential of consciousness, with Maimon ;

as a free act without rational ground, in Fichte. The new was,

that this which could not be comprehended by the reason, and

which resisted its work, was now also to be thought as something

irrational.

1. Schelling was forced upon the path of irrationalism, remarka

bly enough, by taking up the religious motif into his absolute ideal

ism ( 42, 9). If "the Absolute" was thought no longer merely

in Spinozistic fashion, as the universal, indifferent essence of all

phenomena, if the divine and the natural principle of things were

distinguished, so that the eternal Ideas as the Forms of the divine

self-perception were assigned a separate existence beside finite things,

then the transmutation of God into the world must again become a

problem. This was really Hegel s problem also, and the latter was

right when he taught later that, in his view, philosophy has the same

task as theology. He aided himself with the dialectical method

which aimed to show in the form of a higher logic, how the Idea

agreeably to its own conceptional essence releases itself to " other

ness" (Anderssein), i.e. to Nature, to finite phenomenal appearance.

Schelling sought to solve the same problem by the method of

theosopliy, i.e. by a mystico-speculative doctrine, which transposed

philosophical conceptions into religious intuitions. His happening

upon this method was due to the fact that the problem met him in

the form of an attempt to limit philosophy by religion. He obligated

himself, in a vigorous reaction against this in the name of philoso

phy, to solve the religious problem also. This, indeed, could only

be done if philosophy passed over into theosophical speculations.

A disciple of the System of Identity, Eschenmayer, 1 showed that

philosophical knowledge can indeed point out the reasonableness of

the world, and its agreement with the divine reason, but cannot show

how this world attains the self-subsistent existence with reference

to the deity, which it has in finite things. Here philosophy ceases

and religion begins. In order to vindicate this domain also for

philosophy, and restore the old unity between philosophy and relig

ion, Schelling lays claim to specifically religious intuitions as philo

sophical conceptions, and so re-shapes them in accordance with this

claim that they appear usable for both disciplines : in doing which

he makes a copious use of Kant s philosophy of religion.

1 Eschenmayer (1770-1852), Die Philosophic in ihrem Ueberganye zur Nicht-

(1803).

CHAP. 2, 43.] Metaphysics of the Irrational : Schelling. 617

In fact, 1 there is no continuous transition from the Absolute to

the concrete reality; the origin of the world of sense from God is

thinkable only by a leap (Sprung), a breaking off from the condition

of absoluteness. A ground for this Schelling still teaches here

is to be found neither in the Absolute nor in the Ideas : but in the

nature of the latter the possibility at least is given. For to the

Ideas as the " antitype " or counterpart of the Absolute, in which it

beholds itself, the self-subsistence of the archetype communicates

itself, the freedom of that which is in itself ("Li-sich-selbst-seins").

In this lies the possibility of the falling away of the Ideas from God,

of their assuming metaphysical independence, by which they become

actual and empirical, i.e. finite. But this falling away is not neces

sary and not comprehensible: it is a fact without rational ground;

not, however, a single event, but as timeless and eternal as the Abso

lute and the Ideas. We see that the religious colouring of this doc

trine comes from Kant s theory of the radical evil as a deed of the

intelligible character, while the philosophical, on the contrary, comes

from Fichte s conception of the free acts of the ego, which have no

rationale. On this apostasy, therefore, rests the actualisation of the

Ideas in the world. Hence the content of the actual reality is rational

and divine ; for it is God s Ideas that are actual in it : their being

actual, however, is apostasy, sin, and unreason. This reality of the

Ideas external to God is Nature. But its divine essence strives back

to the original ground and archetype, and this return of things into

God is history, the epic composed in the mind of God, whose Iliad

is the farther and farther departure of man from God, and whose

Odyssey is his return to God. Its final purpose is the reconciliation

of the apostasy, the reuniting of the Ideas with God, the cessation of

their self-subsistence. Individuality also experiences this change

of fortunes : its self ness (Ichheit) is intelligible freedom, self-deter

mination breaking loose from the Absolute: its deliverance is a

submergence in the Absolute.

In similar manner Frederick Schlegel 2 made the "triplicity" of

the infinite, the finite, and the return of the finite to the infinite,

the principle of his later theory, which professed to maintain the

contradictions of the actual as a fact, to explain them from the

fall, and to reconcile them through subjection to divine revelation ;

but merely concealed, with great pains, the philosophical impotence

of its author under the exposition employed.

1 Rebelling, Religion und Philosophic, W., I. 6, pp. 38 ff.

2 In the Philosophise/1 e Vorlesnngen, edited by Windischmann (1804-1806),

and likewise later in the Philosophic des Lebens and the Philosophic der

Geschichte (1828-1829).

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2. The subtlety of Schelling, on the contrary, could not free itself

from the once-discovered problem. The monism, which had always

controlled his thought, forced him to the question, whether the

ground of the falling away was not ultimately to be found in the

Absolute itself: and this could be affirmed only if the irrational

was transferred to the essence of the Absolute itself. From the point

of view of this thought, Schelling became friendly to the mysticism

of Jacob Boehme (cf. p. 374 f.). This was brought near to him by

his intercourse with Franz von Baader. The latter himself had

received his stimulus both from Boehme and from Boehme s French

prophet St. Martin, 1 and, holding fast to the Catholic faith, had

elaborated his mysticism with obscure fantastic genius and un

methodical appropriation of Kantian and Fichtean thoughts. The

original idea that stirred within him was, that the course of the

life of man, who is the image of God, and who can know of himself

only so much as God knows of him, must be parallel to the self-

development of God. Since, now, man s life is determined by the

fall as its beginning and redemption as its goal, the eternal self-

generation of God must consist in God s unfolding himself out of

his dark, irrational, primitive essence, through self-revelation and

self-knowledge, to absolute reason.

Under such influences Schelling also began in his treatise 2 on

freedom (1809) to speak of an Urgrund, Ungrund, or Abgrund [pri

mordial ground, unreason, or abyss] in the divine nature, which is

depicted as mere Being, and absolute primordial accident (" Urzu-

fall"), as a dark striving, an infinite impulse. It is the uncon

scious will, and all actual reality is in the last instance will. This

will, directed only toward itself, creates as its self-revelation the

Ideas, the image in which the will beholds itself the reason.

Out of the interaction of the ever dark and blind urgency and its

ideal self-beholding proceeds the world, which as Nature permits

us to recognise the conflict between purposive formation and irra

tional impulse, and as historical process has for its content the

victory of the universal will revealed in reason, over the natural

1 St. Martin (1743-1803), " Le philosophe inconnu," the stern opponent of

the Enlightenment and of the Revolution, was seized through and through by

Boehme s teachings, and translated his Aurora. Of his writings, the most

important are L 1 Homme de Desir (1790), Le Nouvel Homme (179(5), and De

V Esprit de.s Chases (1801) ; the most interesting perhaps is the strange work,

Le Crocodile, on guerre, du bien et du mal arrive.e. sons la refine, de Louis XV.,

poeme epicomagique (1799). Cf. A. Franck, La Philoxophii- Mystique en France

(Paris, 18(i6) ; also v. Osten-Sacken, Fr. Baader und St. Martin (Leips. 1800).

2 This later doctrine of Schelling s is accordingly usually called the Doctrine

of Freedom, as the earlier is called the System of Identity. Sclielliug, Unters.

iiber die Freiheit, W., I. 7, 376.

CHAP. L&gt;, 43.] Metaphysics of the Irrational : Schelling. 619

unreason of the particular will. In this way the development of

the actual leads from the unreason of the primordial will (deus

implicit UK) to the self-knowledge and self-determination of reason

( deus explicit us). 1

3. Thus at last religion became for Schelling the "organon of phil

osophy," as art had been earlier. Since the process of God s self-

development goes on in the revelations, with which in the human

mind he beholds himself, all momenta of the divine nature must

appear in the succession of ideas which man in his historical

development has had of God. Hence in the Philosophy of Mythol

ogy and Revelation, the work of Schilling s old age, the knowledge

of God is gained from the history of all religions: in the progress

from the natural religions up to Christianity and its different forms

the self-revelation of God makes its way from dark primordial will

to the spirit of reason and of love. God develops or evolves in

and by revealing himself to men. 2

In its methodical form this principle reminds us strongly of

Hegel s conception of the history of philosophy, in which "the Idea

comes to itself," and the happy combination and fineness of feeling

with which Schelling has grouped and mastered the bulky material

of the history of religions in these lectures shows itself throughout

akin and equal in rank to the Hegelian treatment. But the funda

mental philosophical conception is yet entirely different. Schelling

terms the standpoint of this his latest teaching, metaphysical em

piricism. His own earlier system and that of Hegel he now calls

negative philosophy : this philosophy may indeed show that if God

once reveals himself, he does it in the forms of natural and historical

reality which are capable of dialectical a priori construction. But

that he reveals himself and thus transmutes himself into the world,

dialectic is not able to deduce. This cannot be deduced at all ; it is

only to be experienced, and experienced from the way in which God

reveals himself in the religious life of mankind. To understand from

this process God and his self-evolution into the world is the task of

positive philosophy.

Those who both immediately and later derided Schelling s Phil

osophy of Mythology and Revelation as " Gnosticism " scarcely

knew, perhaps, how well founded the comparison was. They had

in mind only the fantastic amalgamation of mythical ideas with

philosophical conceptions, and the arbitrariness of cosmogonic and

theogonic constructions. The true resemblance, however, consists

1 Cf. above, p. 2!&gt;o f.

2 Cf. Constantin Frantz, Schelling s Positive Philosophic (Cothen, 1879 f.).

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in this, that as the Gnostics gave to the warfare of religions, in the

midst of which they were standing, the significance of a history of

the universe and the divine powers ruling in it, so now Schelling

set forth the development of human ideas of God as the develop

ment of God himself.

4. Irrationalism came to its full development in Schopenhauer by

the removal of the religious element. The dark urgency or instinct

directed only toward itself appears with him under the name of

the will to live, as the essence of all things, as the thing-iu-itself

(of. 41, 9). In its conception, this will, directed only towards

itself, has a formal resemblance to Fichte s "infinite doing," just as

was the case with Schlegel s irony (cf. 42, 5) : but in both cases

the real difference is all the greater. The activity directed solely

toward itself is with Fichte the autonomy of ethical self-determina

tion, with Schlegel the arbitrary play of fancy, with Schopenhauer

the absolute unreason of an objectless will. Since this will only

creates itself perpetually, it is the never satisfied, the unhappy will :

and since the world is nothing but the self-knowledge (self-revelation

objectification) of this will, it must be a world of misery and

suffering.

Pessimism, thus grounded metaphysically, is now strengthened

by Schopenhauer T by means of the hedonistic estimate of life itself.

All human life flows on continually between willing and attaining.

But to will is pain, is the ache of the "not-yet-satisfied." Hence

pain is the positive feeling, and pleasure consists only in the removal

of a pain. Hence pain must preponderate in the life of will under

all circumstances, and actual life confirms this conclusion. Compare

the pleasure of the beast that devours with the torture of the one

that is being devoured and you will be able to estimate with

approximate correctness the proportion of pleasure and pain in the

world in general. Hence man s life always ends in the complaint,

that the best lot is never to be born at all.

If life is suffering, then only sympathy can be the fundamental

ethical feeling (cf. 41, 9). The individual will is immoral if it

increases the hurt of another, or also if it is merely indifferent

toward it ; it is moral if it feels another s hurt as its own and seeks

to alleviate it. From the standpoint of sympathy Schopenhauer

gave his psychological explanation of the ethical life. But this

alleviation of the hurt is only a palliative ; it does not abolish the

will, and with the will its unhappiness persists. " The sun burns

perpetual noon." The misery of life remains always the same ;

i World as Will and Idea, I. 56 ff. ; II. ch. 46 ; Parerc/a, II. oh. 11 f.

CHAP. 2, 4;}.] Metaphysics of the Irrational : Schopenhauer. 621

only the form in which it is represented in idea alters. The special

shapes change, but the content is always the same. Hence there

can be no mention of a progress in history ; intellectual perfecting

alters nothing in the will which constitutes the essential nature of

man. History shows only the endless sorrow of the will to live,

which with an ever-new cast of characters constantly presents the

same tragi-comedy before itself. 1 On this ground the philosophy of

Schopenhauer has no interest in history ; history teaches only indi

vidual facts ; there is no rational science of it.

A deliverance from the wretchedness of the will would be possible

only through the negation or denial of the will itself. But this is

a mystery. For the will, the tv KOL TTO.V the one and all the only

Real, is indeed in its very nature self-affirmation ; how shall it deny

itself ? But the Idea of this deliverance is present in the mystical

asceticism, in the mortification of self, in the contempt of life and

all its goods, and in the peace of soul that belongs to an absence

of wishes. This, Schopenhauer held, is the import of the Indian

religion and philosophy, which began to be known in Europe about

his time. He greeted this identity of his teaching with the oldest

wisdom of the human race as a welcome confirmation, and now

called the world of idea the veil of Maia, and the negation of the

will to live the entrance into Nirvana. But the unreasonable will

to live would not let the philosopher go. At the close of his work

he intimates that what would remain after the annihilation of the

will, and with that, of the world also, would be for all those who

are still full of will, certainly nothing ; but consideration of the life

of the saints teaches, that while the world with all its suns and

milky ways is nothing to them, they have attained blessedness and

peace. " In thy nothing I hope to find the all."

If an absolute deliverance is accordingly impossible, were it

ever possible, then in view of the ideality of time there could be no

world whatever of the affirmation of the will, there is yet a rela

tive deliverance from sorrow in those intellectual states in which

the pure willess subject of knowing is active, viz. in disinterested

contemplation and disinterested thought. The object for both of

these states he finds not in particular phenomena, but in the eternal

1 Hence the thought of grafting the optimism of the Hegelian development

system on this will-irrationalism of Schopenhauer s after the pattern of Schel-

ling s Doctrine of Freedom was as mistaken as the hope of reaching speculative

results by the method of inductive natural science. And with the organic

combination of the two impossibilities, even a thinker so intelligent and so deep

and many-sided in his subtle investigations as Edward von Hartmann, could

have only the success of a meteor that dazzles for a brief period (Die Philoso

phic, des Unbewussten, Berlin, 1869) [Eng. tr. The Philosophy of the. Unconscious,

by E. C. Coupland, Loud. 1884].

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Forms of the objectification of the will the Ideas. This Platonic

(and Schellingian) element, however (as is the case also with the

assumption of the intelligible character), fits with extreme difficulty

into Schopenhauer s metaphysical system, according to which all

particularising of the will is thought as only an idea in space and

time ; but it gives the philosopher opportunity to employ Schiller s

principle of disinterested contemplation in the happiest mariner to

complete his theory of life. The will becomes free from itself

when it is able to represent to itself in thought its objectification

without any ulterior purpose. The misery of the irrational World-

will is mitigated by morality ; in art and science it is overcome.

# PART VII. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

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tingen, 1898.

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1896.]

The history of philosophical principles is closed with the develop

ment of the German systems at the boundary between the eighteenth

and the nineteenth centuries. A survey of the succeeding development

in which we are still standing to-day has far more of literary -his

torical than of properly philosophical interest. For nothing essen

tially and valuably new has since appeared. The nineteenth century

is far from being a philosophical one ; it is, in this respect perhaps,

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to be compared with the third and second centuries B.C. or the four

teenth and fifteenth A.D. To speak in Hegel s language, one might

say that the Weltgeist of our time, so busy with the concrete reality

and drawn toward the outer, is kept from turning inward and to

itself, and from enjoying itself in its own peculiar home. 1 The

philosophical literature of the nineteenth century is, indeed, exten

sive enough, and gives a variegated play of all the colours ; the seed of

Ideas, which has been wafted over to us from the days of the flower of

the intellectual life, has grown luxuriantly in all spheres of science

and public life, of poetry and of art ; the genniiiaiit thoughts of history

have been combined in an almost immeasurable wealth of changing

combinations into many structures of personally impressive detail,

but even men like Hamilton and Comte, like Rosmini and Lotze,

have their ultimate significance only in the energy of thought and

fineness of feeling with which they have surveyed the typical con

ceptions and principles of the past, and shaped them to new life and

vigour. And the general course of thought, as indicated by the

problems which interest and the conceptions that are formed in our

century, 2 moves along the lines of antitheses that have been trans

mitted to us through history, and have at most been given a new

form in their empirical expression.

For the decisive factor in the philosophical movement of the

nineteenth century is doubtless the question as to the degree of

importance which the natural-science conception of phenomena may

claim for our view of the world and life as a whole. The influence

which this special science had gained over philosophy and the

intellectual life as a whole was checked and repressed at the begin

ning of the nineteenth century, to grow again afterwards with all

the greater power. The metaphysics of the seventeenth, and there

fore the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, were in the main

under the dominance of the thinking of natural science. The con

ception of the universal conformity to law on the part of all the

actual world, the search for the simplest elements and forms of

occurrence and cosmic processes, the insight into the invariable

necessity which lies at the basis of all change, these determined

theoretical investigation. The "natural" was thus made a general

standard for measuring the value of every particular event or expe-

1 Hegel, Berliner Antrittsrede, W., VI., XXXV.

2 To the literary-historical interest in this field, which is so hard to master

on account of its multiplicity, the author has been devoting the labor of many

years. The product of this he is now permitted to hope soon to present as

special parts of the third (supplementary) volume of his Gfeschichte der neueren

Philosophie (2d ed. Leips. 1899). In this can be carried out in detail and

proved what here can only be briefly sketched.

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rience. The spread of this mechanical way of regarding the world

was met by the German Philosophy with the fundamental thought,

that all that is known in this way is but the phenomenal form and

vehicle of a purposefully developing inner world, and that the true

comprehension of the particular has to determine the significance

that belongs to it in a purposeful connected whole of life. The

historical Weltanschauung was the result of the work of thought

which the System of Reason desired to trace out.

These two forces contend with each other in the intellectual life

of our century. And in the warfare between them all arguments

from the earlier periods of the history of philosophy have been pre

sented in the most manifold combinations, but without bringing any

new principles into the field. If the victory seems gradually to

incline toward the side of the principles of Democritus, there are

two main motifs favourable to this in our decades. The first is of

essentially intellectual nature, and is the same that was operative

in the times of intellectual life of previous centuries : it is the

simplicity and clearness to perception or imagination (anschauliche

Einfachheif), the certainty and definiteness of the natural-science

knowledge. Formulated mathematically and always demonstrable

in experience, this promises to exclude all doubt and opinions, and

all trouble of interpretative thought. But far more efficient in our

day is the evident utility of natural science. The mighty trans

formation in the external relations of life, which is taking place

with rapid progress before our eyes, subjects the intellect of the

average man irresistibly to the control of the forms of thought to

which he owes such great things, and on this account we live under

the sign of Baconianism (cf. above, p. 386 f.).

On the other hand, the heightened culture of our day has kept

alive and vital all questions relating to the value which the social

and historical life has for the individual. The more the political

and social development of European humanity has entered upon the

epoch when the influences of masses make themselves felt in an

increasing degree, and the more pronounced the power with which

the collective body asserts its influence upon the individual, even

in his mental and spiritual life, the more does the individual make

his struggle against the supremacy of society, and this also finds

expression in the philosophic reflections of the century. The con

test between the views of the world and of life which spring respec

tively from history and from natural science, has gone on most

violently at the point where the question will ultimately be decided,

in what degree the individual owes what makes his life worth living

to himself, and in what degree he is indebted to the influences of the

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environing whole. Uuiversalism and individualism, as in the time

of the Renaissance, have once more clashed in violent opposition.

If we are to bring out from the philosophical literature of this

century and emphasise those movements in which the above charac

teristic antithesis has found its most important manifestation, we

have to do primarily with the question, in what sense the psychical

life can be subjected to the methods and concepts of natural science;

for it is in connection with this point that the question must first be

decided of the right of these methods and concepts to absolute sov

ereignty in philosophy. For this reason the question as to the task,

the method, and the systematic significance of psychology has never

been more vigorously contested than in the nineteenth century, and

the limitation of this science to a purely empirical treatment has

appeared to be the only possible way out of the difficulties. Thus

psychology, as the latest among the special disciplines, has com

pleted its separation from philosophy, at least as regards the funda

mental principles of its problem and method.

This procedure had more general presuppositions. In reaction

against the highly strained idealism of the German philosophy, a

broad stream of materialistic Weltanschauung flows through the nine

teenth century. This spoke out about the middle of the period, not

indeed with any new reasons or information, but with all the more

passionate emphasis. Since then it has been much more modest in

its claims to scientific value, but is all the more effective in the garb

of sceptical and positivist caution.

To the most significant ramifications of this line of thought

belongs without doubt the endeavour to regard the social life, the

historical development, and the relations of mental and spiritual exist

ence, from the points of view of natural science. Introduced by the

unfortunate name of Sociology, this tendency has sought to develop

a peculiar kind of the philosophy of history, which aims to extend

upon a broader basis of fact the thoughts which were suggested

toward the close of the philosophy of the Enlightenment (see 37).

But on the other hand, the historical view of the world has not

failed to exercise its powerful influence upon natural science. The

idea of a history of the organic world, which was postulated in the

philosophy of nature, early in the century, has found a highly

impressive realization in empirical investigation. The methodical

principles, which had led to the philosophy of Nature, extended as

if spontaneously to other fields, and in the theories of evolution the

historical and the scientific views of the world seem to approximate

as closely as is possible without a new philosophic idea, which shall

reshape and reconstruct.

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From the side of the individual, finally, the suggestions which

were inherent in the problem of civilization as this was treated by

the eighteenth century, temporarily brought the question as to the

worth of life into the centre of philosophic interest. A pessimistic

temper had to be overcome in order that from these discussions the

deeper and clearer question as to the nature and content of values in

general should be separated and brought to clear recognition. And

so it was that philosophy, though by a remarkably devious path, was

enabled to return to Kant s fundamental problem of values which

are universally valid.

From the philosophical literature of the nineteenth century the following

main points may be emphasized :

In France Ideology divided into a more physiological and a more psycho

logical branch. In the line of Cabanis worked principally the Paris physicians,

such as Ph. Pinel (1745-182(5; Nosographie Philosophique, 17!&gt;8), F. ,T. V.

Broussais (1772-1838; Traite de Physiologic, 1822 f. ; Traite de, V Irritation

et de, In Folie, 1828), and the founder of Phrenology, Fr. Jos. Gall (1758-1828 ;

llecherches sur le. tiysteme Nerveux en general et snr celni (hi Cerveau en parti-

culier, 180!), which was edited in conjunction with Spurzheim). The an-

titliesis to tliis, physiologically, was formed by the school of Montpellier :

Barthez (17:54-180(5 ; Nouveaux Elements de la Science de VHomme, 2d ed.,

180(5). Associated with this school were M. F. X. Bichat (1771-1802;

Recherches Physiologiques sur la Vie et la Mort, 1800). Bertrand (179" ; -1831 ;

Traite du Somnamlmlisme, 1823), and Buisson (170(i-1805 ; De la Division

la plus Naturelle des Phenomenes 1 hysiologiqiies, 1802). Corresponding to

this was the development of Ideology with Daube (Essai a" Ideologic, Ib03),

and especially with Pierre Laromiguiere (175(5-1837 ; Lemons de Philosophic,

1815-1818) and his disciples, Fr. Thurot (17(58-1832; De V Entendement et de,

la liaison, 1830) and J. J. Cardaillac (1706-1845; Etudes Elementaires de

Philosophic, 1830). Cf. Picavet, Lex Ideologues (Paris, 1891).

A line of extensive historical study and of deeper psychology begins with

M. J. Deg^rando (1772-1842; De la Generation des Connaissances Ihimaines,

Berlin, 1802 ; Histoire Comparce des tft/xtemes de Philosophic, 1804) and has

its head in Fr. P. Gonthicr Maine de Biran (170(5-1824 ; De la Decomposition

di la Pensee, 1805 ; Les Rapports du Physique et du Moral de VHomme, printed

1834 ; Kssaisur les Fondements de, la Psychologic, 1812 ; (Euvres Philosophiqiies,

edited by V. Cousin, 1841 ; CEuvres Inedites, edited by E. Naville, 1859; Nou-

velle.s CEuvres Inedites, edited by A. Bertrand, 1887). The influences of the

Scottish and German philosophy discharge into this line (represented also by

A. M. Ampere) through P. Provost (1751-1839), Ancillon (1766-1-837),

Royer-Collard (17(53-1845), Jouffroy (1796-1842), and above all, Victor

Cousin (1792-1867; Introduction a V Hixtnire Generale de la Philosophic, 7th

ed., 1872 ; Du Vrai, du Beau et du Bien, 1845 ; complete works, Paris, 184(5 ff. ;

cf. E. Fuchs, Die, Philos. V. C. s, Berlin, 1847 ; J. Elaux, La Philosophic de M.

Cousin, Paris, 18(54). The numerous school, founded by Cousin, which was

especially noted through its historical labours, is called the Spiritualistic or

Eclectic, School. It was the official philosophy after the July Revolution, and is

in part still such. To its adherents who have been active in the historical field,

where their work has been characterised by thoroughness and literary taste,

belong Ph. Damiron, Jul. Simon. E. Vacherot, H. Martin, A. Chaignet, Ad.

Kranck, B. Haureau, Ch. Bartholmess, E. Saisset, P. Janet, E. Caro, etc. F.

Ravaissou has risen from the school to a theoretical standpoint which is in a

certain sense his own. (Morale et metaphusique, in the Revue de Met. et de Mor.

1888).

Its principal opponents were the philosophers of the Church party, whose

theory is known as Traditionalism. Together with Chateaubriand (Le, Genie,

du Christ ianisme, 1802), Jos. de Maistre (1753-1821 ; Essai sur le Principe

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Generateur des Constitutions Politiques, 1810 ; Soirees de St. Petersbourg, 1821 ;

Du Pape, 1829; cf. on him Fr. Paulhan, Paris, 1893) and J. Frayssinons

(17(55-1841; Defense du Christianisme, 1823), V. G. A. de Bonald (1753-1841;

Theorie du Pouvoir Politique et Religieux, 179(5 ; Essai Analytique sur IKS Lois

Naturelles de. V Ordre Social, 1800; Du Divorce, 1801; De la Philosophie

Morale et Politique du l$ e siecle ; complete works, 15 vols., Paris, 1810 ft.)

stands here in the foreground. The traditionalism of P. S. Ballanche is

presented in a strangely fantastic fashion (177(5-1847 ; Essai sur les Institutions

Sociales, 1817 ; La Palingenesie Sociale ; complete works, 5 vols., Paris, 1883).

In the beginning II. F. R. de Lamennais (1782-1854) also supported this line in

his Essai sur V Indifference en Matiere de Religion (1817) ; later, having fallen

out with the Church (Parole d un Croyant, 1834), he presented in the Esquisse

d une Philosophie (4 vols., 1841-1846) a comprehensive system of philosophy,

which had for its prototype partly the Schellingian System of Identity and

partly the Italian Ontologism.

Among the philosophical supporters of Socialism (cf. L. Stein, Geschichte

der socialen Beivegung in Frankreich, Leips. 1819 ff. ) the most important is

Cl. H. de St. Simon (17(50-1825 ; Introduction aux Travaux Scientifiques du

19 e siecle, 1807 ; Reorganisation de la Societe Europeenne, 1814 ; System? In

dustrial, 1821 f. ; Nouveau Christinnisme, 1825 ; fEuvres choisies, 3 vols., 1859).

Of his successors may be mentioned, Bazard (Doctrine de St. Simon, 1829),

B. Enfantin (179(5-1864; La Religion St. Simonie.nne, 1831), Pierre Leroux

(1798-1871 ; Refutation de, I Edccticisme, 1839; De V Humanite, 1840), and Ph.

Bucbez (1796-1866; Essai d un Traite Complet de Philosophie au Point de

Vue du Catholicisme et du Progres, 1840).

Aug. Comte occupies a most interesting position apart. He was born in

Montpellier in 1798 and died alone in Paris in 1857 : Cours du Philosophie

Positive (6 vols., Paris, 1840-1842) [Eng. tr., or rather a condensation and repro

duction by H. Martineau, The Positive Philosophy of A. Comte, 2 vols., Lond.

1853] ; Systeme de Politique Positive (Paris, 1851-1854) ; The Positive Polity

and certain earlier works, trans, by various authors, 4 vols., Lond. 1876-1878;

Catechisme Positiviste (1853) ; cf. Littr^, C. et la Philosophie Positive, Paris,

1868; J. S. Mill, C. and Positivism, Lond. 1865; J. liig, A. C. La Philosophie

Positive Resumee, Paris, 1881 ; E. Caird, The Social Philosophy and Religion

of C., Glasgow, 1885.

In the following period Comte s position became more influential and in part

controlling. E. Littr6 (1801-1881 ; La Science au Point de Vue, Philosophique,

Paris, 1873) defended his positivism in systematic form. A freer adaptation of

positivism was made by such writers as H. Taine (1828-1893 ; Philosophie de.

VArt, 1865; De r Intelligence, 1870; cf. on him G. Barzellotti, Rome, Ib95)

and Ernest Renan (1823-1892; Questions Contempor nines, 1868; L Avenir

de la Science, 1890). Under Comte s influence, likewise, has been the develop

ment of empirical psychology. Th. Ribot, editor of the Revue Philosophique,

is to be regarded as the leader in this field. In addition to his historical works

on English and German psychology, his investigations with regard to heredity

and abnormal conditions of memory, will, personality, etc., may be noted.

In part also Sociology stands under Comte s influence, as R. Worms, G.

Tarde, E. Durkheim, and others have striven to work it out (cf. Annee Sociolo-

gique, pub. since 1894). Finally, evolutionary theories belong in this connection,

which have been especially carried out by J. M. Guyau (1854-1888 ; Esquisse

d une Morale, 1885; L 1 irreligion de Vavenir, 1887; L^art, au point de vue

sociologique, 1889) [Problemes de r Esthetique Contemporaine, 1897].

By far the most important among the present representatives of philosophy in

France is Ch. Renouvier (born 1818; Essais de Critique Generale. 2d ed.,

1875-96; Esquisse d une Classification Syste.matique des Doctrines Philoso-

phiques, 1885; La Philosophie Analytique de VHistoire, 1896; La Nouvelle

Monadologie, 1899). The synthesis of Kant and Comte which he has sought to

effect has its literary organ in the Annee Philosophique (published since 1889).

In England the Associational Psychology continues through Thomas

Brown to men like Thomas Belsham (1750-1829 ; Elements of the Philosophy

of the Human Mind, 1801), John Fearn (First Lines of the Human Mind,

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1820), and many others; finds support here also in physiological and phreno

logical theories as with G. Combe (A System of Phrenology, Kdin. 1825), Sam.

Bailey (Essays on the Pursuit of Truth, 1829 ; The Theory of Reasoning,

1851 ; Letters on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, 1855) and Harriet Mar-

tineau (Letters on the Laws of Man s Nature and Development, 1851), and

reaches its full development through James Mill (Analysis of the Phenomena

of the Hitman Mind. 1829), and his sun, J. Stuart Mill (ltfdO-1873; System

of Logic Itatioci native and Inductive, 184:}; Principles of Political Economy,

1848; On Liberty, Ib5i ; Utilitarianism, Ib03; Examination of Sir W.

Hamilton s Philosophy, 1805; Autobiography, 187:5; Posthumously, Essays on

Religion, 1874 ; Collected Dissertations and Discussions, N. Y., 1882 ; Useful

ed. of Ethical Writings by Douglas, Kdin. 1W)7. Cf. H. Taine, Le Positivisme

Anglais, Paris, 1864 [Eng. tr. by Haye ; Courtney, Life of M., and Meta

physics ofj. S. M. ; Bain, ,/. S. M. 1882], Douglas, J. S. M., A Study of his

Philos., Kdin. 1895). Closely connected with this line of thought stands Alex.

Bain (The. Senses and the Intellect, 185(5, 3d ed. 1808; Mental and Moral

Science, 1808, 3d ed. 1872, Pt. II, 1872 ; The Emotions and the Will, 1859, 3d

ed. 1875 ; Mind and Body, 3d ed. 1874.

The related Utilitarianism is represented by T. Cogan ( Philosophical Treatise

on the Passions, 1802; Ethical Questions, 1817), John Austin (1790-1859;

The Philosophy of Positive Laic, 1832), G. Cornwall Lewis (^4 Treatise on the

Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics, 1852). [As representatives

of Utilitarianism, in addition to Mill, and Bain, op. cit. above, H. Sidgwick.

Methods of Ethics, Lond. 1874, 6th ed. 1901, and T. Fowler, Principles of

Morals, Lond. 1880 f., should also be mentioned.

Scottish Philosophy, after Dugald Stewart and James Mackintosh (1704-

1832 ; Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, 1830), had at first

unimportant supporters like Abercrombie (1781-1840 ; Inquiry concerning the.

Intellectual Powers, 1830; Philosophy of the Moral Feelings, 1833) and

Chalmers (1780-1847), and was especially as academical instruction brought

into affiliation with the eclecticism of Cousin by Henry Calderwood (Philoso

phy of the Infinite, 1854), S. Morell ( An Historical and Critical View of the

Speculative. Philosophy of Europe in the 19th Century, 1840), also H. Wedg

wood (On. the Development of the Understanding, 1848).

The horizons of English thought were widened by acquaintance with the

German literature, to which Sam. Tayl. Coleridge (1772-1834), W. Words

worth (1770-1850), and especially Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881; Past and

Present, 1843 [the articles on various German thinkers and the Sartor Resartiis

belong here also]) contributed. In philosophy this influence made itself felt

primarily through Kant, whose theory of cognition influenced J. Herschel (On

the Study of Natural Philosophy, 1831), and especially W. Whewell (Phi

losophy of the Inductive Sciences, 1840).

In intelligent reaction against this influence, Scottish philosophy experienced

a valuable re-shaping at the hands of Sir William Hamilton (1788-1850 ; Dis

cussions on Philosophy and Literature, 1852 ; On Truth and Error, 1850 ; Lec

tures on Metaphysics and Logic, 1859 ; Editions of Reid s and Stewart s Works ;

cf. J. Veitch, S. W. H., The Man and his Philosophy, Edin. and Lond. 1883

[Memoir in 2 vols , 1809, by same author]). In his school Agnosticism proper,

supported principally by H. L. Mansel (1820-1871 ; Metaphysics or the Phi

losophy of Consciousness, 1800), is separated from a tendency inclining toward

eclectic metaphysics: J. Veitch. H. Lowndes (Introduction to the Philosophy

of Primary Beliefs, 1805). Leechman. McCosh. and others.

Following a suggestion from one aspect of Hamilton s thought, a movement

arose which sought to develop formal logic PS a calculus of symbols. To this

movement belong G. Boole (The Mathematical Analysis of Logic, 1847; An

Analysis of the Laros of Thought, 1854) ; De Morgan (Formal Logic, 1847) ;

Th. Spencer Baynes (An Essay on the Xeir Analytic of Logical Forms, 1850) ;

\V. Stanley Jevons ( Pure Log ic, 1804 ; Principles of Science, 1874) ; J. Venn

(Symbolic Logic, 1881; Log ic of Chance, 1870; Principles of Logic, 1889)

[C. S. Peirce, Algebra of Logic, 1807 ; Ladd and Mitchell, in Studies in Logic,

ed. by Peirce, Boston, 1883]. Compare on this A. Riehl (Vierteljahrsschr. f.

icisK. Philos. 1877) and L. Liard (Les Lnyiciens Anglais Contemporains, 1878).

The combined influence of Kant and the later German theism impressed the

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philosopher of religion, James Martineau (who is also the most prominent

recent representative of intuitionist ethics [Types of Ethical Theory, 1885; A

Study of Religion, 1888 ; Scat of Authority in Rel., 1800]; cf. A. W. Jackson,

J. M., Boston, 1!H)0), and likewise F. W. Newman ( The Sou?, etc., 1849; The

ism, 1858), A. C. Eraser and others. Since Hutcliiuson Stirling (The Secret

of Hegel, 1865 ; What is Thought ? 1000) German idealism in its whole develop

ment and in its metaphysical aspect, particularly in the Hegelian form, has called

forth a vigorous idealistic movement, of which the leading representative was

the late Thomas Hill Green (1838-1882), Professor at Oxford. [His Introd.

to Hume was followed by criticisms on Lewes and Spencer and (posthumously)

by the Prolegomena to Ethics, 1883, and complete works (except the Proleg.),

3 vols., Lon d. and N. Y. 1885, 1886, 1888; cf. VV. H. Fairbrother, The Phi

losophy of T. H. G., Lond. 1896.] In sympathy with this idealistic and more

or less Hegelian interpretation of Kantian principles are F. H. Bradley (Logic,

.Lond. 1883; Ethical Studies, 1876; Appearance and Reality, 1893), H. Bos an-

quet (Logic, 2 vols., 1888 ; Hist, of Esthetics, 1892 ; Philos. of the State, 1899,

etc.) ; J. Caird (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 1880) ; E. Caird

(Critical Phil, of Kant, 2 vols., 1889 ; Essays, 2 vols., 1892 ; Evolution of Religion,

1893); Seth and Haldane (Essays in Phil. Criticism, 1883) ; J. Mackenzie

(Social Philosophy, 1890). Cf. A. Seth, Hegelianism and Personality, 1887,

and the review of this in Mind, by D. G. Ritchie.

These movements above noted stand under the principle of Evolution; the

same principle became authoritative for the investigation of organic nature

through Charles Darwin. (Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection,

1859; Descent of Man, 1871; The Expression of the Emotions, 1872). The

same principle was .formulated in more general terms and made the basis of a

comprehensive System of Synthetic Philosophy by Herbert Spencer (born

1820), First Principles, 1862, 6th ed. 1901; Principles of Psychology, 1855, 5th ed.

1890; Principles of Biology, 1864-1867, 4th ed. 1888; Principles of Sociology,

1876-1896 ; Principles of Ethics, 1879-1893. Cf. on him O. Gaupp, Stuttgart,

1897 [T. H. Green, in Works ; F. H. Collins, Epitome of the Synthetic Philoso

phy, 1889.] Huxley, Wallace, Tyndall, G. H. Lewes (Problems of Life and

Mind, 3d ed. 1874), belong in the main to this tendency.

[Other works in evolutionary ethics are, L. Stephen, The Science of Ethics,

Loud. 1882 ; S. Alexander, Moral Order and Progress, Lond. 1889 ; C. M.

Williams, The Ethics of Evolution, Lond. and N.Y. 1893. This last contains

useful summaries of the chief works.]

[In America idealistic lines of thought were introduced (in opposition to the

prevalent Scottish philosophy) through the medium of Coleridge s interpretation

of Kant, by James Marsh (1829) and Henry s trans, of V. Cousin s Lectures on

Locke (1834), more directly from Germany by L. P. Hickok (Rational Psy

chology, 1848 ; Emp. Psych., 1854 (rev. ed. by J. H. Seelye, 1882) ; Moral

Science, 1853 (rev. ed. by J. H. Seelye), etc.). VV. T. Harris, in the Jour.

Spec. Philosophy, and elsewhere, has done an important work in the same line.

&lt; )f more recent writers, J. Royce ( The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, 1 885 ;

Spirit of Modern Philos., 1892; The World and the Individual, 1900), J.

Dewey (Psychology, 1886 ; Outlines of Ethics, 1891), are closer to the school

of Green, while G. T. Ladd (Phy\*. Psychology. 1887 ; Introd. to Phil, 1891 ;

Psychology Descriptive and Explanatory, 1894 ; Philos. of Mind, 1895 ; Philos.

of Knowledge, 1897 ; A Theory of Reality, 1899) and B. P. Bowne (Meta

physics, Psychological Theory, Ethical Theory, etc.) stand nearer to Lotze.

Orinond (The Foundations of Knowledge, 1900) combines idealistic motives

with those of Scottish thought. The extremely suggestive work of W. James

(Psychology, 2 vols., 1890) should also be mentioned, and as representatives

of the modern treatment of this science, in addition to the works of Ladd and

Dewey cited above, J. M. Baldwin (Psychology, 2 vols., 1890 f. ; Mental Devel

opment, 1895-1897) and G. S. Hall (in Am. Jour. Psychology) may be named

as American writers, and Jas. Ward (art. Psychology in Enc. Brit.), S. II.

Hodgson (Time and Space, 1865 ; The Philosophy of Reflection, 1878 ; Meta

physics of Experience, 1898), James Sully (The Human Mind, 2 vols., 181)2),

and G. F. Stout (Analytic Psychology, 1896) as Englishmen. Darwin,

Romanes, and Lloyd Morgan have treated comparative psychology. The

Dictionary of Psychology and Philosophy, ed. by J. M. Baldwin with coopera-

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tion of British and American writers, will give historical material as well as

definitions (in press).]

The Italian philosophy of the nineteenth century has been determined still

more than the French by political motives, and in the content of the thoughts

that have been worked over for these ends, it has been dependent partly upon

French, partly upon German, philosophy. At the beginning the Encyclopae

dists view of the world, both in its practical and its theoretical aspects, was

dominant in men like Gioja (176(5-1829) or his friend, Romagnosi (17(51-

1835), while as early as Pasquale Galuppi (1771-184(5 ; Saggio Filosojico sulla

Critica delle Conoscenze Umane, 1320 if. ; Filosofia della Vulonta, 1832 ff.)

Kantian influences assert themselves, to be sure, under the psychologistic

form of the Leibnizian virtual innateness.

At a later period philosophy, which was mainly developed by the clergy,

ntially b

Liberalism, inasmuch as Rationalism wished to unite itself with revealed faith.

influenced essentially by the political alliance of the Papacy with democratic

The most characteristic representative of this tendency and the most attractive

personally was Antonio Rosmini-Serbati (1797-1855; Nuovo Saggio suit Ori-

gine delle Idee, 1830 ; Principii della Scienza Morale, 1831 ; Posthum, Teosofia,

1859 ff. ; Saggio Storico-Critico sulle Categoric e la Dialettica, 1884) [Eng. tr.

of the first, Origin of Ideas, 3 vols., Lond. 1883 f. ; also R. s Philos. System, by

T. Davidson, with int. bibliog., etc., Lond. 1882 ; Psychology, 3 vols., Lond. and

Boston, 1884-188!)]. Cf. on him F. X. Kraus (Dentsche Ilundschau, 1890). The

combination of Platonic, Cartesian, and Schellingian ideas proceeds in still

more pronounced lines to an Ontologism, i.e. an a priori science of Being,

in Vincenzo Gioberti (1801-1852; Degli Erron Filosojico di Rosmini, 1842;

Introduzione alia Filosniia, 1840 ; Protologia, 1857. Cf. B. Spaventa, La Filo-

sojia di G., 18(i3). Teren/o Mamiani passed through this entire development

(1800-1885; Confessioni di tin Metafisico, 1865); Luigi Ferri (1826-1895),

Labanca, Bonatelli, and others followed it, though influenced also by German

and French views.

As opponents this tendency found, on the one hand, the rigid Orthodoxism

of Ventura (1792-18(51), Tapparelli and Liberatore (Delia Conoscenza Intel-

letuale, 1865), and, on the other hand, politically radical Scepticism, as repre

sented by Giuseppe Ferrari (1811-1866; La Filosofia delle llevohizioni, 1851)

and Antonio Francki (La Jtcligione del 1 ( J. Secolo, 1853). The Kantian

philosophy was introduced by Alf. Testa (1784-18(50; Delia Critica della

Kagione Pura, 1849 ff.), and more successfully by C. Cantoni (born 1F40 ; cf.

above, p. 532), F. Tocco, S. Turbiglio, and others. Hegel s doctrine was intro

duced by A. Vera (1813-1885), B. Spaventa (1817-188:5), and Fr. Florentine,

and Comte s positivism by Cataneo, Ardigo, and Labriola. [Cf. for this Italian

thought the App. in Ueberweg s Hist. Phil., Eng. tr., Vol. II. 461 ff.]

In Germany (cf. .1. E. Erdmann, History of Phil. [Eng. tr. Vol. 111.]

331 ff.) the first development was that of the gn at ] hilosuphic schools in il.e

third and fourth decades of the century. Herbarf s following proved the most

complete in itself and firmest in its adherence. In it were prominent : M.

Drobisch (Religionsphttoaophie, 1840; Psychologic, 1842; Die nwralische

Matistik und die. menschliche Willensfreiheit, 1867), R. Zimmermann (JE&-

thctik, Vienna, 18(55), L. Strumpell (Haiintpiinkte der Metaphysik, 18-10;

Einleitnng in die Pkilotopkie, 188(5), T. Zillei (Einleitung in die Allgemeine

Pddagogik, 1856). A special divarication of the school is formed by the

so-called Volkerpsychologie [Comparative or Folk-Psychology], as opened by

M. Lazarus (Lebe.ii der Seele, !8"-6 f.) and H. Steinthal (Abriss der Sprach-

wissenschaft, I. ; Einleitnng in die Psychologic itnd Sprachwissenschaft, 1871) ;

cf. their common programme in Vol. I. of the Zeitschrift fiir Volkerpsychologie

u nd Sprach triwit &gt;\*// , iff .

The Hegelian School had rich experience in its own life of the blessing of

dialectic; it split even in the Thirties upon religions antitheses. The important

historians of philosophy, Zeller and Prantl, Erdmann and Kuno Fischer,

went their way, not confused by this. Between the two parties, with a consid

erable degree of independent thinking, stand K. Rozenkranz (1805-1879;

Wissenschaft der logischen Idee, 1858 f.) and Friedrich Theodor Vischer (1807-

1887 ; jEtthetik, 1846-1858 ; Auch Einer, 1879).

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The "right wing" of the Hegelian school, which resisted a pantheistic inter

pretation of the master, and emphasised the metaphysical importance of per

sonality, attracted those thinkers who stood in a freer relation to Hegel, and

maintained Fichtean and Leibnizian motifs. Such were I. H. Fichte (son of

the creator of the Wissenschaftslehre, 1797-1879 ; Beitriige zur Characteristik

der neueren Philosophic, 1829 ; Ethik, 1850 ff. ; Anthropologie, 1850), C. Fort-

lage (1800-1881; System der Psychologie, 1855), Christ. Weisse (1801-1866;

System der ^Esthetik, 1830 and 1871; Grundziige der Metaphysik, 1835; Das

philosophische Problem der Gegenwart, 1842 ; Philosophie des Christenthums,

1855 ff.), 11. Ulrici (1800-1884; Dan Grundprincip der Philosophie, 1845 1. ;

Gott und die Natur. 1861; Gott und der Mensch, 1866); further, E. Trahn-

dorf (1782-1863; ^Esthetik, 1827), Mor. Carriere (1817-1895; sEsthetik, 1859,

3d ed. 1885 ; Die Kunst im Zusammenhang der Kulturentwickelung, 5 vols.).

IMated to these was, on the one side, K. Rothe (1797-1867; Theologische

Kthik, 2d ed. 1867-1871 ; cf. on his speculative system, H. Holtzmann, 1899),

who interwove many suggestions from the idealistic development into an origi

nal mysticism, and on the other side A. Trendelenburg, who set the concep

tion of " Motion " in the place of Hegel s dialectical principle, and thought

thereby to combat Hegel s philosophy. His merit, however, lies in the stimulus

which he gave to Aristotelian studies (1802-1872 ; Logische Untersuchunqen,

1840; Naturrecht, 1860).

To the " Left" among the Hegelians belong Arnold Ruge (1802-1880 ; joint

editor with Echtermeyer of the Halle sche Jahrbiicher, 1838-1840, and of the

Deutsche Jahrbiicher, 1841 f. ; coll. writings in 10 vols., Mannheim, 1846 ff.),

Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872 ; Gedanken iiber Tod und Unsterblichkeit, 1830;

Philosophie und Christenthum, 1839 ; Wesen des Christenthums, 1841 ; Wesen

der Religion, 1845 ; Theogonie, 1857 ; Works, 10 vols., Leips. 1846 ff.). Cf. K.

Griin (L. F., Leips. 1874), David Friedrich Strauss (1808-1874; Das Leben

Jesu, 1835; Christliche Glaubenslehre, 1840 f.; Der Alte und der neue Glaube,

1872 ; Works, 12 vols., Berlin, 1876 ff.). Cf. A. Hausrath, D. F. Str. und die

Theologie seiner Zeit (Heidelberg, 1876 and 1878).

From the Materialism controversy are to be mentioned : K. Moleschott

(Kreislaitf des Lebens, 1852), Rudolph "Wagner (Ueber Wissen und Glauben,

1854 ; Der Kampf um die Seele, 1857), C. Vogt (Kohlerglaube und Wissen-

schaft, 1854 ; Vorlesungen iiber den Menschen, 1863), L. BUchner (Kraft und

Stoff, 1855) [Force and Matter, Lond.].

Related to this materialism was the development of the extreme Sensualism

in the form in which it was presented by H. Czolbe (1819-1873; Neue Dar-

stellung des Sensualismus, 1855 ; Grundziige der extensionalen Erkenntniss-

theorie, 1875), and by F. Ueberweg (1820-1871), who was originally more

closely related to Beneke (cf. A. Lange, History of Materialism, II.). In a

similar relation stood the so-called Monism which E. Haeckel (born 1834 ;

Naturliche Schopfungsgeschichte, 1868 ; Weltrathsel, 5th ed. 1900 : cf. Loofs,

Anti-Haeckel, 1900, and Fr. Paulsen, E: H. als Philosoph. Preuss. Jahrb.

1900) has attempted to develop, and finally the socialistic Philosophy of His

tory, whose founders are Fr. Engels (Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der

klassischen deutschen Philosophie, 1888 ; Der Ursprung der Familie, des Pri-

vateigenthums und des Staates, 1884) and Karl Marx (Das Kapital, 1867 ff.,

Capital, 1891); cf. on Engels and Marx, R. Stammler, Wirthschaft und Becht,

1896 ; L. Wolfmann, Der historische Materialismus, 1900.

By far the most important among the epigones of the German Philosophy

was Rudolph Herm. Lotze (1817-1881 ; Metaphysik, 1841 ; Logik, 1842 ; Mrdi-

cinische Psychologie, 1842 ; Mikrokosmus, 1856 ff. ; System der Philosophic, I.

Logik, 1874 ; II. Metaphysik, 1879) [Microcosmus, tr. by Hamilton and Jones,

Kdin. and N. Y. 1885 ; Logic and Metaphysics, 2 vols. each, tr. ed. by B. Bosan-

quet, Oxford, 1884, also 1888; Outlines, ed. by G. T. Ladd, Boston, 1885 ff.].

Cf. O. Caspar!, //. L. in seiner Stellung zur deutschen Philosophie (1883);

E. v. Hartmann, Z. .s Philosophie (Berlin, 1888); H. Jones, Philos. of L., 1895.

Interesting side phenomena are : G. T. Fechner (1801-1887 ; Nanna, 1848;

Physical, und philos. Atomenlehre, 1855 ; Elemente der Psychophysik, 1860 ;

Drei Motive des Glaubens, 1863 ; Vorschule der ^Esthetik, 1876 ; Die Tagesan-

sicht gegenuber der Nachtansicht, 1879) and Eug. Duhring (born 1833 ; Xat ur-

liche Dialektik, 1865 ; Werth des Lebens, 1865 ; Logik und Wissenschaftstheorie,

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1878). The following from the Catholic side have taken part in the develop

ment of philosophy : Fr. Hermes (1775-1831 ; Einleitiing in die christkatho-

lische Theologie, 1819), Benin. Bolzano (1781-1848; Wissenschaftslehre,

1837), Anton Giinther (1785-1803 ; Ges. Schriften, Vienna, 1881), and Wil-

hehn Rosenkrantz (1821-1874; Wissenschaft des Wissens, 180&lt;&gt;).

Philosophic interest in Germany, which was much crippled about the middle

of the century, hits strongly revived, owing to the union of the study of Kant with

the demands of natural science. The former, called forth by Kuno Fischer s

work (1800). evoked a movement which has been characterized in various aspects

as Neo-Kantianism. To it belong, as principal members, A. Lange (1828-

1875; History of Materialism, 1800) and O. Liebmann (born 1840; Analysis

der Wirklichkeit, 3 Aufl., 1000). In theology it was represented by Alb.

Ritschl ( Theologie und Metaphysik, 1881). [A. T. Swing, Theol. of A. R. 1001.]

Theoretical Physics became significant for philosophy through the work prin

cipally of Rob. Mayer (Bemerkungen uber die Krilfte der unbelebten Natur,

1845; Ueber das uiechanlsche ^Equivalent der Warme, 1850; cf. on him A.

Riehl in the Sif/icart-Abhandlungcn, 1900) and II. Helmholtz (Physiologische

Optik, 1880; Sensations of Tone, 1875; Thatsachen der Wahrnehmung, 1879).

Beginning with physiology, Willhelm Wundt (born 1837) has developed a

comprehensive system of philosophy. From his numerous writings may lie men

tioned (rrundzuge der physiologischen Psychologic, 1873 f., 4th ed. 1893 [Outlines

of Physiological Psychology, Eng. tr. in prep, by E. Titchenor] ; Logik, 18801;

Ethik: 1880 [Eng. tr. by Titchenor, Washburn, and Gulliver] ; The Facts of

the Moral Life, Ethical Systems, 1897 ; Principles of Morality, 1901 ; System

der Philosophic, 1889; Grundriss der Psychologic, 1897 [Eng. tr. by Judd, Out

lines of Psychology, 1897] ; Volkerpsychologie\* 1900.

The Kantian theory of knowledge was met by Realism in J. v. Kirchmann

(Philosophic, des Wissens, 1804), and by Positivism in ( . Goring (System der

kritischen Philosophic, 1874 f.), E. Laas (Idealismus und Positirismus, 1879ft .),

and in part too in A. Riehl (Der philosophische Kriticismu\*, 1870 ff. [Eng.

tr. of Part III. by A. Fairbanks, 1894, Science and Metaphysics]). A similar

tendency was followed by R. Avenarius (Kritik der reinen Erfahrung, 1888-

1890; Der menschliche Weltbegriff, 1891).

As in the first-named authors the concepts of natural science were especially

authoritative, so on the other hand the interests of the historical view of the

world have normative value for investigators such as Rudolf Eucken (Die. Ein-

heit des Geisteslebens, 1888 ; De r Kampf urn einen geistigen Lebensinhalt, 189(5),

II. Glogau (Abriss der philosophischen Grundwissenschaften, 1880), and \V.

Dilthey (Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, 1883).

A mediating standpoint is taken by Christian Sigwart (Logik, 2d ed. 1893;

[Eng. tr. by Helen Dendy, 1895]).

Two authors who occupy a position in closer relation to general literature

are:

E. v. Hartmann (born 1842), who excited general attention by his Philosophy

of the Unconscious, 1809 [Eng. tr. by Coupland, 1884]. This was followed

by a long series of writings, of which the most important are Das Unbewusste

vom Standpunkt der Descendenztheoric, 1872 ; Phanomenologie des sittlichen

Bewusstseins, 1879; Die Religion des Geistes, 1882 ; ^sthetik, 1880 f. ; Katego-

rienlehre, 1897 ; Geschichte der Metaphysik, 1900. These works represent a

more and more completely scientific standpoint. As representing a popular

philosophy, in part pessimistic, in part mystical, may be named as typical,

Mainlander (Philosophic der Erl dsung, 1874 f.) on the one hand, and on the

other, Duprel (Philosophie der Mystik, 1884 f.).

Fr. Wilh. Nietzsche (1844-1900), whose development in its changing stages

is characterised by the following selection from his numerous writings, of which

the complete edition is published in Leipsic, 1895 ff . : Die Geburt der Tragodie

aus dem Geisti- &lt;/&lt;-r Musik. 1872; Unzeitf/emdsse Betrachtungen, 1873-1870;

Menschlicln-\* AIIznm&lt;-&gt;txrItlichcs, 1870-1880 ; Also sprach Zarathustra, 1883 f.;

Jenseits run tint und Hose, 1H80 ; Zur Genealogie der Moral, 1887 ; Gotzendiim-

merung, 1889. [Eng. tr. by A. Tille, 1890 ff., Thus spake Zarathustra ; Beyond

Good and Bad ; Genealogy of Morals.] Cf. Al. Riehl, Nietzsche, Stuttgart,

2d ed. 1897. [P. Cams in The Monist, IX. 572 ff. ; G. N. Dolson in Cornell

Cont. to Phil., III.]

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## 44. The Controversy over the Soul.

A characteristic change in the general scientific relations during

the nineteenth century has been the constantly progressing loosening

and separation of psychology from philosophy, 1 which may now be

regarded as in principle complete. This followed from the rapid

decline of metaphysical interest and metaphysical production, which

appeared in Germany, especially, as a natural reaction from the high

tension of speculative thought. Robbed thus of a more general base

of support, in its effort to give itself a firm footing as purely empir

ical science, psychology had at first but little power of resistance

against the inroad of the method of natural science, according to

which it should be treated as a special province of physiology or

general biology. About this question a number of vigorous move

ments grouped themselves.

1. At the beginning of the century a brisk interchange of thought

obtained between the French Ideology and the later developments

of the English Enlightenment philosophy which had split into asso-

ciational psychology and the common sense doctrine : in this inter

change, however, France bore now the leading part. Here the

antithesis which had existed in the French sensualism from the be

ginning between Condillac and Bonnet (cf. p. 458), came out more

sharply. With Destutt de Tracy, and even as yet with Laromiguiere,

it does not come to a sharp decision. On the other hand, Cabanis is the

leader of the materialistic line : his investigation as to the interconnec

tion of the physical and the psychical (moral) nature of man, after con

sidering the various influences of age, sex, temperament, climate, etc.,

comes to the result that the psychical life is everywhere determined by

the body and its physical relations. With the organic functions thus

reduced solely to mechanical and chemical processes, at least in prin

ciple, it seemed that the soul, now superfluous as vital force, had also

outlived its usefulness as the agent and supporter of consciousness.

In carrying out these thoughts other physicians, for example

Broussais, gave to materialism a still sharper expression: the intel

lectual activity is "one of the results" of the brain functions.

Hence men eagerly seized upon the strange hypothesis of phre

nology, with which Gall professed to localise at definite places in

the brain all the particular " faculties," which empirical psychology

had provided up to that time. It was not merely an interesting

diversion to hear in public that a more or less vigorous development

of special psychical powers could be recognised in the skull ; the

1 Cf. W. Windelband, Ueber den gegenv)i.irligen Stand der psychologischen

Forschung (Leips. 1876).

44.J Controversy over the Soul : Ideology, 635

thought was connected with this, especially among physicians, that

now the materiality of the so-called soul-life was discovered, with

out doubt. In England especially, as is shown by the success of

Combe s writings, the phrenological superstition called out very

great interest and promoted a purely physiological psychology, in

the line of that of Hartley. It was John Stuart Mill who first

brought his countrymen back to Hume s conception of associational

psychology. Without asking what matter and mind are in them

selves, the student should proceed from the fact that the corporeal

and mental states form two domains of experience, completely inca

pable of comparison, and that psychology as the science of the laws of

mental life must study the facts of the latter in themselves, and may

not reduce them to the laws of another sphere of existence. Alex

ander Bain, attaching himself to Mill s standpoint, developed the

associational psychology farther. His especial contribution was to

point out the significance of the muscular sensations, in which the

fundamental facts of the mental life which correspond to spontane

ous bodily motion are to be found. This associational psychology

has thus nothing in common with a materialistic view of the soul ;

nevertheless the mechanism of ideas and impulses is the only prin

ciple recognised for the purpose of explaining the mental processes.

2. The opposition to the materialistic psychology comes much

more sharply to the fore in those lines of thought which emphasise

the activity of consciousness as a unity. Following de Tracy s

example Laromigutere s Ideology distinguished carefully between

the " modifications," which are the mere consequence of bodily exci

tations, and the " actions " of the soul, in which the soul proves its

independent existence, even in perception. In the school of Mont-

pellier they still believed in the " vital force." Barthez regarded

this as separate from body and soul, as a something completely

unknown : Bichat distinguished the " animal " from the " organic "

life by the characteristic of spontaneous " reaction." This element

in psychology came to full development through Maine de Biran.

The acute, subtle mind of this philosopher received many suggestions

from English and German philosophy ; with reference to the latter

his acquaintance with Kant s and Fichte s doctrines though only

a superficial one and with the virtualism of Bouterwek, who was

named with remarkable frequency in Paris, is to be emphasised. 1

1 The lines of communication were here not merely literary (Villers,

Dege"rando, etc.), but in a strong degree personal. Of great importance among

other things was the presence of the Schlegels in Paris, especially the lectures

of Frederick Schlegel. In Paris itself the society of Auteuil, to which also the

Svyiss embassador Stapfer, a prominent medium of influence, belonged, was of

importance.

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The fundamental fact on which Maine de Biran bases his theory,

later called spiritualism, is that in the will we immediately experi

ence at once our own activity and the resistance of the " Non-Moi"

(primarily our own body). The reflection of personality upon this

its own activity forms the starting-point of all philosophy: inner

experience furnishes the form, experience of that which resists fur

nishes the matter. From this fundamental fact the conceptions

force, substance, cause, unity, identity, freedom, and necessity are

developed. Thus Maine de Biran builds upon psychology a meta

physical system, which frequently reminds of Descartes and Male-

branche, but replaces the cogito ergo .sum, by a volo ergo sum; just

for this reason he exerts himself especially to fix securely the

boundary lines between psychology and physiology, and particularly

to exhibit the conception of inner experience (sens intime) as the

clear and self-evident basis of all mental science, of which the self-

consciousness of the willing and choosing personality appeared to

him to be the fundamental principle. These significant thoughts,

directed against the naturalistic one-sidedness of the eighteenth

century, were supplemented by Maine de Biran for his own faith

by a mystical turn, which finds the highest form of life in the

giving up and losing of personality in the love of God. This sup

plementation was made especially toward the close of his life. His

scientific doctrine, on the contrary, found further points of contact,

in part with the Scottish, and in part with the German philosophy,

through his friends, such as Ampere, Jouffroy, and Cousin. In this

process, much of the original character was lost in consequence of

the eclectic appropriation of material. This was shown externally

in the fact that his theory, as thus modified, especially in the in

structional form which it received through Cousin, was freely called

Spiritualism. In fact, the original character of the theory, which

might better have been called Voluntarism, was changed by the

intellectualistic additions which Cousin especially brought to it

from the German philosophy of identity. At a later time, Ravais-

son, and in a still more independent fashion, closely related to the

Kantian criticism, Renouvier, sought to hark back from eclecticism

to Maine de Biran. 1

3. Voluntarism has been on the whole, perhaps, the most strongly

marked tendency of the psychology of the nineteenth century. It is

the form in which empirical science has appropriated Kant s and

1 A similar position is occupied in Italy by Gallupi. Among the "facts of

consciousness" which he makes the basis of philosophy, he regards the au

tonomy of the ethical will as the determining factor, while Rosmini has retained

the older intellectualism.

44.] Controversy over the Soul : Voluntarism. 637

Fichte s transfer of the standpoint of philosophy from the theoretical

over to the practical reason. In Germany the principal influences on

this side have been Fichte s and Schopenhauer s metaphysics. Both

these authors make the essential nature of man to consist in the will,

and the colouring which such a point of view gives to the whole the

ory of the world could only be strengthened by the course of German

history in our century, and by the transformation in the popular

mind which has accompanied it. The importance of the practical,

which has been enhanced to the highest degree, and the repression

of the theoretical, which is not without its dangers, have appeared

more and more as the characteristic features of the age.

This tendency made its appearance in a scientific form with

Beneke, who in spite of his dependence in part upon English philos

ophy and in part upon Herbart, gave a peculiar turn to his exposi

tion of the associational psychology (cf. above, p. 586) by conceiving

the elements of the mental life as active processes or impulses

(Triebe). He called them " elementary faculties" (Urvermogen),

and maintained that these, originally set into activity by stimuli,

bring about the apparently substantial unity of the psychical nature

by their persistence as traces (Sjmren), and by their reciprocal adjust

ment in connection with the continual production of new forces. The

soul is accordingly a bundle not of ideas, as with Hume, but

of impulses, forces, and " faculties." On the other hand, all real

significance is denied to the faculties in the older sense of classifica

tions of the mental activities (cf. above, p. 577). To establish this

doctrine inductively by a methodical elaboration of the facts of inner

perception is regarded by Beneke as the only possible presupposition

for the philosophical disciplines, such as logic, ethics, metaphysics,

and the philosophy of religion. In this procedure he passes on to a

theory of the vahies which belong to stimuli (the so-called "things"),

on account of the increase or diminution of the impulses.

Fortlage gave metaphysical form to the psychological method and

theory of Beneke, by incorporating it into Fichte s Science of Know

ledge. He, too, conceives of the soul and all things in their relations

as a system of impulses or forces, and perhaps no one has carried

through so sharply as he the conception that the source of substantial

existence is the activity of the will, an activity which is devoid of

any substrate. 1 He regarded the essential nature of the psychical pro

cesses as follows : From original functions arise contents which grow

into synthetic union, remain, become established, and thus produce

the forms of psychical reality. He thus pointed out once more the way

1 Cf. C. Fortlage, Beitrage zur Psychologic (Leips. 1875), p. 40.

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by which alone metaphysics can be freed from the schema of material

processes which are conceived as movements of unchangeable sub

stances, such as atoms. But, at the same time, there were in these

theories suggestions for the thought that the processes of ideation,

of attention, and of evaluation in judgments, must be regarded as

functions of the "impulse" which issues in question and assent or re

jection. In the later development, indeed, the psychological analysis

of the thinking process has penetrated even to the realm of logic,

and here has often averted attention from the proper problems of

that science. In the last decades especially, psychology as method

and theory has had a luxurious development similar to that in the

eighteenth century, and in its degenerate forms it has led to the

same manifestations of the most superficial popular philosophy.

4. In England, also, the traditional psychological method and

standpoint remain in control ; nor was this dominance essentially

affected by the transformation which Hamilton gave to the Scottish

tradition under the influence of German philosophy and particularly

of Kant. He, too, defends the standpoint of inner experience and

regards it as affording the standard for all philosophical disciplines.

Necessity and universality are to be found only in the simple, imme

diately intelligible facts of consciousness which are present in every

one. But in these facts and to these belong also all individual

perceptions of the presence of an external thing it is only the

finite, in finite relations and conditions, which comes to our knowl

edge. It is in this sense, and without reference to the Kantian con

ception of the phenomenal, that human knowledge is regarded by

Hamilton as limited to experience of the finite. Of the Infinite and

Absolute, i.e., of God, man has only a moral certainty of faith. Sci

ence, on the contrary, has no knowledge of this " Unconditioned,"

because it can think only what it first distinguishes from another in

order then to relate it to another (of. Kant s conception of synthesis).

Mansel brought this " Agnosticism " into the service of revealed

theology, making a still stronger and more sceptical employment of

the Kantian theory of knowledge. He shows that religious dogmas

are absolutely incomprehensible for human reason, and maintains

that just on this account they are also incapable of attack. The

unknowableness of the " Absolute " or the " Infinite," as Hamilton

had taught it, still plays an important role in other philosophical

tendencies in England ; e.g. in Herbert Spencer s system (cf. below,

45).

As set over against psychology, which has to do only with the

facts of consciousness, Hamilton treats logic, aesthetics, and ethics,

which correspond to the three classes of psychical phenomena, as the

44.] Controversy over the Soul : Hamilton, 639

theory of the laws under which facts stand ; yet he does not attain

complete clearness as to the normative character of this legislation,

and so the philosophical disciplines also remain entangled in the

method of psychology. In working out his system, Hamilton s

logical theory became one of the most clearly defined produc

tions of formal logic. The problem of logic for him is to set forth

systematically the relations which exist between concepts, and he

limits the whole investigation to relations of quantity, going quite

beyond the principle of the Aristotelian analysis (cf. above, pp. 135 f.).

Every judgment is to be regarded as an equation, which declares

what the relation is between what is comprised in the one concept,

and what is comprised in the other. For example, a judgment of

subordination, " the rose is a flower," must take the form : " All S

= some V," " all roses = some flowers." The peculiarity of this is

tMat the predicate is " quantified," whereas previous logical theory

has quantified the subject only. When all judgments were thus

reduced to the form of equations, obtaining between the contents of

two concepts, inferences and conclusions appeared to be operations

of reckoning, performed with given magnitudes. This seemed to

be the complete carrying through of the principle of the terminis-

tic logic, as it was formulated by Occam (cf. above, p. 342), Hobbes

(p. 404), and Conclillac (p. 478). The new analysis or logical cal

culus has spread since the time of Hamilton, and become a broad

field for the intellectual gymnastics of fruitless subtlety and ingenu

ity. For it is evident that such a logic proceeds from only a single

one among the numerous relations which are possible between con

cepts and form the object of judgments. Moreover, the relation in

question is one of the least important; the most valuable relations

of logical thought are precisely those which fall outside this kind of

analysis. But the mathematical exactness with which this logic has

seemed to develop its code of rules has enlisted in its behalf a series

of vigorous investigators, and that not merely in England. They

have, however, overlooked the fact that the living, actual thought

of man knows nothing of this whole formal apparatus, so neatly

elaborated.

5. In the debates over these questions in France and England the

religious or theological interest in the conception of the substance of

the soul is naturally always a factor: the same interest stood in the

foreground in the very violent controversies which led in Germany

to the dissolution of the Hegelian school. They turned essentially

about the personality of God and the immortality of the soul. Hegel-

ianism could not continue as " Prussian state-philosophy " unless it

maintained the " identity of philosophy with religion." The am-

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biguous mode of expression of the master, who had no direct interest

in these questions, enveloped as it was in the dialectical formalism,

favoured this contest as to the orthodoxy of his teaching. In fact,

the so-called "right wing" of the school, to which prominent

theologians like Gabler, Goschel, and Hinrichs belonged, tried to

keep this orthodoxy : but while it perhaps might remain doubtful

how far the " coming-to-itself of the Idea " was to be interpreted as

the personality of God, it became clear, on the other side, that in the

system of perpetual Becoming and of the dialectical passing over

of all forms into one another, the finite personality could scarcely

raise a plausible claim to the character of a " substance " and to

immortality in the religious sense.

This motive forced some philosophers out of .the Hegelian school

to a " theistic " view of the world, which, like that of Maine de Biran,

had for its centre the conception of personality, and with regard to

finite personalities inclined to the Leibnizian Monadology. The

younger Fichte termed these mental or spiritual realities Urpositionen

[prime-positions]. The most important carrying-out of the thought

of this group was the philosophical system of Chr. Weisse, in which

the conception of the possible is placed ontologically above that of

Being, to the end of deriving all Being from freedom, as the self-

production of personality (Fichte).

In the relation between the possible and the actual, we have here

repeated the antithesis set up by Leibniz, between the verites eter-

nelles, and the verites de fait, and likewise the problems which Kant

brought together in the conception of the " specification of Nature "

(cf. above, p. 566). Within the " possibilities " which cannot be

thought away, the actual is always ultimately such that it might be

conceivably otherwise; i.e. it is not to be deduced, it must be re

garded as given through freedom. Law and fact cannot be reduced

to each other.

Carrying out this view in a more psychological manner, Ulrici

regarded the self as the presupposition for the distinguishing activ

ity, with which he identified all consciousness, and out of which he

developed his logical, as well as his psychological, theory.

6. The orthodoxy, which at the time of the Restoration was grow

ing in power and pretension, was attacked by the counter-party with

the weapons of Hegelianism, and in this contest Huge served as

leader in public support of both religious and political liberalism.

How pantheistically and Spinozistically the idealistic system was

apprehended by this wing is best seen from Feuerbach s Thoughts on

Death and Immortality, where the divine infinitude is praised as the

ultimate ground of man s life, and man s disappearance in the same

44.] Controversy over the Soul: Materialism. 641

as the true immortality and blessedness. From this ideal pantheism

Feuer oach then rapidly advanced to the most radical changes of his

doctrine. He felt that the panlogistic system could not explain

the individual things of Nature : though Hegel had called Nature

the realm of the accidental or contingent, which is incapable of

keeping the conception pure. This inability, thought Feuerbach,

inheres rather in the conception which man makes to himself oi

things : the general conceptions in which philosophy thinks are no

doubt incapable of understanding the real nature of the individual

thing. Therefore Feuerbach now inverts the Hegelian system, and

the result is a nominalistic materialism. The actual reality is the

individual known to the senses ; everything universal, everything

mental or spiritual, is but an illusion of the individual. Mind or

spirit is " Nature in its otherness." In this way Feuerbach gives

his purely anthropological explanation of religion. Man regards his

own generic nature what he wishes to be himself as God.

This theory of the wish," is to free humanity from all supersti

tion and its evil consequences, after the same fashion as the theory

of Epicurus (cf. above, p. 188). The epistemology of this " philoso

phy of the future " can be only sensualism ; its ethics only eudae-

mouism: the impulse to happiness is the principle of morals, and

the sympathetic participation in the happiness of another is the

fundamental ethical feeling.

After materialism had shown so illustrious a metaphysical pedi

gree, others employed for its advantage the anthropological mode of

argument which had been in use in French literature since Lamettrie,

and which seemed to become still stronger through the progress of

physiology. Feuerbach had taught : man is what he eats (ist was er

isst) ! And so once more the dependence of the mind upon the body

was interpreted as a materialising of the psychical activity ; thinking

and willing were to be regarded as secretions of the brain, similar to

the secretions of other organs. A companion for this theory appeared

in the guise of a purely sensualistic theory of knowledge, as it was

developed by Czolbe independently of metaphysical assumptions;

although at a later time Czolbe himself reached a view of the world

which bordered closely upon materialism. For, since he regarded

knowledge as a copy of the actual, he came ultimately to ascribe to

ideas themselves spatial extension, and, in general, to regard space

as the supporter of all attributes, giving it the place of Spinoza s

substance.

So the materialistic mode of thought began to spread in Germany

also, among physicians and natural scientists, and this condition of

affairs came to light at the convention of natural scientists at Got-

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tingen in 1854. The contradiction between the inferences of natural

science and the " needs of the heart " (Gemuth) became the theme of

a controversy which was continued in writing also, in which Carl

Vogt championed the absolute sovereignty of the mechanical view of

the world, while Rudolph Wagner, on the contrary, professed to gain

at the bounds of human knowledge the possibility for a faith that

rescued the soul and its immortality. This effort, 1 which with

extreme unaptness was termed " book-keeping by double entry," had

subsequently its chief effect in creating among natural scientists who

saw through the one-sidedness of materialism, but could not befriend

the teleology of idealism, a growing inclination toward Kant, into

whose thing-in-itself they thought the needs of the heart and soul

might be permitted to make their escape. When, then, in 1860,

Kuno Fischer s brilliant exposition of the critical philosophy ap

peared, then began the " return to Kant" which was afterwards

destined to degenerate into literary-historical micrology. To the

natural-science temper, out of which it arose, Albert Lange s History

of Materialism gave expression.

Many misunderstandings, to be sure, accompanied this move

ment when even great natural scientists like Helmholtz 2 confused

transcendental idealism with Locke s theory of signs and doctrine

of primary and secondary qualities. Another misunderstanding

appeared somewhat later, when a conspicuous school of theology,

under the leadership of Ritschl, adopted the doctrine of the " thing-

in-itself," in a form analogous to the position of English agnosticism.

The philosophical revival of Kantianism, which has permeated

the second half of the century, especially since Otto Liebmann s

impressive book, Kant and the Epigones (1865), presents a great

variety of views, in which we find repeated all shades of the oppos

ing interpretations which Kant s theory met at its first appearance.

The empirical and the rationalistic conceptions of knowledge and

experience have come again into conflict, and their historical, as well

as their systematic, adjustment has been the ultimate ground of the

pragmatic necessity which has brought about gradually a return to

Fichte. To-day there is once more an idealistic metaphysics in

process of formation, as the chief representative of which we may

regard Rudolf Eucken.

1 It is not without interest to note the fact that this motif was not far removed

from the French materialists. Of Cabanis and of Broussais we have expressions,

made at the close of their life, which are in this spirit, and even of a mystical

tendency.

2 Cf. H. Helmholtz, Physiologische Optik, 25, and, especially, The Facts of

Perception (Berlin, 1879).

44.] Controversy over the Soul: Lotze. 643

But in all these forms, this Neo-Kantian movement, with its

earnest work upon the problem of knowledge, has had the result of

rendering the superficial metaphysics of materialism evidently inad

equate and impossible, and hence has led to its rejection. Even

where Kant s doctrine was given an entirely empirical, and indeed

positivistic turn, or even in the fantastic reasonings of so-called

"solipsism," the thought of regarding consciousness as an accessory

function of matter was rejected as an absurdity. Rather we find

the opposite one-sided view that primary reality is to be ascribed

only to inner perception, in contrast with outer perception.

Materialism was thus overcome in science; it lives in popular expo

sitions, such as Blichner s " Force and Matter " (Kraft und Stoff), or

in the more refined form of Strauss s " Old and New Faith " \* (Alter

und neuer Glaube); it lives on also as theory of life in just those

circles which love to enjoy the " results of science " from the most

agreeable hand. For this superficial culture, materialism has found

its characteristic exposition in Haeckel s works and his so-called

" monism."

For psychology as science, however, it became necessary to re

nounce the conception of a soul-substance for the basis as well as

for the goal of its investigation, and as a science of the laws of the

psychical life to build only upon inner or outer experience. So we

came by our " psychology without a soul," which is free from all

metaphysical assumptions or means to be.

7. A deeper reconciliation of the above antitheses was given by

Lotze from the fundamental thoughts of German idealism. The

vital and formative activity which constitutes the spiritual essence

of all this real world has as its end, the good. The mechanism

of nature is the regular form in which this activity works in the

realisation of its end. Natural science has doubtless no other prin

ciple than that of the mechanical, causal connection, and this principle

is held to apply to organisms also; but the beginnings of metaphysics,

like those of logic, lie only in ethics. In carrying out this teleological

idealism, motifs from all the great systems of German philosophy

accord to a new, harmonious work; every individual real entity has

its essential nature only in the living relations in which it stands to

other real entities ; and these relations which constitute the con

nected whole of the universe are possible only if all that is, is

grounded as a partial reality in a substantial unity, and if thus all

1 The evidence of descent from the Hegelian dialectic is seen also in this, the

most ingenious form which materialism can find, L. Knapp s Eechtsphiloso-

phic (1857) might perhaps be classed with it, for all higher forms of mental

life are treated as the striving of nature to go beyond herself.

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that takes place between individuals is to be apprehended as pur

poseful realisation of a common life goal. By the powerful uni

versality with which he mastered the material of facts and the forms

of scientific elaboration in all the special disciplines Lotze was

specially fitted to carry out fully this fundamental metaphysical

thought, and in this respect, also, his personality as well as what he

taught, joins worthily on to the preceding epoch. His own attitude

is best characterised by its conception of knowledge as a vital and

purposive interaction between the soul and the other " substances."

The " reaction " of the soul is combined with the excitation which

proceeds from " things." On the one side, the soul develops its own

nature in the forms of perception, and in the general truths which

come to consciousness with immediate clearness and evidence on the

occasion of the stimulus from things; on the other hand, the partici

pation of the subject makes the world of ideas a phenomenal appear

ance. But this appearance or phenomenal manifestation, as the

purposive inner life, is by no means mere illusion. It is rather a

realm of worths or values, in which the good is realising itself. The

coming to actual reality of this world of consciousness is the most

important result of the interaction of substances. It is the ulti

mate and truest meaning of the world-process. From these funda

mental thoughts, Lotze, in his Logic, has conceived the series of

forms of thought as a systematic whole, which develops out of the

problems or tasks of thinking. In his Metaphysics, he has developed

and defined his view of the world with fineness and acuteness in his

treatment of conceptions, and with most careful consideration in all

directions. The view is that of teleological idealism. The third

part of the system, the ethics, has unfortunately not been completed

in this more rigorous form. As a substitute, we have the convic

tions of the philosopher and his mature comprehension of life and

history presented in the fine and thoughtful expositions of the

Microcosmus.

8. Another way of escape from the difficulties of the natural-

science treatment of the psychical life was chosen by Fechner. He

would look upon body and soul as the modes of phenomenal mani

festation completely separated and different in kind, but in constant

correspondence with each other of one and the same unknown

reality ; and follows out this thought in the direction, that every

physical connection has a mental series or system of connections

corresponding to it, although the latter are known through percep

tion only in the case of our own selves. As the sensations which

correspond to the excitation of particular parts of the nervous sys

tem, present themselves as surface waves in the total wave of our

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individual consciousness, so we may conceive that the consciousness

of a single person is in turn but the surface wave of a more general

consciousness, say that of the planetary mind: and if we continue

this line, we come ultimately to the assumption of a universal total-

consciousness in God, to which the universal causal connection of the

atoms corresponds. Moreover, according to Fechner, the connection

of inner and outer experience in our consciousness makes it possible

to investigate the laws of this correspondence. The science of this

is psycho-physics. It is the first problem of this science to find out

methods for measuring psychical quantities, in order to obtain laws

that may be formulated mathematically. Fechner brings forward

principally the method of just perceptible differences, which defines

as the unit of mass the smallest difference that is still perceptible

between intensities of sensation, and assumes this to be equal

everywhere and in all cases.

On the basis of this assumption, which to be sure is quite arbi

trary, it seemed possible to give a mathematical formulation to the

so-called " Weber-Fechner law." This was stated as follows : The

intensities of different sensations are to each other as the logarithms

of the intensities of their stimuli. The hope was thus awakened

by Fechner that through the indirect measurement of psychical

magnitudes a mathematical statement could be given by scientific

methods for the psycho-physical, perhaps even for the psychological

laws, and in spite of the numerous and serious objections which it

encountered, this hope has had great success in promoting experi

mental study during the past decades in many laboratories estab

lished for this purpose. Yet it cannot be said that the outcome for

a new and deeper comprehension of the mental life has kept pace

with the activity of experimentation. 1

The revival of the Spinozistic parallelism has likewise met greater

and greater difficulties. With Fechner it was dogmatically intended

since he claimed complete metaphysical reality for the contents of

sense-perception. He called this view the " day view," and set it

over against the "night view " of the phenomenalism which is found

in natural science and philosophy. Others, on the contrary, con

ceived the parallelism in a more critical fashion, assuming that

mind and body, with all their states and activities, are only the

different manifestations of one and the same real unity. But as

a result of the vigorous discussions which this question has awak-

1 With reference to controversies upon these points, it is simplest to refer to

Fechner himself, Revision dcr Uuuptpunkle, dcr Paychophytik (Leips. 1882).

In addition we may refer especially to H. Miinsterbere;, Ueber Aufgaben und

Mcthiitlen der Psychologic (Leips. 1891) [PtycholOffte, 1900].

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ened, 1 it has become increasingly evident that such a parallelism is

untenable in any form.

This is seen in the case of the investigator who has been most

active in the extension of psycho-physical study, Wilhelm Wundt.

He has gone on in the development of his thought from a " Physio

logical Psychology " to a " System of Philosophy." This latter

work regards the world as an interconnected whole of active indi

vidualities which are to be conceived in terms of will. Wundt employs

iu his metaphysics the conception of activity without a substrate,

which we have met in Fichte and Fortlage, and limits the applica

tion of the conception of substance to the theories of natural science.

The interaction between the activities of these wills produces in

organic beings higher unities of will, and at the same time, various

stages of central consciousness ; but the idea of an absolute world-

will and world-consciousness, which arises from these premises in

accordance with a regulative principle of our thought, lies beyond

the bounds of the capacity of human knowledge.

9. Voluntarism has thus grown stronger and stronger, especially

in its more general interpretation, and has combated the intel-

lectualism which was regarded as a typical feature in the most

brilliant period of German neo-humanism. As a result of this con

flict we find emerging the same problem as to the relative primacy

of the will or the intellect which occupied so vigorously the dia

lectical acuteness of the scholastics (cf. above, 26). That this

problem actually arose from the antagonistic development within

the system of idealism was seen most clearly by Ednard von Hart-

maun. His " Philosophy of the Unconscious " proceeds from a

synthesis of Hegel, on the one hand, with Schopenhauer and the

later thought of Schelling, on the other. Its purpose was to bring

together once more the rational and irrational lines of idealism.

Hartmann attempts by this means to ascribe to the one World-Spirit

both will and idea (the logical element), as coordinated and inter

related attributes. In calling the absolute spirit the "Unconscious,"

Hartmann attributes to the concept of consciousness an ambiguity

like that which Schopenhauer ascribed to the will ; for the activities

of the "Unconscious" are functions of will and ideation which are

indeed not given in any empirical consciousness, but yet presuppose

some other consciousness if we are to think of them at all. This

1 A critical survey of the literature on the question is given by E. Busse in

the Philos. Abhandlungen zur Sigwnrfs 70. Gr.bnrtstag (Tubingen, 1900). Cf.

also especially the investigation by H. Rickert in the same volume. [Cf. also the

arts, by Erhardt, Busse, Paulsen, Konig, and VVentscher, in Zeitschr. f. Philos.,

Vols. 114-117, and A. K. Rogers, in Univ. of Chicago Cont. to Phil., 1899.1

44.] Controversy over the Soul : Hartmann. 647

higher consciousness, which is called Unconscious, and is to form the

common ground of life in all conscious individuals, Hart m an n seeks

to exhibit as the active essence in all processes of the natural and

psychical life ; it takes the place of Schopenhauer s and Schelling s

Will in Nature, and likewise of the vital force of former physi

ology and the " Entelechies " of the System of Development The

Unconscious unfolds itself above all in the teleological inter-rela

tions of organic life. In this respect Hartmann has controverted

materialism very efficiently, since his theory everywhere points to

the unitary mental or spiritual ground of things. To this end he

employed a wealth of knowledge in the fields of natural science,

and that too in the most fortunate manner, although it was an illu

sion to suppose that he was winning his " speculative results by the

inductive methods of natural science." At all events, the interest

which he borrowed from the natural sciences in combination with

an attractive and sometimes brilliant exposition, contributed much

to the extraordinary, though transient, success of the " Philosophy

of the Unconscious" ; its greatest attractiveness lay in the treatment

of pessimism (cf. below, 46), and along this line it was followed

by a train of popular philosophical literature which was for the

most part of very inferior quality.

Hartmann himself made extensive historical studies, and with

their aid extended his fundamental metaphysical thoughts to the

fields of ethics, aesthetics, and philosophy of religion ; then he pro

ceeded to work out a rigorous dialectic system in his Theory of the

Categories. This is the most systematic work of a constructive char

acter in the field of abstract concepts which has appeared during

the last decades in Germany, a work which has been supplemented

by a historical and critical basis in his History of Metaphysics. 1

The Theory of the Categories, which is no doubt Hartmann s main

work from a scientific standpoint, seeks to gain a common formal

basis for the disciplines of philosophy by tracing all the relating

principles employed by the intellect, whether in perception or in

reflection, through the subjective ideal field of the theory of knowl

edge, the objective real field of the philosophy of nature, and the

metaphysical realm. In the fineness of its dialectical references,

and in the wealth of interesting outlooks upon the fields of reality,

it presents a unique counterpart to Hegel s Logic. As Hegel devel

oped dialectically the whole process in which the Idea changes over

into Nature, in which the concept leaves itself and becomes " other,"

so Hartmann shows, in the case of every category, the transforma-

1 Oeschichte der Metaphysik (2 parts, Leips. 1899-1900).

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tion which the " logical " experiences by its relation to the " non-

logical " element of reality, which arises from the Will. Here, too,

the world appears as divided within itself, as the conflict of Reason

against will.

## 45. Nature and History.

The dualism of the Kantian Weltanschauung is reflected in the

science of the nineteenth century by the peculiar tension in the rela

tion between science of Nature and science of mind. At no earlier

time has this antithesis been so current as respects both material

and methods, as in ours; and from this circumstance a number of

promising new shiftings have arisen. If from the domain of mental

science we take, as has been shown, the contested province of psychol

ogy, we then have remaining over against " Nature," what corre

sponds still more to Kantian thought the social life and its historical

development in its full extent in all directions. The thinking of

natural science, pressing forward in its vigorous career of annex

ation, from the nature of the case easily found points in the social

phenomena as it had previously found in the psychological, where it

might set the levers of its mode of consideration, so that a struggle

became necessary upon this field, similar to that which had taken

place on account of the soul ; and thus the earlier antithesis culmi

nated in that between natural science and historical science.

1. The first form in which the struggle between the natural science

and the historical Weltanschauung was fought out, was the successful

opposing of the Revolution Philosophy by the French Traditionalism.

After St. Martin and de Maistre had set forth the Revolution as the

judgment of God upon unbelieving mankind, de Bonald proceeded to

oppose to the social theories of the eighteenth century, which he too

held responsible for the horrors of the Reign of Terror, the theory of

the clerical-legitimist Restoration. Unschooled in abstract thought,

a dilettante, especially in his predilection for etymology, he was in

fluential by the warmth of his presentation and by the weight of the

principle which he defended. It was the mistake of the Enlighten

ment, he taught, to suppose that the reason could from its own re

sources find out truth and organise society, and to leave to the liking

of individuals the shaping of their social life. But in truth all intellec

tual and spiritual life of man is a product of historical tradition. For

it is rooted in language. Language, however (and just here Condil-

lacism is most vigorously opposed), was given man by God as the first

revelation; the divine "Word" is the source of all truth. Human

knowledge is always only a participating in this truth ; it grows out

of conscience, in which we make that which holds universally, our

45.] Nature and History : Traditionalism. 649

own. But the bearer of the tradition of the divine word is the

Church: her teaching is the God-given, universal reason, propagated

on through the centuries as the great tree on which all the genuine

fruits of human knowledge ripen. And therefore this revelation is

the only possible foundation of society. The arrogance of the indi

viduals who have rebelled against this has found its expiation in the

dissolution of society, and it is now in point to build society once

more upon the eternal basis : this was also the thought which held

loosely together the obscure and strange fancies of BaUanche.

2. The philosophical factor in this church-political theory was,

that the generic reason realising itself in the historical development

of society was recognised as the ground of the intellectual and spir

itual life of individuals: if the theological views were distracted

from this Traditionalism, the reader found himself hard by Hegel s

conception of the Objective Spirit. Hence it was extremely humor

ous when Victor Cousin, while adopting German philosophy on just

this side, to a certain extent took from the Ultra-montanes the cream

of their milk. Eclecticism also taught a universal reason, and was

not disinclined to see in it something similar to the Scottish " com

mon sense," to which, however, it still did not deny a metaphysical

basis, fashioned according to Schelling and Hegel. When, there

fore, Lamennais, who at the beginning had been a traditionalist and

had then passed through the school of the German philosophy, treated

the doctrine of Ideas in his Esquisse d une Philosophic, he could fully

retain the above theory of the conscience, so far as its real content

was concerned.

Quite another form was assumed by the doctrine of Objective

Spirit, where it was apprehended purely psychologically and empiri

cally. In the mental life of. the individual, numerous processes go

on, which rest solely upon the fact that the individual never exists

at all except as member of a psychical interconnected whole. This

interacting and overreaching life, into which each one grows, and

by virtue of which he is what he is, evinces itself not by conformity

to natural laws, as do the general forms of the psychical processes :

it is rather of a historical character, and the general mind which lies

at the basis of individual life expresses itself objectively in language,

in customs and morals, and in public institutions. Individual psy

chology must be broadened to a social psychology by a study of these.

This principle has been propounded by Lazarus and Steintlial, and

the eminently historical character which this must have when car

ried out they have indicated by the otherwise less fortunate name

of Volkerpsychologie [Folk or Comparative Psychology].

3. One must take into account the fundamental social thought of

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Traditionalism to understand the religious colouring which is char

acteristic of French socialism since St. Simon, in contrast with the

social-political theories of the last century. St. Simon s theory,

however, stands not only under the pressure of the religious zeal

which was growing to become a new social and political power, but

also in lively relations to German philosophy, and indeed to its

dialectic. All this passed over to his disciple, Auguste Comte,

whose thought passed through an extremely peculiar course of

development.

He aims at nothing more or less than a complete reform of human

society. He, too, regards it as an evident conclusion that with the

Revolution, the Enlightenment, which was its cause, has become

bankrupt. Like the Traditionalists, he fixes the responsibility for

this upon the independence of individuals, upon free investigation

and autonomy in the conduct of life. From these follow anarchy

of opinions and anarchy of public life. The salvation of society is

to be sought only in the dominance of scientific knowledge. We

must find once more, and along securer lines, that subordination of

all the activities of life beneath a universally valid principle which

was approximately attained in the grand but premature catholic sys

tem of the Middle Ages. In place of theology we must set positive

science, which tolerates freedom of faith as little as theology toler

ated it in the Middle Ages. This Horn an tic element determined

Comte s theory throughout. It is shown not only in his philosophy

of history by his enthusiastic portrayal of the mediaeval system of

society, not only in his projected "Religion of Humanity" and its

cultus, but above all in his demand for a concurrent spiritual and

secular authority for the new social order. The new form of the

social order was to proceed from the creative activity of the pouvoir

spiritual, and Comte made fantastic attempts toward this by estab

lishing his " Western Committee." As he thought of himself as the

chairman of this committee, so he trusted to himself the establish

ment of the new teaching. But the positive philosophy on which

the new social order was to arise was nothing other than the ordered

system of the positive sciences.

Comte s projected positive system of the sciences first of all pushes

Hume s and Condillac s conception to the farthest point. Not only

is human knowledge assigned for its province to the reciprocal rela

tions of phenomena, but there is nothing absolute whatever, that

might lie unknown, as it were, at the basis of phenomena. The only

absolute principle is, that all is relative. To talk of first causes or

ultimate ends of things has no rational sense. But this relativism

(or, as it has later been termed, " correlativisrn ") is forfeited at once

45.] Nature and History : Comte. 651

to the universalistic claim of the thinking of mathematical natural

science, when science is assigned the task of explaining all these

relations from the point of view that in addition to individual facts

we must discover and establish also the order of these facts as they

repeat themselves in time and space. This order we may call "gen

eral fact," but nothing more. Thus positivism seeks by " laws "

this is Comte s usual name for general facts not to explain the

particular facts, but only to establish their recurrence. From this

is supposed to come foresight for the future, as the practical outcome

of science, savoir pour prevoir, although such foresight is quite

unintelligible and unjustifiable under his presuppositions. This con

ception of Comte s has found assent not only with philosophers like

C. Goring, who appropriated it especially for his theory of causality,

but also to some degree among natural scientists, particularly with

the representatives of mechanics, such as Kirchhoff KoA. Mach. Their

tendency is to exclude the conception of efficient agency from the

scientific theory of nature, and to reach the elimination of " force "

on the basis of a mere " description " or discovery of the most ade

quate " image." This has been attempted by H. Hertz in his Prin

ciples of Mechanics. Similar thoughts have been spun out into the

unspeakably tedious terminologies of his " Empirio-Criticism," by

Richard Avenarius, who has employed the generalisations of an ab

stract dialectic, and seeks to demonstrate all philosophical conceptions

of the world to be needless variations of one original world-concep

tion of pure experience, which is to be once more restored.

4. Phenomena, according to Comte, both individual and general,

are in part simple, in part more or less complicated. Knowledge of

the simpler must precede that of the more complex. For this reason

he arranges the sciences in a hierarchy which proceeds step by step

from the simple to the complex. Mathematics is followed by

astronomy, then by physics, chemistry, biology which includes

psychology, and finally by " sociology." This relation, nevertheless,

is not to be conceived as if every following discipline was supposed

to be deduced from the preceding discipline or disciplines ; it

merely presupposes these in the sense that their more complicated

facts include within themselves the more elementary facts ; the

completely new facts add their own peculiar combination and nature

to those more elementary facts. So, for example, biology presupposes

physical and chemical processes, but the fact of life is something

completely new, and incapable of deduction from these processes;

it is a fact which must be verified by biological observation. Such,

too, is the relation of sociology to the. five preceding disciplines.

Following this principle Comte s social statics declines with charac-

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teristic emphasis to derive sociality from the individual, as was done

in the Enlightenment philosophy. The social nature is an original

fact, and the first social phenomenon is the family. Still more inde

pendent is his social dynamics, which without psychological explana

tion sets itself the task of discovering the natural law of the history

of society. Comte finds this in the principle of the three stages, which

society necessarily passes through (an aperqu, which had been antici

pated by d Alembert and Turgot as well as by Hegel and Cousin).

Intellectually, man passes out of the theological phase, through the

metaphysical, over into the positive. In the first he explains phe

nomena by supernatural powers and beings thought in anthropo

morphic guise, in the second by general concepts [e.g. force, etc.]

which he constructs as the essence working behind phenomena; in

the positive stage he comprehends the particular only by the actually

demonstrable conditions, from which it follows according to a law

verifiable experimentally. To this universal law of the mental life

are subject all special processes into which the same divides, and

likewise the movement of human history as a whole. Moreover, the

intellectual process is accompanied by a corresponding course of

development in the external organisation of society, which passes

out of the priestly, warlike condition, through the rule of the jurists

(legistes), to the " industrial " stage.

The very circumstantial philosophy of history which Comte here

carries out, interesting in particular points, but on the whole com

pletely arbitrary and often distorted by ignorance and prejudice, is

to be estimated solely as a construction undertaken for his reforma

tory purpose. The victory of the positive view of the world, and at

the same time of the industrial order of life, is the goal of the his

torical development of European peoples. At this goal "the great

Thought, viz. : positive philosophy, will be wedded with the great

Power, the proletariate." \*

But as if the law of the circuit of the three phases was to be first

verified in the case of its author, Comte in the last (" subjective ")

period of his thinking fell back into the theological stage, making

mankind as Grand-etre the object of a religious veneration or wor

ship, as whose high priest he imitated the whole apparatus of worship

of the saints, with a positivist remodelling. Among these phantastic

products of the imagination the history of philosophy can at most

consider only the motive which guided Comte in his later course.

He best set this forth in the General View of Positivism, which is

1 Cf. on Comte, among recent works, Tschitscherin, Philosophische For-

schungen, tr. from the Russian (Heidelberg, 1899).

45.] Nature and History : Comte. 653

reprinted in the first volume of the Positive Polity. This shows him

turning aside from the outspoken individualism which had shown

itself in his earlier conviction that positive science as such would be

sufficient to bring about the reform of society. He has now seen

that the positive philosophy may indeed teach how the new order of

things is to appear, but that the work of bringing about this new

order can be achieved only by the "affective principle" ihe feeling.

Whereas he had formerly taught that the specifically human, as

it develops in history, is to be sought in the predominance of the in

telligence over the feelings, it is from the predominance of the

heart over the intellect that he now expects the fulfilment of his

hopes which he formulates as I amour pour principe, Vordre pour base,

le progres pour but. 1 And since Gall has shown that the preeminence

of heart over intellect is a fundamental characteristic of the brain of

woman, Comte bases on this his worship of woman, which he would

make an essential constituent in the religion of humanity. He who

had begun with the proud announcement of a positivist papacy ended

with an appeal to the proletariate and the emancipation of woman.

o. It is in accord with the practical, i.e. political, ends which

Comte followed, that in history also general facts or laws appeared

to him more important than particular facts. He believed that in

the realm of history a foresight (prevoyance) should guide and

direct action. But apart from this theory and in spite of the one-

sidedness of his education along the lines of mathematics and natu

ral science, Comte was yet sufficiently broad-minded to understand

and to preserve the distinctive character of the different disciplines,

and as he had already attempted to secure for biology its own dis

tinctive methods, he expressly claimed for his sociology the "his

torical method." In the biological field the series of successive

phenomena in a race of animals is only an external evolution which

does not alter or concern the permanent character of the race (hence,

Comte was throughout an opponent of Lamarck s theory). In

sociology we have to do with an actual transformation of the human

race. This has been brought about through the changing vicissi

tudes of generations and the persisting cumulation of definite life

processes which has been made possible thereby. The historical

method is to return to general facts, and thus observation is to be

guided by theory, so that historical investigation will yield only a

construction based upon a philosophy of history. It was thus per

haps not quite in Comte s meaning, but nevertheless it was a con

sequence of his teaching, when the effort was made here and there

1 " Love for the principle, order for the basis, progress for the end."

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to raise history to the plane of a natural science. John Stuart Mill

called attention to this in his methodology. Schopenhauer had

denied to history the character of a science on the ground that it

teaches only the particular and nothing of the universal. This

defect seemed now to be remedied in that the effort was made to

press forward beyond the description of particular events to the

general facts. The most impressive attempt of this sort was made

by Comte s English disciple, Thomas Buckle. In his History of

Civilisation in England (1857), Buckle defined the task of historical

science as that of seeking the natural laws of the life of a people.

For this purpose Buckle found in those slow changes of the social

conditions which are recorded in the statistical tables, much more

usable and exact material than in the recital of particular events to

which the old chronicle forms of historical writing had been limited.

Here the proper sense of the antithesis is disclosed : on the one

hand the life of the masses with the changes taking place conform

ably to general law on the other hand the independent value of

that which presents itself but once, and is determined within itself.

In this respect the essence of the historical view of the world has

been by no one so deeply apprehended, and so forcibly and warmly

presented, as by Carlyle, who worked himself free from the phi

losophy of enlightenment by the assistance of the German idealism,

and laboured unweariedly for the recognition of the archetypal and

creative personalities of history, for the comprehension and ven

eration of " heroes."

In these two extremes are seen anew the great antitheses in the

conception of the world which were already prevalent in the Renais

sance, but which had not at that time attained so clear and methodi

cal an expression. We distinguished in that period a historical

century, and a century of natural science, in the sense that the new

investigation of nature emerged from the conflict of traditions as

the most valuable outcome (cf. Part IV.). From the victory of the

methods and conceptions of natural science resulted the great meta

physical systems, and as their sequence the unhistorical mode of

thought characteristic of the Enlightenment. In opposition to this

the German philosophy set its historical view of the world. It is to

be noted that the almost complete counterpart of this antithesis is

found in the psychological realm in the antithesis between Intellec-

tualism and Voluntarism. On this account the attempt which has

been made during the last decade to introduce the so-called scien

tific \* method into history, is not in accord with the development of

1 [Naturwissenschaftliche. In English the term "science" is so commonly

used as the equivalent of "natural science" that the confusion objected to in

45.] Nature and History : Carlyle, Marx. 655

psychology during our century. It is indeed not the great histo

rians who have fallen victims to this mistake, but here and there

some who have either been too weak to stand against the watch

words of the day, or have made use of them for popular effect. In

this so-called scientific \* treatment of historical structures or pro

cesses the misuse of comparisons and analogies is especially unde

sirable as if it were a genuine insight to call society an organism ; 2

or as if the effect of one people upon another could be designated as

endosmose and exosmose !

The introduction of natural-science modes of thought into history

has not been limited to this postulate of method which seeks to as

certain the laws of the historical process ; it has also had an influ

ence upon the contents. At the time when Feuerbach s Materialism,

which was a degenerate product of the Hegelian dialectic (of. above,

44, 6), was yet in its vigour, Marx and Engels created socialism s

materialistic philosophy of history, in which motives from Hegel and

from Comte cross in peculiar manner. The meaning of history they

too find in the " processes of social life." This collective life, how

ever, is essentially of an economic nature. The determining forces

in all social conditions are the economic relations ; they form the

ultimate motives for all activities. Their change and their develop

ment are the only conditioning forces for public life and politics, and

likewise for science and religion. All the different activities of

civilisation are thus only offshoots of the economic life, and all

history should be economic history.

6. If history has had to defend its autonomy against the destruction

of the boundary lines which delimit it from the sciences, the natural

science of the nineteenth century has conversely contained an emi

nently historical factor which has attained a commanding influence, viz.

the evolutionary motive. In fact we find the natural science of to-day

in its general theories, as well as in its particular investigations, de

termined by two great principles which apparently stand in opposition

to each other, but which in truth reciprocally supplement each other,

viz. the principle of the conservation of energy and that of evolution.

The former has been found by Robert Mayer, Joule, and Helm-

holtz to be the only form in which the axiom of causality can be used

by the physical theory of to-day. The epistemological postulate that

there is nothing new in nature, but that every following phenomenon

the text is all the more likely to occur. Of course the author is objecting not to

scientific methods, but to the assumption that the scientific method for natural

science is the proper scientific method for history.]

2 [But cf. on this, Kant, Critique of Judgment, 65. Cf. also Lapie in Rev

de Met. et de la Morale, May, 1895.]

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is only a transformation of that which precedes, was formulated by

Descartes as the law of the Conservation of Motion (of. above, p. 411),

by Leibniz as the law of Conservation of Force (p. 421), by Kant as

that of the Conservation of Substance (pp. 545 f.). The discovery of

the mechanical equivalent of heat, and the distinction between the

concepts of kinetic and potential energy, made possible the formula

tion that the sum of energy in nature is quantitatively unchangeable,

and only qualitatively changeable, and that in every material system

which is regarded as complete or closed within itself, the spatial

distribution and direction of the kinetic and potential energy at any

time is absolutely determined by the law just stated. It is not to be

overlooked that in this statement the exclusion of other than mate

rial forces from the explanation of nature is made still more sharply

than with Descartes ; on the other hand, however, signs are already

multiplying that a return to the dynamic conception of matter has

been thereby introduced, such a conception as was demanded by

Leibniz, Kant, and Schelling (cf. above, 38, 7).

7. The principle of evolution had many lines of preparation in

modern thought. In philosophic form it had been projected by

Leibniz and Schelling, although as a relation between concepts, and

not as a process taking place in time (so with Aristotle ; cf. 13) ;

and among Schelling s disciples it was Oken who began to regard the

ascending of classes and species in the realm of organic life as a pro

cess in time. With the aid of comparative morphology, to which

also Goethe s studies had contributed, Oken dared that "adventure"

in the "archaeology of nature" of which Kant had spoken (p. 565).

All organisms are regarded as variously formed "protoplasm" (Ur-

schleitri), and the higher have proceeded from the lower by an

increasing multiplication of protoplasmic vesicles. At the same time

(1809), in his Philosophic Zoologique, Lamarck gave the first system

atic exposition of the theory of descent. He explained the relation

ship of organisms by descent from a common original form, and their

differences, in part by the direct effect of environment, and in part

by the indirect effect of environment which operates by calling for

a greater use of some organs and a less use of others. This use

modifies structures, and the modifications in structure are inherited.

The variations in species which become stable were thus explained

by the alternating influences of heredity and adaptation. To these

factors of explanation Charles Darwin added the decisive factor of

natural selection. Organisms tend to increase at a far higher rate

than the available means of nutrition. Hence the struggle for exist

ence. Those plants or animals which vary in a direction that favours

them in this struggle will survive.

45.] Nature and History : Darwin. 657

The presuppositions of the theory, therefore, are the two princi

ples of heredity and variability ; an additional element was the

assumption of great periods of time for the accumulation of indefi

nitely small deviations, an assumption which was made possible by

contemporaneous geological investigations.

This biological hypothesis at once gained more general signifi

cance in that it promised a purely mechanical explanation of the

adaptations or purposive elements which constitute the problems of

organic life, and it was believed that thereby the necessity of the

progress of nature to higher and higher forms had been understood.

The " purposive " had been mechanically explained in the sense of

that which is capable of survival that is, of that which can main

tain and propagate itself and it was supposed that the same

explanation could be applied to everything else which appears pur

posive in other relations, especially to that which is purposive in a

normative respect. So the theory of selection following Darwin s

own suggestions was very soon applied on many sides to psychology,

sociology, ethics, and history, and was pressed by zealous adherents

as the only scientific method. Few were clear on the point that

nature was thereby placed under a category of history, and that this

category had experienced an essential change for such an applica

tion. For the evolutionary theory of natural science, including the

theory of natural selection, can indeed explain alteration but not

progress; it cannot give the rational ground for regarding the result

of the development as a "higher," that is, a more valuable form.

8. In its most universal extent the principle of evolution had

already been proclaimed before Darwin by his countryman Herbert

Spencer, and had been made the fundamental conception of the lat-

ter s System of Synthetic Philosophy, in which many threads of

English philosophy are brought together. He proceeds from agnos

ticism in so far as he declares the Absolute, the Unconditioned, the

Unitary Being, which he is also fain to call Force, to be unknowable,

lleligion and philosophy have laboured in vain to conceive this in

definite ideas ; for us it is by the very nature of the case incapable

of determination. Human knowledge is limited to an interpretation

of phenomena, that is, to the manifestations of the Unknowable.

Philosophy has only the task of generalising the results of the

particular sciences, and putting these generalised results together

into the simplest and most complete totality possible.

The fundamental distinction in phenomena Spencer designates as

that of the "vivid" and the "faint" manifestations of the Un

knowable, i.e. of impressions and ideas. This indicates an attach

ment to Hume which is not fortunate (cf. above, p. 453). From this

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starting-point, although Spencer rightly rejects the reproach of

materialism, he yet introduces a turn in his view of the world which

directs preeminent interest to the character of physical phenomena.

For an examination of all the particular sciences is supposed to

yield the result that the fundamental form in which the Absolute

manifests itself is evolution. And by evolution Spencer under

stands following a suggestion of the scientist, von Baer the

tendency of all natural structures to pass over from the homoge

neous to the heterogeneous. This active variation in which the

ever-active force manifests itself consists in two processes, which in

cooperation with each other constitute evolution, and which Spencer

designates as differentiation and integration. On the one hand, by

virtue of the plurality of effects which belong to every cause, the

simple passes into a manifold ; it differentiates and individualises

itself; it divides and determines itself by virtue of the fulness of

relations into which it enters. On the other hand, the thus sepa

rated individual phenomena come together again to form firm com

pounds and functional systems, and through these integrations new

unities arise which are higher, richer, and more finely articulated

than the original. So the animal organism is a higher unity than

the cell ; society is a higher " individual " than a single man.

This schema is now applied by Spencer to all material and spir

itual processes, and with tireless labour he has sought to enforce it

in the case of the facts of all the particular sciences. Physics and

chemistry are refractory; they stand under the law of the conser

vation of energy. But astrophysical theory shows the differentia

tion of the original gas into the suns and the peripheral structures

of the planets with their satellites, and likewise the corresponding

integration in the articulated and ordered system of motion which

all these bodies maintain. It is, however, in biology and sociology

that the system attains full unfolding. Life is regarded by Spencer

as a progressive adaptation of inner to outer relations. From this

the individualising growth of a single organism is explained, and

from the necessary variations of the latter according to the method

of the theory of selection is explained the alteration of species.

Social life also in its whole historical course is nothing other than

the progressive adaptation of man to his natural and plastic environ

ment. The perfecting which the race wins thereby rests upon the

dying out of the unfit and upon the survival of the fit functions.

From the standpoint of this doctrine Spencer seeks also to decide

the old strife between rationalism and empiricism upon both the

logical and ethical fields. As against the associational psychology

he admits that there are for the individual immediately evident

45.] Nature and History : Spencer. 659

principles, and truths which are innate in the sense that they cannot

be explained by the experience of the individual. Hut the strength

with which these judgments assert themselves so that consciousness

finds it impossible to deny them, rests upon the fact that they are

the intellectual and emotional habits acquired by the race, which

have proved themselves to be adapted to further the race, and have

maintained themselves on this ground. The a priori is everywhere

an evolutionary product of heredity. So in particular for morals,

everything in the form of intelligent feeling and modes of will sur

vives which is adapted to further the self-preservation and develop

ment of the individual, of society, and of the race.

Finally every particular development reaches its natural end when

a condition of equilibrium has been gained in which the inner rela

tions are everywhere completely adapted to the outer, so that the

capacity for further articulation and variation has been exhausted.

It is, therefore, only by external influence that such a system can be

destroyed and disturbed, so that its individual parts may enter into

new processes of evolution. On the contrary Spencer strives against

the assumption of the possibility that the whole universe, with all

the particular systems which it contains, can ever come to a perfect

and therefore permanent condition of equilibrium. He thus con

tradicts those investigators who have regarded as theoretically possi

ble such a distribution of energies as to exclude all alterations ; this

is due ultimately to the fact that Spencer regards the Unknowable

as the ever self-manifesting force, and regards evolution itself as

the most universal law of the manifestation of the Unknowable.

9. Taken all in all Spencer s development of the principle of

evolution is throughout of a cosmological character, and in this is

shown just the alteration in this controlling principle which is due

to the prevalence of natural science in our century. This is seen

most clearly by comparing Hegel and Spencer. With the former,

evolution is the nature of the self-revealing spirit ; with the latter,

it is the law of the successive manifestations of an unknowable

force. To speak in Hegel s language (cf. p. 611). the subject has

again become substance. In fact the Unknowable of Spencer

resembles most that "indifference of real and ideal which Schel-

ling designated as the Absolute. This analogy would lead us to

expect that the cosmological form of the principle of evolution will

not be the final one, and that the historical standpoint and method,

as the appropriate home of this principle, will give the permanent

form which it will take in philosophy. Tn England itself, and still

more in America, a decided turn toward Hegel is to be noticed since

the impressive book of Hutchinson Stirling and Wallace s excellent

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introduction of Hegel s logic. In Germany, Kuno Fischer s exposi

tion of Hegel s doctrine, which is now just reaching completion, will

dissipate prejudices which have hitherto stood in the way of its just

valuation, and by stripping off the terminology which has become

foreign to us, will cause this great system of evolution to appear in

full clearness.

The same tendency to win back the historical form for the thought

of evolution is found in the logical and epistemological efforts which

have as their goal what Dilthey has denoted with a fortunate expres

sion, a " critique of the historical reason." The aim is to break

through that one-sidedness which has attached to logic since its

Greek origins, and which prescribes as the goal and norm of logical

laws in their formal aspect the relation of the universal to the par

ticular (cf. 12), and for the content and material of those laws the

knowledge of nature. Under these presuppositions stand not only

the extreme of mathematical logic (cf. 44, 4), but also the impor

tant works of John Stuart Mill and Stanley Jevons, which are to

be characterised essentially as the logical theory of natural science.

Over against this, the elaborations of logical science by Lotze and

Sigwart, especially in the latter s second edition, show a much more

universal stamp, and in connection with the movement of historical

idealism which has its attachments to the Fichtean view of the world

(cf. 44, 6), a deeper comprehension of the logical forms of histori

cal science is on the way ; such, for example, as we find in Rickert s

investigations regarding the limitations of the concepts of natural

science. 1

## 46. The Problem of Values.

While the end of the century finds us in the yet unadjusted strife

between the historical and the natural-science standards, we see just

in this continuation of an inherited antithesis how little the philoso

phy of this period has been able to win a real progress in its princi

ples. Its great and varied industry has been rather at the periphery,

and in the work of adjusting relations with the special sciences,

while the central development falls prey to a certain stagnation

which must be simply put up with as a fact easily comprehensible

historically. The exhaustion of metaphysical energy and the high

tide of empirical interests give a completely satisfactory explana

tion. For this reason we can readily understand that the philoso

phy of the nineteenth century shows a rich development along the

bounding provinces in which it comes in contact with the empirical

disciplines, as in psychology, philosophy of nature, anthropology,

1 H. Rickert, Grensen der natui-wissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung , 1896.

4(5.] Problem of Values : Utilitarianism. 661

philosophy of history, philosophy of law and philosophy of reli

gion, while on the contrary it makes the impression of an eclectic

and dependent attitude in the fundamental disciplines. Surely this

is the inevitable consequence of the fact that it suffers from the

repressive wealth of traditions which have attained complete histori

cal consciousness. It is in accord with this that no earlier time has

seen such a luxuriant and fruitful growth in the study of the history

of philosophy. But there is need of a new central reconstruction if

philosophy is to meet in satisfactory manner the wants which in

recent time come once more for satisfaction from the general con

sciousness and from the special sciences. 1

The direction in which the solution of this problem is to be sought

is determined on the one hand by the predominance of that volun

tarism which extends from psychology into general metaphysical

theories ( 44), and on the other by the circumstance that the two

forms of the principle of evolution ( 45), viz. the historical and

that of natural science, are distinguished from each other by their

different attitudes toward the determinations of value. In addition

the mighty upward sweep in the conditions of life which Europeans

have experienced in this century has worked at once destructively

and constructively upon general convictions. Civilisation, caught in

this movement of rapid enhancement and extension, is urged on by

a deeper demand for comprehension of itself, and from the problem

of civilisation which made its appearance in the Enlightenment (cf.

37) a movement has developed for which the "transformation and

re-valuation of all values" (Umwertuncj oiler Werthe} has become the

watchword.

1. The characteristic trait in this is that in the foreground of all

ethical considerations the relation of the individual to society stands

lr That the Catholic Church has sought to solve this problem by a revival of

Thoiuism is well known, and does not need to be further set forth here. Nor on

this account do we need to cite the numerous Thomists (mostly Jesuits) in Italy,

France, Germany, Belgium, and Holland. In theory they represent no new

principles, but at most seek to build out the old doctrine in details so that it may

appear in some manner adapted to modern knowledge, in particular to modern

science of nature. But the freer tendencies of Catholic philosophy, which are

usually called Ontologism, have created nothing new and fruitful. They attach

themselves for the most part to the Platonisin of Malebrauche, and point back to

Augustine, so that the antagonism which we noted in the Middle Ages and in the

Renaissance is repeated again (cf. pp. 364, 416.) The finest presentation of

Ontologism was found in the Italians, Rosmini and Gioberti ; the former gave

it a sort of psychological basis ; the latter a purely metaphysical form (L ente

crcn Prsistpnte}. In Germany Giinther introduced into it certain elements of

the idealistic speculations, especially of Fichte s doctrine ; in France, Gratry

from this standpoint combats especially the eclecticism of Cousin, and in this

eclecticism he combats Hegelianism and the " pantheism," which he finds in

both (cf. iZtude sur la Sophistique Contem/draine, letlre a M. Vacherot,

Paris, 1851).

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forth in much more conscious and explicit form than ever before,

whether in the positive form that the subordination of the individual

to society is presented and grounded in some manner as the norm of

all valuation, or whether it be in the negative form that the resist

ance of the individual to the oppressing weight of the species is

praised and justified.

The first form is that which has been transmitted from the phi

losophy of the Revolution and from Utilitarianism, especially in the

stamp given to it by Bentham (of. p. 522). This Utilitarianism goes

through the popular literature of the century as a broad stream in

which the standard of the public good is taken as a matter of course

without deep analysis of its meaning. It is characterised for the

most part by limiting its care " for the greatest happiness of the

greatest number " to man s earthly welfare ; the mental and spiritual

goods are not indeed denied, but the measure of all valuation is

found in the degree of pleasure or pain which a circumstance, a

relation, an act, or a disposition may call forth. Theoretically, this

doctrine rests on the unfortunate inference of the associational psy

chology, that because every satisfied desire is accompanied with

pleasure the expectation of the pleasure is, therefore, the ultimate

motive of all willing, and every particular object is willed and valued

only as means for gaining this pleasure. This formal eudaemonism

was earlier forced either to regard the altruistic impulses as equally

original with the egoistic, or to make them proceed from the egoistic

through the experiences which the individual undergoes in social life.

In contrast with this the noteworthy transformation which Utili

tarianism has experienced in recent time consists in its combination

with the principle of evolution, as has already been mentioned in the

case of Spencer s doctrine (cf. 45, 8). The valuation of altruism

from the standpoint of social ethics appears according to this new

point of view to be the result of the process of evolution, inasmuch as

only those social groups have maintained themselves in the struggle-

for existence whose individual members have achieved altruistic

thought and action in a relatively high degree. 1 The history of

morals is a struggle of values or " ideals," from which we may in

part explain the relativity of historical systems of morals, and in

part their converging development to a universal human ethics.

These fundamental thoughts of evolutionary ethics have been car

ried out in many detailed expositions ; among their representatives

1 Benjamin Kidd, Social Evolution, London, 1895, has attempted to determine

the nature of religion sociologically by considering the part which ideas of the

supernatural have played in this evolutionary process a genuinely English

undertaking.

46.] Problem of Values : Bentham. 663

may be mentioned, in France, Fouillee, in Germany, Paul Ree, whose

evolutionary theory of conscience excited attention for a time, and

G. H. Schneider.

[Before passing to the continental representatives of Utilitarian

ism it will be instructive to consider more fully the changes which

have been effected in British theories both within and without the

so-called Utilitarian school. 1 These changes affect the standard of

value, the motives to which ethical appeal is made, and the relation

which the individual is conceived to sustain to the social body ; their

nature shows the influence of the close relation which ethical theory

in England has always sustained to social and political conditions.

During the century England has seen an almost continuous effort

toward social and political reform. This movement has aimed at

an extension of political privilege, and at making possible a higher

standard of living for the less fortunate members of society. It has

thus been democratic in so far as it has insisted upon the widest par

ticipation in the goods of civilisation ; but by emphasising not merely

material comforts, but also political rights, social justice, and educa

tional opportunities, it has tended to measure human welfare, not so

much in terms of feeling as in terms of " dignity " and fulness of

life or " self-realisation." The movement along these two direc

tions has been due in part to the influence of German idealism as

transmitted through Coleridge, Carlyle, and later through Green and

others, but the immanent forces of social progress have had a deci

sive influence in the same direction.

As has been pointed out (pp. 513 f.), a general tendency of British

theory has been to unite a social standard or criterion of moral value

with an individualistic, and even egoistic theory of motives. This

seemed the more possible to Bentham, because in the individualistic

language of his day the community was defined as a " fictitious body

composed of individual persons who are considered as constituting,

as it were, its members." The" interest of the community, then, "is

the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it."

Hence it might seem that one way to promote the interest of the

community would be for every man to seek his own interest. If,

however, it should be necessary to bring pressure to bear upon the

individual in order to keep him from interfering with the interests

of others, Bentham conceived that the principal reliance should be

placed upon what he called the four sanctions, which he specified

as the physical, political, moral, and religious, meaning by these the

1 The material from this point to the paragraph numbered " 2 " on p. 670 has

been added by the translator.

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pleasures and pains derived from physical sources, from the penal

ties of law, from public opinion, or from belief in divine rewards and

punishments. It is for pain and pleasure alone " to point out what

we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do," and the

ambiguity in the terms " pain " and " pleasure," according to which

they mean in the one case pleasure or pain of the community, and in

the other case pleasure or pain of the agent, permits Bentham to

suppose that he is maintaining a consistent hedonistic theory. But

there were two other important qualifications in this hedonistic and

individualistic theory. In the first place he intimates that the indi

vidual may seek public pleasure as well as private, 1 thus giving the

theoretical statement of the principle which governed his own life,

directed as it was toward the public interest. In the next place, the

maxim which Bentham used to interpret the phrase, " greatest good

of the greatest number," was, " everybody to count for one, nobody

for more than one." This, while apparently a principle of extreme

individualism, was really a recognition of individual rights, and was

based upon fairness rather than upon a purely hedonistic standpoint.

It is thus essentially a social principle, and a demand that the

pleasure which "determines what we should do" shall be not merely

a maximum, but a particular kind of pleasure, regulated not by con

siderations of quantity, but by principles of fairness, and justice. A

further inadequacy of Bentham s theory to account for Bentham s

practice appears in his famous definition that in estimating pleasures

and pains we must consider quantity only, " push-pin is as good

as poetry." But Bentham s own activity, if not primarily directed

toward poetry, was at least as little directed toward push-pin for

himself or for others. His whole life-work was given toward pro

moting legislative and social reform, toward securing rights and

justice; and although he had little appreciation of certain of the

finer values of art arid culture, he was at least as little as his suc

cessor, Mill, to be explained by the hedonistic formula.

The theoretical individualism of the hedonistic standard for meas

uring the values of human life and the motives for moral action

found vigorous and successful opposition in the work of Coleridge

and Carlyle. The former exerted his influence primarily in the

religious field, and in special opposition to the theories of motive

and obligation propounded by Paley (p. 514, above), which had wide

currency in educational and religious circles. According to Paley,

the only difference between prudence and duty is that in the one we

1 Such pleasures seek, if private be thy end. If it be public," etc. Cf.

J. Dewey, Study of Ethic\*.

40.] Problem of Values : Coleridge, Carlyle. 665

consider the gain or loss in the present world ; in the other, we con

sider also gain or loss in the world to come. Obligation, according to

Paley, means to be urged by a violent motive, resulting from the

command of another. Against these positions Coleridge urged that

while man as a mere animal, or as a being endowed merely with

" understanding," may know only motives which spring from the

calculations of pleasures and pains, man as rational may hear another

voice and respond to higher appeals. It is, in fact, in just this

distinction that we find the difference between prudence and true

morality. The written works of Coleridge were few and f ragmen

tary, but his personal influence upon the literary, religious, and

philosophical thought of his own and the succeeding period, in both

Britain and America, has been powerful and far-reaching.

The criticism of Carlyle was directed against " Benthamism." Its

individualism of motive seemed to Carlyle adapted to aggravate

rather than to heal the disease of the age. The economic develop

ment had been steadily in the direction of greater individualism. It

had substituted the wage-system for the older personal relation.

What Carlyle felt to be needed was the deeper sense of social unity,

a stronger feeling of responsibility. Now the pursuit of happiness

is essentially an individualising force, "the man who goes about

pothering and uproaring for his happiness, he is not the man that

will help us to get our knaves and dastards arrested ; no, he is rather

on the way to increase the number by at least one unit." A true

social organisation can be secured only if the individualistic and

commercial theory of interests is abandoned. This leads at once to

the other point of Carlyle s attack, measurement of value in terms

of pleasure and happiness. Instead of a " greatest happiness prin

ciple," a " greatest nobleness principle " must be substituted. Man

cannot be satisfied with the results of attempts to give him pleasure

if these aim simply at pleasure. "Man s unhappiness comes of his

greatness ; it is because there is an infinite in him which he cannot

quite bury under the finite. The shoe-black also has a soul quite

other than his stomach, and would require for his permanent satis

faction and saturation God s Infinite Universe." It is to the heroes

that we must look for our ideals of human life. It is in work rather

than in pleasure that the end of human life is to be achieved.

It was in the thought of John Stuart Mill that the fusion of utili

tarian and idealistic principles found its most instructive illustration.

The social philosophy of Comte and a personal character actuated by

high ideals of duty and ardent for the promotion of public welfare

conspired with the influences already named to secure this result.

Educated by his father, James Mill, in the principles of associational

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psychology, associated with Ricardo, the representative of an indi

vidualistic economic theory, and with Bentham, he inherited thus a

theory of human nature and a method of analysis from which he

never completely freed himself; but on the other hand he introdu3ed

into the scheme a new content which led him to transcend the hedo

nistic position. 1 First as regards the object of desire. It had been the

position of the associationalists that the individual desires originally

pleasure, and pleasure only. This is the only intrinsic good. It was

held that other objects, however, might become associated with the

individual s happiness, and thus become independent objects of

desire. In this theory it would be the purpose of moral training so

to associate the public good with the private good of the individual

that he would come to desire the public welfare. Taught by his own

experience that such external associations had no permanent motive

power, Mill was led to reject this theory, and to state the hedonistic

paradox that to find pleasure one must not consciously seek it. Of

greater significance for our present purpose is Mill s theory of the

motives to moral action. On the one hand he retains so much of

the eighteenth centiiry atomistic view of conduct as to affirm that " the

motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action, though

much with the morality of the agent." He still retains the doctrine

of the external sanctions without stating explicitly that however

useful these may be to control the non-moral or immoral, until other

motives get a foothold, they are not moral motives. But on the

other hand he lays far greater stress upon the " internal " sanctions

of duty. This feeling of duty, in turn, though strengthened by edu

cation and association, has as its ultimate foundation the " social

feelings of mankind." It is because man naturally " never conceives

himself otherwise than as a member of a body " that the interest of

the community is the interest of the individual. The principle of

sympathy which had served alternately as a means of psychological

analysis and as a term for the broader social impulse, was given its

most important place as that on which rests "the possibility of any

cultivation of goodness and nobleness and the hope of their ultimate

entire ascendency."

Finally, Mill transcends the hedonistic criterion of value. While

maintaining that the mental pleasures are superior to the bodily

pleasures on purely quantitative grounds, he asserts that, quite

apart from questions of quantity, some kinds of pleasure are

more desirable and valua-ble than others. The test for pleasure,

1 In addition to the Utilitarianism, the Autobiography, the essays on Bentham

and Coleridge and On Liberty are of special interest.

46.] Problem of Value\* : Mill, Spencer. 667

whether we seek to measure its intensity or its quality, must in any

case be subjective ; and the question as to which of two pleasures

is the better must be decided by those who have had experience of

both. Instead, therefore, of using pleasure as the standard for

value, Mill, like Plato, would appeal to " experience and wisdom

and reason" as judges. Instead of pleasure as standard, we have

rather a standard for pleasure. If, then, we ask what these " com

petent judges " will assign as the highest values, we may find differ

ent names, such as love of liberty and love of power, etc., but the

most " appropriate appellation is the sense of dignity." " It is

better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied ; better

to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied." And in the fur

ther development of this principle of valuation Mill even goes

beyond Carlyle s position by declaring that to do without happiness

is now done involuntarily by nirieteen-twentieths of mankind, and

often has to be done voluntarily by the hero or the martyr, who in

sacrificing his own happiness for that of others displays the a high

est virtue which can be found in man."

A similar conflict between hedonistic and other standards of value

is evident in the ethical system of Herbert Spencer. On the one

hand, following the tradition of a hedonistic psychology, Spencer

maintains that life is good or bad according as it does or does not

bring a surplus of agreeable feeling. The only alternative to this

test is to reverse the hypothesis and suppose that pain is good and

pleasure is bad. No other standard of value can be admitted.

This position is fortified by the biological law that if creatures

should find pleasure in what is hurtful, and pain in what is advan

tageous, they would soon cease to exist. On the other hand, Spen

cer propounds also a standard of value which does not easily

conform to the test of pleasure and pain. According to this

standard the highest conduct is that which conduces to " the great

est breadth, length, and completeness of life " ; the highest stage in

evolution is that reached when " conduct simultaneously achieves

the greatest totality of life in self, in offspring, and in fellow-men."

The subjective standard of pleasurable feeling and the objective

standard of fulness of life are thus set over against each other. The

attempt is made to bring them together by showing that the bio

logical development has necessarily brought about a harmony

between pleasure and progress, but on the other hand it is admitted

that a condition of progress involves a lack of adaptation between

the individual and the environment. It would therefore seem that,

however well-suited pleasure might be as a test for the static indi

vidual, it cannot be regarded as a test of value for the guidance of

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a progressive being. Hence Spencer maintains that the perfect

application of his test supposes an ideal humanity. A consistent

hedonism would require that the test of such an ideal humanity

be solely the continuity and intensity of pleasurable feeling

attained, but the numerous recognitions of more objective fac

tors make it improbable that Spencer would regard merely sen

tient beings deprived of all active faculties as the highest type of

evolution.

The employment by Spencer of the principles of evolution as

affording a moral standard leads to an interesting complication of

the problems considered under 45 with the problem of the indi

vidual in relation to society. On the one hand, as already noted

(p. 662), the social sentiments and related moral principles are

regarded by Spencer as finding their basis in the evolutionary pro

cess. These social qualities subserve the welfare of the family or

species, and aid it in the struggle for existence. On the other hand,

it is maintained that the fundamental law of progress is that " each

individual shall take the consequences of his own nature and

actions: survival of the fittest being the result." Among gregarious

creatures the freedom of each to act has to be restricted by the pro

vision that it shall not interfere with similar freedom on the part

of others. Progress is therefore dependent upon giving the greatest

possible scope to individual freedom. With Bentham and Mill the

maxim " everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one "

had represented a socialising of the criterion and ideal. In Spen

cer s opinion this represents an undue emphasis upon equality ;

from this to communism the step is only one from theory to prac

tice. " Inequality is the primordial idea suggested " by evolution ;

equality, as suggested in the need of restriction, is secondary.

From this individualistic interpretation of evolution Spencer opposes

not only communism in property, but the assumption by the State

of any functions beyond that of securing "justice" to the indi

vidual. The State should keep the individual from interfering

with the freedom of other individuals. The State is thus essentially

negative in its significance. Man in his corporate capacity may not

realise a positive moral value in the pursuit of common good. But

while agreeing thus with the views of Gundling and von Humboldt

(cf. p. 520), Spencer insists that, in denying the possibility of reach

ing positive values through the State, he aims to secure these values

more efficiently by voluntary and private action. " Beneficence "

belongs to the family virtues ; " justice " to the State. 1

1 Cf. Ethics, Vol. II., The Man vs. the State, and Essays, Vol. III.

46.] Problem of Values : Huxley, Green. 669

The relation of evolutionary processes to the problem of moral

values has been most sharply formulated by Huxley. 1 In opposi

tion to certain philosophical writers who find in the evolutionary

process a moral standard, Huxley points out with great vigour and

incisiveness the distinction between the " cosmic process " and

the " ethical process." The attempt to find in the " cosmic pro

cess " an ethical standard is based upon the ambiguity in the

phrase " survival of the fittest." Fittest, it is scarcely necessary to

say, is not synonymous with ethically best. If the temperature

of the earth should be reduced, the survival of the fittest would

mean a return to lichens and diatoms.

The ethical process must find its standard not in the cosmic pro

cess, but in the moral ideals of man. Its principle is not that of

the survival of the fittest, but that of fitting as many as possible

to survive. The duty of man is not to conform to the cosmic pro

cess, but to combat it. In a sense it may be admitted that the moral

process is a part of the cosmic process, but the important point is

that the moral process cannot take its standards from the non-moral

parts of the cosmic process, and the theory of government which

Spencer would derive from this is characterised by Huxley as

"administrative nihilism." 2

The opposition to an ethical theory based upon the conceptions of

natural science, has received its most thorough-going expression in

the work of T. H. Green. Previous English sympathisers with

German idealism had for the most part appropriated results

without attempting for themselves the " labour of the notion."

Believing that current theories of evolution and ethics were

repeating the fallacies of Hume in another form, Green set himself

the task of criticising those fallacies and of re-stating the conditions

under which any experience, and especially any moral experience,

is possible. The central, fundamental, and determining conception

is found in self-consciousness. Questions as to freedom, desire, and

ideals must be stated in terms of self-consciousness, and not in

physical concepts, if they are to be intelligible. Nor can self-

consciousness be explained in terms of the unconscious, or as

developing from the unconscious. It seems rather to be compre

hensible only as the reproduction in man of an eternal conscious

ness. This has an important bearing on the determination of the

moral ideal. In the first place it requires that the end or ideal

shall always be some desirable state of self. In this it seems to

1 In his Romanes lecture, 1803. Reprinted as Evolution and Ethics, 1894.

Cf. .1. Dewey, Evolution and Ethics, Monist, VIII. 321 ff.

2 Critiques and Address?.\*.

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approach hedonism, but whereas hedonism holds that pleasure makes

a state or an object desirable, Green insists that the pleasure follows

the attainment of desire, and that what a being desires is determined

by the nature of the being. Man desires the full realisation of him

self, and " in it alone he can satisfy himself." The good is therefore

a personal good. It is also a common or social good. " Without

society, no persons." While therefore it may not be possible to

state definitely the specific characteristics of the " best state of

man," history shows that man has bettered himself through insti

tutions and habits which make the welfare of all the welfare of

each, and through the arts which make nature the friend of man."

It is in political society that self-consciousness finds fullest develop

ment. The institutions of " civil life give reality to the capacities

of will and reason and enable them to be really exercised." l

The ultimate justification of all rights is that they serve a moral

end in the sense that the powers secured in them are essential to the

fulfilment of man s vocation as a moral being, i.e. as a being who in

living for himself lives for other selves. With Green s definition

may be compared Spencer s formulation of the ideal as " complete

ness of life." It is a striking illustration of the strong relation

which British ethical theory has always maintained to British life,

that two thinkers from such opposite standpoints should approach

so near in actual statement.

2. Turning now to continental theories, we note that] the con

ception of life which corresponds to this utilitarian social ethics is

throughout an optimistic affirmation of the world. Life as an

evolutionary process is the sum total of all goods, and the progress

to the more perfect is the natural necessity of the actual world ; the

strengthening and broadening of life is as well the moral law as the

law of nature. This consequence has been carried out with the most

refinement and warmth, and not without a religious turn by Guyau.

He finds the highest meaning and enjoyment of individual existence

in the conscious unity of life with society, and beyond this with the

universe.

But even without the evolutionary supplement, naturalism and

materialism had asserted their joyous optimism and directed it

against every kind of morals which avoids or renounces the world,

especially against the religious forms of such ethical theories. This

was shown already in the case of FeiterbacJi, who set for his philo

sophical activity the task of making man a " free, self-conscious

1 These principles are further developed by B. Bosanquet, The Philosophical

Theory of the State, 1899.

46.] Problem of Values : fiiihring. 671

citizen of the earth." 1 The will is for him identical with the

impulse to happiness, and happiness is nothing else than " life,

normal, sound, without defect." Hence the impulse to happiness is

the foundation of morals ; the goal, however, consists in the vital

and active combination of the striving toward one s own happiness

with that toward the happiness of others. In this positive action of

willing the welfare of others lies the root of sympathy also. Virtue

stands in contradiction with only that form of happiness which seeks

to be happy at the expense of others. On the other hand, virtue has

a certain degree of happiness as its indispensable presupposition, for

the pressure of want forces the impulse to happiness irresistibly

and one-sidedly toward the egoistic side. Just on this account

human morality can be furthered only by the improvement of man

kind s external situation a thought from which Feuerbach proceeds

to very far-reaching demands. His moral sensualism is supported

by the firm conviction that historical development lies along the

line of his postulates, and with all his pessimistic and often bitter

estimate of the present he combines a strongly hopeful optimism for

the future. Man, as a bodily personality, with his sensuous feeling

and willing, is for him the sole truth ; when set over against this

truth all philosophic theories, echoes as they are of theological

theories, collapse into nothing.

Another optimistic materialist is Eugen Diihring, who has made

a peculiar " philosophy of reality " the basis of his estimation

of the " worth of life." The anti-religious character of this kind of

world-affirmation appears here much more clearly than in the case of

Feuerbach. Diihring sees in the pessimism of the 60 s and 70 s, which

he has opposed with bitter relentlessuess, the romantic continuation

of the attitudes of Christianity and Buddhism, which are hostile

to the world. He regarded the "superstitious" ideas of the "other

world," or the " beyond," as the real ground of the lack of apprecia

tion for the actual world of reality ; only when all superstitious

belief in supernatural beings has bsen banished will the true and

immanent worth of life be completely enjoyed, in his opinion. True

knowledge apprehends reality exactly as it is, just as it lies imme

diately before human experience ; it is delusion to seek still another

behind it. And even as with knowledge, so also with values, they

must be found in what is given ; the only rational is reality itself.

Already in the conceptions of infinity Diihring detects not so

incorrectly a going beyond what is given ; for him, therefore, the

1 Cf. particularly the fragment published by K. Griin, L. Feuerbach in

Seinem Briefwcchsel itnd Vachlass. , II. 253 ff., in which Feuerbach declares his

position as against Schopenhauer.

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actual world is limited in magnitude and number. But it bears

within itself all the conditions of self-satisfying happiness. Even

the view that there is a lack of sufficient means of life, on which

Darwin grounded his doctrine of the struggle for existence and his

theory of selection, is controverted by Duhring in a most vigorous

fashion, although he is not hostile to the theory of descent and the

principle of evolution. On the basis of these conceptions Duhring

seeks to refute pessimism by demonstrating that man s enjoyment

of life is spoiled only by the bad arrangements and customs which

owe their origin to ideas of the supernatural. It is the mission of

the philosophy of reality alone to produce healthy life from healthy

thought, and to create the satisfaction of a disposition based on a

noble humanity, capacities for which have been given by nature

herself in the sympathetic affections. Although Duhring has de

claimed thus sharply and with irritation against the present social

system, he has enlisted himself energetically in defence of the

reasonableness of the actual world as a whole. As he has theoreti

cally maintained the identity of the forms of human perception and

thought with the laws of reality, so he has also convinced himself

that this same reality contains all the conditions for ultimately

realising the values presented in the rational consciousness. For

this rational consciousness of ours is in the last analysis nothing

more than the highest form of the life of nature.

3. All these kinds of positivistic optimism make the most instruc

tive variations in the Hegelian principle of the identity of the real

and the rational (p. 615) ; all of them show besides a trace of that

faith in the goodness of nature which was characteristic of Rousseau,

and in their hope for a better future of the human race they incline

to give an evolutionary stamp to the thought of man s unlimited

capacity for perfection, which the philosophy of the French Revolu

tion had produced (cf. p. 525). All the more characteristic is it

that the last factor has given an essentially altered form to the

opposite conception, viz. pessimism.

In themselves optimism and pessimism, as answers to the hedonic

question, whether the world contains more pleasure or pain, are

equally pathological phenomena. This is true especially in the form

in which these enter as factors into general literature. For science

this question is as unnecessary as it is incapable of answer. The

controversy gains philosophic significance only because it is brought

into connection with the question as to the rationality or irrationality

of the world-ground, as it had already been brought by Leibniz along

one line and by Schopenhauer along another. But in both cases it

was completely impossible to make the hedonistic origin of the

46.] Problem of Values : Hartmann. 673

problem disappear by the metaphysical transformation which was

given to it.

The pessimistic temper which prevailed in Germany in the first

decade of the second half of our century had its easily recognisable

grounds in political and social relations, and the eager reception and

welcome of Schopenhauer s doctrines, supported by the brilliant

qualities of the writer, are usually regarded as easily intelligible for

that reason. It is more remarkable and serious that this temper has

outlasted the year 1870, and indeed that precisely in the following

decade it unburdened itself in an unlimited flood of tirades of a

popular philosophical sort, and for a time has completely controlled

general literature. Considered from the standpoint of the history of

civilisation, this fact will be regarded as a manifestation of relaxation

and surfeit; the part which the history of philosophy has in the

movement is connected with the brilliant and misleading "Philos

ophy of the Unconscious." Edward von Hartmann found a witty

synthesis between Leibniz and Schopenhauer on the basis of his

metaphysics, which regarded the world-ground as a complex resultant

of the irrational will and of the " logical element" (cf. 44, 9). This

synthesis was that this world is indeed the best of all possible

worlds, but nevertheless that it is still so bad that it would have

been better if there had been none at all. The mixture of teleologi-

cal and dysteleological views of nature which had passed by inheri

tance from Schelling to Schopenhauer (pp. 618 ff.) appears here with

Hartmann in grotesque and fanciful development; and the contra

diction is to be solved by the theory that after the irrational will

has once taken its false step of manifesting itself as life and actual

existence, this life-process goes on in a progressive development

whose ripest meaning is the insight into the unreason of the " will to

live." The rational element in this life-process will then consist in

denying that unreason, in retracing the act of world-origination, and

in redeeming the will from its own unhappy realisation.

On this account Hartmann found the essential nature of the

" rational " consciousness to lie in seeing through the " illusions "

with which the irrational pressure of the will produces just what

must make it unhappy, and out of this relation he developed the

ethical task that each one should co-operate to save the world-will

by the denial of illusions. He developed also the thought of funda

mental importance for the philosophy of history that all work of

civilisation should be directed toward this goal of salvation. The

development of the irrational will ought to have the annihilation of

this will as its rational goal ; hence Hartmann approves all work of

civilisation because its ultimate end is the annihilation of life and

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the redemption of the will from the unhappiness of existence. In

this respect he comes into contact with Mainlander, who with him

and after him worked out Schopenhauer s theory to an ascetic " Phi

losophy of Salvation " ; but with Hartmann these thoughts take on

the colouring of an evolutionary optimism which shows a much

deeper intelligence for the earnestness and wealth of historic

development than we find with Schopenhauer. And as von Hart

mann has anonymously given the best criticism of his " Philosophy

of the Unconscious," from the standpoint of the theory of descent,

so in his own development the shell of pessimism has been gradually

stripped off and the positive principle of evolution ha ! s emerged as

the essential thing. In him, too, Hegel has triumphed over Schopen

hauer.

4. All these theories of life, whose typical extremes were here set

over against each other, vary indeed with regard to their recognition

and gradation of individual values and goals, but they coincide in

recognising on the whole the prevailing moral code, and in particular

the altruism which is its chief constituent. Their differences con

cern rather the general formulation, or the sanction, or the motive

of morality, than morality itself. Even the more radical tendencies

seek only to free human ethics from the perversions which it is said

to have experienced in certain historical systems, or in their sur

vivals and their after effects ; and through all the doctrines already

mentioned goes a strongly democratic tendency which sets the weal

of the whole above everything else, and estimates the worth of the

individual much lower than was the case in the great period of Ger

man philosophy. A tendency to hero-worship, like that of Carlyle

(cf. p. 654), is quite isolated in our century; far more prevalent is

the theory of the milieu or environment which Taine brought into

circulation for the history of the mind, and which is inclined to

minimise the part which the individual bears in the historical move

ment as contrasted with the influence of masses.

We cannot fail to recognise that such theories correspond com

pletely to certain political, social, literary, and artistic conditions

and obvious manifestations of modern life; hence it is easier to

understand why, here and there, the reaction of individualism in

an especially passionate form has made its appearance. We must

insist, in the first place, that over against that type of assiduous

striving which permits itself to be driven by every tide of influence,

the individualistic idea of culture which belongs to that great period,

now somewhat depreciatingly denoted Romanticism, has in no wise

so completely died out as is supposed. It lives on in many highly

developed personalities who do not find it necessary to make a dis-

46.] Problem of Values : Stirner, Bahmen. 675

play with it in literature ; for the theory of this ideal has been

expressed by Fichte, Schiller, and Schleiermacher. And just for

this reason it does not make common cause with the artificial para

doxes which radical individualism loves to present on occasion.

The most robust example of such paradoxes came from the He

gelian " left," in the fantastic book of M. Stirner (Kaspar Schmidt,

1806-1856), The Individual and Jus Property 1 (1844). Stirner is re

lated to Feuerbach as Feuerbach is to Hegel : he draws the conclu

sion which would completely invert the premises. Feuerbach had

looked upon " spirit " or the " idea " as the " other-being of Na

ture," and as abstract and unreal as the theological ghost. He had

declared the only reality to be man, living man of flesh and blood ;

but his ethics aimed toward humanity, active love to humanity.

What is mankind? asks Stirner. A general idea, an abstraction

a last shadow of the old ghost which is still walking, even in Feuer-

bach s system. The true concrete reality is the individual the

autocratic personality. Such a personality makes its world both in

its acts of ideation and in its acts of will; therefore its ownership

extends as far as its will extends. It recognises nothing above

itself; it knows no other weal than its own, and serves no alien law

or alien will. For in truth there is nothing for it except itself.

Thus by reversing Fichte s doctrine of the " universal ego," Stirner

attains to " egoism " in both the theoretical and the practical sense

of the word. Pie plays the "solipsist" 2 and preaches unscrupulous

self-seeking, Ich hab mein Sack auf nichts gestettt\* All this

sounded like an artificial cynicism, and it was a matter of doubt

whether the book was intended to be taken seriously. At all events

it soon lost the interest which it momentarily excited, and fell

into an oblivion from which it has only recently been rescued. But

when, as now, there is a disposition to see in it a first cry of distress

from the individual repressed by the mass, it ought not to be ignored

that the " individual " who was here seeking to emancipate himself

from the community did not give any indication of a peculiar value

which would have justified him in any such emancipation. His sole

originality consisted in the courage of paradox.

5. Another bizarre form of individualism was developed from

Schopenhauer s metaphysics of the will, by Julius Bahnsen. Here

the " unreason " of the will is taken with complete seriousness, but

the pantheistic aspect of the " one only will " is stripped away.

1 Der Einzigeund ttein Eigenthum.

2 Cf. above, p. 471. 8 I care for nothing.

4 Beitriiye zur Charakterologie (1867); Der Widerspruch im Wissen und

Wesen der Welt (1881-1882).

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We know only individuals who will, and Bahnsen sees in them the

independent elementary potencies of reality, beyond which no higher

principle is to be assumed. The separate and self-sufficient exist

ence of finite personalities, which Bahnsen also calls " Henads," has

never been so sharply formulated as in this atheistic atomism of the

will. Each of these " wills " is, moreover, divided within itself into

two, and in this consists its unreason and its unhappiness. This

contradiction belongs to the essence of the will ; the will is the " as

serted contradiction," and this is the true dialectic, " the real dialec

tic." This contradiction, however, cannot be grasped by logical

thinking ; hence all the effort which the will makes to know the

world is in vain. Logical thinking which excludes contradiction is

incapable of understanding a world which consists of intrinsically

contradictory wills. The contradiction between the world and the

intellect makes impossible even the partial salvation which Schopen

hauer admitted, 1 and the indestructible individual will must there

fore endure forever the suffering of self-laceration in ever new

existences. At so high a price is the metaphysical dignity pur

chased, which personality here receives as its "intelligible charac

ter." The living out of this "intelligible character," purposeless

and futile as it really is, forms the principle of all values.

Since the theory of knowledge involved in this " real dialectic "

maintains that logical thinking and reality with its contradictions

have no common measure, the fantasies of this " miserableism " make

no claim to scientific validity ; they are only the expression of the

gloomy mood of the individual who is caught in the conflict of his

own will. They form the melancholy counterpart to the pert frivol

ity of Stirner s individual. Both show what result may be expected

if " philosophy " takes moods which constitute the peculiar nature

of pessimism and optimism as a basis for serious conclusions.

This is still more recognisable in the case of the great influence

which has been exercised in the last decade upon the view of life

and its literary expression by the poet, Friedrich Nietzsche. Many

factors combine to form this influence : the fascinating beauty of

language which ensnares and intoxicates even where the content

passes over into enigmatic suggestions; a mysterious symbolism

which, in " Thus spake Zarathustra," permits the author to revel in

obscurity and indefiniteness ; the aphoristic form of expression

which never requires the reader to think coherently in scientific

terms, but rather leaves him to determine for himself how much

stimulus and suggestion he will utilise, and thus decide the degree

1 Cf. p. 621.

46.] Problem of Values : Nietzsche. 677

in which he will expect himself to enjoy the surprising hits, the brill

iant formulations, the happy comparisons, and paradoxical combi

nations. But all these elements are unimportant in comparison with

the immediate impression of the personality of the writer. We meet

an individual of the highest culture, and of a thoroughly original

stamp, who experiences all the tendencies of the time, and suffers

from the same unsolved contradictions by which the time itself is

out of joint. Hence the echo which his language has found ;

hence the danger of his influence, which does not heal the sickness

of his age, but increases it.

The two factors of the inner antagonism of his own nature

Nietzsche himself has called the " Dionysus " and the " Apollo."

It is the antithesis between voluntarism and intellectualism, be

tween Schopenhauer s will and Hegel s idea. It appears here in

an individual of the highest intellectual culture and aesthetic pro

ductiveness, who is able to apprehend history and life with the

greatest delicacy and to reproduce them poetically with equal fine

ness of feeling. But science and art have not saved this individual

from the dark " will to live " ; deep within stirs a passionate, com

pelling impulse toward wild deeds, toward the achieving and unfold

ing of power. His is the case of a nervous professor who would

fain be a wild tyrant, and who is tossed back and forth between the

quiet enjoyment of the goods of the highest culture on the one hand,

and that mysterious, burning demand for a life of passion on the

other. Now he luxuriates in serene blessedness of aesthetic contem

plation and artistic production ; now he casts all this aside and

asserts his impulses, his instincts, his passions. Sensual enjoyment,

as such, has never been a value for him this is shown in the

height and purity of his nature. The enjoyment which he seeks is

either that of knowing or that of power. In the struggle between

the two he has been crushed the victim of an age which is satisfied

no longer by the impersonal and superpersonal values of intellec

tual, aesthetic, and moral culture, but thirsts again for the bound

less unfolding of the individual in a life of deeds. Caught in the

struggle between its reason inherited from the past and its passion

thirsting for the future, it and all of value that it possesses are torn

and ground. The artistic expression of a nature thus rent and torn

is the charm of Nietzsche s writings.

In his first period, which contains the following in germ, the

conflict between the two motive forces has not yet come to open

outbreak ; rather we find him applying Schopenhauer s fundamental

thoughts to the origin of Greek tragedy and to Richard Wagner s

musical drama, and thus presenting art as the source of salva-

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tion from the torture of the will. But even at that time it was his

thought that out of this tragic temper a new, a higher culture

should be brought forth ; a prouder race should emerge, of bold and

splendidly audacious will which would victoriously burst the bonds

of the present intellectual and spiritual life, and even at that period

this bent toward originality and independence threw overboard the

ballast of the historic period. No condition and no authority is to

repress this artistic civilisation ; aesthetic freedom is to be cramped

neither by knowledge nor by life.

It is not difficult to understand that when these thoughts began to

clarify themselves the philosophic poet followed for a time along

the path of intellectualism. Science is the free spirit which casts

off all fetters and recognises nothing above itself; but she is such

only when she makes the " real " man free, placing him on his own

feet, independent of everything that is above the senses or apart

from the senses. This science which Nietzsche would now make

the bearer of the essence of culture is positive science, no meta

physics, not even the metaphysics of the will ; hence he dedicates

his book "for free spirits 1 to the memory of Voltaire, and while

he had earlier turned Wagner from Feuerbach to Schopenhauer,

now he himself goes the reverse way. He comes into agreement

with the utilitarian ethics of Paul Ree; he believes in the possi

bility of the purely scientific culture. He even goes so far as to

see in knowledge the highest and best aim of life. Knowledge is

for him the true joy, and the whole freshness of delight in the joys

of the world and of life which is found in Ouapta (contemplation)

an enjoyment of the present actual world which is at once aesthetic

and theoretical is the fundamental note of this period, the most

fortunate period which was granted to him.

Then the Dionysus element of passion came to expression as an

uncontrollable longing for strong, masterful, unsympathetic living

out of personality, which throws down all that would stand in its

path. The strongest impulse of man is the will for power. It is for

him to assert this. But this unconditional assertion bursts the

system of values in which -our civilisation, up to this time, has

enmeshed itself ; the new ideal is in this sense " beyond good and

bad." l The will for power knows no bonds which prescribe what is

" permitted " ; for it, everything is good which springs from power

and increases power; everything is bad which springs from weak

ness and weakens power. So also in our judgments, in knowledge

1 Jenspits von Gut und Bose, the title of one of Nietzsche s books, translated

by A. Tille.

46.] Problem of Values : Nietzsche. 679

and in conviction, the important thing is not whether they are

" true," but whether they help us, whether they further our life and

strengthen our mind. They have worth only if they make us strong.

Hence, conviction also may and must change as life unfolds its

changes (as was the case in part with Nietzsche himself). Man

chooses what he needs ; the value of knowing also lies beyond true

and false. Here begins, therefore, the overturning and re- valuation

of all values (Umwerthung aller Werthe). Here the philosopher be

comes a reformer of morals, the legislator the creator of a new civili

sation. In the third period of his development Nietzsche was full

of the consciousness of this task.

From this standpoint he sets up the ideal of the over-man (Ueber-

mensch) in contrast with the ordinary, everyday man of the com

mon herd. Will for power is will for mastery, and the most

important mastery is that of man over man. Hegel once said that

of all great things which the world s history shows, the greatest is

the mastery of one free will over others. It recalls this saying

when Nietzsche develops his new idea of civilisation from the

antithesis between the " morals of masters " and " morals of slaves."

All the brutality of trampling down those who may be in the way,

all the unfettering of the primitive beast in human nature, appear

here as the right and duty of the strong. The strong man unfolds

and defends the energy of living as against the scantiness and

meagreness of renunciation and humility. The morality of slaves,

therefore, coincides essentially with the ascetic nature of the super-

naturalism which Nietzsche had formerly combated, and the positive

connection of the transition period with his third period consists in

the "joyous" assertion of a world-conquering thirst for living.

Nevertheless the ideal for the "over-man" remains veiled in

poetic dimness and indetiniteness. According to the original ten

dency, the over-man is the great individuality which asserts its

primitive rights over against the mass. The common herd of the

" far too many " (Viel-zu-Viele) exists only to the end that out of it as

rare instances of fortune may rise the over-men. These, from century

to century, recognize each other as bearers of all the meaning and

worth that is to be found in all this confused driving of disordered

forces. The genius is the end and aim of history, and it is in this

that his right of mastery as over against the Philistine has its root.

But according to another tendency the over-man appears as a higher

type of the human race, who is to be bred and trained as the

strong race which enjoys its strength of mastery in the powerful

unfolding of life, free from the restraints and self-disturbing ten

dencies of the slavish morality. In both cases Nietzsche s ideal of

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the over-man is alike aristocratic and exclusive, and it is a sharp

penalty for the poetic indefiniteness and symbolic ambiguity of his

aphorisms that his combating of " slavish morality " and of its

supernatural foundations has made him popular with just the very

ones who would be the first to strike from the over-man the head by

which he towers above the common herd of the " too many."

Between the two lines along which the ideal of the over-man

develops, the author has not come to a clear decision. Zarathustra

mingles them together, with wavering lines of transition. It is clear

that the one form is an echo of the romantic ideal of the genius as

the other borrows from sociological evolution. But the thought

of an elevation of the human type through the agency of philosophy

reminds us of the postulates of German idealism.

The remark is quite just that from this conception of the doctrine

of the over-man the step to Fichte would not have been a long one.

That Nietzsche could not take it was due to the fact that he had in

his nature too much of Schlegel s " genius," which treats all expe

riences from the standpoint of irony (p. 605). This made him unable

to find his way back from the individual mind to the " universal

ego " to the conception of values which assert their validity over

all.

7. The revolt of boundless individualism culminates in the claim

that all values are relative. Only the powerful will of the over-man

persists as the absolute value, and sanctions every means which it

brings into service. For the " higher " man there is no longer any

form or standard, either logical or ethical. The arbitrary will of the

over-man has superseded the "autonomy of reason" this is the

course from Kant to Nietzsche which the nineteenth century has

described.

Just this determines the problem of the future. Relativism is

the dismissal and death of philosophy. Philosophy can live only as

the science of values which are universally valid. It will no longer

force its way into the work of the particular sciences, where

psychology also now belongs. Philosophy has neither the craving

to know over again from her standpoint what the special sciences

have already known from theirs, nor the desire to compile and

patch together generalisations from the "more general results"

of the separate disciplines. Philosophy has its own field and

its own problem in those values of universal validity which are

the organising principle for all the functions of culture and civili

sation and for all the particular values of life. But it will de

scribe and explain these values only that it may give an account

of their validity ; it treats them not as facts but as norms. Hence

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it will have to develop its task as a "giving of laws " not laws of

arbitrary caprice which it dictates, but rather laws of the reason,

which it discovers and comprehends. By following the path toward

this goal it seems to be the aim of the present movement, divided

within itself as it often is, to win back the important conquests of

the great period of German philosophy. Since Lotze raised the con

ception of value to a place of prominence, and set it at the summit of

logic and metaphysics as well as of ethics, many suggestions toward

a "theory of values," as a new foundation science in philosophy, have

arisen. It can do no harm if these move in part in the psychologi

cal and sociological realm, provided it is not forgotten that in estab

lishing facts and making genetic explanations we have only gained

the material upon which philosophy itself must perform its task of

criticism.

But a no less valuable foundation for this central work is formed

by the history of philosophy, which, as Hegel first recognised, must

be regarded in this sense as an integrant part of philosophy itself.

For it presents the process in which European humanity has

embodied in scientific conceptions its view of the world and judg

ment of human life.

In this process particular experiences have furnished the occasions,

and special problems of knowledge have been the instrumentalities,

through which step by step reflection has advanced to greater clear

ness and certainty respecting the ultimate values of culture and

civilisation. In setting forth this process, therefore, the history of

philosophy presents to our view the gradual attainment of clearness

and certainty respecting those values whose universal validity forms

the problem and field of philosophy itself.

# APPENDIX.

P. 12. Line 15. Add :

On the pragmatic factor, cf. C. Herrmann, Der pragmat ische Zusammenhang

in der Geschichte der Philosophie (Dresden, 1803).

P. 12. Line 10 from foot of the text. Add as foot-note, affixed

to the word " positive " :

A similar, but quite mistaken attempt has been recently made in this direc

tion by Fr. Brentano, Die rier Phasen in der Philosophic and ilir gegenw&rtiger

Stand (Vienna, 1895). Here belong also the analogies, always more or less

artificial, which have been attempted between the course of development in the

ancient and that in the modern philosophy. Cf. e.g. v. Reichlin-Meldegg, Der

Parallelismus der alien nnd neueren Philosophie (Leips. and Heidelb. 1805).

P. 16. Line 6 from foot of text, add :

In all previous expositions of the history of philosophy, whether upon a larger

or smaller scale, a chronological arrangement has been adopted, follow ing the

order and succession of the more important philosophies and schools. These

various arrangements have differed only in details, and these not always impor

tant. Among the most recent might be named in addition, that of J. Bergmann,

whose treatment shows taste and insight (2 vols., Berlin, 1892). A treatment

marked by originality and fineness of thought, in which the usual scheme has

been happily broken through by emphasis upon the great movements and inter

relations of the world s history, is presented by R. Eucken, Die Lebensanschau-

ungen der grossen Denker (2d ed., Leips. 1898).

P. 23. To the foot-note, add :

Windischmann, earlier (Die Philosophie im Fortgang der Weltgeschichte,

Bonn, 1827-1834), and recently P. Deussen (Allgemeine Geschichte der Philoso

phie, I. 1, Leips. 1894) have made a beginning toward the work of relating this

Oriental thought to the whole history of philosophy.

P. 24. Line 8. Affix as foot-note:

K. Kohde has set forth with great insight and discrimination the rich sugges.

tions for philosophy in the following period, which grew out of the transforma

tions of the religious ideas (Psyche, 2d ed., 1897).

P. 27. To the lit. on the Period, add :

A. Fairbanks, The First Philosophers of Greece, N.Y. 1898.

P. 30. Line 30. To the notice of Heraclitus, add :

Ht&gt; was apparently the first who. from the standpoint of scientific insight,

undertook to reform" the public life and combat the dangers of anarchy. Him

self an austere and rigorous personality, he preached the law of order, which

ought to prevail in human life as in nature.

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P. 30. Line 19 from the foot. To the notice of Anaxagoras, add :

His scientific employments were essentially astronomical in their nature.

Neglecting earthly interests, he is said to have declared the heavens to be his

fatherland, and the observation of the stars to be his life work. Metrodorus and

Archelaus are named as his disciples.

P. 42. Foot-note 1. Relating to the vovs of Anaxagoras, add :

Cf., however, M. Heinze in the Ber. d. Sachs. Ges. d. Wiss., 1890.

P. 46. Last line of text. To the word " curved," affix as foot

note :

The tradition (Arist., loc. cit.} shows this collocation ; whereas, from the

cosmology of the Pythagoreans and likewise from that of Plato and Aristotle, we

should expect the reverse order.

P. 55. To the notice of Diogenes of Apollonia, add :

He was the most important of the eclectics of the fifth century. So little is

known as to his life that it is even doubtful whether Apollonia was his home.

Of his writings, even Sirnplicius had only the irtpi &lt;/&gt;tf&lt;rews before him (Phys.,

32 V. 151, 24 D).

P. 62. Add to foot-note 1 :

because in this phase of Greek thought they run along as yet unrelated lines of

thought, side by side with the theories of natural science. Only the Pythago

reans seem as yet to have begun the combination between theology and phi

losophy, which later became through Plato a controlling influence.

P. 68. Prefix to par. 4, which begins with " But while," the

following sentence :

A preparation for this transition was made by the circumstance

that even in the investigation of nature, interest in fundamental

principles had grown weaker after the first creative development,

and science had begun to scatter her labours over special fields.

P. 71. To the personal notice of Socrates, add :

He considered this enlightenment of himself and fellow-citizens a divine voca

tion (Plato s Apology), giving this work precedence even over his care of his

family (Xanthippe). He gathered about him the noblest youth of Athens, such

as Alcibiades, who honoured in him the ideal and the teacher of virtue. He

appeared thus as leader of an intellectual aristocracy, and just by this means

came into opposition to the dominant democracy. [K. Joel. Der echte u. d.

Xvnophontische Sokrates, Vol. I., Berlin, 1893. Vol. II. in 2 pts., 1901. Kralik,

Sokrate.s, 1899.]

P. 96. Line 23. Insert after Plato :

And of their materialism which he so vigorously opposed.

P. 102. At close of par. 4, insert :

This personal influence he himself regarded as the most important part of his

activity. For scientific investigation was only one side of his rich nature. The

demand for ethical teaching and for political and social efficiency had a still

stronger life within him. He had an open vision for the evils of his time. He

united an adherence to the aristocratic party with an activity in the direction

indicated by Socrates, and never quite gave up the hope of reforming the life of

his time through his science. To this was added as a third element in his per

sonality that pre-eminent artistic disposition which could clothe his ideals with

poetic exposition in the most splendid language.

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P. 103. To references on Plato, add :

P. Lutowslawski, Origin and Growth of Plato s Logic (1897).

[R. L. Nettleship, rhilos. Lectures, ed. by Bradley and Benson, 1897. W.

Windelband, Plato, Stuttgart, 1900.]

P. 104. After first par., insert :

In comparison with the high flight of Plato, the personality and life-work of

Aristotle appear throughout of cooler and soberer type. But if he lacks the

impulse toward an active influence in public life, and also the poetic charm of

diction and composition, he has, instead, all the more effective a substitute in

the power of thought with which he surveys and masters his field, in the clarity

and purity of his scientific temper, in the certainty and power with which he

disposes and moulds the results gathered from the intellectual labours of many

contributors. Aristotle is an incarnation of the spirit of science such as the

world has never seen again, and in this direction his incomparable influence has

lain. He will always remain the leading thinker in the realm of investigation

which seeks to comprehend reality with keen look, unbiassed by any interest

derived from feeling.

P. 104. Line 10. After " knowledge," insert :

The recently discovered main fragment of his \\o\treia. rwv Kdyvaluv is a valu

able example of the completeness of this part, also, of his literary work. In the

main only his scientific, etc.

P. 104. [Especially valuable in the recent literature upon Aristotle are : H.

Meier, Die Syllogistik den Aristoteles. Vol. I., 1896, Vol. II. in 2 pte., 1!K)0 ; G.

liodier, Aristote, Traite de VAme, trad, ft annotee. 2 vols., Paris, 1900. Cf. also

W. A. Hammond, ASs Psychology: The De Anima and Parva Nat., tr. with

Int. and Notes, Lond. and N.Y. 1901 ; H. Siebeck, A., Stuttgart, 1899.]

P. 112. As note to close of first par., attached to words " in the

middle " :

Cf., however, on this, A. Goedeke-Meyer, Die Naturphilosophie Epikur s in

ihrem Verhaltniss zu Demokrit, Strassburg, 1897.

P. 119. Line 17. After " back," insert :

according to the general laws of association and reproduction

(Phaedo, 72 ff.).

P. 123. Insert after the first par. under 6, the following par. :

This completely new attempt on Plato s part was supported by the

theological doctrines which he was able to take from the Mysteries of

Dionysus. Here the individual soul was regarded as a " daimon " or

spirit which had journeyed or been banished from another world into

the body, and during its earthly life maintained mysterious emo

tional relations to its original home. Such theological ideas were

brought by the philosopher into his scientific system, not without

serious difficulties.

P. 135. Note attached to the word "not" in line 11 (from

foot) :

For Aristotle means nothing else, even where, as is frequently the case in the

Analytics, he expresses the relation by saying that the question is whether the

one concept is affirmed or predicated (Kar-qyopciv ) of the other.

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A f\_-.

P. 142. After the first sentence in the

" The subordination of the single thing under the general oamaeftt

is for him too, not an arbitrary act oi the intellect in its k off

comparison; it is an act of knowledge which takes us into the

nature oi things and reproduces the actual relations which obtain

there,"

P. 148. Line 3. After ~ world," insert :

Every element has thus its - natural ~ motion in a certain direc

tion and its ~ natural ~ place in the universe. Only by collision with

others (ftia.) is it turned aside or crowded out.

P. 162. Before second par., insert :

\* ID the history of the Stoa we have to distimruish an older period which was

predominantly ethical, a middle period which was eclectic, and a later period

which was rdipons,"

P. 162. To references on Stoicism, add :

A. SchmekeL Dit mittlfTf St.a (Berlin. 18ft2\

P. 162. Line 6 from foot. To references on Lucretius, add :

R. Hemze s Com, on 3d Book (Leips. 1ST"),

P. 163. Line 20. Add :

Cf. E. Pappenheim (Berlin. 1?74 L. Leips. 1877 and 1881).

P. 163. To references on Scepticism, add :

V. Brochard, Zx\* Srxyitiquef Great (Paris. 1887 &gt;. [M. M. Patrick, Sextue

Einpiriruf and Greet Srf.fiUcism (contains trans, of the " I v yrrhonic Sketches."

Camb. and Lond, 1899).]

P. 163. Line 35. After ~ principle," insert :

Cicero stands nearest to the position of Probabiiism

Academy. See below. 17. 7.

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P. 163. To the material

A popular moral eclectic!\*

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P. 217. Lo\*3L A

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P. 217. Line 20 from foot. To the notice of Tertullian, add :

He was a partisan whose hot-headed fanaticism did not shrink from any para

doxical consequence.

P. 217. Line 3 from foot. To the notice of Clement, add :

With iron will and tireless activity he united the peaceful and conciliatory

spirit of scientific culture, with which he sought to exercise an influence in the

passionate ecclesiastical controversies of his time.

P. 218. Line 15. To the notice of Plotinus, add :

A fine, noble nature, in whom the deep inwardising and spiritualising of life,

which was the most valuable result of ancient civilisation, found its best embodi

ment.

P. 218. Line 29. Add:

Porphyry s EtVcryo^T? ei s friis KaTyyoplas was usually known in the Middle Ages

by the title de quinque vocibus.

P. 224. Line 3. Add a foot-note :

Similarly in the Epistle to the Hebrews, the relation of Jesus to the angels

is set forth in the manner in which it is presented by Philo.

P. 234. Line 3 from foot of text, add :

This transition is also connected with the fact that in the Chris

tian view the activity of consciousness just described was considered

less from the theoretical than from the practical standpoint. The

freedom of the will is here the central conception. The Oriental

Church fathers in part stood nearer the intellectualisrn of the Hel

lenistic philosophy, or at least made concessions to it ; on the other

hand, among the western teachers of the Church who were in closer

touch with Rome the will was most strongly emphasised in both

psychology and theology. Among the latter the tendency is domi

nant to regard the spiritual or immaterial principle as passive and

determined by its object in so far as it is knowledge, but as active

and determining in so far as it is will.

P. 238. After line 6, insert the following paragraph :

In this connection the conception of the infinite underwent a

transformation which gave it a radically different value (cf. Jon.

Cohn, Geschichte des Unendlichkeitsproblems, Leips. 1896). The mind

of the Greeks, directed as it was upon measure and definite limita

tion, had originally looked upon the infinite as the incomplete and

imperfect ; it was only with reluctance that when considering the

infinitude of space and time metaphysics had allowed itself to

ascribe to the infinite a second subordinate kind of reality, as was

done by the Pythagoreans, the Atomists, and Plato aside from

the isolated case of Anaximander, whose influence lay in another

direction. Now, infinitude had become the only predicate which

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could be ascribed to the highest reality or to the deity, as over

against the finite things of the world. Even the " negative " theology

could permit this expression. The name "infinite" must be applied

to the divine power which in the Stoic and Neo-Pythagorean phi

losophy of nature was regarded as the essence pervading and

informing the world with its workings ; to the One from which

Neo-Platonism regarded worthy of the world s forms as flowing

forth; to the creative divine will which, according to Christian

teaching, had called forth the world from nothing, and thus shown

its freedom from all limitation ; and finally to this supreme person

ality himself in contrast with finite persons. Thus through this

final development of ancient philosophy the conception of the in

finite became the constituent mark of the highest metaphysical

reality ; it belongs not only to the universe as extended in space,

but also to the inmost essence of things, and, above all, to the deity.

This latter fusion became so fixed and sure that to-day it appears

entirely a matter of course in the sphere of thought, as well as in

that of feeling, to conceive of the supreme being as the Infinite, in

contrast with all finite things and relations.

P. 256. Line 11. To the phrase "drama of universal history"

affix the following foot-note :

This expression has in this connection, as we see, a broader meaning, and

one which conforms much more to the meaning of the words, than in its ordi

nary use.

P. 263. To the literature of the period, add :

B. Haure"au, Notices et Extraits de quelques Manuscripts de la Bibliotheque

National?. 6 vols., Paris, 181)0-189:5; H. Denifle and E. Chatelain, Chartula-

rium Univerxitatis Parisifnsis. 2 vols, Paris, 1890-1894 ; H. Denifle and Fr.

Khrle, Arch. f. Litt. u. Kirch. Gesch. d. Mittelalters, 1885 ff.

P. 273. Line 13. To the notice of Augustine, add :

His youth was in part wild and irregular. His father, Patricius, belonged to

the old religion ; his mother, Monica, to Christianity. To a deeply passionate

nature he joined not only dialectical skill and keen intelligence, but also phil

osophical subtlety and a wide intellectual and spiritual vision, which was

narrowed only at the last by ecclesiastical partisanship. He was made bishop

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P. 274. Line 19.

" Eriugena" is given as first form of the name, with u Erigena" and " Jeru-

gena" as variants.

P. 274. Line 17, from foot, add :

Recently his authorship has been doubted and the work assigned to a Bern-

hard Silvestris (also Bernhard of Tours).

P. 274. Line 14, from foot, add :

Cf. A. Clerval, Les coles de Chartres au Moyen-Qge (Chartres, 1895).

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P. 275. Line 5. To the notice of Abelard, add :

The dialectical virtuosoship to which he owed his success and his fame de

ceived both him and his time as to the slightness of his knowledge. On the

other hand, the freer and bolder convictions which he had gained in the ethical

and religious field by the keenness of his intellect could not overcome the coun

ter-tendency of his age, because they did not find sufficient support in his vain

and weak personality. In addition to the ed. in two vols. of his work, Cousin

has edited also Ouvrages inedits (Paris, 1836). Cf. S. M. Deutsch, P. A. ein

kritisrher Theolog. des 12 Jahrhunderts (Leips. 1883); A. Hausrath, Peter

Abdlard (Leips. 1893).

P. 313. Line 25. To the lit. on the Amalricans, add :

Cf. the Treatise against the Amalric.ans, ed. by Cl. Baumker (Jahrb.f. Philos.

u. spec. Theol., VII., Paderborn, 1893).

P. 313. Line 15 from foot. To the lit. on Albert, add:

V. Hertling, A. M. Beitrdge zu seiner Wiirdigung (Coin, 1880).

P. 316. To the general lit. add :

[T. J. de Boer, Gesch. d. Philos. in Islam (Stuttgart, 1901).]

P. 317. Add to third par. :

Cf. T. de Boer, Die Widerspruche d. Philosophic nach Algazalli und ihr Aus-

gleich durch Ibn Eoschd (Strassburg, 1894).

P. 320. Line 11, add :

But the " natural " man finds that even among a highly developed

people the pure teaching of the natural religion meets in most cases

only misunderstanding and disfavour. He turns back to his isola

tion with the one friend whom he has gained (cf. Pocock s ed.

pp. 192 ff.).

P. 330. Line 3 from .foot. To " Scotus," affix the reference :

Cf. H. Siebeck, Die Willenslehre bei Duns Scotus u. seinen Nachfolgern,

Zeitschrf. Philos. Vol. 112, pp. 179 ff.

P. 331. Line 9 from foot, add :

It was a great service on the part of Buridan that, in order to

grasp the problem more exactly, he sought to state the question

once more in purely psychological terms. He sought to do justice

to the arguments on each side, and made it his purpose to develop

the conception of ethical freedom, in which indifferentism should

lose the element of arbitrary caprice, and determinism should lose

the character of natural necessity. Nevertheless, he did not succeed

in completely clearing up the complication of problems which inhere

in the word " freedom."

P. 333. Foot-note on word " synteresis," add :

Cf., however, recently, H. Siebeck in Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos., X. 520 ff.

P. 339. Foot-note 1. For " and the pseudo," read :

"and perhaps the pseudo."

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P. 342. Line 24. Affix to " Occam," the reference :

Cf. H. Siebeck, Occam s Erkenntnisslehre in ihrer historischer Stellung

(Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos., X. 317 ff.).

T. 348. To the lit., add :

W. Windelband, Geschichte d. neueren Philosophic, 2d ed. Vols. I. II. 1899 ;

II. Hoffding, History of Modern Philosophy (Eng. tr. by B. Meyer, Lond. and

N.Y. 1900) ; K. Lasswitz, Geschichte der Atomistik vom Mittelalter bis Newton.

2 vols., Hamburg, 1889-1890 [W. Graham, English Political Philosophy from

llobbes to Maine, Lond. and N.Y. 1900].

P. 352. To the lit., add :

W. Dilthey, Auffassang und Analyse des Menschen in 15 and 16 Jahr.

(Arch.f. Gesch. d. Philos. , IV., V.).

P. 356. Line 5, add :

H. Maier, M. als Philosoph (Arch.f. Gesch. d. Philos., X., XL).

P. 356. Line 22, from foot, insert :

The unsettled character of his life was in part due to his own character. He

combined a proud flight of imaginative thought and an enthusiastic devotion to

the new truth especially to the Copernican system for which he had to

suffer, with unbridled passionate ness, ambitious boastfulness and keen pleasure

in agitation. On his Italian and Latin writings, cf. recently, F. Tocco (Florence,

1889, and Naples, 1891) ; cf. also Dom Berti, G. B., sua Vita e sua Dottrine

(Rome, 1889).

P. 357. Line 3. To the notice of Campanella, add :

In him, too, we find learning, boldness of thought, and desire of innovation

mingled with pedantry, fancit ulness, superstition, and limitation. Cf. Chr.

Sigwart, Kleine Schriften, I. (Freib. 1889).

P. 362. Line 1. After " also," insert :

Popular Stoicism had a considerable number of adherents among

the Renaissance writers on account of its moral and religious doc

trines, which were independent of positive religion.

P 367. Note 1. Add :

Indeed, the humanistic reaction favoured Stoicism directly as against the more

medieval Neo-Platonism.

P. 378. To the lit., add :

W. Dilthey, Das naturliche System der Geisteswissenschaften in 17 Jahrh.

(Arch.f. Gesch. d. Philos., V., Vl, VII.).

P. 379. Last line. To the notice of Galileo, add :

His quiet, unimpassioned advocacy of the investigation of nature, which had

been newly achieved and given its conceptional formulation by himself, could

not shield him from the attacks of the Inquisition. He purchased peace and the

right to further investigation, which was all that he cared for, by extreme sub

jection. Cf. C. Prantl, Galileo und Kepler als Logiker (Munich, 1875).

P. 380. Line 9. To lit. on I. Newton, add :

F. R. Rosenberger, /. N. und seine physikalischcn Principien (Leips. 1895).

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P. 380. Line 18. To the lit. add :

E. Mach, Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung (Leips. 1883). H. Hertz, Die

Principien der Mechanik, Introd., pp. 1-47 (Leips. 1894).

P. 380. To the notice of Bacon, add :

The unfavourable aspects of his personal character, which had their origin in

political rivalry, fall into the background in comparison with the insight which

filled his life, that man s power, and especially his power over nature, lies only

in scientific knowledge. In a grandiloquent fashion, which was in conformity

with the custom of his time, he proclaimed it as the task of science to place

nature with all her forces at the service of man and of the best development of

social life.

P. 380. To the notice of Descartes, add :

A complete edition of his works is appearing under the auspices of the Paris

Academy. The main characteristics of his nature are found in the passion for

knowledge, which turns aside from all outer goods of life, in his zeal for self-

instruction, in his struggle against self-delusion, in his abhorrence of all public

appearance and of the conflicts connected therewith, in the calm pre-eminence

of the purely intellectual life, and in the complete earnestness which springs

from sincerity.

P. 381. To the notice of Spinoza, add :

In proud independence, he satisfied his modest needs by his earnings from

the polishing of optical glasses. Untroubled by the hatred and opposition of the

world, and not embittered by the untrustworthiness of the few who called them

selves his friends, he lived a life of thought and disinterested intellectual labour,

and found his compensation for the transitory joys of the world, which he

despised, in the clearness of knowledge, in the intelligent comprehension of

human motives, and in the devoted contemplation of the mysteries of the divine

nature. [J. Freudenthal, Lebensgeschichte SpSs, Leips. 1899 ; v. d. Linde,

B. Sp. Bibliographic, Gravenhage, 1871.]

P. 381. Line 24. To the lit. on Pascal, add :

Q. Droz (Paris, 1886).

P. 381. Line 36. To the lit. on Geulincx, add :

J. P. N. Land, Am. Geulincx und seine Philosophic (The Hague, 1895).

P. 413. To the foot-note, add :

Descartes conception of these perturbations reminds us in many ways of

Stoicism, which was brought to him by the whole humanistic literature of his

time. Just on this account the modern philosopher fell into the same difficul

ties respecting theodicy and freedom of the will which had vexed the Stoa.

Cf . above, 16. His ethics was likewise related to that of the Stoics.

P. 425. Under 32. As lit. on this topic :

T. H. Green, Principles of Political Obligation, Wks., Vol. II., and sepa

rately, 1895; D. G. Ritchie, Natural Eights, Lond. and N. Y. 1895; J. H.

Tufts and H. B. Thompson, The Individual and his Relation to Society as re

flected in British Ethics (Chicago, 1898).

P. 440. To the notice of Locke, add :

Plain good sense and sober charity are the main traits of his intellectual per

sonality ; but corresponding to these there is also a certain meagreness of

thought and a renunciation of the philosophical impulse in the proper sense.

In spite of this, the courage of his triviality made him popular, and so made

him leader of the philosophy of the Enlightenment.

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P. 441. To the notice of Shaftesbury, add :

He was one of the foremost and finest representatives of the Enlightenment.

Humanistic culture is the basis of his intellectual and spiritual nature. In this

rests the freedom of his thought and judgment, as well as the taste with which

he conceives and presents his subject. He himself is a conspicuous example

for his ethical teaching of the worth of personality. [B. Hand has recently pub

lished The Life, Letters, and Philosophical Regimen, Lond. and N. Y. 1900.

The Reyimeu consists of a series of exercises or meditations patterned after

those of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. It shows a closer dependence upon

ancient, particularly Stoic, thought than is manifest in the Characteristics.]

V. 441. To the lit. on Adam Smith, add:

[Hasbach, Untcrsuchungen iiber Adam Smith (Leips. 1891); Zeyss, A. S.

(Leips. 1889); Oncken, Smith und Kant (1877) ; Schubert, in Wundfs Stu-

dien, VI. 552 ft]

P. 441. To the notice of Hume, add :

Cool and reflective, clear and keen, an analyst of the first rank, with un

prejudiced and relentless thought, he pressed forward to the final presupposi

tions upon which the English philosophy of modern times rested. And this is

the reason why, in spite of the caution of his utterances, he did not at first find

among his countrymen the recognition which he deserved.

P. 441. To the lit. on English Moral Philosophy, add:-&gt;-

[Selby-Bigge, British Moralists (Clar. Press, 1897), contains reprints of the

most important ethical writings of nearly all the writers of this period, with

Introd.]

P. 442. To the lit. on the Scottish School, add:

McCosh, The Scottish Philosophy ; on the preceding development, E. Grimm,

Zur Geschichte den Erkenntniss-problems von Bacon zu Hume (Leips. 1890).

P. 442. To the notice of Voltaire, add :

For the history of philosophy, the most important elements in Voltaire s

nature are his honest enthusiasm for justice and humanity, his fearless cham

pionship for reason in public life, and, on the other hand, the incomparable

influence which he exercised upon the general temper of his age through the

magic of his animated, striking style. G. Desnoiresterres, V. et la Societe au

18 Sie.de (Paris, 1873).

P. 444. To the notice on Leibniz, add:

Leibniz was one of the greatest savants who have ever lived. There was no

department of science in which he did not work, and that with suggestiveness.

This universalism asserted itself everywhere in a conciliatory tendency, as the

attempt to reconcile existing oppositions. This, too, was his work in political

and ecclesiastical fields.

P. 445. Line 4. Add :

On Platner s relation to Kant, cf. M. Heinze (Leips. 1880) ; P. Rohr (Gotha,

1890;) ; P. Bergemann (Halle, 1891) ; W. Wreschner (Leips. 1893).

P. 445. Line 11 from foot. To the lit. on Empirical Psychology,

add :

M. Dessoir, Geschichte der neueren deutschen Psychologie. Vol. I. (Berlin,

1894. New ed. in press).

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P. 452. To the foot-note, add :

In the field of demonstrative knowledge, Locke makes far-reaching conces

sions to rationalism, as it was known to him from the Cambridge school ; e.g.

he even regarded the cosinological argument for the existence of God as possible.

P. 488. Line 24. After " world " insert :

This theory was, in his case, none other than the imaginative view

of Nature which had been taken over from the Italian Renaissance

by the English Neo-Platonists. In his Pantheist icon, Toland pro

jected a sort of cultus for this natural religion, whose sole priestess

should be Science, and whose heroes should be the great historical

educators of the human mind.

P. 502. To the lit. under 36, add :

J. H. Tufts, The Individual and his delation to Society as reflected in British

Ethics. Part II. (Chicago, in press.)

P. 517. Line 7.

[The conception of " sympathy " in the Treatise is not the same as

in the Inquiry. In the Treatise it is a psychological solvent like

Spinoza s " imitation of emotions," and = "contagiousness of feeling."

In the Inquiry it is opposed to selfishness, and treated as an impulse

= benevolence; cf. on this, Green, Int., Selby-Bigge, Inquiry. ~\

P. 521. Line 6 from foot. To the words " human rights," add the

reference :

G. Jellinek, Die Erklarung der Menschenrechte (Heidelb. 1896) ; [D. G.

Ritchie, Natural Rights, Lond. and N.Y., 1895; B. Bosanquet, The Philos.

Theory of the State, Lond. and N.Y., 1899.]

P. 522. Foot-note 3.

Cf. Comte rendu des Seances des Ecoles Normales. Vol. 1.

P. 527. Line 11 from foot of text, add :

By this definition of history the principles of investigation in natural science

and those appropriate to history were no longer distinguished, and the contrasts

between mechanical and teleological standpoints were obliterated in a way

which necessarily called out the opposition of so keenly methodical a thinker as

Kant. (Cf. his review of Herder s book. Ideas toward the Philosophy of the

History of Mankind, in the Jen. Ally. Litt. Ztg., 1785.) On the other hand, a

harmonising thought was thus won for the theory of the world, quite in accord

with the Leibnizian Monadology, and this has remained as an influential postu

late and a regulative idea for the further development of philosophy.

P. 529. To the lit., add : -

E. von Hartmann, Die deutsche Aesthetik seit Kant (Berlin, 1886). Julian

Schmidt, Geschichte der deutschen Litteratur von Leibniz bis auf unserer Zeit.

[Kuno Francke, Social Forces in German Literature, 2d ed., N.Y. 1897.]

P. 530. Line 8, add :

Through this participation in the work of the highest culture, in which litera

ture and philosophy gave each to the other furtherance toward the brilliant cre

ations of the time, the German people became anew a nation. In this it found

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once more the essence of its genius ; from it sprang intellectual and moral forces

through which, during the past century, it has been enabled to assert in the

world the influence of this, its newly won nationality.

P. 532. To the lit., add :

Fr. Paulsen, 7. Kant, sein Leben und seine Lehre, Stuttgart, 1898.

P. 535. To the notice of Kant, add :

His activity as a teacher extended not only over philosophical fields, but also

to anthropology and physical geography ; and just in these, by his suggestive,

discriminating, and brilliant exposition, his influence extended far beyond the

bounds of the university. In society he was regarded with respect, and his fel

low-citizens sought and found in him kindly instruction in all that excited gen

eral interest.

P. 536. To the lit., add :

Among the publications of Kant s Lectures the most important are the

Anthropoloyle (1798, and by Starcke, 1831) ; Loyik (1800) ; Physische Geogra-

phie (1802-1803) ; Pddagogik (1803) ; Metaphysik (by Politz, 1821). [On this

last, which is valuable for Kant s development, 1770-1780, see B. Krdmann in

Philos. Monatshefte, Vol. XIX., and M. Heinze, A . s Vorlesunyen utter Met.,

Leips. 1894.] A critical complete edition, such as has long been needed, is being

published by the Berlin Academy of Sciences. [This appears in four parts,

comprising, I. Works, published by Kant himself ; II. Correspondence; III. Un

published Manuscripts; IV. Lectures. Vols. I. and II. of the Correspondence

have appeared, ed. by Keicke (Berlin, 1900).] The Kant Studien, ed. by H.

Vaihinger (1890 ), gives the most complete information regarding recent

literature. [Recent translations are Kant s Cosmogony (Glasgow, 1900), by W.

Hastie ; Dreams of a Spirit AVer (Lond. and N.Y.. 1900), by Goerwitz ; 7Ae

Inaugural Dissertation of 1770, by Eckhoff (N.Y., 1894).]

P. 537. To the lit., add :

E. Adickes, Kant s Systematik als systembildender Factor (Berlin, 1887), and

Kantstudien (1894) ; E. Arnoldt, Kritische Excurse im Ge.biet der Kantforschung,

Kbnigsberg, 1894.

[J. G. Schurmann in Philos. Review, Vols. VII., VIII.]

P. 551. To the lit., add :

A. Hegler, Die Psychologic in Kant s Ethik, Freiburg i. Br. 1891.

W. Forster, Der Entwicklunysyany der kantischen Ethik, Berlin, 1894.

P. 557. Line 18 from foot, insert as a new paragraph :

"The Communion of Saints," on the contrary, the ethical and

religious union of the human race, appears as the true highest good

of the practical reason. This reaches far beyond the subjective and

individual significance of a combination between virtue and hap

piness, and has for its content the realisation of the moral law in the

development of the human race the Kingdom of God upon earth.

(Cf. Critique of Judgment, 85ff., Religion within the Bounds of

Mere Reason, 3d part (I. 2 ff.).

P. 559. To the lit. under 40, add :

[V. Basch, Essai critique sur V Esthetique de Kant, Paria, 1896.]

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P. 564. Last line. To " fine art," attach as note :

On the historical connections of the theories here developed by Kant within

the framework of his system, cf. P. Schlapp, Die Anfdnge der Kritik des

Geschmacks und des Genies (Gottingen, 1899).

P. 569. Line 14 from foot of text, add :

Jacobi was in youth a friend of Goethe. He was a typical personality for the

development of the German life of feeling in its transition from the time of

" Storm and Stress," over into the Romantic movement. He was the chief rep

resentative of the principle of religious sentimentality. Cf. on his theory Fr.

Harms (Berlin, 1876).

P. 570. Line 6. Add :

On Beck, cf. W. Dilthey in Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos., II. 592 ff. On Maimon,

cf. A. Molzner (Greifswald, 1890).

P. 570. Line 18. To the notice of Reinhold, add :

He was an ardent, but not an independent, man. His capacity to appreciate

and adopt the work of another, and a certain skill in formulation, enabled him

to render the Kantian philosophy a great service which was not, however, with

out its drawbacks. In this consisted the importance of his Jena period.

P. 570. Line 33. To the lit. on Schiller, add :

G. Geil, /S cA. s Verhaltniss zur kantischcn Ethik, Strassburg, 1888; K.

Gneisse, Sch. s Lehre von der asthetischen Wahrnehmung, Berlin, 1893;

K. Berger, Die Entwicklung von Sch. s Aesthetik, Weimar, 1890; E. Kuhue-

inann, KanCs und Sch. s Begrundung der Aesthetik, Munich, 1895.

P. 570. Line 14 from foot. To the notice of Fichte, add :

As he worked his own way out of difficult conditions with great energy, so

his whole life was filled with a thirst for achievement and for the improvement

of the world. He seeks to reform life, and especially the life of students and

universities, by the principles of Kant s teaching. It is as orator and preacher

that he finds his most efficient activity. High-flying plans, without regard to the

actual conditions and often, perhaps, without sufficient knowledge of the data,

form the content of his restless efforts, in which his "Philosophy of the Will "

incorporates itself. The dauntless and self-forgetful character of his idealism is

evidenced above all in his " Addresses to the German Nation " (1807), in which

he called his people with ardent patriotism to return to their true inner nature,

to moral reform, and thereby to political freedom. [To the Eng. tr. has been

added the Science of Ethics, by Kroeger, 1897.J

P. 571. Line 8. To the notice of Schelling, add :

In his personality the predominant factor is the combining capacity which is

shown by an imagination that received satisfaction and stimulation on every

side. Religion and art, natural science and history, presented to him the rich

material through which he was able to vitalise the systematic form which Kant

and Fichte had constructed, and to bring it into living and fruitful connection

with many other interests. But this explains the fact that he seems to be involved

in a continuous reconstruction of his theory, while he himself supposed that he

was retaining the same fundamental standpoint from the beginning to the end of

his work. (Cf. the lectures by K. Rosenkranz, Danzig, 1843) ; L. Noack, Sch.

und die Philos. der Romantik, Berlin, 1859; E. v. Hartmann, Sch. s positive

Philosophie, Berlin, 18(59; R. Zimmermann, tSVA . s Philosophic der Kunst, Vienna,

187(5; C. Frantz, Sc.h. s positive Philosophie, Cothen, 1879 f. ; Fr. Schaper,

fichus Philos. der Mythologie und der Offenbarung, Nauen, 1893 f.

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P. 571. Line 33. Insert:

J. J. Wagner (1775-1841, System der Idtalphilosophie, 1804, Organon del

menschlichen Erkenntniss, 18.30).

P. 571. Line 4 from foot. To the notice of Hegel, add :

Hegel was of a thoroughly didactic nature, with a tendency to schematise.

An extremely rich and thorough knowledge, which was deeper and more com

prehensive in the realms of history than in those of natural science, was ordered

and arranged in his thought according to a great systematic plan. Imagination

and practical ends fall far into the background in his life, in comparison with

the purely intellectual need of comprehending all human knowledge as a histori

cal necessity and a connected whole. This didactic uniformity appears also in

the construction of his terminology, and has both its good and its bad side. Cf.

H. Ulrici, Ueber Princip und Methode der H. Schen Philos. (Leips. 1841);

P. Barth, Die Geschichtsphilos. //. (Leips. 1890). [^ ecent translations of Phi

losophy of Mind, by W. Wallace, Clar. 1 ress, 1894 ; Philosophy of Religion, by

Speirs and Sanderson, Lond. 1895 ; Philosophy of Right, by S. W. Dyde, 1896.

Cf. J. MacTaggart, Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic, 1896 ; G. Noel, La Log-

ique de IL, Paris, 1897.] Kuno Fischer s work on Hegel is now in press as the

8th vol. of the "Jubilee Edition " of his Geschic.hte der neueren Philosophic,

and has progressed in its brilliant exposition so far as to include the Logic.

P. 572. To the notice of Schleiermacher, add :

Schleiermacher s kindly nature, which was particularly skilful in fine and

delicate adjustments, is developed especially in the attempt to harmonise the

aesthetic and philosophical culture of his time with the religious consciousness.

With delicate hand he wove connecting threads between the two, and removed

in the sphere of feeling the opposition which prevailed between the respective

theories and conceptions. Cf. 1). Schenkel, Sch., Elberfeld, 1868; W. Dilthey,

Leben SchlS\*. Bd. I. Berlin, 1870; A. Kitschl, Sch. s Reden ub. d. ReL, Bonn,

1875 ; F. Bachrnann, Die Entwickluny der Ethik Schl. s, Leips. 1892. [Eng. tr.

of the On Religion, by Oman (Lond. 1893). J

P. 572. To the notice of Herbart, add :

Herbart s philosophical activity was conspicuous for its keenness in concept

ual thought and for its polemic energy. Whatever he lacked in wealth of per

ceptual material and in aesthetic mobility was made up by an earnest disposition

and a lofty, calm, and clear conception of life. His rigorously scientific manner

made him for a long time a successful opponent of the dialectical tendency in

philosophy.

I\*. 573. Line 4. To the notice of Schopenhauer, add :

Of the recent editions of his works the most carefully edited is that of E.

Grisebach. Schopenhauer s peculiar, contradictory personality and also his

teaching have been most deeply apprehended by Kuno Fischer (9th vol. of the

Gesch. d. neneren Philos., 2d ed., 1898).

His capriciously passionate character was joined with a genius and freedom

of intellectuality which enabled him to survey and comprise within one view a

great wealth of learning and information, and at the same time to present with

artistic completeness the view of the world and of life which he had thus found.

As one of the greatest philosophical writers, Schopenhauer has exercised the

strongest influence through his skill in formulation and his language, which is

free from all the pedantry of learning, and appeals to the cultivated mind with

brilliant suggestiveness. If he deceived himself as to his historical position in

the Post-Kantian philosophy, and thereby brought himself into an almost

pathological solitariness, he has nevertheless given to many fundamental

thoughts of this whole development their most fortunate and effective form.

Cf. W. Wallace, Sch. (London, 1891), R. LHimann. Sch., ein fieitrag zur

Psychologic der Metaphysik (Berlin, 1894). [W. Caldwell, S. s System in it\*

Philosophical Significance (Lond. and N.Y. 1896). J. Volkelt, Sch. (Stuttgart,

1900).]

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P. 573. Line 14. After the parenthesis, insert :

to Schelling of J. 1 . V. Troxler (1780-1860, Naturlehre des menschlichen

Erkennens, 1828).

P. 585. Foot-note 2, add :

Cf. A. Schoel, H. s Philos. Lehre von der Religion (Dresden, 1884).

P. 586. Note 3. Line 7. Insert :

The theory thus given its scientific foundation and development by Herbart

became the point of departure for the whole pedagogical movement in Germany

during the nineteenth century, whether the direction taken was one of friendly

development or of hostile criticism. A literature of vast extent has been called

out by it, for which histories of pedagogy may be consulted,.

P. 588. Line 14 from foot. Affix to this the reference :

Cf. Schopenhauer s essay On the. Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient

Reason, and his Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy (in Vol. II. of the Eng. tr.).

P. 592. Line 9 from foot of the text. Affix the reference :

Cf. E. v. Hartmann, Ueber die dialektische Methode (Berlin, 1868).

P. 599. Line 21.

See Jac. Stilling in the Strassburger Goethevortrdgen (1899), pp. 149 ff.

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